
Sometimes, a news story seems so ordinary that it barely garners any attention, even as it turns the world upside down. Sometimes, innocent frolicking on the surface distracts from a rot extending below. This is what happened last week, when the Biden administration announced its plans to send an additional $300 million to Ukraine, meant as a stopgap until Congress can finally pass a funding package. According to national security adviser Jake Sullivan, this aid package was made possible by “unanticipated cost savings” in various contracts with the defence industry to replace equipment already sent to Ukraine.
At first, it seemed like a benign piece of news. What, after all, is wrong with saving a bit of money? Yet the reality is far more complicated. What Jake Sullivan actually announced wasn’t merely a case of finding $300 million of change under a Pentagon sofa cushion, but another sordid act in the slow-rolling and underreported drama that is the ongoing collapse of the American military.
To understand why, it’s useful to begin with some basic facts about America’s military aid to Ukraine. When the Pentagon decided to send weapons to Kyiv, these were mostly taken from already existing stocks. This was unavoidable, for at least two reasons. First, US munitions production was wildly inadequate to cover wartime demands. Second, the lead time for new production was simply too long: many of the weapons ordered for Ukraine in 2022 would realistically only be ready for use after the war had concluded. And so, the United States stripped its own warehouses of equipment â and it didn’t stop there. In some cases, it looted ammunition and weapons from its own combat formations. In others, it stripped many of its allies, such as South Korea, of a large amount of their equipment, too.
All of which raises an important question: when one sends an already existing weapon to Ukraine because producing a new one is too impractical and slow, how much does that weapon really cost? Unfortunately, there isnât a straightforward answer. For instance, some of the weapons sent to Ukraine were no longer in production, and in fact could not be produced anymore. This could be due to their electronic components being obsolete, the factories and tooling having been sold off, the manufacturer being defunct, and so on. So, while the US Army might indeed have paid around $40.000 for a Stinger missile in the mid-Eighties, extrapolating the cost of one today is at best a matter of guesswork. Even in less dramatic cases, where the munitions are still in production, costs can still be subject to extremely high volatility: the price of acquiring 155mm artillery shells for Nato allies has roughly quadrupled since the start of the Ukraine war.
For America, this made it possible to send huge quantities of Nato weapons to Ukraine, while merely guesstimating the real cost of those weapons. And unsurprisingly, this has massively incentivised making optimistic estimates: the less you say the shells and rockets are worth, the more of them you can send within your allotted replacement budget. Of course, if you lowball your cost estimates, or inflation and labour scarcity mean that it is no longer profitable for the defence industry to produce at that price, the end result is a form of budgetary looting. Something has been taken away, money has in theory been allocated to replace it, but either due to naivete, corruption or malice, that money is not sufficient to actually pay for replacements. Ultimately, youâre left with a big hole in your budget, and a big hole in your military readiness. Whether costs are intentionally lowballed or simply underestimated doesnât matter; the result is the same. The US political class, having long believed that their country can go anywhere and do anything, are simply not in the mood to take no for an answer.
Nor is budgetary raiding confined to the Ukraine war. When, for instance, Congress didn’t want to allocate funding for the extremely polarising issue of the southern border wall, the Trump administration briefly floated the idea of simply taking that money out of the US military. Elsewhere, the US Navy is currently planning to pay for its ongoing operations in the Red Sea by taking money out of funds it previously had allocated to badly needed modernisation programmes. In other words, the Navy’s budget is being cannibalised: critical future investments are being eaten up in order to sustain daily operations.
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