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		<title>Shany Mor, a writer for UnHerd</title>
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		<description>think again</description>
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	<title>Shany Mor, a writer for UnHerd</title>
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					<title>How Israel and Lebanon can stop the slaughter</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2024/11/israel-and-lebanon-need-a-lasting-peace/?edition=us</link>
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										<unherd:main_theme>Middle East</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Shany Mor]]>
					</dc:creator>
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																<unherd:article_ranking>3</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[Lebanon and Israel have been at war since 1948 (Photo by Ugur Yildirim/ dia images via Getty Images)]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Shany Mor</strong> is a lecturer political thought at Reichman University.</p>
]]>
						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>ShMMor</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is a lecturer political thought at Reichman University.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Tue, 19 Nov 2024 00:00:55 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Tue, 19 Nov 2024 11:59:03 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Hezbollah]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Israel]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Lebanon]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Palestinians]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[War]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://stage.unherd.com/?p=638332</guid>
																												<description>
								<![CDATA[Another ceasefire is bound to fail]]>
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																			<content:encoded>
								<![CDATA[<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">In the Middle East, transitions between US presidential administrations are often times of bold attempts at diplomacy. It was in the last days and hours of the Clinton administration that intense final status talks were advanced for an Israeli-Palestinian peace, only to be rejected by the Palestinians. It was in the last weeks of the Reagan administration that the US changed its longstanding policy of shunning the Palestine Liberation Organization. And it was the final weeks of the Obama administration that a UN Security Council resolution locking in a set of mostly pro-Palestinian positions on the conflict was engineered by the Americans, who subsequently abstained on the resolution everyone knew they were behind.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">For Israel and Lebanon, the coming weeks will be no different. The outgoing Biden team will seek to have an impact on the war. The incoming Trump team will manoeuvre to have as much unpleasantness as possible finished before it comes and as much credit as possible coming to them. And various European and Arab states will seek to exploit the American transition for their own initiatives.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Across the West, diplomats and experts have settled on a consensus for solving the ongoing Arab-Israeli war — one that reveals exactly why international diplomatic efforts have consistently failed. At its core, this approach focuses on restoring the very ceasefire conditions which Lebanon and Hezbollah violated last year, while avoiding any mention of even the desirability of peace — something Lebanon would benefit from more than any other party. In failing to recognise this, our international diplomats embody all the pathologies and failures that have come to define their contribution to this decades-long conflict.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">According to the Quai d’Orsay and the State Department, the formula for ending the war merely requires punching in the four-digit PIN code 1701. That, of course, is UN Security Council resolution 1701, the one that ended the last war back in 2006. The resolution included several clear obligations for all parties. Israel was to withdraw from Lebanese territory. Hezbollah was to move all its forces north of the Litani River, creating a buffer zone where the only permitted armed forces would be those of the UN peacekeeping force (UNIFIL) and the Lebanese Army (LFA). UNIFIL was to monitor and enforce these deployments. And Hezbollah was supposed to be decommissioned as an armed force inside sovereign Lebanese territory.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The first measure, Israeli withdrawal, was implemented within days of the resolution’s passage. The others were not. </span><span style="font-weight: 400;">Once Israel’s withdrawal was complete, UNIFIL announced that it had no intention of enforcing 1701, and over the course of the next 17 years, Hezbollah assembled an arsenal of rockets and missiles. It also built a network of tunnels that were supposed to allow it, in a future war, to “conquer the Galilee” in an operation similar to the one Hamas ultimately launched hundreds of kilometres away in southern Israel.</span></p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/02/the-next-intifada-is-about-to-begin/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/02/the-next-intifada-is-about-to-begin/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/GettyImages-1247070852-2-e1676651629703-1.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/02/the-next-intifada-is-about-to-begin/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/02/the-next-intifada-is-about-to-begin/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The next Intifada is about to begin</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/02/the-next-intifada-is-about-to-begin/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Shany Mor</a></p></div></a></div>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The day after Hamas’s assault on southern Israel on October 7 last year, Hezbollah began firing rockets on northern Israel, forcing the rapid evacuation of border communities comprising nearly 100,000 residents, most of whom have yet to return home. After 11 months of low-intensity warfare, Israel took the initiative, and in 11 days managed to deal Hezbollah a decisive blow. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">On 17 and 18 September, exploding pagers and walkie-talkies disabled the militia’s communications network, taking thousands of fighters out of commission. Over the next week, a series of airstrikes based on precise intelligence destroyed the majority of Hezbollah’s rockets and launchers and eliminated key military commanders. Finally, on 27 September, an Israeli airstrike on a bunker in Beirut killed nearly every senior figure in the organisation, including its voluble leader Hassan Nasrallah. This was followed by a ground invasion which has seen tunnels and munitions, prepared over a decade and more, destroyed with huge losses to Hezbollah and minimal losses to the IDF.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">However, the 11-day campaign woke up the international community in a way that 11 months of rocket fire did not. And the unanimous response has been an urgent call for implementation of 1701. David Lammy </span><a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/i-call-for-an-immediate-ceasefire-between-lebanese-hizballah-and-israel-uk-statement-at-the-un-security-council" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">called</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> for a “political solution in line with Resolution 1701”. The French ambassador to the UN </span><a href="https://onu.delegfrance.org/we-strongly-call-upon-israel-to-stop-the-escalation-underway-in-lebanon" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">called</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> upon Israel “to stop the escalation underway in Lebanon” and reiterated Frances determination for a cessation of hostilities “in accordance with Resolution 1701”. Hours before the successful operation to kill Nasrallah, the US, Canada, Australia, Canada and a host of European and Arab states issued a joint </span><a href="https://www.elysee.fr/en/emmanuel-macron/2024/09/26/joint-statement-by-the-united-states-australia-canada-european-union-france-germany-italy-japan-saudi-arabia-united-arab-emirates-the-united-kingdom-qatar" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">declaration</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> demanding an immediate 21-day cease “to provide space for diplomacy towards the conclusion of a diplomatic settlement consistent with UNSCR 1701”.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">This consensus around the indeterminate and obsolete Security Council resolution tells, in short, the entire story of the failure to resolve this conflict. If there is one thread running through nearly every diplomatic effort of the last eight decades, it is a firm commitment to the idea that any party that launches a war against Israel and is then defeated is entitled to a restoration of the conditions it violently rejected when launching the war.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">This unspoken normative commitment explains the iterations of final status plans presented to the Palestinian leadership after its rejection of statehood at Camp David and subsequent suicide bombing campaign of the early 2000s. It explains the insistence on pre-1967 armistice lines as the only legal basis for Israel’s border </span><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">after </span></i><span style="font-weight: 400;">1967. It explains the curious exception to that norm regarding the refusal to recognise even the pre-1967 part of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital. And it explains the cruel human experiment known as UNRWA, a refugee agency that, unlike any other refugee agency, exists not to rehabilitate refugees but rather to keep them in a permanent state of immiseration to maintain an irredentist claim against another country.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Such a norm has not featured in the post-war mediation of any other conflict, not before 1945 and not since. No one has ever seriously suggested creating a kind of sportsman</span><span style="font-weight: 400;">’</span><span style="font-weight: 400;">s mulligan as an international diplomatic norm for other conflicts for this very reason. It’s not hard to see why this might be the case. If the international community extended a line of insurance to other aggressors, which promised that launching wars could bring gains with victory but no losses with defeat, there would be a lot more wars. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">But what’s even more notable than the warped consensus around 1701 is the absence of any mention of making </span><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">peace</span></i><span style="font-weight: 400;"> between the two neighbouring states. Nowhere is the establishment of normal diplomatic relations between Lebanon and Israel even mentioned as a long-term goal.</span></p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;Nowhere is the establishment of normal diplomatic relations between Lebanon and Israel even mentioned as a long-term goal.&#8221;</div>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">One might argue that peace right now is not realistic, and that may be true. But that is equally true about an Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank or the establishment of a Palestinian state or the redivision of Jerusalem — and yet these are always mentioned as long-term goals by European governments.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Why shouldn’t a peace treaty be the clearly stated goal? Normal diplomatic relations would resolve any existing border disputes. After all, the ones still extant are tiny and largely invented pretexts for maintaining Hezbollah’s arsenal.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Just before the US election, France hosted an “International Conference in Support of Lebanon</span><span style="font-weight: 400;">’</span><span style="font-weight: 400;">s People and Sovereignty”, where $1 billion in aid was pledged and where French President Macron claimed Israel was “sowing barbarism”. If there was any suggestion that Lebanon’s situation might have been improved by </span><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">not </span></i><span style="font-weight: 400;">firing rockets into Israel for the past 11 months, the participants were too polite to mention it. Nor was there any reckoning with Lebanon’s decision to cultivate an alternative armed force, larger than its own military, implicated in atrocities in Syria, and answerable to the Islamic Republic of Iran. The insistence of global actors, most notably the host country itself, on protecting Hezbollah and securing for it advantageous ceasefire arrangements in previous wars in 1996 and 2006 also went unmentioned.</span></p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/06/chaos-has-consumed-israel/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/06/chaos-has-consumed-israel/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/2-10.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/06/chaos-has-consumed-israel/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/06/chaos-has-consumed-israel/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Chaos has consumed Israel</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/06/chaos-has-consumed-israel/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Shany Mor</a></p></div></a></div>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">And no one mentioned peace. Normal diplomatic relations between Lebanon and Israel wouldn’t mean that Lebanon agrees with everything Israel does. This is already the case for France as well as most of its allies. For that matter, it is also the case for Egypt and Jordan. It would just mean that there is an agreed border, a possibility for minimal economic cooperation, and a commitment to resolve disputes by negotiation. Good for Israel, to be sure. But even better for Lebanon. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">True, no one could seriously believe that this path will be adopted. But the reticence to even raise the topic of peace is in many ways revealing. </span><span style="font-weight: 400;">Most obviously, it sends the wrong message and incentivises the wrong behaviours — as well as violates any normal diplomatic practice regarding other international disputes. But it also mirrors the manner in which the contemporary Western </span><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">cordon sanitaire</span></i><span style="font-weight: 400;"> around racism has an elaborate permission structure exempting hatred of Jews. Once again, all that’s required is to frame one’s dislike as a kind of grievance against Israel — rather than as pathological hatred of a highly imperfect state that is fighting a complex seven-front war it did not seek.</span></p>
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					<title>The next Intifada is about to begin</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2023/02/the-next-intifada-is-about-to-begin/?edition=us</link>
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					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Shany Mor]]>
					</dc:creator>
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																<unherd:article_ranking></unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[Fighters from the Palestinian Fatah movement. (Jaafar Ashtiyeh/AFP/Getty)]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Shany Mor</strong> is a lecturer political thought at Reichman University.</p>
]]>
						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>ShMMor</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is a lecturer political thought at Reichman University.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Mon, 20 Feb 2023 00:02:10 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Mon, 20 Feb 2023 00:02:10 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Benjamin Netanyahu]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Gaza]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Intifada]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Israel]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[palestine]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[West Bank]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://old.unherd.com/?p=461470</guid>
																												<description>
								<![CDATA[Israel's luck will soon run out]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>The deadly wave of Israeli-Palestinian violence that crested in the last week of January seems to have subsided for now. Yes, the IDF keeps raiding West Bank sites to arrest holed-up militants, occasionally with casualties, and various militants keep attempting to carry out terrorist attacks against Israelis. Sometimes even a rocket or two is fired from Gaza toward southern Israel and the Israeli Air Force “retaliates”, mostly without any casualties on either side.</p>
<p>But the unusually high body count in January hasn’t led to a spiralling escalation. There was no terrorist attack that shocked Israelis out of their routine and forced the government’s hand into a broader operation. There was no deadly revenge attack from settler radicals. There was no botched Israeli military operation with a high body count, which then circulated on social media and spiked local passions and global condemnations. But at some point, probably soon, our luck will run out. After nearly two decades of comparative quiet, the Israelis and Palestinians seem headed towards another pointless round of violence.</p>
<p>Israel’s fundamental dilemma has not changed much since 1967 when it first conquered the West Bank from Jordan in the Six Day War. Withdrawing from the occupied territories leaves the very real risk that they will become a base for future attacks (as has happened with nearly every other territory Israel has withdrawn from), while incorporating the territories into Israel requires an existential compromise on either Israel’s democratic or Jewish character. Avoiding a decision, meanwhile, raises the costs of a future settlement while sinking Israel deeper into the strategic and moral morass of occupying a foreign nation and governing the Israeli civilians who have settled there.</p>
<p>Aspects of the dilemma have shifted slightly, but this big picture has not. The internal Israeli political debate has taken to ignoring the issue, and for now is consumed with a controversial legal reform advanced by Netanyahu&#8217;s new Right-wing government to weaken the Supreme Court. It is a highly illiberal reform and Israel will be much better off if it is blocked or heavily diluted. But it’s hard to say that it heralds “<a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/israel/end-israeli-democracy" target="_blank" rel="noopener">the end of Israeli democracy</a>”, especially when that has been the charge against nearly every development in Israeli politics in the last 40 years. And while this diversion draws all the attention, a parallel legislative effort is quietly underway which, if anything, is even more ruinous to Israeli democracy. This is the attempt to legalise the wildcat Israeli settlement Homesh, located outside Jenin in the northern West Bank. It is one of four which Israel took down in the 2005 Disengagement, the same week as it pulled out all of its soldiers and settlers from Gaza.</p>
<p>From 2007 to 2020 the relationship between Israel and the Palestinian territories had three faces. In Gaza, there was no military or Israeli civilian presence of any kind, and the territory was ruled by an isolated and internationally-unrecognised Hamas government. In the northern West Bank around Jenin, there was no Israeli civilian presence but full freedom of action for the IDF to carry out raids and arrests, with varying measures of security cooperation from the Palestinian Authority, and a large and mostly unnoticed business footprint of Israeli Arabs from northern Israel. In the rest of the West Bank there was also a significant Israeli military presence, but unlike in the Jenin sector there was a large and growing Israeli civilian presence as well.</p>
<p>This status quo held for 13 years, and created a kind of unintended laboratory condition for dealing with the Palestinian Territories without a peace agreement (or a full-scale war, for that matter). And the clear winner among the three was the model that had a military presence but no Israeli settlers. Jenin, which had been the suicide bomber capital of Palestine in the Second Intifada, became the quietest sector in the entire conflict. Compared with the chronic violence in and around Hebron, to say nothing of Gaza, it left little room for doubt: the disengagement from the northern West Bank was, in the immediate term at least, a success.</p>
<p>But for the Israeli settler movement, this was a success that had to be denied or obscured, lest it be copied elsewhere in the West Bank. Repeated efforts were made to reestablish settlements, especially around Homesh. But with varying levels of speed and resistance, the IDF generally moved in and removed the illegal outposts whose settlers claimed, not always seriously, that they had established a seminary not a settlement.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/01/netanyahu-is-sacrificing-israels-myths/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/01/netanyahu-is-sacrificing-israels-myths/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/GettyImages-1245871635-2-scaled.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/01/netanyahu-is-sacrificing-israels-myths/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading </span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/01/netanyahu-is-sacrificing-israels-myths/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Netanyahu is sacrificing Israel&#039;s myths</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/01/netanyahu-is-sacrificing-israels-myths/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Anshel Pfeffer </a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Then, in 2020, two things changed. First, coronavirus restrictions ended the flow of Arabs from northern Israel into the northern West Bank — as well as their cash. And second, newly appointed Defence Minister Benny Gantz, not wanting to rock the boat in anticipation of his promised rotation into the PM’s office under the deal he had struck with Netanyahu, temporarily stopped the army from removing the Homesh settlers. There, they became more and more entrenched, and the inevitable friction led to violence with local Palestinians.</p>
<p>When a Homesh settler was killed in an attack in 2021, the perverse logic of the entire settler enterprise ensnared the area in its death grip. The army couldn’t possibly forcibly evacuate the settlers during the mourning period; that would be giving into the terrorists. Settlers from around the West Bank paraded in their thousands to show solidarity, leaving the army no choice but to secure their passage, which necessitated road closures and checkpoints. The pretence of a seminary in Homesh was mostly dropped, and it began to look increasingly like a new settlement.</p>
<p>Tensions mounted and violence increased, between settlers and the local Palestinians, between Palestinians and the army, and between settlers and the army in the few cases where the latter did try to put the brakes on. The Jenin sector, for 15 years the quietest in the territories, was by 2022 the epicentre of a new wave of Palestinian terrorism, which was now spilling onto Israel’s streets — north, south, and in Tel Aviv. The army had no choice but to act, and the pace and aggression of raids and arrests took off. The link between the surge in violence and the sudden reluctance to deal with the squatters at Homesh is barely noted in Israel, and for the settler movement it is crucial that it remain so. For, amid the flurry of populist Right-wing legislation the new government has initiated, perhaps the most dangerous of all is the bill which will retroactively legalise the Homesh settlement.</p>
<p>It is worth pausing to consider all the various ways this unprecedented legislation would irreversibly damage the very foundations of liberal democracy in Israel. First, it would officially create a new Israeli settlement in the West Bank, something from which Israel has largely refrained for around three decades. Second, it would legalise settlement in the one place where Israeli law has explicitly forbidden it since the 2005 Disengagement. Third, it would effectively cancel part of the Disengagement, a major diplomatic initiative undertaken by the State of Israel after it had successfully defeated the Palestinians in the Second Intifada and for which it received real (and potentially reversible) benefits from the United States and the international community. Fourth, it would introduce a civilian Israeli presence into the one sector of the West Bank that has not had one for almost two decades and that, not coincidentally, managed to keep a comparatively low level of violence — with easily predictably grim results.</p>
<p>But fifth, it would formally void one of the central tenets of sovereign statehood, namely the monopoly on armed force and capacity to set foreign and security policy. The proposed law doesn’t change policy for the future; it legitimises the actions of settlers in the past. It essentially tells the armed thugs who violated Israeli law for the past few years, commandeered private property, engaged in violent scuffles with the Israel Police and the IDF, and were linked repeatedly to harassment of Palestinian civilians nearby, that this is and was a legitimate way to pursue political interests. There is no real looking back from this moment, not in a country where so many are armed and where the political divisions are so deep. And not when the Cabinet member who oversees the Israel Police, Itamar Ben-Gvir, is so closely identified with the groups that will have achieved their goals through these methods.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/11/netanyahus-return-is-a-danger-to-israel/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/11/netanyahus-return-is-a-danger-to-israel/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/im-654741-copy-e1667472913859.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/11/netanyahus-return-is-a-danger-to-israel/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading </span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/11/netanyahus-return-is-a-danger-to-israel/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The return of Israel&#039;s vicious far-Right</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/11/netanyahus-return-is-a-danger-to-israel/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Giles Fraser </a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Ben-Gvir, for years a far-Right rabble rouser but now a minister, has never worn a uniform or served a day in his life. He orders the police to quickly demolish the homes of families of terrorists who are killed in their attacks against Israelis, though this tactic has been shown repeatedly to be worse than useless. Bereft of new ideas, he has been reduced to populist stunts, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XwZ_uYnfcbY" target="_blank" rel="noopener">sharing videos of himself eating pitta bread</a> after removing pitta bread from the mess halls of security prisons. Under his watch, a remarkable run of comparative peace and prosperity is coming to an end.</p>
<p>On the Palestinian side, the situation is even worse. The Israelis have an alternative if they ever choose to turn against the coalition currently in power. The Palestinians do not even have a vocabulary for connecting their actions to their outcomes.</p>
<p>Any serious discussion of the Palestinian state should ask whether or not life has improved since the Palestinians rejected statehood at the end of the Oslo process in 2000 and opted instead for violent confrontation with Israel. This isn’t a rhetorical question for Israeli public diplomacy, but one the Palestinians should be asking their leadership.</p>
<p>Yet to pose this question would be to acknowledge a kind of agency that exalted victimhood doesn’t allow for. It is now nearly 23 years since Yasser Arafat rejected Ehud Barak’s Camp David Summit and instead gambled on a violent terror campaign in the hope of better terms. There was no way of knowing then that this gamble would turn out so badly. At the time, it wasn’t viewed as a particularly controversial decision; what’s striking, however, is how that perception hasn&#8217;t changed.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/10/israel-will-never-escape-netanyahu/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/10/israel-will-never-escape-netanyahu/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/GettyImages-1244286927-copy-scaled-e1667210699702.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/10/israel-will-never-escape-netanyahu/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading </span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/10/israel-will-never-escape-netanyahu/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Israel will never escape Netanyahu</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/10/israel-will-never-escape-netanyahu/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Anshel Pfeffer </a></p></div></a></div>
<p><a href="https://www.stateoftelaviv.com/p/war-has-consequences-20-year-scars-of-the-second-intifada" target="_blank" rel="noopener">I’ve argued elsewhere</a> that the entire Palestinian predicament is the outcome of three very different Arab-Israeli wars which began in 1947, 1967, and 2000. It’s not an intuitive historical argument to make, as these three wars have so little in common. The first began as an Arab-Jewish civil war fought village by village, which then expanded into a multi-state war across four borders lasting a year and a half. The second was a rapid but conventional military conflict fought in less than a week. And the third was a low-intensity armed conflict characterised by frequent terrorist attacks and counterinsurgency operations by an occupying army which took about five years to peter out.</p>
<p>All three were preceded by a wave of righteous ecstasy on the Arab side. All three ended in a disastrous defeat for the Arab side that irreversibly worsened the political and economic situation of the Palestinians. And all three defeats were followed by the collective erasure of any memory of the excitement before the conflict. They instead became stories of distilled victimisation, almost ensuring a repeat performance a generation later.</p>
<p>Why does this keep happening? It’s not that Palestinians are uniquely irrational; nor are the Palestinians the only nation birthed by the collapse of an old imperial order. The Irish, Bulgarians, Greeks, Turks, Armenians, Poles, Ukrainians and many others formed modern states on a mix of historical claims and very modern myth-making throughout the 20th century, frequently in conditions of war and displacement, and always with unanswered territorial claims. Some of these were the basis for lingering resentments and conflicts for generations.</p>
<p>Yet none except for the Palestinians rejected statehood when it was on offer because it didn’t include all their territorial claims. And this includes the Israelis who accepted the UN partition plan on roughly half of what was left of the original British Mandate. Zionists accepted a state that didn’t even include Jerusalem, the focal point of Jewish longing for two millennia and already then, as for a century before, home to a Jewish majority. This is the difference between a movement for national liberation and a movement for the elimination of another nation. In the former, even a very difficult compromise can be understood as an achievement (however partial or internally controversial). In the latter, a compromise that leaves this unwanted presence is still an unacceptable defeat.</p>
<p>The Arab war against Zionism has been a central organising political fact of Arab politics for over a century. This self-destructive passion hit its peak in the mid-20th century, dragged numerous Arab states into repeated military catastrophes and saw nearly every Jewish community in the Arab world completely erased, some after a continuous presence of more than 2,000 years. Anti-Zionism serves the same totemic function for broad circles of activists and intellectuals in the West too. Accepting that Israel is not a state whose policies may merit severe critique, but one whose existence is a crime, is now the price of entry to the community of the good.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/06/chaos-has-consumed-israel/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/06/chaos-has-consumed-israel/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/2-10.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/06/chaos-has-consumed-israel/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author </span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/06/chaos-has-consumed-israel/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Chaos has consumed Israel</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/06/chaos-has-consumed-israel/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Shany Mor </a></p></div></a></div>
<p>This is how the &#8220;Arab-Israeli&#8221; conflict morphs into the &#8220;Israeli-Palestinian&#8221; conflict, which then morphs into just “the occupation” and now increasingly “apartheid”. The first transition denied the scope of the conflict and effaced the reality of a tiny Jewish minority being marked for destruction by the Arab world as a whole. The second denied that there was a conflict at all, and rendered the entire situation as an extended outcome of an Israeli sin. The third eliminates even the possibility that such a sin can be expiated; it instead holds Israel’s existence as inherently evil. Between these two external forces, and with all the internal dysfunction of Palestinian politics, it is nearly impossible to expect the Palestinians to do what every other national liberation movement has done: seek political freedom and build a society from there. After three catastrophes in three generations, there is not even a hint of an alternative.</p>
<p>Three destructive and unnecessary wars put the Palestinians in the lamentable place they now inhabit. It’s impossible to know what the fourth will look like, but it’s unlikely it will resemble that or any of the previous three. The current violence has not sparked that war yet, but unless something dramatic changes in the political trajectories of both parties, something eventually will. And when it does, Israelis will pay a heavy and avoidable price — and the Palestinians an even larger one.</p>
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					<title>Chaos has consumed Israel</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2022/06/chaos-has-consumed-israel/?edition=us</link>
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						<![CDATA[Shany Mor]]>
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							<![CDATA[Anarchy rules (AHMAD GHARABLI/AFP via Getty Images)]]>
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							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Shany Mor</strong> is a lecturer political thought at Reichman University.</p>
]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_handle>ShMMor</unherd:twitter_handle>
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						<![CDATA[ is a lecturer political thought at Reichman University.]]>
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										<pubDate>Sun, 26 Jun 2022 23:03:43 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Mon, 27 Jun 2022 10:48:43 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Benjamin Netanyahu]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[Hamas]]></category>
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					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://old.unherd.com/?p=435667</guid>
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								<![CDATA[Disaster merchants are holding the country hostage]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>It’s all too easy to view the chaos of Israeli democracy as an outcome of close elections and irreconcilable differences. But elections have been close before, and fundamental disagreements on policy have barely registered since Naftali Bennet and Yair Lapid ended Benjamin Netanyahu’s 12-year reign with their “change coalition”. If anything, differences <em>inside</em> the coalition, comprising parties from the Right, the centre, the Left, and one Islamist party, were greater than any difference between it and the opposition.</p>
<p>As it turned out, there was no major diplomatic or military or economic crisis that put those differences to the test. There was no war, no painful peace negotiation, no wave of terrorism or runaway inflation. Instead, the drama has been internal, petty and personal.</p>
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<p>The political crisis which began in November 2018 seemed banal by the standards of parliamentary democracy. A senior minister resigned over some forgotten policy difference; a coalition lost its majority; new elections were called. The disagreement, regarding Israel’s policy towards the Hamas regime in Gaza, didn’t seem unusual. Nor did the characters in the drama seem particularly special. Defence Minister Avigdor Lieberman was once a close ally of Prime Minister Netanyahu, but had become his sworn rival. It’s a story you could find almost anywhere in almost any ruling coalition, especially one that had been in power for a decade.</p>
<p>The “early” elections called for 2019 weren’t even all that early. The previous election was in 2015. It was, in other words, a completely ordinary end for a comparatively stable government in a relatively long Parliament. There was nothing to indicate that this was the beginning of a crisis of governability — except, of course, for the Prime Minister’s burgeoning legal troubles.</p>
<p>Nothing in the outcome of that first election in April 2019 indicated that trouble lay ahead, either. Armchair constitutionalists from the English-speaking world had long bemoaned the ills of Israel’s chaotic proportional system. But in this election the two largest parties each secured 35 seats, the first time since 1996 that two parties won more than 30 seats and the first time since 1988 that two parties had won at least 35. And the Right bloc had a secure majority at 65 out of 120 Members.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2021/05/why-israel-erupted/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2021/05/why-israel-erupted/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/GettyImages-1232873479-e1621019557785-1.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2021/05/why-israel-erupted/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2021/05/why-israel-erupted/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Why Israel erupted</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2021/05/why-israel-erupted/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Shany Mor</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>But when Lieberman refused to join the rest of the Right in a Netanyahu-led coalition, Parliament dissolved without any government being formed. New elections were called, but the result was the same: no Government.</p>
<p>Throughout this period, and following the third round of elections in 2020, Netanyahu remained in charge of a caretaker government. Budgets weren’t passed, crucial positions in the civil service went unfilled, and the basic functioning of the state was impaired. It escaped nobody’s notice that this had the potential to benefit Netanyahu just as his trial for corruption was getting underway. It was a crisis Netanyahu never wanted and didn’t seek, but he and his supporters gradually realised that operating in crisis mode had its benefits.</p>
<p>The formation of a new government in 2020 after the third round of elections with Netanyahu’s rival Benny Gantz didn’t really end the crisis. A complicated rotation agreement was reached in the peak of the panic of the first wave of pandemic lockdowns and a general anxiety about the possibility of holding yet another election during the pandemic. But by blocking a budget from passing only a few months later, Netanyahu managed to dissolve Parliament before he would have needed to start the rotation; he sent Israel into a fourth round of elections, while still in charge of a caretaker Government.</p>
<p>The Israeli public was effectively told in no uncertain terms that it would not enjoy a functioning government unless it gave Netanyahu and his backers a solid majority in the Knesset. Nevertheless, the public, for the fourth consecutive time, did not live up to its end of the bargain.</p>
<p>So even though a new Government was formed without Netanyahu and without the Likud, and even though this Government entered office with the confidence of a parliamentary majority and surprisingly coherent coalition policy guidelines, the defeated bloc sought to undermine the legitimacy of the new Government and to obstruct any and all legislation regardless of the merits — in a manner more reminiscent of Gingrich and McConnell than anything seen in Israel’s undisciplined parliamentary tradition.</p>
<p>The now-former Prime Minister was routinely addressed by his supporters as “Prime Minister Netanyahu”. A campaign of harassment was conducted against MPs in the coalition who came from the Right, particularly from Prime Minister Bennett’s party. Bennett himself was routinely referred to as a “crook” (by supporters of a leader on trial for corruption, it bears mentioning), including in settings previously seen as outside the boundaries of politics, such as a Memorial Day ceremony for Israel’s fallen soldiers. And a kind of parliamentary obstructionism that has been the norm in the United States since the Nineties was brought to the Knesset, making even the most routine legislation impossible to pass unless it had the backing of every single member of all parties of the governing coalition, something which has never been the case in any Parliament.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2021/02/how-israel-won-the-vaccine-wars/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2021/02/how-israel-won-the-vaccine-wars/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/GettyImages-1231234087.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2021/02/how-israel-won-the-vaccine-wars/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2021/02/how-israel-won-the-vaccine-wars/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>How Israel won the vaccine wars</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2021/02/how-israel-won-the-vaccine-wars/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Shany Mor</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Barely one year old, the Bennett-Lapid Government already lost its working majority in Parliament thanks to defections from Bennett’s right-wing Yamina party — defections secured by dubious promises of jobs in future Likud-led governments. Despite this, it could have limped on as a minority Government until at least the deadline for the next budget in March 2023. Under normal political conventions, it might very well have done just that. But these are not normal times; the crisis was not over. So Bennett and Lapid announced that this Government had reached the end of its viability and the two set out to dissolve Parliament last week.</p>
<p>What has plunged Israel back into its state of political temporariness is, ironically, a piece of legislation relating to a much deeper and more existential temporariness which Israel has been living in since its lightning victory over three Arab armies 55 years ago. An emergency regulation passed by the Knesset in the weeks immediately following the Six Day War applied some Israeli civil and criminal law to Israelis in the occupied territories. As an emergency regulation, the law has to be renewed every five years.</p>
<p>There are many reasons why such an emergency regulation was necessary even in 1967, but its principal import is in regulating the lives of Israeli settlers living in the West Bank. It means that Israelis living in West Bank settlements are subject to Israeli income tax when they work, that their children’s schools are administered by the Israeli Ministry of Education, and that they are drafted into the Israel Defence Forces when they turn 18.</p>
<p>No one knows quite what it would mean for the law to expire. Israelis living in West Bank settlements might no longer be covered by Israel’s national health insurance; they might not be eligible for unemployment or other welfare benefits. It’s not clear that income tax could be collected from them. The Israel Police could not operate in the West Bank, and all police action would become the responsibility of the military, just as all criminal and civil proceedings would be the responsibility of military courts, none of which are staffed for such an endeavour. An Israeli wanted for a crime could slip across the Green Line into the West Bank and no police officer could legally arrest him. It’s not even entirely clear how the roughly half a million Israelis living in West Bank settlements could vote in a future general election.</p>
<p>A failure to renew the law would lead to legal chaos and materially hurt the very population that is the base of Netanyahu’s support, the West Bank settlers. But the opposition calculated that even in such an extreme case, that anger would be directed at the Government and in particular at Prime Minister Bennett, the “crook” who “betrayed” the Right in general and the settlers in particular. And so the entire opposition voted against renewing basic civil and political and social rights for the settler population that is their most loyal constituency. They didn’t even demand some petty or symbolic change to the legislation to gain their support. They demanded an end to the Government that was in power and which had achieved power, however narrowly, through entirely democratic means.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/03/what-zelenskyy-got-wrong-about-israel/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/03/what-zelenskyy-got-wrong-about-israel/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/GettyImages-1239366179-1-scaled-e1648054901722.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/03/what-zelenskyy-got-wrong-about-israel/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/03/what-zelenskyy-got-wrong-about-israel/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>What Zelenskyy got wrong about Israel</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/03/what-zelenskyy-got-wrong-about-israel/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Lahav Harkov</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>This wasn’t an impasse, but rather a hostage situation. Netanyahu, his party, and his bloc of Right-wing and religious satellite parties were essentially demanding to have power handed to them — despite not having a majority in Parliament — or they would plunge the country into chaos. That the population they were threatening to hurt most, West Bank settlers, was their most ardent and loyal public only served to emphasise that this was disaster bartering without even a thin veneer of policy difference.</p>
<p>If there is an international precedent for this kind of hostage situation, it is the 2011 American debt ceiling crisis, when Republicans in Congress threatened to bring the US into default despite there being no shortage of funds, counting on any blowback being blamed on the Obama administration. When you know the other side will be blamed for the chaos you engineer, all there is to stop you from pursuing it is perhaps love of country or some quaint notion of decorum. Absent those, it’s pure political profit. And, let’s be honest, a bit of a thrill too. The thrill of responsibility-free chaos was a big part of the attraction in both the debt ceiling holdup as well as the West Bank emergency regulations extension.</p>
<p>Just as no one was willing to contemplate an American default and the pointless financial destruction that would entail, no one here seriously entertained the idea that the emergency regulations in the West Bank would actually be allowed to expire. By convention, a law in Israel that is set to expire on a date that falls in the term of a caretaker government is automatically extended to three months past the date of the formation of a new government. This meant that the only way to release the hostage was for the government to end its tenure early, dissolve the Knesset, and schedule new elections.</p>
<p>An election is now scheduled for November this year, exactly four years since the coalition collapse which began the whole endless cycle. In those four years, Israel has spent more time in caretaker Governments than not, and the two short-lived coalitions that did govern did so under the terms of a new and untried arrangements of alternating Prime Ministers. One way or another, Israeli governance has been in a permanent state of temporariness for four years and counting.</p>
<p>One way or another, Netanyahu has never in those four years secured a majority in Parliament to back him for a full term in office. And if the most recent polls are any indication, he will not secure a majority in this upcoming fifth round either. Almost half the country wants to see him in power, but almost half, in a democracy, is not enough.</p>
<p>Chaos, then, isn’t just a side effect of this reality, and it isn’t just a coordination failure. But nor is it part of some grand masterplan to consume Israel’s democracy from within and replace it with some crude form of dictatorship. It has become an end itself. For the loose coalition that swept Netanyahu into power in 2009 and kept him there despite a few close calls for 12 years, the formula is simple: either we govern, or nobody does. Only a decisive outcome in either his trials or in a future election (or both) can bring an end to the madness, and neither seems to be in the offing.</p>
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					<title>Why Israel erupted</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2021/05/why-israel-erupted/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://stage.unherd.com/2021/05/why-israel-erupted/?edition=us#comments</comments>
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					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Shany Mor]]>
					</dc:creator>
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							<![CDATA[The Israeli Iron Dome (left) intercepts rockets fired by Hamas (right) (Photo by ANAS BABA/AFP via Getty Images)]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Shany Mor</strong> is a lecturer political thought at Reichman University.</p>
]]>
						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>ShMMor</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is a lecturer political thought at Reichman University.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Fri, 14 May 2021 23:30:55 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Fri, 21 May 2021 13:17:07 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Benjamin Netanyahu]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Israel]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Jerusalem]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Middle East]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[palestine]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Refugees]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://old.unherd.com/?p=126253</guid>
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								<![CDATA[Distorted narratives about Arab evictions have become a proxy for the entire conflict]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>That Sheikh Jarrah could become the focal point for the latest interminable bout of Israeli-Palestinian violence does not, on the face of it, seem to add up. Affluent and calm by East Jerusalem standards, it has none of the holiness of those contested sites in the Old City just to its south, none of the poverty and crowding of the Shuafat refugee camp just to its north, and none of the neglect and anarchy of parts of East Jerusalem that sit in a no man’s land beyond the concrete wall Israel hastily constructed during the Second Intifada.</p>
<p>That, presumably, is why it houses eight consulates from European countries which function as de facto embassies to the Palestinian Authority, whose administrative headquarters are actually in Ramallah, about 15 kilometres north of Jerusalem. It also is the centre of social and political life for a host of NGOs, consulate staff and activist organisations, and a hub for journalists who tend to be pretty friendly to the Palestinian cause. Indeed, if the revolving door of “humanitarian” NGOs and activist journalists has an axis, then it spins somewhere between the villas and hotel breakfast buffets of Sheikh Jarrah.</p>
<p>It is fitting, then, that the place has captured the attention of Palestinians and pro-Palestinian partisans: a decades-long property dispute over whether Arab families should be evicted from property claimed by Jewish owners has suddenly became a proxy for the entire Jewish-Arab conflict over Jerusalem. Almost overnight, a wave of violent protests exploded in Jerusalem, as surging nationalist and religious tensions erupted across the country.</p>
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<p>“Israeli law allows Jews to reclaim ownership of land they vacated in 1948, but denies Palestinians the right to reclaim the properties they fled from in the same war,” is how the <em><a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/07/world/middleeast/evictions-jerusalem-israeli-palestinian-conflict-protest.html">New York Times</a></em> described it. This was all too typical of the radically distorted narrative that has taken hold in the West. The conflict might be here in the Middle East, but the conversation about the conflict in Western capitals and campuses seems to have become a screen on to which irrelevant historical demons come to get projected.</p>
<p>But the facts of the case don’t quite fit so neatly on to these fashionable narratives and categories; the Arabs and Jews are in conflict because of their own histories and interests, and not because they are play-acting parts in a drama of guilt expiation.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2021/05/everyone-loses-in-israels-new-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2021/05/everyone-loses-in-israels-new-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/GettyImages-1316859301.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2021/05/everyone-loses-in-israels-new-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2021/05/everyone-loses-in-israels-new-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Political posturing won&#039;t save Israel</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2021/05/everyone-loses-in-israels-new-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Giles Fraser</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>The disputed homes cluster in what was once the small Jewish neighbourhood of Shimon Ha-Tzadik, which was founded in the late nineteenth century on land close to a revered tomb. It lay adjacent to Sheikh Jarrah, which has since grown to surround it. Flare-ups of violence occasionally forced Jewish residents to flee, most notably during an Arab attack on the neighbourhood in 1936. Later, following the Arab-Israeli war in 1948, the entire area came under Jordanian control, together with Jerusalem’s Old City and the rest of what came to be known as East Jerusalem.</p>
<p>As in so many wars fought in lands vacated by imperial powers, masses of people fled the fighting, usually to places that were under the control of their side of the conflict. Displacement was, naturally, much higher on the losing side — Jews fleeing Sheikh Jarrah and the Jewish Quarter of the Old City in 1948 were vastly outnumbered by Arabs fleeing parts of West Jerusalem. Compounding the humanitarian tragedy, displaced persons also left behind immovable property, often (but not always) on the other side of a new and hostile international boundary.</p>
<p>And so it was in what had once been Mandatory Palestine, the majority of which fell under Israeli rule and about a fifth under Jordanian rule. Both Jordan and Israel established Custodians for Absentee Property, roughly modelled on the British Custodian of Enemy Property, which took control of German and Italian property in Mandatory Palestine after 1939.</p>
<p>The amount of property held by the Israeli Custodian was much greater, and the handling of it remains controversial. The question of absentee property has long figured in debates about Arab-Jewish relations in Israel or peace talks with the Palestinians. But the issue of absentee property lurks in the background of contemporary political rows that seem superficially to have little to do with the conflict: for example, disagreements over the discrimination against Mizrahi immigrants (from Arab lands), the privatisation of kibbutzim, fees for national parks and even Sabbath laws.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2021/02/how-israel-won-the-vaccine-wars/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2021/02/how-israel-won-the-vaccine-wars/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/GettyImages-1231234087.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2021/02/how-israel-won-the-vaccine-wars/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2021/02/how-israel-won-the-vaccine-wars/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>How Israel won the vaccine wars</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2021/02/how-israel-won-the-vaccine-wars/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Shany Mor</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>On the Jordanian side of the Green Line there was much less absentee property to deal with, largely because the Jordanians were on the losing side of the war. They did conquer roughly one fifth of Mandatory Palestine, but that one fifth had very little Jewish property before the outbreak of hostilities. There were, after all, very few Arab military victories in that war in any part of Palestine that was inhabited by Jews.</p>
<p>The exceptions, of course, were in and around Jerusalem. Following 1948, several small agricultural communities around the city fell to the Jordanians and their inhabitants fled. And the eastern half of Jerusalem, including the Jewish Quarter of the Old City, was also conquered by Jordan and its remaining Jews were expelled under the terms of their surrender.</p>
<p>Both Jordanian and Israeli authorities were keen to divest themselves of absentee property as quickly as possible. Both also faced a tidal wave of refugees in urgent need of resettlement. In Jerusalem, displaced families on both sides were often housed in abandoned properties left by displaced families from the other side of the conflict.</p>
<p>In 1967 another war was fought in Jerusalem, this time with Israel prevailing over the Jordanians in the entire city, including Sheikh Jarrah. After the war, Israel annexed the formerly Jordanian part of Jerusalem (as well as other lands surrounding it) in a move that has not been internationally recognised. (Jordan relinquished its claim to East Jerusalem and the entire West Bank in 1988, but retains a special status over holy sites in the Old City in accordance with its 1994 peace treaty with Israel.)</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2021/04/adolf-eichmann-and-me/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2021/04/adolf-eichmann-and-me/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/GettyImages-51096886-e1618409795564-2.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2021/04/adolf-eichmann-and-me/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2021/04/adolf-eichmann-and-me/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Adolf Eichmann and me</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2021/04/adolf-eichmann-and-me/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Shaul Ladany</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>The annexation of East Jerusalem by Israel following the 1967 Arab-Israeli war created two odd legal challenges in the context of Israel’s 1950 Absentee Property Law; both of which cut to the heart of the dispute in Sheikh Jarrah. The law relates to property in Israel, and the determination that someone is an “absentee” based on, among other things, residing in an enemy state or territory during the period 1948-1950.</p>
<p>But now that East Jerusalem was part of Israel (according to Israeli law at least), and all its property owners — including those now in Sheikh Jarrah — were in Jordanian territory in 1948-50, their return could conceivably be described as a mass seizure of private property throughout East Jerusalem.</p>
<p>The Kafkaesque nature of the situation was further emphasised by an additional, more minor problem. Some of the abandoned property administered by the Jordanian Custodian had not been fully transferred to its new Arab owners. This meant that Israel was now administering small tracts of “enemy property” in East Jerusalem where the “enemies” with property deeds were Israeli Jews who had been forced to flee their homes 19 years earlier.</p>
<p>The law was updated in 1970 with the aim of addressing both problems. It determined that Arab residents of East Jerusalem could not be classified as “absentees”, and that absentee properties in East Jerusalem that were still held in guardianship could be claimed by the Jewish owners they were confiscated from.</p>
<p>This is how the claim on the Shimon Ha-Tzadik properties landed in the Israeli courts back in 1972. The Arab residents claimed that the Jordanian Custodian transferred ownership to them; but the court determined that what they had was a leasehold, and that therefore they were “protected tenants”, not owners. Crucially, a protected tenant cannot be asked to leave under any circumstance, except one: non-payment of rent. Which is exactly the situation here, with the residents of the properties in question refusing to pay rent for property which they believe they own.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2021/03/israels-vaccine-victory-wont-save-king-bibi/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2021/03/israels-vaccine-victory-wont-save-king-bibi/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/GettyImages-528637716-1.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2021/03/israels-vaccine-victory-wont-save-king-bibi/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2021/03/israels-vaccine-victory-wont-save-king-bibi/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Israel&#039;s vaccine victory won&#039;t save King Bibi</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2021/03/israels-vaccine-victory-wont-save-king-bibi/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Arieh Kovler</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>After being bounced across the judicial system for decades, a final verdict was due to be issued this week. For now, amid a shower of bombs, it has been postponed.</p>
<p>But the dispute has taken on a totemic value for East Jerusalem Palestinians, and for supporters of the Palestinian cause worldwide. For a certain lazy kind of commentary, viewing the Jewish state as the bearer of accumulated sin — as white settlers stealing indigenous land — is too tempting a narrative; facts be damned.</p>
<p>At some point, however, despite the ongoing violence, the Israelis and the Arabs might very well enter into a negotiation for a comprehensive settlement of claims. There were, after all, properties abandoned in this conflict not just by Arabs and Jews in Mandatory Palestine, but by Jews who fled Arab countries throughout the Middle East in the most heated years of the conflict. Such a comprehensive settlement would have to not only account for vast amounts of abandoned property, but it would probably have to also make some kind of reckoning with origins and course of the conflict.</p>
<p>That will certainly be a difficult task. But whatever happens, it would surely be better now for Israeli authorities to defuse the situation and find a creative solution to a tiny legal loophole that should never have become a symbol for anything.</p>
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					<title>How Israel won the vaccine wars</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2021/02/how-israel-won-the-vaccine-wars/?edition=us</link>
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						<![CDATA[Shany Mor]]>
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							<![CDATA[Did Israel get lucky? (Photo by Mostafa Alkharouf/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images)]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Shany Mor</strong> is a lecturer political thought at Reichman University.</p>
]]>
						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>ShMMor</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is a lecturer political thought at Reichman University.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Mon, 22 Feb 2021 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Tue, 23 Feb 2021 14:11:51 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Coronavirus]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Covid vaccine]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[Vaccine]]></category>
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								<![CDATA[The country was predisposed to succeed — but took a huge gamble]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>Israel’s remarkable vaccination success story might be less interesting if it were only pulling <em>slightly</em> ahead of comparable countries. But the difference is not one of degree. With more than 82 doses delivered per 100 citizens by the end of last week — compared with 26 for the UK, 17 for the US, and a scandalous 5.9 for the EU — Israel is significantly ahead of the pack.</p>
<p>But why is that? No doubt that’s the question governments across the world are currently attempting to answer, in the hope of replicating some of Israel’s success. But the truth is that the country’s vaccination rollout has been a unique victory — one that has emerged from a confluence of factors which, while individually common in other countries, Israel is alone in having.</p>
<p>Some of those factors are structural. Israel’s universal health system, for example, is built on a regulated service provided by <em>four</em> competing non-profit health service organisations, called “sick funds” — a bit like having four versions of the NHS. Every resident must be a member of a fund, which are financed by a small progressive health tax that ranges from 3-5% of a person’s income. In effect, the system combines the benefits of universal coverage with competition, though it is hardly alone in the world in doing so.</p>
<p>Far less common, though, is the extent of digitisation in the Israeli health system. Each fund maintains a fully digitised records and appointments system, integrated with smartphone apps, websites, and automated phone systems. Crucially, these records are directly connected to the Ministry of Health’s universal vaccination database. This meant that when the time came for organising Covid vaccination appointments, there was no new infrastructure to set up. Appointments were organised automatically for the people who most urgently needed them on platforms that were already familiar.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2021/02/have-londons-orthodox-jews-reached-herd-immunity/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2021/02/have-londons-orthodox-jews-reached-herd-immunity/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/GettyImages-4616704382-.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2021/02/have-londons-orthodox-jews-reached-herd-immunity/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2021/02/have-londons-orthodox-jews-reached-herd-immunity/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>How Covid ripped through London&#039;s Jews</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2021/02/have-londons-orthodox-jews-reached-herd-immunity/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Etan Smallman</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>But none of that would have mattered without an adequate vaccine supply. And this is where the Israeli government stepped in. Well before any vaccines were approved, senior officials were already signing deals with Moderna, Pfizer, AstraZeneca and others — as well as funding a domestically produced vaccine, which is still in clinical trials. They also began securing a large supply of syringes and needles, an element of the vaccine strategy which was surprisingly overlooked by other countries, most notably <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/feb/10/japan-pfizer-vaccine-doses-wrong-syringes" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">Japan</a>.</p>
<p>Of course, many countries put in early bids for vaccines before they were tested or approved. But while EU procurement was focused on leveraging the bloc’s enormous purchasing power to lower the price of vaccines, the Israelis knew there was little hope that a small peripheral country could drive a hard bargain. Working on the assumption that the costs of further lockdowns and hospitalisations would dwarf an inflated vaccine price, Israel prioritised buying as much of it as possible in the swiftest period of time. Exact figures are yet to be made public, but reports in the Israeli press suggests the government paid between double and triple the going rate.</p>
<p>Yet Israel did not just offer more money to get to the front of the queue. It also offered pharmaceutical companies anonymised real-time data on vaccine distribution, side effects, and efficacy — in effect turning its population into Phase IV trial. Data on this scale goes far beyond anything drug companies could obtain in even the largest clinical trials.</p>
<p>Still, while an adequate supply is crucial for a successful vaccination program, it hardly guarantees one. Indeed, it is Israel’s logistical operation, rather than its digitised record system and political decision-making, that ultimately ensured the country’s vaccination program was a success.</p>
<p>As soon as the vaccines arrive at Israel’s Ben Gurion Airport, they are taken straight to a centralised ultra-freeze facility just outside the airport. From there, three times a week, coordinated shipments of vaccine pallets are sent out to the four Israeli health organisations, as well as hospitals, prisons, army bases, purpose-built centres, drive-through facilities, and even mobile units stationed on weekend hiking trails. All are staffed by nurses from local hospitals and clinics which have seen reduced demand during the pandemic, as well as by paramedics and those specially trained to provide extra capacity in the months before the first vaccines arrived.</p>
<p>These centres process, on average, at least eight patients per hour per nurse. Last week, that meant that more than half of Israelis have received their first dose and more than a third have already received both — a figure made even more impressive when you consider that 30% of the population are under 16 and therefore ineligible for any vaccine (pending clinical trials on younger subjects).</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2021/02/why-the-eu-lost-the-vaccine-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2021/02/why-the-eu-lost-the-vaccine-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/GettyImages-1229642126.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2021/02/why-the-eu-lost-the-vaccine-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2021/02/why-the-eu-lost-the-vaccine-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Why the EU lost the vaccine war</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2021/02/why-the-eu-lost-the-vaccine-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Laura Spinney</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Israel’s approach has also adapted when necessary. Early on, a call centre to report possible side effects was established to prevent the telephone appointment system being clogged up and, even more important, to reduce A&amp;E visits to a bare minimum. Meanwhile, messaging for Israel’s diverse population has become more targeted: faced with low turnout in the first weeks in the Arab and ultra-Orthodox communities, authorities turned to social media and other outlets with tailored messages.</p>
<p>But, given that much of Israel’s vaccine roll-out benefitted from pre-existing infrastructure and policy decisions that are now too late to copy, is there anything that other countries can still do to try and replicate some of its success? The simple answer is: nobody knows for certain. But regardless of how easy they are to copy, there are two aspects of Israel’s vaccine operation that bear noting.</p>
<p>First, the criteria for the initial rollout were very broad and very simple. There was no list of at-risk professions and no list of pre-existing medical conditions that meant certain people were prioritised. Had there been, it’s safe to assume that call centres would have been deluged by those seeking exceptions, exemptions or early appointments. Instead, anyone over the age of 60 — a much lower cut-off than any other country — was invited to get vaccinated in the first three weeks, together with medical staff and anyone in “institutionalised” living (mostly care homes).</p>
<p>Though people in their 60s are not at a significantly high risk of dying from Covid, by vaccinating them early, the Israeli health organisations attended to most of the relevant pre-existing conditions, particularly diabetes and obesity. “The low initial age minimum covered nearly all of the co-morbidities anyway,” Dr Boaz Lev, who heads the Ministry of Health’s Advisory Committee on Pandemics and Vaccines, told me. “And it generated early momentum in a way that stricter criteria could not have.”</p>
<p>Such simple criteria were easy to understand and hard to resent. And the result was that, in the first month that vaccines were available, Israel and <a href="https://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/europe/how-denmark-is-administering-vaccines-at-three-times-the-rate-of-ireland-1.4457739" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">Denmark</a> were the only countries where supply actually became an issue. In the rest of Europe and North America, unused vaccines sat in freezers or, worse still, thrown away.</p>
<p>Which brings us to the second crucial aspect of the Israeli operation that observing governments should take to heart: from the very beginning, there was a strict policy of no wastage. Indeed, if there’s one motif to the entire Israeli effort, it’s the idea that one discarded vaccine constitutes a systemic failure. This meant that in small towns where there were leftover vials at the end of the day, residents received text messages inviting them to be vaccinated. Anyone near a vaccination centre where too many vials had been defrosted was also encouraged to get a jab. Even people under 60 could show up at the end of the day and, in the event that there were extra doses, could get vaccinated.</p>
<p>The no wastage policy has had three benefits. It will save money in the long term, as fewer vaccines will need to be purchased than would have been the case if many had been spoiled and discarded. It relieved pressure on the appointments system by discreetly giving vaccines to those people who, for whatever reasons, wanted them earlier than the criteria would allow and who would otherwise have burdened the system with phone calls. And, perhaps most importantly, it quickly introduced more of the vaccine into the community much earlier than would otherwise have been the case — thereby reducing the virus’s transmissibility.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2021/01/dont-call-israel-an-apartheid-state/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2021/01/dont-call-israel-an-apartheid-state/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/GettyImages-1230446948-e1610648338406.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2021/01/dont-call-israel-an-apartheid-state/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2021/01/dont-call-israel-an-apartheid-state/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Don&#039;t call Israel an apartheid state</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2021/01/dont-call-israel-an-apartheid-state/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Giles Fraser</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>What’s remarkable about this most Israeli aspect of the whole Israeli operation is how little consideration was given to it. When I approached officials from the sick funds, the Ministry of Health, and nurses on site with questions about the no wastage policy, they all spoke of it as being common sense; something almost automatic. Israelis who hear the story of Hassan <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/10/us/houston-doctor-fired-covid-vaccine.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">Gokal</a>, the Texas doctor fired for ensuring ten thawed doses would be injected rather than discarded, assume that they have stepped through the looking glass.</p>
<p>These aren’t, of course, logistical innovations that stand alone. A low minimum age at rollout can only really work where the initial supply is suitably large, and a policy of no wastage is only conceivable in a system of fully integrated and readily accessible digital records. In Israel, a leftover dose could be given to someone who happened by a vaccination facility because the nurse was able to swipe that person’s magnetic medical card and see that they have no allergies, no contraindications for the vaccine, no positive tests for the virus — and the person would leave with the appointment for the second dose already booked in the system.</p>
<p>It&#8217;s also worth noting that, in retrospect, Israel’s decision to push hard in the first three weeks was also a huge gamble. Indeed, it might have been more prudent in the first weeks of the vaccine rollout to ensure that they went only to those most acutely in need — those over 80, overweight, and over in assisted living facilities. No one knew for sure there would be a steady supply after the first batch.</p>
<p>But, as it turned out, it was the momentum of those initial three weeks and the reliable data it provided that convinced Pfizer and others that a steady airlift to Israel was worth their while. Before this was settled, it seemed that Israel might even have to pause first doses after the third week doses until further shipments could be secured.</p>
<p>As it turned out, talk of a vaccine shortage spurred even more people to show up, as citizens began to worry that they might end up waiting until late February or March to be eligible again. “I swear we didn’t plan it that way,” an official from the Ministry of Health who worked on a number of the vaccination PR campaigns told me. “But the truth is, it did more to sustain momentum and interest than any of the influencers we contracted.”</p>
<p>The question for Israel now is whether it can complete the task. Pandemic fatigue has set in, and the most recent lockdown has already been lifted despite the infection rate remaining far higher than it was when either of the previous two lockdowns were ended. And while Israel’s dense population and efficient public health system have proved invaluable, some of its demographic problems will be challenging to surmount. Vaccination rates are still lower in the Arab and ultra-Orthodox communities, precisely the places where infection rates are higher.</p>
<p>An even bigger challenge is Israel’s young population. Even if all Israeli adults were vaccinated, that would only amount to about 70% of the population, far below what experts estimate is necessary for herd immunity. By summer it is believed that a vaccine will be approved for those aged 12 and up, but the incentive structure for vaccinations will be flipped.</p>
<p>It is easy to persuade vulnerable 80-year-olds to sign up for a vaccine for a disease that might kill them. Whether parents of teenagers will be similarly inclined for an injection that, while absolutely necessary for society at large, only protects their child from what is likely a minor illness, remains to be seen. Meanwhile, for the rest of the world, such a dilemma is yet another cause for envy.</p>
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