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		<title>Ayatollah Khamenei - UnHerd</title>
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					<title>Mojtaba Khamenei: stooge of the Revolutionary Guards</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2026/04/mojtaba-khamenei-stooge-of-the-revolutionary-guards/?edition=us</link>
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										<unherd:main_theme>Iran</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Ali Ansari]]>
					</dc:creator>
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																<unherd:article_ranking>2</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA['Sooner or later, Mojtaba Khamenei will have to reveal himself.' (Amir Kholousi / Getty)]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Ali Ansari is the Professor of Iranian History and Founding Director of the Institute for Iranian Studies at the University of St Andrews and a Senior Policy Fellow at Policy Exchange. </span><span style="font-weight: 400;">He is also President of the British Institute of Persian Studies.</span></p>
<p><br style="font-weight: 400;" /><br style="font-weight: 400;" /></p>
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															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[<span style="font-weight: 400;">Ali Ansari is the Professor of Iranian History and Founding Director of the Institute for Iranian Studies at the University of St Andrews and a Senior Policy Fellow at Policy Exchange. </span><span style="font-weight: 400;">He is also President of the British Institute of Persian Studies.</span>

<br style="font-weight: 400;" /><br style="font-weight: 400;" />]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Thu, 02 Apr 2026 23:01:30 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Fri, 03 Apr 2026 21:24:32 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ayatollah Khamenei]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[irgc]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[islamic republic]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://stage.unherd.com/?p=1054877</guid>
																												<description>
								<![CDATA[The Ayatollah-in-Hiding doesn’t call the shots]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>A theory currently making the rounds is that the war has made the Islamic Republic “more hardline” — with proponents pointing to the consolidation of power by the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), and the succession of Mojtaba Khamenei. All this, it is argued, might have been avoided had the US and Israel not launched their war. Khamenei Sr may have died peacefully in his bed, and the Islamic Republic might have made a liberal turn with the appointment of a moderate leader. Seasoned observers of Iran would recognise that the word “might” is doing some heavy lifting, while those Iranians at the sharp end of last January’s savagery would fairly wonder just how much more hardline the regime was planning to be.</p>
<p>The notion that the IRGC is making a bid for power that had long evaded it is, frankly, risible. It is no doubt taking advantage of the state of emergency to reinforce its position, but then all militaries, even in non-authoritarian states, enjoy a position of pre-eminence in time of war. There may be an argument that it will seek to prolong the war because its leaders are more fearful of the peace that will follow; but it is altogether different to suggest that the IRGC’s seizure of power has been predicated on the conflict itself. The rise of the Revolutionary Guards has long been in gestation, and their present dominance as a political-military conglomerate is tied closely to the related rise of Mojtaba Khamenei.</p>
<p>Mojtaba first emerged into the political limelight in 2005, when he was accused by one of the contenders in that year’s presidential elections, Mehdi Karrubi, of having interfered to ensure the success of his protegé, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Ever since, his political activities have been a matter of intense controversy in the Islamic Republic, not least because of his character and the hereditary trajectory his emergence implied. The 2005 presidential election was intended to be the crowning moment of the rise of the hardline “principle-ists” — coined from the Persian translation for “fundamentalist” — and the eclipse of the reformists who had ostensibly dominated the political scene since the election of Mohammad Khatami in a shock landslide victory in 1997. So horrified had hardliners been at this reformist turn that they determined to eliminate it as a political force.</p>
<p>Under the ideological mentorship of the uncompromising authoritarian, Ayatollah Misbah-Yazdi, himself also a mentor to Mojtaba, the hardliners developed a framework for the seizing of power, centred on the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei. Around him, they built a cult of personality. For Misbah-Yazdi, the Supreme Leader was far more than a constitutional position — it was a sacred calling, a pillar of belief against which one’s identification as a true Muslim could be defined. Indeed, as Misbah-Yazdi contentiously argued, to deny the principle of the Guardianship of the Jurist (<i>velayat-e faqih</i>) — in other words, to deny the Supreme Leader — was to deny one of the principal pillars of Islam. Adherence to the constitution of the Islamic Republic became a sacred duty, and to challenge it was heresy.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;The rise of the Revolutionary Guards has long been in gestation.&#8221;</div>
<p>To reinforce this conviction, Khamenei was increasingly identified as the “Ali of the Age”, in emulation of the Imam Ali, whose hereditary successors were considered to be the rightful leaders of the Islamic community, and whose followers became known as Shia. This was an extraordinary claim to make, and few outside the “elect” either understood or appreciated its significance. It was first publicly promoted on Iranian television in the early 2000s, when one Ali Larijani was in charge of state broadcasting. More suspicious types were wary of this development, and its implication of hereditary succession, but when Karrubi raised the red flag in 2005, he was dismissed as a sore loser.</p>
<p>Misbah-Yazdi’s project incorporated the IRGC, which became the armed wing of the movement. Having moved away from the “brotherhood in arms” of the Iran-Iraq War, it had through the Nineties reshaped itself as an ideological army with growing business interests, though these were as yet modest. When, in 1999, it challenged the then-reformist president to suppress student discontent “or else”, it found itself at the sharp end of a rebuke. Were the Revolutionary Guards not aware, retorted Khatami, that the father of the revolution himself, Ayatollah Khomeini, had told the armed forces to stay out of politics? The IRGC’s response, albeit at this stage tempered by realities, was that as a <i>Revolutionary</i> Guard, it existed to protect the revolution: from enemies both without and within.</p>
<p>With this ideological and material framework established, the plan was now to overturn the popularity of the reformists with a populist of their own. The IRGC found its man in Ahmadinejad, a hitherto-unknown lecturer close to the Basij militia. Ahmadinejad was generally dismissed as an obsessive who was preoccupied in his relationship with the “Hidden Imam”, the twelfth of the hereditary Shia imams who had disappeared, or gone into “occultation”, sometime in the 9th century. Even revolutionary diehards found him tiresome. But Ahmadinejad did have the populist touch and found favour with the Basij, which could provide the infrastructure for his forthcoming campaigns.</p>
<p>In the 2003 “local elections”, an extremely low turnout ensured Ahmadinejad’s emergence as the mayor of Tehran, providing him with a platform for his populism. Parts of the Western media were suitably impressed by the dynamic “Dr” Ahmadinejad, even as Iranians mocked his risible PhD thesis on traffic management. Ahmadinejad’s religious susceptibilities, and his folksy superstitions, made him the ideal candidate for the project to come, though his pretensions were eventually to sour his relationship with Ayatollah Khamenei. Initially, however, Khamenei had nothing but praise, and his son was dispatched to arrange Ahmadinejad’s ensuing electoral victories. In 2004, the parliamentary elections were rigged to ensure a principle-ist victory; in 2005, with Mojtaba’s management of the Basij, Ahmadinejad stormed from being a nobody to the prime contender in a matter of weeks.</p>
<p>Karrubi, who everyone expected to be in the run-off, was not impressed by this turn of events, and made his feelings felt. At this stage, some reformists warned about the development of an “Islamic monarchy”, pointing to the new sense of deference that was accorded to Khamenei, notably including hand-kissing. But few ventured further, or else considered hereditary succession a remote possibility. Such things, it was argued, went against the “principles” of the revolution. It did not, however, go against tradition, be it Persian or Shia, nor did it account for the practicalities of retaining power in an Islamic Republic that was inexorably shedding its republican skin.</p>
<p>If there were any doubts as to the direction of travel, these were laid to rest in the &#8220;Green Movement&#8221; protests of 2009, the suppression of which Mojtaba was widely involved in. It was in this period of heightened crisis that Misbah-Yazdi made the extraordinary claim that, since Ayatollah Khamenei was the replacement of the Hidden Imam, obedience to him —  and by extension, to the president he approved — equated to obedience to God. This claim was so shocking, not least to many traditional clerics, that it was suppressed in the press. But the cult was clearly now well established; opponents were decried as heretics and therefore beyond the law; and concerns over a planned dynastic succession had people voicing concerns about an “Umayyad” succession — a reference to the first Caliphal dynasty which Shias in particular condemn as the establishment of an Arab kingdom.</p>
<p>With the Green Movement crushed, it should have been apparent that the theoretical and practical justifications for dynastic succession were being put firmly in place. (When I’ve made this point from time to time since 2009, it was dismissed as incompatible with the “republican” principles of the revolution, with one analyst memorably telling me they would “eat their hat” if it ever happened. I hope it’s tasty).</p>
<p>A renewed tolerance of the idea of “monarchy” gathered pace in this period. Ahmadinejad systematically stripped the republican institutions of any real power, transferring them to the revolutionary organs of power: the Supreme Leadership and the IRGC. The institutional emasculation that took place was widely commented on. Even conservatives noted that parliament had been stripped of any effective power, with a succession of rigged elections stuffing it with hardline apparatchiks who competed for the favour of the Supreme Leader. The Guardian Council, whose membership was already partly nominated by the Supreme Leader, became another cypher, while the Assembly of Experts, which ostensibly existed to hold the Supreme Leader to account, became a talking shop of aging clerics — who increasingly pointed out that their role was not to select the new Leader, but merely to recognise whomsoever God had chosen.</p>
<p>This, in short, was government by personality, not institutions, and it all revolved around the personality of Ali Khamenei, the Ali of the Age, and the replacement — not representative — of the Hidden Imam. It is testament to the boldness of this idea that many resisted it as antithetical to the spirit of the Islamic Republic. But the “Islamic Republic” was itself an innovation, not only in its republican turn but in its application of Khomeini’s notion of the Guardianship of the Jurist. For many principle-ists, indeed, the Islamic Republic was merely a transitory affair towards the much purer Islamic state shorn of any democratic heresies.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/03/the-return-of-medieval-diplomacy/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/03/the-return-of-medieval-diplomacy/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/GettyImages-2246892227.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/03/the-return-of-medieval-diplomacy/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/03/the-return-of-medieval-diplomacy/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The return of feudal diplomacy</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/03/the-return-of-medieval-diplomacy/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Malise Ruthven</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Meanwhile, Mojtaba was quietly rising up the ranks of the clerical hierarchy, being promoted as an “ayatollah” in his forties, a remarkably young age for such an achievement. Later, ostensibly in order to broaden his appeal, some suggested that he would be Iran’s MBS. Those who were familiar with him indicated that he was more ruthless than his father, but without the oratorical skills. None of this was heavily publicised, but those on the inside were aware, and Khamenei always demurred when the question of the succession came up. During Rouhani’s presidency, and the focus on the nuclear negotiations, such issues took a back seat. But following Ibrahim Raisi’s “election” to the presidency in 2021, the question emerged again, in large part because some wondered whether Raisi himself might be being groomed to take the elder Khamenei’s role.</p>
<p>Given his background and character, this was always unlikely, and the reality was that Raisi’s engineered rise to the presidency was done to facilitate Mojtaba’s eventual succession as Supreme Leader. Such was speculation that the elder Khamenei was eventually forced to deny such a possibility, albeit indirectly through an intermediary. He never publicly spoke about it himself, thereby retaining a measure of plausible deniability. But no one basides the most naive could imagine that this, in the best traditions of Iranian political culture, was anything but an exercise in dissimulation, a non-denial denial.</p>
<p>In other words, the succession of Mojtaba Khamenei and the restoration of the hereditary principle has long been in train. His rise has been tied closely with that of the IRGC, and has been part of a project to emasculate the republic and replace it with an Islamic autocracy defined by charismatic leadership. The resilience of the system is not “institutional” — this is not a constitutional system in any meaningful sense of the word; no one loses sleep over the semantics of the constitution — but reflective of personal networks whose allegiance is not to the state but to the Supreme Leader as the manifestation of the revolution which he himself defines.</p>
<p>While it was not illogical to target Ayatollah Khamenei in the first strike of the war, it was far from risk-free. His death no doubt demoralised the faithful, but it probably angered and energised them too. They would have been acutely aware that they had nothing to lose and everything to lose. They also likely know that, following the massacre in January, they can expect as much mercy from the Iranian population as they themselves have shown. It has proved a clarifying moment in a manner they may not have immediately understood; they are bound together as much by their fear of the wider public as their devotion to the Supreme Leader.</p>
<p>In these circumstances, it is unsurprising that the IRGC moved swiftly to have Mojtaba declared his father’s heir. Khamenei, they declared, had returned rejuvenated, the charismatic succession was secure, and the allegiance of the faithful could be counted on. Mojtaba has nonetheless remained very much hidden, his mystique intact, his charisma sustained and managed. His IRGC handlers may want to keep it that way. But, sooner or later, he will have to reveal himself — and then his charismatic authority will truly be put to the test.</p>
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					<title>How to end the Iran war</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2026/03/how-to-end-the-iran-war/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://stage.unherd.com/2026/03/how-to-end-the-iran-war/?edition=us#comments</comments>
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										<unherd:main_theme>Middle East</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Edward Luttwak]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/edward_luttwak-1.jpg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>2</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[Thanks Obama. (AFP/Getty)]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Professor Edward Luttwak</strong> is a strategist and historian known for his works on grand strategy, geoeconomics, military history, and international relations.</p>
]]>
						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>ELuttwak</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is a strategist and historian known for his works on grand strategy, geoeconomics, military history, and international relations.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Tue, 17 Mar 2026 00:02:02 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Tue, 17 Mar 2026 00:02:02 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ayatollah Khamenei]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Barack Obama]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Iran War]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[JCPOA]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Revolutionary Guards]]></category>
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																												<description>
								<![CDATA[The Revolutionary Guards threat must be crushed]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>Since October 2023, Iran has launched more than 1,000 ballistic missiles against Israel — and many more against its Gulf Arab neighbors. It has also launched thousands of drones, sending more than 1,500 toward the United Arab Emirates alone. How did the Islamic Republic accumulate such vast inventories of expensive weapons? And expensive they are: drones would only be cheap, as the media keeps claiming, if their number were not so large, while ballistic missiles are necessarily expensive because of their size. Iranian Shahab-3 missiles weigh 16 tons, while Korramshahrs come in at 25.</p>
<p>Just as with any other feat of accumulation, this too is the result of disciplined persistence. In the regime’s case, that meant allocating Iran&#8217;s limited foreign-currency earnings to what really mattered: not waterworks against desertification, not gas pipelines to bring cheap gas to the cities, not desalination plants to overcome water shortages even in Tehran, but rather the production of very large numbers of long-range missiles to attack Israel and other countries.</p>
<p>This enormous industrial effort has been underway for years, yet it was greatly accelerated by the transfer of $1.7 billion to Iran by the Obama administration. Officially, this was merely an overdue refund for canceled military orders dating back to the time of the Shah. But the payment&#8217;s first installment — $400 million in stacked banknotes — was sent on 17 January, 2016. This just happened to coincide with the release of several Americans from Iranian captivity, and the coming into effect of Obama’s grand diplomatic achievement: the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.</p>
<p>In those early weeks of 2016, one would hear the initials “J-C-P-O-A” proudly enunciated by Obama staffers even at lowkey Washington gatherings. Why? Because, its supporters claimed, the deal would definitively end Iran&#8217;s efforts to acquire nuclear weapons. It limited Iran&#8217;s uranium-235 enrichment to just 3.67%, with dangerous levels only kicking in at 60%. Iran was also permitted a meager 300 kilos of nuclear material.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/03/hormuz-irans-dire-strait/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/03/hormuz-irans-dire-strait/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/image-10.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/03/hormuz-irans-dire-strait/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/03/hormuz-irans-dire-strait/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Hormuz: Iran’s dire Strait</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/03/hormuz-irans-dire-strait/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Peter Frankopan</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>But for Robert Malley, head of Obama’s Iran team, this technical win was outweighed by a more emotionally satisfying achievement. Having grown up in a household where Algeria&#8217;s FLN nationalists were much celebrated, and where traditional Arab rulers and Israel were greatly deplored, Malley hoped the JCPOA would stop US-Iran frictions. That, in turn, would allow Obama to finally sideline both the embarrassing Saudis — with their over-the-top gold-bathtub polygamy — and the insufficiently humble but very demanding Israelis.</p>
<p>Given those tacit but clear preferences, one can understand why Obama disregarded all Saudi warnings about the Revolutionary Guards. This was a Shia supremacist organization, but its long-term plan was nonetheless to become the hero of all Arabs, Sunnis included, by defeating Israel and taking the Temple Mount. Mecca itself was another aim. Meanwhile, US diplomats in Saudi Arabia — who reported that Iranians arriving for the Mecca pilgrimage were seemingly eager to assert themselves by picking quarrels — were dismissed as having gone native.</p>
<p>Israel was worried too. It noted that the Revolutionary Guards were taking a rising proportion of Iran&#8217;s oil revenue — itself increased by the JCPOA — to build more missiles, to increase their number of U-235 separation centrifuges, and to expand both their own forces and those of auxiliaries abroad. Those warnings were too well-documented to be dismissed out of hand. Yet nothing was done, for action would have spoiled Obama’s great diplomatic success.</p>
<p>To be fair, Obama was not responsible for what happened next. After the JCPOA removed all export restrictions on Iran, the country’s hard-currency earnings from oil exports rose. The Revolutionary Guards swiftly demanded an even larger share of the total, even after oil prices started to dip.</p>
<p>Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Iran&#8217;s president from 2005 to 2013, and who was famous for his slogan about the <em>sofreh</em> — the traditional tablecloths of modest households, focusing attention on the needs of Iran’s poor — seems to have complained. But Qasem Soleimani and the Revolutionary Guards were in the ascendancy with Ayatollah Khamenei. So while Ahmadinejad was set aside, the Revolutionary Guards claimed an increasing share of Iran&#8217;s oil revenues.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/07/how-the-west-can-beat-the-rest/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/07/how-the-west-can-beat-the-rest/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/GettyImages-73737298.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/07/how-the-west-can-beat-the-rest/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/07/how-the-west-can-beat-the-rest/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>How the West can beat the rest</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/07/how-the-west-can-beat-the-rest/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Edward Luttwak</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>It was then that the Natanz complex was hugely expanded to accommodate two immense centrifuge cascades, of 25,000 centrifuges each, while an entire separate centrifuge cascade was installed deep underground at Fordow. Meanwhile, a weaponization facility was established in Isfahan, to go with one at the Parchim base near Tehran.</p>
<p>I have never heard a convincing explanation for these projects: far more than needed even for many bombs, let alone civilian electricity production, and especially in a country with unlimited natural gas. Corruption is hard to prove in a dictatorship with so much oil money sloshing around. But even here, graft cannot always stay hidden. When Mossad killed the chief nuclear scientist of the Revolutionary Guards in November 2020 — using a remote-controlled machine gun placed inside a parked Nissan van — he was being driven on his hour-long twice-daily commute from Tehran to Absard: a fashionable hill town where rich Iranians go to escape the capital’s pollution. Families without personal chauffeurs tend to visit Absard only on weekends, and generally settle for simple lodgings. But this nuclear scientist seems to have been unusually wealthy by Iranian standards.</p>
<p>At the same time, the Revolutionary Guards also spent immense sums on ballistic missile fuel and other components — including the multiple “cluster” warheads now causing much damage in Israel. The sheer scale of Iran&#8217;s missile production is itself amazing too, with 3,000 the low estimate for the longer-range types targeting Tel Aviv and other Israeli cities.</p>
<p>All the same, neither Israel nor any other country has been as harmed by the Revolutionary Guards as Iran itself. Because the Islamic Republic has overspent its oil export earnings — not at all huge for a country of 90 million — it has neglected to make investments elsewhere. Especially urgent is water supply, needed for major cities including Tehran, whose 13 million inhabitants now face the possibility of desertification-driven evacuation. Mashhad, with three million inhabitants and Iran’s second-largest city, is in the same predicament. Located near the Afghan border, its problems are aggravated by Taliban dam building, as are many smaller cities, including ancient Yazd with its Zoroastrian eternal flame.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;Neither Israel nor any other country has been as harmed by the Revolutionary Guards as Iran itself.&#8221;</div>
<p>What all these places desperately need is a new supply of desalinated seawater, pumped all the way from the Persian Gulf. With three times as much natural gas as the US, Iran could produce all the water it needs, just as Israel is doing — but that would have required vast investments starting decades ago. Iran’s grossly insufficient electrical supply is another victim of Revolutionary Guard overspending, with frequent power cuts whenever temperatures fall and more heating is needed.</p>
<p>We keep being told that Iran&#8217;s population cannot liberate itself for the simple reason Trotsky long ago identified: popular insurgency could conquer the Bastille in 1789, but by the Twenties Trotsky&#8217;s Red Army had Maxim machine guns that could mow down any number of demonstrators. Iran&#8217;s <em>Basij</em> and Revolutionary Guards have done just that, and can do so again.</p>
<p>That being true, the US-Israeli war still has a purpose: to destroy Iran’s missile and drone factories and inventories. For as long as they exist, they will permanently threaten the Gulf states, just as they have already closed the world&#8217;s largest airport in Dubai, and which continue to menace water-desalination plants in Qatar and oil-separation facilities in Saudi Arabia.</p>
<p>Whatever their leaders say in public, nobody of consequence on the western side of the Gulf wants Trump or the Israelis to stop undoing the damage that began with Obama&#8217;s once-celebrated JCPOA. That deal, it is now clear to see, did not stop nuclear enrichment towards the bomb — and indeed accelerated every other danger emanating from the Islamic Republic.</p>
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															<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">1052557</post-id>				</item>
									<item>
					<title>The Iranian plot to blackmail journalists</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2025/07/the-iranian-plot-to-blackmail-journalists/?edition=us</link>
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										<unherd:main_theme>Investigation</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[David Rose and Ali Hamedani]]>
					</dc:creator>
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																<unherd:article_ranking>2</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[Omid Khalili has been separated from his family.]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>David Rose</strong> is <em>UnHerd</em>&#8216;s Investigations Editor and <strong>Ali Hamedani</strong> is a writer and broadcaster, formerly with the BBC World Service.</p>
]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_handle></unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is <em>UnHerd</em>'s Investigations Editor and <strong>Ali Hamedani</strong> is a writer and broadcaster, formerly with the BBC World Service.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Wed, 02 Jul 2025 23:01:02 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Thu, 03 Jul 2025 10:57:14 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ayatollah Khamenei]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Iran]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Israel]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Media]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Politics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Spycraft]]></category>
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					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://stage.unherd.com/?p=689332</guid>
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								<![CDATA[Tehran holds their families hostage]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Omid Khalili is one of the most famous people in Iran. The presenter of a daily TV show broadcast from London, he has an audience of over 30 million, giving voice to millions of Iranians exhausted by the Islamic Republic. Now, though, Khalili is desperate </span><span style="font-weight: 400">—</span><span style="font-weight: 400"> for his wife, parents, sister and niece, who like him, are all UK citizens, and who are currently being held hostage by the country’s brutal theocratic regime. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">The presenter has not heard from his mother, Mahin, since the start of June’s 12-day war with Israel. He suspects she is being detained. What is certain is that Iranian officials have told Khalili that if he ever wants to see his wife Mahsa again, he must return to the land of his birth. For a high-profile opposition broadcaster like him, that is effectively a death sentence, or anyway guarantees a lengthy spell in jail. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Khalili is not alone. Our investigation shows his struggle is part of a wider campaign of intimidation against Iranian journalists working in Britain, one that has reached unprecedented levels since last month’s conflict. Alongside Khalili’s colleagues at Manoto, the satellite channel where he works, Iran’s targets include presenters and reporters at both BBC Persian and the UK-based news channel Iran International. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">With its</span> <span style="font-weight: 400">leadership in shambles and its nuclear weapons program derailed, the Iranian regime is clearly in trouble. That makes controlling the media narrative more urgent than ever, especially as channels like Manoto have become a popular focus for dissident views. It all speaks to a government willing to do anything to survive </span><span style="font-weight: 400">—</span><span style="font-weight: 400"> even as its opponents remain uncowed despite the personal costs. </span></p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/06/the-iranian-refugees-spying-on-britain/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/06/the-iranian-refugees-spying-on-britain/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/GettyImages-1244157339.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/06/the-iranian-refugees-spying-on-britain/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/06/the-iranian-refugees-spying-on-britain/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The Iranian refugees spying on Britain</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/06/the-iranian-refugees-spying-on-britain/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> David Rose</a></p></div></a></div>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Omid Khalili has lived in Britain since 1999, when he was 16, and has been a host at Manoto since it launched 14 years ago. The channel dovetails current affairs with culture and entertainment, and is clearly popular, boasting perhaps 40 million regular viewers worldwide, 34 million of them inside Iran.</span><span style="font-weight: 400"> The channel’s Instagram alone has been viewed some two billion times.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Khalili himself is most famous for </span><i><span style="font-weight: 400">Omid/A.M</span></i><span style="font-weight: 400">, an extended phone-in that provides a unique platform for Iranians to describe the hardships of life in the Islamic Republic. Drawing callers from across society </span><span style="font-weight: 400">— from rural poverty to swish north Tehran — viewers risk their safety every time they call in. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">The government, for its part, has long tried to suppress </span><i><span style="font-weight: 400">Omid/A.M</span></i><span style="font-weight: 400">. </span><span style="font-weight: 400">“As soon as one number starts being used,” Khalili says, “the regime tries to block it, so we just put another one on the screen. Every day we have as many numbers as we need set up and ready to go.” </span></p>
<figure id="attachment_689497" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-689497" style="width: 300px" class="wp-caption aligncenter"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="size-medium wp-image-689497" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Screenshot-2025-07-02-at-18.50.26.jpg?w=300" alt="" width="300" height="157" srcset="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Screenshot-2025-07-02-at-18.50.26.jpg 1259w, https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Screenshot-2025-07-02-at-18.50.26.jpg?resize=300,157 300w, https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Screenshot-2025-07-02-at-18.50.26.jpg?resize=768,401 768w, https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Screenshot-2025-07-02-at-18.50.26.jpg?resize=1024,535 1024w, https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Screenshot-2025-07-02-at-18.50.26.jpg?resize=267,140 267w, https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Screenshot-2025-07-02-at-18.50.26.jpg?resize=253,132 253w, https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Screenshot-2025-07-02-at-18.50.26.jpg?resize=250,131 250w, https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Screenshot-2025-07-02-at-18.50.26.jpg?resize=660,345 660w, https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Screenshot-2025-07-02-at-18.50.26.jpg?resize=480,251 480w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px" /><figcaption id="caption-attachment-689497" class="wp-caption-text">Omid Khalili presents the online call-in show Omid A.M.</figcaption></figure>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">The war raised the stakes yet further. Such was the volume of calls from Iran </span><span style="font-weight: 400">—</span><span style="font-weight: 400"> despite the regime’s attempts to restrict communications, up to 15,000 a day </span><span style="font-weight: 400">—</span><span style="font-weight: 400"> that Manoto extended Khalili’s slot from two to five or six hours, and increased its frequency from five to seven days a week. Worse still from the regime’s perspective, some callers openly welcomed Israeli and US airstrikes, hoping they would hasten the government’s demise. When Donald Trump imposed a ceasefire last week, some bemoaned the fact he was not letting Israel “finish the job”. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">With these tensions in mind, Khalili has long had a target on his back.</span><span style="font-weight: 400"> As far back as 2022, three years into their marriage, Khalili’s Iranian-born wife visited their shared homeland. But when she arrived, officials confiscated her passport. Accusing her husband of being “brainwashed by Zionists”, they told Mahsa that she would only be freed if she helped convince Omid to meet them in Turkey or Dubai. “</span><span style="font-weight: 400">She agreed,” Khalili says, “because she had no choice.”</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">On her return to Britain, regime officials started calling and emailing </span><span style="font-weight: 400">— but Mahsa ignored them. </span><span style="font-weight: 400">In April 2025, however, her brother phoned to say their mother was seriously ill, and that if Mahsa wanted to see her again, she had to travel to Tehran. “I tried to convince her not to go, but I couldn’t,” Khalili says. “She’s her mum’s only daughter.” </span></p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/07/irans-kurds-are-out-of-friends/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/07/irans-kurds-are-out-of-friends/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/GettyImages-1920702337.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/07/irans-kurds-are-out-of-friends/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/07/irans-kurds-are-out-of-friends/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Iran’s Kurds are out of friends</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/07/irans-kurds-are-out-of-friends/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Matt Broomfield</a></p></div></a></div>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">His fears were justified. Once Mahsa arrived, a well-dressed man confronted her, confiscating her passport and saying he would be in touch. Three days later, she was summoned to a meeting, which was then postponed and rearranged several times: apparently to increase her stress. Finally, two weeks after landing in Tehran, Mahsa was interrogated at an office in the city center. Now, the regime’s demand was that if she wanted to leave the country, Omid must meet security officials in Iran. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">This, they</span> <span style="font-weight: 400">told Mahsa, was “for your husband’s own good”. They added a further threat: if he did not return, she might be investigated and tried for unspecified crimes, despite not being a journalist herself. For the time being, she was not under arrest. But she would be closely watched, and was banned from leaving Tehran. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">As ill-luck would have it, Khalili’s parents and sister had also been in Iran for several weeks, visiting other family. Now, they too faced the same threat, and could only return to Britain if the presenter came to Iran. “If you really love your son,” officials told his mother, “convince him to come here”. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">That is easier said than done, and not just because of Khalili’s politics. In December 2020, the </span><a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/iran-execution-ruhollah-zam/30996979.html" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400">dissident</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400"> reporter Ruholla Zam was executed after being lured from his home in France to a supposed interview with an anti-regime cleric in Iraq, where he was abducted and smuggled across the border by Iranian agents. Last year, Reza Valizadeh, an Iranian-American journalist, was </span><a href="https://www.rferl.org/amp/iran-farda-journalist-valizadeh-prison/33239877.html" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400">jailed</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400"> for 10 years for “collaborating with a hostile government” </span><span style="font-weight: 400">— despite being promised safe passage to visit his family. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">For the moment, then, Khalili continues to present </span><a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=d8rCthn80w4&amp;list=PLXiFD28PjqaKX2jRgoD7VNppB5M9SG-Eu&amp;index=1" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><i><span style="font-weight: 400">Omid/A.M </span></i></a><span style="font-weight: 400">as usual. Yet with the regime humiliated, and its own unpopularity increasingly hard to hide, his case is far from unique. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Since the war with Israel began, the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) have threatened numerous</span> <span style="font-weight: 400">London-based journalists, as well as</span><span style="font-weight: 400"> their families in Iran. </span><span style="font-weight: 400">Their message is stark: if the reporters do not resign their jobs, and post pro-regime statements on social media, both journalists and their relatives would be deemed </span><i><span style="font-weight: 400">mohareb</span></i><span style="font-weight: 400">.</span><span style="font-weight: 400"> Translated as </span><span style="font-weight: 400">“enemies of God”, the Islamic Republic punishes this crime by death. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Iran International, another London broadcaster, is a particular focus here </span><span style="font-weight: 400">— hardly surprising given, like Manoto, it also enjoys an </span><span style="font-weight: 400">Iranian audience in the tens of millions. </span></p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;With the regime humiliated, and its own unpopularity increasingly hard to hide, his case is far from unique. .&#8221;</div>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">As with Khalili, moreover, the regime’s threats are deeply personal. Called by her father in the Islamic Republic, one prominent Iran International presenter was told that he, her mother and her brother had all been detained. Audible in the background was an IRGC official dictating a “script” for the call:</span><span style="font-weight: 400"> the usual warning that if </span><span style="font-weight: 400">the presenter did not resign and publicly back the regime, her family would be punished. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Such challenges are hardly new. In 2023, after all, Iran International was forced to temporarily </span><a href="https://www.iranintl.com/en/202302187629" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400">close</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400"> its London offices in the face of IRGC plots. But, says its spokesman Adam Baillie, these threats have increased over recent weeks. It’s hard to disagree: though the family of that first Iran International presenter has been freed for the moment, another hasn’t heard from their relatives in almost a fortnight. For their part, BBC Persian staff say they have received similar threats.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">There are signs, moreover, that as pressure on the regime continues to grow, state oppression does too. Last week, Iran’s parliament passed a bill to criminalize “unlicensed electronic communication tools” such as Starlink, which enabled Iranians to communicate freely with each other and the outside world. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">The law also introduces jail terms for those involved with media outlets deemed to “spread fear, divide the public, or undermine national security” </span><span style="font-weight: 400">—</span><span style="font-weight: 400"> such as Manoto. “The regime is seeking to further limit public access to independent news and information during this crucial time,” say Kayvan and Marjan Abbassi, the channel’s directors. “The targeting of international journalists  is part of a broader effort to silence critical voices.”</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">All the while, Khalili himself continues to suffer. “Most nights I don’t go home but stay with friends, because I miss my family so much,” he says. “I can’t bear being in our bedroom, seeing my wife’s dresses and her shoes, knowing what she’s going through.”</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Not that the presenter plans to give up. Beyond sticking to his daily presenting schedule, he has even asked Mahsa to divorce him </span><span style="font-weight: 400">— hoping, at least, to free her from the regime’s clutches. </span><span style="font-weight: 400">“I can’t let the Islamic Republic tell me what to do,” he says. “Iranians are fighting a war, a war for our country.” Fair enough. But as Omid Khalili knows better than most, all wars have victims. </span></p>
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					<title>Iran’s rebels have lost their nerve</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2025/06/irans-rebels-have-lost-their-nerve/?edition=us</link>
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										<unherd:main_theme>Islamic Republic</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Christopher de Bellaigue]]>
					</dc:creator>
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																<unherd:article_ranking>3</unherd:article_ranking>
																<unherd:image_caption>
							<![CDATA[Public opinion in Iran isn't static. Credit: Getty]]>
						</unherd:image_caption>
						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Christopher de Bellaigue </strong>is a historian, journalist and the founder of the Lake District Book Festival.</p>
<div></div>
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						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle></unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[is a historian, journalist and the founder of the Lake District Book Festival.
<div></div>]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Thu, 19 Jun 2025 23:00:05 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Thu, 19 Jun 2025 23:00:05 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ayatollah Khamenei]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Donald Trump]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Iran]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Israel]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[US]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[War]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://stage.unherd.com/?p=686004</guid>
																												<description>
								<![CDATA[Foreign meddling has spooked the opposition]]>
							</description>
																		
																			<content:encoded>
								<![CDATA[<p>In his fortified bunker, wherever that may be, in front of an institutional beige curtain, the old man with a black turban, diaphanous gown and a pink, rather sweet face did not hide his disappointment with Donald Trump. In a televised address to the Iranian people on Wednesday, the purpose of which was partly to demonstrate that he is still alive, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei said in his quiet, unemphatic way, “the American president threatened us and in an abrasive and unacceptable statement told the Iranian people to surrender”. This, he went on, is “illogical” — and the Supreme Leader knows all about this, having mastered syllogism as a young seminarian — because “the Iranians are not the kind of people who surrender”.</p>
<p>Khamenei was referring to the two noisy, emphatic words that Trump had posted the previous day: “UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER.” The US President had already prompted an exodus from Tehran, by telling the city’s inhabitants to evacuate. Intimating that he knows where Khamenei is hiding, Trump called him an “easy target” even if he won’t kill him “for now”.</p>
<p>Holding up his good hand, which is to say his left, for emphasis (he lost use of his right hand in 1981 to a bomb hidden in a tape recorder by an opposition group called the People’s Mujahedin), the Supreme Leader continued, “if America enters the fray it will suffer irreparable harm.”</p>
<p>Six days into the war, Israeli planes, missiles, and drones continue to cause widespread damage to Iranian military, nuclear and civilian targets, while the odd missile from Iran’s much smaller arsenal gets through Israel’s defenses. On Monday, a US aircraft carrier began steaming from the South China Sea to the Middle East, while Trump toys with the option of “the big one”, as he calls it — bunker-busting bombs dropped by stealth bombers on Iran’s as yet impregnable uranium-enrichment site at Fordow, near the desert city of Qom.</p>
<p>The Supreme Leader’s warning of “irreparable harm” may be intended to suggest that, should the current, purely aerial conflict evolve into a ground operation — in other words, in the event that Fordow cannot be destroyed from the skies and troops are deployed — the result will be, to quote a prominent Tehran-based opposition figure, “Vietnam”.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/06/the-regime-change-maniacs-are-back/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/06/the-regime-change-maniacs-are-back/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/GettyImages-2208496329.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/06/the-regime-change-maniacs-are-back/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/06/the-regime-change-maniacs-are-back/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The regime change maniacs are back</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/06/the-regime-change-maniacs-are-back/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Sohrab Ahmari</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>If it’s true that the Americans — or rather the Israelis, whose penetration of Iran’s intelligence has helped them achieve dominance in the war so far — have spared Khamenei the fate that they have visited on dozens of assassinated military leaders and nuclear scientists, this is presumably because they wish to preserve the only person with binding authority over the entire regime. But keeping Khamenei alive is also a risk, for this fearless warrior in his 87th year is the icon of the regime’s most fanatical foot soldiers. Not for Iran the scenario of Iraq after the 2003 invasion, when Saddam Hussein’s “elite” Republican Guard melted away; nor will Khamenei emulate Bashar al-Assad, the Syrian dictator who scuttled off to exile in Moscow when his regime was toppled last year. The Islamic Republic may have lost the love and respect of the majority of Iranians, but its core is intact.</p>
<p>To be sure, services are starting to falter. Banks that have been hacked have stopped disbursing savings; deposits in gold are also stuck. Some of the thousands of Tehranis who fled in response to Trump’s call have now returned, having found the hills outside the city no safer from Israeli attack than the apartments they left behind. Police stand at every corner, watching for sabotage.</p>
<p>If morale among ordinary Iranians seems to be holding up, this is down to the spirit of resilience and good humor that Iranians often adopt in times of mortal peril. People hand out slices of watermelon or drinks of sherbet to motorists waiting for hours in queues for petrol. Shopkeepers in rural towns deliberately undercharge fleeing urbanites for provisions. Even the practice of buying bread has changed. The head of a large family who used to snap up <em>sangak</em> by the dozen now hands them out to poor people in his neighborhood. Meanwhile, gallows humor is an outlet for jangling nerves, as Iranians joke that the best way to avoid getting killed is to take sanctuary in the house of the country’s president, Masoud Pezeshkian: no one, not even Israel, would waste a bomb on him.</p>
<p>Yet discord is spreading too. The question of how people should react to Israeli aggression has divided opposition activists into two camps that fling accusations at each other with a violence and coarseness I have never before witnessed in Iranian public debate. One side accuses the other of treacherous collusion with Netanyahu’s war of aggression; the other levels charges of falling in meekly behind the domestic tyrant.</p>
<p>Social media is full of pictures of civilian casualties; so much for Netanyahu’s weasel words about standing four-square with “the noble Iranian people”. Of the more than 600 Iranians who are thought to have been killed since the war began, an estimated 263 are civilians. More than 1,300 people have been wounded.</p>
<p>Reza Pahlavi, the exiled son of the last shah of Iran, whose detractors refer to him as Quarter Pahlavi, in honor of a coin of intermediate value named after his father’s dynasty, has been calling without effect for a mass uprising against the regime. The self-proclaimed Crown Prince made a bad impression when he was interviewed by the BBC’s Laura Kuenssberg last Sunday. “Anything that weakens the regime,” he said, “is something positive.” A visibly shocked Kuenssberg asked, “are you actually saying that Israel bombing your country, civilians in Iran being killed, is a positive thing?”</p>
<p>The irony is that, in the short term at least, the war has made Iranians less likely to overthrow their leaders, not more. Just a few weeks ago, the country seethed with political agitation, with truck drivers going on a nationwide strike and Iranians protesting government failures such as water shortages, pollution, and a dearth of the natural gas with which the country is so generously endowed. For two years now, the regime has been unable to force the millions of women who abandoned the hijab during the Woman, Life, Freedom protests of 2022-3 to put on their headscarves again. The devastating effects of sanctions on the economy and expectations of Khamenei’s imminent demise led many to believe that a change of regime would happen organically and without outside stimulus.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;The irony is that, in the short term at least, the war has made Iranians less likely to overthrow their leaders, not more.&#8221;</div>
<p>However much millions of Iranians detest the Islamic Republic, uprisings orchestrated by foreign invaders are tainted with dishonor and treachery. Over the past century or so, Iran has suffered repeated interventions by foreign powers, from regime change to aborted reform movements. No Iranian who has come to power on the coattails of foreigners has prospered.</p>
<p>To Senator Ted Cruz, one of America’s most prominent hawks, regime change is “not a complicated question”, requiring only a “popular uprising”. The people of Iraq and Afghanistan might have something to say about that. Furthermore, implicit in predictions of an imminent rebellion is an assumption that public opinion is static. In fact, it changes fast, particularly in a wartime crisis that forces people to examine their basic allegiances while also placing them, and their families, in acute danger. Many Iranians, if faced with the choice between Khamenei and Netanyahu, will — with the heaviest of hearts — choose the former.</p>
<p>In the United States, the war has exposed rifts in the MAGA movement. Thanks to Tucker Carlson, at least we know not to go to Senator Cruz for Iran expertise. Questioning the Republican senator on Wednesday about his support for regime change, the former Fox News host sprang him a trap, asking, “How many people live in Iran?” When Cruz admitted he didn’t know, Carlson went on with feigned incredulity and impressive comic timing, “you don’t know the population [slight pause] of the country [slight pause] you seek to topple?” Then Carlson asked him what percentage of the Iranian population is ethnically Persian, which of course Cruz was unable to answer, allowing Carlson to declare in triumph, “you’re a senator who is calling for the overthrow of the government and you don’t know anything about the country!”</p>
<p>What is lacking in this war of dubious legality and towering ignorance is a moral or humanitarian compass guiding policy. Regardless of the Islamic Republic’s callous and criminal maladministration, and Khamenei’s role in goading Israel and the United States into their current fury, the acts of war that we are witnessing are propelling Iran towards a fate little different from those of Iraq and Afghanistan following the invasions of the early 2000s. European and other states need to kickstart diplomacy without delay — starting with the meeting that has been scheduled between the foreign ministers of Britain, France, and Germany, on the one hand, and the foreign minister of Iran, on the other, in Geneva on Friday. This must go beyond a polite recapitulation of Trump’s demand of “unconditional surrender” and lay the groundwork for a revived diplomatic process aimed at allowing Iran strictly monitored uranium enrichment and sanctions relief. If this does not happen and Khamenei chooses to go down fighting, not only will the 92 million people of Iran suffer unjustifiably, but their country will radiate regional and global instability for years to come.</p>
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					<title>The chaos behind Iran&#8217;s grand strategy</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2024/01/the-chaos-behind-irans-grand-strategy/?edition=us</link>
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					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[David Patrikarakos]]>
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																<unherd:article_ranking>1</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[Raisi speaks during a commemoration ceremony marking the anniversary of the 2020 killing of Soleimani Iraqi commander Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis (ATTA KENARE/AFP via Getty Images)]]>
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							<![CDATA[<p><strong>David Patrikarakos</strong> is <em>UnHerd</em>&#8216;s foreign correspondent. His latest book is <em>War in 140 characters: how social media is reshaping conflict in the 21st century. </em>(Hachette)</p>
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						<unherd:twitter_handle>dpatrikarakos</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is <em>UnHerd</em>'s foreign correspondent. His latest book is <em>War in 140 characters: how social media is reshaping conflict in the 21st century. </em>(Hachette)]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Sat, 27 Jan 2024 00:10:56 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Mon, 29 Jan 2024 11:39:59 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ayatollah Khamenei]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Hamas]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Houthis]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Iran]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Israel]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Middle East]]></category>
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								<![CDATA[A weakened regime is being forced to look tough]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>Reporting from Israel at the end of last year stirred various emotions in me, not least a constant feeling of mild claustrophobia. Not from the Hamas rockets that incrementally forced me to duck into bomb shelters, nor from the colossal Israeli response I heard thundering overhead. Rather, wherever I travelled, be it to Gaza’s fringes in the south or the Lebanese border in the north, I felt surrounded by Iran.</p>
<p>Right now, Iranian proxies — from Hamas to Hezbollah to its flunkies in Syria, as well as the Houthis — are attacking Israel and its interests. Iran has also kicked off against Pakistan, with the two spending recent weeks lobbing missiles and accusations at each other. It is, some might argue, illogical behaviour. Iran is regarded as generally belligerent, and it is. But as Iranians never tire of telling me, they have not invaded a country or started any wars for centuries. And Iran’s leadership is most certainly not illogical. So why all the violence?</p>
<p>All foreign policy is a product of domestic factors; the internal <em>always</em> creates the external. You cannot understand Brexit without understanding the conflicting personalities that fuelled it. And you cannot understand Iranian behaviour in the Middle East (and beyond) without understanding its corrupt, faction-ridden revolutionary dictatorship, and the degree to which these factors shape its foreign policy. At its core, Iran’s foreign policy rests on a doctrine of “forward defence”. Loosely speaking, it seeks to fight abroad so it doesn&#8217;t have to do so at home. It bases this strategy on two things: long-range ballistic missiles and proxy warfare using local groups. And it has proved successful ever since it was conceived in the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War.</p>
<p>I have always considered those eight years to be the Islamic Republic’s War of Independence. So much of its identity was forged then. All nations are shaped by the accretive wisdom of their history and the unchanging determinants of geography (even if they often ignore one or both). For the Islamic Republic, much of what drives its policy was learned through its experience of being a revolutionary state that had to fight for its existence throughout almost all of its first decade. In particular, the War of the Cities in 1984, during which Iran found itself repeatedly struck by long-range Iraqi missiles with no ability to respond in kind, burned the need for a ballistic missile capability into Iran’s leaders. Now, 40 years later, missiles sit at the centre of Iranian deterrence and state pride. The second thing that the war taught Iran was the value of using proxy forces to fight your enemies. And key to that was a man named Qasem Soleimani.</p>
<p>Soleimani was the head of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’s (IRGC) expeditionary Quds Force until the United States droned him in 2020. In his early twenties at the start of the war, he became commander of a <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep28480.5.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">volunteer force </a>that was deployed to Iraqi Kurdistan — the centre of anti-Saddam separatist activity in Iraq — to work with the Kurds against Baghdad. It was his first taste of using foreign forces to attack an enemy by proxy, and it shaped him.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/12/is-the-west-bank-heading-for-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/12/is-the-west-bank-heading-for-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/GettyImages-1758010446-scaled-e1703245385720.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/12/is-the-west-bank-heading-for-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author </span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/12/is-the-west-bank-heading-for-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Is the West Bank heading for war?</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/12/is-the-west-bank-heading-for-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> David Patrikarakos </a></p></div></a></div>
<p>It was also, at least in spirit, the beginning of the Quds Force, which began life as “Department 900”, specialising in cross-border raids and recruiting Iraqis against Saddam. But as it grew, what made the Quds so effective was its understanding that two things were needed for the kind of leverage it sought. The first was pragmatism. Despite its Shia sectarianism, Tehran was happy for the Quds to find Sunni partners, from the Iraqi Kurds to the Afghan Northern Alliance to Hamas in Gaza. The second, and this was crucial, was the need to expand beyond the military realm. In Afghanistan, Soleimani became a quasi-diplomat, spending years mediating between the various factions — he ultimately became so vital to Afghan politics that the country’s first post-Taliban government might well not have emerged without him. By the time of the 2001 US invasion, Tehran held such political sway in the country that it was able to help Washington against their mutual enemy, the Taliban.</p>
<p>Iran assumed this <em>modus operandi</em> everywhere it went, helping to create a Lebanese Hezbollah that, beyond a terror group, is an effective political party and social-care provider. In Iraq, as well as helping its various Shia militia proxies — collectively known as Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) or Al-Hashd al-Shaabi — to kill coalition soldiers, he also organised them into a political grouping, the Fatah Alliance, to considerable electoral success. In the 2021 general elections, the first after he was killed, Fatah dropped from 48 to 17 seats. This wasn’t even because it received significantly fewer votes, but without Soleimani to guide it, the parties failed to understand recent boundary changes while their opponents instructed followers to vote tactically and hoovered up seats accordingly.</p>
<p>And there was something else, too. During the Eighties, Soleimani struck up a friendship with Khamenei (then the President). When the latter became Supreme Leader, Soleimani had a direct line to the seat of power. The Quds Force, and its doctrine of forward defence has formed the centrepiece of Iran’s foreign operations ever since. This nexus of military, historical and political factors is the broader cause of turmoil we see right now. Beyond its ideological, often lurid rhetoric, Iran sees Israel as the most powerful state in the region and a threat accordingly. For Tehran, the Gaza War is an opportunity to strike Jerusalem via its various proxies — especially when it sees Washington caught up in Ukraine and suffering internal squabbles.</p>
<p>As ever, it retains (admittedly implausible) deniability. In his first <a href="https://www.tabnak.ir/fa/news/1201173/%D8%AC%D9%86%DA%AF-%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%88-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A6%DB%8C%D9%84-%DA%86%D9%82%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D9%85%D8%AD%D8%AA%D9%85%D9%84-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA" target="_blank" rel="noopener">speech </a>after 7 October, Khamenei set out the official position: “Some of its own people [of the Israeli government] have been gossiping in these two or three days… indicating Iran is introduced behind this movement. They are wrong about this, we of course defend Palestine and the struggles… but those who claim that the work of Palestinians is the result of non-Palestinians… are making a wrong calculation.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/12/meet-the-iranians-supporting-israel/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/12/meet-the-iranians-supporting-israel/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/2N8KPPB-1.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/12/meet-the-iranians-supporting-israel/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/12/meet-the-iranians-supporting-israel/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Meet the Iranians supporting Israel</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/12/meet-the-iranians-supporting-israel/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Nicole Lampert</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>But with its strikes in Pakistan, Iranian actions are starting to look incontinent. There is a real chance of a broader mass war, which it has consistently said it does not want, and which logic dictates it must avoid. Once more, to understand this inconsistency, look inside Iran. “The Islamic Republic’s primary goal has always been self-preservation,” Ali Ansari, Professor in Modern History with reference to the Middle East at the University of St Andrews, told me. “But they have now unleashed all these proxy units. Iran doesn’t want to escalate too much and now, if you look at the rhetoric coming out of Hamas and Hezbollah and the Houthis, it’s along the lines of ‘where are you?’ They were expecting Iran to come to their aid, and they haven&#8217;t.”</p>
<p>Part of this is simply the way power operates in the Islamic Republic. “It’s not just their proxies, even within Iran, you have a range of non-state actors, of which the IRGC is one,” Ansari said. “But it is also the nature of the way command and control works there. It is very much totalitarian. Everyone has plausible deniability. And you are expected to be able to read the leader’s mind.” In a time where the regime has faced several years of mass protests to its rule, there are those within the political and military establishment who think now is the time to look tough, and there is no better way of doing this than striking at Israel. And it can all be justified if it is couched in the guise of carrying out the leader’s will (if not his actual words)</p>
<p>Part of the problem, though, is that the Islamic Republic never successfully created a body that could effectively manage elite relationships — and the result is near perennial discord. The Foreign Ministry and the Quds Force have spent 20 years <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/iran/irans-coming-succession-crisis" target="_blank" rel="noopener">squabbling</a> over who handles the foreign affairs portfolio in Pakistan, Afghanistan and the wider Middle East. In August 2022, for instance, the Quds Force excluded the foreign ministry from a meeting with one of Iraq’s most important Shia figures, Muqtada al-Sadr. Instead, what has emerged to fill the bureaucratic void is a series of informal power bases congealed around important figures. The result is that interpersonal disputes and alliances dominate state politics. Throw 120 registered political parties into the mix and chaos is the logical result.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/12/inside-the-hamas-media-operation/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/12/inside-the-hamas-media-operation/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/GettyImages-818461710-1-scaled-e1702575473271.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/12/inside-the-hamas-media-operation/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author </span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/12/inside-the-hamas-media-operation/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Inside the Hamas media operation</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/12/inside-the-hamas-media-operation/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> David Patrikarakos </a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Now add the prospect of an imminent change of leadership. Khamenei is 84 and peppered with cancer. Rumours of his looming death have circulated for years, but this time it seems to be true. He was treated for prostate cancer in 2014; two years ago, after visiting a shrine, he reportedly <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/iran/irans-coming-succession-crisis" target="_blank" rel="noopener">told</a> his entourage that it might be his last visit. The choice of his successor is largely in the hands of the Assembly of Experts, which vets the potential candidates. It is, of course, stuffed with warring factions and opaque feuds, and yet one more centre of infighting.</p>
<p>It will come down to two candidates. First there is Mojtaba Khamenei, Khamenei’s second son, who is the senior IRGC chaplain, which puts him right at the heart of the establishment’s twin power centres: the military and the clergy. Like all revolutionaries, the Mullahs once disavowed notions of hereditary succession; and like all revolutionaries, they have taken on many of the characteristics of the regime they despised. The second candidate is Ebrahim Raisi, but he is unlikely to win. The incumbent President and so-called Butcher of Tehran, a reference to his role as a judge in the mass execution of political prisoners in 1988, is thunderously uncharismatic — no one really likes him.</p>
<p>But the problem of Khamenei’s death remains. “Even if the issue of the succession is settled,” says Ansari, “it’s more the fact that Khamenei doesn&#8217;t have quite the grip he had in the past. Normally he would be able to manage things but with a transition looming, they’re all on manoeuvres, and some people are trying to appear tougher than they are.” The regime, in other words, is losing its authority. And with its credibility diluted, it’s forced to look tough. Of course, as games go, it is a dangerous one, the result is uncertain, and it could well end up being a wider war that nobody really wants — and nobody can escape.</p>
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					<title>Is Iran&#8217;s Arab Spring doomed?</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2022/10/irans-arab-spring-is-doomed/?edition=us</link>
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					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[David Patrikarakos]]>
					</dc:creator>
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							<![CDATA[Not every protest is anti-government (Photo by AFP via Getty Images)]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>David Patrikarakos</strong> is <em>UnHerd</em>&#8216;s foreign correspondent. His latest book is <em>War in 140 characters: how social media is reshaping conflict in the 21st century. </em>(Hachette)</p>
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						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>dpatrikarakos</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is <em>UnHerd</em>'s foreign correspondent. His latest book is <em>War in 140 characters: how social media is reshaping conflict in the 21st century. </em>(Hachette)]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Thu, 27 Oct 2022 23:03:40 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Fri, 28 Oct 2022 11:26:06 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ayatollah Khamenei]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Egypt]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Iran]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Islam]]></category>
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								<![CDATA[The leaderless protestors need another Khomeini]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>Ayatollah Khomeini was a fundamentalist cleric who inspired the 1979 Islamic Revolution to overthrow a millennia-old history of Iranian monarchy. He was also, legend has it, an athletic young man who became <a href="https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/books/first/m/moin-khomeini.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">the leapfrog champion</a> of his village of Khomein and the surrounding area. Whenever I think of political change in modern-day Iran, it is the face of this surly mullah in the winter of his life that appears in my mind.</p>
<p>In 1979, furious Iranians marched in towns and cities across Iran, holding up pictures of Khomeini. Now they march once more: equally as enraged, equally as determined to bring revolution.</p>
<p>It’s been six weeks since protests broke out after the murder of Mahsa Amini, an Iranian-Kurdish woman, at the hands of Iran’s brutal and sinister morality police, uniting different parts of society across age, class, and ethnic boundaries. Women now burn their hijabs daily and cut off their hair. Parents boycott schools. Protestors continue to line the streets. All the while, Iran continues to be strafed by international sanctions, a failed nuclear deal, and <a href="https://www.mei.edu/publications/economic-backdrop-irans-protests" target="_blank" rel="noopener">spiralling inflation and unemployment</a>. The people have had enough.</p>
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<p>The regime, though, fights back. It has cut off the internet, desperate to strangle coordination between protests and to stifle the flow of information out of Iran. But that’s impossible: with the help of VPNs, social media is driving international awareness, with protests breaking out in solidarity across dozens of countries. Yet still the crackdown continues. Iran State TV and its various News Agencies are pumping out regime narratives almost 24/7. Forced “apologies” by protestors who have supposedly seen the error of their ways — after, I would guess, much torture — are now a daily feature on evening TV. And, of course, the killings never cease; the Norway-based Iran Human Rights organisation estimates that more than <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iranians-keep-up-protests-over-mahsa-amini-death-despite-growing-death-toll-2022-10-12/#:~:text=The%20Norway%2Dbased%20Iran%20Human,security%20forces%20have%20been%20killed.">200 Iranians have been</a> murdered to date.</p>
<p>When I look at the Iranian protests in 2022, I cannot help but compare them to 1979. There are clear parallels: the fact the protestors just want the mullahs gone; the centrality of the hijab; a background of economic decline; rumours of Iran’s leader being weakened by cancer. But there is one difference this time: speed.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2021/10/iraqs-fake-news-election/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2021/10/iraqs-fake-news-election/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/2GettyImages-1235759966-scaled-e1635069381124.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2021/10/iraqs-fake-news-election/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2021/10/iraqs-fake-news-election/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>How Iran won Iraq&#039;s election</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2021/10/iraqs-fake-news-election/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> David Patrikarakos</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>In January 1979, just a month before the revolution, Khomeini was still in exile, as he had been since 1963. From a cottage in Neauphle-le-Château, in the French countryside near Paris, Khomeini continued the work he’d begun in Iraq: recording revolutionary sermons, speeches, anti-Shah rhetoric, and the ideology of the Islamic Government onto <a href="https://daily.jstor.org/how-cassette-tapes-helped-muslim-revivalism/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">cassette tapes</a>, which were then sold in Europe and smuggled into Iran. These were then broadcast and duplicated by mosques and distributed — illegally, of course — throughout the country. It was through this system that Khomeini, who was obviously barred from appearing on Iranian media, was able to mobilise Iranians to action. It took him years.</p>
<p>Today, however, the thousands of Iranians pouring onto the streets are likely to have been mobilised in the space of just a few hours by communications technologies that did not exist in 1977-79. Yes, it is now harder than at any other point since internet came to Iran to access it properly. But the government’s ban is not total. Email providers, including Yahoo Mail and Mail.com, are blocked, but, for some reason, Gmail, iCloud, and ProtonMail are <a href="https://www.wired.com/story/subvert-iran-internet-blackout/">not.</a> It’s tricky for the protestors to mobilise, but it’s not impossible.</p>
<p>On the face of it, this can only be good. A popular revolution can only succeed if it’s, well, <em>popular</em>. But digitally powered protests carry as many disadvantages as advantages and, when it comes to turning them into successful revolutions, counterintuitively, perhaps even more. Here, the benchmark is the ultimately unsuccessful 2011 Arab Spring, which took place in the age of early social media: when Facebook was already established and Twitter was booming, but Instagram was in its infancy. It has been called <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2011/09/so-was-facebook-responsible-for-the-arab-spring-after-all/244314/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">the Facebook Revolution</a> and it bears comparison to Iran today — in particular the case of Egypt. There, protestors hoping to overthrow the dictator Hosni Mubarak endured many of the hardships Iranians have faced over the last decade or so: police brutality, electoral fraud, lack of political freedom and liberty, and economic turmoil.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/09/what-western-feminists-can-learn-from-iran/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/09/what-western-feminists-can-learn-from-iran/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/2GettyImages-1426621060-scaled-1.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/09/what-western-feminists-can-learn-from-iran/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/09/what-western-feminists-can-learn-from-iran/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>What Western feminists can learn from Iran</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/09/what-western-feminists-can-learn-from-iran/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Ayaan Hirsi Ali</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Their response was clear: revolution, powered by social media. As Fawaz Rashed, an Egyptian protestor, described at the time: “‎We use Facebook to schedule the protests, Twitter to coordinate, and YouTube to tell the world.&#8221; The demonstrations kicked off on 25 January 2011, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2011/2/14/timeline-egypts-revolution" target="_blank" rel="noopener">known as Police Day</a> in Egypt, and never looked back. Facebook pages such as “We are all Khaled Said” — which gained 100,000 followers in three days after spreading images of a man murdered by Egyptian police for exposing on-duty drug taking — were key fora of the revolution. The #Jan25 hashtag became collective, digital rallying cries, unifying the people around the first protests before the Egyptian government blocked the internet for five days. It was all too much. Three weeks later, Mubarak resigned. The revolutionaries had won.</p>
<p>Or had they? Mubarak was gone. But who would replace him? Social media had enabled Egyptians to mobilise hundreds of thousands onto the streets. This gave Mubarak a choice: cling on to power through massacres of a scale unknown even in Egyptian history or back down. He chose the latter. But the structural strength of social media — its ability to transform every Egyptian protestor into their own mini-broadcaster, amplifying messages and helping to mobilise others — proved to be the revolution’s downfall. Social media is, by nature, diffuse. It is not built around the architecture of central nodes, be it states or, in the case of revolutions, leaders.</p>
<p>So, when Mubarak fell, there was no one to replace him. Millions across the world watched in awe and triumph as he scuttled from power. But the job was only half done. The revolutionaries had no one to replace him. They had no leader — only thousands of Facebook accounts that were incredibly effective in getting the message about Mubarak out, but obviously unable to govern in his place. The revolutionaries had meandered into a void, into which Muhammad Morsi and the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood gratefully stepped. A few years later, after attempting to make himself a <em>de Facto</em> Pharoah, he was overthrown by the former General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi — in essence a Mubarak Mark II.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/08/the-infidels-will-not-be-silenced/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/08/the-infidels-will-not-be-silenced/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/GettyImages-541808811-1.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/08/the-infidels-will-not-be-silenced/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/08/the-infidels-will-not-be-silenced/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The infidels will not be silenced</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/08/the-infidels-will-not-be-silenced/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Ayaan Hirsi Ali</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Now contrast this with 1979. Many date the beginning of the 1979 Revolution to the January 1978 student protests in defence of Khomeini, after the government newspaper <em>Ettela&#8217;at</em> labelled him a “British Agent” in an article entitled “<a href="https://historydraft.com/story/iranian-revolution/the-article-iran-and-red-and-black-colonization/330/2582" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Iran and Red and Black Colonization</a>”. Simply put, the revolutionaries built their protest around the figure of Khomeini. Indeed, the revolution was said to have succeeded when his plane from Paris touched down at Tehran airport on <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/509f5672-f261-11dd-9678-0000779fd2ac" target="_blank" rel="noopener">1 February 1979</a>.</p>
<p>Fast forward to today, and Mahsa Amini’s name has become shorthand for Iranian revolutionary aspiration; her hashtag has been tweeted millions of times. But she can never be more than a martyr. No leader has yet emerged. Instead, the protests are organised by different people or groups in different cities and towns on an almost <em>ad </em><em>hoc</em> basis.</p>
<p>The truth is that if the mullahs were to collapse tomorrow, there are no signs that a democratic movement would sweep to power. Opposition groups such as the Mujahedin-e-Khalq have their supporters, but they remain far from being a government-in-waiting. It is far more likely that the security state — led by the Revolutionary Guard Corps — would step into the void and make apparent what is already largely a fact: that Iran is no longer a clerical state but is now ruled by a Praetorian Guard.</p>
<p>In 1979, Iranians held up images of Khomeini. In 2022, they tear them down. They know they want the regime gone but they have no one to hold up in its place. For a revolution to succeed, it’s not enough to be against someone; you have to be <em>for</em> someone else. It’s not enough that Khamenei loses. Someone else must win.</p>
<p>Until that time, the mullahs will continue to cling on as murderously and barbarously as they always have, and Iranians will continue to die. For years Palestinians would say they needed a Saladin. They were wrong. What they need is a Ben Gurion. What the Iranian revolutionaries need now more than anything else is a Khomeini. Until that happens, this will only ever be half a revolution.</p>
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					<title>What Western feminists can learn from Iran</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2022/09/what-western-feminists-can-learn-from-iran/?edition=us</link>
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					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Ayaan Hirsi Ali]]>
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							<![CDATA[Is this really it? (Sean Gallup/Getty Images)]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Ayaan Hirsi Ali</strong> is an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist. She is also the Founder of the AHA Foundation, and host of <em>The Ayaan Hirsi Ali Podcast</em>. Her Substack is called <a href="https://www.restorationbulletin.com/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em>Restoration</em></a>.</p>
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						<unherd:twitter_handle>Ayaan</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist. She is also the Founder of the AHA Foundation, and host of <em>The Ayaan Hirsi Ali Podcast</em>. Her Substack is called <a href="https://www.restorationbulletin.com/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em>Restoration</em></a>.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Fri, 30 Sep 2022 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Fri, 30 Sep 2022 00:00:00 +0000</updated>
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								<![CDATA[Solidarity means more in Tehran than Washington]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>Is this it? Could this, finally, be the end of the Islamic Republic of Iran? As huge crowds of women and men surge through the Iranian streets, burning hijabs and calling for “Death to Khamenei!”, is an impossible dream finally about to come true?</p>
<p>The prospects certainly look better <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-63006664" target="_blank" rel="noopener">than in 2009</a>, when the country’s protestors were primarily middle-class and more narrowly focused on the issue of Ahmadinejad’s election victory, rather than on dismantling the oppressive system in its entirety. Today, men and women, rural and urban, affluent and poor are all marching to bring down the Islamic Republic. Khamenei <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/middle-east/20220925-iran-ayatollah-khamenei-s-health-issues-prompt-fresh-speculation-on-succession" target="_blank" rel="noopener">is also reported to be in very poor health</a>, so the chants might just come true.</p>
<p>Yet senior US officials I have spoken to have cautioned against blind optimism. As they explained, we’ve seen many moments in recent Iranian history where the tide seemed about to turn, only to be disappointed. The same officials also warned that America is trying not to become too involved: the Biden administration isn’t supporting the protestors, but it isn’t explicitly discouraging them, either.</p>
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<p>This isn’t an example of craven politics: I also fear that the end of the regime might not herald a brave new world, but rather a bloody mess, where Khamenei&#8217;s death is followed by internecine fighting for power between various Iranian factions. Would the overthrow of the regime lead to civil war, a military coup, or liberal democracy? Nobody knows.</p>
<p>None of this is to say that, faced with a possible uprising in Iran, America should avert its gaze. Perhaps more than anything, the wave of protests now sweeping the country is a perfect moment to remind ourselves of the shameful stupidity of US policy in the region in recent years. Take the 2015 <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-iran-nuclear-deal" target="_blank" rel="noopener">JCPOA nuclear deal</a>, which gave the regime time and space and money to strengthen its morality police and security infrastructure, as well as extend its regional influence. If no deal had been signed, perhaps the regime&#8217;s current crisis would have come sooner.</p>
<p>Nor should we forget the fact that <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2021/07/14/iran-journalist-kidnapping-alinejad/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Iran has recently tried</a> to abduct and kill several American citizens on American soil; or that a number of senior US officials believe Iran is to blame for the attempted assassination of Salman Rushdie last month. It’s a national disgrace that America’s politicians saw fit to break bread with the butchers of Tehran in the first place. And still too many think we can politely sit down with them again to re-negotiate the nuclear deal. I wouldn’t blame the brave men and women of Iran if they never forgave us for such short-sighted idiocy.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/08/the-infidels-will-not-be-silenced/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/08/the-infidels-will-not-be-silenced/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/GettyImages-541808811-1.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/08/the-infidels-will-not-be-silenced/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/08/the-infidels-will-not-be-silenced/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The infidels will not be silenced</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/08/the-infidels-will-not-be-silenced/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Ayaan Hirsi Ali</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Still, while the response of the West should be limited to cautious optimism, there is one other conclusion we can draw, no matter what happens: the current protests are a unique, and uniquely inspiring, phenomenon. Nowhere else in the Muslim world — and I mean, literally, <em>nowhere else</em> — would we see what we are seeing right now in Iran: men and women, together, standing up for each other, the men demanding justice for the regime’s murder of a woman who dared to let her hair show. It bears repeating: the men of Iran are standing alongside women as they burn their hijabs.</p>
<p>This is the most dramatic evidence of something I have long suspected: Iran is different. I have many Iranian women friends who are highly accomplished. They are doctors and scientists and writers and artists. When I ask them how they do it, they tell me that they owe much of their success to their male relatives’ support of their ambitions. So perhaps we shouldn’t be surprised that the fire behind the protests was lit by Mahsa Amini’s family — in particular, her father, whose remarkable courage in accusing the Iranian authorities of a cover-up serves as an emblem of the solidarity many Iranian men have with their women.</p>
<p>Now, there are caveats to this. This phenomenon isn’t universal across Iran, and many Iranian women suffer terribly at the hands of their families (and some women are even vicious policers of “morality”). But the fact that even <em>some</em> men behave like this is distinctive in the Muslim world, and their appearence alongside women in these protests is not a sight that will soon be forgotten. In other Muslim countries, women suffer as much, if not more, at the hands of their male relatives as at the hands of the authorities. Men jealously guard women’s honour, beating, imprisoning, and even killing their female family members for bringing shame upon the family.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/09/schools-shouldnt-fly-blm-flags/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/09/schools-shouldnt-fly-blm-flags/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/2GettyImages-1227896217-scaled-1.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/09/schools-shouldnt-fly-blm-flags/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/09/schools-shouldnt-fly-blm-flags/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Schools shouldn&#039;t fly BLM flags</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/09/schools-shouldnt-fly-blm-flags/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Ayaan Hirsi Ali</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>This is part of the reason why Iran is so unique: not only are men standing publicly with women, but women must also be <em>aware</em> that they are under no threat from their husbands and male relatives, otherwise they would not dare put themselves on the front lines like this. Consider, for example, <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-63006664" target="_blank" rel="noopener">the beautiful, inspiring videos</a> of women tossing their headscarves into bonfires before dancing joyously away, for all the world to see. If they thought their fathers or brothers were waiting back home to punish them, I doubt we would see such sights on this scale.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, in the West, where feminism has proved more successful than anywhere else, anti-male grievance dominates the mainstream, with solidarity between men and women replaced by a desire for polarising identity politics. As America&#8217;s feminist movement collapses under the weight of it its own divisiveness, I can’t help but find its Iranian counterpart far more inspiring: men and women standing together, speaking up for each other’s rights. How much better this is than the violently woman-hating Taliban or the petulant privilege of so many Western feminists.</p>
<p>In March 1979, just as the Ayatollah Khomeini came to power, the American feminist Kate Millett travelled to Iran to join a protest against his plan to make hijabs compulsory for women. The demonstration ultimately proved unsuccessful. Millett was arrested and expelled from the country; Iranian women were turned into second-class citizens. Yet, as we are now discovering, their revolutionary spirit was not extinguished. Iranian feminism has stood the test of time; it hasn’t been corrupted. If only the same could be said for the West.</p>
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					<title>Iran&#8217;s revolutionary hell</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2021/06/irans-revolutionary-hell/?edition=us</link>
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					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Maurice Glasman]]>
					</dc:creator>
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							<![CDATA[Iran's government still has its supporters. Credit: Atta Kenare/AFP/ Getty Images]]>
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							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Maurice Glasman</strong> is the founder of Blue Labour and director of the Common Good Foundation. He is a Labour life peer.</p>
]]>
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															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is the founder of Blue Labour and director of the Common Good Foundation. He is a Labour life peer.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Sun, 13 Jun 2021 23:01:51 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Thu, 17 Jun 2021 08:16:58 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ayatollah Khamenei]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[CIA]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Coups]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Iran]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Iranian Revolution]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Mohammad Mossadegh]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Oil]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Regret]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Shah]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://old.unherd.com/?p=146779</guid>
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								<![CDATA[The country is still trapped by the events of 1979]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>Very occasionally, something happens that is so surprising that more than forty years can pass and still it cannot be apprehended, or understood. There is still a longing to go back, and not repeat the mistakes that led to the catastrophe, a desire to redeem the rupture.</p>
<p>I have met men who still long for their wives, when the separation has been longer than the marriage. I have met old Bolsheviks who kept rehearsing Trotsky’s actions after Stalin’s death, believing the Soviet Union would still be with us, and thriving if only he had returned two days earlier to Moscow. I have even met New Labour believers who think that if David Miliband had defeated his brother, then Brexit would never have happened and Labour would be in power, at the vanguard of a renewed EU.</p>
<p>When I listen to such claims, an old Yiddish phrase comes to mind, which is translated as: “If Grandma had wheels she’d be a trolly”. The conversation always ends in a kind of faraway silence. I find it hard to know what to say, while the person thinks about what to do next; whether to send a birthday card, write a letter to the <em>Morning Star</em>, renew their efforts to support Keir Starmer.</p>
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<p>Sometimes the ship has sailed and it is never coming back to port. It has a new crew and a new cargo, a new trading route and a new flag. Yet they still believe that, someday, their ship will return; they stand at the dock, staring out to sea but always walk back home alone.</p>
<p>Sometimes things change, an era changes, and there is no going back. For institutions, for nations, as well as for people, this is hard to accept. For Britain and the United States, the Iranian Revolution is such a phenomenon. It was all going so well, and it is hard to accept that it will never go well again.</p>
<p>Muhammad Ali said that the first rule of boxing is that you never get knocked out by a punch you see coming. It is also the first rule of politics. And no-one predicted the form of the the Iranian Revolution in 1979.</p>
<p>Both London and Washington did predict an imminent threat to the rule of the Shah, but from the Left, through a coalition between disaffected workers and intellectuals supported by the Soviet Union and led, within Iran, by the Tudeh Party. That is not what happened.</p>
<p>The spectre of Mohammad Mossadegh and the 1953 coup, orchestrated by the CIA operative Kermit Roosevelt, held them in its thrall. Mossadegh was an aristocratic liberal nationalist who wanted to nationalise Iranian oil. At the time, the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, the predecessor of BP, held a monopoly of oil production in Iran and signed a deal which only gave 19% to Iranians. It was effectively a nationalised industry and the profits were vital to post-war reconstruction. The NHS was founded on the assumption of continued revenue streams from Iran.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2019/12/all-hail-king-boris/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2019/12/all-hail-king-boris/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/GettyImages-1180314863.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2019/12/all-hail-king-boris/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2019/12/all-hail-king-boris/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>All hail Good King Boris</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2019/12/all-hail-king-boris/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Maurice Glasman </a></p></div></a></div>
<p>The Labour Government of 1945 was extremely opposed to to Iranian nationalisation, while pursuing it vigorously at home. Colonial double standards. Ernest Bevin, Herbert Morrison and Clement Attlee all took a hostile view of Mossadegh and supported the Shah as the instrument of maintaining the status quo. Eisenhower agreed and Kermit and his muppet show was unleashed; Mossadegh was deposed and condemned to a life of internal exile.</p>
<p>That is the lost moment of Iranian history, the great “what if?” What if we had supported Mossadegh rather than depose him? What if Iran had grown into a liberal democracy?</p>
<p>This is the question that haunts the minds of our diplomats because what happened was completely different: an Iranian Revolution led by Ayatollah Khomeini and the imposition of an eternal form of clerical domination, “the rule of the jurists” — and there’s no way out.</p>
<p>The coming Iranian presidential elections on Friday indicate and express the doomed eternity of stasis that the revolution created. The inevitable winner will be Ebrahim Raisi, a mass-murdering apparatchik who was part of the four-man team responsible for the public executions of up to 30,000 Leftists in a few months in 1988 for the crimes of atheism and apostasy.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2021/01/roger-scruton-still-gives-me-strength/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2021/01/roger-scruton-still-gives-me-strength/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/50718299733_7a70813666_o.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2021/01/roger-scruton-still-gives-me-strength/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2021/01/roger-scruton-still-gives-me-strength/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Roger Scruton still gives me strength</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2021/01/roger-scruton-still-gives-me-strength/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Maurice Glasman </a></p></div></a></div>
<p>He will be elected on a turnout of less than 30%. Most Iranians understand that the power lies not with the President, but in the office of the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, which controls the Revolutionary Guard, the media channels, the clerics and foreign policy.</p>
<p>In other words, there is a double system. These elections are for a government that will pretend to govern while the real power lies elsewhere. Just look at the country’s vaccine programme, which has inoculated only 2% of the population. The Health Ministry fully participated in Covax to receive vaccines, and yet Khamenei announced a ban on both British and American jabs on the grounds that they were “likely designed to contaminate foreign nations”, leaving the Chinese vaccine and Sputnik as the only options. One is useless and the other is scarce.</p>
<p>The office of the Supreme Leader also vets who can stand for office, and they rejected all candidates from outside the revolutionary vanguard. The former reforming President, Mohammad Khatami, set up an “Association of Combatant Clerics” and put forward fourteen candidates, but each was rejected.</p>
<p>Iranian foreign policy is based on building proxies, Hezbollah in Lebanon, the militias in Iraq, Hamas in Palestine, the Houthis in Yemen. And it’s the same at home. These elections are just proxy politics, the candidates represent the regime, not the people.</p>
<p>I sat through the first three-hour debate between the approved candidates. They were not allowed to discuss Covid, vaccines, sanctions, power cuts, sinking ships or burning factories. It reminded me of Brezhnev-era Soviet plenaries, where all the candidates agreed that the achievements of the Revolution were eternal, but the enemies of socialism were still sabotaging the project, particularly the Government.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2021/01/america-and-iran-need-each-other/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2021/01/america-and-iran-need-each-other/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/GettyImages-124131099.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2021/01/america-and-iran-need-each-other/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2021/01/america-and-iran-need-each-other/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>America and Iran need each other</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2021/01/america-and-iran-need-each-other/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> David Patrikarakos</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>This time, it’s the unprecedented form of Shia theocracy invented by Khomeini that must be preserved. When I was in Najaf in 2018, the historic home of Shia religious authority, I met with two senior ayatollahs and many clerics, all of whom rejected the Iranian system as hostile to the teaching and practices of the Shia Muslim faith. In Iraq, a year later, I witnessed the assassinations of protestors by Iranian-backed militias. Tens of thousands of Shia protestors in Baghdad sang “Iran Iran, go away” every night. They are still there; still shooting them.</p>
<p>At that time in November 2019 demonstrations against the regime exploded all over Iran, so the Government turned off the internet and shot the protestors. Any remaining political prisoners were recently transferred to the violent offenders section of the prison. They won’t last long.</p>
<p>And yet Western diplomats still believe that it is possible to negotiate with the government, to normalise relationships, to go back to 1953 and do the right thing this time. The first foreign policy act of the Biden Presidency was to re-engage with Iran and revive the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, lifting sanctions on proxies and renewing the distinction between hardliners and &#8220;moderates&#8221;. This is not a distinction that is believed in by the Iranian people as reflected in the overwhelming majority who will boycott the election. The Biden approach still assumes that they are negotiating with Mossadegh when the truth is otherwise.</p>
<p>The Iranian Left have been utterly routed and the middle class lurk in North Tehran, playing cat and mouse with <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-36101150" target="_blank" rel="noopener">the Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice</a>, over how much hair women can show in public. And yet the yearning of Iranians for something better and different cannot be stilled. It remains a <a href="https://www.google.com/search?q=christianity+crime+iran&amp;ei=ryfDYILeBNGcjLsP8sKTkAE&amp;oq=christianity+crime+iran&amp;gs_lcp=Cgdnd3Mtd2l6EAM6BwgAEEcQsAM6BAgAEEM6BQgAEJECOgQILhBDOgUIABCxAzoLCC4QsQMQxwEQowI6CAgAELEDEIMBOgcILhBDEJMCOgsILhDHARCvARCRAjoKCAAQsQMQgwEQQzoOCC4QxwEQrwEQkQIQkwI6BwgAELEDEEM6BQguELEDOgUILhCRAjoICC4QxwEQowI6AgguOgIIADoICC4QxwEQrwE6BggAEBYQHlC3nANY8K4DYLqwA2gDcAJ4AIABfogB-A2SAQQyMi4ymAEAoAEBqgEHZ3dzLXdpesgBBcABAQ&amp;sclient=gws-wiz&amp;ved=0ahUKEwjC8ZyinY_xAhVRDmMBHXLhBBIQ4dUDCA8&amp;uact=5" target="_blank" rel="noopener">crime</a> in Iran to speak to others about Jesus or to claim that you have a relationship with him. And yet, the number of Christians there is now <a href="https://www.christianitytoday.com/news/2020/september/iran-christian-conversions-gamaan-religion-survey.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">estimated</a> to be close to a million.</p>
<p>There is a network of underground churches. Bibles are smuggled in and passed from hand to hand. The numbers continue to grow. It seems that for thousands of Iranians the only way to get rid of this regime is to change your religion. That is the long story in Iran. The desert church is lighting its candles for the prince of light once more.</p>
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