The practical complications are clear: Ukrainian MPs would have to take the time to organise themselves and agree ceasefire terms across party lines, with the numbers involved presenting greater opportunities for Russian manipulation. That is before one considers the challenges of holding elections when voters are abroad or at the front. Additionally, Putin last week said he would be open to Slovakia’s offer to hold peace talks. These would presumably be hosted by Slovakian Prime Minister Robert Fico, who has drawn Kyiv’s ire for his friendly relations with the Kremlin.

From the West’s perspective, this is Russia’s most dangerous available strategy: Putin making positive signals but slowing the process with delays and arbitrary or unacceptable demands. The Kremlin’s hope would be to push forward on the battlefield as the Western focus switches from supplying weapons to supporting negotiations, with aid commitments to Kyiv thrown into limbo by doubts about the longevity of the conflict.

So how to get Russia to the negotiating table? Trump’s plan is to increase arms to Ukraine should Putin refuse. However, previous efforts have suffered logistical obstacles and the move could prove unpopular with his MAGA base. Another solution proposed by analysts is penalties for procrastination, with further sanctions on Moscow and more weapons deliveries to Kyiv for every month without a deal. Yet the Kremlin has proven it can work around sanctions, and Putin knows that the true peril for Ukraine is not running out of weapons but running out of men, making discussion from Trump’s camp of “arming Ukraine to the teeth” actually rather toothless.

The Russian President is also aware that Trump may soon lose patience with drawn-out negotiations and, with less leverage over Russia than he has over Ukraine, then pressure Kyiv into accepting unfavourable terms just to get a deal. Zelensky suggested at the end of November that a deal could be struck if his remaining territory comes “under the Nato umbrella”. Yet while he is saying what he could accept, Putin is insisting upon what he could not.

On 26 December, Russia’s leader rejected a suggestion — reportedly central to Trump’s plan — that Ukraine receive Nato membership within 20 years. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov then reiterated Moscow’s dissatisfaction with that idea, as well as the prospect of European peacekeepers in Ukraine. Clearly in no hurry, he rejected any engagement with Trump’s team until after the inauguration. Meanwhile, Lavrov’s announcement that Russia will abandon a moratorium on the deployment of intermediate and shorter-range nuclear-capable missiles shows Moscow will not desist from nuclear sabre-rattling. Putin has also signalled unwillingness to bend on limiting Ukraine’s military to 85,000 troops, permanent neutrality for Ukraine, and Kyiv withdrawing entirely from the Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions. These are the demands on which Ukraine may therefore find itself urged to compromise.

All deals begin with maximalist positions, but Putin is demonstrating no interest in actually compromising. He will be hoping he is not the only one. The Kremlin will be betting on the White House’s new “dealmaker” finding this particular agreement too dull and delayed to merit anything beyond a rushed effort.

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Bethany Elliott is a writer specialising in Russia and Eastern Europe.

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