'There is no principled defence or critique of the Barnier government.' Ludovic Marin/Pool/AFP via Getty Images

During a recent visit to a Michelin factory, on the outskirts of Paris, the minister for industrial affairs Marc Ferracci was heckled and shouted at. The factory is one of many to be shut down as part of a wave of industrial closures across France. Added to this are expected strikes by public sector workers and the railways. Right now, it is too early to say whether the republic will experience a protracted social crisis as it has in the past, but the situation is far from promising.
In spite of these severe economic woes, the French political class is consumed by strategising and tactical manoeuvres, all tied to the possible fallout from the collapse of the Barnier government. It looks increasingly likely that Barnier will push through his budget using the famous Article 49:3 of the Constitution, which allows legislation to be passed without a parliamentary vote. The Left has said it would respond by seeking to bring down the government. The far-Right, whose votes will be decisive, has said that as things stand they are minded to vote with the Left. In which case, the Barnier government will collapse some time between 15 and 21 December.
In the last few days, the possibility of an even earlier move to bring Barnier down has been suggested — perhaps as early as next week. French public opinion is divided on the matter, though it seems surprisingly favourable to the prospect of a collapse. A recent poll found that just over half of those surveyed supported dissolution, despite the turbulence of the legislative elections over the summer. This number falls a little when the prospect of a financial crisis is evoked, but even then a hefty 46% still support a move against Barnier.
When the Barnier government was first put together, at the end of the summer, after an extended period of feverish uncertainty, it seemed as if it might signal some kind of return for the country’s centre-right Républicains. They were given some of the most powerful roles — the minister of interior, for instance — whilst Barnier himself came from this wing of the political spectrum. The Left cried foul, as they considered themselves the winners of the legislative elections, and yet the centre-right was back in power.
However, it was always dangerous to rest the revival of a party and a political tradition on an edifice as fragile as the Barnier government. Less than six months later, we see that the fundamental dynamic of political fragmentation — where no political force is able to create a majority of any kind — is reasserting itself. And the Barnier government is a distillation of that fragmentation rather than a way of overcoming it.
This fragmentation has not come out of the blue. It was already evident in the early 2000s, but it was masked by the rallying effect that came from surprisingly good scores by the French far-Right. The fact that neither the Left nor the Right could command the same sort of vote share as in the past was hidden by the power of the cordon sanitaire: majorities were built on a fear of letting the far-Right into power.
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