Why Trump won’t end the war in Ukraine Russia has the upper hand

The main hurdle is that the West’s relentless push for an impossible Ukrainian victory against a much stronger opponent has strengthened Russia’s hand. By rejecting earlier opportunities for negotiation — when Ukraine was in a stronger position — Western leaders have allowed Russia to consolidate its military gains, leaving little incentive for Putin to compromise.

In this sense, the belief that the West can achieve at the negotiating table what it failed to secure on the battlefield is, as political realist John Mearsheimer has argued, a dangerous illusion. “To win at the negotiating table, you have to win on the battlefield,” he explained, “and it’s the Russians who are winning on the battlefield.” Putin’s own words at his end-of-year conference underscore this: “The Russian army is advancing along the entire front line… We are moving towards resolving the main objectives that we set at the beginning of the military operation.”

Ukraine — and the West — face a difficult decision: either accept Putin’s terms, or endure the continuation of the war, which will further weaken Ukraine’s position (while causing countless more lives to be lost for nothing). Putin’s conditions for peace are unambiguous: legal recognition by Ukraine and the West of Russia’s annexed territories — Crimea, Sevastopol, Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia — as part of the Russian Federation; Ukraine’s full withdrawal from contested territories; and Ukraine’s renunciation of Nato membership aspirations and adoption of neutral, non-aligned status, coupled with demilitarisation, in exchange for Western security guarantees.

These demands render Zelenskyy’s proposed compromise — ceding territory for Nato membership — untenable. Preventing Ukraine from joining Nato was, after all, the primary rationale for Russia’s military operation. Trump appears to grasp this. Reports suggest his team is considering delaying Ukraine’s Nato membership by at least 20 years, possibly in exchange for continued Western arms supplies. Statements by his running mate JD Vance indicate Trump might advocate for Ukraine to cede Russian-controlled regions, while agreeing to a demilitarised zone.

Certain factions will undoubtedly decry such terms as an unacceptable capitulation. However, the reality is that accepting a deal now is Ukraine’s best option. All evidence suggests that the longer the war continues, the worse Ukraine’s position will become. The West bears significant responsibility for squandering earlier opportunities to pursue peace, when Russia’s demands were far less severe — and all to wage what even Boris Johnson candidly admitted in a recent interview to be a Nato proxy war against Russia.

Yet, Zelenskyy’s insistence on Nato membership essentially rules out any possibility of even starting negotiations. Trump could potentially sidestep this problem by excluding Ukraine from the first rounds of peace talks, as well as forcing Ukraine to face reality by cutting back military aid for Kyiv, but the real problem will be selling an agreement on Russia’s terms inside the US, where he is likely to face massive pushback from the pro-war establishment, including the neocons in his own party. They will try to weaponise Trump’s “America First” rhetoric against him by claiming — as they are already doing — that this would be a “humiliation” for the US.

Trump’s vision of a “quick fix” in the form of a ceasefire or truce, pending a more comprehensive agreement, is also unlikely to succeed. Putin believes a prolonged ceasefire would merely allow Ukraine to rearm and prepare for a renewed offensive; his scepticism is rooted in his perception of the Minsk agreements as a Western ploy to buy Ukraine time to pursue a military solution. And Western commentary has done little to dispel such fears. One recent RUSI article proposed using a “frozen ceasefire” à la North and South Korea to heavily arm a diminished Ukraine, transforming it into a more effective bulwark against Russia in the future. Such proposals all but guarantee Moscow’s resistance to any short-term, half-botched agreements.

The deeper challenge here lies in navigating the profound mistrust between Russia and the West. This demands a fundamental shift in the West’s approach: abandoning its (failed) attempts to isolate and weaken Russia, and taking genuine steps to address Russia’s security concerns. This is why Putin has emphasised that a comprehensive peace deal must include the removal of all sanctions against Russia.

Achieving such a geopolitical grand bargain, though, would require an all-out paradigm shift, in which the West relinquishes its pursuit of dominance and recognises the multipolar nature of global power dynamics. Yet, no Western leader — including Trump — seems prepared to make this leap. Despite potential shifts in priorities, such as focusing on Latin America and Iran, the strategic underpinnings of US policy are unlikely to change significantly under Trump’s leadership. There is little to suggest a fundamental departure from the US’s current strategy of aggressively countering the decline of American global dominance through diplomatic, economic and even military pressure.

Trump’s foreign policy picks reinforce this view. For example, Keith Kellogg, his choice for special envoy to Ukraine, co-authored a report earlier this year arguing that it is in America’s interest to ensure a “defeated and diminished Russia”, and that the next Trump administration should continue to arm Ukraine and refrain from asking Ukraine to relinquishing the goal of regaining all its territory. While Kellogg might have changed his mind over the past few months, this kind of mentality is unlikely to facilitate the reassessment of US-Russia relations that Putin views as essential for peace.

Europe, too, represents a major obstacle. Its leaders have shown little inclination toward diplomacy, with some actively opposing Trump’s overtures. Kaja Kallas, the EU’s new foreign affairs chief, recently dismissed the idea of pressuring Zelenskyy into peace talks, claiming that Putin is unwilling to negotiate. Meanwhile, the European Council has just adopted a new sanctions package vowing that “Russia must not prevail” and reconfirming “the EU’s unwavering commitment to providing continued political, financial, economic, humanitarian, military and diplomatic support to Ukraine and its people for as long as it takes and as intensely as needed”. This comes on the heels of an even more hawkish European Parliament resolution essentially calling for a total war against Russia — or World War III.

Europe’s economic and security interests clearly lie in ending the war and renormalising relations with Russia — a stance that enjoys growing support among European citizens. In this respect, Trump could be viewed as an opportunity: to the extent that the US has always viewed Nato as a way to ensure Europe’s strategic subordination, the president-elect’s threat of reducing US commitments to the alliance could present an occasion for Europe to redefine itself as an autonomous and peaceful actor. Instead, Europe appears to be reacting to its identity crisis by projecting the United States’ role onto itself, replicating the aggressive stance of its former protector.

Meanwhile, Nato’s general thrust seems unaffected by Trump’s impending return, suggesting that it answers more to the US military-security apparatus than it does to the White House. Hence, Mark Rutte, Nato’s new Secretary-General, recently said that the alliance shouldn’t be talking about peace but should instead focus on sending more weapons to Ukraine.

The path forward remains fraught with obstacles. Putin’s conditions for peace are uncompromising, Western leaders remain entrenched in their positions, and Europe’s hawkish stance only complicates matters further. For Trump, the challenge will be twofold: overcoming domestic resistance to concessions and navigating the geopolitical minefield of competing interests. While his desire to end the war is commendable, the complexities of achieving a lasting resolution will demand far more than quick fixes or bold proclamations.

The stakes couldn’t be higher. Without a serious commitment to diplomacy and a willingness to make difficult compromises, the conflict will either continue as a slow-burning war of attrition or be temporarily frozen, only to flare up again later. In either case, this will further antagonise Western-Russian relations — with catastrophic consequences for Ukraine, Europe and the world at large.

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Thomas Fazi is an UnHerd columnist and translator. His latest book is The Covid Consensus, co-authored with Toby Green.

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