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		<title>Isabel Hilton, a writer for UnHerd</title>
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	<title>Isabel Hilton, a writer for UnHerd</title>
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					<title>China will never stop rewriting history</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2021/02/china-will-never-stop-rewriting-history/?edition=us</link>
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						<![CDATA[Isabel Hilton]]>
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							<![CDATA[Mao was great, say the CCP — just don't mention the famine! (Photo by: Universal History Archive/Universal Images Group via Getty Images)]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p>Isabel Hilton is a London based writer, broadcaster and China watcher.</p>
]]>
						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>isabelhilton</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[Isabel Hilton is a London based writer, broadcaster and China watcher.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Fri, 12 Feb 2021 00:53:56 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Fri, 12 Feb 2021 09:33:27 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[CCP]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[China]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Civilization]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[History]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Mao Zedong]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Xi Jinping]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://old.unherd.com/?p=57170</guid>
																												<description>
								<![CDATA[No party on earth leans more on myth to create unity than the CCP ]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>In his address to the nation last month, Xi Jinping, after praising his country’s pandemic efforts, drew attention to the upcoming centenary in July of the founding of the Chinese Communist Party. But his purpose wasn’t to look back into the past. It was to signal his plans for the future, namely for the Party to still be in charge for the <em>next</em> big centenary in its diary — the founding of the People’s Republic of China itself in 2049.</p>
<p>Still, at 100 years old, the Communist Party will have much to celebrate: after 30 disastrous years under Mao, Deng Xiaoping’s opening to foreign investment and global markets laid the ground for decades of growth and made possible Xi’s vision of China’s “great rejuvenation”.</p>
<p>Yet it is interesting to speculate what the twelve delegates, among them the young Mao Zedong, who met a century ago in Shanghai to found the CCP would make of today’s China. With the country’s New Year celebrations starting today, Mao, we can be fairly certain, would not be amused: he spent the last two decades of his life trying to prevent Deng Xiaoping from coming to power, accusing him, not unreasonably as it turned out, of wanting to “take the capitalist road”. But what of the other revolutionaries, men for whom Confucius was the despised symbol of everything that was wrong with traditional, imperial China, who dreamed of a society in which class divisions had ceased to exist and who proposed “liberation” and independence for Xinjiang, Tibet and Mongolia?</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2021/02/will-chinas-millennials-ever-rebel/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2021/02/will-chinas-millennials-ever-rebel/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/GettyImages-1278945992.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2021/02/will-chinas-millennials-ever-rebel/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this series</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2021/02/will-chinas-millennials-ever-rebel/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Will China&#039;s millennials ever rebel?</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2021/02/will-chinas-millennials-ever-rebel/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Mary Harrington </a></p></div></a></div>
<p>They would be pleased, no doubt, that China was stronger and wealthier, and that the era of western colonialism was over. But what would they make of the country’s wealth distribution, which a century later is among the <a href="https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/businessreview/2019/04/01/income-inequality-is-growing-fast-in-china-and-making-it-look-more-like-the-us/" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">most unequal in the world</a>? Or that the current Communist Party leadership, while proclaiming “socialism with Chinese characteristics”, also promotes Confucius and invokes the glories of its imperial history as a source of its own legitimacy?</p>
<p>In <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/658e78ce-0287-11e9-99df-6183d3002ee1" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">another speech</a> last December, this one to celebrate 40 years since the beginning of Deng Xiaoping’s reforms, Xi repeated the most common, and questionable, claim about that history. “To promote reform and development in China — a large country with a more than 5,000-year history of civilisation and more than 1.3bn people — there is no textbook that can be regarded as a golden rule, and there is no great master who can dictate to the Chinese people,” he said.</p>
<p>His appeal to China’s uniquely ancient calling card is one frequently repeated by visiting foreign dignitaries and business leaders — some, perhaps, because they know no better, others because they understand that making money in China is easier with a smile from above. It is also at the core of Chinese exceptionalism promoted by Xi and all who seek to please him: we are the world’s oldest continuing civilisation and that will never change.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2021/02/the-communist-party-on-campus/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2021/02/the-communist-party-on-campus/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/GettyImages-493920726.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2021/02/the-communist-party-on-campus/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this series</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2021/02/the-communist-party-on-campus/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>How China bought Britain&#039;s universities</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2021/02/the-communist-party-on-campus/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Mark Edmonds</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>From there it is an easy step to say that these unique characteristics allow the country to make its own rules, and to question them is a hostile act. No so-called “universal principles”  — let alone human rights —  can get in the way of that story. How could they, given China’s serene and unbroken accumulation of wisdom over more than five millennia?</p>
<p>These claims are, of course, historical nonsense. The China of today bears little resemblance to that of the past. Put to one side the fact that the Great Wall, commonly thought of as a defensive fortification against invasion by the intermittently dangerous steppe peoples, is puzzlingly located today in the middle of the map of China. A glance at any historical atlas reveals that the Ming Dynasty borders (1388-1644) enclosed a country that was half the size of its current “immutable” version. Turning the pages further back reveals a pattern of continually shifting boundaries and frequent divisions.</p>
<p>So why does the Chinese Communist Party insist upon its alternative history so strenuously? The answer, I suspect, lies in the fracture of the country’s imperial model in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century, as well as the new ideas, such as Marxism, that took hold among intellectuals and revolutionaries as they struggled to imagine a different polity. In their attempt to define post-imperial China, these revolutionaries had to grapple with the question of what, in the absence of an emperor to whom all loyalties could be directed, was the big idea that would hold this huge and diverse former empire together.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2021/02/dont-mess-with-chinas-feminists/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2021/02/dont-mess-with-chinas-feminists/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/GettyImages-75883527-scaled-1.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2021/02/dont-mess-with-chinas-feminists/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this series</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2021/02/dont-mess-with-chinas-feminists/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Don&#039;t mess with China&#039;s feminists</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2021/02/dont-mess-with-chinas-feminists/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Qi Chen </a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Reformers were calling for science and democracy, but first there had to be a clear idea of what China was, what it would be called and — given the vast diversity of languages, loyalties and cultures — what common appeal could be offered to people who identified with their province but lacked the sense of China as a nation state.</p>
<p>In the end, they looked less to history for their answers than to western writings on race, eugenics and social Darwinism. The outcomes were not always pretty, and strong racial influences still underscore the way the state defines China and who belongs there. Some drew lines around peoples who did not share their language or culture, and claimed both them and the territory of the collapsed Manchu empire as innately “Chinese ” on spurious genetic grounds.</p>
<p>Yet all this was far from a given. After all, it was Sun Yatsen, the country’s first president, who said: “The Kuomintang (Nationalist Party)… recognises the right of self-determination of all national minorities in China and it will organise a free and united Chinese republic.” And the Communist Party went further, first calling for a federated republic, <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/14672715.1985.10414416" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">then, in Article 14</a> of its first constitution in 1931, stating that the national minorities of China — from the Mongolians to the Tibetans — had the “right to complete separation from China and to the formation of an independent state of each national minority.” It continued:<strong> </strong>“They may either join the Union of Chinese Soviets or secede from it and form their own state as they may prefer.”</p>
<p>That promise did not last. Today, the party insists that all those territories that could have been independent under the terms of the 1931 constitution have “always” been part of China. In fact, it claims, these regions had only been granted a highly qualified “autonomy” that promised cultural and language rights and a nominally autonomous government. The Party was always in command.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2021/02/chinas-plan-for-medical-domination/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2021/02/chinas-plan-for-medical-domination/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/GettyImages-1211365730-2.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2021/02/chinas-plan-for-medical-domination/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this series</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2021/02/chinas-plan-for-medical-domination/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>China&#039;s plan for medical domination</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2021/02/chinas-plan-for-medical-domination/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Steve Boggan</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>And this message was particularly important following the death of Mao Zedong and, later, the crushing of the student-led occupation of Tiananmen Square in 1989. A new national story was needed and history was pressed into service. Instead of a socialist paradise tomorrow, the party offered the memory of a past greatness cruelly stolen by rapacious foreigners. Only the party, they said, could prevent that from happening again. That story, coupled with rising living standards, more or less held the line until 2012, when Xi became President.</p>
<p>Today, however, living standards are rising less rapidly and that national story again needs a refresh. Xi Jinping’s revision, accompanied by a re-centralisation of power in the party and himself, is that western democracies are decadent and that China’s model — drawn from Marx, yes, but resting on those accumulated 5000 years of wisdom — will emerge triumphant.</p>
<p>In this new narrative, the essential requirement of belonging in the rejuvenated China is to love the Party; a 21<sup>st</sup>-century version of the imperial idea that allowed barbarians to consider themselves “<em>hua</em>” — civilised — if they embraced the superior culture. In today’s version, however, loyalty is the most important factor. In China’s new national story, assimilation is the only option.</p>
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					<title>Will China&#8217;s demography be its downfall?</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2018/06/will-chinas-demography-downfall/?edition=us</link>
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						<![CDATA[Isabel Hilton]]>
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							<![CDATA[Chinese women training to be nannies. Credit: Kevin Frayer / Getty]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p>Isabel Hilton is a London based writer, broadcaster and China watcher.</p>
]]>
						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>isabelhilton</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[Isabel Hilton is a London based writer, broadcaster and China watcher.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Fri, 15 Jun 2018 09:07:14 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Fri, 15 Jun 2018 09:07:14 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[China]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Demography is destiny]]></category>
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								<![CDATA[<p class="Default"><span lang="EN-US">Over the Chinese New Year holiday two years ago, in a slightly curious move, China Central Television’s documentary channel devoted 18 hours to a twice-nightly documentary series that featured declassified Russian files dating back to the days of Mao Zedong. Since the current Party Secretary, Xi Jinping, insists that the history of the People’s Republic since 1949 is a seamless whole, and the Mao era is not to be repudiated, this clearly was no accident. </span></p>
<p class="Default"><span lang="EN-US">It is of some interest, therefore, that included in the broadcast material for the first time was a notorious speech <a href="https://rsa.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13523278608414805?journalCode=fjcs19#.WyLpbi-ZP-Y" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Mao made in Moscow in 1957</a>. In it, Mao mused on topical fears of nuclear war. He was unfazed. “I’m not afraid of nuclear war,” he said. &#8220;There are 2.7 billion people in the world; it doesn’t matter if some are killed. China has a population of 600 million; even if half of them are killed, there are still 300 million people left. I</span>’<span lang="EN-US">m not afraid of anyone.</span>”</p>
<p class="Default"><span lang="EN-US"><div class="inner-body-quote" data-type="quote">
	<div class="quote-open"></div>
	<div class="quote"><div class="inner">The young Chinese are expected to carry the moral and financial burden of parents and grandparents, the expectations of up to six elderly people on their shoulders
	<div class="quote-close"></div></div>
	</div>
	
	<div class="attribution">- </div>
</div></span></p>
<p class="Default"><span lang="EN-US">Mao was keen on a large population, not least because, in the early years of the People’s Republic, China had little else: it was a country impoverished by decades of war and famine, followed by Party-directed political violence. Mao sought to make a virtue of China’s population through the mass mobilisation of vast numbers of people — an army of ants equipped only with shovels, to build roads and dams. </span></p>
<p class="Default"><span lang="EN-US">That spirit was encapsulated in one of Mao’s short essays that became required reading: <i>The Foolish Old Man Who Moved the Mountain</i>. In it, an old man is so vexed by the mountain that blocks his view that he begins to dig at it. When people mock, he responds that it doesn’t matter how long it takes, he, or his descendants, will move the mountain. It was a metaphor that millions were obliged to enact in grueling physical labour until Mao’s death. Deng Xiaoping, Mao’s pragmatic successor, preferred the strategy of moving the house.  </span></p>
<p class="Default"><span lang="EN-US"><div class="inner-body-quote" data-type="quote">
	<div class="quote-open"></div>
	<div class="quote"><div class="inner">Mao’s approach to China’s development, coupled with the firm socialist conviction that the theories of Malthus were a capitalist fallacy, led him to encourage population growth for the first three decades of the People’s Republic
	<div class="quote-close"></div></div>
	</div>
	
	<div class="attribution">- </div>
</div></span></p>
<p class="Default"><span lang="EN-US">Mao’s approach to China’s development, coupled with the firm socialist conviction that the theories of Malthus were a capitalist fallacy, led him to encourage population growth for the first three decades of the People’s Republic. But by 1976, Mao was dead and China’s population had leapt from just over 500 million in 1949 to 970 million. In 1979, concerned that  population expansion might outpace economic development, the Party swung rapidly in the other direction, introducing a coercive &#8216;one child&#8217; policy.  </span></p>
<p class="Default"><span lang="EN-US">The policy was brutally enacted for 39 years, with forced late-stage abortions commonplace. There were material rewards and punishments, too: </span><span lang="EN-US">families who complied benefited from better job </span><span lang="EN-US">and housing offers, and higher wages. Those who did not, faced heavy fines and the loss of jobs or other key economic permissions, such as their business licence. Many</span><span lang="EN-US"> took evasive action, concealing unlicensed children or, in the more affluent families, choosing to give birth abroad.</span></p>
<p><span lang="EN-US"><div class="inner-body-quote" data-type="quote">
	<div class="quote-open"></div>
	<div class="quote"><div class="inner">Educating and empowering women, it turns out, is as effective as forcing them to abort
	<div class="quote-close"></div></div>
	</div>
	
	<div class="attribution">- </div>
</div></span></p>
<p class="Default"><span lang="EN-US">China continues to defend the one-child policy, claiming it, among other things, as a contribution to climate change mitigation. But there are grounds to doubt whether its coercive brutality was necessary, since population trends would probably have changed without it. As China’s Asian neighbours entered their own rapid, post-war development, girls received better educational and professional opportunities and large numbers of women entered the paid labour force. Population growth fell at much the same rate that China’s did. Educating and empowering women, it turns out, is as effective as forcing them to abort. </span></p>
<p class="Default"><span lang="EN-US">Today, having reaped the economic benefits of a young and mobile workforce, China is suffering the reverse: the country now has the world’s most rapidly ageing population overall, with too few young people entering the labour market and a growing army of retirees who will have to be supported. Since they do not have large traditional families to maintain them, their care will largely fall to a shrinking public purse. Today, the question that haunts China’s planners is, will China grow old before it grows rich?</span></p>
<p class="Default"><span lang="EN-US"><div class="inner-body-quote" data-type="quote">
	<div class="quote-open"></div>
	<div class="quote"><div class="inner">China is entering the dangerous territory of the middle-income trap with no demographic energy behind it
	<div class="quote-close"></div></div>
	</div>
	
	<div class="attribution">- </div>
</div></span></p>
<p class="Default"><span lang="EN-US">This has further economic effects: for decades the state benefited from China’s high savings rate as people worried about future health and educational expenses and the state was able to use those savings to invest in infrastructure and other development. Now it needs its people to spend as it tries to shift the economic drivers away from exports towards consumption. The state is trying to encourage more births, but since the majority of the population is now urban, and the costs of raising a child are prohibitive, the take-up has been disappointing. China is entering the dangerous territory of the middle-income trap with no demographic energy behind it.</span></p>
<p class="Default"><span lang="EN-US">It does, though, have a young generation that is unlike any previous Chinese cohort: wealthier, more entitled, digital natives, recipients of a highly nationalistic education yet more able to travel and study abroad than any before it. They have little memory or understanding of the traumatic landmarks of the first 30 years of Communist rule, and their spending habits, tastes and desires are keenly studied. They have grown up in a country in which the collective disciplines of family and clan have been drastically weakened, yet they are still expected to carry the moral and financial burden of parents and grandparents, the expectations of up to six elderly people on their shoulders.    </span></p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/05/time-west-tackled-chinas-dangerous-rise/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/05/time-west-tackled-chinas-dangerous-rise/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/GettyImages-813958920.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/05/time-west-tackled-chinas-dangerous-rise/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Further reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/05/time-west-tackled-chinas-dangerous-rise/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>It&#039;s time the West tackled China&#039;s dangerous rise</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/05/time-west-tackled-chinas-dangerous-rise/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Henry Olsen</a></p></div></a></div>
<p class="Default"><span lang="EN-US">The impacts of China’s demographic revolution will play out in profound social and cultural changes for decades. You can already see it in the language. It has mapped family relationships in extraordinary detail, with designations that immediately signal degrees of consanguinity, dynastic ranking and levels of authority in the wider family. These terms, which once dictated the rules of deference, obligation and authority, are now historic curiosities in a society of individuals who have grown up with no siblings, no cousins, and no aunts or uncles. </span></p>
<p class="Default"><span lang="EN-US">Generational divides are now profound: among the most tragic is the well-documented emotional alienation of “<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Left-behind_children_in_China" target="_blank" rel="noopener">left behind</a>” children — those rural young whose parents left to work in new factories or construction sites a thousand miles away and were rarely able to return more than once a year. Brought up by elderly grandparents and poorly educated, many have dim prospects themselves. </span></p>
<figure id="attachment_14668" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-14668" style="width: 2000px" class="wp-caption alignnone"><img fetchpriority="high" decoding="async" class="size-full wp-image-14668" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/GettyImages-517035226.jpg" alt="" width="2000" height="1336" srcset="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/GettyImages-517035226.jpg 2000w, https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/GettyImages-517035226.jpg?resize=300,200 300w, https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/GettyImages-517035226.jpg?resize=768,513 768w, https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/GettyImages-517035226.jpg?resize=1024,684 1024w, https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/GettyImages-517035226.jpg?resize=1536,1026 1536w, https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/GettyImages-517035226.jpg?resize=267,178 267w, https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/GettyImages-517035226.jpg?resize=253,169 253w, https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/GettyImages-517035226.jpg?resize=250,167 250w, https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/GettyImages-517035226.jpg?resize=660,441 660w, https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/GettyImages-517035226.jpg?resize=480,321 480w" sizes="(max-width: 2000px) 100vw, 2000px" /><figcaption id="caption-attachment-14668" class="wp-caption-text">In China, the number of people over age 60 is expected to reach nearly half a billion within 30 years. Credit: Kevin Frayer / Getty</figcaption></figure>
<p class="Default"><span lang="EN-US">Young men in these circumstances find it very hard to find a wife, since the one-child policy reinforced a preference for males, and the availability of selective abortion skewed the sex ratio in some provinces as high as 130:100. Today that has produced, in these rural cohorts, a chronic shortage of possible brides. </span></p>
<p class="Default"><span lang="EN-US">The numbers are unreliable, since some rural families simply concealed the birth of a girl or gave the child away in order to have another chance at a boy, but official estimates of surplus males over females over the period of the one child policy run at 20-34 million. These poor rural bachelors, in China’s brutally direct parlance, are known as “bare branches”. On top of the personal impacts of enforced bachelorhood, they carry the social stigma of being unable to fulfil their dynastic duty. </span></p>
<p class="Default"><span lang="EN-US">On the other side, there are the “<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sheng_nu" target="_blank" rel="noopener">left-over women</a>”, also a much-studied phenomenon. These young women have earning power and education and are reluctant to accept traditional attitudes to marriage. Much to the distress of their family elders, they have remained single well past the traditional age of marriage. </span></p>
<p class="Default"><span lang="EN-US"><div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/05/chinas-campaign-moral-restoration/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/05/chinas-campaign-moral-restoration/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/PA-26193230.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/05/chinas-campaign-moral-restoration/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Further reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/05/chinas-campaign-moral-restoration/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>China&#039;s campaign for moral restoration</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/05/chinas-campaign-moral-restoration/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Michael Burleigh</a></p></div></a></div></span></p>
<p class="Default"><span lang="EN-US">This is also a phenomenon visible in China’s prosperous neighbours: in Taiwan, for instance, in some years, the percentage of births to foreign born women has risen as high as 20%, the result of bride importation from poorer Asian countries such as Laos and Cambodia to fill the gap left by educated Taiwanese women who chose not to marry. Today, even with a relaxed population policy, medical technology and preference mean that Chinese newborns still show a <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1569153/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">distorted gender ratio</a>.</span></p>
<p class="Default"><span lang="EN-US">These demographic distortions are deeply worrying for the countries planners. The</span><span lang="EN-US"> potential impacts of such a stark gender imbalance on <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/news/world/gender-imbalance-a-threat-to-stability/2007/10/30/1193618880862.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">social stability</a>, and the impact of age imbalance on future prosperity could be catastrophic. For decades the regime maintained its legitimacy by delivering rapid economic growth, with cheap labour a key component. But i</span><span lang="EN-US">n the new phase of its economic development, with cheap young labour dwindling, China must simultaneously seek cleaner, smarter growth, meet largely unfunded health and pension demands, reform its tax base to increase government revenues and stimulate domestic consumption. For now, though, is growth is fuelled not by increased productivity but by credit expansion, a dangerous phenomenon that cannot continue for ever. </span></p>
<p class="Default"><span lang="EN-US">Exact impacts are hard to predict in a world plagued by a US president apparently intent on destroying the existing economic order. It is a world that is also undergoing profound technological transformation, which raises further questions about the skills that will be required in the new economy. That transformation will pose new challenges, but the legacy of China’s dramatic, torturous demography – and the misguided attempts to control it – will continue to impact its social and economic development for decades to come.  </span></p>

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					<title>China is playing the West for fools</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2018/05/china-playing-west-fools/?edition=us</link>
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						<![CDATA[Isabel Hilton]]>
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							<![CDATA[Donald Trump meets Xi Jinping in Hamburg, Germany. Credit: Xinhua/Yao Dawei ]]>
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							<![CDATA[<p>Isabel Hilton is a London based writer, broadcaster and China watcher.</p>
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						<unherd:twitter_handle>isabelhilton</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[Isabel Hilton is a London based writer, broadcaster and China watcher.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Tue, 15 May 2018 13:55:55 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Tue, 24 Jul 2018 11:53:03 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Taking on China: how the West can save free trade]]></category>
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								<![CDATA[<p>Until now, Donald Trump’s incipient trade war with China has been notable for its ineptitude. The list of demands presented by the US delegation in Beijing included a US$200 billion reduction in the trade deficit within two years, and the overnight scrapping of several libraries’ worth of trade and investment regulations that have been carefully crafted by Beijing to favour Chinese companies.</p>
<p>No Chinese leader, would accept them, and certainly not a muscular nationalist like Xi Jinping, who already hopes that history is going his way.</p>
<div class="inner-body-quote" data-type="quote">
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	<div class="quote"><div class="inner">Trump’s  behaviour continues to create winning scenarios for China, allowing it to pose as a staunch defender of global free trade, while continuing its harmful, restrictive practices
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<p>This is a missed opportunity to tackle significant problems in China’s trade and industrial policy – problems that urgently need a response, not only from the US but also from other advanced economies that have suffered by it and stand to suffer further. But Trump’s  behaviour continues to create winning scenarios for China, allowing it to pose as a staunch defender of global free trade, while continuing its harmful restrictive practices.</p>
<p>To develop an effective defence of their interests, China’s trading partners need first to abandon some illusions. In the 19<sup>th </sup>century, an excited British textile manufacturer dreamed of the fortunes that would be made in Lancashire if every “Chinaman” were to add just one foot to the length of his shirt tails. This mix of hope and ignorance lingers on: the persistence of it in the face of reality is testament to China’s skilful deployment of its most powerful weapon – the irresistible attraction of market opportunities in a country home to one fifth of the world’s population.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/05/forget-free-trade-agreements-heres-uk-can-get-china/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/05/forget-free-trade-agreements-heres-uk-can-get-china/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/PA-34744992-2.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/05/forget-free-trade-agreements-heres-uk-can-get-china/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Recommended reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/05/forget-free-trade-agreements-heres-uk-can-get-china/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Forget the free-trade agreements – here&#039;s how Brexit Britain can work with China</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/05/forget-free-trade-agreements-heres-uk-can-get-china/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Bruno Maçães</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>So let’s be clear: yes, the market is huge. No, China does not intend to open it in ways that will assist the US, the UK or any other advanced economy.</p>
<p>What is likely, particularly in a weakened post-Brexit Britain, is China’s continuing effort to use the UK as a bridgehead. It has already happened with China’s nuclear industry with Hinkley Point and the promise to China that it will be allowed to build and operate nuclear plants in the UK; with digital infrastructure (<a href="https://www.parliament.uk/documents/other-committees/intelligence-security/Critical-National-Infrastructure-Report.pdf">the Huawei-BT deal</a>), and now, the MOU that Liam Fox has just signed with Tencent, a Chinese digital services giant that answers directly to state security in China.</p>
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	<div class="quote"><div class="inner">Anyone who still imagines that as yet untapped markets beckon in China for Brexit Britain should pay close attention
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<p>China’s policy is not a secret: it is clearly set out in a string of documents that detail the regime’s industrial masterplan. These include the <em>National Medium- and Long-Term Science and Technology Development Plan Outline (2006-2020), </em>the <em>State Council Decision on Accelerating and Cultivating the Development of Strategic Emerging Industries </em>(<em>SEI Decision</em>)<em>, </em>and, the shortest and most succinct iteration, the <em>Notice on Issuing “Made in China 2025” </em>published in 2005.  This is not light reading, but anyone with an interest in the shape of the future China envisages would be advised to take a look. In particular, anyone who still imagines that as yet untapped markets beckon in China for Brexit Britain should pay close attention.</p>
<p>In them, the Chinese government helpfully lays out its strategy: to keep barriers to the China market high, to enforce technology transfer and to acquire foreign companies that possess advance technologies, all to help China leap-frog the risky and difficult innovation stage, to upgrade its industrial technologies and to become dominant both domestic and global markets. Extensively recorded elsewhere, is the third route to the acquisition of advanced technologies – industrial and digital espionage.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/05/taking-china-west-can-save-free-trade/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/05/taking-china-west-can-save-free-trade/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/PA-35276720.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/05/taking-china-west-can-save-free-trade/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Recommended listening </span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/05/taking-china-west-can-save-free-trade/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Taking on China: how the West can save free trade</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/05/taking-china-west-can-save-free-trade/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Juliet Samuel </a></p></div></a></div>
<p>The starting point for China’s vision is uncontentious: by pursuing a traditional catch-up strategy, aided by WTO membership and globalisation, foreign investment, and a huge and hardworking population, China has attained middle-income status, become the world’s second largest economy and accumulated a substantial, though not inexhaustible, war chest of foreign currency to spend.</p>
<p>But the next bit is tricky: growing from poverty to middle-income status is relatively straightforward; getting through the middle-income trap to become a rich country is tougher, especially when burdened with an ageing population, incumbent resistance, a shrinking workforce, too much debt and a legacy of industrial damage to the country’s life support systems.</p>
<p>Some countries make it; most have not. According to The World Bank’s <em>China 2030 </em>report, published in 2013, of the 101 economies classified as ‘middle-income’ in 1960, only 13 had become ‘high-income’ by 2008.  The advice of a <a href="https://www.adb.org/publications/escaping-middle-income-trap-innovate-or-perish">paper </a>published last year by the Asian Development Bank was that “the starting point&#8230; has to be the existence of political will to embark on an innovation-focused strategy with the requisite active policies to implement it”.</p>
<div class="inner-body-quote" data-type="quote">
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	<div class="quote"><div class="inner">The end result of China&#8217;s strategy, if successful, will be the loss to advanced economies of hard-earned competitive edge
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<p>That is a lesson China has taken to heart, realising that it needs to upgrade its industrial technologies and raise its productivity as fast as possible and China deploys every means at its disposal to achieve it – begging, borrowing, acquiring and, yes, stealing advanced technologies from those who have them, in a range of practices, some of which are illegal under WTO rules and most of which are characterised as unfair. The end result of this strategy, if successful, will be the loss to advanced economies of hard-earned competitive edge. It is a prospect that has provoked alarm not only in the US but also in Europe.</p>
<p>Every country is entitled to upgrade its technology and to grow. The contentious point for China’s partners and competitors is how it is done. China deploys a wide range of restrictive practices: compulsory joint venture arrangements that only win regulatory approval if they involve technology transfer; <a href="https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Annual_Report/Chapters/Chapter%202%2C%20Section%203%20-%20China%27s%20Intelligence%20Services%20and%20Espionage%20Threats%20to%20the%20United%20States.pdf">digital industrial espionage</a> on a grand scale; and the targeted acquisition of high-tech companies while reciprocal investment into China is prohibited. This is not so much an uneven playing field as a cliff face that foreign competitors are obliged to climb, in the hope of reaching the sunlit uplands of the huge Chinese market.</p>
<p>It&#8217;s a Morton’s Fork dilemma, as many western partners have testified: they either hand over their most valuable asset in the hope of accessing one of the world’s largest markets, or they stay out, and wrestle with the downside of exclusion.</p>
<div class="inner-body-quote" data-type="quote">
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	<div class="quote"><div class="inner">The issue is less about the current balance of trade than who owns the future
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<p>The impacts are documented in the US Trade Representative’s <a href="https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/Section%20301%20FINAL.PDF"><em>Section 301 Report into China&#8217;s Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property, and Innovation</em></a><em>, </em>and it is clear that the serious issue is less about the current balance of trade than who owns the future and how the game is played.</p>
<p><em>Made in China 2025 </em>highlights high-tech industries, automotive, aviation, machinery, robotics, high-tech maritime and railway equipment, energy-saving vehicles, medical devices and information technology among others, with the ambition of achieving future market dominance in these areas. The ambition is import substitution and the terms employed – “indigenous innovation” and “self-sufficiency” – are no more concealed than the targets set out to achieve them. These include a deadline for increasing the proportion of domestically produced components to 70 per cent by 2025, enabled by large subsidies and low-cost government backed finance to favoured Chinese enterprises.</p>
<p>The second aspect – making life difficult for foreign operators in China, is also copiously documented. As a recent <a href="https://www.merics.org/sites/default/files/2017-09/MPOC_No.2_MadeinChina2025.pdf">report from the Berlin-based</a> MERICS think tank put it, while Chinese high-tech companies enjoy massive state backing, the foreign counterparts face:</p>
<blockquote><p>“The closing of the market for information technology, the exclusion from local subsidy schemes, the low level of data security and the intensive collection of digital data by the Chinese state. As China’s own smart manufacturing capabilities mature, it is likely that the Chinese state will further step up its discriminatory practices and restrictions of market access in the field of smart manufacturing.”</p></blockquote>
<p>The outbound aspect of <em>Made in China 2025 </em>is the acquisition of international high-tech companies, facilitated by the open nature of advanced economies. But China’s acquisitions are directed by state strategy, funded with capital that hides behind opaque investor networks.<em> </em>As the MERICS report points out:</p>
<blockquote><p>&#8220;In the long term, China wants to obtain control over the most profitable segments of global supply chains and production networks. If successful, <em>Made in China 2025</em> could accelerate the erosion of industrial countries’ current technological leadership across industrial sectors. As illustrated by the fierce discussions surrounding recent high-profile high-tech acquisitions, governments in Europe and the U.S. increasingly perceive this dimension of China’s quest for technological upgrading as a crucial and pressing challenge.”</p></blockquote>
<p>There are many possible responses. Unfortunately President Trump is unlikely to choose the most effective: a firm alliance with the EU and other powerful trade partners to enforce and defend the rules.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/11/test-article/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/11/test-article/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/11/test-article/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from our 'Taking on China' series</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/11/test-article/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Test article</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/11/test-article/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> James Coney</a></p></div></a></div>
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					<title>Xi&#8217;s power grab echoes China&#8217;s political struggles of old</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2018/02/xis-power-grab-echoes-chinas-power-struggles-old/?edition=us</link>
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						<![CDATA[Isabel Hilton]]>
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							<![CDATA[Xi Jinping has too many enemies to give up power safely. (Credit: Sean Gallup/Getty Images)]]>
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							<![CDATA[<p>Isabel Hilton is a London based writer, broadcaster and China watcher.</p>
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						<unherd:twitter_handle>isabelhilton</unherd:twitter_handle>
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						<![CDATA[Isabel Hilton is a London based writer, broadcaster and China watcher.]]>
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										<pubDate>Wed, 28 Feb 2018 14:39:38 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Wed, 28 Feb 2018 14:43:47 +0000</updated>
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		<category><![CDATA[China (not Trump)]]></category>
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								<![CDATA[<p>In December 2014, Xi Jinping closed the trap around <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-30352458" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Zhou Yongkang</a>, the retired Politburo Standing Committee member who had built and led the most comprehensive internal security system China had ever seen. As he dispensed with &#8216;the Tiger&#8217;, <a href="https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2014/07/catch-tiger-fall-zhou-yongkang/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">his most powerful opponent</a>, the chances of Xi Jinping voluntarily leaving office sharply declined.</p>
<p>And then, the announcement at the weekend <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/fe…" target="_blank" rel="noopener">that the two-term rule for the Chinese presidency was scrapped</a> provided a conclusion to the five-year process of power accumulation; it marked a return to politics of leader worship, and the re-assertion of Communist Party dominance in Chinese life.</p>
<p>This move was no surprise to anyone who has followed Xi’s first term in office. When he came to power, in 2012, China was riding high on the prosperity that Deng Xiaoping’s reforms had ushered in 20 years previously. Deng had learned the hard way that excessive concentration of power damaged both Party and country, and had laid out a succession formula which had allowed a peaceful transition twice – an unprecedented advance in China. For the first time, power was passed on without bloodshed.</p>
<figure id="attachment_12404" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-12404" style="width: 2000px" class="wp-caption alignnone"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="size-full wp-image-12404" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/GettyImages-452882098.jpg" alt="" width="2000" height="1333" srcset="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/GettyImages-452882098.jpg 2000w, https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/GettyImages-452882098.jpg?resize=300,200 300w, https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/GettyImages-452882098.jpg?resize=768,512 768w, https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/GettyImages-452882098.jpg?resize=1024,682 1024w, https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/GettyImages-452882098.jpg?resize=1536,1024 1536w, https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/GettyImages-452882098.jpg?resize=566,376 566w, https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/GettyImages-452882098.jpg?resize=267,178 267w, https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/GettyImages-452882098.jpg?resize=253,169 253w, https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/GettyImages-452882098.jpg?resize=250,167 250w, https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/GettyImages-452882098.jpg?resize=660,440 660w, https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/GettyImages-452882098.jpg?resize=480,320 480w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 2000px) 100vw, 2000px" /><figcaption id="caption-attachment-12404" class="wp-caption-text">Zhou Yongkang&#8217;s power stretched across government, industry and security forces. He was accused of corruption, and brought down, whereupon the likelihood of Xi Jinping ever voluntarily leaving office sharply declined  (Photo by Feng Li/Getty Images)</figcaption></figure>
<p>Consider what had gone before: from 1949 to Mao’s death in 1976, China had been consumed by savage internecine power struggles within the Party that had spilled out into catastrophic nationwide battles. In the years of Maoist supremacy, nobody dared gainsay the leader’s grandiose visions, visions that killed more Chinese in those decades than all the war, pestilence and famine that had marked the first half of China’s grim 20<sup>th</sup> century.</p>
<div class="inner-body-quote" data-type="quote">
	<div class="quote-open"></div>
	<div class="quote"><div class="inner">Xi Jinping has undermined or bypassed the institutions of the state, concentrating executive power in “leading small groups”
	<div class="quote-close"></div></div>
	</div>
	
	<div class="attribution">- </div>
</div>The Party has never owned up to the precise tally: some four million in land reform; an unknown number dead in labour camps in the anti-rightist movement; up to 40 million starved to death by the effects of the Great Leap Forward; perhaps two million in the Cultural Revolution. The cost of strong leadership in China has been high.</p>
<p>Deng himself, twice a victim of Mao’s purges, was clear that China should never again suffer under a leader who held absolute power, and <a href="https://dangshi.people.com.cn/GB/165617/173273/10415396.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">understood</a> what was required to avoid it. One important condition was a consensual model of leadership. Another was that a power holder could relinquish his position safe from fear of vengeance. When Xi imprisoned Zhou Yongkang, he removed that guarantee. Now, he himself has too many enemies to give up power safely.</p>
<figure id="attachment_12405" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-12405" style="width: 2000px" class="wp-caption alignnone"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="size-full wp-image-12405" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/PA-29768578.jpg" alt="" width="2000" height="1404" srcset="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/PA-29768578.jpg 2000w, https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/PA-29768578.jpg?resize=300,211 300w, https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/PA-29768578.jpg?resize=768,539 768w, https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/PA-29768578.jpg?resize=1024,719 1024w, https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/PA-29768578.jpg?resize=1536,1078 1536w, https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/PA-29768578.jpg?resize=267,187 267w, https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/PA-29768578.jpg?resize=253,178 253w, https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/PA-29768578.jpg?resize=250,176 250w, https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/PA-29768578.jpg?resize=660,463 660w, https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/PA-29768578.jpg?resize=480,337 480w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 2000px) 100vw, 2000px" /><figcaption id="caption-attachment-12405" class="wp-caption-text">Chairman Mao Zedong meets the Soviet Union Prime Minister, Alexei Kosygin (Credit: Viktor Budan/TASS)</figcaption></figure>
<p>Xi Jinping’s real power bases are his posts of General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party and head of the Military Commission. When he took over the Party, it was in decline: its ideology was confused, its membership was shrinking and it was publicly reviled as a vehicle for corruption and rent seeking. Political reform was widely expected and openly demanded, as people hoped for a continuation of Deng’s prescription of strengthening the state and the rule of law as a defence against Party abuse.</p>
<p>But Xi Jinping has undermined or bypassed the institutions of the state, concentrating executive power in “leading small groups”, many of which he chairs. He has reinserted the Party into every aspect of national life – from the education system to private enterprise, shutting down the think tanks, locking up the lawyers and others who were freely debating China’s constitutional future.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/02/chinas-rise-stunning-shouldnt-afraid/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/02/chinas-rise-stunning-shouldnt-afraid/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/GettyImages-482367208.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/02/chinas-rise-stunning-shouldnt-afraid/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/02/chinas-rise-stunning-shouldnt-afraid/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>China&#039;s rise has been stunning - and we shouldn&#039;t be afraid of it</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/02/chinas-rise-stunning-shouldnt-afraid/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Michael Burleigh</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>He has imposed a new ideology that promises to <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-22726375" target="_blank" rel="noopener">make China great again</a>, in an obvious echo of another global leader. And he has revived an imperial approach in which the ruler personifies the state and the national interest. As he himself put it at a high-level Party <a href="https://chinaheritage.net/journal/whos-on-first/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">meeting</a> in 2016:</p>
<blockquote><p>&#8220;Everything in China is under the direction of the Communist Party: party, state, army, civilian life and education, and at all points of the compass.&#8221;</p></blockquote>
<p>And everything in the Party is now dominated by Xi.</p>
<p>Will it hold? It is generally unwise to take dictatorships at their word. Xi sits at the apex of a series of structural problems at home and is heavily dependent for his legitimacy on the chimera of militant nationalism, combined, of course, with an ambitious system of digital surveillance and coercion.</p>
<p>But this is no longer the Mao era. When <a href="https://www.marxists.org/history/erol/uk.hightide/mao.htm" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Mao Zedong Thought</a> was the national catechism, China was poor, troubled and closed off. Today China is out in the world, a major beneficiary of globalisation, and the Party is now obliged to try to impose its story in the global context. Abroad, as the <i>Global Times</i>, one of the Party’s more extreme mouthpieces <a href="https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1090821.shtml" target="_blank" rel="noopener">put it</a>, China has yet to establish global leadership in ideology and in communications. Expect more demands that business partners, visiting dignitaries and Western scholars <i>kowtow</i> to the Party’s version of history as the price of the relationship.</p>
<div class="inner-body-quote" data-type="quote">
	<div class="quote-open"></div>
	<div class="quote"><div class="inner">Under the People’s Republic, every nominated successor between 1949 and 1989 ended up deposed, in jail or dead
	<div class="quote-close"></div></div>
	</div>
	
	<div class="attribution">- </div>
</div>Next month, in an annual ritual, China’s National People’s Congress will act out the fiction that it is the China’s supreme authority by embracing the Party’s latest directives, including constitutional reform. I doubt that any delegate will comment on the irony that “constitutionalism” was one of the objects of attack in Xi’s first term – the notion that the China’s constitution, with its desirable guarantees of freedom of speech and religion, could be invoked in defence of the citizen. In truth, it hardly matters what the constitution says, since the Party is supreme and beyond the reach of any law.</p>
<figure id="attachment_12407" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-12407" style="width: 2000px" class="wp-caption alignnone"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="size-full wp-image-12407" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/PA-34732623.jpg" alt="" width="2000" height="1333" srcset="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/PA-34732623.jpg 2000w, https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/PA-34732623.jpg?resize=300,200 300w, https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/PA-34732623.jpg?resize=768,512 768w, https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/PA-34732623.jpg?resize=1024,682 1024w, https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/PA-34732623.jpg?resize=1536,1024 1536w, https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/PA-34732623.jpg?resize=566,376 566w, https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/PA-34732623.jpg?resize=267,178 267w, https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/PA-34732623.jpg?resize=253,169 253w, https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/PA-34732623.jpg?resize=250,167 250w, https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/PA-34732623.jpg?resize=660,440 660w, https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/PA-34732623.jpg?resize=480,320 480w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 2000px) 100vw, 2000px" /><figcaption id="caption-attachment-12407" class="wp-caption-text">Prime Minister Theresa May in Beijing with Premier Li Keqiang, a possible rival to Xi Jinping</figcaption></figure>
<p>So why was it necessary to remove term limits to the presidency, when Xi’s real power lies in a Party position that has no term limits? Deng Xiaoping, after all, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1991/01/29/world/a-year-later-signs-that-deng-guides-china.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">continued to dominate China in later years</a> from his position as Honorary President of the Chinese Bridge Association. One possible reason might be to deprive any rival – perhaps <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/world/china-watch/business/chinese-economic-growth-and-reform/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Premier Li Keqiang</a> – of a future power base. If so, then the move is a sign of anxiety rather than confidence.</p>
<p>Succession, however, is the Achilles heel of any dictatorship and, as China’s history teaches us, of the imperial system also: <a href="https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smart-news/2000-year-old-texts-reveal-first-emperor-chinas-quest-eternal-life-180967671/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Qin Shi Huang</a>, China’s brutal first emperor, set up a 10,000 year <i>reich</i> that collapsed four years after his death. In the two millennia since, China’s elite power struggles have been savage. Under the People’s Republic, every nominated successor between 1949 and 1989 ended up deposed, in jail or dead. Deng&#8217;s settlement gave China an interlude of relative political order. Now that is over, sooner or later, trouble is likely to return.</p>
<p><em><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/series/china-not-trump/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Read UnHerd&#8217;s China (not Trump) series</a></em></p>
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