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		<title>Ian Garner, a writer for UnHerd</title>
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		<description>think again</description>
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	<title>Ian Garner, a writer for UnHerd</title>
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					<title>What Iran means for Putin</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2026/03/what-iran-means-for-putin/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://stage.unherd.com/2026/03/what-iran-means-for-putin/?edition=us#comments</comments>
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										<unherd:main_theme>Geopolitics </unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Ian Garner]]>
					</dc:creator>
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																<unherd:article_ranking>2</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[The multipolar world is marginalising Putin. (Credit: Pavel Bednyakov / Getty Images)]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Dr. Ian Garner</strong> is assistant professor of totalitarian studies at the Pilecki Institute in Warsaw. His latest book is <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/z-generation/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em>Z Generation: Russia&#8217;s Fascist Youth</em></a> (Hurst).</p>
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						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>irgarner</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is assistant professor of totalitarian studies at the Pilecki Institute in Warsaw. His latest book is <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/z-generation/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em>Z Generation: Russia's Fascist Youth</em></a> (Hurst).]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Mon, 02 Mar 2026 11:56:10 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Mon, 02 Mar 2026 12:10:15 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[America]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Iran]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[multipolarity]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Russia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Vladimir Putin]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://stage.unherd.com/?p=1050740</guid>
																												<description>
								<![CDATA[Multipolarity is a disaster for Russia]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>As the Middle East lurches toward wider war, Vladimir Putin finds himself confronted by the terrifying reality of the world he has always demanded. For a quarter of a century, the Russian president has been demanding a “multipolar world order”, one that would overturn the hypocritical liberal consensus. Now, that order might have arrived, but the system taking shape is not creating a stronger Russia. Instead, it reveals an increasingly isolated and weakened state — one that, if the history of Putin’s rule is anything to go by, might see the Kremlin turn toward even further domestic repression and foreign confrontation.</p>
<p>When Putin first became the country’s president, back in 2000, Russian national security doctrine <a href="https://www.bits.de/EURA/natsecconc.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">claimed</a> that “multipolarity” meant “equal and equitable relations with all countries” and the “universal observance of human rights and freedoms and the impermissibility of dual standards in this respect”. Over the last 25 years, however, it’s become clear that “multipolarity” in <a href="https://nestcentre.org/russia-in-a-multipolar-world/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">practice</a> doesn’t mean any of those things. Rather, it means the end of American dominance and the restoration of post-Soviet Russia as a great power. In this world, large states will set the rules within their own backyards — ignoring international boundaries and treaties — while weaker ones will have to suffer the consequences.</p>
<p>Putin has become increasingly <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/russias-war-on-ukraine/B5B11221D6352CF59474C2EC89C6C554" target="_blank" rel="noopener">obsessed</a> with these ideas, pursuing them through his war against Ukraine, and his constant demands that Russia holds special rights over the political future of its neighbors’ “ethnic Russian” populations. Disruptive behavior at the United Nations fits into the same pattern. Amid speculation about peace deals in Ukraine and Donald Trump’s conspicuous performances alongside Putin — including the much-discussed Alaska meeting — commentators have suggested that the White House may be about to grant Moscow its sphere of influence, leaving it free to redraw borders and reorder the post-Soviet space.</p>
<p>Today, in the wake of the strikes on its strategic partner Iran — which has provided significant support for the war against Ukraine — and the violence spilling into Lebanon, Moscow is playing out a role at what it would call the top table of a “multipolar world order.” State media outlets speak with striking confidence. Commentators <a href="https://www.pravda.ru/world/2335685-iran-usa-war-ideology-collapse/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">speculate</a> about a potential American “defeat” in Iran that could trigger the “inexorable collapse” of the United States itself. Reports <a href="https://en.iz.ru/en/2051707/2026-03-02/iran-has-hit-government-quarter-tel-aviv-and-military-industrial-complex-facilities-haifa">highlight</a> Iran’s retaliatory strikes against regional targets, suggesting Tehran is undeterred even after the killing of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Meanwhile, Western allies and Western publics are purportedly <a href="https://www.pravda.ru/news/travel/2335691-dubai-supermarket-panic-flood/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">gripped</a> by total panic.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/03/how-jd-vance-lost-the-foreign-policy-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/03/how-jd-vance-lost-the-foreign-policy-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/GettyImages-2246210659.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/03/how-jd-vance-lost-the-foreign-policy-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested Reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/03/how-jd-vance-lost-the-foreign-policy-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>How JD Vance lost the foreign policy war</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/03/how-jd-vance-lost-the-foreign-policy-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Sohrab Ahmari</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>At the diplomatic level, Russian officials present themselves as guardians of stability and law — harking back to the familiar but hollow language of the “multipolar world order”. Russia’s Foreign Ministry has <a href="https://mid.ru/en/maps/il/2083284/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">declared</a> that “Russia, as always, stands ready to assist in advancing peaceful solutions grounded in international law, mutual respect and balance of interests” (a familiar line harking back to Putin’s violent <a href="https://assets.production.carnegie.fusionary.io/static/files/files__Remler_UN_final.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">war</a> against Chechnya in the 2000s). The language, absurd given Moscow’s propensity for waging war and advocating brutally for its own interests, echoes the early formulations of “equal and equitable relations” and the rejection of “dual standards”. In the Kremlin’s strategic narrative, American power is brittle, Iranian resolve undamaged, and history is bending in Russia’s direction.</p>
<p>In reality, of course, the limits of Russian diplomatic and military capacity have been brutally exposed. There is no serious prospect of Moscow deterring the US or Israel. There is no realistic mechanism by which Russia can guarantee or even influence Iran’s security. Unlike in Syria a decade ago, when Russian airpower altered the balance on the ground, the Kremlin today lacks the capacity required to shape events in the Middle East. Its military resources are heavily committed elsewhere; its diplomatic leverage is negligible; its economic tools are non-existent.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;There is no serious prospect of Moscow deterring the US or Israel.&#8221;</div>
<p>Russia thus talks the talk of great power arbitration — while exercising no control over outcomes. Its media and diplomats read loudly from the Putinist script of sovereignty, balance, legality, even as more powerful actors decide the fate of the region. Donald Trump’s government is flaunting its global strike capacity in Iran and Venezuela. Putin’s old Syrian ally, Bashar al-Assad, is confined to a sordid exile in a Moscow apartment block.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, Russia is bleeding economically, militarily, and demographically from its war against Ukraine. Moscow’s security guarantees for <a href="https://www.azatutyun.am/a/33606129.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Armenia</a> proved unreliable when tested by Azerbaijan. China, for its part, is increasingly strident in Africa and Central Asia, where once Soviet and post-Soviet Kremlin governments were the undoubted military and economic top dogs. In an international free-for-all — and despite the pageantry of state visits to and from China, the United States, and Central Asian states — Vladimir Putin is ever weaker on the global stage.</p>
<p>Putin has got the world he asked for, but not the one he wanted. As Canada’s Prime Minister Mark Carney recently <a href="https://www.weforum.org/stories/2026/01/davos-2026-special-address-by-mark-carney-prime-minister-of-canada/?gad_source=1&amp;gad_campaignid=22228224717&amp;gbraid=0AAAAAoVy5F61eQVoBwPQ_KGiN0sPEiNpi&amp;gclid=CjwKCAiAh5XNBhAAEiwA_Bu8FQ9etyHzxnnjHUoeIvY2pdWsDSaWmHL7FSP5DgbQrEh7ys2Ewdf8LRoCPegQAvD_BwE" target="_blank" rel="noopener">warned</a>, countries now face “the end of a pleasant fiction and the beginning of a harsh reality, where geopolitics, where the large, main power, geopolitics, is submitted to no limits, no constraints.” But that reality has only revealed how weak Russian power really is. Putin can only watch on as the United States, China, and anybody else who chooses eliminate his erstwhile friends in South America and the Middle East.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/02/putin-cant-survive-without-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/02/putin-cant-survive-without-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/GettyImages-1231134359.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/02/putin-cant-survive-without-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/02/putin-cant-survive-without-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Putin can’t survive without war</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/02/putin-cant-survive-without-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Ian Garner</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>The last time Putin was confronted with a moment of such global fragility was in the aftermath of the Arab Spring. As authoritarian regimes collapsed across the Middle East and mass protests filled Russian streets in 2011 and 2012 — this was the era of Boris Nemtsov and Alexei Navalny — the Kremlin briefly feared for its own survival. Gripped by <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctvr697c8" target="_blank" rel="noopener">paranoia</a>, Putin openly feared that the revolutionary wave might reach Moscow. The response was swift and decisive. A sweeping security crackdown followed. Freedom in political life was extinguished. The language of nationalism and civilizational struggle hardened. Next came Crimea, war against Ukraine, and a foreign policy defined by aggressive confrontation.</p>
<p>Today, Putin and his coterie of hangers-on might be wondering what would happen if an opposing power or even an internal enemy — unlikely as it seems, even if Yevgeny Prigozhin’s ill-fated <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jun/25/prigozhins-march-on-moscow-chronology-of-an-attempted-coup" target="_blank" rel="noopener">march</a> on the Russian capital took place barely three years ago — decided to blitz Moscow and topple the Russian leadership. In the Putin regime’s eyes, weakness demands a response. If the multipolar disorder now taking shape continues to marginalize Moscow, Putin may again turn inwards to tighten repression and outwards to make the world pay attention to Russia through violence. The question is no longer whether the world has entered the harsher era of disorder Putin long desired. It may be how far he is prepared to go to avoid becoming one of its losers.</p>
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					<title>Putin can’t survive without war</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2026/02/putin-cant-survive-without-war/?edition=us</link>
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										<unherd:main_theme>Anniversary</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Ian Garner]]>
					</dc:creator>
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																<unherd:article_ranking>2</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[A Kremlin-approved Orthodox Christianity is bound up with worship of the fallen in past wars. (Credit: Dimitar Dilkoff / AFP via Getty)]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Dr. Ian Garner</strong> is assistant professor of totalitarian studies at the Pilecki Institute in Warsaw. His latest book is <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/z-generation/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em>Z Generation: Russia&#8217;s Fascist Youth</em></a> (Hurst).</p>
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						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>irgarner</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is assistant professor of totalitarian studies at the Pilecki Institute in Warsaw. His latest book is <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/z-generation/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em>Z Generation: Russia's Fascist Youth</em></a> (Hurst).]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Tue, 24 Feb 2026 00:02:33 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Tue, 24 Feb 2026 09:06:39 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Anniversary]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Geopolitics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ukraine]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Vladimir Putin]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[War]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://stage.unherd.com/?p=1049810</guid>
																												<description>
								<![CDATA[Death has become a political religion]]>
							</description>
																		
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								<![CDATA[<p>Final victory over Napoleon elevated the Russian Empire to the heart of European politics. Yet reformers were eager for more. How, they asked, could a depleted Russia, still utterly agrarian and with little culture of its own, build on its triumph and march into the future? The answer, in the short term anyway, was that it couldn’t. Following the botched Decemberist Revolt of 1825, the country returned to ideological rigidity. The new tsar, Nicholas I, embraced a reactionary doctrine: “Orthodoxy, Autocracy, and Nationality”. In response, the philosopher Pyotr Chaadaev penned an excoriating criticism of his country and its politics. Signing his letter from “the Necropolis” — the city of the dead — Chaadaev suggested that the nation’s perpetual cycle of war, revolt, and repression had left it moribund. The author was promptly declared insane and placed under house arrest.</p>
<p>Two centuries on, Vladimir Putin has framed his crusade against Ukraine as the path to recovering Russian vitality once more. Putin has repeatedly invoked memories of the Westernizing 18th-century Tsar Peter the Great, and of the Soviet Union, to equate expansion with renewal — and war as a method of national rejuvenation. Through its battle against Ukraine, Putin promised, Russia would reshape the international order, overturn Western dominance, and forge itself as a stronger, more unified society. A new, vibrant Russia could emerge from a conflict in which its army has slaughtered thousands of Ukrainians and faced death and destruction itself.</p>
<p>For years, state propaganda has ceaselessly pushed this vision. Occupied cities such as Mariupol are <a href="https://zenodo.org/records/15714770" target="_blank" rel="noopener">presented</a> as showcases of a coming “new Russia”: rebuilt, modernized, and cleansed of European influence. A rash of new school textbooks describe a rising power reclaiming its historical destiny. Official imagery projects motion born of war: construction sites, patriotic festivals, soldiers as founders of a renewed nation. Even diplomatic theater — including the Russian media <a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/08/russians-are-laughing-at-the-peace-talks/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">reception</a> of Putin’s red-carpet welcome in Alaska — reinforces the impression of restored prestige, of a country returning to its rightful place at the center of global affairs. The war serves as the engine of historical revival; it is the catalyst for life renewed.</p>
<p>Exactly four years after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, of course, Russia’s war has failed. Endless casualties have bought barely a fifth of Ukrainian territory. The world has not reorganized itself around Russian power, while the promised internal renewal has failed to materialize. Behind the spectacle of official optimism, meanwhile, death has moved to the demographic, economic and cultural heart of public life. The mechanisms meant to restore national strength are instead consuming the human and institutional resources on which that strength depends. Russia’s leaders set out to escape the Necropolis. Now, though, the country is addicted to war, and entrenching itself as a land of the dead.</p>
<p>Wherever Russians live, death has found a burrow. Each month, some 30,000 new recruits depart from country towns and industrial outskirts, and another stream of wounded traipses back the other way. Official promises of rehabilitation, employment, and social prestige often dissolve into bureaucratic delay and indifference. Despite promises of grand new veteran support centers, <a href="https://dzen.ru/a/ZDQnzKwNOVL8fmgD" target="_blank" rel="noopener">complaints</a> rumble on social and even state media about the difficulty of actually accessing them. Still, the wounded are the lucky ones. As many as 325,000 soldiers have been killed since the full-scale invasion began. The life expectancy of a Russian soldier in some places may be as <a href="https://www.thetimes.com/world/russia-ukraine-war/article/stepnohirsk-zaporizhzhia-putin-russia-ukraine-war-tzjj6vqgz" target="_blank" rel="noopener">low</a> as 12 minutes. No major power has sustained losses on this scale in a single conflict since the Second World War, yet on and on the cycle of recruitment and casualty is repeated.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/11/russias-veterans-are-bringing-violence-home/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/11/russias-veterans-are-bringing-violence-home/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/GettyImages-2213589148.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/11/russias-veterans-are-bringing-violence-home/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/11/russias-veterans-are-bringing-violence-home/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Russia’s veterans are bringing violence home</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/11/russias-veterans-are-bringing-violence-home/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Ian Garner</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>The consequences are already visible far from the battlefield. Across provincial Russia, amputees hobble over icy streets; families reorganize themselves around absence; cemeteries spill over their old boundaries as the dead are put to rest. In one tiny village in far-flung Kamchatka, almost all the young men are gone: of 39 who <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/ce8n4l8elpgo" target="_blank" rel="noopener">signed</a> contracts to fight in Ukraine, 12 are missing or dead already. Life is more brutal in other ways too. Domestic violence is up and veterans, accustomed to the amorality of the front, have committed a spate of murders. Just this week Rustam Nogmov, a former soldier, was <a href="https://oc-media.org/ex-soldier-who-fought-in-ukraine-sentenced-for-brutal-nalchik-murder-of-elderly-woman/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">jailed</a> for the apparently motiveless murder of an 86-year-old woman.</p>
<p>Russia’s leadership makes no attempt to conceal this creeping presence of the funereal. A Kremlin-approved blend of Orthodox Christianity is today bound up with worship of the fallen from the Second World War and the casualties of the present struggle. Death in Ukraine, the Orthodox Patriarch Kirill has <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-patriarch-kirill-dying-ukraine-sins/32052380.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">claimed</a>, “washes away all sin.” Images of fallen soldiers proliferate across everyday space, as if imitating icons of Orthodox saints. Roadside billboards bear uniformed portraits; official websites praise the young dead; memorial plaques fixed to school walls hang over children who sit at “heroes’ desks” commemorating the dead. Enrolled in state-sponsored youth organizations that <a href="https://yandex.ru/images/search?from=tabbar&amp;img_url=https%3A%2F%2Fshkola52saratov-r64.gosweb.gosuslugi.ru%2Fnetcat_files%2F45%2F255%2FIMG_20230222_104752.jpg&amp;lr=10472&amp;pos=14&amp;rpt=simage&amp;text=%D1%8E%D0%BD%D0%B0%D1%80%D0%BC%D0%B8%D1%8F%20%D0%BF%D0%B0%D1%80%D1%82%D0%B0%20%D0%B3%D0%B5%D1%80%D0%BE%D0%B5%D0%B2" target="_blank" rel="noopener">teach</a> military skills and the inevitability of battle, Russia’s youth are being fed into the same pipeline that is killing their elders.</p>
<p>Older Russians are roped in too. In carefully staged media stories, parents declare pride at their children’s death at the front. One mother from Stavropol <a href="https://stavropol.media/news/2300461/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">claimed</a> that, after her son died, she had dedicated herself even more fully to patriotic activities. “I focus,” she said, “on teaching lessons about bravery in schools, visiting museums, and attending exhibitions related to the special military operation.” The state’s commemorative machinery absorbs individual tragedies into a pantheon of sacrifice, where ordinary citizens, through death, can be elevated into symbols of national heroism — even as their living relatives are obliged to prostrate themselves before the very machinery that brought annihilation. The boundary between the living and the dead has begun to erode; participation in national life is parsed through the language of sacrifice and loss.</p>
<p>Thanks to the war, meanwhile, household finances across Russia’s shabby provinces now too contend with death. Enlistment, for all its risks, has become one of the few reliable paths to economic stability available to young men outside major cities. Recruitment bonuses, combat salaries, compensation payments to families of the dead — some of these bonuses, if the sometimes-reluctant state bothers to pay them, reach figures of $60,000 and more — have funneled vast sums into pockets after years of stagnation. Provincial towns that struggled to sustain small businesses now see <a href="https://www.semafor.com/article/03/30/2025/ukraine-war-boosts-economies-of-russias-industrial-towns" target="_blank" rel="noopener">new</a> cafés, gyms, dog groomers, and other big-city amenities.</p>
<p>This influx of money creates the impression of renewal, but the new prosperity depends on citizens turning themselves into “human capital” out there on the western steppe. Without the war, there would be no boom. This is, as one analyst has put it, “<a href="https://www.ifri.org/en/papers/deathonomics-social-political-and-economic-costs-war-russia" target="_blank" rel="noopener">deathonomics</a>”. And where local economies go, so too the federal government has <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/the-russian-economy-in-2025-between-stagnation-and-militarization/">created</a> a wartime overheating effect. Yet as the economist Alexandra Prokopenko starkly <a href="https://www.economist.com/by-invitation/2026/02/16/russias-economy-has-entered-the-death-zone">put it,</a> the economy is destroying itself in its pursuit of war by “metabolizing its own muscle tissue.” Military expenditure absorbs an ever larger share of state resources, sustaining defense industries while weakening civilian sectors that depend on long-term investment. Factories linked to arms production operate at full capacity, but labor shortages intensify elsewhere as workers enlist, migrate, or are redirected toward wartime production. State spending — as much as 40% of it is now linked to the war effort — desperately prioritizes military needs over infrastructure, healthcare, and education, narrowing the foundations from which future development might come.</p>
<p>Output rises in sectors connected to the war effort, but the money is running out. All that is left is consuming more human capital — flesh-and-blood boys from Buryatia and Belgorod and Tatarstan. Skilled workers vanish from local economies. Younger cohorts face increasing incentives to exchange long-term prospects for short-term financial security at the front. Deprived regions in the provinces have become increasingly dependent on transfers that cannot exist without continued fighting: even as their men perish in the so-called “meat grinder,” the system demands ever more sacrifice. Economic stability begins to rely on conditions that steadily erode the society meant to benefit from it. And at the bottom of it all, “deathonomics” draws individuals into sacrificing themselves in the name of war.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;Deathonomics draws individuals into sacrificing themselves in the name of war.&#8221;</div>
<p>Peace, under such circumstances, is all-but impossible. Demobilization would remove income streams that can sustain entire communities, while returning veterans would require medical care, employment, and social reintegration on a scale the state has rarely managed. Indeed, the history of Russia’s modern wars in Afghanistan and Chechnya suggests that this latest venture will not see troops integrated peacefully into society. Ending the conflict would expose weaknesses that wartime spending conceals — a paradox that the Kremlin has no plan to avoid. Death has not just become central to Russia as a visible category and a political religion. Today, it&#8217;s at the very heart of the Kremlin’s self-destructive economic program.</p>
<p>All the while, Russian culture, which has given birth to some of the greatest works in human history, has slipped into a coma. The Kremlin’s wars have often produced music and books of genuine import, their authors forcing Russians to confront what violence does to a society. Tolstoy’s early sketches from Sevastopol repudiated the bombastic heroism of official propaganda; Isaak Babel turned the Civil War into a record of cruelty, racism, and moral disintegration; Vasily Grossman produced the great tragedy of the Second World War in <em>Life and Fate.</em></p>
<p>Each of these works bears witness to the ways that leaders justify their wars through sacrifice — and how, for ordinary people, morality can be corrupted by the temptations of death. Yet this distinguished tradition of war writing depended on the ethical insights of an intelligentsia willing to frankly confront corrosive wartime violence. Today, though, Russia’s most popular and insightful artists have mostly <a href="https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2023/06/08/leaving-russia-four-artists-forced-into-exile-a81421" target="_blank" rel="noopener">fled</a> the country. Alla Pugacheva, perhaps the country’s most beloved singer and a familiar face for half a century, has been an outspoken critic from abroad, slamming the war as “terrible” and declaring that “to tell your homeland that it is wrong, that is patriotism”. But voices like these are barely heard in the motherland. Most of those that remain acquiesce to a state that now uses culture to promote its cult of death.</p>
<p>Russia in 2026 certainly doesn’t want for cultural production. Indeed, it produces a great deal. Unfortunately, what passes for culture here is increasingly administered with bureaucratic tedium. Patriotic grants, competitions, publishing initiatives, and a constant stream of “heroic” content optimized for online circulation — all comprises the most visible output. What the state’s organs desire, above all, are odes to soldiering and sacrifice. “Fan art” competitions and children’s poetry contests fill social media with images of soldiers in battle and death. Soldiers crop up on light entertainment shows on television. The state hands out <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2026/feb/22/russia-cultural-liberal-elite-putin">awards</a> to aging producers and writers who beat the drum of war most loudly.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/02/what-the-russians-taught-epstein/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/02/what-the-russians-taught-epstein/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/GettyImages-2252159204.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/02/what-the-russians-taught-epstein/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/02/what-the-russians-taught-epstein/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>What the Russians taught Epstein</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/02/what-the-russians-taught-epstein/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Seva Gunitsky</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>A constant stream of identikit, state-funded (and mostly ignored) Second World War movies clog up movie theater screens. The greatest state praise today is reserved for the purveyors of so-called “Z Literature”: the war veterans who write of their own experiences in Ukraine, meditating as they go on the necessity of bloodshed in crude and gruesome doggerel. A line in a poem by Alexander Pelevin, a veteran in his thirties whose writing has been awarded and praised by state media, <a href="https://link.springer.com/book/9783032176851" target="_blank" rel="noopener">sums</a> up the genre: “‘Alive’ means only ‘not yet dead’. / I am the abyss; the one that reigns supreme.” Defined by the moment of death, the soldier’s life exists in limbo. He is morally empty — an abyss — yet by fighting and dying, he can become “supreme”. State commissions seek out such writers and lavish them with prizes.</p>
<p>But in a bitter twist, the state breaks even those it praises. Pelevin recently posted on Telegram about his own poverty: “Your Russian writer is broke, ruined, and in debt.” He begged for financial help from subscribers. The same state that fills public spaces with heroic portraits, sanctified language, and everyday rituals of death — this state struggles to provide stable support even for the poets who reinforce its narrative. Individuals, whether soldiers or writers, remain instruments in the hands of the state. Their cultural value lies only in what can be extracted from them: death.</p>
<p>The state insists that war generates new life. The longer the war continues, however, the more the Kremlin and society as a whole cannot escape its clutches without economic and social collapse. Yet all the while, the war itself is a burden, dragging Russia into an economic and cultural morass. This country stuck in its own moral stagnation, just like the Russia of the 1820s, is the inescapable necropolis of late Putinism.</p>
<p>A decade from now, Moscow may continue to glitter, sustained by media spectacle, distance from the front, and economic support from China. But elsewhere, the necropolis will surely have taken hold. Imagine a typical small town. The war memorial has been renovated again, its granite polished and its list of names extended. Across the street, the roof of the school — now named after a local dead military “hero” — still leaks. A café opened during the wartime boom stands all but abandoned, its prices beyond what most residents can afford. Recruitment notices take up space on a bulletin board alongside funeral announcements and pleas for money for wounded veterans. The faces of the dead look down from the local church. The living cling to the hopes of a new war to inject more money into their ailing town and empty bank accounts, even as they know it will take yet more sons and brothers from them. More war — more death — is the only way out of the catastrophe. In attempting to destroy Ukraine, Russia has not revived itself: it has turned itself into the land of the dead.</p>
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					<title>Russia loves the Epstein files</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2026/02/russia-loves-the-epstein-files/?edition=us</link>
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										<unherd:main_theme>kompromat</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Ian Garner]]>
					</dc:creator>
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																<unherd:article_ranking>2</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[Russians have responded to the Epstein Files with glee. (Davidoff Studios/Getty )]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Dr. Ian Garner</strong> is assistant professor of totalitarian studies at the Pilecki Institute in Warsaw. His latest book is <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/z-generation/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em>Z Generation: Russia&#8217;s Fascist Youth</em></a> (Hurst).</p>
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						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>irgarner</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is assistant professor of totalitarian studies at the Pilecki Institute in Warsaw. His latest book is <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/z-generation/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em>Z Generation: Russia's Fascist Youth</em></a> (Hurst).]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Wed, 04 Feb 2026 00:01:59 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Wed, 04 Feb 2026 00:13:26 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Epstein files]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[honeytrap]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Russia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[sexpionage]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://stage.unherd.com/?p=1047266</guid>
																												<description>
								<![CDATA[Nationalists delight in Western debauchery]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>The latest tranche of material from the Epstein files has led to claims that resemble something out of the wildest espionage thriller: that the world’s most notorious sexual predator was also entangled in “sexpionage”. He would allegedly supply his rich and powerful guests with Russian women, many of whom could have been working for the Kremlin.</p>
<p>Journalists parsing the files have found <a href="https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-15516349/Epsteins-sex-empire-KGB-honeytrap-Paedophile-financier-Putin-Russian-girls.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">thousands</a> of references to Vladimir Putin and to Russia. There is still no proof that these files relate to a real espionage operation, in which victims were blackmailed after sordid encounters with Russian women. But connecting the dots leads to what sounds like an absurd conspiracy theory, where some of the world’s most powerful men, men with security teams and agencies meant to guard and protect them, were left exposed to an age-old, tried-and-tested Russian trick: the “honeytrap”.</p>
<p>The honeytrap is as straightforward as espionage maneuvers come: the sexual seduction of a target is photographed or filmed then used for blackmail. In return for keeping the indiscretion secret, the blackmailer demands information or political favors. If the Epstein case was a honeytrap, who can know what Epstein, his guests, or his Russian contacts knew, agreed to, or wanted? But what is certain is that the scandal summons up the memory of honeytraps long past. It’s precisely because it sounds like pulp that the scandal now lands with such force in a political culture already primed to believe the worst about elite networks and hidden influence.</p>
<p>If the Epstein story has provoked hand-wringing and disbelief in the West, the reaction in Russia has been something closer to glee. On Russian Telegram channels, nationalists and Kremlin-supporting patriots are delighted. The dominant tone is a rolling mix of mockery and derision. But it’s also permeated with a sneering commentary on the West’s “perverse ecosystem” which permits such behavior, combined with a knowing scorn for a tabloid culture that yearns for Russiagate tapes and <em>kompromat</em> porn. One widely shared post <a href="https://t.me/optimistkavshtatskom/26683" target="_blank" rel="noopener">treats</a> the entire affair as confirmation that Western elites are decadent, hypocritical, and permanently compromised. But it also says that claims about Russian involvement are false, cooked up by “British spies”. Indeed, another user <a href="https://t.me/RVvoenkor/108534?comment=35856023" target="_blank" rel="noopener">dismisses</a> the entire story as “the invention of deranged Brits”.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/11/russias-veterans-are-bringing-violence-home/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/11/russias-veterans-are-bringing-violence-home/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/GettyImages-2213589148.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/11/russias-veterans-are-bringing-violence-home/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/11/russias-veterans-are-bringing-violence-home/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Russia’s veterans are bringing violence home</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/11/russias-veterans-are-bringing-violence-home/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Ian Garner</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Alongside this ire runs something even less subtle: unalloyed delight at the West’s rich and powerful looking ridiculous. One popular channel <a href="https://t.me/RVvoenkor/108534" target="_blank" rel="noopener">revels</a> in the image of Western financiers, politicians, and intellectuals undone not by some grand geopolitical strategy but by their own uncontrollable sexual appetites. Should they exist, these Russian women should not be ashamed of degrading themselves or being trafficked, say the Putin supporters. Instead they should be proud: they have fulfilled their patriotic duty by undermining the West.</p>
<p>In this framing, Epstein is not an aberration or a one-off monster, but merely the latest episode in a long and satisfying history of honeytrap stings on Westerners that reveal their sexual avarice. Proof, once again, that the West cannot be trusted to govern itself morally and that Russia is the world’s real bastion of “traditional values”. Sex trafficking, simply put, is less a tool for corrupting the West than for revealing its inherent corruption. Thus some Russians cheer the Epstein scandal as the latest example of their spy agency’s most beloved technique.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">“Sex trafficking, simply put, is less a tool for corrupting the West than for revealing its inherent corruption.”</div>
<p>The history of Moscow’s honeytrap operations runs back to the early Cold War days. The KGB professionalized seduction with an almost bureaucratic seriousness. Female agents known as <em>lastochki</em> — “swallows” — were trained to target foreign diplomats, journalists, soldiers, and businessmen. There was remarkably little shame in the Russian secret services about using underhanded or dirty methods. Former KGB “swallows” later described their work as patriotic duty.</p>
<p>Honeytraps were a common feature of everyday espionage. Diplomats were told to assume that everybody they met was an agent and, accordingly, to behave with discretion. Bars and clubs, especially in the homosexual underground, were constantly monitored. Foreigners visiting Moscow were funneled through official Intourist hotels staffed and monitored by NKVD and KGB personnel. Soviet women were deployed by the security services, sometimes to target a specific individual and sometimes to seduce any Westerner they could. Anyone, wherever they sat in the social or political hierarchy, could be targeted — after all, even low-level functionaries might still have some useful information. Rooms fitted with hidden cameras and microphones ensured that sexual encounters were recorded. The kompromat factory was a nationwide affair.</p>
<p>A compromised Westerner might never be contacted at all. Some ignored the KGB’s threats: the American columnist and CIA operative Joseph Alsop was compromised in a gay honeytrap in Moscow in 1957 but rejected the ensuing blackmail attempt. Counterintelligence prevented other scandals getting out of hand: Sir Geoffrey Harrison, Britain’s ambassador to Moscow, was recalled after being confronted with compromising material in 1968. Others proved more pliable: Clayton Lonetree, a US Marine guard, was seduced in the Eighties by a woman posing as a translator and went on to pass sensitive information to Soviet handlers.</p>
<p>The honeytrap was so effective because it was a ruse that gathered intelligence which also produced explosive political material that could damage Western democracies. The classic British example is the case of John Vassall, a junior Admiralty clerk who was <a href="https://media.nationalarchives.gov.uk/index.php/scandalous-case-john-vassall/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">photographed</a> in a homosexual encounter in Moscow in 1954 and for several years passed classified information to his handlers. When the case finally became public, the scandal caused huge embarrassment to then prime minister Harold Macmillan’s government by exposing failures of vetting, security, and judgment at the heart of the British state.</p>
<p>But the Russian state’s security organs don’t only use the honeytrap strategy on Westerners; they sometimes use it on their own citizens. It has been deployed against Putin’s challengers, such as the opposition leader Ilya Yashin who was <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/10203840?utm_source=chatgpt.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">subjected</a> to a crude attempt to undermine his political credibility by letting him drown in a moral quagmire of his own making. In Russia, humiliating and denigrating an opponent is politics as normal; the same offensive tools used against Western targets are just as easily deployed against Russians by a Kremlin that’s terrified of both internal and external threats.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/02/jeffrey-epsteins-corrupt-overclass/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/02/jeffrey-epsteins-corrupt-overclass/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/Screenshot-2026-02-02-at-17.48.43.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/02/jeffrey-epsteins-corrupt-overclass/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested Reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/02/jeffrey-epsteins-corrupt-overclass/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Jeffrey Epstein&#039;s corrupt overclass</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/02/jeffrey-epsteins-corrupt-overclass/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Mary Harrington</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>The honeypot approach is still used because it’s blunt but effective. It uses kompromat sometimes in exotic, outrageous forms, but just as often in banal, almost bureaucratic ways that resemble those of the Soviet era. One entirely ordinary Estonian soldier, for example, was <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2019/06/estonia-russia-deniss-metsavas-spy/592417/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">seduced</a> on a trip to visit family in Russia and subsequently convicted for espionage.</p>
<p>It would be a surprise if sexual blackmail is not being deployed against high-level Western businessmen, diplomats, and politicians today. Russia does not primarily seek to attack the West by surgically extracting targeted information, as traditional espionage would. Instead, it seeks to embarrass, humiliate, and degrade Western societies into <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/03/09/russia-putin-disinformation-propaganda-hybrid-war/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">destroying</a> themselves by widening existing political fissures and disagreements and watching as a story-hungry media and viral social media storms do the hard work.</p>
<p>From Moscow’s perspective, it doesn’t matter so much whether the latest poisonous claims in the Epstein files are true. Even if the most sensational claims about who is (or who isn’t) a Russian agent collapse under scrutiny, the story itself will please Putin immensely. It will fuel suspicion that, regardless of their political orientation, the rich and powerful in the West can commit moral aberrations with impunity, and that institutions will shield them from consequence, instead of investigating them.</p>
<p>Backed by a group of supporters with no moral limits when it comes to undermining the West, the Kremlin will surely keep drudging up kompromat. But next time around, it may not need to wait for some hapless Westerner to fall into its trap. In the age of hacking and AI fakery, anybody, anywhere can be made the target of such blackmail. The future honeytrap does not need hotels and hidden cameras. It will be enough to make Western publics ask only whether something could have happened — and that, played out to the roaring crowd on social media, will achieve the Kremlin’s aims.</p>
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					<title>Russia’s veterans are bringing violence home</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2025/11/russias-veterans-are-bringing-violence-home/?edition=us</link>
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										<unherd:main_theme>Ukraine war</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Ian Garner]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/Blue-thumb.jpg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>2</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[Russian soldiers are promised the world. Kirill Kudryavtsev/AFP]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Dr. Ian Garner</strong> is assistant professor of totalitarian studies at the Pilecki Institute in Warsaw. His latest book is <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/z-generation/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em>Z Generation: Russia&#8217;s Fascist Youth</em></a> (Hurst).</p>
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						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>irgarner</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is assistant professor of totalitarian studies at the Pilecki Institute in Warsaw. His latest book is <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/z-generation/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em>Z Generation: Russia's Fascist Youth</em></a> (Hurst).]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Wed, 19 Nov 2025 00:02:01 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Mon, 22 Dec 2025 12:23:10 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Russia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ukraine war]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Veterans]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Vladimir Putin]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://stage.unherd.com/?p=1037762</guid>
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								<![CDATA[The state keeps them in battle mode]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>This summer, Russian soldier Sergei Moskalenko absconded from his unit at the frontline in Ukraine. Slipping past the military authorities, Moskalenko made it home to Chelyabinsk, a dilapidated industrial city in the remote Urals, where his wife and two children were waiting for him. Within days, he had violently<a href="https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2025/08/08/chelyabinsk-police-locate-war-veteran-suspected-of-killing-his-wife-a90140" target="_blank" rel="noopener"> murdered</a> his wife at home.</p>
<p>The road from contract soldier to violent criminal has become all too familiar in Russia in recent years. At least 500 civilians have been<a href="https://globalinitiative.net/analysis/russia-demobilization-challenge-galeotti-organized-crime-conflict/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"> killed</a> or seriously injured by returning veterans since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, and the tide of violence shows no signs of slowing.</p>
<p>Tune into the state’s propaganda channels, however, and a different picture emerges. On 31 December 2024, a handful of “Special Military Operation” veterans in immaculately pressed uniforms were feted as heroes at <em>Goluboi Ogonek</em>, Russia’s glitzy televised New Year’s light festival, alongside the usual cavalcade of pop stars and celebrities. They sang the praises of their government, their country’s war, and their comrades-in-arms.</p>
<p>Similarly glittering visions of soldiers, hymned as the saints of the Kremlin’s cult of war, are plastered over Russian state-owned media. The image of ordinary soldiers returning from the front, flush with cash, to acclaim and accolades is everywhere in popular culture. Billboards with the faces of the “Heroes of Russia” sprawl across highway bridges and loom over city streets throughout the land. The Russian Orthodox patriarch sings the praises of veterans from the pulpit,<a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-patriarch-kirill-dying-ukraine-sins/32052380.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener"> claiming</a> that to die in Ukraine “washes away all sins”.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/08/how-russia-fell-out-of-love-with-trump/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/08/how-russia-fell-out-of-love-with-trump/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/bromance.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/08/how-russia-fell-out-of-love-with-trump/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/08/how-russia-fell-out-of-love-with-trump/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>How Russia fell out of love with Trump</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/08/how-russia-fell-out-of-love-with-trump/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Ian Garner</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>On top of this choreographed public zeal is a deluge of advertising that promises up to $60,000 (USD) to those who enlist and survive a year as a <em>kontraktnik</em>, a contract soldier. The adverts promise Russian men that they can be rich and successful — which, stuck in the underdeveloped, stagnant regions outside wealthy cities, most ordinary Russians cannot otherwise hope to be. And it’s not just talk: as much as 1.5% of Russia’s GDP is being spent on these bonuses. The mostly uneducated men who seize the chance and survive their year in the “meat grinder”, which has left hundreds of thousands of Russian men dead in Ukraine,<a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2025/04/03/trump-putin-russia-ukraine-ceasefire-peace-negotiations-economy/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"> brag</a> on social media about the cash lining their pockets. Yet there is nothing to brag about during their time at the front, where they are initiated into Russia’s particularly brutal way of warfare which embraces violence, torture, rape, and the murder of combatants and civilians alike.</p>
<p>Russian soldiers are promised the very best treatment on their return from war. The Kremlin has created a special &#8220;Defenders of the Fatherland&#8221; foundation, led by<a href="https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D0%9F%D1%83%D1%82%D0%B8%D0%BD,_%D0%92%D0%BB%D0%B0%D0%B4%D0%B8%D0%BC%D0%B8%D1%80_%D0%92%D0%BB%D0%B0%D0%B4%D0%B8%D0%BC%D0%B8%D1%80%D0%BE%D0%B2%D0%B8%D1%87" target="_blank" rel="noopener"> Vladimir Putin&#8217;s</a> cousin Anna Tsivileva, to advocate for veterans. State-run groups on VK and Telegram — two of the country’s most popular social media platforms — run Q&amp;A<a href="https://vk.com/wall-37475973_52283?ysclid=mh8wgq5kf0133289040" target="_blank" rel="noopener"> sessions</a> for those seeking to maximize the new benefits the Kremlin is supposedly offering, which include access to family and child support, employment opportunities, and healthcare. The media<a href="https://news.mail.ru/society/66152484/?ysclid=mh8wdt5212458811158" target="_blank" rel="noopener"> explains</a> how soldiers and their families can access free trips to luxurious recuperation sanatoria; meanwhile, the wounded are supposedly cared for at hyper-modern rehabilitation clinics. In reality, such benefits are available only for the lucky few who can navigate their way through Russia’s arcane veterans bureaucracy.</p>
<p>Behind the Kremlin-orchestrated spectacle, however, lurks an angry, violent group of veterans. The state deliberately leaves its demobbed troops in a perpetual battle mode, firing them up with social and mainstream media campaigns that promise that, since Russia is surrounded by enemies at home and abroad, the battle is never over. Men who have killed for the state are told that they may have to fight again to defend their meager gains. Those who return home are thus often left unrecognizable. As one wife<a href="https://meduza.io/en/feature/2024/05/31/mitigating-factors" target="_blank" rel="noopener"> commented</a> on social media: “My husband returned home from the war. But this isn’t my husband, he’s not the man I knew before. Sometimes it feels like he was killed. His body came back, but not his soul. He’s become irritable. Everything angers him. Me, the kids, and everyone around him.” All over the country, Russia’s ex-soldiers seem incapable of interacting within a peaceful civilian milieu.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;Russia’s ex-soldiers seem incapable of interacting within a peaceful civilian milieu.&#8221;</div>
<p>Meanwhile, murder after murder hit the headlines. A veteran<a href="https://novayagazeta.eu/articles/2024/10/17/russian-veteran-who-allegedly-killed-friend-with-chair-before-going-to-bed-is-taken-into-custody-en-news" target="_blank" rel="noopener"> beats</a> his friend to death with a chair; another<a href="https://novayagazeta.eu/articles/2024/10/11/russian-veteran-and-former-convict-stabs-ex-girlfriend-to-death-in-front-of-daughter-en-news" target="_blank" rel="noopener"> stabs</a> his ex-girlfriend to death while her daughter watches; a Chechen man<a href="https://united24media.com/latest-news/russian-war-veteran-stabs-chechen-man-to-death-at-bus-stop-in-nizhny-novgorod-region-5698" target="_blank" rel="noopener"> is butchered</a> at a bus stop. These stories don’t receive much coverage in the Russian media, even as the violence conducted by ex-soldiers let loose on civilian society spreads. Serious crimes are punished with heavy jail terms, but the spiraling cases of domestic violence result in fines as small as $55 — pocket change for men who have made thousands of dollars by fighting in Ukraine. There is little real justice, and the state barely pretends to care.</p>
<p>When soldiers are demobbed from modern Western armed forces, they are offered psychological and reintegration support to help them leave their identity as soldiers — as killers — behind. But in Russia, no widespread programs exist for the hundreds of thousands of men Putin has sent to fight in Ukraine. The few rehabilitation centers that do exist are overwhelmed and poorly equipped to treat deep psychological trauma. And for those who develop post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) — a diagnosis barely even acknowledged in official media — help is scarce and stigmatized. After all, the state has no intention of transitioning these soldiers away from the violence of war — and that violence continues to offer plenty of rewards.</p>
<p>Problems are glossed over in the stilted bureaucratic language of the administrative state: “We have faced a shortage of rehabilitation institutions with highly qualified personnel,”<a href="https://www.business-gazeta.ru/article/675351?ysclid=mh8wllfw2v629108058" target="_blank" rel="noopener"> explained</a> one official this summer — but now the problem is “solved”. Wives are expected to<a href="https://vk.com/search?q=%D0%BF%D0%BE%D0%BC%D0%BE%D1%89%D1%8C%20%D0%BF%D0%BE%D1%81%D0%BB%D0%B5%20%D1%81%D0%B2%D0%BE&amp;z=video-13984605_456260695%20" target="_blank" rel="noopener"> support</a> their husbands instead of psychiatrists, reinforcing the state’s strict gender rules about women’s roles as supporters of male violence. Yet even the Kremlin does not pay more than lip service to the idea of instructing women on how to stem the rising tide of violence. One Moscow psychologist running a private practice told me they have treated a handful of former soldiers, but have been contacted by many more distraught wives — terrified of and for the men who came back from the front.</p>
<p>To those familiar with Russia’s history, this might seem par for the course. Over the past century, Russia has embroiled itself in vast wars that have left millions of men and women engulfed in post-traumatic nightmares when the guns have gone quiet. At times, this has tipped the country into outright chaos: would the Civil War have seen a wave of unfathomable brutality sweep across the country, resulting in at least eight million casualties, had the Eastern Front of the First World War not been so violent? Would post-Soviet Russia have been so dominated by criminal thuggery had a generation of young men not been sent to fight in Afghanistan, then welcomed home with a shrug as the USSR collapsed? Would the nihilism of the late Nineties, before Putin swept to power on promises of masculine and national renewal, have been so acute if Boris Yeltsin hadn’t sent a generation of conscripts into a conflict in Chechnya?</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/10/how-nord-stream-2-has-blown-up-europe/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/10/how-nord-stream-2-has-blown-up-europe/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/GettyImages-2213966859.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/10/how-nord-stream-2-has-blown-up-europe/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/10/how-nord-stream-2-has-blown-up-europe/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>How Nord Stream 2 has blown up Europe</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/10/how-nord-stream-2-has-blown-up-europe/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Wolfgang Münchau</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Each time Moscow sends its young to kill and be killed, it promises personal and collective triumph but delivers disillusionment. As one veteran of the Afghan war explained in Nobel prizewinner Svetlana Alexievich’s seminal study of those who had returned from that conflict, <em>Zinky Boys</em>: “I wanted to be in a war, but not like this one. Heroic World War 2, that’s what I wanted.” Successive regimes have seemed determined to treat the mass of their soldiers as<a href="https://www.wiley.com/en-us/Internal+Colonization:+Russia's+Imperial+Experience-p-9780745651293" target="_blank" rel="noopener"> human capital</a> more than as heroes. These angry bands of ex-soldiers have plagued the Kremlin’s incumbents with criminality, opposition and uprisings.</p>
<p>It might, therefore, appear that Putin is repeating the mistakes of the Eighties and Nineties as he foments another generation of angry soldiers who behave as brutally at home as they did at the front. But the state has done little to stymie what is an obvious problem. Instead, it almost seems to encourage it as a means to keep the entire population on edge, ready to engage in what the Kremlin <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/393526798_Russia_and_Modern_Fascism" target="_blank" rel="noopener">claims</a> is an endless war against enemies that are out to destroy Russia.</p>
<p>Putin has chosen to pursue a particularly bloody form of warfare in which soldiers are rewarded for committing violent atrocities. When they return home, the Kremlin’s soldiers are in turn offered opportunities to act as its agents of violence by enrolling in the domestic security services, taking up positions of power in the war economy, and advocating for further conflict. This is the approach Putin took in the 2000s, when he offered the disillusioned and criminal veterans of Afghanistan and Chechnya paths into the hierarchy of power as municipal police, security agents, mayors, governors, and even Duma deputies as a means to placate them. Now he is repeating the trick at a far larger scale.</p>
<p>These violent men do not represent a threat to Putin’s regime; in fact, they are key to upholding it. The Kremlin has<a href="https://cup.columbia.edu/book/russia-and-modern-fascism/9783838220154/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"> put</a> the country on a constant war footing, ensuring it is always ready to fight the next battle, which leaves it with little incentive to aid veterans. It thus pretends to help ex-soldiers while counting on those embittered and psychologically broken men to keep Russian society enveloped in a cycle of conflict and repression that Vladimir Putin’s allies claim is essential to the nation’s survival (and, of course, to their own hold on power). The soldier who lives by violence may prove necessary to an increasingly draconian regime that is struggling with a faltering economy, spiraling inflation, and a lackluster war effort. After all, history <a href="https://books.google.pl/books?id=pCeQDwAAQBAJ&amp;newbks=1&amp;newbks_redir=0&amp;lpg=PA308&amp;dq=freikorps%20trauma&amp;pg=PA308#v=onepage&amp;q&amp;f=false" target="_blank" rel="noopener">tells</a> us that oppression at home and conflicts abroad will be far more easily waged by bands of men who are psychologically traumatized by war and convinced that violence is simply part and parcel of political life.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, back in Chelyabinsk, Sergei Moskalenko is awaiting trial for the murder of his wife. Should he be convicted, he may not languish long in jail. Almost 200,000 Russian prisoners have already enlisted to, as the Red Army’s propagandists in the Second World War<a href="https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D0%98%D1%81%D0%BA%D1%83%D0%BF%D0%BB%D0%B5%D0%BD%D0%B8%D0%B5_%D0%BA%D1%80%D0%BE%D0%B2%D1%8C%D1%8E" target="_blank" rel="noopener"> christened</a> it, “atone for their crimes by blood”: to fight in return for their freedom. Moskalenko, in this case, may be back at the front within months — free to abscond, free to serve out his time, and free to return home, just as full of violence as when he left.</p>
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					<title>What Russians think about the peace talks</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2025/08/russians-are-laughing-at-the-peace-talks/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://stage.unherd.com/2025/08/russians-are-laughing-at-the-peace-talks/?edition=us#comments</comments>
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										<unherd:main_theme>Russia</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Ian Garner]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/Blue-thumb.jpg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>2</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[What's he really thinking? Andrew Caballero-Reynolds/AFP via Getty Images.]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Dr. Ian Garner</strong> is assistant professor of totalitarian studies at the Pilecki Institute in Warsaw. His latest book is <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/z-generation/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em>Z Generation: Russia&#8217;s Fascist Youth</em></a> (Hurst).</p>
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						<unherd:twitter_handle>irgarner</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is assistant professor of totalitarian studies at the Pilecki Institute in Warsaw. His latest book is <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/z-generation/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em>Z Generation: Russia's Fascist Youth</em></a> (Hurst).]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Wed, 20 Aug 2025 23:01:56 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Wed, 20 Aug 2025 23:01:56 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Media]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[peace talks]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Politics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Propaganda]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Putin]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[restofworld]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Russia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ukraine]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://stage.unherd.com/?p=702032</guid>
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								<![CDATA[The Kremlin has promised to humiliate Kyiv]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>Donald Trump, along with the rest of the Western political world, is full of optimism about peace in Ukraine. Following his intimate meeting with Vladimir Putin in Alaska, and his almost-cordial talks with Zelensky at the White House, the irrepressible American President is <a href="https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/115052030103944534" target="_blank" rel="noopener">treating</a> peace as all but guaranteed: “Everyone is very happy about the possibility of PEACE for Russia/Ukraine,” he wrote on Truth Social. He has even dangled the possibility of a three-way summit between himself, Putin, and Zelensky before the end of August.</p>
<p>Ukraine’s political leaders and population remain, understandably, far more cautious. Zelensky cannot easily accept a settlement that might cement the loss of vast swathes of his country in exchange for little more than a temporary reprieve from Russian attack. Europe’s leaders are likewise treading carefully. But the greatest hold-out remains Putin. If anyone thought that the spectacle of Putin’s welcome in Alaska, which brought the leader out from several years in the political cold, would persuade the Russian President to agree to peace, they may be in for disappointment. Putin appears set on pursuing the war against Ukraine and playing diplomatic hardball.</p>
<p>Compared to the excitable commentary that has resounded across the West, the Kremlin’s public response to the weekend’s events has been remarkably muted. Scoring an invitation to Alaska was certainly a coup, and pictures of American soldiers rolling out the red carpet for Putin were <a href="https://t.me/boris_rozhin/176201" target="_blank" rel="noopener">received</a> with delight on pro-Kremlin social media channels. However, a bland statement <a href="http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/77814" target="_blank" rel="noopener">released</a> by the Kremlin on 19 August mentioned only that Russia was “continuing to make progress on a peaceful resolution to the Ukraine crisis”. While Trump seems to think one grand photo-op with the leaders of Kyiv and Moscow will conjure peace, Putin is committing, as ever, to almost nothing at all.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, Putin’s mouthpieces are working hard to dampen expectations at home of a quick and easy deal. Where the White House speaks of a trilateral summit, Yuri Ushakov, one of Putin’s most senior foreign policy advisers, mentioned only the possibility of “raising the level of representatives of the parties”. This would mean that more rounds of lower-level talks, akin to earlier gatherings in Istanbul or Saudi Arabia that saw few concrete changes, would have to precede any grand summit.</p>
<p>Sergey Lavrov, Putin’s veteran foreign minister, who always chooses his words carefully, used a television appearance yesterday to <a href="https://t.me/aifonline/157943" target="_blank" rel="noopener">remind viewers that</a>: “the Ukrainian Constitution retains the obligation of the state to fully ensure the rights of Russians.” An official Kremlin statement said much the same: “without respect for the security of Russia and the full rights of Russians in Ukraine, there can be no talk of any long-term agreements.” These comments, which are being repeated across dozens of television channels and hundreds of social media feeds, echo the justifications Putin offered when he launched the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. By repeating them now, Lavrov and his diplomatic peers are making clear that the Kremlin is not on the verge of compromise. Russia will not be hurried by Trump, Zelensky, or anyone else.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;Putin appears set on pursuing the war against Ukraine and playing diplomatic hardball.&#8221;</div>
<p>These noises are being echoed in the massive, state-controlled Russian media landscape, where unlike on Trump’s feeds, the emphasis is on complexity. On Tuesday, <em>Izvestiya</em>, Russia’s newspaper of record, <a href="https://iz.ru/1939232/2025-08-19/tramp-vstretilsia-s-zelenskim-i-liderami-es-v-belom-dome-chto-nuzhno-znat">ran</a> a lengthy explainer that twisted Trump’s statement that the remaining issues aren’t “overly complex” to suggest that the issues <em>are </em>“complex” — a way of shifting attention away from the excitement in Washington and back towards the grinding reality of diplomacy.</p>
<p>These complex issues — questions of language, minority rights, Nato, and EU membership — will not, Russians are told, be resolved in multilateral forums with Zelensky and European leaders. The Russians remember all too well the failed Minsk agreements, which aimed to halt fighting in the east of Ukraine in 2014-15. Laboriously negotiated by Ukraine, Russia, France, and Germany over months, two separate agreements failed to stop the fighting. The Minsk process became — in Moscow’s eyes — a cause of the current invasion: the West, goes the Russian narrative, was only ever interested in helping Ukraine continue to attack “Russians” on its own territory.</p>
<p>The Russian media has a lowly opinion of Europe’s leaders, who are seen to be obsessing over irrelevant details and making impossible demands. Aleksandr Kots, one of Russia’s leading war correspondents, described Monday’s Washington DC meeting bluntly: “The Europeans have proven their absolute uselessness.” Zelensky fares no better. He remains, in Russian state media, the illegitimate head of a “Kiev regime” who has put off elections in Ukraine and only holds power due to what is portrayed as the illegal Maidan “coup”. Dmitry Medvedev, ever one for a fiery turn of phrase, <a href="https://www.foxnews.com/world/russias-medvedev-says-europes-coalition-willing-failed-outplay-trump-after-zelenskyy-meeting" target="_blank" rel="noopener">dismisses</a> him on social media as a “buffoon”; others <a href="https://www.kp.ru/daily/27740/5129962/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">declare</a> that he is trapped in a diplomatic “dead end”. These comments rocket between social and traditional media and vice versa, filling Russians’ minds with the same idea.</p>
<p>The only dealmaker Russian commentators are interested in is Trump. He has been cast as a decisive leader who can talk straight with Putin and put Europe in its place. State outlets <a href="https://www.kp.ru/daily/27740/5129962/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">reveled</a> in reports that the American President had “harshly rebuffed” European leaders’ ceasefire proposals during their meetings in Washington. For Russia’s commentators, Monday’s meeting was a distraction from the real action: negotiations between Trump and Putin.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/08/europe-isnt-prepared-for-peace/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/08/europe-isnt-prepared-for-peace/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/08/newtrump.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/08/europe-isnt-prepared-for-peace/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested article</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/08/europe-isnt-prepared-for-peace/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Europe isn’t prepared for peace</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/08/europe-isnt-prepared-for-peace/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Wolfgang Munchau</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Yet any admiration for Trump is tempered by the widespread belief that he will easily be outwitted by Putin. Pro-Kremlin journalist Aleksandr Yunashev <a href="https://t.me/Yunashev_Live/106181" target="_blank" rel="noopener">warned</a> on Telegram that a Putin-Zelensky summit “on any terms does not correspond to our interests, but we do not plan to close this window of opportunity”. Trump, he reminded readers, still wants to sell weapons to Ukraine and has a record of flip-flops and about-turns. Yunashev thus suggests that Moscow is wary of Trump, but will string him along — because, unlike Europe’s divided, ineffectual, and indecisive leaders, Trump can supposedly deliver what Putin wants.</p>
<p>Scroll through Russian Telegram channels and the message is clear: Putin is masterminding the entire negotiation process. He is outfoxing Trump, running circles around the hapless Europeans, and reducing Zelensky to an illegitimate spectator. Little surprise that some Russian social media users <a href="https://t.me/tsargradtv/114527?comment=3498895" target="_blank" rel="noopener">believe</a> that Putin is &#8220;laughing at the plans of all the people who might try to make a fool of him”.</p>
<p>The propagandists insist that Russia is making great gains in its offensive in Eastern Ukraine. Breakthroughs, whether real or exaggerated, are trumpeted as proof that Moscow has the upper hand, even as the Russian economy stutters and army recruitment barely keeps pace with casualties. The more land Putin holds when a summit with Zelensky eventually happens, the more he can claim in any territorial deal. In fact, he’s used this tactic before, back in 2015, when Russian forces pushed to seize the Ukrainian settlement of Debaltseve even as the Minsk II ceasefire was being finalized — and briefly continued that push even after the deal was struck. In recent weeks, Russian officials have repeatedly <a href="https://www.prio.org/comments/1781" target="_blank" rel="noopener">reiterated</a> their maximalist war goals, which would leave Ukraine not controlled by Moscow but in a quasi-dismembered state ripe for the economic and political taking. There is no sign of a sea change after the weekend’s public diplomacy.</p>
<p>The Kremlin, in short, is telling two stories to two different audiences. Putin tells Trump that the peace negotiations are serious, that the Kremlin is ready to make progress, and that Russia may even agree to Trump’s grand peacemaking summit with Zelensky. Meanwhile, Russian media is telling citizens to trust the President’s plan: if the Russian people endure further conflict, then the Kremlin will deliver them territory, protection, self-respect, and a seat at the global top table. Most of all, though, the Kremlin is promising that Zelensky will be brought to a summit with Putin not to negotiate but to submit to a humiliating peace deal.</p>
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					<title>Could defeat radicalize Ukraine?</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2025/08/could-defeat-radicalise-ukraine/?edition=us</link>
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										<unherd:main_theme>Alaska summit</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Ian Garner]]>
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							<![CDATA[The Ukrainian far-Right is currently a tiny minority.  Sergei Supinsky/AFP via Getty.]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Dr. Ian Garner</strong> is assistant professor of totalitarian studies at the Pilecki Institute in Warsaw. His latest book is <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/z-generation/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em>Z Generation: Russia&#8217;s Fascist Youth</em></a> (Hurst).</p>
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						<unherd:twitter_handle>irgarner</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is assistant professor of totalitarian studies at the Pilecki Institute in Warsaw. His latest book is <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/z-generation/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em>Z Generation: Russia's Fascist Youth</em></a> (Hurst).]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Thu, 14 Aug 2025 23:01:47 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Thu, 14 Aug 2025 23:01:47 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Alaska]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Donald Trump]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Europe]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Peace]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Putin]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[russia ukraine war]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ukraine]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[War]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Zelensky]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://stage.unherd.com/?p=700703</guid>
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								<![CDATA[Dishonored nations turn violent]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Humiliation on the battlefield is one of the most reliable catalysts for an ultranationalist backlash. From the Freikorps in Germany to Russian “violence merchants” — the embittered veterans of the Afghan War and the brutal conflicts of the Nineties — rage, criminality, and organized violence have a habit of spilling back into society when wars end in dishonor. Disappointed, traumatized troops return home with the conviction that only force can redeem the nation, spreading chaos and revanchist politics as they go. And, if Vladimir Putin </span><a href="https://www.barrons.com/articles/putin-will-get-what-he-wants-in-alaska-his-long-game-353680aa"><span style="font-weight: 400">manages</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400"> to draw Donald Trump into agreeing to a one-sided peace deal that will reward his war of aggression and leave thousands of Ukrainians stranded under a brutal Russian occupation, history could yet repeat itself in Kyiv. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Today, Putin and Trump are expected to meet and, if Trump is to be taken at his word, hammer out the terms of a peace deal over Ukraine. The stakes could hardly be higher. Trump, ever the showman, </span><a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/crev9ep2vdgo"><span style="font-weight: 400">hails</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400"> the Alaska meeting as a decisive moment to “end the war”. Across the table, two men whose own political fortunes have been bound up with nationalist spectacle may soon decide Ukraine’s future. Regardless of what they agree, one thing is missing: Ukrainian representation. And without that representation, any deal may fuel Ukrainian veterans’ disappointment, damning its society to years of political turmoil.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">The phrase doing the rounds around the proposed deal is “</span><a href="https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-land-swap-trump-summit-e8e869d5d5ec672fee3e86022b20d11a"><span style="font-weight: 400">land swap</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400">” — a euphemism that, in practice, means no swap at all. In reality, it would involve Ukraine ceding a vast swathe of territory now under Russian occupation. Should that happen, and should Zelensky be bludgeoned into selling the deal to his own people, Ukraine’s near future could be defined less by recovery than by a smoldering, violent response to perceived defeat.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Unsurprisingly, Ukrainians across the political spectrum are furious with the outline of the deal. Zelensky himself, who is under immense pressure from the country’s political class and civil society not to hand Putin a victory, would find it all but impossible to sell any deal to the public, even if he wanted to. As he has </span><a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/aug/12/ukraine-russia-donbas-springboard-for-war-zelenskyy"><span style="font-weight: 400">made</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400"> this clear: “Ukraine won’t cede land that could be used as a springboard for war.” He has been similarly bullish about being frozen out of the Alaska summit, warning that “they cannot decide anything about Ukraine without us”.</span></p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">“Ukraine’s near future could be defined less by recovery than by a smoldering, violent response to perceived defeat.”</div>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Ukrainians remember the failures of the Minsk I and II agreements made with Putin a decade ago, and Russia riding roughshod over the Budapest Memorandum that promised them safety in return for giving up their nuclear arms in the Nineties. Above all, they remember the images of murdered civilians in Bucha and Irpin that shocked the world in early 2022. Soldiers on the front, where the death and casualty rate soars ever higher, and where at least 50,000 Ukrainians have died, bristle at the idea of giving in to Russia. As one frontline soldier put it, fighting will </span><a href="https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/ukrainian-troops-doubt-quick-ceasefire-reject-territorial-concessions-2025-08-12/?utm_source=chatgpt.com"><span style="font-weight: 400">continue</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400"> “until Russia suffers big enough losses”. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">A deal that therefore fails to grapple either with the causes or the effects of the war — which have never been limited to Nato expansion — will only ever result in backlash from the Ukrainian population. Indeed, it is important to stress that the war against Ukraine stems from the Kremlin’s increasingly paranoid, imperialist messianism, a worldview in which Ukraine’s independent existence is an existential affront. Ever since the humiliation of seeing his favored candidate, Viktor Yanukovych, lose Ukraine’s 2004 presidential election to the Western Ukrainian Viktor Yushchenko, Putin’s state media has peddled myths about Ukrainian “nationalists” and “Nazis” plotting against Russian-speakers in Ukraine. After the Maidan Revolution of 2014, Russia’s dictator acted on those fictions, invading Crimea and parts of Donbas under the pretext of stopping an imagined “genocide” against Russian speakers.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">By 2022, Putin’s language had become even more wild. After all, Ukraine’s far-Right held only a sliver of the electoral vote, and no seats in parliament. It had little following on social media and no discernible cultural sway. Indeed, the country’s president was a Russian-speaking Jewish entertainer popular on both sides of the border, elected not to build a nationalist utopia but on a promise to ease the war in the east. Putin’s war against “fascists” has always been Quixotic — a tilting at windmills in service of an imagined imperial conquest by a man who increasingly </span><a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/peace-is-impossible-while-vladimir-putin-denies-ukraines-right-to-exist/"><span style="font-weight: 400">sees</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400"> himself as a new Peter the Great, or even a new Stalin.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">However dim the prospects of regaining territory currently occupied by Russian forces, agreeing to formally surrender it would be a deep psychic wound. Russian forces have committed war crimes on an industrial scale. They have flattened cities like Mariupol, where 85% of the housing stock was destroyed and tens of thousands of civilians killed. In place of a functioning if corrupt democracy, Russia has established a system of totalitarian </span><a href="https://t4pua.org/en/2869"><span style="font-weight: 400">torture</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400"> and control that sees objectors beaten, jailed, and murdered. All the while, </span><a href="https://instytutpileckiego.pl/pl/instytut/aktualnosci/raport-skradzione-dziecinstwo-zbrodnie-przeciwko-dzieciom"><span style="font-weight: 400">children</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400"> are torn from their parents and sent to Russia, to be adopted and “Russified”. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Moscow </span><a href="https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.15715194"><span style="font-weight: 400">taunts</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400"> Ukrainians online with glossy footage of rebuilt apartment blocks and new public facilities — much of it in fact shoddy — and grotesque images of sites where Ukrainian children are put up for adoption. Toss resentment against an unjust peace into the mix and the response could be severe. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">A “stab in the back” myth — built around the belief that Washington and Europe have always been slow to back Ukraine, before abandoning Kyiv when the fight became inconvenient — is already simmering in Ukrainian discourse. Trump is certainly unpopular in this regard, but his predecessor Joe Biden was the </span><a href="https://theconversation.com/why-did-the-us-change-its-mind-on-ukraine-firing-missiles-into-russia-and-will-it-impact-the-war-243920"><span style="font-weight: 400">target</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400"> of much ire for slow-pedaling on first providing, then giving permission to use, the ATACMS missile system.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">The roots of this narrative go back to 2014, when Germany’s business-as-usual policy with Moscow brushed over the seizure of Crimea. From there, the “betrayal” of Ukraine seems set to dominate every nook and cranny of Ukrainian society over years to come, should the Trump-Putin deal become a reality. Nor is this really surprising: what was the sacrifice of tens of thousands of Ukrainian lives worth if the outcome is not merely lost land but a diminished sense of nationhood — and thousands more Ukrainians abandoned to their fates under Moscow’s thumb? </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Some Ukrainians might still look to Europe for answers. The pro-Nato, pro-EU bloc, which sees them as bulwarks against Putin’s war on individual freedom, remains the largest and most powerful force in Ukrainian politics. For its part, Zelensky’s Servant of the People party still leads the polls by some distance. Yet Europe looks to many like a house divided: Keir Starmer and Emmanuel Macron’s “coalition of the willing” has talked up its willingness to help, but in practice has done little to prepare for a defense of either Ukraine or the European continent. Instead, leaders have </span><a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QoiDzhpfpQQ"><span style="font-weight: 400">gazed</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400"> on as Trump’s Ukraine policy has oscillated, even as the Kremlin has </span><a href="https://nationalinterest.org/feature/russias-hybrid-war-on-poland?fbclid=IwY2xjawMJHxVleHRuA2FlbQIxMQABHlZ7mLVNRntMcj9nHzSGMdUZtw7YRXcva24ypCv674KCxA7y-SiKq5NyOL4u_aem_rduGPHuUnO8ntZKzN3S16Q"><span style="font-weight: 400">conducted</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400"> a hybrid war against Europe. An extraordinary 90% of Ukrainians favored EU membership last summer. Surely that number will not hold if the stab-in-the-back narrative spreads. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">The darkest scenario here is an ultra-nationalist turn, and a politics dominated by embittered, violent veterans in a demographically and economically decimated country hungry for scapegoats. And scapegoats there will be. In some corners of Ukrainian society — including pro-European and liberal factions, but especially among the armed forces — names are already circling: Western leaders are first among the </span><a href="https://www.bangkokpost.com/world/2972828/stab-in-the-back-ukrainians-in-shock-after-us-aid-halt"><span style="font-weight: 400">villains</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400">, blamed for choosing short-term and commercial interests over saving Ukraine. But Ukrainian military leaders and politicians are not without blame. That means above all military commanders such as Oleksandr Syrskyi, the commander-in-chief blamed by ordinary soldiers for the worsening frontline situation in recent months. Should Zelensky be seen to sell his forces down the river, the reaction will be extreme, regardless of how little choice he actually had.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">The optics of the Alaska summit will not help here. A camera-friendly meeting between Putin and Trump — two strongmen casually hashing out Ukraine’s future without a single Ukrainian in the room — has justifiably enraged Ukrainians across the political spectrum. If the deal is rammed through over Kyiv’s objections, nationalists will mine the “betrayal” for decades: it’ll be another Munich, when Hitler was allowed to annex the Sudetenland, with today’s Ukraine betrayed by a West that simply didn’t care. Ukrainians could thus prime themselves for another war, choosing leaders whose reputation and politics rests on war — or find themselves watching as those leaders, from among a corps of embittered veterans, force their way to power.</span></p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">“Should Zelensky be seen to sell his forces down the river, the reaction will be extreme, regardless of how little choice he actually had.”</div>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Support for nationalist factions today is still limited. The far-Right remains a minority in politics. In a June poll, the ultranationalist National Corps reached 6%, its highest ever rating. But Servant of the People did not even exist a decade ago, and Ukraine’s political scene is not dominated by entrenched parties. Especially in the wake of a devastating war, it is deeply susceptible to whirlwind forces transforming nations everywhere: online mobilization, norm-shattering rhetoric, the rise of new parties from nowhere, and the demolition of old political truths. Not long ago, most Ukrainians opposed Nato membership. Indeed, not long ago, Zelensky was a TV comedian. There is nothing to prevent an ultra-nationalist rise in Ukraine. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">The question, then, is not where public opinion stands today but where it might go in the next few years, turbocharged by disappointment, social collapse, economic devastation, and a Europe increasingly inclined to slam the door shut on a fragile and unstable Ukraine. The Ukraine that could emerge would be defined by military paranoia. Veterans alone would have “earned” the right to set the national agenda. Indeed, rumors now abound that figures like Valerii Zaluzhnyi, the popular former commander-in-chief now serving as Ukraine’s ambassador in the United Kingdom, might enter politics. Zaluzhnyi is no extremist, but others with more hardline views might explode from the ranks of the army into the public consciousness should widespread resentment take hold. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Indeed, Zelensky’s decision to welcome and thus implicitly endorse nationalist soldiers in the military, desperate for anyone willing to fight, may turn out to be a major strategic error. This Ukraine would look neither to Brussels nor to Washington but inward — rebuilding its forces, militarizing society, and, as some voices around the country are already advocating for, seeking nuclear weapons to reverse the “mistake” of giving up its arsenal in the Nineties. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Putin claimed he was forced to invade Ukraine to destroy the threat of Ukrainian “fascism”. Yet in February 2022, the far-Right in Ukraine was a negligible force: indeed Russia’s neo-Nazi problem far exceeded Ukraine’s. But do a deal with Trump over his enemy’s head, and Putin could soon find that his fantasy of a fascist Ukraine becomes reality. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">I am not arguing that this is the most likely scenario. Ukraine’s democracy has repeatedly resisted the pull of extremes — from Russian interference and invasion to internal politicking and corruption — since independence from Moscow in 1991. Its commitment to reinforcing democratic norms, bolstered by the EU, other nations, and a large, vocal civic block willing to take to the streets, most recently against Zelensky’s targeting of anti-corruption laws, suggests that liberal democracy may yet prevail.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">But nationalists will not hesitate to use force if they see an opening. Complacent Western leaders, and Trump most of all, seem uninterested in this risk. Ironically, this was the very mistake made in Russia in the Nineties, when the West adopted a <a href="https://www.npr.org/sections/money/2022/03/22/1087654279/how-shock-therapy-created-russian-oligarchs-and-paved-the-path-for-putin" target="_blank" rel="noopener">shock economic policy</a> to “repair” post-Soviet Russia while ignoring worrying trends in the country’s culture and identity. Putin, for his part, knows all about the psychologically scarred veterans of the Afghan and Chechen wars. After all, in the early 2000s, he channeled their trauma and propensity for violence into support for his own nationalist myth. Today, his government and security services are full of these men, still willing to use any means to secure and hold power.</span></p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/08/the-new-cold-war-will-divide-the-west/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/08/the-new-cold-war-will-divide-the-west/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/08/GettyImages-2212294858.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/08/the-new-cold-war-will-divide-the-west/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/08/the-new-cold-war-will-divide-the-west/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The new Cold War will divide the West</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/08/the-new-cold-war-will-divide-the-west/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Philip Cunliffe</a></p></div></a></div>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Reining in such forces in a post-conflict Ukraine will be a vital task. Peace can be salvaged even from the most brutal and bitter conflicts, but only with hard work, serious negotiation, mutual compromise, and above all, a focus on what comes </span><i><span style="font-weight: 400">after</span></i><span style="font-weight: 400"> the ink dries. The Dayton Accords, which ended the Yugoslav wars in 1995, were the product of three months of intense talks built on years of groundwork, strong-arming from Europe and the Americans — and input from all sides. And even then, the Accords left the roots of nationalism and factionalism intact.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">The mooted Alaska plan is long on promises and short on detail. A made-for-social-media deal is unlikely to last. Even those Ukrainians most inclined to peace are unlikely to be placated by a “land surrender” agreement while Russia remains unbowed. At any moment, Moscow could return to the battlefield, retooled and remanned, this time without the blunders of February 2022. Putin shows no signs of making real concessions. His propagandists continue their maximalist talk, and his army continues its scorched-earth advances. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Indeed, the further Ukraine moves towards ultranationalism to hedge against this continued threat — or in response to the disappointment of a peace deal forced down the population’s throats — the more Putin will claim he is justified in launching new aggression against his western neighbor. The peace deal, far from ending the fight, might only encourage Russia to assault the fragile remainder of a free Ukraine in a few years’ time.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Nonetheless, nobody in the White House, publicly at least, seems to be thinking beyond the next move. Signing a peace deal will not make the problem of Russian aggression disappear; it may even exacerbate the problem. As heart-rending images of burned-out Ukrainian cities and murdered Ukrainian families fade from our screens, we may be tempted to believe the problem is gone. But Moscow will still be fighting — and a resentful, traumatized Ukraine will still remember. </span></p>
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					<title>How Russia fell out of love with Trump</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2025/08/how-russia-fell-out-of-love-with-trump/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://stage.unherd.com/2025/08/how-russia-fell-out-of-love-with-trump/?edition=us#comments</comments>
										<unherd:featured_image>https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/bromance.jpg?w=544</unherd:featured_image>
										<unherd:main_theme>War</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Ian Garner]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/Blue-thumb.jpg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>2</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[Will Putin listen to Trump's latest ultimatum? Photo: Sean Gallup/Getty.]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Dr. Ian Garner</strong> is assistant professor of totalitarian studies at the Pilecki Institute in Warsaw. His latest book is <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/z-generation/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em>Z Generation: Russia&#8217;s Fascist Youth</em></a> (Hurst).</p>
]]>
						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>irgarner</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is assistant professor of totalitarian studies at the Pilecki Institute in Warsaw. His latest book is <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/z-generation/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em>Z Generation: Russia's Fascist Youth</em></a> (Hurst).]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Thu, 31 Jul 2025 23:01:05 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Fri, 01 Aug 2025 09:21:48 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Donald Trump]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Europe]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Politics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Russia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ukraine]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ukraine ceasefire]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Vladimir Putin]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://stage.unherd.com/?p=696919</guid>
																												<description>
								<![CDATA[His ultimatum has ended the Putin bromance]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>The man who once <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2025/07/29/politics/trump-promises-gaza-ukraine-mcgurk-analysis" target="_blank" rel="noopener">claimed</a> he could end the war in Ukraine on his first day in office appears to be finally losing patience with the Kremlin. On Monday, President Donald Trump declared that he was shortening his former 50-day peace deadline; from then on, Trump <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/trump-sets-new-deadline-10-or-12-days-russia-act-ukraine-2025-07-28/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">insisted</a>, Putin had just “10 or 12 days” to move toward peace.</p>
<p>The Kremlin has thus far shown no signs of easing off its offensive campaign against Ukraine. Indeed, it is <a href="https://kyivindependent.com/massive-fires-reported-in-kyiv-amid-russias-latest-drone-attack/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">pummeling</a> its neighbor with rocket and drone attacks almost nightly. But for once, Trump’s MAGA supporters, who have been <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-politics/trump-putin-russia-maga-republicans-b2716558.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">skeptical</a> toward granting Ukraine aid and even supportive of Vladimir Putin, have shown little signs of disagreement. The loudest voices, such as that of Senator Lindsey Graham, have <a href="https://x.com/LindseyGrahamSC/status/1949938809095016804" target="_blank" rel="noopener">promised</a> that the President means business: “To those in Russia who believe that President Trump is not serious about ending the bloodbath between Russia and Ukraine: You and your customers will soon be sadly mistaken… Get to the peace table.”</p>
<p>Will the sheer strength of Trump’s nerve, backed up by the threat of a more united Republican Party, yet more American military support for Ukraine, and further sanctions against Russia, be enough to finally force Putin to retreat? The reaction in both Russian diplomatic and political circles, and in the social media spaces where hundreds of state-aligned and funded influencers, bloggers, and “grassroots” news services disseminate opinions on the war against Ukraine, suggests not. Trump’s once enviable stock has plummeted in the Russian patriotic sphere, which now treats “grandpa Donny” as a flaccid figure of fun and laughs off his threats of repercussions.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/07/why-ukraine-cant-trust-the-white-house/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/07/why-ukraine-cant-trust-the-white-house/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/zelen.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/07/why-ukraine-cant-trust-the-white-house/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/07/why-ukraine-cant-trust-the-white-house/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Why Ukraine can’t trust the White House</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/07/why-ukraine-cant-trust-the-white-house/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Ian Garner</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>The transformation of Trump’s image in the Russian public eye has taken place at lightning speed. During Trump’s first four years in the White House, Russia was <a href="https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2020-11-05/russia-us-presidential-elections-neutrality-a-slight-tilt" target="_blank" rel="noopener">disappointed</a> by the American President’s coolness toward the Kremlin. However, the promise of a newly combative Trump returning to power and pulling the rug from under Ukraine sent Russian hopes sky high. Moscow sent a string of positive signals in the wake of Trump’s inauguration, congratulating the leader and indicating its readiness to talk terms not just on Ukraine but on Russia’s re-entry into the global financial and political elite. Mere weeks ago, Russian politicians were still sprinkling their public pronouncements with praise for a leader they considered, if not quite Putin’s equal, then at least the kind of old-fashioned quasi-authoritarian with whom they could do business.</p>
<p>A series of phone calls between Putin and Trump, in which the former <a href="http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/76953" target="_blank" rel="noopener">wished</a> his opposite number every “success” at home and committed to collaboration and cooperation, had been <a href="http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/76953" target="_blank" rel="noopener">heralded</a> by the Russian President himself as “very constructive”. After all, as Putin put it in late June, Trump was just like him: a man who had battled the liberal enemy to seize power, who wanted to put his country on the right track at any cost, and who <a href="http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/77316" target="_blank" rel="noopener">was</a>, “a manly fellow, that much is clear”. The two men were, as one Kremlin aide put it, “on the same wavelength”: together the strongmen would bring Ukraine to heel, carve up assets and influence, and humiliate liberal factions across Europe.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">“The transformation of Trump’s image in the Russian public eye has taken place at lightning speed.“</div>
<p>The so-called “Runet<em>”</em> — the parallel network of Russian-language web and social media spaces that dominates the country’s online life — embraced Trump in exactly these terms. He was the sort of man who, even if they disagreed on some aspects of policy, at least respected and understood Russian nationalism and Russia’s war against Ukraine. Images of Putin and Trump conversing on equal terms, memes depicting Trump as an all-American hero crushing the liberals (often sourced from MAGA groups on Truth Social and other pro-Trump networks), and commentary anticipating a deal that would wrap up the war to Russia’s benefit proliferated.</p>
<p>When Trump all but kicked Volodymyr Zelensky out of the Oval Office in February, the Runet went <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2025/02/28/russia-reaction-trump-zelenskyy-meeting-00002741" target="_blank" rel="noopener">wild</a>. Trump had bested the “little pig” Zelensky; he had emasculated Russia’s ur-enemy.</p>
<p>Yet Trump’s “10 to 12 days” demand has transformed his image on the Runet. A flood of derisive material has dismissed the President’s ultimatum and belittled him in terms equivalent to those formerly reserved for Joe Biden and Barack Obama — in Russia, Biden is derided as a befuddled, powerless old man with no grasp on reality, while Obama is mocked in racist terms and called a liberal cuckold. Ivan Kondakov, a popular nationalist social media influencer who has <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/z-generation/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">appeared</a> on state TV, penned a poem mocking Trump: “Each of us got lots done through the day/Sorted the mess, did work the right way/But Trump just sat there losing it,/Running his mouth, talking total shit.” An AI-generated image that has gone viral in Russia shows an exhausted Trump in a therapist’s office: “And how long has it been since you last made peace?” the therapist asks. “A week,” Trump says. “Now I really want to un-make peace with somebody.” Far from being the “manly” figure praised by Putin and the Russosphere in recent months, Trump has been cast as the fool: a leader incapable of making up his mind, and who is roundly ignored by the resolutely robust and powerful Russia.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/05/trumps-peacemaking-was-always-doomed/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/05/trumps-peacemaking-was-always-doomed/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/GettyImages-2212826685.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/05/trumps-peacemaking-was-always-doomed/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/05/trumps-peacemaking-was-always-doomed/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Trump’s peacemaking was always doomed</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/05/trumps-peacemaking-was-always-doomed/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Thomas Fazi</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Many of these Runet posts are followed by a cacophony of derisive comments and reams of laughter emojis: “He came up with his own ultimatum and now he can stew in it. Donny the bullshit artist”; “The orange guy’s lying. In reality, Putin told him to fuck off. The orange guy’s just hiding it.” Gone from the Runet is Trump the strongman. In his place is a pathetic figure who is dominated by Putin and whose tantrums and threats are as easy to ignore as they are to laugh at.</p>
<p>Naturally, Russia’s chaotic social media sphere does not dictate Moscow’s foreign policy, nor will much of this material ever reach the eyes and ears of Trump. However, a threat made in the realm of international relations rests on credibility: will the politician or country making the threat actually follow through? The more Trump shifts from one position to another without taking action against Russia, the more likely it is that Putin will call his bluff. In the early days of his second presidency, Trump appeared to have a chance to exert his will to bring the war in Ukraine to an end or at least a standstill — whether by working with Putin or against him. But the more he flip-flops, the more he turns into a figure that the Kremlin will ignore.</p>
<p>Perhaps even Trump subconsciously recognizes the limits of his will. Reflecting on his latest ultimatum, he wondered aloud: “I dunno if it&#8217;s going to affect Russia.” He may not know what comes next, but the patriotic segments of Russia’s public and politicians are far more certain: they believe that Trump is an emperor with no clothes, and that Putin has bested yet another American president.</p>
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									<item>
					<title>Why Ukraine can’t trust the White House</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2025/07/why-ukraine-cant-trust-the-white-house/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://stage.unherd.com/2025/07/why-ukraine-cant-trust-the-white-house/?edition=us#comments</comments>
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										<unherd:main_theme>U-turn</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Ian Garner]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/Blue-thumb.jpg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>3</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[In two weeks will Trump change his mind again? Photo: Sergei Supinsky/Getty.]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Dr. Ian Garner</strong> is assistant professor of totalitarian studies at the Pilecki Institute in Warsaw. His latest book is <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/z-generation/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em>Z Generation: Russia&#8217;s Fascist Youth</em></a> (Hurst).</p>
]]>
						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>irgarner</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is assistant professor of totalitarian studies at the Pilecki Institute in Warsaw. His latest book is <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/z-generation/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em>Z Generation: Russia's Fascist Youth</em></a> (Hurst).]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Tue, 15 Jul 2025 23:00:48 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Wed, 16 Jul 2025 06:37:41 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Donald Trump]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Politics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[President Zelensky]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[russia ukraine war]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[US]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Vladamir Putin]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Xi Jinping]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://stage.unherd.com/?p=692722</guid>
																												<description>
								<![CDATA[Trump’s inconsistency is predictable]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>Donald Trump, apparently “disappointed” by Russia’s increasingly intense attacks on Ukraine over the past month, is on the warpath. News that the mercurial American president has agreed to provide Ukraine with billions of dollars’ worth of military equipment, paid for by NATO allies, and threaten Russia with “100% tariffs” has come as a shock to Ukrainian decision-makers and analysts only just responding to the sudden <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/7/11/us-sending-special-envoy-after-weapons-deliveries-resumed-says-ukraine" target="_blank" rel="noopener">pause</a> and subsequent resumption of US weapon deliveries — all in just a few short weeks. Pro-Ukrainian commentators, such as former US Ambassador to Moscow Michael McFaul, are <a href="https://x.com/McFaul/status/1944800693468192986" target="_blank" rel="noopener">delighted</a>: “President Trump is finally beginning to understand the true nature of Putin.”</p>
<p>But it is not yet five months since Volodymyr Zelensky’s visit to the Oval Office ended abruptly — and in humiliating fashion — after Trump dressed down his Ukrainian opposite number, accusing him of “gambling with World War III”. Trump’s months-long charm offensive with Vladimir Putin, meanwhile, was characterized by lengthy and seemingly convivial phone calls that <a href="https://www.newstatesman.com/world/europe/ukraine/2025/02/donald-trump-vladimir-putin-russia-ukraine" target="_blank" rel="noopener">flattered</a> the Russian president’s ego. Nonetheless, it did not budge the Kremlin’s position on the war. An apparently irate Trump, who styles himself as the ur-peacemaker, now claims to want to “finish” the war through other means. On the surface, it seems as if Trump’s policy toward Russia and Ukraine has entirely shifted in the last two weeks.</p>
<p>If Trump is still committed to ending the war in Ukraine, which last autumn he promised he could do in 100 days, then he has decided — for the time being at least — to achieve that goal by forcing Vladimir Putin to back down rather than giving him what he wants. Today, he is not just promising a restored weapons supply, he is even purportedly <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/b66f03b5-e295-4f8c-92ba-516a527d588c" target="_blank" rel="noopener">asking</a> Zelensky if he can strike deep into Russian territory, potentially as far as Moscow. “Absolutely”, reportedly replied Zelensky, “We can, if you give us the weapons.” Is this a new Trump, whose electoral commitment to isolationism and peace has seen him launch attacks on Iran and now promise to use American military might to bend Moscow to his will? And if this new, serious Trump is willing to use such levers to get his way, do his intentions go beyond a change in policy toward Russia and Ukraine?</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/06/why-russia-fell-out-with-iran/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/06/why-russia-fell-out-with-iran/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/GettyImages-2210143605.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/06/why-russia-fell-out-with-iran/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/06/why-russia-fell-out-with-iran/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Why Russia fell out with Iran</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/06/why-russia-fell-out-with-iran/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Ian Garner</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>The halls of power in Washington are riven with divides over these questions. A substantial group, including, most notably, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Elbridge Colby, have been vocal <a href="https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/elbridge-colbys-vision-blocking-china/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">advocates</a> for a rapprochement with Moscow, which they see as a means to disrupt the emerging Russia-China partnership by trying to get on side with Moscow and thus weaken Beijing. Meanwhile, another group, including Senator Lindsey Graham, advocates for a more hawkish policy toward Russia that resembles Cold War-era visions of containment and would play well with an American public that <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/2025/04/17/how-americans-view-russia-and-putin/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">remains</a> deeply suspicious of Vladimir Putin’s Russia. In recent days, analysts have <a href="https://www.semafor.com/article/07/09/2025/trump-edges-closer-to-russia-hawks-but-will-the-move-last" target="_blank" rel="noopener">struggled</a> to understand where Trump stands, given that the president now seems to be as critical of Vladimir Putin as he has been of Xi Jinping, and whether his new approach will last.</p>
<p>The explanation for the last fortnight’s events is as simple as it is frustrating for analysts and Ukraine’s military planners: although the White House’s policy in the short-term may have changed, the underlying logic of Trump’s behavior remains just the same. Few can disagree that Donald Trump — ever since the Eighties, and certainly since 2016 — has been a creature who feeds on, and whose persona has been created by, media attention. It is Vladimir Putin’s continued stalling over giving Trump the grandest of all headlines — Trump as the great peacemaker in Ukraine, Trump as a potential Nobel Peace Prize winner — that is likely motivating the president to change tack today.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/05/trumps-peacemaking-was-always-doomed/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/05/trumps-peacemaking-was-always-doomed/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/GettyImages-2212826685.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/05/trumps-peacemaking-was-always-doomed/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/05/trumps-peacemaking-was-always-doomed/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Trump’s peacemaking was always doomed</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/05/trumps-peacemaking-was-always-doomed/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Thomas Fazi</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Trump seems to <a href="https://legrandcontinent.eu/fr/2025/02/05/trump-destruction-spectaculaire/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">feed</a> on news coverage that, whether as hero or villain, makes him out as the protagonist of the story: the deal-maker who calls the shots. Look at how often he complains of being treated unfairly by the media, how he stages extravagant shows of signing executive orders and appearing in the White House to dictate the run of political play, and how he even brought a military parade to Washington in June. Trump’s staged phone calls with Putin, his elaborately orchestrated <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/3/24/us-russia-talks-on-ukraine-war-whats-on-the-table-in-saudi-arabia" target="_blank" rel="noopener">peace</a> talks in Saudi Arabia, and his Oval Office blow-up with Zelensky — all of which favored the Russian president — have come to nought.</p>
<p>Moreover, theatrics sympathetic to Putin now offer diminishing media coverage, as the public have become used to them. Unlikely to succeed, making another offering to Putin would be of little interest to a fatigued public and media. What better than to perform an outrageous <em>volte-face</em>, play the strong man, and generate endless inches of media coverage in articles just like this one? Look past the headlines, and Trump is behaving entirely predictably, at least according to his own lights.</p>
<p>Unsurprisingly, then, the Russian political apparatus is totally unfazed by what seems like terrifying news for a country whose economy is barely running on fumes and which can barely stop Ukraine’s makeshift drone strikes, let alone repel offensive US-made weaponry. The Russian stock market <a href="https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2025/07/15/russian-stock-market-rises-after-trump-sets-ukraine-peace-deal-deadline-a89817" target="_blank" rel="noopener">surged</a> in response to the news of the weapons deal and Trump’s talk of sanctions, while former Russian president and current Security Council member Dmitry Medvedev on Twitter dismissed Trump’s move as a “theatrical ultimatum.” Hardly known for his political nous<em>,</em> even Medvedev has Trump pegged.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;Look past the headlines, and Trump is behaving entirely predictably, at least according to his own lights.&#8221;</div>
<p>Should Trump make good on his latest promises — and there is no guarantee that the weapons systems at hand will make their way to Ukraine, let alone be used for offensive strikes on Russia itself — the war might well be prolonged or even turned. That, of course, would still turn on Ukraine being able to strike deep and hard enough into Russian territory to affect the population en masse or to cause fear of a military collapse among the Russian elites. Should massive tariffs or wide sanctions on Russia also be implemented, Trump and Ukraine may even force a desperate Putin to the negotiating table. Until they do, Volodymyr Zelensky and his allies — especially the NATO nations that have been on tenterhooks ever since the American president was inaugurated in January — will at least be pleased with this new spirit of collaboration.</p>
<p>Nonetheless, they will remain hesitant about whether a man like Donald Trump can really commit to a long-term policy of military support for both Ukraine and the Western alliance. In a BBC interview on 14 July, Trump <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c1e02q12z32o" target="_blank" rel="noopener">admitted</a> that he trusts “almost nobody”. Should Vladimir Putin find a way to stroke the president’s ego, give him an opportunity for a grand media spectacle, and allow him to make some more headlines, another sudden U-turn might be in the offing. State visits, gifts, and all sorts of other attention-generating moves might be enough.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, there is only one big winner from this chaos. As Trump continues to blow hot and cold with his allies, eroding stability and certainty in both the financial and security worlds, Xi Jinping will look on with calm confidence. Until Trump commits to a coherent, long-term strategy that will ensure American economic dominance and military superiority continue — and that would likely mean continued and transparent cooperation with either NATO or another group of reliable allies, a move that today seems unlikely — the day that China overtakes the USA as the world’s superpower only looks to grow closer.</p>
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					<title>Why Russia fell out with Iran</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2025/06/why-russia-fell-out-with-iran/?edition=us</link>
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										<unherd:main_theme>geopolitics</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Ian Garner]]>
					</dc:creator>
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																<unherd:article_ranking>2</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[Army Day in Tehran. Atta Kenare/AFP/Getty Images]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Dr. Ian Garner</strong> is assistant professor of totalitarian studies at the Pilecki Institute in Warsaw. His latest book is <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/z-generation/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em>Z Generation: Russia&#8217;s Fascist Youth</em></a> (Hurst).</p>
]]>
						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>irgarner</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is assistant professor of totalitarian studies at the Pilecki Institute in Warsaw. His latest book is <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/z-generation/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em>Z Generation: Russia's Fascist Youth</em></a> (Hurst).]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Sun, 29 Jun 2025 23:01:24 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Sun, 29 Jun 2025 23:01:24 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Foreign Policy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[International Relations]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Iran]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[multipolarity]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Politics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Russia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[US hegemony]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Vladimir Putin]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://stage.unherd.com/?p=688166</guid>
																												<description>
								<![CDATA[The multipolar order is inherently unstable]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p><span lang="EN-US">A decade ago, pundits were </span><span lang="EN-US"><a href="https://ecfr.eu/wp-content/uploads/ECFR_186_-_THE_NEW_POWER_COUPLE_RUSSIA_AND_IRAN_IN_THE_MIDDLE_EAST_PDF.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">hailing</a></span><span lang="EN-US"> Russia and Iran as the world’s “new power couple”. Together, they seemed to be ushering in a “multipolar world” that would replace the American hegemony of the post-Cold War era. Nations across the developing world eagerly anticipated the end of the “international rules-based order” — a derisive synonym for Washington doing as it pleased.</span></p>
<div>
<p><span lang="EN-US">Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Iran and Russia’s relationship seemed only to be deepening. Military commitments have increased, especially as Iran has sent thousands of Shared drones to aid the Russian army’s aerial campaign against Kyiv. Economic ties have deepened, with Tehran joining the BRICs group last year. As recently as this January, presidents Putin and Pezeshkian signed a new Comprehensive Strategic Partnership. As a result, analysts </span><span lang="EN-US"><a href="https://jamestown.org/program/iran-and-russia-pursue-multipolar-world-order/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">affirmed</a></span><span lang="EN-US"> the shared commitment to building a “multipolar world”. With Donald Trump’s ascension to the presidency in 2025, it looked like Washington would let that world flourish.</span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p><span lang="EN-US">Six months on, the cozy relationship of those committed to the “multipolar world” has been blown apart — if things were ever as rosy as they seemed. Two events have shaken the Moscow-Tehran relationship to its foundations: first, Vladimir Putin’s indifferent response to Israel and America’s bombing of Iran; second, the leak of internal Russian documents that </span><span lang="EN-US"><a href="https://theins.ru/en/inv/282473" target="_blank" rel="noopener">reveal</a></span><span lang="EN-US"> a vast ongoing spying operation and deep mutual distrust between the purported allies. In a nutshell, Russia does not trust Iran, and seems unready to offer its ally any military support, while Iran is desperate to get its hands on Russia’s nuclear secrets and remains wary of Putin’s real motives.</span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p><span lang="EN-US">Moscow insiders might have been </span><span lang="EN-US"><a href="https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2025/06/20/between-two-fires-kremlins-loss-of-leverage-exposed-by-israel-iran-conflict-a89521" target="_blank" rel="noopener">blindsided</a></span><span lang="EN-US"> by the US attack on Iranian nuclear facilities, but there was never any realistic possibility of Vladimir Putin offering military support. The Russian army is exhausted by the vast losses sustained in Ukraine. Even if the capacity did exist, Putin has long been careful to avoid provoking Israel, which is home to more than a million Russian speakers. Moreover, as Russian military production capacity has improved, Russia’s reliance on Iranian drone technology has </span><span lang="EN-US"><a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/russia-eurasia/politika/2025/01/russia-iran-strategic-agreement?lang=en" target="_blank" rel="noopener">decreased</a></span><span lang="EN-US">. Even if he could, Putin would have little to gain by aiding Iran militarily. Putin and Pezeshkian might talk big at press conferences — indeed, Dmitry Medvedev rapidly backtracked from a veiled threat issued on social media to give Iran nuclear weapons — but their commitment has never been more than “</span><span lang="EN-US"><a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2025/06/25/russia-putin-iran-israel-nuclear-diplomacy/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">aspirational</a></span><span lang="EN-US">”.</span></p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/12/russias-plan-for-tulsi-gabbard/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/12/russias-plan-for-tulsi-gabbard/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/GettyImages-2184056462.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/12/russias-plan-for-tulsi-gabbard/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/12/russias-plan-for-tulsi-gabbard/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Russia&#039;s plan for Tulsi Gabbard</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/12/russias-plan-for-tulsi-gabbard/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Ian Garner</a></p></div></a></div>
</div>
<div>
<p>When the chips are down, and just as was the case with Putin’s rapid retreat from Syria earlier this year, the “multipolar world” has been exposed for what it really is: a toothless alliance of fair-weather friends with no shared ideological vision and without the power or will to offer each other military support. In this world, economically and militarily dominant powers like China — whose commitment to both Russia and Iran is entirely self-interested — will easily be able to assert themselves.</p>
</div>
<div>
<p><span lang="EN-US">Nonetheless, </span><span lang="EN-US">the creation of a “multipolar world” has been central to Vladimir Putin’s foreign policy since the beginning of his rule a quarter of a century ago. A new National Security Concept, </span><span lang="EN-US"><a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2000-01/features/russias-national-security-concept" target="_blank" rel="noopener">published</a></span><span lang="EN-US"> in January 2000 in the wake of NATO’s bombing of Kosovo — which outraged Russian nationalists — damned US “use of military force”. Again and again, Putin has returned to this theme. “One state and, of course, first and foremost the United States,” he claimed in 2007, “has overstepped its national borders in every way.” In 2022, he </span><span lang="EN-US"><a href="https://germany.mid.ru/de/aktuelles/pressemitteilungen/the_vision_of_a_multipolar_world_the_civilizational_factor_and_russia_s_place_in_the_emerging_world_/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">claimed</a></span><span lang="EN-US"> that the “multipolar world” was a means for those the West had “robbed… and humiliated” to “get back their fair share of wealth”.</span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p><span lang="EN-US">This vision of global order is not based on agreements and cooperation. It is fueled by grievance and a sense of injustice. Indeed, Iran itself is pursuing the construction of the multipolar world as part of a wider </span><span lang="EN-US"><a href="https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/migrated_files/documents/atoms/files/therme_russian_iran_partnership_2022.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">policy</a></span><span lang="EN-US"> of “realpolitik”. Its shared vision with Russia runs only so far as outrage against perceived American global dominance. What and who will dictate terms in the new “multipolar world” cannot but remain vague, since to discuss this would mean confronting irreconcilable differences: Iran is a theocratic and deeply antisemitic state; Russia is an ethno-nationalist construction fueled by ideological fantasies about the construction of a Eurasian civilization in the space of the former Soviet Union. When these worlds collide in arguments about nuclear technology or the balance of power in the Middle East, grievance alone cannot provide Tehran and Moscow with a means of affirming their long-term interests or resolving the differences.</span></p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/02/is-this-the-end-of-american-hegemony/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/02/is-this-the-end-of-american-hegemony/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/GettyImages-1159007452.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/02/is-this-the-end-of-american-hegemony/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/02/is-this-the-end-of-american-hegemony/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Is this the end of American hegemony?</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/02/is-this-the-end-of-american-hegemony/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Wolfgang Münchau</a></p></div></a></div>
</div>
<div>
<p><span lang="EN-US">Putin might express his displeasure at attacks on Iran, labeling them “unjustifiable and inexcusable”, and Dmitry Medvedev might froth on social media, but Russia will not do much more to help. Likewise, Iran may send drones to Russia to aid in its far-off war in Ukraine, but surely it would do nothing to assist its ally if the Putin regime were in danger of collapse. Indeed, when the Wagner leader Yevgeny Prigozhin marched on Moscow in 2023 — perhaps the only real moment of danger Putin has faced in the past two decades — Tehran offered nothing more than words, </span><span lang="EN-US"><a href="https://europeanleadershipnetwork.org/commentary/how-the-wagner-rebellion-was-seen-in-iran/">condemning</a></span><span lang="EN-US"> the action as part of a Western “cognitive war”.</span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p>The turmoil of recent weeks and months demonstrates what a “multipolar world” has in store: constant and unpredictable spikes in conflict. Israel provokes Iran; Iran strikes back; now America intervenes. Each move appears impulsive, almost unstrategic, fostering only more chaos. The unpredictability of these events erodes any illusion of an emerging equitable global order — especially when the notion of any nation&#8217;s “fair share of wealth” remains tied exclusively to the ambitions and beliefs of individual leaders or elites.</p>
</div>
<div>
<p>In truth, despite the bravado of authoritarian leaders and the misplaced optimism among certain Western observers, both on the political Right and Left, there was never a credible prospect of stability emerging from this supposed “multipolar world”. Regimes like Putin’s Russia, driven by neo-imperial dreams of controlling the &#8220;near abroad&#8221;, or Iran’s theocratic rulers brandishing nuclear threats amid antisemitic fervor, look out only for number one.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;There was never a credible prospect of stability emerging from this supposed &#8216;multipolar world&#8217;.&#8221;</div>
</div>
<div>
<p><span lang="EN-US">Grievance politics begets only more grievances. As American influence wanes under Trump&#8217;s increasingly self-destructive America, suspicion among erstwhile partners like Russia and Iran may well deepen. With geopolitical boundaries dissolving thanks to technological connectedness, and military fronts </span><span lang="EN-US"><a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/war-in-the-smartphone-age/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">reshaped</a></span><span lang="EN-US"> by hybrid warfare and drone technology, the pressure will only grow higher.</span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p>Far from ushering in stability or fairness, the era of multipolarity promises only deeper chaos, heightened paranoia, and relentless distrust — a nightmarish Hobbesian world fragmenting ever faster. If Moscow was surprised by America’s intervention in Iran, or by Iran’s spying campaign, it should not have been: both of these events are reflections of the order that Vladimir Putin has spent twenty-five years trying to build. Russia’s, and Vladimir Putin’s, power in this world will only ever be weaker — and their authority over the “near abroad” will always be limited by the need to fear attack from all sides.</p>
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					<title>Syria has exposed Russias frailty</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2024/12/syria-has-exposed-russias-frailty/?edition=us</link>
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										<unherd:main_theme>Vassal state</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Ian Garner]]>
					</dc:creator>
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																<unherd:article_ranking>3</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[Syria is no longer Russia's friend. Aaref Watad/AFP/Getty Images ]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Dr. Ian Garner</strong> is assistant professor of totalitarian studies at the Pilecki Institute in Warsaw. His latest book is <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/z-generation/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em>Z Generation: Russia&#8217;s Fascist Youth</em></a> (Hurst).</p>
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						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>irgarner</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is assistant professor of totalitarian studies at the Pilecki Institute in Warsaw. His latest book is <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/z-generation/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em>Z Generation: Russia's Fascist Youth</em></a> (Hurst).]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Tue, 10 Dec 2024 00:03:24 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Fri, 13 Dec 2024 17:13:07 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Bashar al-Assad]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Russia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Syria]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Vladimir Putin]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[War]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://stage.unherd.com/?p=642928</guid>
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								<![CDATA[Putin's multipolar world is a sham]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>Five months ago, Vladimir Putin <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/world/putin-says-multipolar-world-reality-now/3266012" target="_blank" rel="noopener">declared</a> that the so-called “multipolar world” had become a reality. He surely imagined this meant Russia would be one of only a handful of powerful nations able to dominate 21st-century global politics. But if the sudden collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s government in Syria is anything to go by, then the multipolar reality is for Russia one of chaos and enfeeblement.</p>
<p>For a quarter of a century, Putin has dreamed of ending the era of American hegemony that followed the Cold War. Just 11 days after his shock appointment as acting president in 1999, Putin <a href="https://www.bits.de/EURA/natsecconc.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">signed</a> a National Security Policy declaring that “Russia will facilitate the formation of an ideology of establishing a multipolar world”. In theory, the “multipolar world” describes the end of American unipolarity. In reality, it is a synonym for the return of Russia’s international standing. After years of humiliating decline — a national debt crisis, a military disaster on home turf in Chechnya, and Russia’s increasing marginalization in international security discussions — Putin was promising a new era of national and international strength.</p>
<p>Russians hoped their nation would once again become a great power. Back in the Seventies, the Soviet Union was a major player in Africa and the Middle East. By funnelling money, arms, and propaganda to support friendly countries, and fuel chaos and revolution in unfriendly ones, the Kremlin was, effectively, wrestling with the USA in proxy economic and physical wars. But as the Soviet empire unravelled at home and economic strife hit, Moscow’s influence waned. Formerly friendly countries looked to Washington instead. Throughout the Nineties, the government of the new Russian Federation was powerless to stop its influence collapsing.</p>
<p>Yet Syria remained one of Moscow’s most enduring friends and obedient servants, a role it has played for much of the last 80 years. After the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1944, the USSR openly advocated on behalf of Damascus. Moscow poured arms and money into Syria as the country ended French colonialism in the Forties. The following decades saw ever more tokens of friendship. A Soviet naval base opened in Tartus in 1971, and Moscow assisted Syria in the Yom Kippur War. Billions of dollars went to propping up the relationship, all eagerly received by the Syrians themselves.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;Syria remained one of Moscow’s most enduring friends and obedient servants, a role it has played for much of the last 80 years.&#8221;</div>
<p>Even as the USSR’s foreign power flagged in the Eighties, then president Hafez Assad’s government <a href="https://books.google.pl/books?id=GU6fDwAAQBAJ&amp;newbks=1&amp;newbks_redir=0&amp;lpg=PT19&amp;dq=hafez%20assad%20soviet%20afghan%20war&amp;pg=PT19#v=onepage&amp;q&amp;f=false">expressed</a> support for the disastrous Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and continued to rely on Moscow for assistance. Their enduring relationship exemplified the old, bipolar world order. Come what may, the Syrian regime relied on Moscow for military and ideological firepower. Syria, in turn, was an unusually stable country in an often fractured region, while the Soviet Union could count itself a major regional player thanks to this one-sided relationship.</p>
<p>In the Nineties, Russia’s inability to provide any real support to Syria saw the partnership wither. Under Putin’s aegis, a plan was hatched to revive it. While Moscow was hesitant at first to directly intervene in the Syrian Civil War, its airpower and ground forces proved crucial in helping Bashar al-Assad cling on to power as rebel forces gathered steam. The Russian Air Force’s <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/mar/02/russia-committed-war-crimes-in-syria-finds-un-report">brutal</a> bombing campaigns were conducted with the same disregard for humanitarian law and civilian casualties as its earlier war in Chechnya, and foreshadowed Moscow’s approach to the Ukraine conflict. In return for propping up Assad, Russia was able to keep its naval base in Tartus, which allowed it to reach further into Africa. More important, Putin sent a clear message: he was willing to use any means necessary to ensure Russia was a global power that Washington and its allies could not ignore. The “multipolar world order” — if that meant the West listening to a powerful Russia — seemed to be coming to life.</p>
<p>Assad has stuck by Moscow like few others in recent years. While other countries in the Kremlin’s economic and military orbit, including traditional partners in Central Asia and Africa, have attempted to play off Russia and an ascendant China, Assad remained the perfect vassal. Speaking at the Kremlin last year, the former Syrian leader <a href="https://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/70680">expressed</a> his fealty by parroting Russian propaganda. He offered support for Russia’s war “against neo-Nazis and their predecessors”, and went on to speak of his “devotion” to Russia and the “need to stabilize the world”. Subjugation to Russia meant stability for the dictator.</p>
<p>Today it transpires that this stability has been, along with Moscow’s military, economic, and cultural strength, another of Putin’s grand illusions. Just as the campaign against Ukraine revealed military weaknesses in hours, so Russian power in Syria has evaporated in a matter of days. Stretched to the limit by its war in Ukraine, where despite recent progress some 30,000 soldiers and billions of dollars are being <a href="https://kyivindependent.com/russia-has-spent-200-billion-on-full-scale-war-in-ukraine-suffered-700-000-casualties-austin-says/">lost</a> every month, the Kremlin has no more forces, no more men, and no more money to send to the Middle East. The best it can offer is asylum to the humiliated Assad. Today’s “multipolar world order” has turned out to be a sham, more akin to the Eighties world of ailing Soviet power than the genuine strength of the post-Second World War decades.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/12/why-syria-is-back-at-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/12/why-syria-is-back-at-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/GettyImages-2187154696-e1733161682622.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/12/why-syria-is-back-at-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/12/why-syria-is-back-at-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Why Syria is back at war</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/12/why-syria-is-back-at-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Aris Roussinos</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Putin’s power is crumbling across the old Soviet Empire and beyond. Ukraine may not take back Crimea and its eastern regions in the near future, but the country’s population has definitively turned away from Moscow. Ten years ago, for example, Ukrainians were <a href="https://books.google.pl/books?id=MmTiEAAAQBAJ&amp;newbks=1&amp;newbks_redir=0&amp;lpg=PT100&amp;dq=popova%20shevel%20nato&amp;pg=PT102#v=onepage&amp;q&amp;f=false">ambivalent</a> about NATO and EU integration. Today, they overwhelmingly embrace both. Across Central Asia, countries look to China, not Russia, for development aid. Azerbaijan behaves without regard for Moscow’s opinion, while Armenia looks to India, China, and the USA for support.</p>
<p>Even worse, Russia has been forced to accept ever more negative trade terms with stronger countries, such as India and China, thanks to the West’s firm approach to sanctions. Its few real alliances, like those with North Korea and Iran, see the smaller partners dictating terms. Today, Putin needs those countries more than they need him, and they are extracting maximum benefits in exchange for providing soldiers and military equipment to Moscow. At any moment, Putin’s whole foreign policy facade could crumble.</p>
<p>Russian diplomats might today claim that their country “does not betray its friends in difficult situations”, but their world is one of smoke and mirrors, in which Moscow’s PR men project dominance, with fake news, disinformation, and braggadocio about everything from Syria to <a href="https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2024/12/03/exclusive-kremlin-stages-oreshnik-propaganda-blitz-as-nuclear-threats-lose-their-potency-a87206">ballistic</a> missiles, to cover up their country’s comparative weakness. Russia deployed its usual range of propaganda tactics to claim Assad’s position was impregnable, but at the first sign of trouble, some of its propagandists now <a href="https://theins.press/en/news/277029">claim</a> that Syria never mattered anyway.</p>
<p>Ever since 1999, Putin’s aim has been to recreate Russian power with mastery over vassal states like Syria and Ukraine, but he has presided over chaos. Moscow is capable of breaking things, of instigating revolutions, of creating this chaos, but it does not have the strength to institute new international power structures.</p>
<p>Russia no longer has any control over Syria, which is likely to collapse into a period of turmoil as new leadership is asserted and contested. It seems unlikely that the new Syrian leadership, carried to power by soldiers with memories of being brutally attacked by Russian forces, will be as favorable to Moscow as any of its predecessors. Russia today has less power in the Middle East and across the post-Soviet space than it did a decade ago. A combination of big economic and military players — above all China — and chaotic, independent-minded groups, like in Syria, is filling that vacuum.</p>
<p>The Kremlin lacks the money, materiel, and motivation to do little more than hope that its international influence does not erode further. Short on options, and following his response to the Arab Spring, Putin will likely attempt to boost his domestic standing with attacks on Ukraine and more aggressive nationalism at home. This inward turn is not the multipolar world order Vladimir Putin was hoping for.</p>
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					<title>Russia&#8217;s plan for Tulsi Gabbard</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2024/12/russias-plan-for-tulsi-gabbard/?edition=us</link>
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										<unherd:main_theme>National security </unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Ian Garner]]>
					</dc:creator>
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																<unherd:article_ranking>3</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[Tulsi Gabbard is dividing America. Kamil Krzaczynski/AFP/Getty  ]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Dr. Ian Garner</strong> is assistant professor of totalitarian studies at the Pilecki Institute in Warsaw. His latest book is <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/z-generation/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em>Z Generation: Russia&#8217;s Fascist Youth</em></a> (Hurst).</p>
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						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>irgarner</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is assistant professor of totalitarian studies at the Pilecki Institute in Warsaw. His latest book is <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/z-generation/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em>Z Generation: Russia's Fascist Youth</em></a> (Hurst).]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Wed, 04 Dec 2024 00:01:12 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Wed, 04 Dec 2024 16:53:08 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Donald Trump]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Politics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Russia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[tulsi gabbard]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[US]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Vladimir Putin]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://stage.unherd.com/?p=641119</guid>
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								<![CDATA[She is the ideal weapon in Putin's propaganda war]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>With Syrian rebels storming Aleppo, reigniting a civil war widely presumed to be over, Donald Trump’s appointment of Tulsi Gabbard as Director of National Intelligence is more controversial than ever. Rumours are swirling that the outspoken Gabbard is incapable of handling the ultra top-secret, life-and-death importance of the National Intelligence file. Some have suggested that Trump’s appointee is overly sympathetic to Moscow, citing her strident declarations over a decade that unerringly seem to toe the Kremlin line on foreign policy or <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2024/11/22/politics/tulsi-gabbard-government-watch-list-travel-connections/index.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">the news</a> that Gabbard was on an official US travel watchlist. Others have, without providing any evidence, labelled her a Russian agent.</p>
<p>Certainly, Gabbard seems to express support for America’s chief adversary. When Russia entered the war against Syria in 2015, Gabbard welcomed Vladimir Putin’s move to, as she saw it, bomb Al-Qaeda where Barack Obama <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/what-tulsi-gabbard-has-said-about-russia-ukraine-china-1985839" target="_blank" rel="noopener">would</a> not. The then-congresswoman seemed to slavishly parrot the Kremlin’s lines that Moscow’s war in Syria was a purely anti-terrorist operation and that any evidence civilians were being harmed was a fake or Western “provocation” — claims that the Kremlin <a href="https://cpd.gov.ua/en/international-threats-en/kremlin-spreads-fakes-about-ukraine-and-nato-preparing-provocations-in-syria/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">continues</a> to make today. Subsequently, she attempted to <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2024/11/21/politics/tulsi-gabbard-director-national-intelligence-distrust/index.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">introduce</a> legislation in Congress to support whistleblowers — or traitors advancing Russian interests, depending on one’s point of view — like Edward Snowden and Julian Assange.</p>
<p>Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Gabbard’s claims about Russian foreign policy have been even more pointed. She has blamed Joe Biden and Nato for the invasion, accusing them of ignoring “Russia’s legitimate security concerns regarding Ukraine’s becoming a member of Nato”. This claim has been one of Putin’s favourite lines, trotted out whenever Moscow’s bellicose behaviour in the space of the former Soviet Union has <a href="https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/what-putin-fears-most/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">needed</a> a flimsy justification over the past 25 years.</p>
<p>Naturally, Gabbard has become the subject of bipartisan opprobrium. Her unfounded assertion that Joe Biden’s government was covertly <a href="https://t.me/denazi_UA/80750">funding</a> a series of secret biolabs stuffed with deadly pathogens in Ukraine and around the world led Mitt Romney to warn that her “treasonous lies may well cost lives”. One Democrat congresswoman <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2024/nov/16/trump-cabinet-tulsi-gabbard-democratic-reactions" target="_blank" rel="noopener">received</a> news of Gabbard’s proposed new role as intelligence chief in a similar vein: “There’s no question I call someone like her a Russian asset.” Even Trump supporter Nikki Haley was <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2024/nov/21/nikki-haley-trump-cabinet-tulsi-gabbard-rfk-jr" target="_blank" rel="noopener">critical</a>.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/10/the-axis-of-evil-is-a-fantasy/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/10/the-axis-of-evil-is-a-fantasy/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/GettyImages-668803174.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/10/the-axis-of-evil-is-a-fantasy/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/10/the-axis-of-evil-is-a-fantasy/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The axis of evil is a fantasy</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/10/the-axis-of-evil-is-a-fantasy/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Ian Garner</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>The accusations levelled against Gabbard are fuel for fiery Russian propaganda networks, which have in recent weeks been cock-a-hoop over news of Trump’s plan. State media channels have been quick to remind their audiences of Gabbard’s apparent support for some of Russia’s more <em>outré</em> claims. The Telegram channel of Vladimir Solovyev, Russian TV’s loudmouth propaganda ringmaster, showed <a href="https://t.me/SolovievLive/295449" target="_blank" rel="noopener">clips</a> of Western media coverage that discussed how Americans were questioning Gabbard’s allegiances. The channel, which has 1.3 million subscribers, then posted a series of images of Gabbard, plastering the congresswoman’s “friendly” words about Ukraine, Russia, and the potential for peace over each image. A series of warm profiles <a href="https://www.kp.ru/daily/27661.5/5011558/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">have hailed</a> Trump’s pick, which has the FBI and CIA “trembling”.</p>
<p>However, much of this cheery Russian propaganda is laced with irony. In the Kremlin’s narrative, Ukraine seems comically incapable of deciding whether or not Gabbard is a Russian agent. Gabbard is as much an object of mockery as a source of pride: a sign that Russia’s control over the Western information space is so complete that Americans will spend more time arguing over Gabbard’s allegiance than countering Russia’s very real threats against their homeland. The more that Gabbard becomes a central figure in Donald Trump’s pantomime, the more the Russian propaganda apparatus will use her to divide and inflame opinions abroad.</p>
<p>What the Russian state’s propagandists have been less keen to reveal, of course, is Gabbard’s repudiation of some of her own beliefs. Outlets have drawn <a href="https://t.me/denazi_UA/80750" target="_blank" rel="noopener">attention</a> to her comments about biolabs, for example — but they have not mentioned her claim that her support for the erroneous theory was based on “miscommunication and misunderstanding”. Gabbard is a <a href="https://theintercept.com/2022/02/24/russian-tv-uses-tucker-carlson-tulsi-gabbard-sell-putins-war/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">familiar</a> face on Russian TV, but the Russian audience is led to believe — as are many Westerners — that she is a one-dimensional propagandist or agent.</p>
<p>Moscow relishes precisely this sort of uncertainty, ironic distancing, and mockery, which it <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/03/09/russia-putin-disinformation-propaganda-hybrid-war/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">sees</a> as part of an information warfare strategy designed to encourage the West to tear itself apart. Placed at the heart of the national and international intelligence apparatus, Gabbard will become an ideal weapon in that war. A woman who, with her mixed European and Samoan ancestry, ought to be the perfect fit for Democratic identity politics instead joined the military, took increasingly provocative positions on national security topics, and switched her party allegiance twice. She makes claims and walks them back, indulges in conspiracy theories, and seems incapable of making many decisions for herself. Her career is a spectacular tangle of contradictions and uncertainties, and is ripe for Russia’s propaganda narratives. Gabbard is just one of dozens of prominent Americans — from Tucker Carlson to the <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/maryroeloffs/2024/09/05/who-are-tim-pool-and-benny-johnson-what-to-know-about-the-six-right-wing-commentators-doj-alleges-were-funded-by-russia/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">influencers</a> at the heart of the Tenet Media scandal — who play this role.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;Moscow relishes precisely this sort of uncertainty, ironic distancing, and mockery.&#8221;</div>
<p>As Putin ratchets up the pressure in Ukraine, and mulls the fate of Syria, the Senate and the American media are about to become embroiled in what is certain to be a bitter battle over Gabbard’s confirmation hearings. The Kremlin is already trying to dial up the uncertainty even further by using sympathetic voices in the West to suggest, as the pro-Kremlin influencer Jackson Hinkle has done, that Gabbard is the innocent victim of a series of “<a class="c-link c-link--focus-visible" href="https://t.me/warfakes/25804" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer" data-stringify-link="https://t.me/warfakes/25804" data-sk="tooltip_parent">fakes</a>” produced by Russophobes and war hawks. Exactly how and why Gabbard’s own comments can have been faked is left unsaid. Instead, uncertainty is left unresolved to bewilder the American audience.</p>
<p>If her appointment is confirmed, nobody is quite sure how Gabbard might act as America’s intelligence chief. International and internal intelligence sharing and, presumably, morale within the national security agencies and departments will suffer as a result. In an era of global fragmentation and warfare, and when the Russian Federation believes it is locked in a grand geopolitical battle with the West, this lack of trust may be hugely corrosive.</p>
<p>According to the Chinese military strategist Sun Tzu, one of the fundamental rules of warfare is to “know the enemy and know yourself”. Whether Gabbard is a Russian agent or not is irrelevant; she will remain an unknown quantity. The very idea that her loyalty may not be to the United States is enough to embroil America’s politicians, intelligence workers, and security operatives in a deep battle that will see Putin and his allies rubbing their hands with glee. In the disinformation era, it is no longer clear who is a patriot and who a traitor, nor where the war begins and where it ends. A divided and paranoid America can only benefit the Kremlin.</p>
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															<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">641119</post-id>				</item>
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					<title>The axis of evil is a fantasy</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2024/10/the-axis-of-evil-is-a-fantasy/?edition=us</link>
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										<unherd:main_theme>Weekend report</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Ian Garner]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/Blue-thumb.jpg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>1</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[An axis of convenience (Photo by ED JONES/AFP via Getty Images)]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Dr. Ian Garner</strong> is assistant professor of totalitarian studies at the Pilecki Institute in Warsaw. His latest book is <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/z-generation/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em>Z Generation: Russia&#8217;s Fascist Youth</em></a> (Hurst).</p>
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						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>irgarner</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is assistant professor of totalitarian studies at the Pilecki Institute in Warsaw. His latest book is <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/z-generation/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em>Z Generation: Russia's Fascist Youth</em></a> (Hurst).]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Fri, 18 Oct 2024 23:02:09 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Wed, 23 Oct 2024 11:45:53 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Axis of Evil]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[DPRK]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Europe]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[North Korea]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Putin]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Russia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ukraine]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[War]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://stage.unherd.com/?p=630371</guid>
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								<![CDATA[North Korean help exposes Putin's weakness]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">A terror is stalking Europe. That, at least, is the impression you get from Kyiv. As Andriy Yermak, head of the country’s office of the president proclaimed, a new “axis of evil” is forming right across the planet, developing into a thoroughgoing military alliance that “challenges democracies and the world order”. And certainly, you can understand his fears to a point. North Korea, after all, is apparently planning to </span><a href="https://kyivindependent.com/north-korea-has-sent-10-000-soldiers-to-russia-western-source-says/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">deploy</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> some 10,000 troops to bolster Russia’s war effort, even as Pyongyang may now be supplying </span><a href="https://www.thetimes.com/world/russia-ukraine-war/article/north-korea-supplies-half-of-the-shells-used-by-russia-in-ukraine-d3fkhppjs"><span style="font-weight: 400;">half</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> of Moscow’s artillery shells. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Yet if a June 2024 agreement between the countries is certainly worrying,</span><span style="font-weight: 400;"> especially when dovetailed by Chinese sabre-rattling in the Pacific, the West is facing less an axis of evil than of convenience. The truth is that </span><span style="font-weight: 400;">Vladmir Putin is deeply reliant on </span><span style="font-weight: 400;">Kim Jong Un</span> <span style="font-weight: 400;">— and the help he’s getting from the hermit kingdom is basically a sign of weakness, not strength. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The sudden appearance of North Koreans in their country was unsurprisingly greeted by alarm in Kyiv. And considering how the conflict is going, Yermak’s dramatic language surely makes sense. Over the last few months, after all, the Russians have made grinding gains right across Ukraine, sometimes </span><a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2024/09/04/russian-offensive-in-ukraine-s-donbas-region-gains-momentum_6724761_4.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">advancing</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> as much as a kilometre a day and threatening strategically significant cities like Pokrovsk.</span> <span style="font-weight: 400;">To an extent, meanwhile, the recent alliance between Moscow and Pyongyang reflects a long-standing amity. The countries have enjoyed generally warm relations since Putin’s ascension to the presidency 25 years ago. Among other things, Pyongyang played host to one of the president’s first state visits abroad, when he </span><a href="https://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/38420" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">hailed</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> the Soviet army’s special role in “liberating” North Korea from Japanese occupation in 1945.</span></p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/07/vladimir-putins-immigrant-army/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/07/vladimir-putins-immigrant-army/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/GettyImages-1244112041.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/07/vladimir-putins-immigrant-army/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/07/vladimir-putins-immigrant-army/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Vladimir Putin&#039;s immigrant army</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/07/vladimir-putins-immigrant-army/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Ian Garner</a></p></div></a></div>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Nonetheless, Moscow issued firm </span><a href="https://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/36410" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">condemnations</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> of North Korea’s erratic and dangerous behaviour on the international stage in the mid-2000s, when Putin hoped to burnish his international reputation by playing mediator on the Korean Peninsula. No less important, the sweep of Russian history demonstrates the real balance of power between the two countries. During the early years of the Cold War, the North Korean regime </span><a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/book/kim-il-sung-the-khrushchev-era-soviet-dprk-relations-and-the-roots-north-korean-despotism-1953" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">relied</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> on Soviet help to carve out territory. From there, it spent decades oppressing its population while dodging Soviet retaliation. While the Kim dynasty were never Russian pariahs, in other words, they were always treated as junior partners, to be praised or scolded as it suited Moscow. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Since his 2022 invasion, however, Putin has been desperate for partners wherever he can find them. Now, the president makes naked attempts to rewrite history and paint Russia and Korea as old and </span><a href="https://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/72265" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">equal</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> partners. The security partnership signed this year, and North Korea’s increasing provision of soldiers and shells, seem to suggest that equality is being embraced by both sides. Yet despite the pageantry of the official dinners, and the finesse of the PR statements, Putin is clearly desperate for Kim Jong Un’s support. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Notwithstanding recent Russia’s victories around places like Pokrovsk, that’s fundamentally down to its broad geopolitical frailty. Russia is today struggling with a deep crisis in military recruitment, fuelled mainly by the huge losses it’s suffered at the front. Each month, 30,000 men enter the military </span><span style="font-weight: 400;">—</span><span style="font-weight: 400;"> and the same number are invalided home or killed on the battlefield. Despite the vast bonuses offered to contract soldiers who choose to enlist, which by some measures now account for 1.5% of the Russian spending, the state is still forced to scour the globe for mercenaries to support its war. A division of raw North Korean conscripts, ignorant of Russian and unfamiliar with their officers, would vanish if thrown into the Ukrainian meat grinder. </span></p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;A division of raw North Korean conscripts would vanish if thrown into the Ukrainian meat grinder.&#8221;</div>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">And if its reliance on North Korea speaks to a military problem, meanwhile, Russia also leans on the DPRK economically. Though the Kim regime can certainly manufacture shells in vast numbers,</span><span style="font-weight: 400;"> reportedly shipping some </span><a href="https://www.rfa.org/english/news/korea/north-korea-munitions-production-ukraine-russia-07292024131858.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">five million</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> to its Russian allies, many appear to be badly made. The fact that Putin is accepting them anyway suggests that he has nowhere else to turn. </span><span style="font-weight: 400;">That’s clear elsewhere: though Russia is now </span><a href="https://sceeus.se/en/publications/the-russian-state-budget-at-war/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">spending</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> some 40% of its budget on defence, and refurbishing factories to pump out munitions, it remains totally reliant on external partners like North Korea. Despite boasting an economy some 10 times larger than North Korea’s, in short, Russia, seems incapable of waging an independent war on Ukraine </span><span style="font-weight: 400;">—</span><span style="font-weight: 400;"> let alone launching an attack on Nato as part of some nefarious plot to explode the global order. Pyongyang, for its part, can only offer marginal support to their desperate Russian partner, assistance they’re anyway giving mainly to extract cash, scientific research,</span> <span style="font-weight: 400;">and other goodies.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Despite the ominous signs, then, the purported axis of evil probably shouldn&#8217;t worry Western leaders. On the contrary, the June alliance points to Moscow’s ever weaker position on the world stage. Putin, frantic to pick up whatever scraps of men and materiel he can, has been reduced to begging. And as soon as the North Koreans spot a better deal, particularly from China, they’ll have little incentive to remain loyal to Moscow. Should China demand or buy Pyongyang’s support for an invasion of Taiwan, Putin’s war will be forgotten in an instant.</span></p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/08/putin-is-no-longer-russias-saviour/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/08/putin-is-no-longer-russias-saviour/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/GettyImages-2151576171.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/08/putin-is-no-longer-russias-saviour/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/08/putin-is-no-longer-russias-saviour/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Putin is no longer Russia&#039;s saviour</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/08/putin-is-no-longer-russias-saviour/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Ian Garner</a></p></div></a></div>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Russia may win some small gains from its North Korean ally. But 10,000 troops </span><span style="font-weight: 400;">—</span><span style="font-weight: 400;"> as unwelcome as their presence in Ukraine undoubtedly is </span><span style="font-weight: 400;">—</span><span style="font-weight: 400;"> ultimately won’t change the course of the war. Yet if the world at large has little to fear from Putin and Kim’s fair-weather friendship, might the West have an opportunity here? If, after all, Kim Jong Un can be tempted to stop providing shells and soldiers to Moscow, either by China or a Western coalition, might an exhausted Russia be forced to retreat from Ukraine? </span><span style="font-weight: 400;">Such a move won’t, of course, win the war alone. Re-supplying Ukraine’s own exhausted military is vital too. Yet squeezing Russia’s supply of weapons would surely hamper Putin’s ability to hold the line, or indeed prepare for another attack against Ukraine. Divided by ideological differences, and opposing medium-term goals, the new “axis of evil” is hardly an axis at all. </span></p>
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															<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">630371</post-id>				</item>
									<item>
					<title>Putin is no longer Russia&#8217;s saviour</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2024/08/putin-is-no-longer-russias-saviour/?edition=us</link>
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										<unherd:main_theme>Russia-Ukraine War</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Ian Garner]]>
					</dc:creator>
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																<unherd:article_ranking>2</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[Can Putin save his legacy? Mikhail Klimentyev/Pool/AFP/Getty Images]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Dr. Ian Garner</strong> is assistant professor of totalitarian studies at the Pilecki Institute in Warsaw. His latest book is <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/z-generation/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em>Z Generation: Russia&#8217;s Fascist Youth</em></a> (Hurst).</p>
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						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>irgarner</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is assistant professor of totalitarian studies at the Pilecki Institute in Warsaw. His latest book is <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/z-generation/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em>Z Generation: Russia's Fascist Youth</em></a> (Hurst).]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Sun, 18 Aug 2024 23:01:32 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Sun, 18 Aug 2024 23:01:32 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Europe]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[kursk]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Kursk region]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Putin]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Russia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[russia ukraine war]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Soviet collapse]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[War]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://stage.unherd.com/?p=616357</guid>
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								<![CDATA[The president appears as powerless as Boris Yeltsin]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p dir="ltr">At the start of this month, Kyiv’s exhausted forces seemed at last overwhelmed by their opponents’ superiority in manpower and firepower. But once again, they have defied expectations. The Ukrainian Armed Forces’ mass incursion into Russian territory has unfolded at lightning speed and with unexpected success. More than 1,000 troops now occupy a swathe of the Russian Federation’s territory, which Moscow is struggling to recover.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Ukraine has launched <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-65681806" target="_blank" rel="noopener">occasional</a> smash-and-grab raids on Russia over the last two and a half years, but this attack is on another scale entirely — it is a bona fide invasion. Ukrainians are justifiably cock-a-hoop. Putin’s three-day war to conquer their country has resulted in what many commentators have claimed is the first <a href="https://kyivindependent.com/kursk-incursion-deals-blow-to-putins-prestige-marking-first-ground-invasion-of-russia-since-world-war-ii/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">invasion</a> of Russia since the Second World War. The mood in ruling Russian circles could, meanwhile, hardly be bleaker. Moscow is struggling with a spluttering economy and a growing military recruitment problem — despite offering increasingly large cash bonuses to recruits, the number of newcomers is <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AnrbiQqVDpw&amp;t=1120s" target="_blank" rel="noopener">still matched</a> by the number of casualties. Ukraine’s “terrorist” attack on Kursk, as the Kremlin is labelling it, adds more fuel to these fires. It is the most serious issue that Vladimir Putin has faced since February 2022.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Putin has a knack of escaping dire situations with his reputation intact. If we cast our minds back to his first days in power, we are reminded that his Russia has been marched on before — and that the president responded mercilessly. Will he do the same this time?</p>
<p dir="ltr">Twenty-five years before Ukrainian troops crossed the border on 6 August, the militant Shamil Basayev led roughly 2,000 men from Chechnya — legally a part of Russia but de facto independent since Boris Yeltsin’s embarrassing failure to suppress the territory in a war that ended in 1996 — into Russia’s Dagestan region. The troops killed Russian border guards, captured several settlements and declared an independent state. Basayev’s men would remain in Dagestan for a month before Moscow’s armed forces finally dislodged them. After the humiliations of the Nineties, Russia’s superpower status had been replaced by bankruptcy, the loss of empire and now the inability to militarily control its own territory.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/06/how-will-the-ukraine-war-end/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/06/how-will-the-ukraine-war-end/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/GettyImages-1406536234-e1718886936930.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/06/how-will-the-ukraine-war-end/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/06/how-will-the-ukraine-war-end/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>How will the Ukraine war end?</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/06/how-will-the-ukraine-war-end/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Aris Roussinos</a></p></div></a></div>
<p dir="ltr">Three days after Basayev’s attack on Dagestan, Putin was appointed Prime Minister of Russia. The attack was just what the new man in the Kremlin needed to underscore the difference between him and his impotent post-Soviet predecessors: a <em>casus belli</em> to win back Dagestan, re-invade Chechnya, make Russia whole again, and thus prove that a new leader would usher in an era of safety, stability and national pride.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Putin’s rhetoric in 1999 was, if not quite that of a firebrand, then certainly uncompromising. In September of that year, as the war in Dagestan turned into a war in Chechnya, and the war in Chechnya led to terrorist attacks on Moscow and other Russian cities, Putin <a href="https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2000-jan-01-mn-49592-story.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">declared</a>: “We will pursue the terrorists everywhere. You will forgive me, but if we catch them on the toilet, we will wipe them out in the outhouse.” Within five years, the Chechen capital, Grozny, had been obliterated and 50,000 Chechen civilians were <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/30043870" target="_blank" rel="noopener">dead</a>. Putin’s forces had piloted the scorched earth form of warfare that they have recently reprised in Ukraine. When it came to Russia’s “stability”, any means justified the ends.</p>
<p dir="ltr">The Chechen insurgency took half a decade to finally subdue, but the war made Putin’s name as somebody who would keep Russia safe, no matter the cost. In the minds of Russians, the war was a vital part of kickstarting a decade of unprecedented wealth and success. National humiliation was replaced by national pride.</p>
<p dir="ltr"><div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;The Chechen war made Putin’s name as somebody who would keep Russia safe, no matter the cost.&#8221;</div>
<p dir="ltr">Can Putin, now an ageing incumbent, repeat the trick? Will the Kursk incursion be the “proof” that Russia needs to be “saved” from Ukraine — drawing international support? Threading such a fine-eyed needle will be tough for Putin. At the moment, Russian troops seem to be making no headway in responding to a well-equipped and trained Ukrainian army. The local population of Kursk are fleeing the invaders. Russians are expecting Putin to solve the problem, but few are leaping at the chance to help: only the promise of earning outlandish sums of money — between $1,600-$4,000 — for <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2024/08/14/world/video/russia-ukraine-advances-war-ebof-digvid" target="_blank" rel="noopener">digging</a> defensive trenches is drawing them in. Young conscripts, who are being deployed en masse for the first time in this war, seem more likely to surrender than to throw themselves into battle. But withdrawing experienced troops from occupied Ukraine to send to Kursk risks Putin’s gains after years of war.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Putin’s own behaviour this week stands in marked contrast to that of the arriviste of 1999. His response to the invasion — a mere “provocation” staged by a handful of “saboteurs” — has been conducted from the confines of the Kremlin. Publicly at least, it has been restricted to a single televised Security Council meeting. During this session with regional governors, Putin <a href="https://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/74856" target="_blank" rel="noopener">appeared</a> either short tempered, cutting one politician short, or indifferent, as he listened to reports of evacuations and military preparations. His own words were limited to vague affirmations that something would be done: “We must assess the developments unfolding there, and we will offer our evaluation.” Unlike in 1999, Putin seems unwilling to associate himself with the invasion, and therefore unable to inspire the masses as he then did. Putin appears as impotent as Boris Yeltsin in 1999, when he meekly handed the baton over to his young successor.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Yet this apparent unwillingness to take the lead does not mean that Putin is helpless. In the early 2000s, the Chechen war was characterised by similar difficulties with conscription, bungling military failures and immense internal corruption. At times, the president was deluged with questions about his slowness to act. “Our army”, he <a href="https://t.me/optimistkavshtatskom/17439" target="_blank" rel="noopener">explained</a>, “is strong enough to “go all the way through [Chechnya] and back again. But that’s not the point. The point is to totally destroy the terrorists’ bases.” In the end, Putin waited for the moment to strike, then used every military means at his disposal to win. He might do the same again today. The question is: would Putin be willing to annihilate parts of Kursk to win back his territory? With his legacy at risk, he may yet restore his reputation as a man willing to sacrifice anything for victory.</p>
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															<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">616357</post-id>				</item>
									<item>
					<title>Vladimir Putin&#8217;s immigrant army</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2024/07/vladimir-putins-immigrant-army/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://stage.unherd.com/2024/07/vladimir-putins-immigrant-army/?edition=us#comments</comments>
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										<unherd:main_theme>Ukraine war</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Ian Garner]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/Blue-thumb.jpg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>3</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[Migrant workers aren't safe on Russian soil. Getty Images]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Dr. Ian Garner</strong> is assistant professor of totalitarian studies at the Pilecki Institute in Warsaw. His latest book is <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/z-generation/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em>Z Generation: Russia&#8217;s Fascist Youth</em></a> (Hurst).</p>
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						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>irgarner</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is assistant professor of totalitarian studies at the Pilecki Institute in Warsaw. His latest book is <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/z-generation/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em>Z Generation: Russia's Fascist Youth</em></a> (Hurst).]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Sun, 21 Jul 2024 23:00:14 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Sun, 21 Jul 2024 23:00:14 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Central Asia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[row]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Russia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ukraine war]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[War]]></category>
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																												<description>
								<![CDATA[Ethnic minorities are being forced onto the battlefield ]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>Two and a half years of full-scale war in Ukraine have devastated Moscow’s invading forces. As many as 500,000 soldiers — 2% of Russian men between the ages of 20 and 50 — may have been <a href="https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2024/07/05/how-many-russian-soldiers-have-been-killed-in-ukraine?itm_source=parsely-api" target="_blank" rel="noopener">killed</a> or seriously wounded. Russian social media networks are alight with stories of terrible conditions at the front, where troops with cursory training and substandard equipment are tossed into battle. Comparisons are drawn with the life expectancy during the Second World War, when at some times the average soldier <a href="https://www.britannica.com/facts/Battle-of-Stalingrad" target="_blank" rel="noopener">survived</a> mere days. Receiving the dreaded <em>povestka </em>— the Russian army’s enlistment paper — is all but a death sentence.</p>
<p>Despite all this, Moscow by means fair and foul continues to find soldiers to cover its losses. The Russian state’s biggest challenge remains not replacing men but equipment, and its army <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/russia-exploiting-ukraine-manpower-shortage-thin-line-breakthrough-war-expert-2024-5" target="_blank" rel="noopener">continues</a> to hold a significant manpower advantage over its Ukrainian opposition. But the Kremlin’s recruitment strategy is not limited to forcing its own citizens into uniform. It has found a way to marry an imperial Soviet tradition and 21st-century global capitalism to make joining the Russian army an appealing choice for many foreigners. Soldiers from Somalia, Syria and other friendly nations are an <a href="https://kyivindependent.com/foreign-pows-on-being-lured-to-fight-for-russia-in-ukraine/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">occasional</a> sight at the front, but the largest contingent of foreign fighters hail from the Central Asian nations of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan.</p>
<p>Russia has long been a draw for Central Asian immigrants. As many as five million Central Asians may <a href="https://www.migrationdataportal.org/regional-data-overview/central-asia#:~:text=Of%20the%207.8%20million%20international,(UN%20DESA%2C%202020)" target="_blank" rel="noopener">currently</a> be residing in Russia compared to 1.3 million in the next most popular destination, Germany. The <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=QMyNAgAAQBAJ" target="_blank" rel="noopener">history</a> of Russia-Central Asian military enlistment, moreover, is a long one. Prior to the collapse of the USSR, when Moscow ruled the entirety of Central Asia, millions of soldiers from the region served in conflicts on behalf of their Soviet masters. From the Second World War to Afghanistan, Soviet Russia used its Central Asian population as a source of disposable military material. And Central Asian soldiers tended to die more often than their Russian peers: Kazakhs were one and a half times more likely than Russians to be <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_War_II_casualties_of_the_Soviet_Union" target="_blank" rel="noopener">killed</a> in the Second World War, a fact never mentioned in today’s jingoistic Putinist war propaganda.</p>
<p>After independence in 1991, post-Soviet Russia’s wars in Chechnya and Georgia had to be fought without troops from its neighbours. But since February 2022, Moscow has been seeking to bolster its ranks with Central Asian immigrants. Terrified migrants received <em>povestki </em>on the first day of the full-scale invasion, and many <a href="https://jamestown.org/program/russia-uses-all-means-to-recruit-central-asians-for-war-in-ukraine/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">sought</a> help from all but powerless local lawyers and NGOs. Media reports — and heavily publicised scandals back home in Central Asia — have drawn attention to the Russian army’s brutal press ganging of new arrivals and to numerous cases of workers <a href="https://jamestown.org/program/russia-uses-all-means-to-recruit-central-asians-for-war-in-ukraine/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">tricked</a> into enlisting.</p>
<p>And yet, foreign soldiers tend to cause less trouble politically. While the Kremlin’s mass mobilisation of its citizens in September 2022 was successful in terms of recruitment numbers, it sparked disquiet among privileged and hitherto “safe” residents of Moscow and St. Petersburg. Since then, efforts to recruit Central Asians have become more frequent and more violent. Any migrant who sets foot on Russian soil risks being hastily rounded up and packed off to the front in Ukraine, ready to join the ranks of the fallen in an early grave.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;Any migrant who sets foot on Russian soil risks being packed off to the front in Ukraine, ready to join the ranks of the fallen in an early grave.&#8221;</div>
<p>The irony is that Russia’s war is portrayed in propaganda as an <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/16/world/europe/putin-war-ukraine-recolonization.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">ethnonationalist</a> crusade to reunite Muscovites with their Ukrainian “brothers”. It is, according to the rhetoric, a war fought to save white Russians from the “<a href="https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/article-a-missile-destroyed-a-childrens-hospital-in-ukraine-and-moscows/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">epidemic</a>” of Westernism — with all its connotations of queerness, blackness, and other “non-traditional” values — emanating from Ukraine. The heroes of the war feted on television and at official ceremonies are, almost to a man, white Russians. Meanwhile, ethnic minorities — Muslims recruited at home and abroad — <a href="https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2024/02/24/2-years-into-ukraine-war-russias-ethnic-minorities-disproportionately-killed-in-battle-a84170" target="_blank" rel="noopener">bear the brunt</a> of the worst fighting. Yet despite it all, Central Asian migrants keep coming to Russia. And, more bizarrely still, they keep choosing to enlist in the Russian army.</p>
<p>What might be driving one of the most downtrodden ethnic groups in the region to voluntarily risk their lives in Moscow’s war? The chance of earning a life-changing sum of money is the obvious motivation. Moscow promises volunteers more than $2,000 a month in wages. When the <a href="https://www.ceicdata.com/en/indicator/kyrgyzstan/monthly-earnings" target="_blank" rel="noopener">average</a> salary in Kyrgyzstan is less than $400 a month, that offer might give any young Kyrgyz pause for thought — even if their country’s authorities officially <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/kyrgyz-man-prison-term-joining-russian-troops-invading-ukraine/33006815.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">forbid</a> them to take up the offer and Moscow does not always pay out.</p>
<p>But, more than a short-term pay-out, Moscow promises to make good on the old immigrant dream. Over the past two years, the route to Russian citizenship — and long-term socioeconomic security, assuming the fighting in Ukraine can be navigated safely — has become easier and easier for volunteers. In its desperate hunt for bodies, the Kremlin has binned more and more rules <a href="https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2024-02-20/putins-foreign-legion-foreigners-fighting-war-ukraine" target="_blank" rel="noopener">preventing</a> Central Asians from becoming citizens. Today, a volunteer has a path to a passport after just a few months spent in the Russian army: a simple quid pro quo that suits both parties, even if the power imbalance is self-evident. Moscow, the old imperial centre, is still a land of unrivalled economic opportunity in the region.</p>
<p>It&#8217;s impossible to say how effective these tactics have been in terms of raw numbers, as Moscow does not release official statistics about the size and composition of its army. However, the evidence suggests that plenty of Central Asians are, by force or choice, landing in the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/russian/articles/c0kyzvlxz5no" target="_blank" rel="noopener">ranks</a> of Putin’s army in Ukraine. Hundreds are dying, but still their compatriots keep coming, with 1.3 <a href="https://www.caspianpolicy.org/research/economy/central-asian-labor-migration-exploring-new-destinations-amid-geopolitical-tensions" target="_blank" rel="noopener">million</a> arriving in the first quarter of 2023 and similar numbers since.</p>
<p>In this way, Moscow has established a new type of capitalist imperialism. In some ways, its hold over its regions resembles the old Soviet system, when citizen-comrades dreamed of coming to the imperial metropolis of Moscow to realise dreams of upward mobility in a rigid social hierarchy. But this old-fashioned relationship between the empire and its peripheries is married to a 21st century globalism. In the Soviet era, movement between and within nations was tightly controlled. Today, though, sovereignty is no boundary to a greater power siphoning off the human resources of a neighbour. This is taken to a new, brutal extent by Moscow’s military recruitment tactics, which turn Central Asians into mercenaries-cum-economic migrants. In Europe, such free movement is an opportunity for richer Western nations to draw on their Eastern neighbours for cheap labour; in Russia, it provides the manpower for a 20th century “meatgrinder”.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/05/putins-ruthless-new-plan-to-win/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/05/putins-ruthless-new-plan-to-win/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/GettyImages-2151577663.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/05/putins-ruthless-new-plan-to-win/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/05/putins-ruthless-new-plan-to-win/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Putin&#039;s ruthless new plan to win</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/05/putins-ruthless-new-plan-to-win/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Ian Garner</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Ironically, Central Asia itself has become the recipient of an outflow of Russian migrants. Educated and wealthy young Russian <a href="https://www.economist.com/asia/2024/06/13/russian-exiles-are-making-a-mark-in-the-caucasus-and-central-asia" target="_blank" rel="noopener">exiles</a> are setting up cafes, IT firms and other businesses in what were once the imperial peripheries of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, where visas are easily available and Russian is still widely spoken. The Kremlin is getting a raw deal: in return for a flood of bodies to be sacrificed in war today, the best of its young generation are leaving and taking tomorrow’s economy with them.</p>
<p>However, a growing number of Central Asians are increasingly <a href="https://ecfr.eu/publication/steppe-change-how-russias-war-on-ukraine-is-reshaping-kazakhstan/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">disgruntled</a> with this untenable situation. As their governments vacillate over relations with the Kremlin, sections of society are buoyed by <a href="https://www.asianews.it/news-en/The-'de-colonisation'-of-young-Kazakhs-58453.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">anti-Russian</a> and national pride movements. Indeed, it’s likely that many of the young immigrants in Russia itself are only there for the money and would much rather be at home. In the years ahead, perhaps, the youngest Central Asian generation will follow in the footsteps of their Ukrainian peers and thoroughly reject not just Russian influence at home but the lure of the imperial metropolis as an immigration destination. Moscow cannot count on Central Asia as its recruit reservoir forever.</p>
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					<title>The European Right is spurning Moscow</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2024/06/the-failure-of-moscows-global-revolution/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://stage.unherd.com/2024/06/the-failure-of-moscows-global-revolution/?edition=us#comments</comments>
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										<unherd:main_theme>Russia</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Ian Garner]]>
					</dc:creator>
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																<unherd:article_ranking>2</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[Moldovan citizens protest to join the EU last year. Diego Herrera Carcedo/Anadolu Agency/Getty Images.]]>
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							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Dr. Ian Garner</strong> is assistant professor of totalitarian studies at the Pilecki Institute in Warsaw. His latest book is <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/z-generation/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em>Z Generation: Russia&#8217;s Fascist Youth</em></a> (Hurst).</p>
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						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>irgarner</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is assistant professor of totalitarian studies at the Pilecki Institute in Warsaw. His latest book is <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/z-generation/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em>Z Generation: Russia's Fascist Youth</em></a> (Hurst).]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Sun, 16 Jun 2024 23:02:20 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Mon, 17 Jun 2024 10:29:12 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Europe]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Politics]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://stage.unherd.com/?p=606051</guid>
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								<![CDATA[Putin has lost his old admirers ]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">In the lead-up to the European elections, the Kremlin poured vast amounts of resources into attempting to tilt the results in favour of far-Right, pro-Russian politicians. All the familiar </span><a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/article/2024/may/18/disappearing-ink-fake-polls-and-voter-eu-fears-as-russian-propaganda-ads-target-euro-elections" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">tactics</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> were seen in the wild. Moscow hardly bothers to cover its tracks any longer: viral stories on TikTok and Instagram pumped out lurid claims about the opposition, </span><a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/dutch-party-websites-attacked-as-eu-vote-kicks-off/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">hackers</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> caused disruption, and, behind the scenes, Russian agents were hard at work within NGOs and political structures across the continent. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">At first glance, Vladimir Putin seems to have won an enormous victory. Sympathetic far-Right parties, including openly neo-fascist outfits in Slovakia and Bulgaria, won seats across Central and Eastern Europe. Marine Le Pen’s Rassemblement National performed so well — clocking 31.5% of the vote in France — that Emmanuel Macron was moved to call a national election in response. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Russian politicians have been cock-a-hoop, declaring with confidence that the parliamentary results are a turning point in a broader war against the West. On X, an increasingly combative Dmitry Medvedev </span><a href="https://x.com/MedvedevRussiaE/status/1800103568239702099" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">declared</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> in his broken English that the results “come as a reflection of your inept policy of providing support to the bandera authorities in the f. Ukraine at the cost of your own citizens, your idiotic economic and migration policy!” A swathe of Russian media pundits followed his lead, </span><a href="https://dumatv.ru/news/aleksandr-sholohov-o-viborah-v-es--russkaya-kultura-i-traditsii-nahodyat-vse-bolshe-priznaniya?utm_source=yxnews&amp;utm_medium=desktop&amp;utm_referrer=https%3A%2F%2Fdzen.ru%2Fnews%2Fsearch%3Ftext%3D" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">proclaiming</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> that the electoral results would lead to a definitive weakening in support for Kyiv and that “Russian culture and traditions are gaining more and more </span><a href="https://dumatv.ru/news/aleksandr-sholohov-o-viborah-v-es--russkaya-kultura-i-traditsii-nahodyat-vse-bolshe-priznaniya?utm_source=yxnews&amp;utm_medium=desktop&amp;utm_referrer=https%3A%2F%2Fdzen.ru%2Fnews%2Fsearch%3Ftext%3D" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">recognition</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> in the West”. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">These leading commentators are assuring a Russian public, struggling with the economic and human costs of the country’s war against Ukraine, that a long-promised goal — one enshrined in official doctrine for close to two decades — is about to be realised: the creation of a “multipolar world” led by Moscow, and the rebuilding of a lost empire. </span></p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/05/putins-ruthless-new-plan-to-win/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/05/putins-ruthless-new-plan-to-win/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/GettyImages-2151577663.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/05/putins-ruthless-new-plan-to-win/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More by this author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/05/putins-ruthless-new-plan-to-win/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Putin&#039;s ruthless new plan to win</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/05/putins-ruthless-new-plan-to-win/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Ian Garner</a></p></div></a></div>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Depicting Europe as the antithesis of Russian values, power and success has been central to selling this project to the Russian population. Indeed, it was the pro-Russian Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych’s decision to reject an EU Association Agreement in 2013 that led to the Maidan Revolution in Kyiv. In turn, Putin in large part decided to invade a few months later as Ukraine looked to be rejecting Russia in favour of Europe.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Thus the suggestion that Europe is about to be broken for good not only invokes the collapse of the EU; it also implies Russia’s inexorable rise, the recreation of an empire with Moscow at its heart, and the recompense for two years of bitter suffering in Ukraine.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Yet is the situation as promising as Medvedev and his ilk claim? Despite the successes of the European far-Right, it is hard to imagine that 2024 will be a major turning point in Moscow’s relationship with Europe, or that the European Union’s old guard is on its knees. Indeed, it may yet transpire that 2024’s elections will see a new pact between the centre-right and the Left that could tilt both Moldova and Ukraine — each a traditional part of Russia’s imagined sphere of influence — even further toward Brussels.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">For all the headlines about far-Right successes, the most openly pro-Russian politicians struggled at the polls. The pro-Russian Latvia MEP Tatjana Ždanoka, who announced her “retirement” in February after </span><a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-investigation-latvia-mep-accused-kgb-fsb-russia-spy/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">allegations</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> of spying for Russia were made public, </span><a href="https://x.com/EuropeElects/status/1799778520115065284" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">saw</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> her party fail to regain its single seat. Vocal pro-Russian Left-wingers such as the Dubliner Clare Daly, who was publicly backed by liberal celebrities including Susan Sarandon, also </span><a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/article/2024/jun/11/controversial-dublin-mep-candidate-clare-daly-loses-seat-despite-celebrity-backing" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">made</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> their exits from Strasbourg. Voters might be angry about immigration and the political intransigence of Brussels, but they are not ready to embrace Moscow.</span></p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;Voters might be angry about immigration and the political intransigence of Brussels, but they are not ready to embrace Moscow.&#8221;</div>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Meanwhile, it will be service as normal in the halls of power in Europe. The European People’s Party (EPP) — which contains all of the familiar big hitters continues to back Ursula von der Leyen as president of the European Commission — remains the largest bloc in the Parliament. None of its members are pro-Russian, and there is no indication that their views on providing support to Ukraine, let alone retreating from the Baltics and the former Communist countries of Eastern Europe, are about to change. Indeed, a resurgent Poland is leading a group of European countries determined to take on Putin, come what may.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Jostling for position behind the EPP is a bitterly divided rabble of Right-wing parties, only a minority of whom are outright pro-Russian. The most pro-Moscow bloc, the Identity and Democracy (ID) grouping of parties, gained a mere nine seats in the elections. But for the past two years, the group has been riven with infighting and allegiance switching as members such as the hard nationalist Finns Party have doubled down on their support for Ukraine and chosen to exit. Despite dalliances with pro-Russian positions, the far-Right in Italy and France remain pro-Ukraine. The crucial issues for the Right, even those more sympathetic to Moscow, are around economy, migration, and values — not about giving the Kremlin a grand strategic victory.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">It is more likely that a centre-left bloc will cut a deal with the EPP grouping to offer Moldova and Ukraine new paths to </span><a href="https://cepa.org/article/moldova-russias-last-chance-to-derail-the-journey-to-europe/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">integration</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">, and possibly a route to membership. Even as Medvedev loudly declares the advent of a Russian-led multipolar world, Russia’s former subjects are fast heading in the opposite direction, toward a Europe that is ready to embrace them — and that is pumping great quantities of money and arms into Ukraine. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">After more than two years of total warfare in Ukraine, Moscow is further away than ever from recreating the Soviet and Russian empire. Europe has, once again, overwhelmingly rejected Russia and its useful idiots. The Kremlin’s stooges will keep claiming that the turning point is just over the horizon, but it is hard not to be reminded of the Soviet promise that global revolution is just around the corner. The more that promise is made, the more obvious it is that Russia’s star is waning.</span></p>
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					<title>Putin&#8217;s ruthless new plan to win</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2024/05/putins-ruthless-new-plan-to-win/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://stage.unherd.com/2024/05/putins-ruthless-new-plan-to-win/?edition=us#comments</comments>
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										<unherd:main_theme>Kremlinology</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Ian Garner]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/Blue-thumb.jpg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>3</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[Putin and Shoigu in Moscow last week (NATALIA KOLESNIKOVA/AFP via Getty Images)]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Dr. Ian Garner</strong> is assistant professor of totalitarian studies at the Pilecki Institute in Warsaw. His latest book is <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/z-generation/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em>Z Generation: Russia&#8217;s Fascist Youth</em></a> (Hurst).</p>
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						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>irgarner</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is assistant professor of totalitarian studies at the Pilecki Institute in Warsaw. His latest book is <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/z-generation/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em>Z Generation: Russia's Fascist Youth</em></a> (Hurst).]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Mon, 13 May 2024 23:00:09 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Mon, 17 Jun 2024 10:29:35 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Europe]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Russia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ukraine]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Vladimir Putin]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[War]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://old.unherd.com/?p=498503</guid>
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								<![CDATA[The Russian economy has been readied for war ]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>Over his 24 years in charge, Vladimir Putin has filled his cabinets with an array of mostly indistinguishable and eminently replaceable politicians. Some have lasted for just a few months in the upper echelons of the Kremlin machine, but the one figure who — until this weekend — seemed set to remain in situ for as long as Putin did was the now former Minister of Defence Sergei Shoigu. On Sunday came the shock announcement that Shoigu had been removed from his post as part of Putin’s post-inauguration cabinet reshuffle — but Putin’s choice of replacement, a technocratic economist, might herald the creation of a new, more streamlined war machine designed to engage in all-but permanent war.</p>
<p>Shoigu has long been part of the political furniture in the Russian Federation. He was appointed Minister for Emergency Situations by Boris Yeltsin in 1991 in the dying months of the Soviet era. He remained in that post until 2012, seeing out Yeltsin, Putin and even Dmitry Medvedev’s presidential terms. But as Putin returned to the presidency in 2012 on a platform filled with militaristic ultra-nationalism — one that promised a restoration of national greatness in the face of a purported Western onslaught — Shoigu ascended to his most important post, becoming the Minister of Defence in May that year.</p>
<p>Barely two years later, Russia had invaded the east of Ukraine and Crimea. Shoigu and Putin’s popularity boomed. A very public bromance between president and minister saw the two regularly <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/gallery/2017/aug/05/sunbathing-in-siberia-vladimir-putins-summer-holiday-in-pictures" target="_blank" rel="noopener">photographed</a> together playing hockey and engaging in bare-chested fishing sessions.</p>
<p>Since 2012, Shoigu has been the ever-present face of Russia’s wars. Whether briefing Putin at heavily publicised meetings in the Kremlin, attending the state’s lavish Victory Day parades, handing out medals to veterans of the “special military operation”, or <a href="https://www.interfax.ru/russia/906961?ysclid=lw56nsqzic270635069" target="_blank" rel="noopener">visiting</a> the injured in hospital, this doggedly loyal Putinist — always in uniform, and often bedecked with a rash of unearned medals — has seemed to embody the new, militarised Russia.</p>
<p>Yet in the past two years, Shoigu has become the target of much ire over the death toll and slow progress the Russian army has experienced in Ukraine. The former, and now deceased, Wagner leader Yevgeny Prigozhin almost <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-66013532" target="_blank" rel="noopener">launched</a> all-out war against the state after Shoigu’s Defence Ministry attempted to assert control over his forces in summer 2023. He claimed that Shoigu was the source of the army’s failings, and only wanted to wage war to award himself more military honours. A slew of similar criticisms has bedeviled Shoigu’s ministry for years: its corruption, bureaucracy and incompetence are the subject of constant public criticism. Shoigu is thus perceived as a man with few redeeming features bar his loyalty to Putin.</p>
<p>Into Shoigu’s shoes, however, steps yet another close Putin ally: the long-serving economist Andrey Belousov. Belousov’s public image is far blander than his predecessor’s. White-haired, quiet and always clad in a neat business suit, Belousov is known for his impressive knowledge of — and competence in — economics. Even better, given the struggles that Shoigu’s ministry experienced, Belousov has gained a reputation for incorruptibility throughout his time in government.</p>
<p>Yet it would be a categorical error to interpret Belousov’s appointment as a return to normality or a move toward restoring order after the aggressive, militaristic chaos of the past few years. Belousov is a strong proponent of the post-2012 order, and was one of very few economists in Russia who <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/5/13/the-goal-is-not-peace-whats-behind-putins-wartime-russia-reshuffle" target="_blank" rel="noopener">welcomed</a> the invasion of Crimea in 2014 — even though it brought disastrous sanctions on the country and saw the value of the Russian ruble plummet. He has been a key architect of the transition away from a liberal capitalist order in the Russian economy toward one in which the state — and in particular the state’s military enterprises — looms large.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;It would be a categorical error to interpret Belousov’s appointment as a return to normality.&#8221;</div>
<p>Early signs from Belousov’s new ministry suggest that the state is looking for ways not to rein in but to streamline its forces, to find efficiencies, resolve long-standing organisational issues and continue to wage war for years to come. Belousov has been <a href="https://t.me/vityzeva/101750" target="_blank" rel="noopener">charged</a> with immediately looking into issues around troop survival rates and the provision of proper medical care and civil allowances for soldiers returning from the front.</p>
<p>Whatever the change in leadership at the Ministry of Defence portends, therefore, it will not be a move toward a more peaceful Russia. Nor will it necessarily be a more humane Russian way of warfare in Ukraine. For the time being, Valery Gerasimov — a man <a href="https://novayagazeta.eu/articles/2023/01/27/the-story-of-general-gerasimov-en" target="_blank" rel="noopener">accused</a> of encouraging Russian troops’ war crimes in both Chechnya and Ukraine — remains the armed forces’ Chief of General Staff with primary responsibility for operational conduct in the theatre of war. Belousov’s role will presumably not be to issue correctives to men like Gerasimov but to provide them with a more efficient supply line of troops, arms and armour to behave in the way they see fit.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/02/the-cost-of-russias-collapsing-empire/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/02/the-cost-of-russias-collapsing-empire/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/GettyImages-454420636-e1707234847800.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/02/the-cost-of-russias-collapsing-empire/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/02/the-cost-of-russias-collapsing-empire/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The cost of Russia&#039;s collapsing empire</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/02/the-cost-of-russias-collapsing-empire/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Robert D. Kaplan</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>It&#8217;s hardly a surprise that Russia’s nationalist factions are cock-a-hoop at the news of Shoigu’s dismissal, which is, to <a href="https://t.me/vityzeva/101728" target="_blank" rel="noopener">quote</a> one leading blogger, “a logical step”. Even if there is some suspicion that Belousov’s experience working with Americans might make him a soft touch (one popular commentator even jokingly <a href="https://t.me/kolezev/15018" target="_blank" rel="noopener">called</a> him a “veteran foreign agent”), the positive responses far outweigh the negative. Extreme nationalists — who have long railed against the logistical failures of Shoigu’s ministry — are revelling in the slew of Western news articles commenting on Belousov’s economic credentials. “They’re terrified,” claimed one user on a popular Telegram channel, “because Russia’s on the right path.” Paired with news of continued Russian progress against a depleted Ukrainian army, the sense of stagnation about the war within the country may be about to disappear.</p>
<p>At last week’s presidential inauguration, Putin <a href="https://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/73981" target="_blank" rel="noopener">spoke</a> of the importance of the “special military operation” to Russia’s history. In a climactic flourish, he declared that “together, we will win!” In the past two years, Russia’s economy has pivoted from being one funded almost entirely by the sale of resources to one that funds itself through the production of material for war. Put simply, Russia now needs war to stave off economic collapse. With Andrey Belousov at the helm of the Ministry of Defence, Putin has made a choice to pursue that economic path with a ruthless efficiency that would have been impossible under the loyal but hapless Sergey Shoigu — and to provide his army with the means they need to win in Ukraine.</p>
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					<title>Can Putin survive a Chechen civil war?</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2024/05/can-putin-survive-a-chechen-civil-war/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://stage.unherd.com/2024/05/can-putin-survive-a-chechen-civil-war/?edition=us#comments</comments>
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										<unherd:main_theme>Russia</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Ian Garner]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/Blue-thumb.jpg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>2</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[It's not looking good for Ramzan Kadyrov. Sergei Savostyanov/Pool/AFP/Getty Images]]>
						</unherd:image_caption>
						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Dr. Ian Garner</strong> is assistant professor of totalitarian studies at the Pilecki Institute in Warsaw. His latest book is <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/z-generation/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em>Z Generation: Russia&#8217;s Fascist Youth</em></a> (Hurst).</p>
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						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>irgarner</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is assistant professor of totalitarian studies at the Pilecki Institute in Warsaw. His latest book is <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/z-generation/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em>Z Generation: Russia's Fascist Youth</em></a> (Hurst).]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Mon, 06 May 2024 23:02:31 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Thu, 09 May 2024 08:16:11 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Chechnya]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Defence Sector]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[row]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Russia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ukraine]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Vladimir Putin]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[War]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://old.unherd.com/?p=497682</guid>
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								<![CDATA[A bloody battle would distract Russia from Ukraine]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>Is Chechnya preparing for a bloody succession battle? According to reports, Ramzan Kadyrov, the ruthless leader of Russia’s Chechnya region, is suffering from a fatal pancreas condition. Although rumours about his health have cropped up repeatedly in recent years, this time things do not look good. Neither the Kremlin nor its counterpart in Grozny have been able to dispel the sense that Chechnya may be about to face a turning point — one that may provide an opportunity for Vladimir Putin’s opponents to get the better of Russia in Ukraine.</p>
<p>Chechnya has for two centuries been a thorn in imperial Moscow’s side. Over and over again, its people have revolted against the imposition of Christian Orthodox power and dragged Russia into protracted and bloody conflicts. The first of these post-Soviet conflicts, which ran from 1994 to 1996, saw Russian troops humiliated. Boris Yeltsin, who had staked his reputation on reasserting control over the region, saw his reputation permanently damaged. Worse, Russians themselves were humbled. A decade earlier, they had been vying for global supremacy with Washington. Now, they could not even win a war against a separatist rabble in their own backyard.</p>
<p>When in late 1999 Putin, then a young and straight-talking upstart, stormed into the halls of power, he promised to bring Chechnya back into the fold at any cost. Launching a new war, he sent his troops into the breakaway region with carte blanche to exterminate and destroy. Almost a decade of fighting left more than 50,000 civilians dead and Grozny razed. Widespread criminality — looting, rape and murder — by Russian troops at the front went mostly unpunished.</p>
<p>Into this maelstrom of violence stepped a young Ramzan Kadyrov, one of many former insurgents turned pro-Russian fighters. Appointed by Putin to lead the territory in 2007, his 17 years in power have been characterised by an awkward combination of Moscow-style autocracy, with various strongmen vying for favour while Kadyrov watches on, and regressive Islamism, designed through a combination of misogynism, traditionalist flourishes and militancy to appease and oppress the majority Muslim local population in equal measure.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/02/alexei-navalny-has-left-no-heir/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/02/alexei-navalny-has-left-no-heir/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/GettyImages-136042322-1-1.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/02/alexei-navalny-has-left-no-heir/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/02/alexei-navalny-has-left-no-heir/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Alexei Navalny has no heir</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/02/alexei-navalny-has-left-no-heir/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Ian Garner</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>But above all, Kadyrov has ruled in the same style as the Russian army conducted its invasion: with criminality and absolute violence. Kadyrov and his henchmen have personally been involved in torture and extrajudicial killings of political opponents and purported criminals. Brutal anti-gay purges have seen hundreds abducted, tortured and beaten — and several killed. Putin and his ally seemed to have found a solution to the age-old problem of Chechen insurgency: a flexible nationalism, ruthless violence and a mafia-like internal politics.</p>
<p>Imagining a post-Kadyrov Chechnya, pundits float bold hypotheses: could Kadyrov’s death provoke a bitter succession crisis that would spark another regional war? If Russian troops had to be deployed, would Putin’s reputation as the man who quelled the restive Chechens for good be ruined? Could rebellion in Chechnya even lead to a wave of revolts across the imperial peripheries, where Muslim minorities have not profited from the past two decades like their ethnic Russian peers and where local populations have borne much of the burden of fighting in Ukraine? If the wrong leader is imposed by Moscow, could demonstrations like those in Bashkortostan — another Muslim majority province where in January several thousand angry locals <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/russias-bashkortostan-protests-separatism-isnt-the-real-threat-facing-putin/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">clashed</a> with security services after a local activist was jailed — break out and perhaps spread? Both Kadyrov and Putin have plans in place to ensure that such disasters don’t unfold, but the situation is flammable.</p>
<p>Kadyrov himself seems intent on a dynastic succession. Two of his sons, the teenaged Adam and Akhmat, are being groomed for power. The 16-year-old Adam has been <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/chechnya-kadyrov-son-adam-16-special-forces-supervise/32924923.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">appointed</a> supervisor Chechya’s Special Forces School, while his 18-year-old <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/chechnya-kadyrov-son-minister/32824549.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">brother</a> is the territory’s Minister for Youth and even attended a one-on-one meeting with Putin in 2023. The former shows the same penchant for violence as his father: Kadyrov <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/chcehnya-kadyrov-son-beats-koran-burning-man/32609979.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">announced</a> he was “proud” when footage of Adam viciously beating a man who had burned a Koran went viral.</p>
<p>Yet neither of these stripling dauphins, who lack the support of either the public or a force of loyal foot-soldiers, would likely be able to keep control of Chechnya for long. A crowd of potential challengers, such as Kadyrov’s right-hand man Magomed Daudov, another Chechen War turncoat, and Apti Alaudinov, who commands a unit fighting in Ukraine and seems to be the Kremlin’s <a href="https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2024/04/24/what-next-for-chechnya-after-kadyrov-reported-seriously-ill-experts-weigh-in-a84949" target="_blank" rel="noopener">preferred choice</a>, eagerly watches on. Each possesses far more significant support among Chechnya’s elites than the risible Kadyrov siblings. Should one or the other make a play for the top spot, it is hard to see the Kadyrov dynasty surviving.</p>
<p>Still, none of the challengers represent a separatist movement. Each has a vested interest in maintaining Putin’s support — and thus the inflow of money and, should any troubles arise, extra security services. Each would be able to rule in much the same vein as Kadyrov. Meanwhile, a fragmented separatist movement lacks the resources and manpower to mount a serious challenge. Significant opposition to Chechnya’s status as part of the Russian Federation does exist, and some Chechens are even fighting against Russia in Ukraine, but Chechnya is not the rebellious place it once was. Unlike other peripheral regions, it has not seen major protests as a result of the 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Even anti-Russian rebel leaders have <a href="https://www.kyivpost.com/post/31889" target="_blank" rel="noopener">suggested</a> that Kadyrov’s death would not be a “game changer”.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/02/the-chechens-fighting-for-ukraine/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/02/the-chechens-fighting-for-ukraine/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/ewfwefewff-e1675181756381.jpeg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/02/the-chechens-fighting-for-ukraine/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/02/the-chechens-fighting-for-ukraine/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The Chechens fighting for Ukraine</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/02/the-chechens-fighting-for-ukraine/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> David Patrikarakos</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>The real danger for the Kremlin, then, is in Chechnya’s various power blocks engaging in an internal struggle so violent that it threatens regional stability. Unlike in the Nineties and 2000s, they would not fight for secession but for power. In a territory where mountainous and sparsely populated territory provides the perfect platform for guerilla warfare, and where performative masculine violence — showcased in regular mass demonstrations of Chechen military might — and traumatised veterans dominate political culture, such a conflict could easily spiral out of control. Perhaps the only way for Putin to restore order would be to deploy Russian troops en masse — and even then, judging by past wars, the conflict would not be resolved quickly.</p>
<p>That said, such a low-level conflict would not be regime ending. Putin’s propagandists would beat the patriotic drum, claiming that one or other (or all) sides were being funded by the usual enemies: the CIA, Islamic extremists, Ukraine. The conflict would be painted as just another example of how the West is trying to smash Russia apart — and thus proof that Putin remains the only man who knows how to face down this existential threat. It would fan the flames of anti-Muslim xenophobia, long nurtured by the Kremlin as a convenient means of rallying racial hatred for political ends and <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2024/03/30/russia-faces-wave-of-islamophobia-after-moscow-attacks_6666864_4.html">at a peak </a>following the government’s handling of the Crocus City Hall terrorist attacks, rather than anti-Putin rebellion. Many Russians welcomed the sight of visibly brutalised Tajik Muslims appearing in court following the Crocus attacks; a wave of spontaneous victimisation of Central Asians has followed. In this febrile atmosphere, Chechens could easily receive the same sort of treatment.</p>
<p>In this case, Putin might emerge with his reputation intact or even enhanced. But a period of instability following Kadyrov’s death could also be a golden opportunity for Russia’s opponents to seriously weaken the Russian president. A military venture in Chechnya would hoover up significant money, manpower and materiel — all in short supply after two years of war in Ukraine. Just as the Russian army is gearing up for a big summer campaign to break through its stagnant position in eastern Ukraine, it could be drawn into a long and bloody war in Chechnya.</p>
<p>All Russia’s opponents need to do is fuel the ambitions of Kadyrov’s potential successors and encourage them to plot and commit violence against one another. Even providing arms to the handful of separatists operating in Chechnya or perhaps those fighting in Ukraine, if they were willing to return home to combat Putin, might be a viable option if it were to seriously disrupt Moscow’s war on Ukraine. Such a course of action would be cheap, has the potential to save Ukrainian lives, and might give Putin pause for thought as he weighs up his options vis-à-vis Kyiv. Kadyrov’s death might be the gifthorse a war-fatigued Western world is looking for.</p>
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					<title>The true purpose of Russia&#8217;s fake election</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2024/03/the-true-purpose-of-russias-fake-election/?edition=us</link>
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										<unherd:main_theme>Putin</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Ian Garner]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/Blue-thumb.jpg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>2</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[Putin remains firmly in charge. Vladimir Nikolayev/AFP/Getty Images]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Dr. Ian Garner</strong> is assistant professor of totalitarian studies at the Pilecki Institute in Warsaw. His latest book is <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/z-generation/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em>Z Generation: Russia&#8217;s Fascist Youth</em></a> (Hurst).</p>
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						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>irgarner</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is assistant professor of totalitarian studies at the Pilecki Institute in Warsaw. His latest book is <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/z-generation/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em>Z Generation: Russia's Fascist Youth</em></a> (Hurst).]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Fri, 15 Mar 2024 00:02:32 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Fri, 15 Mar 2024 00:02:32 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Election]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[row]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Russia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Vladimir Putin]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[War]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://old.unherd.com/?p=493105</guid>
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								<![CDATA[Putin's campaign is barraging the young]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>There is a brutal irony to the fact that the Russian word for “elections” — <em>vybory </em>— literally translates as “choices”. In reality, this weekend&#8217;s “election” is, by democratic standards, no such thing. Russians will have no choice but to side with Vladimir Putin. And indeed, the most reliable indicators of public opinion suggest that Russians are increasingly <a href="https://www.levada.ru/en/ratings/assessment-of-situation-in-the-country/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">positive</a> about their country’s situation. In voting for Putin, Russians will declare their fealty to a new, emboldened, and militaristic nation — one with a vision of a future dominated by war in Ukraine and beyond.</p>
<p>The decision to run an election when the outcome is certain may seem baffling. But we should see Russia’s election not as one in which voters have <em>choices</em> for leadership, but a singular <em>choice</em>: between aligning oneself with Putin’s Russian nation, which is locked in perpetual war, and aligning oneself with the nation’s enemies. State operatives have made this choice clear. As journalist Roman Golovanov put it in a Telegram post later shared by propagandist-in-chief Vladimir Solovyev, “the only important thing” in the electoral results “is Russia’s victory”. Whether Golovanov had in mind an abstract political victory or a literal military victory was left deliberately unclear.</p>
<p>In a country like Russia, the electoral ritual is vital to affirm public support for militarism. According to the state’s propaganda, the Russian Federation is purportedly surrounded by enemies, from Westerners to Ukrainians, fascists, and a supposed international LGTBQ alliance that has been legally deemed an “extremist” group. Every one of these enemies seeks to destroy Russia — and anybody who opposes Putin, who is synonymous with Russia, must therefore be on the side of the anti-Russians.</p>
<p>This year’s get-out-the-vote campaign — always important in Russia, where citizens are notoriously uninterested in directly engaging with political life, and as late as November 2023 only around half of the country was aware a presidential election was even in the offing — has therefore centred on the purported benefits of Russia’s war against Ukraine. Propagandists have spread photographs and videos of frontline troops taking advantage of early voting, <a href="https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/54680" target="_blank" rel="noopener">declaring</a> that turnout has (of course) been “close to 100%”. Residents in occupied territories — which Russia has declared to be a part of its own territory — are revealed to be voting with gusto, thus displaying their fealty to the state. One elderly lady in occupied Zaporizhzhia almost cried with joy as she fills out her early ballot, <a href="https://t.me/anna_news/63255" target="_blank" rel="noopener">exclaiming</a> “thank God for the chance to vote for the President of Russia!” For Moscow, the election is a chance to show off a newer, bigger, and bolder Russia — a Russia created through war.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;For Moscow, the election is a chance to show off a newer, bigger, and bolder Russia — a Russia created through war.&#8221;</div>
<p>In typical Kremlin style, every positive narrative is accompanied by the reminder that disaster is never far off. As the election nears, the state’s propagandists have summoned up the phantom spectre of foreign interference to rally Russians in opposition to a purported threat from the West. Earlier this week, Russia’s SVR spy agency publicly <a href="https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2024-03-11/russias-spy-service-accuses-us-of-trying-to-meddle-in-presidential-election" target="_blank" rel="noopener">accused</a> the USA — a country that Russians have overwhelmingly <a href="https://www.levada.ru/en/ratings/attitudes-towards-countries/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">negative</a> views about — of planning to interfere in the election by hacking the new electronic voting system.</p>
<p>At least some users on social media took the bait. Followers of one large pro-government Telegram channel, for instance, <a href="https://t.me/boris_rozhin/116062" target="_blank" rel="noopener">responded</a> to the news with enthusiasm: &#8220;I wasn&#8217;t going to bother voting but now I definitely will!&#8221;; &#8220;Now I&#8217;ll show those Yankee fuckers and go vote&#8230; for Putin.” Voting becomes a symbolic act that bonds citizens in their opposition to Russia’s enemies. Choosing anyone but Putin is unthinkable. Participating in and talking about the election gives ordinary civilians a means to imagine themselves locked in a war with the West.</p>
<p>The state is not just reaching out to its traditional voter base with this loudhailer messaging. It’s also barraging the young and the disenchanted with visions of a future that is at once alluringly modern and dangerously militaristic. At the World Youth Festival, a state-run event that took place near Krasnodar in early March, thousands of young people — chiefly from Russia, with some delegates from friendly countries in the Global South — were treated to a glamorous and immaculately branded multi-day carnival of concerts, games, panel discussions, and celebrity talks. A special panel was <a href="https://fest2024.com/en/photo/vote-for-russia-discussion" target="_blank" rel="noopener">dedicated</a> to explaining the importance and fairness of the Russian electoral system.</p>
<p>The festival’s star was Vladimir Putin, who <a href="https://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/73616" target="_blank" rel="noopener">spoke</a> on the nature of elections for his audience: “A politician,” he went on to explain, “thinks about the next election, while a statesman” — Putin has himself in mind — &#8220;thinks about the next generation”. In between platitudes about equality, justice, and the future, he urged the young to participate in political life, but only if they do so through the lens of war and militarism: “Even in the most difficult of times, at the turning points of Russia’s history, the hardest times, there were always a lot of volunteers, including during the Great Patriotic War.” Here, Putin’s message was clear: young people have a choice of engaging in social activity such as voting, waging war and fighting or, by rejecting the “statesman” that Putin is, making themselves the enemy of the next generation.</p>
<p>Despite this urgency, the 2024 election has been perhaps the most subdued in Russia’s recent history. There have been none of the usual flag-waving, immaculately choreographed stadium rallies in support of Putin in Moscow — perhaps out of fear of Ukrainian drone attacks, which caused the <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/putin-cancels-victory-day-parades-as-ukraine-invasion-continues-to-unravel/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">cancellation</a> of Victory Day celebrations in 2023, or perhaps because the regime feels so secure it no longer sees the need to stage such lavish events.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/02/alexei-navalny-has-left-no-heir/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/02/alexei-navalny-has-left-no-heir/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/GettyImages-136042322-1-1.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/02/alexei-navalny-has-left-no-heir/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/02/alexei-navalny-has-left-no-heir/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Alexei Navalny has no heir</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/02/alexei-navalny-has-left-no-heir/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Ian Garner</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Regardless, there is no opposition movement to challenge Putin. A brief tilt at the election by Boris Nadezhdin, an anti-war candidate, was <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/barred-anti-war-russian-presidential-candidate-fails-two-legal-challenges-2024-02-15/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">quashed</a> by the authorities before it made any serious headway. Nadezhdin’s 20-year career as a moderate politician in an increasingly extreme political landscape made him a palatable alternative for many Russians, who took immense personal risks to help him <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russian-anti-war-candidate-nadezhdin-says-he-has-enough-signatures-run-president-2024-01-31/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">gather</a> more than 100,000 nomination signatures and join the presidential race. Even though Nadezhdin hardly presented a real challenge to the Putinist order, the state was still unwilling to allow even moderate discontent to coalesce, and promptly used the electoral commission to <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/boris-nadezhdin-russia-presidential-election-1.7133104" target="_blank" rel="noopener">assert</a> that the candidate’s nomination list contained “irregularities” that disqualified him. Anti-Putin Russians might have hoped the death of Alexei Navalny would prove a catalyst for protests, but those hopes rapidly fizzled out as moderate numbers attended the leader’s funeral then went back to their homes. Now, the regime is cracking down on both Navalny and Nadezhdin&#8217;s supporters through <a href="https://novayagazeta.eu/articles/2024/03/13/nadezhdin-campaign-volunteer-arrested-for-lgbt-propaganda-after-using-rainbow-flag-emoji-en-news" target="_blank" rel="noopener">judicial</a> and <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-68549966" target="_blank" rel="noopener">violent</a> means.</p>
<p>The result is that, this week, Russians will open their ballots and make a choice between Putin and three candidates who broadly support the Kremlin. As usual in Russia’s presidential elections, the alternatives are bit-part players with little name recognition and little to differentiate their vision of the future from the status quo. The expected runner-up, Leonid Slutsky, is an ultranationalist, long-time Duma deputy and Putin ally who has <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russian-negotiator-says-ukraines-azov-fighters-dont-deserve-live-2022-05-17/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">claimed</a> that captured Ukrainian troops should be executed. The communist candidate, Nikolay Kharitonov, doesn’t even pretend to <a href="https://tass.ru/politika/19616679" target="_blank" rel="noopener">challenge</a> the incumbent: Putin “is responsible for his own work, so why would I criticise him?”</p>
<p>After the polls close, the state will rapidly name Putin the winner. The president will declare victory and claim that the nation has once more chosen not just its leader but its identity as a warring power. He will claim that, in engaging in this process, Russians have engaged in a vital act of defence against a cabal of Western nations that seek to destroy it. And he will suggest that Russia’s future is bolder, brighter, and more united as a result. Even after two years of a disastrous war, Putin remains firmly in charge of Russia — and Russia remains firmly in support of the president’s vision of an increasingly militaristic future.</p>
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					<title>Alexei Navalny has no heir</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2024/02/alexei-navalny-has-left-no-heir/?edition=us</link>
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										<unherd:main_theme>Weekend analysis</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Ian Garner]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/Blue-thumb.jpg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>1</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[The future looks bleak. (Andrey Smirnov/AFP/Getty Images)]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Dr. Ian Garner</strong> is assistant professor of totalitarian studies at the Pilecki Institute in Warsaw. His latest book is <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/z-generation/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em>Z Generation: Russia&#8217;s Fascist Youth</em></a> (Hurst).</p>
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						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>irgarner</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is assistant professor of totalitarian studies at the Pilecki Institute in Warsaw. His latest book is <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/z-generation/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em>Z Generation: Russia's Fascist Youth</em></a> (Hurst).]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Fri, 16 Feb 2024 17:47:38 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Fri, 16 Feb 2024 22:41:16 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Alexei Navalny]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[row]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Russia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Society]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Vladimir Putin]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://old.unherd.com/?p=490540</guid>
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								<![CDATA[Is this the end of Russia's opposition?]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>When Alexei Navalny chose to board a flight to Moscow in January 2021, the opposition leader must have known his death was all but inevitable. After surviving one assassination attempt, and staring down the barrel of a long jail sentence handed down by Russia’s corrupt judiciary, Navalny chose to martyr himself in the name of overthrowing Putin. Yet today, he leaves behind him no united opposition, no leader to occupy his place, and little hope that tomorrow will be any brighter for the Russian Federation.</p>
<p>In the three years since his return to Russia, the former lawyer and blogger made occasional appearances by fuzzy video link from remote Russian jails to respond to absurd charges. His emaciated body showed the signs of extreme suffering. Russia’s <em>kolonii</em> — penal colonies for hardened criminals — are brutal places at the best of times. But Navalny received a special diet of inhuman<a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/navalny-prison-russia-penal-colony-polar-wolf-b2497548.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener"> torture</a>. Months spent alone in solitary confinement in freezing conditions and on meagre rations destroyed his health. The state even refused for long periods to turn his cell’s lights off, and blasted political propaganda into his room for hours on end.</p>
<p>Yet Navalny, astonishingly, seemed to remain in rude psychological health. In court the day before he died, the political prisoner<a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/court-day-before-his-death-alexei-navalny-laughed-cracked-jokes-2024-02-16/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"> was seen</a> laughing and joking — he rarely took the regime’s show trials seriously, choosing to mock rather than participate in them — and he regularly wrote searing critiques of the Putin regime and its wars from his jail cell. When his lawyers were able to reach him, they shared these materials through Navalny’s popular social media feeds. Navalny’s body may have been broken, but he remained conscious of both Russia’s politics and, presumably, the terrible fate that awaited him.</p>
<p>When Navalny burst onto the political scene in the early 2010s, he used social media to bring hundreds of thousands of Russians to protest on the streets against the Russian state’s corruption and criminality. Writing on his personal blog, Navalny laid into the elites and gave voice to the opposition: “We are not cattle or slaves. We have a voice and the strength to defend it.” This handsome and youthful lawyer spoke in the language of the young, using the communications platform of the young, to rile up opposition to Vladimir Putin’s criminal regime. And Navalny’s overarching message, broadcast at a time when mass oppression was only just beginning in post-Soviet Russia, was simple: anybody but Putin.</p>
<p>A skilled political operator, writer, and orator, Navalny appealed to Russians from across the spectrum to band together and give Putin the boot. In those early marches, which centred on opposition to the undemocratic presidential election of 2012, Navalny called on everyone from greens to communists, liberals, and nationalists to join his campaign. Showing little regard for who he worked with, Navalny soon found himself the leader of an informal grouping whose leaders are today, like Ilya <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/dec/09/russian-opposition-figure-ilya-yashin-jailed-for-denouncing-ukraine-war" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Yashin</a>, in jail — or, like Boris<a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2023/07/16/boris-nemtsov-murder-human-rights-kremlin/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"> Nemtsov</a>, long ago killed by the regime. Nobody at the time knew how to speak to or unite such a broad spectrum of Russia’s disparate opposition as Alexei Navalny.</p>
<p>Yet it was this very strategy of unity that provoked the greatest criticism of Navalny. The leader’s alignment with the far-Right and earlier support for nationalist policies — he would later apologise for <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/2/25/navalny-has-the-kremlin-foe-moved-on-from-his-nationalist-past" target="_blank" rel="noopener">alluding</a> to Muslims as “cockroaches” in a 2007 video — has tarnished his reputation with Ukrainians in particular. Photographs of Navalny marching alongside the far-Right haunt any mention of the leader in online fora, and critics regularly <a href="https://crimea.suspilne.media/en/news/942#:~:text=He%20also%20said%20that%20when,his%20supporters%20and%20other%20oppositionists." target="_blank" rel="noopener">accused</a> him of equivocating over the fate of Crimea in 2014. Navalny was never the liberal white knight that some in the West may have hoped he would be.</p>
<p>Nonetheless, Navalny was the only opposition leader in the last 24 years of Putin’s increasingly totalitarian rule to offer a serious path out of dictatorship, oligarchy, and extreme nationalism. While Navalny’s poll ratings in the abortive electoral campaigns he was involved in never suggested that he had garnered mass support — indeed, his approval rating among the Russian public was actually <a href="https://re-russia.net/en/review/185/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">falling fast</a> in recent years — his publicity team reached a huge online audience and, through their campaign efforts abroad, built serious political links with policymakers around the world. For example, the team’s <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ipAnwilMncI" target="_blank" rel="noopener">expose</a> of Putin’s opulent palace on the Black Sea Coast, built with embezzled funds, has been watched over 100,000,000 times on YouTube.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/02/the-cost-of-russias-collapsing-empire/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/02/the-cost-of-russias-collapsing-empire/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/GettyImages-454420636-e1707234847800.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/02/the-cost-of-russias-collapsing-empire/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/02/the-cost-of-russias-collapsing-empire/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The cost of Russia&#039;s collapsing empire</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/02/the-cost-of-russias-collapsing-empire/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Robert D. Kaplan</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Putin may have controlled the mass media, but Navalny’s team deftly skirted official restrictions to reach a huge audience. Almost everybody in Russia had heard of Alexei Navalny and knew he represented genuine opposition to Putin (whom Navalny christened “the old man in his bunker” — an out of touch, cranky grandpa bent on destroying Russia). In a country whose politics has been littered with fake opposition candidates, Navalny was, for better or worse, the most recognisable and the only alternative to Putin for the majority of Russians.</p>
<p>It may be a coincidence that Navalny’s tragic death in Russia’s far-flung Yamalo-Nenets region comes just a month before the country goes to vote in a presidential election — or, more accurately, participates in the latest coronation of Vladimir Putin. However, it also follows both last week’s news that Putin challenger and soft opposition candidate Boris Nadezhdin has been<a href="https://meduza.io/en/news/2024/02/15/russia-s-supreme-court-rejects-putin-challenger-boris-nadezhdin-s-first-claim-against-central-election-commission"> barred</a> from the ballot paper. These stories only add to the countless reports of the arrests, beatings, and killings of opposition journalists and politicians all over Russia over the past two years. The 2010s generation of opposition leaders and supporters are broken, battered, and destroyed. Now their greatest hope has been killed.</p>
<p>The days when opposition candidates could be allowed to operate in Russia’s peripheries, or even to make a brief appearance in election campaigns, are long gone. Those “vegetarian times”, as Navalny’s former press secretary Anna Veduta once described them to me, have been replaced by oppression that harks back to the darkest days of the 20th century. Now the regime is using new media to turn the screw even tighter, constantly disrupting and diminishing any sparks of opposition before figures like Alexei Navalny are allowed to fan the flames of revolt. Whenever a new campaign is launched, it is instantly drowned out with the noise of bots, trolls, and Putinist true believers — and its proponents are tossed into Russia’s rotting jails. In these circumstances, how can a new, untarnished, and popular Navalny emerge?</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;How can a new, untarnished, and popular Navalny emerge?&#8221;</div>
<p>Navalny&#8217;s greatest achievement was to unite the opposition under the &#8220;everyone but Putin&#8221; banner in the early 2010s. He built bridges between opposing, fragmented groups. Without Navalny, it would have been impossible to imagine communists marching alongside greens against Putin. The Russian opposition today desperately needs a figure with the psychological fortitude and self-sacrificial character of Alexei Navalny: somebody who is brave enough to stay in Russia, speak the truth without regard for the consequences, and to create new momentum for an “anybody but Putin” campaign. As of today, both analysts watching from abroad and the many Russians who knew Alexei Navalny’s name would agree that no such figure exists.</p>
<p>Perhaps that figure might be Navalny’s wife, Yuliia, who made an <a href="https://thehill.com/policy/international/4472349-navalny-wife-speech-munich-security-conference/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">uncompromising</a> and powerful public speech calling for revenge against her dead husband’s murderers shortly after hearing news of his passing. Perhaps it will be an unknown, a young Russian who will take TikTok or some other new technology by storm, as Alexei Navalny did in 2011. But in a world where Putin’s control of mainstream and social media looks stronger than ever, and where the regime is using ever more extreme means to oppress its population, Alexei Navalny’s death signals a newer, bleaker future for Russia.</p>
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					<title>How Putin exploits Russian antisemitism</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2023/11/how-putin-exploits-russian-antisemitism/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://stage.unherd.com/2023/11/how-putin-exploits-russian-antisemitism/?edition=us#comments</comments>
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										<unherd:main_theme></unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Ian Garner]]>
					</dc:creator>
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																<unherd:article_ranking></unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[Putin thrives on chaos and violence. Sasha Mordovets/Getty Images]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Dr. Ian Garner</strong> is assistant professor of totalitarian studies at the Pilecki Institute in Warsaw. His latest book is <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/z-generation/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em>Z Generation: Russia&#8217;s Fascist Youth</em></a> (Hurst).</p>
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						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>irgarner</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is assistant professor of totalitarian studies at the Pilecki Institute in Warsaw. His latest book is <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/z-generation/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em>Z Generation: Russia's Fascist Youth</em></a> (Hurst).]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Wed, 01 Nov 2023 00:01:57 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Wed, 01 Nov 2023 00:01:57 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Antisemitism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Dagestan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Israel]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[pogrom]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Putin]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Russia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ukraine]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://old.unherd.com/?p=489840</guid>
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								<![CDATA[The Dagestan pogrom is being used to justify his war]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>Sunday’s ugly scenes at Makhachkala Airport in Russia’s Dagestan region, where a mob ran riot through the terminal and onto the runway in search of Jews disembarking from a plane from Israel, might suggest that Vladimir Putin is beginning to lose his iron grip on the Russian Federation. Videos of protesters threatening not just the public but pelting the police with missiles spread rapidly on domestic social media networks, calling to mind the chaotic violence that preceded the 1917 Revolution.</p>
<p>In reality, however, the Putin regime does not just tolerate but encourages violence against minorities in order to justify the state&#8217;s own wars and attempt to create a more harmonious Russian society. The Machachkala pogrom, while unplanned and perhaps even undesired, is easily rewritten to fit a narrative in which Russia is constantly under threat of invasion from the outside.</p>
<p>In the world of official propaganda, Russia is a flourishing &#8220;multinational&#8221; country where millions of Muslims, indigenous peoples, and even Jews live happily alongside one another under the banner of a shared Russianness. The morning after the violence in Makhachkala, Russia&#8217;s schoolchildren were treated to a mandatory patriotism lesson in preparation for the &#8220;Day of National Unity&#8221; on 4 November. Videos and slideshows produced by the state and shown in classrooms across the country <a href="https://razgovor-cdn.edsoo.ru/media/file/unityday2023-34-presentation.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">depicted</a> beaming caricatures of Russia&#8217;s national minorities living harmoniously. Such celebratory material is hardly new to Russia: the Putin regime is merely emulating Soviet-era <a href="https://books.google.ca/books?id=UdN2DAAAQBAJ&amp;newbks=1&amp;newbks_redir=0&amp;lpg=PA71&amp;dq=soviet%20multinationalism&amp;pg=PA71#v=onepage&amp;q&amp;f=false" target="_blank" rel="noopener">depictions</a> of racial harmony. In Russia, citizens are told again and again that the country is a model of peaceful ethnic integration.</p>
<p>Yet, perhaps contrary to expectations, the violent pogrom in Makhachkala has not been ignored by the state media, which rarely reports on political protests. As events unfolded on Sunday, major news services and state-aligned social media personalities <a href="https://t.me/rian_ru/219825" target="_blank" rel="noopener">carried</a> updates and even <a href="https://t.me/SolovievLive/218272" target="_blank" rel="noopener">shared</a> alarming videos from the ground. If the state was worried that the contagion of unrestrained violence might reveal a deeper instability, then its anxiety was well hidden. Indeed, the state’s propaganda organs seemed to relish reporting on the grisly details of arrests made and injuries inflicted in a flood of stories over the next 24 hours.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/10/saudi-arabias-empire-of-sand/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/10/saudi-arabias-empire-of-sand/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/GettyImages-1052816394-e1698425182811.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/10/saudi-arabias-empire-of-sand/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/10/saudi-arabias-empire-of-sand/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Saudi Arabia&#039;s empire of sand</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/10/saudi-arabias-empire-of-sand/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Ben Judah </a></p></div></a></div>
<p>By Monday, the state’s top political spokespeople added a new dynamic to the story. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov <a href="https://life.ru/p/1617543?utm_source=yxnews&amp;utm_medium=desktop&amp;utm_referrer=https%3A%2F%2Fdzen.ru%2Fnews%2Fsearch%3Ftext%3D">attributed</a> the violence to “interference from the outside… given the circulation of footage showing the horror of Gaza — the deaths of children, seniors, medics — it’s easy for miscreants to manipulate the situation, to provoke and inflame people.” Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova chipped in to name the “miscreants” as “the criminal Kiev [sic] regime”. In this reading, Russia is under attack by shadowy forces from the outside; violence within Russia must be evidence not of internal problems but of a world conspiring against the country’s multiracial harmony.</p>
<p>In reality, of course, it is not Russia’s opponents but the Russian state itself that has fuelled the flames of antisemitism at home. In recent years, it has introduced numerous laws targeting non-Orthodox religions. Jewish organisations have come under repeated attacks, <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/radio/asithappens/russian-rabbi-antisemitism-1.6703546" target="_blank" rel="noopener">culminating</a> in the exile of the now-former chief rabbi of Russia, Pinchas Goldschmidt. The social media channels of major state outlets and their presenters have been <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/world-news/europe/2022-04-26/ty-article/.premium/putins-favorite-tv-host-mixes-nuclear-threats-jewish-roots-and-antisemitic-quotes/00000180-66d0-d5b7-a3e3-f7d9191b0000" target="_blank" rel="noopener">accused</a> of using antisemitic language and tropes. In September, Putin himself <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/ukraine-lashes-putin-for-saying-west-put-a-jew-in-power-to-cloak-countrys-nazism/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">claimed</a> that the Jewish president of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelensky, was only in power to hide his country’s “glorification of Nazism”. Openly antisemitic rhetoric runs rife through official discourse while the slightest transgressions of draconian freedom of speech laws about the so-called “special military operation” or the government’s conduct can result in lengthy jail terms.</p>
<p>Yet the state has denied any responsibility. On 30 October, the day after the violence in Makhachkala, Putin <a href="https://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/72618" target="_blank" rel="noopener">confirmed</a> his spokespeople’s explanation of its causes in a meeting of Russia’s Security Council: “The USA’s ruling elites and its satellite [nations] are behind the tragedy of the Palestinians and the chaos in the Middle East, the conflict in Ukraine, and many other conflicts around the world.” His hypocrisy is so brazen that it seems inexplicable. Why would a government that has so openly deployed antisemitism lay the blame for violence at the door of the opposition?</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/10/israel-is-no-longer-britains-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/10/israel-is-no-longer-britains-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/GettyImages-1725071312-1-e1697734528786.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/10/israel-is-no-longer-britains-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/10/israel-is-no-longer-britains-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Israel is no longer Britain&#039;s war</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/10/israel-is-no-longer-britains-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Aris Roussinos</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Maintaining war, not peace, is optimal for the continued justification of Putin’s arch-nationalist rule. Russia’s response to Makhachkala, according to Putin, must not take the form of internal questioning or domestic reform, but an external battle: “Russia is fighting on the battlefield [in Ukraine] for our future, for the principles of a just world order, and for the freedom of countries and nations.” To fight in Ukraine, he explained, was to decide “the future of Russia, the whole world, and even the future of the Palestinian people”. To resolve internal conflict such as antisemitic violence in Makhachkala, according to this topsy-turvy logic, requires the waging of a far larger, and potentially endless, battle against both Ukraine and the United States.</p>
<p>In this neo-fascist world, chaos and violence, rather than being perilous phenomena that threaten domestic stability, create the energy and unity that drive Russia’s march toward historical greatness (a point that Putin underlined by littering his speech to the Security Council with references to past conflicts). To fight, to wage war, is an essential part of Russia’s path to its historical destiny: an absurd historical formulation that means that violence is as inevitable as it is desirable.</p>
<p>This stance has long been a central part of political discourse under Putin. Almost two decades ago, after Islamic militants conducted a violent attack and siege on a school in Beslan, North Ossetia, he made a <a href="https://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/22589" target="_blank" rel="noopener">near-identical speech</a>. Putin argued that, after hundreds of Russian schoolchildren were killed in large part thanks to a botched rescue effort led by Russian security forces, national unity was essential to fight a “cruel and full-scale war”— in this case, the “entire nation” had to be mobilised to wage war against Islamic separatists in Chechnya. The state’s own role in unleashing bloody violence against its own population in the region was left unexamined.</p>
<div class="ad-insert-events"></div>
<p>For the Putinist state, though, the cycle of war and peace is not limited to the present. In this week’s school patriotism lesson for the Day of National Unity, children learned that national unity can <em>only</em> be achieved through war. A central part of the lesson for every age group is to learn the story of Kuzma Minin and Dmitry Pozharsky, two militia heroes who led a revolt against Polish invaders in 1612. Russia’s children are told that, without violent struggle against forces seeking to destroy the country, both today and historically, peace is impossible. Russians must, in effect, be perpetually ready to fight as an act of self-defence — even if that means attacking other inhabitants of the country from time to time.</p>
<p>The state and the propaganda organs under Putin do not seek to end horrific acts like those witnessed in Makhachkala. They encourage them, for they justify the state’s consistent failures to create the harmonious society it has long promised but failed to deliver. After all, for as long as Russians witness and participate in violent chaos at home, they can be assured that external enemies are marshalling their forces against Moscow — and that the Kremlin’s latest war, whether in Chechnya, Ukraine, or elsewhere, is not just desirable but unavoidable.</p>
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					<title>How Putin is weaponising Prigozhin</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2023/08/how-prigozhin-became-a-war-hero/?edition=us</link>
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					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Ian Garner]]>
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							<![CDATA[A 'hero of Russia'. Wagner Account/Anadolu Agency/Getty Images]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Dr. Ian Garner</strong> is assistant professor of totalitarian studies at the Pilecki Institute in Warsaw. His latest book is <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/z-generation/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em>Z Generation: Russia&#8217;s Fascist Youth</em></a> (Hurst).</p>
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						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>irgarner</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is assistant professor of totalitarian studies at the Pilecki Institute in Warsaw. His latest book is <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/z-generation/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em>Z Generation: Russia's Fascist Youth</em></a> (Hurst).]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Tue, 29 Aug 2023 23:02:09 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Wed, 30 Aug 2023 08:49:06 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Russia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Vladimir Putin]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[wagner group]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Yevgeny Prigozhin]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://old.unherd.com/?p=483945</guid>
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								<![CDATA[The dead traitor has become a war hero]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>Even in Russia, where the line between fact and fiction is often impossibly blurred, the life and death of Yevgeny Prigozhin is a fantastic tale. Two months ago, having been pilloried as a traitor who had threatened to bring down Vladimir Putin and execute a host of senior military leaders, Prigozhin seemed to have gotten away with his coup-that-wasn’t when he returned to Russia and retained control of his Wagner mercenary group.</p>
<p>The former warlord’s stunning death in a plane crash in Tver Province seems — or so the story spreading on social media and in the Western press goes — to have confirmed the fate that awaits challengers to Putin’s iron rule: a spectacular execution ordered by a mafia-like leader. The traitor lies dead, an example to all. But could there be one last twist in the story of Yevgeny Prigozhin?</p>
<p>The circumstances of Prigozhin’s death remain clouded in the fog of Russia’s unreliable information sphere. Various explanations have, aided by Russian propagandists and astroturfed groups, torn through social media networks like Telegram and VK (Russia’s equivalent of Facebook). A bomb on board the plane may have exploded mid-flight. The plane was sabotaged on the ground by buyers invited to view the vehicle, which was purportedly for sale. An air defence missile struck and destroyed the plane. Or perhaps, one story goes, it was all a terrible coincidence. And who did it? Perhaps the order came from Putin directly. Or it was Ukrainian saboteurs, the FSB, or rogue army units.</p>
<p>Neither we nor the Russian public will know what really happened any time soon, even if Western intelligence agencies currently <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/siladityaray/2023/08/25/a-complete-lie-russia-dismisses-western-intelligence-reports-of-a-bomb-on-board-prigozhins-plane/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">favour</a> the bomb story. Such is the nature of Russia’s media. The aim of propagating material is not the dissemination or discovery of the truth, but the creation of a <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/04/23/propaganda-russia-atrocity-bucha/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">malleable reality</a> where anything can become possible — and where the life of Prigozhin can be rewritten into the state’s chosen narrative. The reality of Prigozhin’s life was already deeply contradictory before his death. Within the last six months alone, he has been a deliberately sadistic warlord — the public embodiment of ultranationalist, genocidal violence; a would-be revolutionary persona non grata; and, mere days before his death, a willing <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/aug/22/wagner-prigozhin-recruiting-post-russia-rebellion-video-africa-putin" target="_blank" rel="noopener">instrument</a> of Russian state power in Africa.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/08/lessons-from-an-old-school-mercenary/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/08/lessons-from-an-old-school-mercenary/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/08/GettyImages-1620915355-1-scaled-e1692981934541.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/08/lessons-from-an-old-school-mercenary/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/08/lessons-from-an-old-school-mercenary/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Lessons from an old-school mercenary</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/08/lessons-from-an-old-school-mercenary/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Brian Pottinger </a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Many of these shifting and contradictory stories were shaped by the vociferous Prigozhin himself, who masterfully used the megaphone that networks such as Telegram provide wannabe powermongers to draw attention to himself and recreate his own image over and again. Nobody in Russia has so successfully created alternatives to the state’s media — even if Prigozhin frequently adopted the same narrative flexibility as the Kremlin. Now that Prigozhin is dead, however, the state can leap into this space and recreate the life of the dead man on Putin’s terms alone.</p>
<p>Western media and audiences have voraciously consumed stories about Prigozhin’s demise: the front pages of publications on both sides of the Atlantic are packed with obituaries and speculation. Yet Russia’s news media — not usually known for its reticence to cast judgement — has thus far been surprisingly quiet on the topic. Reports on the circumstances of Prigozhin’s death have been bland, describing, for example, a “plane crash in which eleven people died” with only a brief mention of the man himself. The Kremlin has issued rote <a href="https://www.pravda.ru/news/society/1877676-peskov_otvetil_na_obvinenija_zapada_v_ubiistve_prigozhina/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">denials</a> of Western claims about Prigozhin’s death and claimed that crash experts are busy analysing the events that took place above Tver (although, on past evidence, their analyses are likely to be <a href="https://theconversation.com/putin-is-now-implicated-in-the-downing-of-flight-mh17-so-why-is-the-investigation-shutting-down-199583" target="_blank" rel="noopener">misleading</a>).</p>
<p>The few <a href="https://aif.ru/society/people/pogib_rukovoditel_chvk_vagner_chto_izvestno_o_evgenii_prigozhine?from_inject=1" target="_blank" rel="noopener">obituaries</a> published have been equally unremarkable. The “businessman and founder of Wagner PMC” had a long career as the founder of a catering company, but his military activity in Ukraine is deserving only of a brief and vague footnote. Pravda, Russia’s newspaper of record, has published a paltry seven stories mentioning Prigozhin in the last three days. The fired general Sergey Surovikin, meanwhile, has <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/russia-ukraine-war-latest-1.6944699" target="_blank" rel="noopener">featured</a> in eight articles in the same time period. It seems that, for the time being, the Russian newspapers are more <a href="https://aif.ru/society/people/lyubila_laksheri_chto_izvestno_o_pogibshey_styuardesse_samoleta_prigozhina" target="_blank" rel="noopener">interested</a> in the fate of the glamorous stewardess killed in the Tver plane crash than in Prigozhin.</p>
<p>Yet by shifting the focus away from Prigozhin the sadistic warlord, the Kremlin will have the chance to slowly rewrite his story in the public eye. Indeed, early signs suggest that Prigozhin is to be commemorated as an exemplary military hero, a man whose sole fault was that his patriotism was so fierce as to force him into a confrontation with the apathetic elites holding back the war effort.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/08/has-xi-jinping-bankrupted-china/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/08/has-xi-jinping-bankrupted-china/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/08/GettyImages-1618914777-1-e1692804521946-copy.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/08/has-xi-jinping-bankrupted-china/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/08/has-xi-jinping-bankrupted-china/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Has Xi Jinping bankrupted China?</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/08/has-xi-jinping-bankrupted-china/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Edward Luttwak </a></p></div></a></div>
<p>A leading article for <em>Pravda</em> signalled this shift. Prigozhin, the man who mere weeks ago had been threatening to unleash violence on Moscow and execute the Minister of Defence, is <a href="https://www.pravda.ru/society/1877149-evgenii_prigozhin/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">now</a> “the most controversial but tough and straight-talking patriot and hero of Russia… a symbol of honour, courage, and the motherland”. This Prigozhin is a man who “forced senior officials to listen to the voice of the people”: the latest in a long line of Russian historical courtiers who have pluckily alerted the tsar to the incompetence and malice of those surrounding the country’s leader. The article concludes on a note of tangible, shared grief: “We are saying goodbye to an epochal man, a heroic man, a legendary man.” In this way, Prigozhin’s death is transformed from Putin’s deadly revenge on a political opponent, a moment to reject a dangerous enemy, into a national tragedy — an outlet for patriots of all stripes to mourn the death of a great man.</p>
<p>Putin himself all but confirmed that this would be the official story in a TV address to the nation on the day after the plane crash. Prigozhin, asserted the President, was a “complicated man” who worked “for the common good when I asked for it”. While Western commentators have been quick to <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tMxQbTaI4J4" target="_blank" rel="noopener">point</a> out that the remarks sound like those of a callous mafia boss gloating after a hit, there is an alternative reading: Putin was confirming for the nation that Prigozhin’s hot temperament was merely the expression of an ardent patriotism, and reaffirming that there is no greater patriotic action than dying in the name of the national cause. In the days since Putin’s speech was made, public discussion turned to where to bury a “hero of Russia”. The <a href="https://publico.ru/news/pochesti-geroyu-rossii-eksperty-obsudili-pohorony-evgeniya-prigozhina?utm_source=yxnews&amp;utm_medium=desktop" target="_blank" rel="noopener">favoured location</a> was briefly the Serafimov Cemetery in St. Petersburg, where Prigozhin would have lain alongside sportspeople, artists, military heroes — and Putin’s own parents. The Wagner leader ended up in the city&#8217;s still prestigious Porokhovskoe Cemetery, another resting place for military heroes of the past. There was never a question of hiding the dead man in some nondescript resting place.</p>
<p>If the story of Prigozhin the hero is indeed the narrative to be disseminated, Russian audiences will likely accept it without question. Early survey data suggests that Prigozhin’s reputation in death is not that of a traitor. When as few as 8% of Russians are willing to <a href="https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/few-russians-blame-putin-prigozhin-death-6c2gbdcl5" target="_blank" rel="noopener">state</a> that Putin likely killed the Wagner leader, we cannot expect public opposition to a posthumous rehabilitation to be vocal. For Wagnerites, Prigozhin is to be treated with respect and accorded a place in Russia’s pantheon of military martyrs (albeit there will be vocal, and potentially violent, dissenters). For others, the coup leader will become a man who simply could not control his genuine desire to fight on behalf of “the common good”— even if that meant upsetting a few Kremlin military elites, who are widely viewed as corrupt kleptocrats. Putin, meanwhile, has clean hands.</p>
<p>Prigozhin’s death has provided Putin with an arsenal of political ammunition. A man made by his own relentless PR will be remade by the state’s PR machine in death. In Russia’s pantomime existence, where reality is reshaped as easily as modelling clay, yesterday’s treacherous coup leader can become today’s fallen hero — while the President emerges, yet again, unscathed.</p>
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					<title>The pantomime is over for Prigozhin</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2023/06/the-pantomime-is-over-for-prigozhin/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://stage.unherd.com/2023/06/the-pantomime-is-over-for-prigozhin/?edition=us#comments</comments>
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					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Ian Garner]]>
					</dc:creator>
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							<![CDATA["Prigozhin is a busted flush." Prigozhin/Telegram]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Dr. Ian Garner</strong> is assistant professor of totalitarian studies at the Pilecki Institute in Warsaw. His latest book is <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/z-generation/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em>Z Generation: Russia&#8217;s Fascist Youth</em></a> (Hurst).</p>
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						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>irgarner</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is assistant professor of totalitarian studies at the Pilecki Institute in Warsaw. His latest book is <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/z-generation/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em>Z Generation: Russia's Fascist Youth</em></a> (Hurst).]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Sun, 18 Jun 2023 23:00:34 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Sun, 18 Jun 2023 23:00:34 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Putin]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Russia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Telegram]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ukraine war]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[wagner group]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://old.unherd.com/?p=476727</guid>
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								<![CDATA[The Wagner Group leader won't survive on theatrics]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>Yevgeny Prigozhin, the vitriolic and confrontational leader of the Wagner “Private Military Company”, has come to play a leading role in the bitter war of words between the country’s nationalists and armed forces. For months, he has been lobbing increasingly fiery rhetorical grenades at defence chief Sergei Shoigu’s Army and Ministry of Defence, which he accuses of incompetence and corruption, and blames for Russia’s floundering war effort.</p>
<p>Western pundits were <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/mercenary-chief-makes-cryptic-profane-remark-about-russian-war-leadership-2023-05-09/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">agog</a> when Prigozhin appeared to go so far as to criticise Putin, promising to remove his forces from the line and threatening Shoigu with execution. He even appeared to <a href="https://www.kyivpost.com/post/16843" target="_blank" rel="noopener">label</a> Putin “grandpa” — a nickname made popular by jailed opposition leader Alexey Navalny — in a caustic video. Many wonder whether Wagner’s leader might attempt to seize control of the military leadership or even launch a coup. But recent developments suggest that this pantomime is about to end. Prigozhin’s power is to be curtailed — and there’s little he can do about it.</p>
<p>Prigozhin, an ex-convict known as “Putin’s chef”, has long been a master self-publicist. His Wagner Group, whose state connections were until recently officially denied, is an exquisitely branded enterprise <a href="https://www.euronews.com/2022/11/04/russias-wagner-paramilitary-group-opens-first-official-hq-in-st-petersburg" target="_blank" rel="noopener">housed</a> in a glass office tower in St. Petersburg. The group’s social media presence is no less brazen. The online world of the Wagner “musicians”, as the organisation’s soldiers are known, is made up of thousands of gloomy TikTok videos displaying balaclava-wearing, skull-emblazoned troops rattling off machine gun rounds and rockets. Wagner musicians and their online fans soundtrack videos of war crimes and violent fighting with uber-macho hip hop beats and ceaseless nationalist and racist commentary about the Ukrainian enemy. In this world, morality and ethics seem to have been cast aside in favour of macabre destruction for its own sake.</p>
<p>Prigozhin channels this violence in selfie videos released to Telegram channels with hundreds of thousands of followers, promising to wreak havoc against the state’s enemies and — if he doesn’t get the arms, troops, and control he wants — against the state itself. The threat of internecine violence is not rhetorical. Last week, Wagner forces in occupied Ukraine “<a href="https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2023/06/08/russian-officer-accuses-wagner-of-torture-disinformation-a81444" target="_blank" rel="noopener">arrested</a>” a senior Russian Army officer who had purportedly ordered his forces to fire on Wagner positions. The officer’s interrogation was published on Prigozhin’s channel: he was brazenly baiting his nemesis. Wagner and the Army, it seemed, were at war.</p>
<p>The Russian state’s elite cliques and power blocs have long engaged in bitter power struggles to position themselves to reap financial rewards, curry favour with Vladimir Putin, and cement their own status. Typically, Putin has watched on from the sidelines while his underlings tear chunks out of one another. Eventually, the conflict ends in a moment of public political theatre as the losing “villain” is publicly shamed. Such has been Putin’s modus operandi since the arrest and <a href="https://khodorkovsky.com/resources/first-trial-2004-2005-2/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">televised trial</a> of the oil baron Mikhail Khodorkovsky in 2003. Rarely does the show begin, however, before the outcome is determined.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/06/how-aleksandr-dugin-influences-the-west/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/06/how-aleksandr-dugin-influences-the-west/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/GettyImages-1242664420-1-e1686483936582-2.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/06/how-aleksandr-dugin-influences-the-west/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/06/how-aleksandr-dugin-influences-the-west/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>How Aleksandr Dugin influences the West</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/06/how-aleksandr-dugin-influences-the-west/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Aris Roussinos</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Prigozhin, though, has pre-emptively brought the battle into the open. The nature of social media allows Prigozhin’s fans — and enemies — to participate in these conflicts in a way that would not have been possible two decades ago. Russia’s nationalists form a baying crowd that watches on and even — by liking, sharing, and commenting on materials — amplifies elite splits. On Grey Zone, a Russian Telegram channel associated with Wagner, any mention of Shoigu — Putin’s long-time ally — is received by users with raucous mockery: “What’s he smoking?”; “F*cking liar”; “What a clown!!” Meanwhile, the channel’s almost 500,000 followers pour adulation on the <em>muzhiki</em> — macho men — who have died fighting or committed acts of vandalism or criminality at the front. The overwhelmingly male and young audience of this sort of content thrives on violence and macho adulation.</p>
<p>Almost every man in the Wagner Group owes Prigozhin a personal debt. By offering prisoners a means to escape from jail, and the rural poor hefty salaries in return for service, he has cultivated a sense of obligation among his troops. And by releasing materials directly to the online public, he strives to build a broader base of public support, as well as to strengthen the loyalty of his acolytes, The strategy is not necessarily misguided: the Russian public <a href="https://www.hachettebookgroup.com/titles/peter-pomerantsev/nothing-is-true-and-everything-is-possible/9781610396004/?lens=publicaffairs" target="_blank" rel="noopener">delights</a> in such pantomime political theatrics.</p>
<p>However, Prigozhin may be about to discover the limits of the support that can be built through memes and virality. Shoigu might be the online nemesis of Wagner followers, but Prigozhin himself barely features in their discussions. At best he will sometimes be referred to as <em>muzhik</em>, but he is often derided as vain, foolish, or arrogant. His followers prize manhood, masculinity, and violence more than any particular leaders: they are nihilists out for themselves, not the sort of citizens who will die for their leader’s cause.</p>
<div class="ad-insert-events"></div>
<p>This self-interested support has given Putin an easy means to drop the final curtain on Prigozhin’s theatrics. In a meeting last week, he <a href="https://meduza.io/en/news/2023/06/14/putin-expects-private-military-companies-to-become-government-contractors-prigozhin-says-wagner-group-won-t-do-it" target="_blank" rel="noopener">confirmed</a> that all frontline troops — including those attached to Prigozhin and Wagner — will be forced to sign a contract with the state by 1 July. “If there’s no contract with the state,” explained Putin, “there can be no social guarantees [for the troops].” In other words, the state is about to usurp Prigozhin’s sole hold over Wagner: the promise that he can provide money, support, and freedom to the men under his command.</p>
<p>Prigozhin has responded with total denial, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/prigozhin-says-wagner-will-not-sign-any-contract-with-russian-defence-minister-2023-06-11/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">declaring</a> that “Wagner will not sign any contracts with Shoigu”. Fellow nationalist leaders who have been critical of the MoD have <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/wagner-group-prigozhin-mutiny-shoigu-girkin-defense-ministry-bakhmut-ukraine-1805866" target="_blank" rel="noopener">accused</a> him of “mutiny” for this refusal, and other elite powerbrokers have <a href="https://twitter.com/dpatrikarakos/status/1668935797922250753?s=46&amp;t=gUXZIBtVmvzcIkWJVIjiPg" target="_blank" rel="noopener">sided</a> against him. While his troops are tied up at the front in Ukraine, sustaining enormous casualties and consuming vast resources as they do Putin’s dirty work, Prigozhin has no recourse. There is no hope of a mass mutiny without broader public support or the promise that Prigozhin can give his men something the state cannot. Simply put, neither Prigozhin’s soldiers nor the wider public have any reason to go into battle for him. If a power grab was ever on the cards, the chance is gone: Prigozhin is a busted flush.</p>
<p>In some senses, Prigozhin is an embodiment of the Putin era’s postmodern culture, in which reality is created, distorted, and destroyed momentarily by an arbitrary state. He stands for no ideas, cannot build elite coalitions, and alienates the general public. Through money, force of will, and outlandish PR, he has turned himself into a heavyweight — but his importance will likely diminish now the state has started to turn the screws. Distracted by the next scene in Russia’s pantomime of the absurd, sympathetic nationalists will move onto the next man to promise them an outlet for their frustration and rage. For now, Putin, the conductor of a cacophonous orchestra that plays far louder than Wagner’s “musicians” ever can, remains above the fray. If there have been questions <a href="https://archive.is/2023.06.07-064058/https:/foreignpolicy.com/2023/06/06/russia-ukaine-war-putin-counteroffensive-belgorod-border-drones-moscow/%5d" target="_blank" rel="noopener">raised</a> about the Russian president’s ability to control the narrative of his war in Ukraine, he is showing that he remains — for now — in full control.</p>
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					<title>Russia&#8217;s Youth Army is recruiting</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2023/04/russias-youth-army-is-recruiting/?edition=us</link>
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										<unherd:main_theme></unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Ian Garner]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/Blue-thumb.jpg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking></unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[Ready to fight for the Motherland. Kirill Kudryavtsev/AFP/Getty Images]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Dr. Ian Garner</strong> is assistant professor of totalitarian studies at the Pilecki Institute in Warsaw. His latest book is <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/z-generation/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em>Z Generation: Russia&#8217;s Fascist Youth</em></a> (Hurst).</p>
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						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>irgarner</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is assistant professor of totalitarian studies at the Pilecki Institute in Warsaw. His latest book is <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/z-generation/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em>Z Generation: Russia's Fascist Youth</em></a> (Hurst).]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Mon, 17 Apr 2023 23:01:42 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Fri, 28 Apr 2023 10:26:02 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Conscription]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Russia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ukraine]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ukraine war]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Vladimir Putin]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://old.unherd.com/?p=470342</guid>
																												<description>
								<![CDATA[Fleeing millennials have caused manpower shortages]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>Last June, a trio of uniformed Russian teens clutching a Soviet-era banner goose-stepped past a memorial to victims of Nazi fascism. Next to them, a dozen younger children stood awkwardly to attention as they watched soldiers and local politicians coat the memorial in fresh flowers. “The history of our country will never be forgotten,” announced a local functionary. “Never forget that you are citizens of a mighty nation!”</p>
<p>His audience — a gaggle of pre-teens — were about to be <a href="https://mariupol-news.ru/society/2022/06/23/8138.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">inducted</a> into the Youth Army, the Russian state’s paramilitary youth group for children aged six and up. Founded by the Kremlin’s Ministry of Defence in 2016 as a means to prepare children physically, intellectually, morally, and “<a href="https://yunarmy.ru/headquarters/about/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">spiritually</a>” for war, it now counts 1.3 <a href="https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/5116296?ysclid=lgckesqybb899509514" target="_blank" rel="noopener">million</a> members and an annual state subsidy of $80 million. The inductees repeated, like the 300,000 other youths who joined the group in 2022, an oath of allegiance: “I swear to remain forever true to the Fatherland and to the Brotherhood of the Youth Army!”</p>
<p>This is a scene played out in hundreds of locations across the Russian Federation as the state seeks to militarise its young people by transforming them into warriors ready to do battle with internal traitors, as well as the West and Ukraine. New recruits spend their free time gathering humanitarian aid for refugees and the “evacuated” from Ukraine, learning about Russia’s historic military feats in the face of an aggressive West, meeting heroised “veterans” of Russia’s current war, and practising military skills — first aid, tactical exercises, and even live firing — to prepare them for conflict. These children are, as one Ukrainian commentator <a href="https://ru.krymr.com/amp/krym-deti-yunarmiya-rossiya/31660294.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">puts</a> it, learning “to die for the Motherland”.</p>
<p>But this particular initiation did not take place in Russia, and these were not Russian children. These were Ukrainian children in occupied Mariupol. Just one month after the end of Russia’s brutal siege, which razed the town and left as many as 25,000 civilians <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-63536564" target="_blank" rel="noopener">dead</a>, Russia kickstarted an indoctrination campaign to turn Ukraine’s children into Russian citizens and warriors. The Ukrainian state <a href="https://t.me/spravdi/26529" target="_blank" rel="noopener">feared</a> that the project would successfully feed yet more sacrificial bodies into an ailing Russian war machine.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/02/ultra-patriots-are-putins-greatest-threat/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/02/ultra-patriots-are-putins-greatest-threat/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/GettyImages-452850768-scaled-e1677245555529.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/02/ultra-patriots-are-putins-greatest-threat/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/02/ultra-patriots-are-putins-greatest-threat/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Ultra-patriots are Putin&#039;s greatest threat</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/02/ultra-patriots-are-putins-greatest-threat/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Jade McGlynn</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>After all, Youth Army members are told that Ukraine is a fascist nation that threatens to obliterate Russia — just as the Nazi invaders did in 1941. It’s no coincidence that the heavily publicised enlistment of these first dozen Mariupol “young soldiers”, as they are known, took place at a monument to the Soviet war effort, or that Mariupol’s “unit” was officially formed on May 9, the anniversary of the end of the Second World War. The speaker at the ceremony implored the young listeners to “follow in the footsteps” of past soldiers in “liberating our brother nation from fascism”.</p>
<p>After its illegal invasion and annexation of Crimea in 2014, the Russian government launched a wave of youth “re-education” projects that spanned changes to the school curriculum, the creation of “volunteer” projects for local youths, the reinstatement and recreation of Soviet-era monuments and rituals to war, and, in 2016, the creation of Youth Army “units” on the Crimean peninsula.</p>
<p>As of last summer, there were 11,000 “<a href="https://crimea-news.com/society/2022/06/16/934340.html?ysclid=lgcklsubcs408119418" target="_blank" rel="noopener">young soldiers</a>” in Crimea. Hundreds take part in symbolic Victory Day parades, attend the newly <a href="https://www.krympatriotcentr.ru/o-nas/tsel-i-zadachi-tsentra" target="_blank" rel="noopener">founded</a> “Crimean Patriots’ Centre” for military education, and spend parts of their summer at a local <a href="https://yunarmy.ru/yunarmeyskielagerya/yunarmiya-art-mdts-artek/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">resort</a> camp. At home, they might join one of the Youth Army’s social media groups, take part in online campaigns, download the “Young Soldier” app, and play patriotic games. Soon, they may join the army proper and imitate the dozens of former “young soldiers” from Crimea that are already <a href="https://nts-tv.com/news/53-nastavnika-krymskikh-yunarmeyskikh-otryadov-uch-44513/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">fighting</a> in the so-called “special military operation”.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/02/are-we-prepared-for-eternal-war-in-ukraine/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/02/are-we-prepared-for-eternal-war-in-ukraine/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/4-1.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/02/are-we-prepared-for-eternal-war-in-ukraine/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/02/are-we-prepared-for-eternal-war-in-ukraine/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Are we prepared for &#039;eternal war&#039; in Ukraine?</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/02/are-we-prepared-for-eternal-war-in-ukraine/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Tom McTague</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>In the recently occupied regions of Ukraine, potential recruits to the new Youth Army units are offered plenty of incentives. The patriotic Russian singer Shaman, a 31-year-old whose song “I am Russian” became a smash-hit after February 2022, <a href="https://zanmsk.ru/shaman-vystupil-s-koncertami-v-mariupole-i-luganske/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">visited</a> Mariupol and Donetsk to perform in January of this year. Local Youth Army members were given front-row tickets. And if that doesn&#8217;t appeal, recruits can always interact online with the big-name influencers who spread the Youth Army’s message. The organisation is led by Nikita Nagornyy, a chisel-jawed 26-year-old Olympic gymnast, who counts hundreds of thousands of followers across the platforms he uses to spread a message of clean living, self-discipline, and military ideals. Those who enrol are also promised other sweeteners, including easier paths into top universities in Moscow and St. Petersburg, which promise good jobs and an escape from the day-to-day violence of the occupied regions.</p>
<p>When the carrot doesn’t work, the Russian state tries the stick. Ihor Solovey, Head of the Ukrainian government’s Centre for Strategic Communications and Informational Security, tells me that “Russia has taken its model of youth involvement in militaristic, ideological organisations from the Soviet Union” when participation in such groups was “voluntary-compulsory”. Ukraine’s children are told that: “You are in Russia. Russia is here forever. You must obey Russia.” That means taking part in military education — which is to become mandatory in every Russian school in September — “volunteering” for out-of-hours municipal projects, and joining groups like the Youth Army.</p>
<p>Throughout these programmes, the threat of aggression always looms in the background. Children report seeing Ukrainian flags burned in classrooms, being forced to sing the Russian national anthem, and experiencing vicious bullying. Those who still refuse to participate are <a href="https://youtu.be/Oa-NgId7Vw0" target="_blank" rel="noopener">denounced</a> by teachers and administrators, and even targeted by their peers.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/03/why-chinas-peace-plan-for-ukraine-will-fail/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/03/why-chinas-peace-plan-for-ukraine-will-fail/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/GettyImages-1172713104-1-1.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/03/why-chinas-peace-plan-for-ukraine-will-fail/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/03/why-chinas-peace-plan-for-ukraine-will-fail/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Why China&#039;s peace plan for Ukraine will fail</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/03/why-chinas-peace-plan-for-ukraine-will-fail/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span>  Edward Luttwak</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Meanwhile, Youth Army leaders in occupied regions have launched online campaigns to encourage their charges to spread the gospel of Russian salvation. Children, for example, <a href="https://m.vk.com/ynarmdn" target="_blank" rel="noopener">post</a> letters they have written to soldiers at the front on their social media feeds: “I, a Young Soldier of the Donetsk Youth Army, am taking part in the Letter to a Soldier campaign!” They upload videos hymning their Russian language teachers, their Youth Army leaders and Russia’s history. Backed up by slick marketing and an army of paid and volunteer social media influencers, the online message spreads from peer to peer: the Russian state is good, caring, and noble; the Ukrainian is an enemy.</p>
<p>The reality, of course, is quite the opposite. As Solovey explains, Russian propaganda emphasises that Ukrainian children are “infected with Russophobia” from which they need to be “cured”. The removal of visible symbols of Ukrainian identity — flags, language, town names and books — from Ukraine is thus matched by efforts to “cure” children through military re-education. Children are, according to official Russian statements, “<a href="https://24tv.ua/ru/arest-putina-gaage-vydali-order-otreagirovali-kremle_n2276589" target="_blank" rel="noopener">saved</a>” by the invasion. Destroying children’s identities, severing connections to their communities and turning them against their homeland is painted as pure benevolence.</p>
<p>Yet for the Ukrainian government, explains Solovey, the militarisation of children through organisations like the Youth Army is a war crime — to add to the crimes that Vladimir Putin has been charged with by the International Criminal Court. Putin, however, has more pressing concerns. Russia is wrestling with manpower issues as millennials flee the fighting. Following its flawed mobilisation last autumn, when hundreds of thousands of Russian men escaped the country, the Kremlin is now attempting to use digital tools to crack down on draft dodgers. But it is also working on indoctrinating its youngest subjects into militarism to prevent a repeat of the issue in the coming years. Hundreds of young Ukrainians in Mariupol, Donetsk and Zaporizhzhya have already been coaxed or forced into the ranks of the Youth Army.</p>
<p>And if the success of the Youth Army in its seven years of work in occupied Crimea is anything to go by, the numbers will grow as time goes on — and youngsters may become more likely to Russify themselves or even take up arms against Ukraine. If the Kremlin is planning a “forever war”, then its youngest subjects may prove more willing soldiers than wantaway millennials.</p>
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