Do we need to embrace private vice? (David Attie/Getty Images)

Ever since the events of October 7, the streets of American and Western cities are routinely filled with heated demonstrations. The vast majority of the people in attendance are usually not themselves citizens of Palestine or Israel, but locals whose cultural identities, social circles or political loyalties compel them to embrace one cause and to excoriate the other. Beneath the discourse around high ideals such as human rights or national self-determination, there is the same fundamentally extra-rational instinct of solidarity as in every issue under the sun: “Their positions are my positions; their claims are my claims; and their enemies are my enemies.” How do we escape this tribal impasse?
The Anglo-Dutch philosopher Bernard Mandeville is today neither well-remembered nor wholly forgotten, but his work may hold some helpful insights for the present moment. His most infamous tract was The Fable of the Bees (1714) in which he argued for recognising self-interest, rather than other-regarding sentiments, such as solidarity or altruism, as the soundest basis for organising society. Even more than David Hume, Adam Smith, and the classical economists who were to follow, it was Mandeville who best embodied the emergence of what we now understand as liberal-capitalist modernity, sounding the death knell for the pre-liberal forms of private and communitarian morality that still held sway among the political and ecclesiastical classes.
Mandeville’s intervention, taking place in the years after the 1688 Glorious Revolution, gave expression to the transformation then unfolding in public life, from the passionate (and violent) preoccupation over moral sectarianism and ultimate ends, which so brutally scarred the 17th century, and toward the relatively peaceful and civilised pursuit of wealth and affluence that characterised the 18th. One wonders if the West is overdue for another paradigm shift from solidarity to self-interest as the animating principle of politics.
First, it is worth considering the difference between the two paradigms. Enacting such a change would not eliminate conflict from public life but radically alter its direction and outlet. It is one thing for there to be sharp divisions structuring political exchange, but conflicts over competing material interests or economic programmes can be hashed out in rational processes of give-and-take; whereas the kind of reductive battles over intangible values — what is known as the culture war — has led to the wrong kind of conflict, one in which humanity’s natural tendencies toward solidarity and communal morality degenerates into rigid, zero-sum stand-offs. The result is stasis and stultification. Compared to this, there can be little doubt that a renewed politics of self-interest would be conducive to more dynamism and material progress: the only question is how do we get to such a place from where we are now?
The England to which Mandeville immigrated from Holland in the 1690s was already one generation removed from the apocalyptic, often theologically motivated bloodshed of the Cromwellian era. It was in the midst of the post-1688 commercial boom and financial revolution, on course to becoming the world’s richest nation.
Yet even as England’s social complexion was changing, the moral outlook of many of its elites (embodied by Lord Bolingbroke and his magazine The Craftsman) remained mired in antiquated notions of virtue held to by the Old Whigs and Commonwealthmen, whose agrarian, puritanical, and civic republican sensibilities derided the new forms of mobile financial wealth and concentrated state power arising under the Court Whig government of the day as harbingers of a plague of “corruption”/ This corruption was attributed to the spirit of avarice encouraged by the new economy; and it was contrasted with the selflessly patriotic and solidaristic ethos of virtue espoused by the anti-Court opposition. It was in this context of conflicting moralities that Mandeville became the centre of national controversy when the 1723 edition of his book led to a presentment before the Grand Jury of Middlesex. He was accused of wishing to “run down Religion and Virtue… and to recommend Luxury, Avarice, Pride, and all vices, as being necessary to Public Welfare… tending to the Destruction of the Constitution,” a line of attack that paralleled opposition polemics against the Court Whig regime, with which Mandeville became identified.
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