
Hamas leaders know that once the Israeli counter-offensive starts, they will lose their greatest asset: their inter-connected tunnels. This vast warren conceals the vital operations for the manufacture, storage and launch of their rockets, and shieldsheadquarters and rest areas from detection and air strikes. So big is the network, it has been nicknamed the Underground, after London’s.
The discovery that Hamas was going all out to build these tunnels marked the start of the Israeli army’s education in the arcane art of finding, conquering (“clearing” is reductive) and quickly demolishing them. But tunnel warfare, it swiftly discovered, is not for amateurs. Nor is it even for highly accomplished but generic “commandos” including its top echelon Sayeret Matkal. It requires specific detection and monitoring skills, ultra close-combat skills and weapons (even compact assault rifles are too long), specialised shields and respirators, as well as the very quick reactions that all first-rate soldiers must have.
Hamas knows from previous experience that the closer the range, the greater the qualitative gap between their men and first-line Israeli infantry; Arik Sharon, who ended up as Prime Minister after a brilliant military career, discovered back in the Fifties that Israelis had the edge in close combat. Even in Hamas’s hyper-successful surprise raids, that took full advantage of Israel’s grossly over-confident reliance on high-tech observation towers and absurdly few troops, they lost more than a thousand to civilian home guards with their pistols and submachine guns and a handful of soldiers.
Knowing these odds, Hamas is now doing all it can to delay Israel’s tunnel offensive by releasing hostages in pairs after lengthy talks for each batch. At two at a time, with more than 200 to go, assuming they are still alive, this approach could delay the offensive until next year, if then.
In human terms, the waiting is excruciating. And with 360,000 reservists recalled to duty alongside the additional 160,000 on active duty (the entire British army numbers 80,360 including the Ghurkas; the US Army, 452,689), there is also the very practical consideration of what happens when you keep a great part of the labour force away from its jobs, and parents away from their families. But the solution here can been found in the very thing that makes Israel so vulnerable: its size. It is small enough that batches of troops can be released from their unit deployments facing Gaza and allowed to go home to live and work, but still be back in a matter of hours if called to launch the offensive. They are certainly not needed to defend now that the defences are wide awake; today there are guard units all along the perimeter, where they should have been all along. (Overconfidence is also an Israeli trait: on October 6 1973, when the Egyptian army crossed the Suez Canal with tens of thousands of troops, there was a paltry 411 Israeli reservists holding 17 Canal-side forts).
But the intensely frustrating delay in launching the offensive doesn’t preclude all offensive action. Both the Israeli Army and the Shin Bet security service have units of skilled individual fighters who speak perfect Palestinian-accented Arabic and who can look the part. With all the confusion caused by the bombing, they have been able to walk into the Gaza strip to blend in and look for Hamas leaders. So far, the names and photos of 28 Hamas commanders and political chiefs successfully found and killed have been published—and the mini-campaign is continuing.
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