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					<title>America&#8217;s new caste system</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2024/11/americas-new-caste-system/?edition=us</link>
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										<unherd:main_theme>Weekend Essay</unherd:main_theme>
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						<![CDATA[Mark Lilla]]>
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							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Mark Lilla</strong> is the author of <a href="https://marklilla.com/the-shipwrecked-mind/"><em>The Shipwrecked Mind: On Political Reaction</em></a> and <a href="https://marklilla.com/the-reckless-mind-intellectuals-in-politics/"><em>The Reckless Mind: Intellectuals in Politics</em></a>.</p>
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						<![CDATA[ is the author of <a href="https://marklilla.com/the-shipwrecked-mind/"><em>The Shipwrecked Mind: On Political Reaction</em></a> and <a href="https://marklilla.com/the-reckless-mind-intellectuals-in-politics/"><em>The Reckless Mind: Intellectuals in Politics</em></a>.]]>
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										<pubDate>Sat, 16 Nov 2024 00:16:43 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Fri, 22 Nov 2024 17:57:47 +0000</updated>
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		<category><![CDATA[De Tocqueville]]></category>
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								<![CDATA[The education gap has dented democracy ]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>I’ve been teaching Tocqueville’s <em>Democracy in America </em>for a very long time. But only recently have I come to appreciate some of his deepest assumptions and their implications about the whole democratic experiment. In particular I’ve been thinking about the opening two paragraphs of the book.</p>
<p>I had always rushed past them, since they seemed anodyne. But Tocqueville mastered the art of making the boldest of claims in an off-handed way. These paragraphs are far more radical than they first appear. They’ve encouraged me to argue that the first and most necessary condition of democracy is the feeling of inclusion.</p>
<p style="padding-left: 40px;">“Of all the novel things which attracted my attention during my stay in the United States, none struck me more forcibly than the equality of conditions. I had no difficulty in discovering the extraordinary influence this fundamental fact exerts upon the progress of society; it sets up a particular direction to public attitudes, a certain style to the laws, fresh guidelines to governing authorities, and distinctive habits to those governed.</p>
<p style="padding-left: 40px;">&#8220;Soon I came to recognise that this very fact extends its influence well beyond political customs and laws; it exercises no less power over civil society than it does over the government. It forms opinion, creates feelings, proposes ways of acting, and transforms anything it does not directly instigate itself.”</p>
<p>To fully understand what Tocqueville means by “equality of conditions”, we need to appreciate how different the new democratic societies were. Tocqueville describes the old aristocratic societies as archipelagos of mini-societies inhabited by different classes of people with very different material conditions, and therefore different sets of emotions. But on each island there was a sense of inclusion and mutual recognition of others who faced those conditions.</p>
<p>The situation in the United States was destined to be something else. There were no pre-existing islands of privilege, thinking, and feeling. Instead the earliest Americans faced the same set of opportunities and challenges posed by their new environment — sparsely populated and vast, the land was also wild and untamed. Securing basic necessities was difficult for everyone, not just one class. And as settlement moved West, they had to learn the art of self-government for themselves. They were, in an almost unimaginable way today, starting over.</p>
<p>That task was made much easier, Tocqueville thought, by another kind of equal condition: ethnic and religious homogeneity. The first settlers shared an Anglo-Protestant cultural heritage, prizing religious liberty and a shared stock of concepts for engaging in politics. Paradoxically, it would turn out that a certain kind of homogeneity in early America helped give birth to principles that would one day be employed to defend diversity.</p>
<p>From these observations, Tocqueville drew two very important conclusions. First, since different human feelings are generated by different material conditions, those feelings should be considered brute facts as solid as the conditions themselves. The set of dominant emotions arising from the equality of conditions in democracies are crucial givens, so long as those conditions hold. Second, since the equality of conditions towards which modern societies are tending is historically novel, so too we should expect to see novel democratic feelings.</p>
<p>So what are the implications of these conclusions? If American democracy rests on a bedrock of brute factual similarity — similar challenges in life, aspirations and habits — then the emotional weather of the regime will depend on the degree to which that similarity holds. If it changes, if citizens feel they belong to separate realities, if a part of the population feels excluded, we should not be surprised if it sets off an emotional storm.</p>
<p>American democracy, then, does not rest ultimately on the principles of liberty and equality, as so many patriotic interpreters have assumed. Nor does it rest ultimately on religious beliefs, as his pious interpreters believe. It rests instead on a lucky break. The roughly similar material conditions that the first, roughly similar settlers faced when they landed naturally gave rise to feelings of inclusion and recognition, which spread throughout the entire society, not just on small islands of an archipelago.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2020/11/when-will-my-fellow-liberals-learn/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2020/11/when-will-my-fellow-liberals-learn/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/GettyImages-1229520354.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2020/11/when-will-my-fellow-liberals-learn/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2020/11/when-will-my-fellow-liberals-learn/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>When will my fellow liberals learn?</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2020/11/when-will-my-fellow-liberals-learn/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Mark Lilla</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Tocqueville’s observations about inclusion were not wholly original — thinking about the political significance of inclusion and mutual recognition in the Western tradition began with Aristotle, was elaborated in the Christian Middle Ages, and continues to play a role in Catholic theology today. But his application of them to modern democracy was.</p>
<p>In Tocqueville’s view, to sustain a democratic society, feelings must be engaged and then widely shared: what “keeps a majority of citizens under the same government” is the “instinctive and, in a sense, unconscious agreement resulting from like feelings and similar opinions”. What he has in mind here has nothing to do with an aspiration to Christian virtue, or the moral principle of equality, or appeals to a contrived notion of reflective civic patriotism. He is referring to a factual reality, a brute fact of congruence in the feelings of citizens and their general outlook on the world. Either it is there or it is not.</p>
<p>There still are contexts in which a basic congruence of feelings and outlook among Americans becomes apparent. Imagine you have been spending a few years in a foreign country, whose language you have learned and whose customs you have got used to. One day you find yourself in a restaurant seated next to a group of loud and garrulous American tourists. Suddenly you feel yourself beamed into a psychological and moral universe you only dimly remember. In it, everyone is open, even confessional, in their speech. Self-doubt and irony have fled the room, driven out by an almost oppressive bonhomie. The poor waiter has been asked for his first name and is informed that these new friends from downstate Illinois will be staying in touch.</p>
<p>How do you, the American observer, feel once they have left? The sound of familiar voices might come as a welcome respite from the rudeness of the French or the humourlessness of the Germans. You might feel the urge to pull up a chair and join them, knowing that you would be welcomed into the conversation. If you’ve had too much to drink you might even share your email address with them at the end of the evening.</p>
<p>But what if you have been straining to fit into this foreign culture and not appear American? What are you feeling as you stick your head more deeply into your copy of <em>Le Monde </em>and pray that the tourists leave soon? You are experiencing exactly the same set of feelings as the other American observer, just with a negative valence. You both recognise yourselves in your fellow citizens and feel implicated in their behaviour. Some inner string vibrates at the same frequency as those of these intruders, whether you wish it or not.</p>
<p>But, notwithstanding that example, we cannot deny that the feelings of democratic belonging have diminished rapidly in our contemporary democracies. A complex cultural gap has opened up in our democracies that we find much more difficult to bridge.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;A complex cultural gap has opened up in our democracies that we find much more difficult to bridge.&#8221;</div>
<p>Tocqueville’s subtle observation about the difference between Southerners and Northerners that he discovered on his travels might help us understand:</p>
<p style="padding-left: 40px;">“If two men belonging to the same society have the same interests and to some extent the same opinions, but their characters, education, and style of living are different, it is highly likely that they will not see eye to eye.”</p>
<p>Even if he found himself speaking to people of the same class, with the same economic interests, their characters, education, and styles of living were so different — mainly due to slavery — that mutual recognition and political friendship between them was difficult, and soon would become impossible.</p>
<p>Today the cultural gap in America is not a function of geography but of education. A certain level of education — basically a bachelor’s degree — is now required to advance significantly in society. We may forget in our little university and urban cocoons but only a little more than a third of adult Americans have such a degree. When I looked up the percent of Manhattanites with a university degree, which I assumed to be a little less than 50%, I discovered that it has risen to nearly 70%. It is only 23% in the Bronx. I had no idea.</p>
<p>And the consequences of this gap are not just economic. University does not only provide training for entering lucrative professions, it also socialises students into new styles of living, as Tocqueville called it, that are vastly different from those of the less educated. Graduates come out of the university with different ideas about how to comport themselves in public and at work, what to eat, how to entertain themselves, how many children to have and how to raise them, how to manage money, and how to take care of their health. Even the typical bodies of our cultural classes are notably different today.</p>
<p>The term caste is thrown around fairly promiscuously, but frankly I can’t think of a better one to describe the seriousness of the new cultural gap. If Tocqueville was right that extremely different styles of living can set apart even people who have shared economic and political interests, then we are in trouble.</p>
<p>A widely shared sense of exclusion, with all the attendant emotions of shame and resentment, is toxic to democracies. We are living with a new brute, generating fact that is triggering new feelings of distrust, contempt, resentment, antipathy, and withdrawal. A large class of white Americans is experiencing for the first time a range of emotions that American minorities, especially black Americans, have always had to contend with on a far vaster scale.</p>
<p>That is why I have come to take very seriously the expressed need to feel included, “to see people who look and talk like me”, beginning in our educational establishments. In a book I wrote a few years ago I treated such expressions as divisive, on the grounds that emphasising group identities can block people from recognising the wider common good. While that can be true, it is more true of diversity. There is, I think, a tension between the ideals of diversity and inclusion, since the former is centrifugal in effect and the latter is centripetal.</p>
<p>But the feelings of exclusion in Americans today extend beyond minority groups. The white working class feels it, the religious population feels it, the South feels it. Our common sense of mutual recognition is melting away and we have no idea really how to stop it. The crisis of inclusion extends far beyond our elite spats over college admission and corporate hiring.</p>
<p>Is there an institution that still helps Americans from different walks of life feel included? The only example I can come up with is college sports — and for a somewhat personal reason.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/08/how-to-build-a-far-right-troll/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/08/how-to-build-a-far-right-troll/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/gettyimages-2164758325-612x612-1.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/08/how-to-build-a-far-right-troll/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/08/how-to-build-a-far-right-troll/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>How to build a far-Right revolutionary</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/08/how-to-build-a-far-right-troll/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Mark Lilla</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>My late father never attended college. But he was a sports fan and had developed a vicarious attachment to the University of Michigan. The day I was admitted to the university was the second happiest day of his life, the happiest being the day he saw the team win the Rose Bowl. After he was widowed, he came to visit me every weekend and we would go to games together — football, basketball, anything. He started buying up paraphernalia and soon everything in his house was covered in maize and blue.</p>
<p>But the significance of the experience for him was not simply in watching university sports. It was that when we crossed campus together, he felt at home. He knew the streets and he knew the buildings. He felt somehow welcomed — even without a degree. And it certainly made him more willing to pay taxes for the university.</p>
<p>This story is not to say life is like football — quite the contrary. I am simply saddened and a little shocked to discover that I couldn’t think of a single other institution in American life that makes people from different education classes all feel included.</p>
<p>And even then, I’m not sure it’s still working. When I attended an Ohio State game last year, I marvelled once again at the class diversity of the crowd and the palpable sense of friendship among those who attended. But as I walked past the cars in the parking lot when the game was over, I saw nothing but bumper stickers expressing hate or contempt for fellow citizens who didn’t share the owner’s political outlook. What happens in the stadium, stays in the stadium apparently.</p>
<p>So, yes, we are in a very bad way.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">***</p>
<p><em>This article is based on a lecture delivered at the conference “Beyond the Impasse: Theological Perspectives on DEI&#8221; at the Aquinas Institute in Princeton.</em></p>
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					<title>Should America be more like Ukraine?</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2022/11/should-america-be-more-like-ukraine/?edition=us</link>
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						<![CDATA[Mark Lilla]]>
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							<![CDATA[A world of moral entropy (Evgen Kotenko/ Ukrinform/Future Publishing via Getty Images)]]>
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							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Mark Lilla</strong> is the author of <a href="https://marklilla.com/the-shipwrecked-mind/"><em>The Shipwrecked Mind: On Political Reaction</em></a> and <a href="https://marklilla.com/the-reckless-mind-intellectuals-in-politics/"><em>The Reckless Mind: Intellectuals in Politics</em></a>.</p>
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						<![CDATA[ is the author of <a href="https://marklilla.com/the-shipwrecked-mind/"><em>The Shipwrecked Mind: On Political Reaction</em></a> and <a href="https://marklilla.com/the-reckless-mind-intellectuals-in-politics/"><em>The Reckless Mind: Intellectuals in Politics</em></a>.]]>
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										<pubDate>Sat, 12 Nov 2022 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Sat, 12 Nov 2022 00:00:00 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
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								<![CDATA[Western society is being liquified ]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>For those of us in the West, the Ukrainian response to the Soviet invasion has been somewhat embarrassing. We are used to living in peace and prosperity and are not in the habit of fighting for our way of life or making sacrifices for the common good. I don’t think I’m alone in asking myself whether, under similar circumstances, we would be as courageous and unselfish as the Ukrainians have proved themselves to be. The question brings a blush to the cheeks.</p>
<p>Perhaps I’m being too hard on us. Crises can inspire people to do uncharacteristic things. Let me delicately point out that liberal values have never been deeply rooted in Ukraine, nor were its citizens known for their sense of fraternity and civic responsibility. Very few observers who knew Ukraine’s history could have predicted the surge of resistance that followed the Russian invasion. Vladimir Putin was not alone.</p>
<p>How long this feeling will last once the war is over is anyone’s guess. There are countless historical examples of wars changing the DNA of nations; take post-war Germany, for instance. But as we know from our personal relations, the camaraderie forged by a crisis tends to dissipate over time. There is a law of entropy in human relations, just as there is entropy in the physical world. There is even such a thing as moral entropy; one can only expect people to be good for so long.</p>
<p>But for now, the resistance of the Ukrainians and their sense of solidarity is an inspiration to the rest of us. Yet to some, it is more than an inspiration: it is teaching us a lesson. Already certain liberal intellectuals are using the Ukraine war to criticise our own liberal democracies. Why, they are asking, can’t we be more like Ukraine?</p>
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<p>This is not a wise question, but it arises out of a genuine concern. The feeling is that we have lost a strong sense of civic purpose, that democratic norms are being openly flouted, and that there is a chilling indifference to the public good. Our countries look less like republics of citizens today than assemblies of consumers and web surfers glued to their screens. Meanwhile, a xenophobic nationalism is replacing a generous patriotism that once reflected optimism about the democratic prospect. And so, yes, why can’t we be more like Ukraine?</p>
<p>A good example of this line of question comes from David Brooks, one of the most sober political journalists in the United States. Last month, he wrote in <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/10/06/opinion/ukraine-liberal-nationalism.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">the <em>New York Times</em></a> that: “The war in Ukraine is not only a military event; it’s an intellectual event. The Ukrainians are winning not only because of the superiority of their troops. They are winning because they are fighting for a superior idea.” For Brooks, that idea is liberal nationalism. He believes that Ukraine is teaching us that a feeling of national belonging need not contradict a commitment to individual liberty. On the contrary: liberalism can ennoble nationalism, teaching it to be generous. And an elevated nationalism can connect liberalism to our feelings of attachment to each other, and inspire us to fight for what we share. And so: let us all be liberal nationalists now.</p>
<p>This is an admirable wish. But it begs the following question: why are we not liberal nationalists now? Why is there so little concern for the public good in contemporary democracies? Why are we such indifferent citizens? Why has illiberal nationalism acquired such appeal?</p>
<p>Rather than try to answer these difficult questions, it is much easier simply to charge our leaders and fellow citizens with a failure of nerve in the face of threats to democracy. (Brooks was not doing this, but <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/04/03/opinion/putin-ukraine-liberalism.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">others</a> are.) One could write an interesting little book about the role that the “failure of nerve” charge has played in modern politics. We usually associate it with the reactionary and militaristic Right. One of the ironies of the present conflict is that Vladimir Putin, who often weaponised this charge, is now the target of it. Because of his military failures, his courage has been thrown into question by the radical Russian Right he helped to create.</p>
<p>But the charge has also been used on the Left. Anyone familiar with the history of communist states and post-colonial revolutionary regimes will recognise the phrase “insufficient revolutionary zeal”, which was employed to explain regime failures or to purge troublesome public officials. Why have we not met the quota set by the five-year plan? A lack of revolutionary zeal. Why has the collectivisation of farms caused famine? A lack of revolutionary zeal. Behind the magical economic thinking of Marxism-Leninism was a theory of the will to power.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/10/the-revenge-of-the-technocrats/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/10/the-revenge-of-the-technocrats/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/2GettyImages-516917686-scaled-1.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/10/the-revenge-of-the-technocrats/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading </span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/10/the-revenge-of-the-technocrats/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The revenge of the technocrats</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/10/the-revenge-of-the-technocrats/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> John Gray </a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Defenders of liberal democracy developed the unfortunate habit of employing similar rhetoric during the Cold War. Looking back at the writings of the period, it is striking how often the terms faith and war appear. We must have faith in democratic principles! We must win the war of ideas! It is understandable that liberals began to speak this way. After all, communism was a messianic faith and communist intellectuals were not above using force to reach their ends.</p>
<p>But the only legitimate object of faith is a god, not an idea. And ideas are not weapons developed to serve armchair generals. Ideas serve our pursuit of truth through reflection and criticism; that is all they do. Ideologies, on the other hand, do inspire faith, and they can, and sometimes must, be employed in political conflicts. But there is no such thing as a “war of ideas”. The real power of ideas is their capacity to unmask ideologies, not propagate them. Those who look to Ukraine today to scold their own democracies seem on automatic pilot. They have genuine worries, which I share (and <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Once-Future-Liberal-Identity-Politics/dp/0062697455/ref=sr_1_1?crid=DODD19R7BI5L&amp;keywords=once+and+future+liberal&amp;qid=1666088117&amp;qu=eyJxc2MiOiIwLjgyIiwicXNhIjoiMS4wNCIsInFzcCI6IjEuMjkifQ%3D%3D&amp;sprefix=once+and+future+liberal%2Caps%2C192&amp;sr=8-1" target="_blank" rel="noopener">even wrote a book</a> expressing them a few years ago). But I do not think that the sorry state of our democratic societies has much to do with a failure of nerve, or a loss of faith, or the lack of a unifying idea like liberal nationalism. The older I get, the more a materialist I have become. Not a materialist in the sense of Karl Marx, but in the sense of Alexis de Tocqueville.</p>
<p>In recent years, I have been spending a lot of time with Tocqueville, and I am struck by what a subtle and convincing materialist he was. His masterpiece, <em>Democracy in America</em>, does not begin with an invocation of democratic values and why we must fight for them. It begins with the geography of North America — the forests, the swamps, the mountains, the rushing rivers. In the face of the vast, unspoiled American landscape, the early settlers found themselves in a state of relative material equality. Nature was very big, and they were very small. They needed each other.</p>
<p>In Tocqueville’s view, this fact of equality was a necessary condition for establishing the principle of equality in American democracy; and that principle then inspired a passion for equality. In other words, live passions are rooted ultimately in material reality. Tocqueville did not believe, as Marx did, that political ideas just mirror a society’s material relations. But he knew that no political idea is convincing for long, or even relevant, if it is utterly detached from present social reality. This is a challenge to all utopian thinkers: they must imagine a new state of affairs that does not seem utterly divorced from present reality.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/06/putins-war-is-just-beginning/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/06/putins-war-is-just-beginning/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/2GettyImages-489129208-scaled-1.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/06/putins-war-is-just-beginning/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading </span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/06/putins-war-is-just-beginning/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Putin&#039;s war is just beginning</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/06/putins-war-is-just-beginning/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Harald Malmgren </a></p></div></a></div>
<p>There is an important correlate to Tocqueville’s materialism: if political ideals that once captured people’s imaginations no longer do, our first instinct should be to ask what change in social conditions might be behind the change, making the old ideals less compelling than they once were. It should not be to adopt a prophetic pose and implore everyone to return to the true faith or embrace a new one. And so, if we are concerned, as we ought to be, about a lack of civic attachment, social solidarity, and respect for the common good in Western democracies, we must ask ourselves the following question: What has changed in the way we live now to erode our sense of democratic citizenship?</p>
<p>My own thinking about this question is not original. It seems to me that the ultimate source of democratic erosion is the fact that our societies have become more liquid and less solid, to adopt the terms of the Polish sociologist Zygmunt Bauman. Bauman’s use of the term “liquid” was an oblique reference to <em>The Communist Manifesto</em>, in which Marx and Engels declared that under capitalism, “all that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is profaned”.</p>
<p>Bauman pointed out that Marx and Engels took solidity to be a good thing. In this sense, they were conservatives. And their expectation was that once unstable capitalist societies were overthrown, a new, solid type of society under communism would emerge. Marx and Engels did not preach permanent revolution; they were not Maoists. For them, the whole point of engaging in socialist and Communist politics was (ideally) to restore solidity and establish certainty so that human beings could live healthily in line with their natures. Hence the importance of socialist values like solidarity, and policies like economic planning.</p>
<p>Today, the communist utopian dream is dead and capitalism remains in place. But its power to liquify human relations has massively increased. Capitalism in the wide sense — including modern science and technology — no longer just eats away at solid social institutions. It prevents new solid ones from even forming. This was Bauman’s most important insight.</p>
<p>We now live in a world where people have begun to anticipate that fewer of our institutions and norms will endure as they once did. They have factored this into their thinking and — even more importantly — into their feelings. We know that children of divorced parents have more trouble than most in developing solid relationships with others. Having lost a sense of certainty about the families they grew up in, they lack confidence that they can establish stable ones of their own. My sense is that this is now happening in society more generally. From the importance of biological sex to the dominant role of the family, fewer and fewer of the social institutions and norms that exist when someone is young will exist when they are old. If this trend continues, it is hard not to imagine that we are in store for a radical transformation of human consciousness and social life.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2020/11/when-will-my-fellow-liberals-learn/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2020/11/when-will-my-fellow-liberals-learn/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/GettyImages-1229520354.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2020/11/when-will-my-fellow-liberals-learn/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2020/11/when-will-my-fellow-liberals-learn/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>When will my fellow liberals learn?</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2020/11/when-will-my-fellow-liberals-learn/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Mark Lilla </a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Obvious examples of this liquidity abound. In the economic sphere, deregulation, “flexible” labour markets, privatisation, global finance and trade, and the dismantling of social protections have made workers’ lives and their communities more fragile. In the technological sphere, the unavoidable internet offers young people a vast menu of human possibilities, which has undermined the transmission of national and religious customs and values. It has also subjected all of us to psychological and moral viruses that ricochet around the globe instantaneously. In the medical field, rapid advances in research and treatment render today’s therapeutic wisdom obsolete tomorrow, leaving less-educated people confused and increasingly sceptical of the medical establishment. Finally, and most dramatically, we see the effects of liquidity in new ideologies of fluid psycho-sexual identities.</p>
<p>This is an historically unprecedented situation. The nature of human society has always been conservative. Its function has been to offer a stable environment in which individuals can develop psychologically and cooperate with each other; it also, crucially, has transmitted knowledge and norms to subsequent generations. The ideas and institutions of liberal democracy developed in societies that functioned in this conservative way. But our contemporary liquid societies do all this less well. They are becoming, so to speak, less social. Their energy is centrifugal, not centripetal.</p>
<p>What I have just put forward is just a thesis, and not an original one. But if it is even half right, we need to engage in much deeper thinking about liberal democracy and civic engagement than we are accustomed to. In an unstable environment where institutions and values have trouble getting rooted, just what does the term “common good” mean? Or solidarity? When the forces that determine human destinies are global and ever changing, what does democratic citizenship mean?</p>
<p>These are not intended to be rhetorical questions. They are, to my mind, the fundamental political questions of our time. We need answers to them before we can think clearly about much else. We cannot “fight” for liberal democracy if we don’t know what it is still capable of, given the societies we must now live in and the expectations and feelings we now have. Many people today are convinced that the greatest threat to liberal democracy is xenophobic nationalism, not liquification. They are concerned about ideologies that want to make our societies less open, less diverse, and less subject to dissent. I share this concern, at least in the short run: today’s self-declared illiberal nationalists are trouble and can cause a lot of damage.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/05/covid-was-liberalisms-endgame/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/05/covid-was-liberalisms-endgame/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/GettyImages-1219281982-scaled-e1652983505354.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/05/covid-was-liberalisms-endgame/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading </span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/05/covid-was-liberalisms-endgame/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Covid was liberalism&#039;s endgame</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/05/covid-was-liberalisms-endgame/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Matthew Crawford </a></p></div></a></div>
<p>What they cannot do, however, is change the laws of social physics. The so-called “national conservative” activists who gather in Budapest these days to hear the gospel of Christian integrism are children of liquid societies. Whatever their nostalgic fantasies about a world they’ve never known, and never existed in the form they imagine, their psychological outlook presumes liquidity, movement, independence. They are bees who were born outside a hive — like the rest of us. They are not built to live in even a hive as inviting to them as a fully “integrated” Catholic nation.</p>
<p>The fact is that today’s nationalists can never achieve their goals. History has erased the possibility of sustainable, homogeneous theological-political regimes. We should still be concerned about today’s far-Right nationalists and resist them politically. But that is because political movements that fail to achieve their ends are often more dangerous than movements that do.</p>
<p>What we all hope is that soon, very soon, Ukraine will be able to join the community of liberal democratic nations in full security. We also hope that the experience of war will establish enough trust among Ukrainians to allow democratic institutions to operate as they are intended to, with loyal opposition and respect for opposition.</p>
<p>But the truth is that even were these hopes realised, Ukraine would then find itself subject to all the centrifugal social, economic, and psychological forces other liberal democracies are contending with. Every regime faces them today, even Russia. It is worth remembering that in the early weeks of the war, few Russian citizens demonstrated against it, and almost no one demonstrated for it or rushed to enlist in the military. Instead, they rushed to IKEA to buy furniture in fear that the store would close for good.</p>
<p><em>An early version of this article was presented on October 14 at the 2022 Freedom Games conference organised by the Liberté Foundation in Łódź, Poland.</em></p>
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					<title>Progressives have sacrificed liberalism</title>
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						<![CDATA[Paul Marshall]]>
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							<![CDATA[Matt Hancock failed to understand the limitations of science. Credit: David Cliff/Anadolu Agency via Getty]]>
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							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Paul Marshall</strong> is UnHerd&#8217;s founder/publisher.</p>
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						<![CDATA[ is UnHerd's founder/publisher.]]>
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										<pubDate>Thu, 30 Dec 2021 00:02:24 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Thu, 30 Dec 2021 11:08:54 +0000</updated>
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		<category><![CDATA[Ayn Rand]]></category>
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								<![CDATA[The mania for political purity is squandering our hard-won freedoms]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>Is liberalism in retreat? Today the term “liberal” is used to describe so many diverse creeds and movements as to make it almost meaningless. It is used as a term of abuse by its critics and regularly used to discredit all kinds of tendencies which aren’t liberal at all.</p>
<p>Sometimes, the derision is deserved; in the English-speaking world, the new “liberal” mania for political and ideological purity is causing ancient liberties to be sacrificed in the name of new “rights”. And the pursuit of liberal individualism is thought to be in conflict with ideas of community. These apparent failings of the liberal idea are leading some to gather together under the banner of “post-liberal”.</p>
<p>But the problem is not that liberalism has passed its sell-by date; rather, it has lost its moorings.</p>
<p>These can be traced back to the emergence of British Liberalism with the Glorious Revolution and the 1689 Bill of Rights — which enshrined many of the liberties that Parliament and the people had fought for during the previous century.</p>
<p>The Liberalism of 1689 was grounded, in particular, in the Christian (and more specifically) Protestant faith, born of the fight to produce an English translation of the Bible and to defend freedom of conscience.  There was much intolerance and more than a few beheadings along the way — William Tyndale died for the cause of publishing his translation — but the settlement of 1689 required and established a new understanding of tolerance and freedom.</p>
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<p>In all the great struggles of the 17th century, the calls for freedom were inseparable from the deep Christian faith of the protagonists, whether we are talking about the Parliamentarians, the Levellers or Oliver Cromwell himself. John Milton, driven and defined by his faith, wrote what is probably the foundational text in defence of free speech <em>Areopagitica</em> at the peak of the Civil War. It contained an impassioned argument against the introduction of the new Licensing Order (1643), which required government approval for any published work. All these calls were anchored in a shared understanding of meaning, knowledge and virtue. Meaning came from God, knowledge from the Bible and virtue from following the teachings of the Old and New Testaments.</p>
<p>The importance of liberalism’s moorings were not lost on the American Founding Fathers, who shared the same inheritance. In <em>First Principles</em>, Thomas Ricks describes how dedicated they were to assessing the problem of “virtue” — of determining that their new Republic would be anchored in a shared understanding of morality so that civil society and freedom would be able to flourish. Adams and Jefferson looked as much to Ancient Rome for these virtues as they did to the Christian faith, but in practice American society was grounded overwhelmingly in the shared values of Christianity.</p>
<p>De Tocqueville understood this better than most. In <em>Democracy in America</em>, he plants the character of “Anglo-American civilisation” firmly in two elements: “the spirit of religion and the spirit of liberty”. For him, religion and liberty were kindred spirits. In America, they were indeed kindred, arriving together with the pilgrims. But in England, religion was the parent of liberty rather than sibling. And in both cases, the flourishing of liberty would depend on the stability and strength of her Christian moorings.</p>
<p>In 19th-century Britain, Classical Liberalism carried all before it in the pursuit of great causes — widening the democratic franchise, opening the economy to free trade, educational reform, laying the foundations of the welfare state, eradicating the global slave trade. But just as it seemed to be all-conquering, its roots were being poisoned.</p>
<p>That poison stemmed from the Enlightenment itself. A new, anthropocentric way of thinking arrived in the 18th century, bringing with it an alternative understanding of human nature, a new theory of human knowledge and a new calculus of virtue. While Enlightenment Liberalism was aligned with the Christian worldview on certain principles of freedom, the two traditions diverge in key ways – and it is this divergence that is now proving toxic to liberalism as we know it.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2021/10/the-tories-can-save-blue-labour/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2021/10/the-tories-can-save-blue-labour/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/2-GettyImages-1233914758-scaled-e1633965805482-copy.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2021/10/the-tories-can-save-blue-labour/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2021/10/the-tories-can-save-blue-labour/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The Tories can save Blue Labour</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2021/10/the-tories-can-save-blue-labour/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Aris Roussinos</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Traditional British liberalism rests on the Judaeo-Christian understanding that we are all, in moral terms, fallen creatures. The writings and speeches of the great heroes of liberty in the 16th and 17th centuries came with a deep sense of humility, of mankind’s brokenness and of the Fall.</p>
<p>Somewhere amid the arrogance of the Enlightenment, we lost this sense of fallenness. Ayn Rand embodies the new way of thinking with her theories of rational egoism and “the virtue of selfishness”. Encouraged, no doubt, by evidence of technological progress, she assumed moral progress would move in lockstep with technology. She has many modern disciples, wittingly or unwittingly, especially in California, with its strapline of “move fast and break things”. Her Libertarianism is very different from traditional British Liberalism, despite the tendency of many to confuse the two, because of her different assumptions about human fallibility (or lack of, in her case), and about virtue.</p>
<p>Allied to the Enlightenment sense of human perfectibility and rationality is the belief in Progress. The origins of this go all the way back to Thomas Macaulay and the Whig interpretation of history. But Macaulay saw progress essentially in political terms – in the extension of the franchise and other associated political freedoms such as freedom of conscience and freedom of the press. Sadly, the creed of Progress has now been pushed into every walk of life, ignoring the lessons of history and defying any biblical understanding of human nature. For Progressives, humankind’s moral progress is on a perpetual upward curve in parallel with technological progress. The history of the 20th century does not give much support to this conceit — it would be fairer to say that technology simply amplifies the expression of our moral fallibility.</p>
<p>Enlightenment liberals also built their own theories of morality, independent of a god, starting with Benthamite Utilitarianism, and extending all the way to John Rawls. Morality became a mathematical calculus, shorn of compassion or community, let alone repentance and forgiveness. According to Jeremy Bentham, “nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do as well as to determine what we shall do.” No reference to morality here, just pain and pleasure. One of Bentham’s disciples, William Jevons, even went as far as to develop a “felicific calculus” whereby all pain and pleasure could be quantified.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2021/07/theres-nothing-new-about-post-liberalism/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2021/07/theres-nothing-new-about-post-liberalism/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/GettyImages-869722170-e1626811620636-1.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2021/07/theres-nothing-new-about-post-liberalism/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2021/07/theres-nothing-new-about-post-liberalism/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The surprising legacy of the neocons</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2021/07/theres-nothing-new-about-post-liberalism/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Oliver Wiseman</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Enlightenment thinkers also developed their own theories of knowledge. One built on the empiricism of Hume and Adam Smith, the other built on the Rationalism of Descartes and Rousseau. The former, with its inherent modesty, is compatible with the Christian understanding of human fallibility, the latter is not.</p>
<p>Hayek describes the two schools of epistemology in <em>The Constitution of Liberty</em>. He warned that the latter, which he called the French tradition of liberty, with its “flattering assumptions about the unlimited powers of human reason” could lead to “totalitarian democracy”. His warnings were all too well-founded and it is the Rationalist version of epistemology which has taken particular hold with today’s cult of science.</p>
<p>Belief in the power of science has never been stronger. It has climaxed amid Covid, with politicians increasingly wrapping themselves in “the science” to justify ever more stringent intrusions on our freedom. Scientism, in the wrong hands, can become dangerous. And the worst hands are those of politicians and civil servants too easily tempted to use the authority of “experts” to infringe on our liberties.</p>
<p>This type of politician, Matt Hancock being the best example, fails to understand the limitations of science, fails to understand the nature of risk and uncertainty and fails to understand the difference between observable historical evidence and predictions of an uncertain and hypothetical future.</p>
<p>These different understandings of the theory of knowledge, of meaning and of virtue have led  to a corruption of liberalism at its source.</p>
<p>What we are seeing today being enacted in the name of liberalism is not liberal at all. Instead, let’s call it by the name which its proponents are prepared to use — progressivism. This is the creed which unites Tony Blair, Nick Clegg, most of the US Democratic Party, most of the British Labour Party and the <em>New York Times</em>. These are not traditional Liberals in any understanding of the term. They are Progressives. They believe humankind is on a permanent upward path of progress. They believe in the rule of experts and in the authority of “the science”.</p>
<p>So where do genuine classical liberals go, faced with the corruption of the creed? Ironically, the attacks on our most ancient freedoms such as freedom of speech, conscience and assembly, make it more important than ever to assert the foundational understanding of liberty. “Classical liberals” need to unite and stand up for their tradition. It has never been so relevant.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, to those who do embrace the term “post-liberal”, and believe it applies to our new era, I would just say this: be careful what you wish for.</p>
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