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		<title>Leah Downey, a writer for UnHerd</title>
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	<title>Leah Downey, a writer for UnHerd</title>
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					<title>Will Rachel Reeves tackle the Bank?</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2025/10/will-rachel-reeves-tackle-the-bank/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://stage.unherd.com/2025/10/will-rachel-reeves-tackle-the-bank/?edition=us#comments</comments>
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										<unherd:main_theme>Economics</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Leah Downey]]>
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																<unherd:article_ranking>2</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[An intervention by Reeves would require significant political capital. Photo by Peter Cziborra – WPA Pool/Getty Images]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Leah Downey</strong> is a political theorist at Cambridge, and the author of <a href="https://press.princeton.edu/books/hardcover/9780691244433/our-money?srsltid=AfmBOoo6uqWyoafS_ylXvQoRcKP9JnUwYCvk0TpF6lvaO18GrIF_YSgh"><em>Our Money</em></a>.</p>
]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_handle></unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is a political theorist at Cambridge, and the author of <a href="https://press.princeton.edu/books/hardcover/9780691244433/our-money?srsltid=AfmBOoo6uqWyoafS_ylXvQoRcKP9JnUwYCvk0TpF6lvaO18GrIF_YSgh"><em>Our Money</em></a>.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Wed, 22 Oct 2025 23:02:07 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Thu, 23 Oct 2025 10:37:17 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Bank of England]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Cental banks]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Economics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[federal reserve]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Labour Party]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://stage.unherd.com/?p=1034003</guid>
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								<![CDATA[Its powers are undemocratic]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>Are central banks, tasked primarily with securing price stability, being asked to do too much or too little? Have their tools, such as Quantitative Easing (QE), been overindulged in since 2008? Or has their immense power to steer the macroeconomy been put to good use in the face of crises like climate change, severe inequality, and sluggish productivity?</p>
<p>US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent has made his <a href="https://www.international-economy.com/TIE_Sp25_Bessent.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">view on the matter clear</a>: central banks are asked to do too much. But others have argued the opposite. Earlier this month, economic historian Adam Tooze wrote <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/761508c9-4d7b-47c2-ad60-7c6b4bf9e703">in the <em>Financial Times</em></a> that the monetary policymaking arrangement in the UK isn’t working well, and should be revisited. In essence, the Bank of England is not helping, and perhaps even hindering, the government’s efforts to grow the economy. Suffering from a severe period of economic malaise, the UK needs all the help it can get, from every part of the state, independent or not.</p>
<p>Without delving too deeply into the quagmire of central bank independence, Tooze called for a “new concordat” between the Bank and the Government. Others on the progressive end of politics have, along similar lines, <a href="https://greencentralbanking.com/2025/05/08/monetary-fiscal-policy-coordination/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">advocated for</a> more fiscal and monetary <a href="https://neweconomics.org/2025/06/a-coordinated-macroeconomic-framework-for-europe" target="_blank" rel="noopener">coordination</a>. Personally, I don’t like the term “coordination”, because it hides the real question: who should be in charge, the Bank or the Government? The answer to that question, in the context of a modern <a href="https://www.amazon.co.uk/Our-Money-Monetary-Democracy-Matters/dp/069124443X">democracy</a>, would seemingly have to be the Government.</p>
<p>So, whether you think that we should junk central bank independence altogether (a point I’ll return to) or merely that the nature of the relationship between the Bank and Parliament, which was set down in 1997, needs revisiting, it’s worth considering what such a new concordat might address. In other words, what should the Government consider changing about how the Bank of England operates?</p>
<p>The concordat should address four things. First, the Bank’s mandate which is currently to secure price stability and then to support government policy. On this basis, one could argue that the central bank is already failing. Currently, it is engaged in a process known as Quantitative Tightening (QT), which is effectively the unwinding of the better-known Quantitative Easing, which was first used after the financial crisis. During QE, the Bank purchased bonds in order to inject money into the economy. QT involves selling off those bonds, or simply letting them mature without reinvesting. In so doing, the Bank of England is shrinking its balance sheet and affecting the gilt market. QT is not necessary for price stability, and — far from supporting government policy — it is, by some accounts, making things fiscally tighter for the government. This might lead one to ask: is the Bank’s decision to engage in QT, particularly right now, in line with its mandate?</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;Is the Bank’s decision to engage in quantitative tightening, particularly right now, in line with its mandate?&#8221;</div>
<p>That is not even to mention all the things that the Bank is choosing not to do, which could support the Government’s aims and are unlikely to prejudice price stability. Consider, for instance, changes in bank regulation to encourage investment —particularly domestic growth driving investment, even green investment, or investment in particular regions of the country. Other central banks have deployed programs designed to support credit creation in particular regions and sectors — India, Japan, and the Eurozone, for instance. The Bank itself, prior to the recent bout of inflation, had committed to tilting its own bond purchases, meaning skewing them toward “green” rather than “dirty” bonds. It later abandoned this program.</p>
<p>A concordat could change the way we understand price stability. Instead of instructing the Bank to aim for 2% inflation precisely, a target that is widely accepted as itself arbitrary, the Government could instruct the Bank to seek price stability understood as the absence of highly volatile price levels or hyperinflation. We might imagine this as keeping inflation roughly below 10%, as much empirical evidence suggests inflation doesn’t do lasting harm to the real economy until it gets into double digits.</p>
<p>Some would undoubtedly object: we’ve just had a bout of inflation below this level and it was very painful. This is, of course, true, but even with a precise target, the central bank was unable to prevent the pain and its solution was far from painless, as many at the time <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/02/16/the-fight-against-inflation-is-becoming-a-class-war/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">pointed out</a>. In fact, it was government action, not central bank policy, that was required to ease the inflationary hurt, something we’d be more likely to get if there was no pretense that solving the issue was the central bank’s sole responsibility in the first place.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/07/how-independent-is-the-fed/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/07/how-independent-is-the-fed/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/GettyImages-2226860627.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/07/how-independent-is-the-fed/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/07/how-independent-is-the-fed/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>How independent is the Fed?</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/07/how-independent-is-the-fed/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Leah Downey</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>The second area I’d suggest considering in a potential new concordat would be the Treasury indemnity of central bank losses. The UK is unusual among central banks for two reasons: first, the Bank of England considers itself capable of making a loss, and second, the Treasury has committed to an indemnity covering any central bank losses. That is: the Treasury, if need be, will bail out the Bank.</p>
<p>Not all central banks consider themselves capable of making a loss. The most obvious counter-example is the US Federal Reserve System, which does not register central bank losses in its official records. Instead, it has adopted a practice of deferred asset accounting. This means that anything which might be otherwise logged as a loss for the Fed is balanced off against the assumption of future gains — this assumption is not unrealistic, given the history of regular gains in the past that are remitted to the Treasury. In short, it is a choice for the Bank of England to account for “losses” in the way it does, and it is a choice for the Treasury to indemnify them. The alternative would be for the central bank to simply cover the losses itself, as in the US, based on future gains, or by virtue of its power to print money.</p>
<p>MPs involved in this new concordat should consider changing the Bank’s accounting practices and/or eliminating the indemnity. Or at the very least, they could force the publication of the legal terms of the indemnity. At the moment the conditions for the Treasury covering central bank losses are unknown to those outside the Treasury. Many have called for the release of the details; among them is <a href="https://lordslibrary.parliament.uk/economic-affairs-committee-report-making-an-independent-bank-of-england-work-better/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">the House of Lords committee on Economic Affairs</a>, <a href="https://hansard.parliament.uk/lords/2021-11-15/debates/9124C980-531B-4688-BEA0-D439C5D04703/QuantitativeEasing(EconomicAffairsCommitteeReport)" target="_blank" rel="noopener">twice</a>. Without knowledge of how the current indemnity works, it’s hard to understand why it should exist at all.</p>
<p>The third area ripe for reconsideration is the way the Bank of England conducts monetary policy. Since 2009, the Bank has conducted interest rate policy by paying bank rate — that is, the interest rate paid by banks rather than consumers — on the reserves that private banks hold at the central bank. In 2024 it paid out approximately £40 billion to private banks, and such payments are <a href="https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/asset-purchase-facility/2024/2024-q4" target="_blank" rel="noopener">projected</a> to continue through 2033. As well as being large, these payments tend to be politically counter-cyclical. The central bank pays more to private banks when it is trying to raise the interest rate. This is usually a moment of economic pain for the average citizen. It’s hard to understand why the state should be giving huge sums of money, in such a tough moment, to private banks, and not using it to support public institutions. Some will claim that the answer is that we need to induce banks to hold reserves, and that paying them to keep their reserves at the central bank is the best way to do it. I’m not so sure. We don’t pay car companies to install seat belts, we just require it.</p>
<p>By paying interest on reserves to private banks since 2009, the Bank has effectively separated balance-sheet policy from interest rate policy, enabling the central bank to hold a large balance sheet without distorting interest rates. In practice, this has given the Bank a new and incredibly powerful policy tool — the balance sheet. But it’s not obvious what the Bank should be using this tool to achieve, given it is not technically necessary to secure price stability. One might suppose, based on the mandate, that it should be used to support government policy, but the Bank has not adopted such a view.</p>
<p>One way in which a new concordat could alter the contemporary payment on reserves mechanism would be for the Bank could adopt a tiered system of reserves — as many of <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/nigel-farage-reform-uk-debanking-bank-profits-tax-cut-bank-of-england/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">various</a> political <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/00467653-b2a3-4088-a9c1-d935010cf295" target="_blank" rel="noopener">stripes</a> have suggested and other central banks (like the European Central Bank) have implemented. This involves paying banks different rates depending on the amount of reserves they hold at the central bank. It could mean paying banks only for a certain level of reserves — and not for excess or even placing a negative rate on excess. Or it could mean not paying banks at all for the required level of reserves and perhaps implementing a negative rate for those above that level. Notably, for this to work, the bank would likely need to embrace, or re-embrace, reserve requirements — reserve requirements are rules that set out the minimum amount of liquid assets that a commercial bank must hold.</p>
<p>Questioned by Richard Tice about whether the Bank should introduce reserve requirements, Andrew Bailey <a href="https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/-/media/boe/files/letter/2025/letter-to-richard-tice-june-2025.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">dismissed</a> the idea. There is, in fact, no reason to dismiss the possibility of reserve requirements: they have been deployed historically by nearly every monetary jurisdiction and are still used (and encouraged) in many jurisdictions today.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/10/the-fall-of-the-crypto-oligarchs/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/10/the-fall-of-the-crypto-oligarchs/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/GettyImages-2208409748.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/10/the-fall-of-the-crypto-oligarchs/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/10/the-fall-of-the-crypto-oligarchs/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The fall of the crypto-oligarchs</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/10/the-fall-of-the-crypto-oligarchs/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> John Rapley</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Finally, the last specific area ripe for reconsideration as part of a new concordat is balance sheet policy itself. QE, as we all know by now, had a major impact on the economy, but also on our political and social life. This is not particularly surprising as it involved the government creating buckets of money and using it to buy particular assets and not others. What the Bank buys, and how much, matters. There is good reason to consider a means of political input into any such deployment of the balance sheet. In 2024, the House of Lords Committee on Economic Affairs issued a report which called for a memo of understanding between the Treasury and the Bank on such policy, suggesting that two were not in full accord on the matter. Each institution responded to the report effectively saying there was no need for such a memo because I know what I’m doing. Clearly that’s not sufficient, given the mess we’re in right now where the Treasury is desperate to initiate economic growth and the Bank is chuntering on with QT as if it can’t hear the Chancellor at all.</p>
<p>We should reflect for a moment on what all this adds up to. This is a list of pretty major aspects of the contemporary monetary policymaking system. All of them are in need of a re-think if we are to assemble a unified macroeconomic policy in the UK that is fit for the moment. But that might make you wonder: is this a one-off? Should we be engaging in an ad-hoc reconsideration of the system, and then go back to our respective corners (the Government and the central bank)? Or is it more sensible to consider a mechanism through which the Government and the central bank can more regularly “coordinate” policy?</p>
<p>The UK, unlike many other jurisdictions, already has a means for establishing more institutionalized, regular exchange between the Government and the central bank. Every year the Chancellor writes a letter to the Bank offering guidance. In recent decades, as a result of deference to central bank independence, this letter has largely been pro forma and not imbued with much coercive power. But that need not be the case. We could reinvigorate this mechanism, should the Chancellor decide to use this letter to inform the Bank of changes the Government wishes to see both in the structure and operation of the central bank, starting with the four I’ve discussed here.</p>
<p>Unfortunately, it seems unlikely that Rachel Reeves will announce anything like a new concordat at the budget in November, or anytime really. Labour seems committed to hewing as closely as possible to what they understand to be conventional economic and financial wisdom on the subject. I don’t understand why exactly, but right now, the party in government seems unable or unwilling to try anything the contemporary central bank hasn’t already embraced. Consequently, it’s easy to see who is in charge here. One agent hoards the conventional wisdom and the other bows to it. It’s a shame twice over. Doing things as they have been done since the late Nineties is not a recipe for economic success in the 2020s and a system of government in which the central bank is calling the shots is not a democracy.</p>
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									<item>
					<title>How independent is the Fed?</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2025/07/how-independent-is-the-fed/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://stage.unherd.com/2025/07/how-independent-is-the-fed/?edition=us#comments</comments>
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										<unherd:main_theme>technocracy</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Leah Downey]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/images-7.jpeg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>2</unherd:article_ranking>
																<unherd:image_caption>
							<![CDATA['Exactly the sort of relationship that central bankers want to avoid.' Chip Somodevilla / Getty Images]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Leah Downey</strong> is a political theorist at Cambridge, and the author of <a href="https://press.princeton.edu/books/hardcover/9780691244433/our-money?srsltid=AfmBOoo6uqWyoafS_ylXvQoRcKP9JnUwYCvk0TpF6lvaO18GrIF_YSgh"><em>Our Money</em></a>.</p>
]]>
						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle></unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is a political theorist at Cambridge, and the author of <a href="https://press.princeton.edu/books/hardcover/9780691244433/our-money?srsltid=AfmBOoo6uqWyoafS_ylXvQoRcKP9JnUwYCvk0TpF6lvaO18GrIF_YSgh"><em>Our Money</em></a>.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Sun, 27 Jul 2025 23:01:50 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Mon, 28 Jul 2025 09:26:43 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[central bank]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Donald Trump]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Economics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[fed]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[US]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://stage.unherd.com/?p=695484</guid>
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								<![CDATA[Defending the bank is inevitably political]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>Regular breakfast between the Fed chair and the Treasury Secretary was a long-held <a href="https://www.barrons.com/articles/fed-independence-trump-treasury-powell-ee680e8b">tradition</a>. Janet Yellen <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/podcast/the-new-yorker-radio-hour/janet-yellen-on-the-danger-of-a-banana-republic-economy">recently described</a> her tenure as being peppered with chats with President Obama, as he “expressed interest in understanding the economy and the economic outlook”. That’s to say, interactions between the US administration and the central bank are common enough. But what happened last Thursday was different.</p>
<p>Trump’s visit to the Federal Reserve was explicitly antagonistic, meant to exert pressure and influence over the central bank. This was perhaps made most vividly and uncomfortably clear when Trump accused the Fed of going well over its renovation budget and Powell <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/live/2025/07/24/us/trump-federal-reserve-powell">directly contradicted the President</a>. But this is only the latest escalation in a long series of public clashes between Fed Chair, Jerome Powell, and the Trump administration — exactly the sort of thing central bankers want to avoid because it constitutes a threat to the holy grail of macroeconomic policymaking: central bank independence (CBI).</p>
<p>Today such independence is considered sacrosanct: the height of technocratic, expert governance. And any Fed (or <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/About/Factsheets/Sheets/2023/Protecting-IMF-resources-safeguards-assessments-of-central-banks">IMF</a>) official <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2025/07/21/opinion/federal-reserve-independence-trump.html">would tell you today</a>, just as they <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/20048280?seq=1">would have in the</a> Nineties, that it is essential to a healthy and successful economy.</p>
<p>No surprise, then, that the surge in antagonisms between Trump and the Fed has produced a vocal, international response from people directly in support of <a href="https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/business/india-business/backs-powell-central-bank-independence-is-essential/articleshow/122915250.cms">Powell</a>. They extol <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XTkFtTjGt3Q">his courage</a> and admire his insistence not to bow to the pressure from the administration. For them, Powell is the consummate independent central banker — standing up for the conventional wisdom against a political maelstrom calling for change. But others have taken a slightly different tack, offering a theoretical defense of the independence of central banks in general.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;Such a defense of central bank independence simply isn’t compelling.&#8217;</div>
<p>A recent essay in <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2025/07/21/opinion/federal-reserve-independence-trump.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em>The New York Times</em></a> trots out most of the widely accepted defenses of CBI. The authors, Janet Yellen and Ben Bernanke, who are former central bankers, predictably assert that “the ability of the central bank to act independently is essential for its effective stewardship of the economy”. They go on to assure readers that an independent central bank is not an unaccountable central bank. This is true, to an extent. Congress sets the Fed’s mandate and holds the central bank accountable to it. It is also true that the Fed’s mandate is to secure credit aggregates in line with price stability, maximum employment, and moderate long-term interest rates. In reality the Fed seeks price stability defined as 2% inflation. As Yellen and Bernanke themselves write later in the op-ed, “<em>if</em> inflation is firmly under control, the Fed has more flexibility to respond to any weaknesses in the job market” — suggesting the price stability aim has primacy. Furthermore, while the Fed does have an inspector general tasked with overseeing its decisions, the inspector general at the Fed, unlike any other in the US government, reports to the Chair of the Federal Reserve, <a href="https://www.mercatus.org/research/policy-briefs/federal-reserve-overstaffed-or-overworked-insights-feds-financial-statements">not directly to Congress</a>.</p>
<p>But if it’s not a lack of accountability that makes the Fed independent, then what is it? The former central bankers state that “independence means that monetary policymakers are permitted to use fact-based analysis and their best professional judgment in determining how best to reach their mandated goals, without regard to short-term political pressures”. But surely that can’t be right. Don’t we expect policymakers who are not as independent as those as the Fed — education policymakers, environmental policymakers, fiscal policymakers — to use “fact-based analysis and their best professional judgment” when they make policy? Perhaps the key is in the final phrase, “without regard to short-term political pressure”. In which case, independence is not about a lack of democratic accountability, but it is about building in a lack of democratic control over policy. Independence means legislators cannot actively steer policy going forward.</p>
<p>Why would we want this? The common suggestion is that we should insulate Fed policymakers from political influence because monetary policy is simply too complicated and/or too important to be left to politicians. But again, this seems crazy. If congresspeople are too dumb or too frivolous to control monetary policy, why are we happy, nay insistent, that those same dimwits hold the power to declare war, to tax, to spend, and to put people in jail and throw away the key?</p>
<p>Too often, defenders of CBI claim that history supports their view that independence is necessary to secure a stable and growing economy. That’s not my reading of history. First, independence in its current form is rather new. For most of the history of central banks, they were independent not by virtue of their expert status, but because they were privately owned and run — an arrangement most of us have no interest in resurrecting. Second, the evidence in favor of independence since the Fifties is mixed at best. More compelling, in my view, are arguments that suggest independence arrives right when countries <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/713601585">need it least</a>. Or in other words, that independence is the product of economic stability, <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/3488576.pdf">not its cause</a>.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/05/the-battle-for-the-fed/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/05/the-battle-for-the-fed/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/GettyImages-2182550504-e1747044989980.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/05/the-battle-for-the-fed/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/05/the-battle-for-the-fed/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The battle for the Fed</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/05/the-battle-for-the-fed/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Leah Downey</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Yellen and Bernanke mention two particular periods of history to defend their claims. First the years immediately following the Second World War when the Treasury pressured the Fed to cap interest rates to help finance war debt. According to the authors, this led to soaring rates of inflation by the late Forties. They go on to suggest that this inflationary period spurred the Fed-Treasury Accord of 1951 which is widely accepted as the birth of modern CBI in the US. But this is somewhat odd from a historical perspective, as the period following the Second World War is generally considered an economic golden age — a fact which suggests that CBI is best understood as a product, not a cause, of economic stability.</p>
<p>Perhaps the most infamous interaction between a Fed chair and a President in economic circles occurred in 1972 when Richard Nixon pressured Arthur Burns to keep interest rates low in the lead up to the election. Yellen and Bernanke suggest that this single instance should be blamed for the Stagflation of the early Eighties — an assertion that seems out of proportion, not least because the stagflation occurred almost 10 years later. They further suggest that stagflation was later brought under control when Paul Volcker “refocused the bank on reducing inflation in the early 1980s”. But this is an odd suggestion to make given the prior historical reference. They claimed that CBI emerged in 1951, in which case, we might ask, why didn’t it prevent the Nixon issue of 1972? Or put differently, if the Fed was independent from 1951, why did Volcker have to “refocus” the central bank on inflation in the Eighties? Far from clearly endorsing independence as essential to effective economic stewardship, history suggests, at best, that CBI is useful for those Fed chairs who want to act against the interests of elected politicians, but by no means acts as a guarantee of low, stable inflation or a healthy economy.</p>
<p>But while there are some parts of the <em>NYT</em> essay that are clearly on point, for example central bank independence does act to undergird foreign investor confidence in the economy, the most important aspect is what is not there: Congress. The power to create money and “regulate the value thereof” is assigned to the legislature in Section 8(5) of the US Constitution. This is still the case, even if Congress has largely failed to use these powers for the past 100 years. The legislature could (in theory) change, guide, or even eliminate the Fed tomorrow with a simple majority vote. Consequently, it’s striking that in discussing theories of central bank independence, Yellen and Bernanke don’t consider the only existing political institution that does <em>in fact</em> hold formal powers over the central bank — the same institution that was intended to control monetary policy.</p>
<p>In short, such a defense of central bank independence simply isn’t compelling. But maybe that’s because that’s not really what it’s about. Maybe the authors are less concerned with defending central bank independence than with defending Powell from Trump. Fine. But if that’s the case, let them say so. At the moment, Trump’s bullying of Powell has caused a mixed and confused reaction amongst the economic commentariat — with some extolling Powell’s spine of steel, others paradoxically calling for him to step down to preserve the Fed’s independence, and still others making stale theoretical defenses of CBI more generally. Instead of engaging in these confused and usually rather tepid arguments about theory, if Yellen and Bernanke and others think Trump should back off and let Powell conduct monetary policy, they should say so and stop hiding behind poor theoretical arguments for insulating the Fed from political influence more generally.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/02/the-flawed-philosophy-of-rachel-reeves/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/02/the-flawed-philosophy-of-rachel-reeves/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/GettyImages-1969119675.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/02/the-flawed-philosophy-of-rachel-reeves/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/02/the-flawed-philosophy-of-rachel-reeves/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The flawed philosophy of Rachel Reeves</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/02/the-flawed-philosophy-of-rachel-reeves/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Leah Downey</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>There are good reasons for the Fed to be independent of the private sector: the most obvious are the classic arguments against state capture. There are good reasons for the Fed to be independent of the President: a constitutional aversion to the creation of a King, for one. There are good reasons for the Fed to be independent of Donald Trump: most specifically, he’s unpredictable. What is important to recognize, however, is that while important and compelling, all these reasons do not add up to good reasons for the Fed to be independent of the democratic legislature.</p>
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					<title>The battle for the Fed</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2025/05/the-battle-for-the-fed/?edition=us</link>
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										<unherd:main_theme>global finance</unherd:main_theme>
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						<![CDATA[Leah Downey]]>
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							<![CDATA['Will this wannabe King prevail in a battle with the global financial system?' Timothy A. Clary / AFP via Getty Images]]>
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							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Leah Downey</strong> is a political theorist at Cambridge, and the author of <a href="https://press.princeton.edu/books/hardcover/9780691244433/our-money?srsltid=AfmBOoo6uqWyoafS_ylXvQoRcKP9JnUwYCvk0TpF6lvaO18GrIF_YSgh"><em>Our Money</em></a>.</p>
]]>
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															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is a political theorist at Cambridge, and the author of <a href="https://press.princeton.edu/books/hardcover/9780691244433/our-money?srsltid=AfmBOoo6uqWyoafS_ylXvQoRcKP9JnUwYCvk0TpF6lvaO18GrIF_YSgh"><em>Our Money</em></a>.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Mon, 12 May 2025 10:34:25 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Mon, 12 May 2025 11:16:49 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[2008 Financial Crisis]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Central Banks]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Donald Trump]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Economics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Finance]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Politics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[the fed]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[US]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://stage.unherd.com/?p=676421</guid>
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								<![CDATA[Ambiguity is baked into the institution]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>First Donald Trump threatened to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/us/trump-threatens-try-fire-fed-chief-powell-2025-04-17/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">fire Jerome Powell</a>. Then he <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/98174536-161e-48ef-ae4a-8c1025878523" target="_blank" rel="noopener">backed down</a>. Now he’s <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/trump-calls-jerome-powell-fool-federal-reserve-interest-rate-decision/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">criticizing him again</a>. The President’s volatile bullying of the Chair of the Federal Reserve is not just political theatre — it may well decide the fate of the Fed and independent agencies more broadly.</p>
<p>Imagine how useful it would be for a President to have the power to open the credit tap and ease economic conditions by lowering interest rates. Now imagine how useful it would be to have these powers if you were a President who had just kicked off a tariff war that was going to be very painful for consumers. Trump wants that power, but Powell doesn’t want to give it to him.</p>
<p>The current bout of financial chaos is particularly interesting (if you’re a social scientist) or disturbing (if you’re almost anyone) because it has been brought about intentionally by an elected official. This puts the Fed in unusual territory. The central bank is meant to be apolitical, not passing judgment on the choices of the elected branches. However, it is also, at least in <a href="https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/federal-reserve-independence-essential-for-financial-stability-by-simon-johnson-and-erkki-liikanen-2025-05" target="_blank" rel="noopener">one prominent view</a><a href="https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/federal-reserve-independence-essential-for-financial-stability-by-simon-johnson-and-erkki-liikanen-2025-05">,</a> meant to secure the stability of the financial system. What, then, is the central bank meant to do when the political branches are intentionally exploding the stability of the financial system?</p>
<p>To answer, we have to go back to the roots of the Fed, for ambiguity has been baked into the institution from the start. Founded in 1913 in response to a series of financial panics and charged with furnishing an “elastic currency” necessary to underpin a stable financial system, the central bank was a compromise on all fronts. It was decentralized with a centralized capstone body; it was privately owned but had public powers. The Federal Reserve System is made up of 12 reserve banks placed around the country with one capstone body located in Washington, D.C. Each reserve bank was, and still is, owned by the private banks in the region and is run by a board made up partly of local bankers and their appointees. The Board of Governors in D.C. is appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/02/the-flawed-philosophy-of-rachel-reeves/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/02/the-flawed-philosophy-of-rachel-reeves/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/GettyImages-1969119675.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/02/the-flawed-philosophy-of-rachel-reeves/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/02/the-flawed-philosophy-of-rachel-reeves/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The flawed philosophy of Rachel Reeves</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/02/the-flawed-philosophy-of-rachel-reeves/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Leah Downey</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Founded in this convoluted way, both endowed with the public power to govern the creation of money and established to underpin the efficiency and effectiveness of the private financial system, the Fed was born with a central tension that it has never resolved: is it an independent arm of the state acting in the public interest or a private organization seeking to advance the interests of the financial system?</p>
<p>In 1927, when the Fed’s charter was extended in perpetuity, one Senator from Iowa protested:</p>
<p style="padding-left: 40px">“I concede to the commercial interest the right to have their own competitive banking system with reserve banks and all under their own control; but I demand on behalf of the farms and the people who labor with hand or brain the same right under the law to organize a cooperative system with cooperative reserve and all under their own control.”</p>
<p>In other words, if the Fed serves Wall Street, what about the interests of farmers or teachers? One clear implication being, the central bank was <em>not</em> designed to act in the public interest broadly construed.</p>
<p>This tension inherent in the Fed’s formation, between its role as a public institution and its aim to support the financial system, later emerged as friction between the Fed’s role in domestic policy and its role in the international financial system. Not long after the Fed opened its doors, the central bank was thrust onto the international financial scene. With the First World War came financial disruption, not least with the effective abandonment of the international gold standard. As a consequence, the President of the New York Fed, Benjamin Strong, and the Governor of the Bank of England, Montagu Norman, struck up a friendship. After the war, the two men worked hard to re-establish the gold standard on the belief that it was required for a healthy capitalist economy. Later, in 1930, they collaborated in founding the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), an international body established to coordinate German reparation payments and to act as the central node in what would become a global system of financial governance. Put simply, Strong was more interested in coordinating Fed policy with Norman than with any US Treasury Secretary.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/03/trumps-crypto-time-bomb/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/03/trumps-crypto-time-bomb/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/GettyImages-22040595091.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/03/trumps-crypto-time-bomb/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/03/trumps-crypto-time-bomb/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Trump’s crypto time bomb</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/03/trumps-crypto-time-bomb/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Yanis Varoufakis</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>The Fed’s ambiguous relationship to its international and domestic policy responsibilities would rear its head as the century progressed. In the Sixties, the Fed actively cultivated the birth of the Eurodollar market — the offshore currency that now acts effectively as an international currency. And only a decade later, it declared its intention, via the BIS, to informally backstop the Eurodollar market, which by then had effectively become too big to fail. Here was the monetary authority for the United States supporting the growth of an offshore market in its own currency. From the perspective of the Fed as a domestic policy institution this is hard to understand — it was promoting and supporting the expansion of an unregulated market in US dollars. From the perspective of the Fed as an international financial actor, however, it made more sense: Eurodollars had become a de facto international currency after the gold standard, and someone needed to backstop the market’s liquidity.</p>
<p>By the time the Great Financial Crisis arrived the Fed was comfortably established as the de facto central bank to the world, not least because of its role in backstopping the Eurodollar market. The Fed’s extension of international swap lines during the crisis and its high-profile bailouts of foreign banks, such as RBS (something that Andrew Jackson had worried about, and which motivated his veto of the second bank of the US), revealed how far the Fed was willing to go in its role of providing international financial support. But its justification was this: given the deep integration of the US financial sector with global finance (cultivated in part by the Fed itself), the Fed must seek the stability of the international financial system (or more precisely, some parts of it, just ask those nations which didn’t receive swap lines in the wake of 2008).</p>
<p>This sort of justification, and consequent action, stems from a particular understanding of the role of the central bank: that it has a public-spirited aim, dedicated to the stability of the domestic, and by proxy global, financial system. According to this view, a powerful international financial system is in the public interest.</p>
<p>This is quite different from the alternative view which sees the central bank as an independent agency of the state — like the EPA, the FTC, or the SEC — with the aim of executing monetary policy in the public interest. In this view, what is in the public interest, who is the public, and who gets to articulate its interests are all relevant questions. In other words, this alternative conception of the Fed puts it firmly in the context of domestic politics, and much less clearly in the position of backstopping international finance.</p>
<p>The tension at the heart of the Federal Reserve, then, is all about the public interest. What is it? Or more precisely, who gets to define it? One view of the Fed takes as given that the stability of the international financial system is in the interest of the American public. The other view sees defining the public interest as a matter of domestic politics.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;The tension at the heart of the Federal Reserve is all about the public interest.&#8221;</div>
<p>With this historical context in hand, we can see today’s battle over the Fed in a new light. Trump’s actions, not least in their undermining of Fed independence, have begun to upset the global financial governance arrangement. For the first time since at least the Sixties we are seeing cracks in the dominant view that the central bank should seek to preserve the effectiveness and efficiency of the domestic financial system and thus underpin the functioning of the international financial system. But if Trump’s actions are pushing the Fed away from the previous consensus, what are they pushing the central bank towards?</p>
<p>There are reasonable arguments for changing the contemporary structures of the Federal Reserve, and in particular its relationship to the international financial system. An international financial system based on the creation of unregulated domestic currency doesn’t seem sensible, and there <a href="https://www.elibrary.imf.org/display/book/9781451972511/ch001.xml#:~:text=The%20proposal%20is%20to%20establish,and%20all%20members%20of%20the" target="_blank" rel="noopener">have been</a> many <a href="https://static.bullionstar.com/blogs/uploads/2022/03/Bretton-Woods-III-Zoltan-Pozsar.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">proposals</a> over the years to change it. Furthermore, the shifting of financial global powers has <a href="https://www.jpmorgan.com/insights/global-research/currencies/de-dollarization" target="_blank" rel="noopener">led some to believe</a> it may change anyway, even if not by design. But what about <a href="https://press.princeton.edu/books/hardcover/9780691244433/our-money?srsltid=AfmBOopedhHnSbx9sX1v4FKyAtKS44swUb6RJtrvLOTPIitxxEYH51Pb" target="_blank" rel="noopener">making the Fed</a> into an agency concerned with the pursuit of monetary policy in the public interest as articulated by domestic politics? Arguments in favor tend to emphasize that any such monetary policy will have to be rooted in the policies of the nation state. But they clearly point toward more congressional, not presidential, control of the central bank. If the President’s actions elsewhere (crypto in particular) are any guide, Trump will seek to use the state’s capacity to create money and regulate the private creation thereof to fill his own coffers at the expense of everyone else. This was precisely the worry of the American founders, who explicitly put the power to regulate the value of money in the hands of Congress, not the President, as they worried that in such a case, he might fancy himself a king.</p>
<p>And Trump undoubtedly does. The question is, will this wannabe King prevail in a battle with the global financial system? The stakes are unquestionably high. But what lurks behind this battle is that longstanding, deeper question: who should define the public interest? The current debate pits Trump, the wannabe King, against Powell, the sensible preserver of international financial stability. There is no voice here for domestic, democratic politics in articulating the public interest, and that may be the most worrying thing of all.</p>
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					<title>Team Starmer’s flawed monetary philosophy</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2025/02/the-flawed-philosophy-of-rachel-reeves/?edition=us</link>
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										<unherd:main_theme>economics</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Leah Downey]]>
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																<unherd:article_ranking>2</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA['Growth is about the future. Reeves is focused on the past.' Dan Kitwood / Getty]]>
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							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Leah Downey</strong> is a political theorist at Cambridge, and the author of <a href="https://press.princeton.edu/books/hardcover/9780691244433/our-money?srsltid=AfmBOoo6uqWyoafS_ylXvQoRcKP9JnUwYCvk0TpF6lvaO18GrIF_YSgh"><em>Our Money</em></a>.</p>
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						<![CDATA[ is a political theorist at Cambridge, and the author of <a href="https://press.princeton.edu/books/hardcover/9780691244433/our-money?srsltid=AfmBOoo6uqWyoafS_ylXvQoRcKP9JnUwYCvk0TpF6lvaO18GrIF_YSgh"><em>Our Money</em></a>.]]>
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										<pubDate>Mon, 03 Feb 2025 00:02:59 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Mon, 03 Feb 2025 14:16:35 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Economics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[John Locke]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Labour]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Politics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[rachel reeves]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Treasury]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[UK]]></category>
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								<![CDATA[Central banks are not democratic]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>In 2018, in a pamphlet titled “The Everyday Economy”, a backbench Labour MP called Rachel Reeves attempted to untangle Britain’s convoluted financial system. To do so, she started by drawing upon the history of political philosophy — and the work of one philosopher in particular: David Hume, whom she grandly called “perhaps the most significant figure in the British Enlightenment”.</p>
<p>She didn’t mention another of the UK’s most celebrated political theorists, John Locke. Perhaps she should have read more widely. Indeed, some seven years on, as the now-Chancellor finds herself scrambling to reboot her plan for Britain, it’s Locke’s work on the economy that should be front of mind.</p>
<p>Much more than an academic, Locke was active in the rough and tumble of British politics. It was in the course of his political jostling during the coinage crisis of the late 17th century that he made his most influential arguments on the political nature of money. He recognized that the value of a state’s currency is ultimately set by fiat, and thus within the political power of the sovereign. The sovereign, after all, could alter the worth of the nation’s currency at the drop of a hat — a particularly devastating scenario given the fragility of the money system, which relies on the confidence of the populace. Should the sovereign decide to start altering the value of the currency indiscriminately, that confidence would erode. The whole monetary system, in other words, would fall apart.</p>
<p>To prevent this, Locke suggested that the sovereign refrain from using their political power over money. Instead, to ensure stability, he proposed that the sovereign maintain a fixed value of the currency — not because of any inherent worth of the coinage, as measured by precious metals, but because Locke thought that maintaining a consistent valuation would suggest as much. His plan, as Stefan Eich has observed, “was a political strategy to depoliticize money’s appearance”, making it seem as if the sovereign lacked the power to alter the value of money at any moment and for any reason.</p>
<p>In recent decades most contemporary states have followed Locke’s example, if not fixing the value of their currency in gold, then depoliticizing it by putting it under the purview of an independent central bank. Then came Liz Truss, who in her campaign for the leadership of the Conservative Party began to question the independence of the Bank of England, and in the wake of her failed premiership blamed her fortunes on the Bank. The supposed neutrality of Britain’s monetary policy suddenly risked being exposed.</p>
<p>Labour subsequently attempted to put as much space between them and Truss’s questioning of economic policymaking practices as possible. Under the watchful eye of Reeves, the Government ran back into the arms of the BoE and the OBR, reinforcing its commitment to “sensible” economic policy, by which it meant depoliticized policy conducted by “sensible” experts. The storm, apparently, had passed.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;Under the watchful eye of Reeves, the Government ran back into the arms of the BoE and the OBR.&#8221;</div>
<p>But is the stasis we’re in any better? As the past fortnight’s U-turns have demonstrated, the Labour government finds itself hamstrung, unable to engage in transformative politics and susceptible to political challenge from the Right. We could be forgiven for asking: will that ever change? Or perhaps more importantly, would the storm really be worse?</p>
<p>Let’s start at the beginning. The conventional economic theory of money is rooted in a potted history of its use. That history goes roughly like this: before money, people bartered. They traded goods and services for each other. Bartering, however, proved inefficient, as each trade required a “double coincidence of wants” — I have to want exactly what you have, and you have to want exactly what I have. Money solves this problem. If everyone wants money, as a medium of exchange, there is no need to satisfy the “double coincidence”, as money ensures it is always satisfied.</p>
<p>There are (at least) two problems with this story. First, it is historically inaccurate. As far as economic historians and sociologists are concerned, there never was an exclusively barter economy. Money in the form of credit (and debt) has always existed. It was never the case that, as a table-maker, I would need to barter with each individual to get all the resources necessary to build tables; rather, it was more likely that the blacksmith had a ledger in which he recorded my debts each time I needed nails. Then someday, I might repay those with a table. Those ledgers, or more precisely the credit they recorded, was a form of money, a solution to the (never actually experienced) problem of the “double coincidence of wants”.</p>
<p>The second problem with the bartering story is the implication that money has no effect on production. Put simply, money makes trade easier. It does not change what resources exist, nor what technologies are available, nor how much labor is free. From this perspective, money has no influence on what could be produced in the economy. It simply makes trade, and therefore production, more efficient. And there’s nothing political about that. In economics this is known as monetary neutrality. Because money doesn’t go into building things or delivering services — there are no dollar coins in your coffee or notes used in the construction of your home — it is merely a veil on the economy; without it the same things could be produced and created, albeit less efficiently.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/01/rachel-reeves-is-a-pound-shop-george-osborne/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/01/rachel-reeves-is-a-pound-shop-george-osborne/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/GettyImages-2161916383-e1736957267664.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/01/rachel-reeves-is-a-pound-shop-george-osborne/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/01/rachel-reeves-is-a-pound-shop-george-osborne/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Rachel Reeves, the pound shop George Osborne</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/01/rachel-reeves-is-a-pound-shop-george-osborne/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Yanis Varoufakis</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>The idea that money is nothing more than a veil on the real economy goes back at least to Hume’s essay on the balance of trade, in which he argued against mercantilist trade policies. (This essay did not feature in Reeves’s pamphlet.) Free-trade policies, he suggested, are the most desirable, because what matters to a nation’s economy is not its stock of money but rather its stock of goods and services — or perhaps more accurately, its capacity to produce real goods and services. Consequently, it does not make sense to stockpile gold and other forms of money as the mercantilists advocate. Instead, Hume argued, nations should “preserve money nearly proportionable to the art and industry of each nation”. Like Milton Friedman after him, Hume suggested that the role of good monetary policy was to ensure the supply of money matches the real economy.</p>
<p>But what this fails to take account of is the temporal dimension of production. It may be true that, without money, all the same production could take place, in the sense that the economic fundamentals are unchanged. But without money, the same amount of production would not in fact take place. From a realistic point of view, the efficiency and convenience that money introduces into the economic system inevitably affects what can be produced, where, and how much, in a given period of time.</p>
<p>Nevertheless, the theory of monetary neutrality is widely accepted, as is its corollary: if money is neutral, then so is monetary policy. The claim is deceptively simple. On this view, monetary policy governs how much money is in the economy, or the price of money, by managing short-term interest rates. It does not, however, influence the relative prices of goods. Consider the following illustration. Suppose a loaf of bread costs $1 and a gallon of milk costs $5. Now, suppose there is a massive injection of new money into the economy and a loaf of bread now costs $10 and a gallon of milk $50. The relative prices remain the same, so the price increase should have no influence on production. Thus, claim monetary neutrality advocates, monetary policy has no influence on the real economy.</p>
<p>Monetary policymakers, in this view, are like the ball boys and girls at a tennis match. They determine when to throw the balls onto the court or when to inject new money into the economy. If they do their job well, they enable the tennis players to play to the best of their ability, not breaking their flow, and allowing them to produce their best possible game. However, they could make mistakes, releasing lots of balls onto the court, causing the players to trip or get confused, or failing to give the players balls when necessary, causing the game to stop and the players to be unable to play. Getting monetary policy right, just like being a good ball boy, means preventing money from being a source of disturbance. A good ball girl cannot make the players better than they are. Similarly, conventional monetary theory suggests good monetary policy cannot improve real productive possibility. More money does not mean more production, just as more balls do not mean better tennis.</p>
<p>However, it can’t be that monetary policy is completely neutral. After all, if monetary policy has no effect on actual economic production, if it were impotent in relation to the real economy, why would we care about monetary policymaking at all? It simply wouldn’t matter. It would be like gravity policy. The reason monetary policy is not like this is that the neutrality claimed for monetary policy has one crucial qualifier: it is thought to be neutral only in the long run.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/10/keir-starmer-is-haunted-by-england/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/10/keir-starmer-is-haunted-by-england/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/Screenshot-2024-10-22-at-11.34.29.png?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/10/keir-starmer-is-haunted-by-england/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/10/keir-starmer-is-haunted-by-england/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Keir Starmer is haunted by England</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/10/keir-starmer-is-haunted-by-england/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Alexander Poots</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Hume recognized this in his essay. He argued that while money would not matter in the long run, in the short run an increase in money could cause a burst in economic activity. Back to the bread and milk. If the central bank were to inject money into the economy, all prices would not automatically adjust in tandem. Rather, it may be the case that the price of a loaf of bread would increase from $1 to $10 before milk went from $5 to $50, supposing it ever does. As such, in the interim, the change in relative prices (bread at $10, milk still at $5), could have a significant impact on the production and consumption of milk and bread. By claiming that monetary policy is neutral in the long run, but not the short run, the conventional view holds that by the time the economy reaches equilibrium, any effects downstream of monetary policy will be neutralized.</p>
<p>Which is all very well — except for the fact that money is not neutral, as we all know. Who has access to money — credit in particular — determines who gets to go to law school, buy a house, expand their business and so on. Conventional economic theorists would respond, well, yes of course this is true in the short run, but in the (theoretical) long run money makes no difference in the aggregate. But this is ridiculous. The person in real life with access to a loan to go to law school then becomes more likely to get a good mortgage because of their law degree. Their house then grows in value, which gives them more access to credit and income which they can invest, which allows them to make more money, and so on. This impacts not just the distribution of income in society but its aggregate productive capacity as well. The effects of short-run access to credit aren’t neutralized in the long run in which we actually live. Far from it.</p>
<p>And yet, despite this, the mainstream Left in both the UK and the US remains grounded in the monetary policy neutrality doctrine. Which brings us back to Reeves. She wants growth for Britain. Her supporters describe her as laser focused on it, her detractors as desperate for it. In any case, she has offered nothing transformational to secure it. Her theory of growth seems to be preventing the Tories from cutting taxes, discussing long-term planning reform (which could actually make a difference, but not anytime soon), and maybe someday building another runway at Heathrow to <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cvg4d97wxgdo" target="_blank" rel="noopener">“make Britain the world’s best connected place to do business”</a>. Oh, and not to do anything to piss off the City. Her theory of growth, in other words, is: let’s go back to the Nineties.</p>
<p>It is not the Nineties. The growth of the Nineties wasn’t built on production, but rather on selling off what Britain had, and now it’s gone. That won’t work again. Growth, like politics, is about the future. Reeves is focused on the past. The Nineties were the age in which Britain embraced monetary neutrality, exemplified by the 1997 decision to make the Bank of England independent. Reeves would do well not to make Locke’s mistake, again. Today, states all over the world have followed Locke in depoliticizing money on the basis that, over the long run, monetary policy will have no effect on the real economy. And as many are now discovering, there are two issues with this. First, as we’ve seen, it’s not true. And second, to act as if it is neuters our political capacity.</p>
<p>There is almost nothing more fundamental to a state than its power to create money. We cannot just create money out of nowhere whenever we want for whatever reason and assume there will be no negative consequences. We can, however, just create money, and we have done that a lot in recent decades, to support war, to bail out ailing financial institutions, and to survive pandemics. Even in the face of this, we — and particularly the current British government — seem to have failed to grasp the obvious implication: creating money is a political choice and thus, in a democratic society, when and how the state creates money, and on what basis, should be a democratic decision.</p>
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