An anti-immigration protester in Dover (SUSANNAH IRELAND/AFP via Getty Images)

The English hatred for incompetent tyrants runs deep. In 1215, King John of England was forced to sign a treaty limiting royal power, after his most powerful barons rebelled against his military incompetence, arbitrary decision-making, and swingeing tax regime. Yet even among the Anglo-Saxon kings of the so-called Dark Ages, it was understood that before kingship comes popular consent.
Who gets to rule, and on what terms? This question underpins some of the most turbulent episodes in English domestic history. After a few centuries of relative quiet, it’s recently bubbled to the surface: first in the chaos that followed the 2016 Brexit vote, and afterwards in the issue of immigration. Most recently, it’s the deep story behind the drama over Sunak’s “Rwanda policy”.
England is, once again, revisiting a question we’ve asked at intervals since Bad King John: what political arrangement best guarantees our way of life? The Savoyard aristocrat and counter-revolutionary Joseph de Maistre, a keen observer of English political history, might have replied that this has the question backwards. In Studies on Sovereignty (1796), he argued that there’s no point trying to start with an ideal form of government, for “the government of a nation is no more its own work than is its language”. Nor is there any universally best form of government: rather, “all peoples have the government that suits them, and none has chosen it”.
De Maistre made these arguments against then-contemporary revolutionary efforts to rewrite France’s political settlement from the ground up. He argued that this attempt wasn’t just hubristic but impossible: that one cannot simply devise a constitution from first principles, “like a watchmaker makes a watch”. Rather, governments that actually suit a people emerge, over time, in conjunction with the specific geographic, cultural, economic and religious traits of that people. And if the people themselves are not predisposed to value what the constitution grants, then it doesn’t matter what the document says; you still won’t get the desired result. For as he argues, the settlement appropriate to a people reflects that people’s unwritten, core assumptions — what he calls “political dogmas” — that precede and give shape to the space of political possibility and command maximum power not once codified as a constitution, but before anyone writes them down.
If de Maistre had lived to see the 20th century, he might have illustrated this with the Russian political settlement since the 1917 revolution, which sought to depose a remote, ultra-wealthy aristocratic class that lived by extracting rents from an immiserated peasantry, while leading gilded international lives. He might have noted that the resulting, nominally Communist government also produced a remote, wealthy nomenklatura which extracted rents from a peasant class, while themselves living in luxury. And that since the 1991 upheavals that deposed this class, Russia is still somehow governed by a remote, ultra-wealthy aristocratic class that extracts rents from a ground-under peasantry, while leading gilded international lives. From this we might infer further that, had the international coalition that tried to democratise Iraq and Afghanistan at the turn of the millennium read Studies on Sovereignty, we might have saved many military lives and a great deal of money.
While I can’t speculate on Afghans’ or Russians’ political dogmas, over a millennium of English political history suggests that, for the English, a central one is that rule by absolutists is Just Not On — especially when they’re not even much good at ruling. During the 10th century, for instance, Anglo-Saxon kings weren’t crowned unless they received the imprimatur of the Witenagemot, a council of high-ranking lords on whose loyalty and military mustering-power that king would subsequently rely on to defend his realm. And though a great deal had changed in England by the 17th century, this turned out to be still more or less true. Charles I was beheaded in 1649 for, among other things, making too strong a claim to absolute rule: repeatedly dissolving Parliament when it didn’t go along with his demands, and only reconstituting it to ask for more money.
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