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		<title>Andrei Sakharov - UnHerd</title>
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					<title>What we get wrong about Solzhenitsyn</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2022/03/what-we-get-wrong-about-solzhenitsyn/?edition=us</link>
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						<![CDATA[Blake Smith]]>
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							<![CDATA[This ain't Jordan Peterson's Solzhenitsyn. (Photo by MICHAEL EVSTAFIEV/AFP via Getty Images)]]>
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							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Blake Smith </strong>is a Harper-Schmidt Fellow at the University of Chicago. A historian of modern France, he is also a translator of contemporary francophone fiction and a regular contributor to <em>Tablet</em>.</p>
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						<unherd:twitter_handle>blejksmith</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[is a Harper-Schmidt Fellow at the University of Chicago. A historian of modern France, he is also a translator of contemporary francophone fiction and a regular contributor to <em>Tablet</em>.]]>
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										<pubDate>Tue, 15 Mar 2022 00:00:04 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Tue, 15 Mar 2022 12:52:11 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Andrei Sakharov]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Communism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Culture Wars]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Gulag]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Jordan Peterson]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Michel Foucault]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Russian Imperialism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Russian Nationalism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[The Gulag Archipelago]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[USSR]]></category>
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								<![CDATA[The West has forgotten his extreme nationalism]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>In the West Alexander Solzhenitsyn is accorded the status of a secular saint. In 1970 the Nobel committee lauded the “ethical force” of his writings as they awarded him literature’s greatest prize. Soon after, the publication of a French edition of <em>The Gulag Archipelago</em> was heralded by Michel Foucault, who used it to support his increasingly open attacks on orthodox Marxism (and borrowed its metaphor of the “archipelago” for his work on prisons in the West). More recently Jordan Peterson, who often decries Foucault’s intellectual influence, described writing a forward to a new edition of Solzhenitsyn’s opus as “the greatest honour of my life.” Across the political spectrum, Western thinkers have turned to Solzhenitsyn, finding in him a wintry, experience-honed critic of communism, a witness to one of a century’s greatest horrors, and a model of courageously free speech.</p>
<p>First imprisoned, then internally exiled from 1945 to 1956, and finally expelled from the Soviet Union in 1974, Solzhenitsyn seemed a living testament to the injustices he exposed. But while Western intellectuals and politicians acclaimed this aspect of his message, they largely ignored another side of it. Solzhenitsyn warned that a Russia free of Communism would not become Western. Russia would continue to oppose liberalism, and pursue geopolitical ambitions that would bring it into conflict with other powers.</p>
<p>In his famous 1978 <a href="https://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/alexandersolzhenitsynharvard.htm">commencement address at Harvard</a>, Solzhenitsyn warned that Westerners, with a combination of naïveté and arrogance, assumed that the world was moving towards a standard set by its capitalist liberal democracies. They could not understand that Russia, although currently “in Communist captivity”, was the heir to an “autonomous world” that would never be assimilated to the West. Indeed, the problem with Communism was that it, too, was a cosmopolitan ideology with ambitions for remaking the world, destroying Russia’s autonomous cultural traditions in the process.</p>
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<p>Solzhenitsyn’s speech is <a href="https://thefederalist.com/2018/06/08/40-years-later-alexander-solzhenitsyns-harvard-speech-blazes-beacon-renewal/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">fondly</a> <a href="https://quillette.com/2020/10/24/reflections-on-solzhenitsyns-harvard-address/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">remembered</a> by <a href="https://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/40-years-ago-today-when-solzhenitsyn-schooled-harvard/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">conservatives</a> in the West as a stinging critique of cultural liberalism. With his call for a return to traditional values, he appeals to the contemporary Western Right as a useful figure in our own culture wars. But his conjoining of liberalism and Communism as two aspects of a common assault on traditional non-Western cultures goes much further than a repudiation of ‘political correctness’. Asserting that the world is divided into distinct cultural zones, and opposing any ideology that on whatever premises puts our common humanity before their preservation, Solzhenitsyn implied that liberals would have little to look forward to from a post-Communist Russia.</p>
<p>Most Western observers at the time were too taken with Solzhenitsyn’s critique of the Soviet system to pay adequate attention to his views on the Russian past and warnings about the Russian future. However, some of his fellow dissidents and Western critics observed saw that Solzhenitsyn — and the Russian nationalism that he represented — represented a dark cloud on the horizon.</p>
<p>In 1974 the dissident Russian scientist <a href="https://www.nybooks.com/articles/1974/06/13/in-answer-to-solzhenitsyn/">Andrei Sakharov</a> noted that Solzhenitsyn argued against Communism less out of a desire for freedom at home and peace with the West. He believed that the author wanted more than to promote supposedly traditional values; Solzhenitsyn wanted to focus Russian energies on the military threat (which he took to be existential) posed by China, entering a new Cold War with its neighbour. The future Russian regime, for Solzhenitsyn, could not be a liberal democratic one imported from the West, but one shaped by an understanding of Russia’s dangerous geopolitical situation and particular history. The latter, Sakharov bitterly summarised, seemed to have taught Solzhenitsyn that “when accompanied by respect for law and by Orthodoxy the authoritarian system was not all that bad.”</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/02/rene-girards-apocalypse-is-now/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/02/rene-girards-apocalypse-is-now/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/15827-girardobit_teaser.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/02/rene-girards-apocalypse-is-now/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/02/rene-girards-apocalypse-is-now/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>René Girard&#039;s apocalypse is now</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/02/rene-girards-apocalypse-is-now/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Blake Smith</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>It was on this heading that, in a 1980 issue of <em>Foreign Affairs</em>, a group of <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/20040662?searchText=solzhenitsyn+france&amp;searchUri=%2Faction%2FdoBasicSearch%3FQuery%3Dsolzhenitsyn%2Bfrance%26so%3Drel&amp;ab_segments=0%2Fbasic_search_gsv2%2Fcontrol&amp;refreqid=fastly-default%3A22206e112c75924bc7d9738c25e529cb&amp;seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents" target="_blank" rel="noopener">American scholars</a> criticised Solzhenitsyn for his rosy image of pre-revolutionary Russia — a vision that elided, or falsified, many historical facts. Where he had argued that the Tsars tolerated dissident intellectuals and religious minorities (including Jews), historians observed that this was a fantasy.</p>
<p>The Russian empire under the Tsars organised massive surveillance programmes, and routinely imprisoned and executed suspects without trial. Far from tolerating minorities, it subjected Jews to humiliating restrictions and implicitly sanctioned pogroms. In the year 1905 alone, there were 690 documented pogroms (with over 3,000 reported murders) during the two weeks following the declaration of the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/October-Manifesto" target="_blank" rel="noopener">October Manifesto</a>. Nicholas II, according to one historian, regarded this violence as a form of “justified revenge” against subjects he considered to be politically suspect. The Russian revolution, although intended to overturn the old regime, perpetuated many of its signature domestic policies, from secret policing to anti-Semitism.</p>
<p>Solzhenitsyn was also criticised for exaggerating the differences between Tsarist and Soviet foreign policy. <a href="https://www.encyclopedia.com/religion/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/loebl-eugen" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Eugen Loebl </a>argued that he downplayed the continuities between the imperialist policy of the Tsars and that of the Soviet leadership, which both sought, under the pretext of Christianity or Communism, to extend Russian power over subject nations. Loebl had a personal stake in this critique. He had been a member of Czechoslovak Communist government in the Sixties, an era of liberalising reform — cut short when the Soviets invaded the country to restore Communist orthodoxy and obedience to Moscow. From Loebl’s perspective, this invasion was continuous with Russia’s nineteenth-century expansion into Eastern Europe and violent suppression of nationalist and democratic movements throughout the region. The Tsars and Communists justified their policies in terms of apparently opposite ideologies, but their common aim was Russian power.</p>
<p>Countering Loebl, Solzhenitsyn argued that Communism was an “international or even metaphysical entity”. To understand it as something akin to Nazism — an ideology of national self-aggrandisement — would lead to disaster. In the West, opponents of Communism, especially on the centre and Right, often linked the Soviet regime and the Third Reich as examples of ‘totalitarianism’, a concept popularised by Hannah Arendt. Solzhenitsyn, however, stressed that there were important differences between the Nazis and the Communists.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/03/the-russia-we-have-lost/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/03/the-russia-we-have-lost/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/GettyImages-1238727310-1.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/03/the-russia-we-have-lost/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested article</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/03/the-russia-we-have-lost/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The Russia we have lost</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/03/the-russia-we-have-lost/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Ben Judah </a></p></div></a></div>
<p>After the Nazi invasion of the USSR in 1941, many in the Soviet Union had believed German rule might be preferable to Communism — particularly to the murderous purges, famines, and population transfers that characterised Stalin’s reign in the Thirties. Soldiers deserted the Red Army in huge numbers during the first weeks of Operation Barbarossa. It was not only oppressed peoples, such as Balts and Ukrainians, who did so, but Russians as well.</p>
<p>In spite of sympathy from Russians and non-Russians alike, Nazi <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Generalplan_Ost" target="_blank" rel="noopener">policy</a> towards the region was openly genocidal, founded on a project of eliminating local populations to make room for future German colonisation. Hitler, Solzhenitsyn argued, “had declared war on the Russian people as such, leaving them no way out”. Russians thus rallied to the Soviet regime not out of any loyalty to Communism, or sense that it represented their ‘national’ interests, but because they had no other choice.</p>
<p>There was an important lesson for the West in Germany’s defeat, Solzhenitsyn argued. The Nazis had conflated Russia and the Soviet Union, and thus forced Russians who would have accepted German rule to rally around Stalin. Advised by figures such as Loebl, the West risked making the same mistake of seeing “the threat now looming over the world as Russian rather than as Communist”. This would have a “devastating outcome”. While Russians despised their Communist government and yearned for liberation, they would oppose any power that threatened their existence as a people.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/03/populists-are-losing-this-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/03/populists-are-losing-this-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/GettyImages-872780694-scaled.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/03/populists-are-losing-this-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested article</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/03/populists-are-losing-this-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Populists are losing this war</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/03/populists-are-losing-this-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Eric Kaufmann </a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Solzhenitsyn was warning the West that if it hoped for friendly relations with a future, post-Communist Russia, it would have to accept Russian nationalism — and attendant demands for ‘security,’ often understood in expansionist terms by successive Russian governments. Loebl, meanwhile, warned that Russian nationalism, whether it disguised itself as Communist or anti-Communist, would inevitably mean Russian imperialism in Eastern Europe. Both warnings, perhaps, were true.</p>
<p>Already in 1980 Western leaders reading the exchange between Solzhenitsyn and Loebl might have foreseen that there was a dangerous tension at the heart of their hopes for the collapse of the Eastern Bloc. If Russian anti-Communists like Solzhenitsyn sympathised with their ideological opposition to the Soviet regime, they did not agree with Eastern European dissidents such as Loebl that Russian power was an inherent danger to peace. A common hostility to Communism, however, could conceal for a time fundamentally different geopolitical visions — which have been brought into terrible clarity in recent weeks, as Russia began its assault on Ukraine.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/03/the-dark-heart-of-russia/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/03/the-dark-heart-of-russia/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/GettyImages-94984802-e1648463685245.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/03/the-dark-heart-of-russia/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested article</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/03/the-dark-heart-of-russia/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Why Russian leaders kill</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/03/the-dark-heart-of-russia/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Costică Brădățan </a></p></div></a></div>
<p>The West’s enthusiasm for Solzhenitsyn, celebrating his anti-Communist resistance while ignoring his rehabilitation of Tsarist illiberalism and imperialism, is of a piece with two signal failures of our collective political understanding during the last decades of the twentieth century. First, the United States supported Islamic terror networks to oppose the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in the Eighties, only to find itself their target after the collapse of the USSR. Still more to its detriment, the West pursued in those years, and since, a strategy of economic engagement with China, in the hope that integration in the global capitalist economy would <a href="https://www.iatp.org/sites/default/files/Full_Text_of_Clintons_Speech_on_China_Trade_Bi.htm" target="_blank" rel="noopener">lead to political reform</a> in Beijing.</p>
<p>As with Solzhenitsyn, Western leaders failed to perceive that sharing temporary tactical goals with non-Western intellectuals, militants, and regimes was only a short-lived suspension of the always-present possibility of renewed enmity, based on enduring, and perhaps irreconcilable, visions of the world. Liberal democracy, based as it is on a cosmopolitan understanding of human rights, often misperceives a world which does not share its assumptions about those rights. For the duration of the present crisis in Ukraine, at least, such misperceptions will be impossible to sustain — and their resumption will make a disastrous situation even worse.</p>
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					<title>Vladimir Putin&#8217;s war on history</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2022/01/vladimir-putins-war-on-history/?edition=us</link>
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						<![CDATA[John Lloyd]]>
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							<![CDATA[Little brother. Credit: Mikhail Svetlov/Getty]]>
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							<![CDATA[<p><strong>John Lloyd</strong> is a contributing editor to the <em>Financial Times </em>and is writing a book on the rise of the New Right in Europe.</p>
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															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is a contributing editor to the <em>Financial Times </em>and is writing a book on the rise of the New Right in Europe.]]>
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										<pubDate>Thu, 20 Jan 2022 00:01:25 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Thu, 20 Jan 2022 12:00:37 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Andrei Sakharov]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Arseny Roginsky]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Boris Yeltsin]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Democracy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Memorial]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Mikhail Gorbachev]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Nato]]></category>
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								<![CDATA[The closure of Memorial shows the fragility of Russia]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>Vladimir Putin came to the world’s notice, in 2000, styled as a New Russian Democrat. He had been an aide to the charismatic Petersburg reformist mayor, Anatoly Sobchak. His assumption of the supreme political office of president — after a rapid series of promotions — was blessed by the retiring Boris Yeltsin, an idiosyncratic ruler, often absent from duty but never backing down from his decision to finish with communism and look west for models of governance.</p>
<p>Putin’s first, modest speeches were shaped for Western applause. He suggested Russia might join Nato. He embraced the freedoms of the media and speech. He gave a book length interview where he revealed that he had, under his mother’s influence from 1993, embraced Orthodox Christianity. In his <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2000/05/08/world/putin-s-inaugural-address-we-believe-in-our-strength.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">first inauguration speech</a>, in May 2000, he said, “the path to a free society was not simple and easy: in our history there have been tragic and bright pages. The construction of a democratic state is far from complete, but much has already been done.”</p>
<p>The façade which he and his aides had constructed during these first months soon crumbled. The rackety, already corrupt and incomplete democracy Putin inherited has, in the 22 years since that speech, been undone. Among the most shocking, tragic acts of undoing came last month, a little before Christmas: the central offices of Memorial, a human rights group, were <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/dec/28/russian-court-memorial-human-rights-group-closure" target="_blank" rel="noopener">closed</a>.</p>
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<p>Memorial was founded, in the dying years of the Soviet Union, by Andrei Sakharov, the nuclear scientist and human rights activist and the historian Arseny Roginsky. Sakharov had been released from internal exile by Mikhail Gorbachev; Roginsky was once imprisoned for publishing a document named &#8220;Memory&#8221; — a doomed effort to hold the mass incarcerations of the Stalinist period to account. Memorial took on Roginsky’s lone work. It had research offices in the main camp zones. It was backed by large support from abroad and researchers devoted to often savage discoveries. Memorial would diligently publicise their findings.</p>
<p>While a reporter in Moscow, I flew, in the early winter of 1992, to Vorkuta in the Arctic Circle to report on the campaign for the coming parliamentary elections of Yegor Gaidar, the prime minister. Vorkuta had been built in the early Thirties to be the administrative hub for a network of camps, whose prisoners dug coal from anthracite mines. Gaidar had been booked to give a speech in the town’s cultural centre. The town council organised a good show by local dancers, musicians, actors and singers. When the small, tubby prime minister came on stage, he was given a cheer — a reception which soured quickly. Gaidar, a brave and principled man, spoke of the town’s past as a centre for oppression. Scattered at first, then louder, came the hisses and boos. When Gaidar left, I struggled to get near him because of the crush of people angrily mobbing him, his security detail ploughing their way through.</p>
<p>It was the first time I had seen how much the invoking of the past as a horror struck people as an insult. These citizens — who had a tough life in that freezing city, which is now <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-vorkuta-soviet-mining-abandoned-gulag-arctic-exodus/31196830.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">rapidly becoming a ghost town</a> — wanted a sense that they and their parents and grandparents, who had staffed the city-prison, had honour. Gaidar was impugning it.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/01/what-the-west-gets-wrong-about-putin/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/01/what-the-west-gets-wrong-about-putin/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/GettyImages-1364191853-scaled-2.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/01/what-the-west-gets-wrong-about-putin/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/01/what-the-west-gets-wrong-about-putin/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>What the West gets wrong about Putin</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/01/what-the-west-gets-wrong-about-putin/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Harald Malmgren </a></p></div></a></div>
<p>By closing Memorial, Putin will, for a substantial number of Russians, gain rather than lose points, as he and his advisors must have calculated. Yet does this mean — as many commentators, Russian and foreign, now believe — that the suppression of an institute dedicated to exhuming the truth foreshadows a descent into a state comparable to Nazism, or Stalinism in the Thirties?</p>
<p>I do not believe so.</p>
<p>Hitler and Stalin advertised themselves, from the beginning, as tyrants. Tyrants in a noble cause, they believed. Tyrants of necessity, who would lead their people though sacrifice into societies of freedom and plenty, underpinned by ideologies and force which removed enemies. Putin came in as an awkward democrat and progressed, by degrees, into a fitful authoritarian, finding his mission not before but as he ruled — a mission to reconstitute as much of the lost Soviet Union as was possible. And among many — though they tend to be the older generations — that’s a fine ambition. Not for so many of the young.</p>
<p>Putin isn’t popular with the rising generation. Polls by the Levada Institute in <a href="https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2021/02/04/dissatisfaction-with-putin-surges-among-young-russians-levada-poll-a72835" target="_blank" rel="noopener">February</a> and <a href="https://www.levada.ru/en/2021/10/13/vladimir-putin-11/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">October</a> last year show that nearly half of 18-24 year olds disapprove of the President’s performance, and only one third wish him to be re-elected. An <a href="https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2021/12/17/how-do-russians-feel-about-a-war-with-ukraine-a75847" target="_blank" rel="noopener">essay</a> by the commentator Andrei Kolesnikov last month, based on polls by the Carnegie Institute, detailed a strong aversion to a war with Ukraine, and a positive view of the country by two thirds of the 18-24 year olds. Putin doesn’t have the force, the ideology or, likely, the stomach for mass repression, once wide-scale protests begin over a bloody war with the nearest neighbour.</p>
<p>This isn’t the Thirties. Then, throughout the industrialised world, the globalisation of the early 20th century had failed. Depression ruled. Now globalisation is unavoidable. Russia is ill-equipped to benefit properly from it, since its feeble attempts at industrial modernisation have yielded little. But it is <a href="https://adamtooze.substack.com/p/chartbook-68-putins-challenge-to" target="_blank" rel="noopener">energy rich</a>: it is crucial to keeping much of Europe, especially Germany, supplied with light and heat. Its elite, many of the members corruptly enriched by the Putin presidency, wish to be able to spend their money in Europe, North America and the Caribbean. When Stalin was dictator he possessed an ideology that could be used to excuse the hideous consequences of his rule. Putin&#8217;s corruption, dependent on international cooperation from tax havens and the City of London, is more limited in scale.</p>
<p>Russia&#8217;s ever-closer relations with China also impose limits on Putin. In Stalin&#8217;s day, the Soviet Union was the inspiring model, the “big brother”, for Mao Tse Tung; now China has assumed the big brother role. The CCP, learning from the sight of Gorbachev <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2021/12/what-china-learned-from-the-collapse-of-the-ussr/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">giving the basis of communism away</a>, has kept its ability to inspire fear, identify and suppress its enemies — presently, the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/11/16/world/asia/china-xinjiang-documents.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Uighurs</a>. Nevertheless, even more than for Russia, globalisation is the lifeblood of communism with Chinese characteristics. China seeks to acquire at least equal status with the United States, but not to destroy it, whether through ideology or war. It, too, has limits, and will enforce them on little brother.</p>
<p>What options for containment are available to the West, beyond registering revulsion at the closure of a great institution such as Memorial? The looming possibility of an invasion of Ukraine sharpens the question.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2021/12/the-closing-of-the-russian-mind/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2021/12/the-closing-of-the-russian-mind/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/GettyImages-490419826-scaled-e1638469893429-1-copy.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2021/12/the-closing-of-the-russian-mind/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2021/12/the-closing-of-the-russian-mind/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The closing of the Russian mind</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2021/12/the-closing-of-the-russian-mind/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> John Lloyd</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>The answer is mostly obvious. It is to recognise the nature of the Russian (and Chinese) regimes, dedicated to covert subversion in Western states — and to strengthen democracies against them. In part this is military, where the US remains unparalleled and where Nato leaders last week, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/01/14/world/europe/nato-russia-ukraine-europe.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">according to the <em>New York Times&#8217;</em></a> Steven Erlanger, “spoke, in talks with the Russians, with exceptional unity for a 30-member alliance whose commitment to collective defence was increasingly in question&#8221;. Erlanger quoted Anna Wieslander, chair of Sweden’s Institute for Security and Development, as saying that “Deterring Russia is in the DNA of Nato because Russia is what can bring existential threats to European nations”. Sweden, like Finland, is not a Nato member, but both the Swedish Prime Minister Magdalena Andersson and the Finnish Premier Sauli Niinistö have recently indicated that they <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2022-01-10/russia-is-pushing-finland-and-sweden-toward-nato" target="_blank" rel="noopener">might now argue for membership</a>. Putin’s threats have caused Nato’s popularity to surge — not, presumably, what he wished for.</p>
<p>As important as military strength is the renewal of our ideology, which is based on freedom, and depends on states with democratic politics which foster civil society. <a href="https://www.state.gov/summit-for-democracy/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">The Democracy Summit</a>, hosted by President Joe Biden in December, was encouraging: as was his earlier recognition that democracy “doesn’t happen by accident: we have to defend it, fight for it, strengthen it, renew it”. Renewing it, above all, by elevating the fight against corruption to being a constant theme in politics and in the media. Without this struggle, Western societies, where the majority of people are just getting by, will continue to fragment. Civic life in a democracy must be exemplary. Democracy and freedom certainly don’t happen by accident — and they aren’t sustained by being taken for granted.</p>
<p>Putin&#8217;s Russia warns of what happens when corruption goes unchecked. Memorial was dedicated to revealing the tragedies of history, and for that Putin&#8217;s government considered it a threat and an outrage. The state&#8217;s prosecutor charged them with being “traitors to the motherland and Nazi collaborators” — a grimly ironic reversion to the Stalinist language of the past. Such lies can only be the product of fragility, and fear. The Russian government knows that a generation is growing full of men and women intolerant of a state fashioned to make authoritarian leaders rich, and history what Vladimir Putin says it is.</p>
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