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		<title>Mark Lilla, a writer for UnHerd</title>
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					<title>America&#8217;s new caste system</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2024/11/americas-new-caste-system/?edition=us</link>
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										<unherd:main_theme>Weekend Essay</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Mark Lilla]]>
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							<![CDATA[Is college football the last great unifier? (Getty Images North America)]]>
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							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Mark Lilla</strong> is the author of <a href="https://marklilla.com/the-shipwrecked-mind/"><em>The Shipwrecked Mind: On Political Reaction</em></a> and <a href="https://marklilla.com/the-reckless-mind-intellectuals-in-politics/"><em>The Reckless Mind: Intellectuals in Politics</em></a>.</p>
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															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is the author of <a href="https://marklilla.com/the-shipwrecked-mind/"><em>The Shipwrecked Mind: On Political Reaction</em></a> and <a href="https://marklilla.com/the-reckless-mind-intellectuals-in-politics/"><em>The Reckless Mind: Intellectuals in Politics</em></a>.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Sat, 16 Nov 2024 00:16:43 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Fri, 22 Nov 2024 17:57:47 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[De Tocqueville]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Democracy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Liberalism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Politics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Solidarity]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[US]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://stage.unherd.com/?p=637776</guid>
																												<description>
								<![CDATA[The education gap has dented democracy ]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>I’ve been teaching Tocqueville’s <em>Democracy in America </em>for a very long time. But only recently have I come to appreciate some of his deepest assumptions and their implications about the whole democratic experiment. In particular I’ve been thinking about the opening two paragraphs of the book.</p>
<p>I had always rushed past them, since they seemed anodyne. But Tocqueville mastered the art of making the boldest of claims in an off-handed way. These paragraphs are far more radical than they first appear. They’ve encouraged me to argue that the first and most necessary condition of democracy is the feeling of inclusion.</p>
<p style="padding-left: 40px;">“Of all the novel things which attracted my attention during my stay in the United States, none struck me more forcibly than the equality of conditions. I had no difficulty in discovering the extraordinary influence this fundamental fact exerts upon the progress of society; it sets up a particular direction to public attitudes, a certain style to the laws, fresh guidelines to governing authorities, and distinctive habits to those governed.</p>
<p style="padding-left: 40px;">&#8220;Soon I came to recognise that this very fact extends its influence well beyond political customs and laws; it exercises no less power over civil society than it does over the government. It forms opinion, creates feelings, proposes ways of acting, and transforms anything it does not directly instigate itself.”</p>
<p>To fully understand what Tocqueville means by “equality of conditions”, we need to appreciate how different the new democratic societies were. Tocqueville describes the old aristocratic societies as archipelagos of mini-societies inhabited by different classes of people with very different material conditions, and therefore different sets of emotions. But on each island there was a sense of inclusion and mutual recognition of others who faced those conditions.</p>
<p>The situation in the United States was destined to be something else. There were no pre-existing islands of privilege, thinking, and feeling. Instead the earliest Americans faced the same set of opportunities and challenges posed by their new environment — sparsely populated and vast, the land was also wild and untamed. Securing basic necessities was difficult for everyone, not just one class. And as settlement moved West, they had to learn the art of self-government for themselves. They were, in an almost unimaginable way today, starting over.</p>
<p>That task was made much easier, Tocqueville thought, by another kind of equal condition: ethnic and religious homogeneity. The first settlers shared an Anglo-Protestant cultural heritage, prizing religious liberty and a shared stock of concepts for engaging in politics. Paradoxically, it would turn out that a certain kind of homogeneity in early America helped give birth to principles that would one day be employed to defend diversity.</p>
<p>From these observations, Tocqueville drew two very important conclusions. First, since different human feelings are generated by different material conditions, those feelings should be considered brute facts as solid as the conditions themselves. The set of dominant emotions arising from the equality of conditions in democracies are crucial givens, so long as those conditions hold. Second, since the equality of conditions towards which modern societies are tending is historically novel, so too we should expect to see novel democratic feelings.</p>
<p>So what are the implications of these conclusions? If American democracy rests on a bedrock of brute factual similarity — similar challenges in life, aspirations and habits — then the emotional weather of the regime will depend on the degree to which that similarity holds. If it changes, if citizens feel they belong to separate realities, if a part of the population feels excluded, we should not be surprised if it sets off an emotional storm.</p>
<p>American democracy, then, does not rest ultimately on the principles of liberty and equality, as so many patriotic interpreters have assumed. Nor does it rest ultimately on religious beliefs, as his pious interpreters believe. It rests instead on a lucky break. The roughly similar material conditions that the first, roughly similar settlers faced when they landed naturally gave rise to feelings of inclusion and recognition, which spread throughout the entire society, not just on small islands of an archipelago.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2020/11/when-will-my-fellow-liberals-learn/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2020/11/when-will-my-fellow-liberals-learn/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/GettyImages-1229520354.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2020/11/when-will-my-fellow-liberals-learn/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2020/11/when-will-my-fellow-liberals-learn/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>When will my fellow liberals learn?</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2020/11/when-will-my-fellow-liberals-learn/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Mark Lilla</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Tocqueville’s observations about inclusion were not wholly original — thinking about the political significance of inclusion and mutual recognition in the Western tradition began with Aristotle, was elaborated in the Christian Middle Ages, and continues to play a role in Catholic theology today. But his application of them to modern democracy was.</p>
<p>In Tocqueville’s view, to sustain a democratic society, feelings must be engaged and then widely shared: what “keeps a majority of citizens under the same government” is the “instinctive and, in a sense, unconscious agreement resulting from like feelings and similar opinions”. What he has in mind here has nothing to do with an aspiration to Christian virtue, or the moral principle of equality, or appeals to a contrived notion of reflective civic patriotism. He is referring to a factual reality, a brute fact of congruence in the feelings of citizens and their general outlook on the world. Either it is there or it is not.</p>
<p>There still are contexts in which a basic congruence of feelings and outlook among Americans becomes apparent. Imagine you have been spending a few years in a foreign country, whose language you have learned and whose customs you have got used to. One day you find yourself in a restaurant seated next to a group of loud and garrulous American tourists. Suddenly you feel yourself beamed into a psychological and moral universe you only dimly remember. In it, everyone is open, even confessional, in their speech. Self-doubt and irony have fled the room, driven out by an almost oppressive bonhomie. The poor waiter has been asked for his first name and is informed that these new friends from downstate Illinois will be staying in touch.</p>
<p>How do you, the American observer, feel once they have left? The sound of familiar voices might come as a welcome respite from the rudeness of the French or the humourlessness of the Germans. You might feel the urge to pull up a chair and join them, knowing that you would be welcomed into the conversation. If you’ve had too much to drink you might even share your email address with them at the end of the evening.</p>
<p>But what if you have been straining to fit into this foreign culture and not appear American? What are you feeling as you stick your head more deeply into your copy of <em>Le Monde </em>and pray that the tourists leave soon? You are experiencing exactly the same set of feelings as the other American observer, just with a negative valence. You both recognise yourselves in your fellow citizens and feel implicated in their behaviour. Some inner string vibrates at the same frequency as those of these intruders, whether you wish it or not.</p>
<p>But, notwithstanding that example, we cannot deny that the feelings of democratic belonging have diminished rapidly in our contemporary democracies. A complex cultural gap has opened up in our democracies that we find much more difficult to bridge.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;A complex cultural gap has opened up in our democracies that we find much more difficult to bridge.&#8221;</div>
<p>Tocqueville’s subtle observation about the difference between Southerners and Northerners that he discovered on his travels might help us understand:</p>
<p style="padding-left: 40px;">“If two men belonging to the same society have the same interests and to some extent the same opinions, but their characters, education, and style of living are different, it is highly likely that they will not see eye to eye.”</p>
<p>Even if he found himself speaking to people of the same class, with the same economic interests, their characters, education, and styles of living were so different — mainly due to slavery — that mutual recognition and political friendship between them was difficult, and soon would become impossible.</p>
<p>Today the cultural gap in America is not a function of geography but of education. A certain level of education — basically a bachelor’s degree — is now required to advance significantly in society. We may forget in our little university and urban cocoons but only a little more than a third of adult Americans have such a degree. When I looked up the percent of Manhattanites with a university degree, which I assumed to be a little less than 50%, I discovered that it has risen to nearly 70%. It is only 23% in the Bronx. I had no idea.</p>
<p>And the consequences of this gap are not just economic. University does not only provide training for entering lucrative professions, it also socialises students into new styles of living, as Tocqueville called it, that are vastly different from those of the less educated. Graduates come out of the university with different ideas about how to comport themselves in public and at work, what to eat, how to entertain themselves, how many children to have and how to raise them, how to manage money, and how to take care of their health. Even the typical bodies of our cultural classes are notably different today.</p>
<p>The term caste is thrown around fairly promiscuously, but frankly I can’t think of a better one to describe the seriousness of the new cultural gap. If Tocqueville was right that extremely different styles of living can set apart even people who have shared economic and political interests, then we are in trouble.</p>
<p>A widely shared sense of exclusion, with all the attendant emotions of shame and resentment, is toxic to democracies. We are living with a new brute, generating fact that is triggering new feelings of distrust, contempt, resentment, antipathy, and withdrawal. A large class of white Americans is experiencing for the first time a range of emotions that American minorities, especially black Americans, have always had to contend with on a far vaster scale.</p>
<p>That is why I have come to take very seriously the expressed need to feel included, “to see people who look and talk like me”, beginning in our educational establishments. In a book I wrote a few years ago I treated such expressions as divisive, on the grounds that emphasising group identities can block people from recognising the wider common good. While that can be true, it is more true of diversity. There is, I think, a tension between the ideals of diversity and inclusion, since the former is centrifugal in effect and the latter is centripetal.</p>
<p>But the feelings of exclusion in Americans today extend beyond minority groups. The white working class feels it, the religious population feels it, the South feels it. Our common sense of mutual recognition is melting away and we have no idea really how to stop it. The crisis of inclusion extends far beyond our elite spats over college admission and corporate hiring.</p>
<p>Is there an institution that still helps Americans from different walks of life feel included? The only example I can come up with is college sports — and for a somewhat personal reason.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/08/how-to-build-a-far-right-troll/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/08/how-to-build-a-far-right-troll/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/gettyimages-2164758325-612x612-1.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/08/how-to-build-a-far-right-troll/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/08/how-to-build-a-far-right-troll/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>How to build a far-Right revolutionary</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/08/how-to-build-a-far-right-troll/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Mark Lilla</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>My late father never attended college. But he was a sports fan and had developed a vicarious attachment to the University of Michigan. The day I was admitted to the university was the second happiest day of his life, the happiest being the day he saw the team win the Rose Bowl. After he was widowed, he came to visit me every weekend and we would go to games together — football, basketball, anything. He started buying up paraphernalia and soon everything in his house was covered in maize and blue.</p>
<p>But the significance of the experience for him was not simply in watching university sports. It was that when we crossed campus together, he felt at home. He knew the streets and he knew the buildings. He felt somehow welcomed — even without a degree. And it certainly made him more willing to pay taxes for the university.</p>
<p>This story is not to say life is like football — quite the contrary. I am simply saddened and a little shocked to discover that I couldn’t think of a single other institution in American life that makes people from different education classes all feel included.</p>
<p>And even then, I’m not sure it’s still working. When I attended an Ohio State game last year, I marvelled once again at the class diversity of the crowd and the palpable sense of friendship among those who attended. But as I walked past the cars in the parking lot when the game was over, I saw nothing but bumper stickers expressing hate or contempt for fellow citizens who didn’t share the owner’s political outlook. What happens in the stadium, stays in the stadium apparently.</p>
<p>So, yes, we are in a very bad way.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">***</p>
<p><em>This article is based on a lecture delivered at the conference “Beyond the Impasse: Theological Perspectives on DEI&#8221; at the Aquinas Institute in Princeton.</em></p>
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					<title>How to build a far-Right revolutionary</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2024/08/how-to-build-a-far-right-troll/?edition=us</link>
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										<unherd:main_theme>Revolution</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Mark Lilla]]>
					</dc:creator>
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																<unherd:article_ranking>2</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[An anti-immigration protester outside of the Holiday Inn housing migrants in Rotherham (Photo by Christopher Furlong/Getty Images)]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Mark Lilla</strong> is the author of <a href="https://marklilla.com/the-shipwrecked-mind/"><em>The Shipwrecked Mind: On Political Reaction</em></a> and <a href="https://marklilla.com/the-reckless-mind-intellectuals-in-politics/"><em>The Reckless Mind: Intellectuals in Politics</em></a>.</p>
]]>
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															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is the author of <a href="https://marklilla.com/the-shipwrecked-mind/"><em>The Shipwrecked Mind: On Political Reaction</em></a> and <a href="https://marklilla.com/the-reckless-mind-intellectuals-in-politics/"><em>The Reckless Mind: Intellectuals in Politics</em></a>.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Mon, 05 Aug 2024 23:01:30 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Tue, 25 Nov 2025 15:19:26 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Europe]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Fascism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[France]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Gilles]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Pierre Drieu La Rochelle]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Radical Right]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Society]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Summer Reads 2024]]></category>
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								<![CDATA[How would a fascist explain the radical Right?]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p style="font-weight: 400;">Those who make it their business to study the radical Right today know that its young enthusiasts are obsessed as much by questions of “manliness” as of politics. As <em>New York Times</em> columnist David French put it in an insightful <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/08/13/opinion/masculinity-right-young-men.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">article</a> last year: “Hatred, combined with masculine insecurity and cowardice, is herding young Right-wing men into outright bigotry and prejudice. Contrary to their self-conception, they’re not strong or tough or courageous. They’re timid sheep in wolves’ clothing, moving exactly where the loudest and most aggressive voices tell them to.”</p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;">More recently, <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/world-news/2024-06-27/ty-article/romes-jews-outraged-after-videos-show-antisemitism-in-italian-pms-youth-movement/00000190-5a8d-dc65-abff-7aaf324f0000?utm_source=App_Share&amp;utm_medium=iOS_Native" target="_blank" rel="noopener">a group of Italian journalists infiltrated</a> the ranks of the youth movement in prime minister Giorgia Meloni’s Brothers of Italy party and <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nRwZ70JGRio" target="_blank" rel="noopener">broadcast videos</a> of their secret meetings. While there are plenty of young women in the movement, the nocturnal gatherings captured here are sweaty <em>Männerbund</em> rituals of male bonding — complete with Hollywood’s fanciful “Roman” forearm handshake — that whip the participants into an aggressive frenzy.</p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;">What we are witnessing in these young reactionaries cannot be chalked up to “toxic masculinity” alone, which is always with us. It is also bound up with an apocalyptic view of history that periodically sets off moral panics in societies at moments of perceived crisis. Today’s political apocalypticism takes the form of an unshakeable conviction that we live in an age of modern cultural decadence and that the destiny of the nation — perhaps of the world itself — will be decided by those brave enough to seize this decisive moment.</p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;">The assumed culprits are many and somewhat incompatible: unorthodox medieval Catholic theologians, Protestant reformers who undermined Vatican authority, the atheistic French Enlightenment, English liberal individualism, Marxian socialism, progressivism, feminism — all culminating in the cultural catastrophe of the Sixties. The aftershocks we feel today — wokeism, transgenderism, identity politics — are the inevitable result of a wrong historical turn taken long, long ago. And so history itself must be made to change direction, <em>now</em>. This prophetic vision is very attractive, and very toxic, to young men eager to display a misplaced courage. They are obsessed with <em>coming to the rescue</em>, like real men<em>. </em></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;">But how does one actually become a reactionary, psychologically speaking? What are the inner steps by which one moves from curiosity to despair, despair to anger, anger to commitment, and commitment to action? What exactly is happening to the young minds drawn to the radical Right today?</p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;">Over the past two centuries some of the great Western novelists have explored the revolutionary mind: Dostoevsky, Turgenev, Conrad, Koestler… the list is long. But non-cartoonish portraits of the reactionary mind are vanishingly few. One of the least known is the French novel <em>Gilles</em> (1939), by the infamous fascist intellectual Pierre Drieu la Rochelle. It plunges more deeply into the psychology of Right-wing radicalisation than any novel of the period I know. Unfortunately, it remains untranslated, for obvious if mistaken reasons.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;Non-cartoonish portraits of the reactionary mind are vanishingly few.&#8221;</div>
<p style="font-weight: 400;">Drieu, as he was known, belonged to that class of young European men who returned from the First World War wounded in every sense, yet somehow also invigorated by the ecstatic experience of having faced death and survived. An Eastern European friend once told me that people get drunk because they are hoping to retrieve the beautiful rush of that first sip of vodka. Something similar was at work in the European post-war generation.</p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;">In the decades immediately after the war, contempt for the worlds of business and parliamentary politics was intense among those addicted to raptures. And this contempt extended to the Jews, who had been successful in both. At the popular level, Jews were seen as aggressive, domineering agents cleverly manipulating the world to their benefit, and stabbing in the back those rooted in the nation and its history. Among reactionary intellectuals the charges were, in some respects, the reverse. The Jews were portrayed as cowardly, physically weak, and effeminate chameleons without roots in any soil. As one character in <em>Gilles</em> puts it: “I cannot stand the Jews because they are, par excellence, the modern world which I loathe.” In contemporary terms, they are the quintessential “nowheres” and a threat to all “somewheres”.</p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;">Drieu’s <em>Gilles</em> is the Bildungsroman of a fascist, written by a fascist. It is also, unsurprisingly, highly autobiographical. Drieu served in the First World War, was wounded three times, and returned to his native Paris disgusted with the bourgeois decadence and political chaos of post-war Europe. Searching for a rush he drifted into the Dada and Surrealist artistic movements, frequented communists and royalists, and joined a radical Left-wing party before shifting decisively in the opposite direction after a far-Right anti-parliament riot was violently put down in Paris in 1934.</p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;">A year later, he joined a writers’ junket to Nazi Germany, attending the Nuremberg rally, and for a short while afterwards edited a journal he appropriately titled <em>The End Times</em>. When the Germans occupied Paris he plunged into the collaborationist world without hesitation, editing the once prestigious <em>New French Review</em> and writing occasional articles in the antisemitic press. He lost faith in Nazism by 1943, but saw the Occupation through. After the Liberation, when he came across a warrant for his arrest in a newspaper, he went home, swallowed some pills, put his head in an oven, and killed himself.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/06/bidens-secret-support-for-iran/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/06/bidens-secret-support-for-iran/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/GettyImages-486322098-e1717429351221.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/06/bidens-secret-support-for-iran/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/06/bidens-secret-support-for-iran/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Biden&#039;s secret support for Iran</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/06/bidens-secret-support-for-iran/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Mark Lilla </a></p></div></a></div>
<p style="font-weight: 400;">It was a tragic life, and <em>Gilles </em>is a tragic novel. Its main character, Gilles Gambier, is no highly polished hero. He, too, is a victim of the modern decadence he wants to combat. As the novel begins, we learn that he was an orphan, and so as rootless, traditionless, and solitary as everyone else in modern society. His loathing of the modern world is wrapped up with loathing of himself as its offspring, and this fuels his rage to force a radical break in himself and in history. Near the end of the war, he returns badly wounded to Paris, where high society is dominated by women and Jews and homosexuals, and the political world by spineless men too impotent to take decisive action and demagogues who exploit their weakness. The so-called radical intellectuals he meets who would bring the entire system down are even worse — solipsistic, confused dandies who talk but never act. In one of the novel’s brilliant subplots, a Left-wing conspiracy to assassinate the Prime Minister is hatched only to fall apart ineptly, and the politician’s son, who participated in the plan, kills himself.</p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;">In such a world of weak and cowardly men, Gilles’s looks and reserve make him attractive to many women, all but one of whom he treats heartlessly. He mocks their frivolity, their taste for bourgeois luxury, their pacifism. He even briefly marries a Jewish woman (as Drieu himself surprisingly did), only to cynically seize most of her money when they divorce. He then returns briefly to the war, risking his life rather than sharing it with a sensitive modern woman. Gilles’s misogyny and antisemitism are of a piece.</p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;">For a time, Gilles is attracted to the radical revolutionary ideas of Marxism, its will to destroy and build an entirely new order. But eventually he realises that the authority, discipline, and will to power he admired in communism is also present in fascism, without all the foolishness about human equality dreamed up by the Jews. Fascism is anti-capitalist, anti-democratic, anti-egalitarian, anti-bourgeois, antisemitic, anti-women — in short, anti everything the modern age has imposed on the human race. This epiphany arrives at the end of the book’s last chapter and we are briefly led to wonder how he will find the opportunity to fight for his new fascist ideal.</p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;">In the Epilogue we get our answer. It is now the Spanish Civil War and Gilles joins up with a group of Catholic men who try to make sense of their rival commitments to the Church, the nation and the fascist cause. All they can agree on is that they “are for the virile Catholicism of the Middle Ages” and that in fascism they see the possibility of reconciling “the most ancient with the most new”. Gilles agrees and says he sees himself as belonging to a new military and religious order devoted to saving Europe. And that requires the spilling of blood, much blood. In the novel’s final pages, we find him shooting out of the embrasures of an old fort in a surely futile attempt to beat back a powerful Republican advance. He is about to die, but what’s on his mind is not Franco or fascism. Or liberalism, or communism, or even the Jews. It is the god Dionysius and Christ, the gods who die and are reborn in blood. His final thoughts are about “the Christ of the cathedrals, the great white and virile God. A king, a prince.”</p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;">The alert reader puts down Drieu’s novel convinced of one thing above all: that Gilles has no idea what he is actually fighting for, only one of what he hates. The tragedy is not that he chose to become an immoral fascist, but that young men in his position really had no choice. Modernity made them do it, Drieu would have us believe. In the end, the novel unwittingly reveals fascism to be one more cultural disease, of which it pretends to be the cure. It is pure Id, a scream reified into symbols and fanciful apocalyptic myths. What <em>Gilles</em> helps us to understand is how someone could find himself in this position — the role of inner passions and resistances and self-deceptions and lies, the small psychological steps that lead an ordinary young man to become a hate-filled spiller of blood.</p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;">Anyone who has spent time following far-Right young trolls on social media today will recognise the profile. Their confidence in their manhood is weak and so they lash out at women, dreamy indecisive liberals, and the physically vulnerable in pathetic displays of adolescent bravado, all from the safety of their mothers’ basements. They buy the supplements influencers tell them to, they follow goofballs who convince them to eat raw liver, they read long screeds by the Bronze Age Pervert which convince them they are the remnants of a dying breed. They are not the acned faces they see in the mirror, they are nigh unto gods. And they bring salvation at the end of times.</p>
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					<title>Should America be more like Ukraine?</title>
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						<![CDATA[Mark Lilla]]>
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							<![CDATA[A world of moral entropy (Evgen Kotenko/ Ukrinform/Future Publishing via Getty Images)]]>
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							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Mark Lilla</strong> is the author of <a href="https://marklilla.com/the-shipwrecked-mind/"><em>The Shipwrecked Mind: On Political Reaction</em></a> and <a href="https://marklilla.com/the-reckless-mind-intellectuals-in-politics/"><em>The Reckless Mind: Intellectuals in Politics</em></a>.</p>
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						<![CDATA[ is the author of <a href="https://marklilla.com/the-shipwrecked-mind/"><em>The Shipwrecked Mind: On Political Reaction</em></a> and <a href="https://marklilla.com/the-reckless-mind-intellectuals-in-politics/"><em>The Reckless Mind: Intellectuals in Politics</em></a>.]]>
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										<pubDate>Sat, 12 Nov 2022 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Sat, 12 Nov 2022 00:00:00 +0000</updated>
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								<![CDATA[Western society is being liquified ]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>For those of us in the West, the Ukrainian response to the Soviet invasion has been somewhat embarrassing. We are used to living in peace and prosperity and are not in the habit of fighting for our way of life or making sacrifices for the common good. I don’t think I’m alone in asking myself whether, under similar circumstances, we would be as courageous and unselfish as the Ukrainians have proved themselves to be. The question brings a blush to the cheeks.</p>
<p>Perhaps I’m being too hard on us. Crises can inspire people to do uncharacteristic things. Let me delicately point out that liberal values have never been deeply rooted in Ukraine, nor were its citizens known for their sense of fraternity and civic responsibility. Very few observers who knew Ukraine’s history could have predicted the surge of resistance that followed the Russian invasion. Vladimir Putin was not alone.</p>
<p>How long this feeling will last once the war is over is anyone’s guess. There are countless historical examples of wars changing the DNA of nations; take post-war Germany, for instance. But as we know from our personal relations, the camaraderie forged by a crisis tends to dissipate over time. There is a law of entropy in human relations, just as there is entropy in the physical world. There is even such a thing as moral entropy; one can only expect people to be good for so long.</p>
<p>But for now, the resistance of the Ukrainians and their sense of solidarity is an inspiration to the rest of us. Yet to some, it is more than an inspiration: it is teaching us a lesson. Already certain liberal intellectuals are using the Ukraine war to criticise our own liberal democracies. Why, they are asking, can’t we be more like Ukraine?</p>
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<p>This is not a wise question, but it arises out of a genuine concern. The feeling is that we have lost a strong sense of civic purpose, that democratic norms are being openly flouted, and that there is a chilling indifference to the public good. Our countries look less like republics of citizens today than assemblies of consumers and web surfers glued to their screens. Meanwhile, a xenophobic nationalism is replacing a generous patriotism that once reflected optimism about the democratic prospect. And so, yes, why can’t we be more like Ukraine?</p>
<p>A good example of this line of question comes from David Brooks, one of the most sober political journalists in the United States. Last month, he wrote in <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/10/06/opinion/ukraine-liberal-nationalism.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">the <em>New York Times</em></a> that: “The war in Ukraine is not only a military event; it’s an intellectual event. The Ukrainians are winning not only because of the superiority of their troops. They are winning because they are fighting for a superior idea.” For Brooks, that idea is liberal nationalism. He believes that Ukraine is teaching us that a feeling of national belonging need not contradict a commitment to individual liberty. On the contrary: liberalism can ennoble nationalism, teaching it to be generous. And an elevated nationalism can connect liberalism to our feelings of attachment to each other, and inspire us to fight for what we share. And so: let us all be liberal nationalists now.</p>
<p>This is an admirable wish. But it begs the following question: why are we not liberal nationalists now? Why is there so little concern for the public good in contemporary democracies? Why are we such indifferent citizens? Why has illiberal nationalism acquired such appeal?</p>
<p>Rather than try to answer these difficult questions, it is much easier simply to charge our leaders and fellow citizens with a failure of nerve in the face of threats to democracy. (Brooks was not doing this, but <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/04/03/opinion/putin-ukraine-liberalism.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">others</a> are.) One could write an interesting little book about the role that the “failure of nerve” charge has played in modern politics. We usually associate it with the reactionary and militaristic Right. One of the ironies of the present conflict is that Vladimir Putin, who often weaponised this charge, is now the target of it. Because of his military failures, his courage has been thrown into question by the radical Russian Right he helped to create.</p>
<p>But the charge has also been used on the Left. Anyone familiar with the history of communist states and post-colonial revolutionary regimes will recognise the phrase “insufficient revolutionary zeal”, which was employed to explain regime failures or to purge troublesome public officials. Why have we not met the quota set by the five-year plan? A lack of revolutionary zeal. Why has the collectivisation of farms caused famine? A lack of revolutionary zeal. Behind the magical economic thinking of Marxism-Leninism was a theory of the will to power.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/10/the-revenge-of-the-technocrats/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/10/the-revenge-of-the-technocrats/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/2GettyImages-516917686-scaled-1.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/10/the-revenge-of-the-technocrats/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading </span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/10/the-revenge-of-the-technocrats/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The revenge of the technocrats</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/10/the-revenge-of-the-technocrats/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> John Gray </a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Defenders of liberal democracy developed the unfortunate habit of employing similar rhetoric during the Cold War. Looking back at the writings of the period, it is striking how often the terms faith and war appear. We must have faith in democratic principles! We must win the war of ideas! It is understandable that liberals began to speak this way. After all, communism was a messianic faith and communist intellectuals were not above using force to reach their ends.</p>
<p>But the only legitimate object of faith is a god, not an idea. And ideas are not weapons developed to serve armchair generals. Ideas serve our pursuit of truth through reflection and criticism; that is all they do. Ideologies, on the other hand, do inspire faith, and they can, and sometimes must, be employed in political conflicts. But there is no such thing as a “war of ideas”. The real power of ideas is their capacity to unmask ideologies, not propagate them. Those who look to Ukraine today to scold their own democracies seem on automatic pilot. They have genuine worries, which I share (and <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Once-Future-Liberal-Identity-Politics/dp/0062697455/ref=sr_1_1?crid=DODD19R7BI5L&amp;keywords=once+and+future+liberal&amp;qid=1666088117&amp;qu=eyJxc2MiOiIwLjgyIiwicXNhIjoiMS4wNCIsInFzcCI6IjEuMjkifQ%3D%3D&amp;sprefix=once+and+future+liberal%2Caps%2C192&amp;sr=8-1" target="_blank" rel="noopener">even wrote a book</a> expressing them a few years ago). But I do not think that the sorry state of our democratic societies has much to do with a failure of nerve, or a loss of faith, or the lack of a unifying idea like liberal nationalism. The older I get, the more a materialist I have become. Not a materialist in the sense of Karl Marx, but in the sense of Alexis de Tocqueville.</p>
<p>In recent years, I have been spending a lot of time with Tocqueville, and I am struck by what a subtle and convincing materialist he was. His masterpiece, <em>Democracy in America</em>, does not begin with an invocation of democratic values and why we must fight for them. It begins with the geography of North America — the forests, the swamps, the mountains, the rushing rivers. In the face of the vast, unspoiled American landscape, the early settlers found themselves in a state of relative material equality. Nature was very big, and they were very small. They needed each other.</p>
<p>In Tocqueville’s view, this fact of equality was a necessary condition for establishing the principle of equality in American democracy; and that principle then inspired a passion for equality. In other words, live passions are rooted ultimately in material reality. Tocqueville did not believe, as Marx did, that political ideas just mirror a society’s material relations. But he knew that no political idea is convincing for long, or even relevant, if it is utterly detached from present social reality. This is a challenge to all utopian thinkers: they must imagine a new state of affairs that does not seem utterly divorced from present reality.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/06/putins-war-is-just-beginning/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/06/putins-war-is-just-beginning/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/2GettyImages-489129208-scaled-1.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/06/putins-war-is-just-beginning/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading </span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/06/putins-war-is-just-beginning/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Putin&#039;s war is just beginning</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/06/putins-war-is-just-beginning/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Harald Malmgren </a></p></div></a></div>
<p>There is an important correlate to Tocqueville’s materialism: if political ideals that once captured people’s imaginations no longer do, our first instinct should be to ask what change in social conditions might be behind the change, making the old ideals less compelling than they once were. It should not be to adopt a prophetic pose and implore everyone to return to the true faith or embrace a new one. And so, if we are concerned, as we ought to be, about a lack of civic attachment, social solidarity, and respect for the common good in Western democracies, we must ask ourselves the following question: What has changed in the way we live now to erode our sense of democratic citizenship?</p>
<p>My own thinking about this question is not original. It seems to me that the ultimate source of democratic erosion is the fact that our societies have become more liquid and less solid, to adopt the terms of the Polish sociologist Zygmunt Bauman. Bauman’s use of the term “liquid” was an oblique reference to <em>The Communist Manifesto</em>, in which Marx and Engels declared that under capitalism, “all that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is profaned”.</p>
<p>Bauman pointed out that Marx and Engels took solidity to be a good thing. In this sense, they were conservatives. And their expectation was that once unstable capitalist societies were overthrown, a new, solid type of society under communism would emerge. Marx and Engels did not preach permanent revolution; they were not Maoists. For them, the whole point of engaging in socialist and Communist politics was (ideally) to restore solidity and establish certainty so that human beings could live healthily in line with their natures. Hence the importance of socialist values like solidarity, and policies like economic planning.</p>
<p>Today, the communist utopian dream is dead and capitalism remains in place. But its power to liquify human relations has massively increased. Capitalism in the wide sense — including modern science and technology — no longer just eats away at solid social institutions. It prevents new solid ones from even forming. This was Bauman’s most important insight.</p>
<p>We now live in a world where people have begun to anticipate that fewer of our institutions and norms will endure as they once did. They have factored this into their thinking and — even more importantly — into their feelings. We know that children of divorced parents have more trouble than most in developing solid relationships with others. Having lost a sense of certainty about the families they grew up in, they lack confidence that they can establish stable ones of their own. My sense is that this is now happening in society more generally. From the importance of biological sex to the dominant role of the family, fewer and fewer of the social institutions and norms that exist when someone is young will exist when they are old. If this trend continues, it is hard not to imagine that we are in store for a radical transformation of human consciousness and social life.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2020/11/when-will-my-fellow-liberals-learn/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2020/11/when-will-my-fellow-liberals-learn/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/GettyImages-1229520354.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2020/11/when-will-my-fellow-liberals-learn/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2020/11/when-will-my-fellow-liberals-learn/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>When will my fellow liberals learn?</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2020/11/when-will-my-fellow-liberals-learn/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Mark Lilla </a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Obvious examples of this liquidity abound. In the economic sphere, deregulation, “flexible” labour markets, privatisation, global finance and trade, and the dismantling of social protections have made workers’ lives and their communities more fragile. In the technological sphere, the unavoidable internet offers young people a vast menu of human possibilities, which has undermined the transmission of national and religious customs and values. It has also subjected all of us to psychological and moral viruses that ricochet around the globe instantaneously. In the medical field, rapid advances in research and treatment render today’s therapeutic wisdom obsolete tomorrow, leaving less-educated people confused and increasingly sceptical of the medical establishment. Finally, and most dramatically, we see the effects of liquidity in new ideologies of fluid psycho-sexual identities.</p>
<p>This is an historically unprecedented situation. The nature of human society has always been conservative. Its function has been to offer a stable environment in which individuals can develop psychologically and cooperate with each other; it also, crucially, has transmitted knowledge and norms to subsequent generations. The ideas and institutions of liberal democracy developed in societies that functioned in this conservative way. But our contemporary liquid societies do all this less well. They are becoming, so to speak, less social. Their energy is centrifugal, not centripetal.</p>
<p>What I have just put forward is just a thesis, and not an original one. But if it is even half right, we need to engage in much deeper thinking about liberal democracy and civic engagement than we are accustomed to. In an unstable environment where institutions and values have trouble getting rooted, just what does the term “common good” mean? Or solidarity? When the forces that determine human destinies are global and ever changing, what does democratic citizenship mean?</p>
<p>These are not intended to be rhetorical questions. They are, to my mind, the fundamental political questions of our time. We need answers to them before we can think clearly about much else. We cannot “fight” for liberal democracy if we don’t know what it is still capable of, given the societies we must now live in and the expectations and feelings we now have. Many people today are convinced that the greatest threat to liberal democracy is xenophobic nationalism, not liquification. They are concerned about ideologies that want to make our societies less open, less diverse, and less subject to dissent. I share this concern, at least in the short run: today’s self-declared illiberal nationalists are trouble and can cause a lot of damage.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/05/covid-was-liberalisms-endgame/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/05/covid-was-liberalisms-endgame/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/GettyImages-1219281982-scaled-e1652983505354.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/05/covid-was-liberalisms-endgame/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading </span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/05/covid-was-liberalisms-endgame/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Covid was liberalism&#039;s endgame</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/05/covid-was-liberalisms-endgame/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Matthew Crawford </a></p></div></a></div>
<p>What they cannot do, however, is change the laws of social physics. The so-called “national conservative” activists who gather in Budapest these days to hear the gospel of Christian integrism are children of liquid societies. Whatever their nostalgic fantasies about a world they’ve never known, and never existed in the form they imagine, their psychological outlook presumes liquidity, movement, independence. They are bees who were born outside a hive — like the rest of us. They are not built to live in even a hive as inviting to them as a fully “integrated” Catholic nation.</p>
<p>The fact is that today’s nationalists can never achieve their goals. History has erased the possibility of sustainable, homogeneous theological-political regimes. We should still be concerned about today’s far-Right nationalists and resist them politically. But that is because political movements that fail to achieve their ends are often more dangerous than movements that do.</p>
<p>What we all hope is that soon, very soon, Ukraine will be able to join the community of liberal democratic nations in full security. We also hope that the experience of war will establish enough trust among Ukrainians to allow democratic institutions to operate as they are intended to, with loyal opposition and respect for opposition.</p>
<p>But the truth is that even were these hopes realised, Ukraine would then find itself subject to all the centrifugal social, economic, and psychological forces other liberal democracies are contending with. Every regime faces them today, even Russia. It is worth remembering that in the early weeks of the war, few Russian citizens demonstrated against it, and almost no one demonstrated for it or rushed to enlist in the military. Instead, they rushed to IKEA to buy furniture in fear that the store would close for good.</p>
<p><em>An early version of this article was presented on October 14 at the 2022 Freedom Games conference organised by the Liberté Foundation in Łódź, Poland.</em></p>
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					<title>When will my fellow liberals learn?</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2020/11/when-will-my-fellow-liberals-learn/?edition=us</link>
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						<![CDATA[Mark Lilla]]>
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							<![CDATA[President-elect Joe Biden. Credit: Drew Angerer/Getty ]]>
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							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Mark Lilla</strong> is the author of <a href="https://marklilla.com/the-shipwrecked-mind/"><em>The Shipwrecked Mind: On Political Reaction</em></a> and <a href="https://marklilla.com/the-reckless-mind-intellectuals-in-politics/"><em>The Reckless Mind: Intellectuals in Politics</em></a>.</p>
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															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is the author of <a href="https://marklilla.com/the-shipwrecked-mind/"><em>The Shipwrecked Mind: On Political Reaction</em></a> and <a href="https://marklilla.com/the-reckless-mind-intellectuals-in-politics/"><em>The Reckless Mind: Intellectuals in Politics</em></a>.]]>
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										<pubDate>Wed, 04 Nov 2020 14:43:16 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Sun, 08 Nov 2020 11:52:35 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[1619 Project]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[2020 US election]]></category>
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					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://old.unherd.com/?p=49373</guid>
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								<![CDATA[Democratic leaders have work to do if they hope to build a durable future majority]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p class="">Exactly four years ago, in the wake of Donald Trump’s stunning electoral victory, I published <a class="" href="https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/20/opinion/sunday/the-end-of-identity-liberalism.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">an article</a> that caused a ruckus. Titled “The End of Identity Liberalism,” it was written out of all too apparent anger. Like so many Americans, I felt betrayed by a Democratic Party that not only failed to capture the White House in order to advance its agenda. It also failed to protect the United States and the world from a human menace. Little did I anticipate how bad things would eventually get.</p>
<p class="">A significant factor in the Democrats’ defeat, I argued, was a style of politics that prevented them from developing an ambitious vision of America’s future — one that was capable of inspiring people from all walks of life. Indeed, it seemed that ever since the 1980s, American liberals had gotten out of the vision business altogether. They redirected their energies from party politics to movement politics, focusing attention in particular on minority and gender identity movements.</p>
<p class="">While that shift was morally comprehensible, it made it harder for liberals to speak of the common good across group lines. It also ingrained the habit of forgetting large constituencies that did not fit into the liberal-Left identity narrative, such as working-class whites and evangelicals — the latter group making up about a <a class="" href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2020/04/06/why-trump-is-reliant-on-white-evangelicals/" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">quarter</a> of the adult population. If you are going to mention groups in America, you had better mention all of them. Otherwise you give your opponent the opportunity to, as Donald Trump did with great success.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/11/test-article/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/11/test-article/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/11/test-article/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/11/test-article/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Test article</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/11/test-article/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Matthew Goodwin</a></p></div></a></div>
<p class="">This movement politics mindset proved to be electorally suicidal. From the 1980s on we witnessed a massive transfer of political power, in large sections of the country, from the Democrats to an increasingly radical Republican Party. The most perverse consequence was that as Democrats ceded ever more geographical ground to Republicans, particularly in state and local governments, they lost the ability to protect the very identity groups they professed to care about — in particular, their right to vote. <a class="" href="https://www.census.gov/newsroom/releases/archives/2010_census/cb11-cn185.html">More than half</a> of all African Americans, for instance, live in the deep red South.</p>
<p class="">Yet Democrats resisted the obvious lessons to be drawn from these developments: that you cannot help anyone if you do not hold institutional power. And you cannot acquire that power without a vision that transcends group attachments, without denying them.</p>
<p class="">Democrats have had four years to ponder their defeat as America crumbled around them. Now that hopes of a Democratic landslide have been dashed and defeat is within the realm of possibility, the question remains as to whether they have drawn the right lessons from their electoral performance. The signs are decidedly mixed.</p>
<p class="">The good news is that Democratic politicians, party functionaries, and most importantly donors focused their energies on addressing the common good and capturing the political centre. They had seen that in the 2018 midterm elections the seats the party gained were mainly won by centrist candidates who focused on building a suburban base, particularly among white women.</p>
<p class="">They also realised that while minority groups make up an important part of the base, many of their members are culturally conservative. African-Americans, particularly older ones, are more likely to have reservations about the LGBT movement. A significant portion of Latinos oppose abortion due to their Catholic faith and have more conventional views about marriage and gender roles.</p>
<p class="">That seems to have registered, because in the recent election Democratic candidates generally avoided cultural and identity themes (apart from police reform), despite the efforts of Republicans and Fox News to provoke them into it. Joe Biden and Kamala Harris ran a rather old-fashioned campaign based on policy, competence, and basic decency, and pointedly did not portray the Democratic Party as a “rainbow coalition” of distinct groups. This bodes well for the future.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/11/test-article/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/11/test-article/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/11/test-article/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/11/test-article/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Test article</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/11/test-article/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Gavin Haynes</a></p></div></a></div>
<p class="">The bad news is that the cultural Left is even more focused on identity than it was in 2016. In part, this is due to the Trump experience. What we back then genteelly called “populism” has degenerated on the Right of the Right into a reactionary force of poorly-educated whites with their own identitarian agenda. It is tempting to want to fight fire with fire.</p>
<p class="">But over the last summer, other events revealed just how large the gap has grown between the ambition and tactics of political Democrats and those of the cultural Left. Here I am thinking of elites whose power base is in universities, the media, Hollywood, the publishing and advertising industries, the art world, and philanthropic institutions. It also includes young activists whose notion of political engagement is identity-based, confrontational, and social-media driven.</p>
<p class="">This cultural Left has been behind the so-called “<a class="" href="https://www.vox.com/2019/3/22/18259865/great-awokening-white-liberals-race-polling-trump-2020">Great Awokening</a>” on race of the past five years or so. I speak here not of economic and social policies intended to improve the condition of African-Americans, which is a historical duty. Nor of legal protections for gay, lesbian, and trans people. I refer to the focus on symbols and gestures meant to display one’s conformity with enlightened opinion on such matters.</p>
<p class="">Consider the aftermath to the impressive early demonstrations following the murder of George Floyd in May. There were massive, peaceful gatherings in cities and small towns across America (and the world). But very quickly the situation degenerated into conflicts over symbols. Countless cultural institutions felt compelled to make statements about racial justice, and some of their directors resigned after making acts of contrition.</p>
<p class="">Many businesses followed suit and announced requirements that employees attend “anti-racist” training sessions, run by highly-paid, self-declared “consultants”. Twitter mobs descended on people thought to hold impure views. Editors were fired for running controversial pieces, while a researcher was fired for circulating an academic study on racial attitudes. What began as a summer of civic solidarity ended with squabbles about “cancel culture” that contributed nothing to improving life for non-elite African Americans.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2020/11/whats-the-mood-in-trumpland/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2020/11/whats-the-mood-in-trumpland/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/GettyImages-826173358-e1603963357412.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2020/11/whats-the-mood-in-trumpland/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2020/11/whats-the-mood-in-trumpland/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>What&#039;s the mood in Trumpland?</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2020/11/whats-the-mood-in-trumpland/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Ian Birrell</a></p></div></a></div>
<p class="">A major force behind this wrong turn was the liberal media, which has fallen into bad habits during the Trump presidency. Feeling that they had not been hard enough on Trump in the 2016 election, reporters got used to calling out “lies,” of which there were plenty. But the distinction between demonstrable lies and differences of opinion has gotten lost in the process. The standard of journalistic impartiality is being jettisoned in the name of an undefined “moral clarity.”</p>
<p class="">Central to these efforts has been editorial pressure on reporters to emphasise the racial dimension to stories and to play an active role in rewriting the national narrative. For example, in 2019 the <em class="">New York Times </em>launched “<a class="" href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/08/14/magazine/1619-america-slavery.html">The 1619 Project</a>” to mark the date when African slaves first arrived in the United States. What began as a thought-provoking idea soon became a tendentious effort to make the crime of slavery the true founding of the republic. Historians complained about inaccuracies and the <em class="">Times</em> <a class="" href="https://quillette.com/2020/09/19/down-the-1619-projects-memory-hole/">silently corrected</a> them, while still standing behind the project’s editor, who won a Pulitzer Prize. Young reporters were left with the impression that such efforts will still help them to advance their careers.</p>
<p class="">While the Biden campaign was not overly distracted by these psychodramas, it would be a mistake for Democratic leaders to pretend any longer that they don’t exist. Right-wing media will keep the culture war over symbols before the public eye, which can only help the Republican Party. That means that the Democratic politicians must explicitly distance themselves from ideological “anti-racist” rhetoric and political theatre, such as efforts to tear down statues of American presidents. And they must resist efforts to distort American history in our schools.</p>
<p class="">Democratic voters care about racial justice but they are focused on the present and the future, not on litigating the past. They also believe in fair play, open debate, and legitimate differences of opinion. They want to build America, not indict America. Democratic leaders must make it crystal clear that they feel the same way. No matter what the final results of this year’s elections, they desperately need to do some housecleaning if they hope ever to build a durable Democratic majority in our lifetimes.</p>
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