(Drew Angerer/Getty Images)

Now that Ron DeSantis has dropped out of the Republican primary race and endorsed Donald Trump, the race for the party’s presidential nomination has become more than just a battle of personalities — finally, it is a battle of ideas. With DeSantis’s pseudo-Trumpism firmly rejected, primary voters now have a choice between two ideological visions for the future of the party and the United States: Trumpism and pre-Trumpism.
Trumpism, at its core, is the American version of the transatlantic phenomenon of national populism. Local variants in the West differ, but they share common characteristics: opposition to mass immigration, for instance, as well as socially conservative programmes and protectionist trade policies previously favoured by the trade unions.
Many of these voters and their ancestors used to find a home in the parties of the centre-left, such as the New Deal Democrats in the US, Labour in the UK and the Social Democrats in Germany. But the replacement of the union by the university as their social and ideological base — now defined by identity politics, equity and a quasi-religious obsession with long-term climate change — has driven away these parties’ core supporters. At the same time, many have been repelled by the post-Thatcher and post-Reagan conservatives who sought to cut their government benefits, supported the mass importation of cheap labour from abroad, and backed inconclusive or doomed “forever wars” following 9/11.
Donald Trump was not the first candidate to seize this national-populist mantle in the US. In 1992, thanks to his economic nationalism, Ross Perot won more votes than any third-party contender for the White House since former president Theodore Roosevelt in 1912. Populist candidates for the Republican presidential nomination such as Patrick Buchanan, Mike Huckabee and Rick Santorum have also sounded national-populist themes, only to have their campaigns starved of funds by the party’s libertarian and globalist donor elite.
Trump was unique in that his wealth, along with small donor contributions, allowed him to personally fund much of his successful campaign to win the nomination in 2016, in spite of a big donor boycott. In the election that followed, he won because he appealed to national-populist voters, particularly in the deindustrialised swing states of the Midwest. He added their support to the existing Republican base of economic libertarians and evangelical Protestants and conservative Catholics.
In different ways, DeSantis’s Pseudo-Trumpism and Nikki Haley’s Pre-Trumpism are attempts to build bridges between these raucous MAGA newcomers and the remnants of the older Bush Republican party — at least those who had not already quit the party out of disgust with the populist parvenus who have crashed the country club.
Join the discussion
Join like minded readers that support our journalism by becoming a paid subscriber
To join the discussion in the comments, become a paid subscriber.
Join like minded readers that support our journalism, read unlimited articles and enjoy other subscriber-only benefits.
Subscribe