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		<title>Economics - UnHerd</title>
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		<description>think again</description>
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	<title>Economics - UnHerd</title>
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					<title>Brussels will destroy Andy Burnham</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2026/10/brussels-will-destroy-andy-burnham/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://stage.unherd.com/2026/10/brussels-will-destroy-andy-burnham/?edition=us#respond</comments>
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										<unherd:main_theme>Rejoin</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Jonny Ball]]>
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																<unherd:article_ranking>1</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[Weighing up his options. (Jeff J Mitchell/Getty)]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><b>Jonny Ball </b>is a Contributing Editor at <em>UnHerd</em>. He formerly wrote under the name Despotic Inroad.</p>
]]>
						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>DespoticInroad</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[<b>Jonny Ball </b>is a Contributing Editor at <em>UnHerd</em>. He formerly wrote under the name Despotic Inroad.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Tue, 20 Oct 2026 23:04:56 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Wed, 21 Oct 2026 07:59:44 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Brexit]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Burnham]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Economics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[EU]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Politics]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://stage.unherd.com/?p=1079111</guid>
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								<![CDATA[The EU was never Labour’s friend]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p dir="ltr">Decades before Brexit, in one of the landmark speeches on Britain in Europe, an orator hailing from their party’s Right flank asked their audience: “What does federation mean?” The answer was nothing good. Powers, the speaker warned, would be “taken from national governments and given to federal parliaments”. And then? Nothing less than “the end of Britain as an independent nation state” — “the end of 1,000 years of history.” This was no Powellite rant, nor some excerpt from Thatcher’s famous Bruges speech. Rather, that evocative “1,000 years of history” line was conjured by Hugh Gaitskell, the modernizing leader of the Labour Party from 1955 until his untimely death eight years later.</p>
<p dir="ltr">How times have changed. For Labour now has a Prime Minister apparently intent on reopening the Brexit debate, even as he frames his political project around reasserting state power over the market, something seriously undermined by EU membership. Never mind Andy Burnham’s attacks on the Brexit “status quo”, <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/4f466ef0-04ea-4bbb-89f7-927f2a4b2f54?syn-25a6b1a6=1" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.ft.com/content/4f466ef0-04ea-4bbb-89f7-927f2a4b2f54?syn-25a6b1a6%3D1&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1792593937635000&amp;usg=AOvVaw0E6wpU4HJz1lQSwcyFcQtr">let alone</a> Treasury plans to reignite “Project Fear” — for decades, the British Left understood this contradiction perfectly. Postwar socialism, proclaimed by Attlee in the hallowed year of 1945, relied too heavily on statist mechanisms, from tariffs to industrial subsidies, basically incompatible with the freedoms of the European bloc. Facilitating free trade through a giant continental single market was a concern for the <em>capitalists</em>, for the bosses — not for the <em>labor</em> interest.</p>
<p dir="ltr">As Gaitskell’s thundering speech makes clear, meanwhile, this approach to Europe was once near-consensus even on the Labour Right, uniting him with socialist firebrands like Nye Bevan. As Gaitskell’s rival once put it, supranationalism was a symptom of “political malaise” that “elevated the marketplace”, resulting from a failure of socialists “to use the sovereign power of their parliaments to plan their economic life”.</p>
<p dir="ltr"><div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/09/andy-burnham-should-embrace-your-inner-trotsky/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/09/andy-burnham-should-embrace-your-inner-trotsky/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/GettyImages-2296069081.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/09/andy-burnham-should-embrace-your-inner-trotsky/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/09/andy-burnham-should-embrace-your-inner-trotsky/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Andy Burnham should embrace his inner Trotsky</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/09/andy-burnham-should-embrace-your-inner-trotsky/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Jonny Ball</a></p></div></a></div>
<p dir="ltr">Here, perhaps, are faint echoes of Burnham’s nostalgic lament for a social democracy sacrificed at the altar of market efficiency. Where Bevan identified Europe with mammon, and where the Right’s Friedrich Hayek <a href="https://fee.org/ebooks/the-economic-conditions-of-interstate-federalism/" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://fee.org/ebooks/the-economic-conditions-of-interstate-federalism/&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1792593937635000&amp;usg=AOvVaw2VidPUetnCoJpFpjMN5dnQ">rhapsodized</a> over &#8220;Interstate Federalism&#8221;, today Burnham identifies Brexit as one of his “four horsemen of Britain’s apocalypse”. The irony, of course, is that his other three riders are deindustrialization, austerity and privatization: each engendered as heartily by European technocratic elites as by Britain’s homegrown ideologues.</p>
<p dir="ltr">All the same, there is a political calculation at the heart of Burnham&#8217;s pre-EU shift. His immediate electoral challenge lies in reuniting Britain’s Left-wing voters behind the Labour banner, yet the fiscal picture is bleak. Manchesterism’s promise of large-scale renationalization, green investment, municipal housebuilding — all could potentially attract Labour-Green defectors back into the fold. But they would also raise the ire of gilt traders all too aware of Britain’s inability to either constrain current spending or manage major capital projects effectively. Europe, then, offers a cheap salve, a way of rallying the twin forces of urban Remainia and provincial Bregret, while reinjecting dynamism into “UK PLC” without imposing huge costs on John Healey’s Treasury.</p>
<p dir="ltr"><div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">“Europe, then, offers a cheap salve, a way of rallying the twin forces of urban Remainia and provincial Bregret.”</div>
<p dir="ltr">The problem is that this sets Burnham on a path toward breaking his so-called “Makerfield test”: that policies should be judged against their putative benefits for blue-collar and postindustrial Britain, as exemplified by his Wigan constituency. Unfortunately for Burnham, though, Makerfield voted 65% Leave. And while that enthusiasm is sure to have declined of late, the idea that there would now be a natural majority for Rejoin remains fanciful.</p>
<p dir="ltr">The break in the collective Labourite omertà on Europe, then, could be seen as part of a grim, reluctant acceptance of a future divorced from “Makerfield Man”: with Labour a progressive party, not a labour party, one made up of public-sector workers in alliance with urban social renters and young, downwardly mobile graduates. Rejoinerism might represent the final breach of a historical obligation, emotionally preserved by party bigwigs even today, that Labour should reflect its roots as an electoral vehicle built by and for the organized working class.</p>
<p dir="ltr">That nostalgia likely explains why the next Labour manifesto ultimately won’t promise British re-entry or even another referendum. Burnham, too, is as romantic as Gaitskell. No amount of polling data on Labour’s new base of white-collar professionals will rid him of his belief that the party should orient itself, at least rhetorically, toward some notion of “the traditional working class”, however broadly conceived. Of course, Labour will be happy to nurture a pro-European vibe, not least around some amorphous “reset in relations”. But don’t expect genuine pan-Europeanism, in the style of the Liberal Democrats or, indeed, Tony Blair, anytime soon.</p>
<p dir="ltr">As with much of Burnhamism, the point is in the signaling, not the substance. We might therefore see some limited reassociation, or a new, closer customs arrangement. And, to be fair, these options could offer a way to cut Brexit red tape without reopening the broader constitutional question. Still, even an unenthusiastic rapprochement could quickly cause trouble. Dominic Cummings has <a href="https://dominiccummings.substack.com/p/regime-change-2026-29-results-from?utm_source=publication-search" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://dominiccummings.substack.com/p/regime-change-2026-29-results-from?utm_source%3Dpublication-search&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1792593937635000&amp;usg=AOvVaw1U0dvLqDoEDRn7ovz9kKr0">noted</a> the paradox of Europhile progressives who champion regulations at home, yet who bemoan the imposition of bureaucratic hurdles on multinationals around cross-border trade. Meanwhile, some Brexit stalwarts will see any realignment as an undemocratic capitulation. And if the Treasury does indeed lay out the modeling numbers for various options, from re-joining the customs union to the full hog, it would still be a brave party leader to turn freedom of movement into an electoral issue come 2029.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/07/dont-fall-for-project-smear-mr-burnham/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/07/dont-fall-for-project-smear-mr-burnham/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/GettyImages-2281925071.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/07/dont-fall-for-project-smear-mr-burnham/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested Reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/07/dont-fall-for-project-smear-mr-burnham/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Don&#039;t fall for Project Smear, Mr Burnham</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/07/dont-fall-for-project-smear-mr-burnham/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Yanis Varoufakis</a></p></div></a></div>
<p dir="ltr">If that again hints at a party in limbo — trapped between its old Makerfield base and its new professional-managerial one — there are more practical reasons to be suspicious of Brussels. After all, neither the single market nor the customs union have been panaceas for Europe’s long-term trend of relative decline. Indeed, Britain has outgrown both France and Germany since leaving the EU’s free-trade and regulatory regimes. If AI really is the sector of the future, then Europe’s data regulations exclude the continent from its windfalls. Besides, the bloc Britain would now rejoin is not that of Mitterrand or Kohl: it would be the Europe of Marine Le Pen and Alice Weidel. The dissonance between the Europe of the Remainiac imagination and the actually-existing EU grows wider by the day — not least given the recent disorder in France. Besides, Britain would enter this unhappy arrangement without exemptions from the Euro and Schengen, nor the significant budget rebate, all available before we left.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Through all this, Burnham could do worse than recalling the lesson of his predecessors: embracing their Labourism not just in romantic rhetoric but in practice. The Prime Minister’s program, as sketched so far, is an attempt to “roll back the Eighties”: public ownership of utilities and rail, and a reindustrialization drive that favors British firms in public procurement. Each of these risks being stymied by the legal architecture of EU membership. European treaties make nationalization and compensation processes far more complex. Procurement rules require open tendering and preclude preferences for domestic bidders. The free movement of capital forecloses the controls that Attlee relied on to steer investment. Rejoining would not deliver the “social Europe” promised by Jacques Delors in 1988, instead binding Labour to a settlement that Burnham’s own program is designed to escape. That’s why Gaitskell and Bevan opposed Common Market entry over half a century ago, and why Burnham can’t now both pass the Makerfield test and commit to rejoining.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Here, of course, Burnham would be swimming against the tide. Left Euroscepticism, once hegemonic, is now relatively niche. In the 2016 referendum, “Lexit” was backed by only a smattering of half a dozen or so Labour MPs, the Communists, the Socialist Workers, and the Rail Maritime and Transport Workers Union. One notable holdout was Jeremy Corbyn, who former allies tell me likely voted Leave. The eccentricities of this merry band don’t detract from the incompatibility of the EU with building a more cohesive national economy.</p>
<p dir="ltr">While frictionless trade and globalization will find few defenders on the Left today — not in an age of “securonomics” and so-called “post-neoliberal” growth models — freedom of movement was itself an integral pillar of economic liberalization. The creation of a single employment market, one stretching from Belfast to Bucharest, imposed a sham level playing field upon populations with vastly divergent employment practices and payment standards. The UK, with its relatively unregulated labor market, then became what Helen Thompson <a href="https://www.lrb.co.uk/the-paper/v40/n12/helen-thompson/will-it-hold" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.lrb.co.uk/the-paper/v40/n12/helen-thompson/will-it-hold&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1792593937635000&amp;usg=AOvVaw0hJ3Ooqe7VHrrmff5Dsr0X">has called</a> “the employer of last resort”. And, concurrently, the old Left transformed into an altogether different political tribe, more defined by what Wolfgang Streeck calls “cosmoliberalism”, far more concerned with preserving European constitutional arrangements than with adherence to traditional social democracy. Borderless capitalism, once trumpeted by Hayek and his ilk, should be as unloved on the British Left as it is still among British voters.</p>
<p dir="ltr">And, here, perhaps, is one more lesson of history. Whatever Burnham’s own muddled blend of romance and reality, politics and pragmatism, the basic truth remains: the grand European vision of Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman never fully took hold in our small island nation. Even for British pro-Europeans, people like Gaitskell’s old protege Roy Jenkins, being “in Europe” long meant little more than inclusion in modernity, in the world of services and capital, and the competition it unleashed on old-fashioned British industry. It was a pragmatic arrangement, rarely viewed in romantic or grand historic terms. It was only after Brexit that the metropolitan middle classes began to get teary eyed about the 12 gold stars and Beethoven’s Ninth. And even then, the most regular complaint heard was over passport checks at the airport — not Anglophone exclusion from some lofty transnational demos. For peoples who had, on several occasions, engaged in mass slaughter over the constitutional status of Alsace-Lorraine, the EU may have felt like the realization of Enlightenment brotherhood after centuries of war. For Britain, though, its customs were alien, its languages incomprehensible, its people Other. Gaitskell understood that dilemma six decades ago, and changing Labour’s electoral coalition has not made it disappear.</p>
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					<title>The flight of the angry entrepreneurs</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2026/10/the-flight-of-the-angry-entrepreneurs/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://stage.unherd.com/2026/10/the-flight-of-the-angry-entrepreneurs/?edition=us#respond</comments>
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										<unherd:main_theme>economy</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Wessie du Toit]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/bluecopy.jpg?w=91</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>1</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA['The chemicals magnate Jim Ratcliffe.' (Nicolò Campo/LightRocket/Getty)]]>
						</unherd:image_caption>
						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Wessie du Toit</strong> writes about culture, design and ideas. His Substack is <em><a href="https://thepathosofthings.substack.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">The Pathos of Things</a>.</em></p>
]]>
						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>wessiedutoit</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ writes about culture, design and ideas. His Substack is <em><a href="https://thepathosofthings.substack.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">The Pathos of Things</a>.</em>]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Tue, 13 Oct 2026 23:03:16 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Wed, 14 Oct 2026 07:38:00 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Billionaires]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Economics]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[UK]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Wealth]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://stage.unherd.com/?p=1078222</guid>
																												<description>
								<![CDATA[Who will listen to what they say about Britain?]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>In 2019 the businessman James Dyson, famed for his bagless vacuum cleaners, found himself at the center of a different kind of cyclone. He was facing a storm of criticism for moving his company’s headquarters to Singapore, soon after a Brexit referendum in which he had argued that leaving the EU would boost British enterprise and trade. The <i>Daily Mirror </i>accused <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-bristol-67589147" target="_blank" rel="noopener">him of hypocrisy</a>; he was so insulted that he fought an unsuccessful libel suit against the newspaper.<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span></p>
<p>The controversy raised salient questions about the role of footloose billionaires in British politics. Must they meet some benchmark of commitment to the country before we consider their views? Or is their willingness to leave further evidence that we are not paying enough attention to the needs of business?</p>
<p>Over the past year, Britain has witnessed a succession of wealthy businessmen fuming at the mismanagement of the country and dabbling in politics, often from a position of opulent exile. The chemicals magnate Jim Ratcliffe, another prominent Brexit supporter who <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cm0463619r1no" target="_blank" rel="noopener">moved his tax residency</a> to Monaco in 2020, has not been shy about criticizing his home country. Last month, Ratcliffe declared that Britain was “on the slide”. At one time, he recalled, “we had the greatest empire in the world, we were a great people. We won two world wars.” Today, by contrast, Britain suffers from high taxes, a “green eye towards wealth”, and a failure to control immigration and welfare spending. Above all, Ratcliffe has complained about “ridiculously high” energy prices, which have recently led his company, INEOS, to mothball three chemicals plants in Hull.<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span></p>
<p>These comments provoked a response from the wealth manager Peter Hargreaves, also a Brexit-backer, who started his company from a bedroom in the Eighties. Hargreaves <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/88526316-f378-4e59-ae52-75dbffdbe049?syn-25a6b1a6=1" target="_blank" rel="noopener">quipped that Britain</a> “isn’t on a slide, it’s slid&#8230; This country is never, ever coming back, it’s finished.”</p>
<p>Meanwhile, it was recently reported that David Reuben, the real estate tycoon who, together with his brother Simon, possesses Britain’s second largest family fortune, relocated to Monaco over the summer. The brothers tend not to comment on politics, but they <a href="https://www.thetimes.com/uk/politics/article/tory-donors-support-reform-may-elections-005vxcl7q" target="_blank" rel="noopener">donated £100,000</a> to Reform UK this year, having previously given just shy of £1 million to the Tories. This story has since been called into doubt, with <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/news/2026/oct/07/billionaire-quit-uk-wealth-tax-resident-monaco-super-rich-exodus" target="_blank" rel="noopener">evidence</a> that David has already been resident in Monaco for over a decade, but there has been no shortage of super-rich individuals leaving Britain in recent years. Analysis of the <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2026-10-04/billionaire-exodus-from-uk-leaves-160-billion-hole" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Bloomberg Billionaires Index</a> suggests that more than half of the country’s billionaire wealth has moved away since Labour took power in 2024. Hedge fund manager Christopher Rokos, steel magnate Lakshmi Mittal and shipping tycoon John Fredriksen have all left recently. <span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span></p>
<p>It is naturally somewhat embarrassing for the government that successful businessmen are leaving the country like rats fleeing a sinking ship, in some instances taking hundreds of millions of pounds of annual tax revenues with them. Yes, Britain’s prosperity and public finances depend far more on raising economic productivity than on wealthy individuals, but insofar as a dim view of Britain’s prospects makes such individuals less likely to invest here, the two are not unrelated. Yet the problem of unhappy capitalists is surely priced-in by a Left-wing government, which can to some extent turn it to their own advantage. Look at these self-interested billionaires, they can say (making sure to utter the word <i>billionaire </i>with a sneer), they would rather abandon us than pay their share.<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span></p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/09/what-burnham-can-learn-from-bismarck/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/09/what-burnham-can-learn-from-bismarck/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/GettyImages-2292597445.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/09/what-burnham-can-learn-from-bismarck/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author </span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/09/what-burnham-can-learn-from-bismarck/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>What Burnham can learn from Bismarck</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/09/what-burnham-can-learn-from-bismarck/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Wessie du Toit</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>By the same token, since many of these truculent expats are either Brexit supporters or Reform and Conservative donors, their interventions pose a problem for the Right. For parties promising to put British people first, it is awkward to be receiving financial and rhetorical support from ultra-wealthy individuals whose commitment to the country often does not extend to actually living here. This reinforces what Janan Ganesh <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/d29a4116-0511-4a85-b005-b1b4b110cdcd?syn-25a6b1a6=1" target="_blank" rel="noopener">has called</a> a “patriotism problem” on the Right: figures like Nigel Farage claim to love Britain, but have almost nothing positive to say about the country as it actually exists. Then again, that stance is what endears Reform to the section of the electorate that thinks the country is fundamentally broken. For those voters, the fact that billionaires share the same analysis may matter more than their tax residency does. Their decision to leave the country is, after all, a powerful confirmation of the narrative.</p>
<p>A greater contradiction lies in Reform’s attitude to the wealthy in general. Farage, whose career began as a commodities trader in the midst of the Thatcher revolution, speaks proudly about his ability to earn money, and to attract it. His party has received tens of millions of pounds — the largest political donations in British history — from another pair of expat billionaires, the cryptocurrency magnates Ben Delo (until recently a Hong Kong resident) and Christopher Harborne (who has acquired Thai citizenship). Both have now returned to Britain after Labour attempted to block their contributions. Over the summer, Farage defended his monied backers as “men who’ve gone off around the world as entrepreneurs and succeeded — the sort of people we used to admire over centuries”. Yet his party appeals to struggling blue-collar workers and lower middle-class sole traders and small business owners, many of whom feel the deck has been stacked against them and in favor of the rich. Last week, Robert Jenrick criticized the Conservatives’ proposed inheritance tax reforms as “offering handouts to multi-millionaires”.</p>
<p>Wealth, however, may not be as important as we might assume. Dyson is an intriguing figure in this context because he has long argued that Britain’s problems are tied to the character of its elites, who esteem knowledge work and cultural literacy above the hands-on business of technology, invention, entrepreneurship and trade. In 2004, he even stormed out of his post as chairman of London’s Design Museum, complaining that it had become a “style showcase” chasing visitor numbers with frivolous exhibitions about flower-arranging and designer shoes, rather than a place to promote serious engineering.</p>
<p>In many Western countries, there is now a prominent dividing line between, broadly, managerial cultures and entrepreneurial ones. The former are those employees in institutional settings — corporations, the public sector, NGOs, and what Dyson <a href="https://www.thetimes.com/culture/books/article/james-dyson-how-trial-and-error-made-him-britains-wealthiest-inventor-qbm5jtd0z" target="_blank" rel="noopener">calls</a> an “Oxford-Westminster bubble” — who value credentials, are fond of rules, and assume that the world is shaped by ideas and narratives. By contrast, those of an entrepreneurial persuasion are interested in the material facts of how things actually work, while chafing against rules and prizing innovation and individual ambition.<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span></p>
<p>Consider the coalition that voted for Donald Trump in 2024. It included people who work in traditional industries involving cars, machinery or oil and gas, as well as those who do business outside of corporate structures, such as <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2025-03-06/maga-wants-to-end-capitalism-as-we-know-it" target="_blank" rel="noopener">family-owned enterprises</a> and venture capitalists. These groups were united in their resentment of a professional managerial class, stereotypically inhabiting a world of yoga studios and DEI policies, which stifled them with regulations and liberal mores.<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span></p>
<p>The revolt of Britain’s entrepreneurs indicates that a similar tension has emerged here. Terms of opprobrium such as “lanyard class” and “the Blob” try to capture a middle-class, managerial ethos that now runs through the country’s institutions like a stick of rock. Its priority is not how the economic and material underpinnings of modern life operate, but ensuring that they conform to the appropriate standards mandated by equalities law, environmental regulations and progressive cultural etiquette. There is an utter disconnect between this worldview and, for instance, the cowboy capitalism of post-Soviet Russia where the Reuben brothers originally made their fortune trading aluminum, or INEOS factories producing nasty chemicals and spewing out carbon emissions, or disruptive and potentially dodgy technologies such as cryptocurrency. <span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span></p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;For those voters, the fact that billionaires share the same analysis may matter more than their tax residency does.&#8221;</div>
<p>The important thing to note about this conflict is that, while it is primarily expressed as a fissure within Britain’s elites, it is fundamentally a question of attitudes and social environment, and can therefore provide the basis of a much wider division. Less privileged staff at managerial institutions are likely to absorb the dominant assumptions of those settings, while people of widely differing means and backgrounds can identify with a message of self-reliance, ambition and scorn for meddling bureaucrats. Seen in these terms, there is a political logic in Reform courting crypto-billionaires, fossil fuel-reliant industries and broader swathes of voters who sympathize with an anti-establishment sentiment. Likewise, there is a logic in parties of the Left treating these things as threats to be resisted.<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span></p>
<p>The fundamental problem for the Right is that, 10 years on from Brexit, it is no closer to a viable program for the dynamic, free-trading Britain envisioned by its entrepreneurial supporters. That would mean lowering taxes on business and wealth — paid for by welfare cuts — and deregulating everything from planning laws to wages and the financial sector. It would mean, moreover, explaining to the public that they must struggle for survival in a highly competitive global economy, something which only Liz Truss has attempted in recent years, and she only succeeded in making the idea less palatable. British politics has become increasingly insular in recent years, focused on domestic stability and reluctant to compromise with a wider world that appears to be largely a source of insecurity and danger. This suits the Right when it comes to territorial and legal sovereignty, with both the Tories and Reform converging on a platform of tighter borders, withdrawing from international treaties and curbing multiculturalism at home. Yet neither party has found a way to reconcile its business-friendly instincts with a public that still desires a protective state.<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span></p>
<p>Kemi Badenoch’s new Conservative manifesto, <i>The Right Way</i>, is at least somewhat forthright in its diagnosis, emphasizing the need for Britain to be “competitive” in the conditions it offers to businesses. Yet details are notably scarce when it comes to the goal of reducing strategic dependency on China, a rather large and complex caveat to the statement that “free trade should be the presumption”. More importantly, this return to the Conservatives’ free-market, small-state default, greeted with a profound sigh of relief from what remains of the party faithful, is essentially a concession of electoral defeat. It marks the end of Tory efforts to compete against Labour and Reform in working-class, post-industrial regions.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/09/britains-paramilitary-nightmare/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/09/britains-paramilitary-nightmare/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/Copy-of-Furniture-e1788886022647.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/09/britains-paramilitary-nightmare/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author </span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/09/britains-paramilitary-nightmare/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Britain&#039;s paramilitary nightmare</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/09/britains-paramilitary-nightmare/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Wessie du Toit</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>But nor has Reform reckoned with the degree of state subsidy that rebuilding British industry in these areas will actually require, or how this can be squared with <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2025/nov/02/nigel-farage-business-deregulation-economic-policy-speech" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Farage’s belief</a> that, vis-à-vis Brexit, “we have not taken advantage of the opportunities to deregulate and become more competitive”. The answer, we are told time and again, is that scrapping Net Zero taxes and cutting wasteful government spending will boost industry and the exchequer alike, yet this simple solution belies the complexity of the problem. Even if an anti-establishment coalition spanning billionaires and tradesmen can work electorally, it will soon come under pressure from the conflicting interests and power disparities within it. The prodigious sums donated by Delo and Harborne suggest that a Reform government would likely follow a similar course to the second Trump presidency, beginning with ineffectual support for blue-collar workers before swerving into the warm embrace of global tech capital.<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span></p>
<p>Strangely, it is Andy Burnham’s Labour Party that looks best placed to capitalize on Britain’s siege mentality. The party’s identification with multiculturalism, and its instinctive support for immigration, has left the residual impression that it is an outward-looking political force. In fact, Labour now trumpets its pride in a diverse Britain while viewing the wider world with a mixture of suspicion and apathy. Burnham is the most domestically-focused prime minister in recent memory. Though his desire to invest in the country’s economic foundations is welcome, his big-state program offers no meaningful role for business or entrepreneurship. Labour has many antagonists — Donald Trump, American tech oligarchs, Russia, Israel — but few real friends. Rejoining the EU is increasingly the limit of its global imagination, and insofar as that vision does not account for the bloc’s own serious economic and political difficulties, it is an imagined one.<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span></p>
<p>The irony is that Burnham’s comforting insularity is only possible thanks to the degree to which globalization is already part of the grain of British society. This is a country that can afford an expensive commitment to national decarbonization, driving away industrialists like Ratcliffe, because it has resigned itself to dependency on China’s coal-powered factories. It can fund its social expenditures because the markets, even if they charge an ever-greater premium, continue to buy its debt. And it can produce a leader like Burnham because, as the recent scandal at Manchester City FC has reminded us, his municipal fiefdom was regenerated with oil and gas money from Abu Dhabi.<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span></p>
<p>Clearly, this strange settlement cannot go on forever. The chancellor is preparing for a budget in two weeks where neither borrowing nor taxes can sustainably go much higher, while the need to control runaway welfare spending and ease pressure on businesses is becoming pressing even from a soft-Left perspective. It has been easy to ignore billionaires lamenting Britain’s lack of competitive drive when relying on others has been so easy. That may not be much longer.<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span></p>
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					<title>Is France about to default?</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2026/10/is-france-about-to-default/?edition=us</link>
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										<unherd:main_theme>Debt</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Wolfgang Munchau]]>
					</dc:creator>
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																<unherd:article_ranking>1</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[Gilet jeunes. (Laurent Demartini/Getty)]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Wolfgang Münchau</strong> is the Director of <a href="https://www.eurointelligence.com/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Eurointelligence</a> and an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist.</p>
]]>
						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>EuroBriefing</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is the Director of <a href="https://www.eurointelligence.com/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Eurointelligence</a> and an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Sun, 11 Oct 2026 23:04:00 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Mon, 12 Oct 2026 15:11:50 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Debt]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Economics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[France]]></category>
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					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://stage.unherd.com/?p=1077982</guid>
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								<![CDATA[It’s uncool to balance the books]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p><em>Can’t Pay? Won’t Pay!</em>, the translated title of Dario Fo’s 1974 play, is one of the great works of Italian postwar literature. Exploring the struggles between moderates and hardliners in the country’s Communist Party, Fo drags his audience into the heady, violent atmosphere of the Years of Lead. In Italy, of course, that world is dead and buried, yet Fo’s story could just as well apply to the modern French Left. It, too, is riven by factionalism — even if, unlike Italy in the Seventies, France’s radicals now seem to be winning.</p>
<p>More than his story, though, it’s Fo’s title that feels most relevant to contemporary France. For it’s quite possible that the country will, at some point, stop paying its debts. If debtors can’t pay, they won’t. But a debtor who can theoretically pay might still choose not to. As one of the richest countries on Earth, France has no excuse on that score. But when politics intrudes, all bets are off, with ominous consequences far beyond bank balance sheets.</p>
<p>The economics here aren’t hard to grasp. Surpass a certain threshold of debt, and France risks ending up in a debt trap. Borrow too much — and public debt is already at €3.6 trillion, accounting for 119% of GDP — and creditors will get so nervous that they start selling. With more sellers than buyers, interest rates go up. This, in turn, raises the cost of servicing future debt. Countries tend not to notice this process at first — but then, from Sri Lanka to Argentina, it just happens.</p>
<p>When nations fall into a debt trap, there are four potential escape routes. Perhaps the starkest option is simply defaulting on their debt. Then there are two forms of belt-tightening: either enforcing austerity via higher taxes and lower spending, or selling state-owned land or companies. Finally, central banks can bankroll their governments and print more money, which in practice means buying government debt. That last strategy helps push interest rates down, much like what has been happening lately in Japan.</p>
<p>Politics determines which combination of those four options are chosen. The French electorate has for quite some time not voted for candidates who prioritize balancing the budget, something considered distinctly uncool within the country’s political culture. Indeed, the two candidates which polls now predict most likely to enter the second round of the next presidential elections also happen to be the least fiscally responsible: Marine Le Pen, leader of the Right-wing National Rally, and Jean-Luc Mélenchon, head of La France Insoumise, which translates as “France Unbowed”.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/09/the-next-financial-crash-a-scenario/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/09/the-next-financial-crash-a-scenario/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/GettyImages-2292626872.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/09/the-next-financial-crash-a-scenario/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/09/the-next-financial-crash-a-scenario/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The next financial crash: a scenario</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/09/the-next-financial-crash-a-scenario/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Wolfgang Munchau</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>In the case of Mélenchon’s party, we might well ask: unbowed to what exactly? The bond markets? Mélenchon favors the cancellation of French debt held by the European Central Bank. To achieve this, he suggests an old financial wheeze: keeping all the money France has borrowed, never paying it back, and never paying interest on it either.</p>
<p>Mélenchon’s “perpetual zero-coupon” trick — as this scheme is officially known — is a technical way of saying that he wants to default on his country’s debt. The idea is that this would give him scope to raise more debt to fund his electoral spending promises. Yet there is no way Mélenchon could get the rest of the EU, especially Germany, to agree to this. If he were to be elected, and really did proceed with his plan, France would likely crash out of the eurozone and even the EU itself.</p>
<p>To be fair, the polling numbers will probably change between now and the first round of the presidential election next April — but it’s not clear how. An air of insurrection has descended on the hexagon, and that may well play into Mélenchon’s hands. After all, a protest by high-school students, sick of their overcrowded and dilapidated classrooms, has now spread from Paris to the rest of France. Last week saw 250,000 students take to the streets, forcing the closure of some 500 schools.</p>
<p>The protests also saw eruptions of spontaneous violence, with demonstrators throwing projectiles at police, and setting cars and buildings on fire. By the end of the week, officers had arrested almost 7,000 mostly young people, of whom a third will face prosecution. Not that this is merely an insurrection of the poor: even students from elite schools, like the Lycée Henri-IV in Paris, have joined their fellow teenagers, frustrated by crumbling schools and rising state violence. Mélenchon taps into this febrile atmosphere like no other politician.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/09/the-west-is-losing-two-wars-at-once/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/09/the-west-is-losing-two-wars-at-once/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/GettyImages-2252937217.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/09/the-west-is-losing-two-wars-at-once/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/09/the-west-is-losing-two-wars-at-once/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The West is losing two wars at once</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/09/the-west-is-losing-two-wars-at-once/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Wolfgang Munchau</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Marine Le Pen represents the other end of the political spectrum: the France of the angry rural middle classes. She has been leading in the polls for a long time, and her conviction in a trial about the abuse of EU funds has had no impact whatsoever on her popularity. Just as lawfare did not work against Donald Trump, it didn’t work in France either, even as there have been rumors that the <em>gilet jaune</em>s, who paralyzed the country back in 2018, could yet turn out to join the students.</p>
<p>Unlike Mélenchon, to be fair, Le Pen doesn’t want to default on French debt. But if she follows through with the tax and spending program she outlined last week, she might end up in a similar place. One of the biggest sources of new income would come from a unilateral two-thirds cut to French contributions to the EU budget, a policy with history. Before it was called the National Rally, Le Pen’s party was called the National Front — and under its leader, Marine’s father Jean-Marie, leaving the EU was a core policy.</p>
<p>Marine, too, supported France’s withdrawal from the EU until 2019. She no longer talks about “Frexit” in explicit terms, but her policies are as inconsistent with EU membership as Mélenchon’s. The EU would cease to function if France were to default on its membership contributions — just as it would collapse by defaulting on French debt, with Germany and the Netherlands left as the only countries bankrolling the operation.</p>
<p>Of course, six months to go until the first round of voting, and it’s still possible that a centrist politician might emerge as a viable candidate. But to win, such a person would still have to default in one form or another. Perhaps bondholders would still get what they were promised — but pensioners or students or farmers would need to be sacrificed to maintain France’s fiscal position.</p>
<p>What I struggle to see, though, is any scenario where a radical centrist like Macron could emerge as a surprise winner and return the country towards a path of liberal centrist reforms. Macron, after all, was elected back in 2017: and his political experiment has failed both politically and economically. As France is approaching the end of his decade in power, French cities are burning, and financial markets are wondering whether France will default on its debt. This was not the way Macron’s centrist revolution was supposed to end.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;What I struggle to see, though, is any scenario where a radical centrist like Macron could emerge as a surprise winner&#8221;</div>
<p>France falls into the category of countries that are too big to fail — and too big to save. If it refuses austerity for political reasons, it will also refuse the sale of assets. They are not going to auction off the Mona Lisa or the Bayeux Tapestry. This leaves us with exactly two ways out of the crisis: some combination of a default, and a bailout by the central bank.</p>
<p>Certainly, the European Central Bank (ECB) could simply buy French debt. This would lead to lower interest rates on French bonds, but wouldn’t resolve the country’s underlying debt problem. Indeed, the ECB could take its support to such extreme levels that the eurozone itself ends up with higher debt and inflation, with other countries lining up to demand support. Italy’s public finances are much better managed than France’s, for instance, but Italy also has higher levels of debt relative to the size of the economy.</p>
<p>The ECB could therefore find itself in a position where it’s damned if it helps France — and damned if it doesn’t. This is the fundamental problem with the eurozone: once the big countries diverge in their politics and economics, the end is nigh. The only thing that can help you then is a political union that enforces convergence. The eurozone crisis was the last moment when such a union could have been established. But instead of solving the bloc&#8217;s underlying financial problems, EU leaders did the bare minimum needed to prevent the emergency from spinning out of control, for instance by granting cheap loans to already over-indebted countries.</p>
<p>We used to say back then that Brussels was kicking the can down the road. Well, we are now at the end of the road, with a skip full of cans piling up around us. Certainly, with far-Right parties in the ascendance everywhere in Europe, union is too late today, even as high inflation means the ECB has far less room for maneuver than it did a decade ago. No one can predict how things will play out from here: but some form of financial crisis is probable.</p>
<p>This returns us to Fo’s play: and the basic difference between Italy then and France today. <em>Can’t Pay? Won’t Pay!</em> was about a dispute within the Italian Communist Party, which at the time had abandoned its radicalism, accepted austerity, and moved closer to the political center. Fo himself was a hardliner. As he once said about capitalists: “the only way to get that mob thinking straight is to stuff them down the bog and pull the chain!” That’s Mélenchon’s language too — except that unlike Fo, his dramatics aren&#8217;t limited to the theatre.</p>
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															<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">1077982</post-id>				</item>
									<item>
					<title>Britain needs a bonds crisis</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2026/10/britain-needs-a-gilts-crisis/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://stage.unherd.com/2026/10/britain-needs-a-gilts-crisis/?edition=us#respond</comments>
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										<unherd:main_theme>Economy</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Damian Pudner]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/Screenshot-2026-10-07-at-15.32.46.jpg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>2</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[Denis Healey was the first Chancellor to face an IMF bailout. But will he be the last? (Getty/JG Fox)]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Damian Pudner </strong>is a monetary economist and director of <a href="https://gbtt.info/">the Great British Think Tank</a>.</p>
]]>
						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle></unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[is a monetary economist and director of <a href="https://gbtt.info/">the Great British Think Tank</a>.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Wed, 07 Oct 2026 23:01:20 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Thu, 08 Oct 2026 10:15:49 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Accelerationism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Britain]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Crash]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Economics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[gilts]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Markets]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Politics]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://stage.unherd.com/?p=1077500</guid>
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								<![CDATA[It would end the inertia]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Fifty years ago, as a currency crisis threatened Britain&#8217;s finances, Denis Healey was forced to leave the VIP lounge at Heathrow and rush back to the Treasury. He was due to fly to Manila for the IMF&#8217;s annual meetings, but sterling was plunging. Within days, Britain had gone cap-in-hand and applied to the Fund. That same week in Blackpool, James Callaghan, in a moment of intellectual honesty, told the Labour conference that the old option of spending your way out of a recession no longer existed. Fifty years on, both episodes are worth remembering.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">On 28th October, another Healey delivers his first Budget. The latest estimates suggest higher bond yields have cut his fiscal headroom in half, from £23.6bn at the Spring Statement to about £11bn. By the Budget, I suspect, it could be close to zero.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">As someone who has spent nearly 25 years in the City, I know full well that markets can force a government’s hand long before politics does. Governments can choose to ignore economists, opposition parties and sometimes even their own fiscal rules. What they cannot ignore for long is the bond market. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">I’ve said publicly that it will probably take a crisis to wake British politicians up. I’ve now reached a harsher conclusion. Britain needs a bond crisis! This is because a crisis can break the political deadlock that prevents reform in normal times. Measures that are thought politically impossible suddenly become unavoidable once the decision is made for you.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">We remember 1976 as a humiliation, a reminder that if you spend years mismanaging the economy and ignoring hard choices on the budget, outsiders can force even tougher ones later. But it was also the only time since the War that a British government did what was needed at the speed required. The $3.9bn stand-by arrangement, then the largest the IMF had ever made to a member, came with punishing conditions: fiscal, monetary and incomes policy imposed all at once.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The public sector borrowing requirement had to fall from around 9% of GDP to 6% within a year. Domestic credit expansion was cut by about a third. Real take-home pay was expected to drop by around 7.5% by mid-1977. It was really a moment of capitulation forced on politicians that had delayed and obfuscated until somebody else made the hard choices for them.</span></p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/07/the-great-net-zero-showdown/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/07/the-great-net-zero-showdown/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/GettyImages-2287045125.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/07/the-great-net-zero-showdown/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/07/the-great-net-zero-showdown/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The great Net Zero showdown</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/07/the-great-net-zero-showdown/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> John Rapley</a></p></div></a></div>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">That October, while the Treasury was still negotiating with the Fund, the Conservatives published </span><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">The Right Approach</span></i><span style="font-weight: 400;">, the document that laid the ground for Margaret Thatcher’s election victory in 1979. Politicians knew what to do, but it needed the market to force them to act after years of delay. The crisis broke the deadlock, and what followed was a decisive shift towards sounder money, lower taxes and a more competitive economy. Sadly, such political weakness is still familiar today.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">This pattern of delay and avoidance by politicians has been studied, and economists even have a name for why politicians kept avoiding the tough choices they eventually had to make during the IMF crisis. In 1977, Finn Kydland and Edward Prescott, who later won the Nobel prize in economics, showed that a policymaker who keeps re-optimizing will rationally abandon the plan that&#8217;s best in the long run, because the temptation to deviate today never goes away. They called it “time inconsistency”. Politicians often promise a long-term plan but end up changing it for short-term political convenience. Politicians lose the capacity for pre-emptive reform, because the political cost is immediate and the potential payoff can take decades.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Mancur Olson explained in </span><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">The Rise and Decline of Nations</span></i><span style="font-weight: 400;"> why reform gets harder with time. Mature democracies build up “distributional coalitions” — organized interests whose purpose is to defend the status quo. The Blob, if you like. Layer enough of them together and the state becomes almost impossible to shrink. Alberto Alesina and Allan Drazen described what follows as a war of attrition, in which every group refuses to carry the cost, delaying stabilization until the cost of waiting becomes unbearable. In 1993, Drazen and Vittorio Grilli wrote a paper called, rather fittingly, &#8220;The Benefits of Crises for Economic Reforms&#8221;. Their conclusion was that making a crisis <em>less</em> painful can actually prolong it. Without pain, the pressure to fix the policy failure weakens considerably.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">We fixed this problem for monetary policy in 1997, when Gordon Brown handed operational independence for interest rates to the Bank of England. Nobody has ever done the same for tax and spending.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">That is why politicians resent the bond market so much, seeing it as a referee blowing the whistle on their spending plans. Andy Burnham once said Britain had to get beyond being &#8220;in hock to the bond markets&#8221;. Paula Barker, one of his MPs, went further, saying the markets would have to fall into line and telling the Commons that people were fed up with bond markets dabbling in the democracy of the country. But nobody forced ministers to borrow nearly £123bn last year. That was a political choice about what to spend and how much to tax. The gilt market simply took a view on the risk and quoted them a price, and if ministers are unhappy with that price, they have the option to adjust how much they borrow.</span></p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/09/the-next-financial-crash-a-scenario/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/09/the-next-financial-crash-a-scenario/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/GettyImages-2292626872.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/09/the-next-financial-crash-a-scenario/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/09/the-next-financial-crash-a-scenario/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The next financial crash: a scenario</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/09/the-next-financial-crash-a-scenario/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Wolfgang Münchau</a></p></div></a></div>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Back in 1993, James Carville, Bill Clinton&#8217;s strategist, said he wanted to be reincarnated as the bond market because then he could intimidate everybody. He was complaining, because the market had just forced a newly elected Democratic president into cutting the deficit. What he was actually describing was the one institution in public life you can&#8217;t lobby or fob off. Our own political class would do well to remember that, and soon.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Last week in Liverpool, Burnham used his first conference as Prime Minister to admit that his generation of politicians had been too cowardly to fix social care. But within minutes of saying someone had to “rip the plaster off”, he confirmed the triple lock would remain untouched for the rest of this Parliament, with a slight tweak delayed until April 2030 — safely beyond the next election. It was a perfect demonstration of Kydland and Prescott&#8217;s point. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Burnham also promised to repeal the Thatcher-era ban on public ownership of water companies. He wants to set up a publicly owned Great British Grid, and bring energy, water, and housing back under what he calls stronger public control. When he ran through Labour&#8217;s great moments, he named 1945, 1964 and 1997. He conveniently skipped 1974 to 1979, the government that ended up at the IMF.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">For decades, successive governments have avoided enacting spending restraint by borrowing or taxing more: so much so that both routes are now at breaking point. Last week the 30-year gilt smashed through 6% for the first time since 1998, reaching an intraday high of 6.07%, and the 10-year hit 5.51%, its highest since 2007. That matters for the government’s debt-interest bill. In the year to March 2026, central government spent nearly £100bn on debt interest alone, nearly 80% per cent of the £123bn it borrowed. Andrew Griffith put the problem bluntly at Conservative conference this week: Britain has “a debt problem, a tax problem and a growth problem”. Any gilt investor should find that frightening, because it means we are mostly borrowing to pay the interest on what we&#8217;ve already borrowed. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Taxation, too, is running out of road. The Office for Budget Responsibility&#8217;s March forecast had the tax take rising to 38.5% by 2030-31 — in other words, the state would be taking nearly 39 pence in tax for every £1 generated across the economy. This is the highest tax has been since the Second World War, and businesses are already reacting. After the rise in employer National Insurance, the Bank of England found that 44% of the firms it surveyed had reduced staff relative to what they would have done otherwise.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">What used to be a managed decline has become a thunderous one, with shops closing and pay packets shrinking in real terms. Plenty of voters no longer expect any government to make the reforms to spending, tax and incentives that would materially improve their own living standards. Instead, they want it for their children and grandchildren, who may once have believed the old British promise that each generation does better than the last and are instead set to inherit the debt and the stagnation.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">But the next crisis won&#8217;t be a rerun of the 2022 mini-Budget. That episode was a combination of unfortunate known and unknown events and suspect timings. The Bank of England confirmed active gilt sales the day before the mini-Budget, excessively leveraged pension funds didn’t hold enough collateral, and regulators failed to reform liability-driven investment strategies that matched long-term liabilities with long-dated bonds. The mini-Budget fiasco saw the 30-year yield rise by more than a percentage point in a few days. Sterling hit an all-time low against the dollar, and the Bank was forced to intervene to calm markets. Mortgage rates jumped, deals were pulled, buyers saw what they could afford collapse almost overnight, and the housing market froze. Within weeks the Chancellor and the Prime Minister were both gone.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Westminster took the wrong lesson from the debacle and decided that radical economic policy is dangerous. The real lesson was that tax cuts without credible control of spending won&#8217;t convince the market.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The former Bank of England governor Mark Carney, was right when he once said the country relies on the kindness of strangers. Britain is exposed to what economist Guillermo Calvo popularized as a “sudden stop”: a sharp withdrawal of foreign capital. Investors may suddenly refuse to buy our government debt leading to a failed gilt auction, or quickly sell off what they already hold. If that happens, gilts and sterling are likely to fall together.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">A crisis would begin in the primary market with a weak or failed gilt auction, then another. In this scenario, dealers are left holding more gilts, prices fall and the move spills over into the secondary market. Collateral calls get triggered. Sterling weakens and foreign investors demand an even larger risk premium. The government is forced to refinance maturing and new debt issuance at substantially higher rates. Debt interest costs jump, and the sell-off becomes self-reinforcing.</span> <span style="font-weight: 400;">A gilt sell-off would push up mortgage rates for millions of households already under a cost-of-living crisis, valuations would collapse, borrowing costs for businesses would rise, and sterling would collapse hard. The consequences would hit more than the gilt market. Equities would sell off too, especially housebuilders, banks, and heavily indebted domestic companies.</span></p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;We need a trigger to clear away some of the distortions built up over fifteen years of near-zero interest rates, quantitative easing, a borrow-and-spend mentality within government, and political reluctance to change.&#8221; </div>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">And we would now reach an inflection point. Milton Friedman wrote in 1982 to the preface to </span><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">Capitalism and Freedom</span></i><span style="font-weight: 400;">, that only a crisis produces real change, but that what happens next depends on the ideas lying around. I have seen none of value from this, or indeed, the last government.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">So what is the case for a crisis? It is not that pain is desirable. It is that we need a trigger to clear away some of the distortions built up over fifteen years of near-zero interest rates, quantitative easing, a borrow-and-spend mentality within government, and political reluctance to change. Such an outcome would force a repricing of the state itself.</span><span style="font-weight: 400;"><br />
</span><span style="font-weight: 400;"><br />
</span><span style="font-weight: 400;">It is still theoretically possible to avoid the crisis. Labour would need to make the requisite changes before the country is forced to. The pain would be acute, but it would be temporary. The reward could be years of stronger investment, higher productivity and rising living standards as capital and labor move back towards productive uses.</span> <span style="font-weight: 400;">Spending and the tax burden have to come down. The triple lock and working-age welfare need radical reform in this Parliament, not tweaks in the next one. Energy has to get cheaper, and planning needs genuine liberalization.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">John Healey has three weeks before the markets could force the issue. He could put welfare on a falling path and cut the public-sector paybill, and do voluntarily what his namesake was made to do in 1976. But nothing in fifty years of British politics, nor in the Prime Minister&#8217;s speech last week, suggests he will, and I&#8217;m not expecting much in the way of radical change on 28th October. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Then the decision passes to investors who have no seats in the Commons and no interest in the electoral cycle — only adequate compensation for lending to a highly indebted borrower. They may decide to keep selling gilts until the government is forced to act. I&#8217;d rather Britain were spared that. History, however, tells me the cowardice of politicians will not allow it. And so the least-bad realistic outcome, painful though it would be, is a bond crisis.</span></p>
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															<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">1077500</post-id>				</item>
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					<title>How to solve the debt crisis</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2026/09/how-to-solve-the-debt-crisis/?edition=us</link>
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										<unherd:main_theme>Bond Market</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Jagjit Chadha]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/Screenshot-2026-09-25-at-09.26.27.jpg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>1</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[Healey has committed to those totemic fiscal rules, under which Britain, uniquely among advanced economies, has imposed an IMF-style programme on itself. (Photo by Leon Neal/Getty Images)]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Jagjit Chadha</strong> is a professor of economics at the University of Cambridge, and was Director of the National Institute of Economic and Social Research from 2016-2024. His book, <em>The Money Minders</em>, was published in 2022.</p>
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						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle></unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is a professor of economics at the University of Cambridge, and was Director of the National Institute of Economic and Social Research from 2016-2024. His book, <em>The Money Minders</em>, was published in 2022.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Wed, 23 Sep 2026 23:03:05 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Wed, 23 Sep 2026 23:03:05 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Burnham]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Crash]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Economics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[gilts]]></category>
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																												<description>
								<![CDATA[Can we create stable demand for UK bonds?]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p dir="ltr">Another week, another depressing update on the state of Britain&#8217;s debt, with public-sector borrowing <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/a17b2217-e49f-432c-8fdb-31e9bc3a4361?syn-25a6b1a6=1" target="_blank" rel="noopener">rising</a> to an eye-watering £18.3 billion in August. Little wonder that Kristalina Georgieva, head of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), now <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cx305ymq4ldqo" target="_blank" rel="noopener">proclaims</a> that politicians must make cuts with courage — and that John Healey and Andy Burnham have adopted equally robust language around &#8220;responsibility&#8221; and &#8220;discipline&#8221;. Just yesterday, the prime minister <a href="https://www.newstatesman.com/cover-story/2026/09/andy-burnham-seizes-control" target="_blank" rel="noopener">conceded</a> that the country was in urgent need of a far more &#8220;streamlined, productive&#8221; state.</p>
<p dir="ltr">About time. For Britain now lies close to a full-blown fiscal crisis, as public debt has been ratcheted up in several giant steps since the 2008 crash. Whatever Burnham&#8217;s fine words now, indeed, successive governments have long demonstrated remarkable degree of fiscal incontinence, whether that&#8217;s bailing out RBS or spending £70 billion on pandemic-era furlough. The result has driven up long-term borrowing costs — at 5.3%, 10-year rates are at their highest in nearly 30 years — crowding out the fiscal space for necessary public investment. Interest payments on UK debt alone are now approaching 4% of GDP.</p>
<p dir="ltr"><div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/06/burnham-vs-the-bond-markets/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/06/burnham-vs-the-bond-markets/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/GettyImages-2282325395-e1782295528239.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/06/burnham-vs-the-bond-markets/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested Reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/06/burnham-vs-the-bond-markets/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Burnham vs the bond markets</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/06/burnham-vs-the-bond-markets/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> John Rapley</a></p></div></a></div>
<p dir="ltr">How did we get here? The Chancellor is not wrong when he says that the UK used to be famous for getting “its house back in order when things go wrong”. The last example of an actual government default was back in 1672, when King Charles II suspended payments on debts owed to English goldsmiths as the kingdom’s profligacy began hampering the public finances. With war against France heating up, and a financial crisis in full swing, the Bank of England was established in 1694 to reform the state’s monetary system and support the management of government debt and borrowing costs.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Admittedly, British public debt was regularly racked up in wartime, when resources needed to be mobilized quickly. But an awareness of the need to borrow in future meant that after each splurge — in other words when peace was agreed — the Exchequer worked to move public finances into surplus: whether by spending cuts, or tax rises, or both. This ongoing commitment to stable finances, or “sound money”, underpinned Britain’s access to debt markets and nurtured low borrowing rates for centuries.</p>
<p dir="ltr">This fiscal orthodoxy wouldn’t survive the 20th century. A sequence of fiscal deficits in the Seventies led to the September 1976 crisis, when James Callaghan’s Labour government was forced to apply for a $3.9 billion loan from the IMF (some $23 billion in today&#8217;s money), with long-lived consequences for the country’s financial reputation. Though overall debt was considerably lower in 1976 — at just under 50% of GDP, compared to 94% now — interest payments on that debt were nonetheless approaching that magic number of 4% of GDP. Thankfully, a sustained debt consolidation followed, with the debt-to-GDP ratio duly falling to around 30% by the turn of the century.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Over more recent times, however, and encouraged by the seemingly blank check that years of ultra-low interest rates implied, governments have come to the rescue of banks, bond markets and households to the tune of billions of pounds. Public debt is unsurprisingly expected to hit the £3.5 trillion mark by 2030, representing around 95% of GDP. Worse still, these interventions have not kick-started the economy, or indeed provided the services and infrastructure needed for a modern country to prosper. To that extent, Britain’s addiction to debt has acted less like a springboard and more like a somnambulant pillow.</p>
<p dir="ltr"><div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;To that extent, Britain’s addiction to debt has acted less like a springboard and more like a somnambulant pillow. ”</div>
<p dir="ltr">Little wonder that the bond markets have become so concerned about Britain’s ability to manage the public purse, further pushing up borrowing costs in the face of global shocks and our own domestic maelstrom. Whatever the complaints from people like Burnham — who, despite now softening his tone, has previously claimed that the vigilantes are undemocratic arbiters of the nation’s fate — any excess market sensitivity simply mirrors Britain’s fiscal woes. If the Government’s economic position were more credible, the vigilantes would cut us some slack.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Nor has Britain helped itself when it comes to more specific policies. With the establishment of the Office of Budget Responsibility (OBR), after all, the Treasury seems to have become little more than the Government&#8217;s policy cheerleader — vacating its former role as a &#8220;critical friend&#8221; seeking to correct policy errors and nurture growth. Not unrelated, Whitehall’s relaxed attitude to raising debt means the Treasury has an incentive to see inflation as the way out of our fiscal mess. Yet if that reduces the value of Britain’s elephantine debt, it soon sparks other challenges, not least in the weekly supermarket bills of millions of ordinary people.</p>
<p dir="ltr">The Burnham government must take its share of the blame as well. The prime minister’s commitment to Labour’s 2024 manifesto, precluding changes to income tax or VAT, has been an ongoing sore, especially as spending commitments never seem to be matched by spending cuts (the pension triple lock, for one, looks as <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/c2l8v7l0djqo" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/c2l8v7l0djqo&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1790259859313000&amp;usg=AOvVaw3sgt027Q-dlsE3tYGkZJdl">immovable</a> as ever). That’s even as Healey has committed to those totemic fiscal rules, under which Britain, uniquely among advanced economies, has imposed an IMF-style program on itself, precluding room for economic maneuver let alone a substantive discussion about the appropriate objectives for fiscal policy.</p>
<p dir="ltr">The bitter irony, here, is that, for all its theoretical sternness, the OBR has done little to steady the economic ship in practice. Changing countless times since the Coalition founded the Office in 2010 — leaving the bond market to merely guess at what comes next — the fiscal rules have in any case obviously been “honor&#8217;d more in the breach than the observance”.</p>
<p dir="ltr">For instance, the rules currently impose an expected reduction in public debt over the next three years. But that does little to constrain debt in earlier years, while acting to squeeze the policy debate into one arbitrary and imaginary number. Basing everything on forecasts has also increased the incentives for political game-playing: why would a Chancellor worry about their accuracy today when they may not be in post tomorrow? The result is a painfully short-termist policy environment, one where managerial KPIs are lauded over the fundamentals of building state capacity and encouraging a more stable financial climate for private investors.</p>
<p dir="ltr">How then do we get ourselves out of this self-imposed mess? It won’t be easy, but there’s plenty Healey and Burnham could do. The working principles for any government should first mean committing, over the course of a parliament, to a level of debt that falls <em>materially</em> relative to GDP. Next, debt service payments must be sustained at much less than 4% of GDP, with the aim of giving Whitehall more room for fiscal maneuver.</p>
<p dir="ltr">In practice, of course, that means finally cutting welfare; tackling the triple lock; increasing public-sector productivity; and cutting its workforce. As far as possible, meanwhile, measures to control and reduce public debt should become “timeless” political facts, followed and accepted by any government, allowing future Chancellors to be judged on the same standard as their predecessors. That equally means sticking to the analysis of actual fiscal outcomes, and scrapping those shifting and capricious OBR projections. Let’s be clear about our tax-and-spend priorities, and phase debt reduction accordingly — rather than focusing on “headroom” to the exclusion of sensible policy initiatives.</p>
<p dir="ltr"><div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/09/the-next-financial-crash-a-scenario/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/09/the-next-financial-crash-a-scenario/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/GettyImages-2292626872.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/09/the-next-financial-crash-a-scenario/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested Reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/09/the-next-financial-crash-a-scenario/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The next financial crash: a scenario</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/09/the-next-financial-crash-a-scenario/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Wolfgang Munchau</a></p></div></a></div>
<p dir="ltr">It would also help if Britain stopped relying on foreign assessments of the economy. Every year, the IMF in Washington DC and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in Paris produce two each. Just this week, indeed, the OECD warned that the UK would grow <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/c607ly09y7rlo" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/c607ly09y7rlo&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1790259859313000&amp;usg=AOvVaw3q8joG4k13T4SM90CKLt6R">slightly less</a> than expected next year, piling ever more pressure on Healey as his first Budget looms. Unfortunately, and whatever the justification for the unease of people like Georgieva, both bodies are arguably stymied by their limited and inexperienced staff knowledge of the UK. Certainly, developing its own home-based independent public assessments, perhaps drafted by a research institute in conjunction with market and industry experts, would allow Britain a more rounded and authoritative assessment of the state of the economy.</p>
<p dir="ltr">That, in turn, might finally allow more thoughtful public discussion of the big economic questions of our time. What, for example, might happen if debt continues to remain high over the course of this Parliament? How much could things be improved by bolstering productivity? How can we create more stable demand for UK bonds? Getting some answers feels more urgent than ever. After all, the markets don’t have infinite patience, and the day is coming when government failure to cut debt leads to a fully-fledged fiscal crisis — one where a “sudden stop” limits Britain’s ability to roll over debt or access market funds. That would be disastrous for the Government’s fiscal reputation, let alone the countless public services kept afloat on cheap debt.</p>
<p dir="ltr">The way things are going, an emergency of this sort may be the only thing to shake the politicians from their stupor. Either way, we’ll wish we listened to the bond vigilantes far, far sooner.</p>
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															<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">1075263</post-id>				</item>
									<item>
					<title>The next financial crash: a scenario</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2026/09/the-next-financial-crash-a-scenario/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://stage.unherd.com/2026/09/the-next-financial-crash-a-scenario/?edition=us#respond</comments>
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										<unherd:main_theme>Big Tech</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Wolfgang Munchau]]>
					</dc:creator>
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																<unherd:article_ranking>1</unherd:article_ranking>
																<unherd:image_caption>
							<![CDATA[Chinese competition could ultimately triumph over Sam Altman's OpenAI. (Matt Ramey/Getty)]]>
						</unherd:image_caption>
						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Wolfgang Münchau</strong> is the Director of <a href="https://www.eurointelligence.com/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Eurointelligence</a> and an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist.</p>
]]>
						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>EuroBriefing</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is the Director of <a href="https://www.eurointelligence.com/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Eurointelligence</a> and an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Sun, 06 Sep 2026 23:03:08 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Tue, 08 Sep 2026 14:02:54 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[ai]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Economics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Financial crash]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Politics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[USA]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://stage.unherd.com/?p=1073635</guid>
																												<description>
								<![CDATA[AI debt could spark a chain reaction]]>
							</description>
																		
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								<![CDATA[<p dir="ltr">There are two mistakes you can make with predictions: claiming that something will happen when it won’t, or that it won’t happen when it will. The economist Paul Samuelson joked in 1966 that the stock markets predicted nine of the last five recessions. What, then, should we make about forecasts that the AI boom will burst, and that the world as we know it will end?</p>
<p dir="ltr">Rather than predictions, let’s focus on what we know. The coming of AI is the biggest structural shift happening to the global economy right now. If the massive AI investments currently under way in the US succeed, the payoff for the world will be enormous. If they fail, we will go into recession. There is a scenario where they fail in the short-term but succeed in the long-run. Remember the dotcom bubble in the late Nineties? The bubble burst. Dotcom didn’t.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Big financial crises generally do not happen when the stock market falls, but when people and governments take on too much debt. The global financial crisis started with a subprime mortgage bubble. Today’s equivalent could be the rise in debt to fund the AI boom.</p>
<p dir="ltr">One of the few Wall Street insiders to predict the 2008 crash was Steve Eisman, who featured prominently in Michael Lewis’ book <em>The Big Short</em>, and who was portrayed by Steve Carell in the subsequent film. Eisman said in a recent podcast that he predicted Armageddon once in his life — but isn’t quite ready to do it again.</p>
<p dir="ltr"><div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/08/the-case-for-de-escalation-with-russia/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/08/the-case-for-de-escalation-with-russia/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/GettyImages-2286277155.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/08/the-case-for-de-escalation-with-russia/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested Reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/08/the-case-for-de-escalation-with-russia/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The case for de-escalation with Russia</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/08/the-case-for-de-escalation-with-russia/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Wolfgang Münchau</a></p></div></a></div>
<p dir="ltr">That reluctance is probably wise. For if AI almost certainly is the most transformative technology since the invention of the steam engine, we don’t yet know when and how this transformation will happen, and whether it’ll justify the massive debts currently being accrued by the largest industry players.</p>
<p dir="ltr">The so-called hyperscalers — large tech companies that operate data centers and cloud-computing infrastructure — are estimated to incur capital expenditures in the region of $600-800 billion in the US <em>alone</em> this year. Eisman notes that 70% of hyperscaler AI revenue comes from only two companies, OpenAI and Anthropic. This pair accounts for around a third of the hyperscalers’ entire cloud computing revenue, and though Anthropic is on a roll right now, OpenAI is currently undershooting revenue forecasts. More worryingly, Sam Altman’s firm has suffered an exodus of senior staff, a sign, perhaps, that something is going seriously wrong. Certainly, if any of the big AI companies were to go bankrupt, this could unleash a chain reaction of defaults.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Global financial crises are always caused by chain reactions; the Great Depression and the global financial crisis were both chain reactions within the banking sector. What most of these crises also have in common is a sudden explosion in debt. The logic, however, does not go the other way: just because debt is rising, and stock prices go up, you cannot conclude that it will inevitably lead to a crisis. There are perfectly legitimate reasons for people to borrow money, and debt-funded investments that fuel future productivity gains are a good thing.</p>
<p dir="ltr">But if you believe this narrative, and I do myself, you have to watch out for things going the wrong way. After all, though the dotcom bubble had a solid underlying rationale — that the internet would give rise to very profitable businesses — the investors of that era were in too much of a hurry. Many of the companies that eventually succeeded had not yet been founded.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Whatever these challenges, the subprime crisis of the early 2000s was fundamentally different. It was, to be blunt, a scam from the outset. Banks gave people no-questions-asked teaser mortgages that the borrowers could not conceivably service once interest rates reset. Then banks repackaged the mortgages into financial products and sold them to naive investors, all with the collusion of the rating agencies. Once mortgage delinquency rose, most of those “triple-A” products became worthless.</p>
<p dir="ltr"><div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/09/get-ready-for-the-trump-slump/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/09/get-ready-for-the-trump-slump/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/GettyImages-2291893464.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/09/get-ready-for-the-trump-slump/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested Reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/09/get-ready-for-the-trump-slump/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Get ready for the Trump Slump</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/09/get-ready-for-the-trump-slump/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> John Rapley</a></p></div></a></div>
<p dir="ltr">Those varied histories explain what happened next. When the dotcom bubble burst, recovery soon followed. When subprime exploded, however, it triggered a chain reaction throughout the world. This was infamously true in the eurozone: after US mortgage products turned into junk, banks found themselves sitting on billions worth of worthless products. Many got into financial difficulties. Governments bailed them out, but in smaller countries with large financial sectors, finance ministries overextended themselves. This is how the Greek sovereign crisis started, and how it spread to Spain, Portugal, and Ireland.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Today,  there is still a potential for global chain reactions — but the mechanisms would be different. Over the years, China and Germany have accumulated massive trade surpluses against the US. As a result, both countries have large investment stocks in American companies. If the AI bubble blew up, and if that resulted in a US government bailout of big tech, the combination could trigger falls in both global stock markets and the dollar’s exchange rate. This would be a double whammy for the Europeans: a strong euro would kill the continent’s export industry, while all those American investments would suddenly be worth far less.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Yet if this suggests any crisis would quickly cross the Atlantic, none of this tells us if a crash is actually coming. How, then, to answer this question?</p>
<p dir="ltr">One vital thing to reiterate is that the rationale underpinning the AI boom is fundamentally correct. AI matters not because ChatGPT can do our children’s homework — but because it can transform countless different industries. The fate of legal assistants suggests this is happening already, with AI promising to transform everything from finance to accountancy, perhaps even journalism. The automation inherent in these changes could encourage manufacturing productivity to skyrocket, making goods cheaper and leaving workers with more free time.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Another reason for optimism is how quickly AI models are improving. Anthropic’s Mythos model was deemed too dangerous for ordinary users and had to be neutered before it was released to the wider public. OpenAI released its latest model GPT 6.0 only a few days ago; I have not been able to test it yet, but the broad progression in quality has been astounding.</p>
<p dir="ltr">To be clear, I am not predicting a Panglossian utopia. Friction in the transition will be enormous. Yet I think that if an AI crash <em>does</em> happen, it wouldn’t be caused by AI as an idea, or even as an industry, but, rather like the dotcom crash of the Nineties, because of excessive optimism and unfortunate timing. With firms taking on so much debt, the risk is that they’d be forced to repay before their investments started paying off. Another risk, for Wall Street anyway, is that China’s open-source software ends up overtaking the top US companies.</p>
<p dir="ltr"><div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;We can have both — AI as a life-transforming technology, and an AI bubble that triggers a toxic chain reaction in financial markets.&#8221; </div>
<p dir="ltr">So even if the big picture story of an AI-led productivity boom is correct, the investment story is more complicated. We can have both — AI as a life-transforming technology, and an AI bubble that triggers a toxic chain reaction in financial markets. The single biggest node here would be the American government. The rise in US debt to the symbolic benchmark of $40 trillion should give us all pause for thought. If the US economy were to continue to grow at 2-3% as it has done in the past, all would be fine. Contrary to forecasts, Donald Trump did not crash the economy. Yet he is piling on a ton of debt, and if the AI bubble bursts, and the US economy falls into recession, those levels would suddenly look dodgy.</p>
<p dir="ltr">And if Eisman is getting nervous, so too are some of the world&#8217;s top investors. The Norwegian sovereign wealth fund, for instance, which is still the world’s largest, says it wants to diversify its government-bond portfolio away from the US. That should be a warning sign for the rest of us, especially given the way government and private debt can fuse during a financial chain reaction.</p>
<p dir="ltr">This is how it might start. First, a large AI company gets into trouble. So do several large investors. The US government then comes under pressure to bail out the financial sector, but has already accrued too much debt itself. At this point, the Federal Reserve steps in to buy US government debt and cut interest rates. Inflation duly rises further, the dollar crashes — and the crisis spreads to the rest of the world.</p>
<p dir="ltr">But remember: what goes for the stocks markets that predicted nine of the last five recessions also goes for columnists and financial experts. Our ability to predict financial crises is not great. But what we can do, at least, is prepare for one. And the time has come, I think, to do just that.</p>
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															<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">1073635</post-id>				</item>
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					<title>Get ready for the Trump Slump</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2026/09/get-ready-for-the-trump-slump/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://stage.unherd.com/2026/09/get-ready-for-the-trump-slump/?edition=us#respond</comments>
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										<unherd:main_theme>Economy</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[John Rapley]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/blued-up-fella.jpg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>1</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[It may be time to call off the strikes on Iran. (Kent NISHIMURA / AFP via Getty Images)]]>
						</unherd:image_caption>
						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>John Rapley</strong> is an author and academic who divides his time between London, Johannesburg and Ottawa. His books include <i>Why Empires Fall: Rome, America and the Future of the West </i>(with Peter Heather, Penguin, 2023) and <i>Twilight of the Money Gods: Economics as a Religion</i> (Simon &amp; Schuster, 2017).</p>
]]>
						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>jarapley</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is an author and academic who divides his time between London, Johannesburg and Ottawa. His books include <i>Why Empires Fall: Rome, America and the Future of the West </i>(with Peter Heather, Penguin, 2023) and <i>Twilight of the Money Gods: Economics as a Religion</i> (Simon &amp; Schuster, 2017).]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Wed, 02 Sep 2026 23:03:10 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Thu, 03 Sep 2026 10:30:11 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[donald j trump]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Economics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Iran War]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[oil and gas]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Politics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[recession]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[War]]></category>
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																												<description>
								<![CDATA[Iran strikes could burst the AI bubble]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Improbable though it may seem, a bombing raid on Iran may, like the proverbial Chinese butterfly flapping its wings and causing faraway chaos, trigger disparate distant ructions. Not only could the US’s November elections be upended, and the political honeymoon of Andy Burnham brought to a halt. The chaos could also trigger a fall in global stock markets and possibly a slide into recession.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Donald Trump’s latest attempt at escalating to de-escalate in the Middle East conflict has not had the desired effect. Since the bombing began over the weekend, bond yields have been rising across the world, the price of oil has shot back up and stock markets have turned shaky. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">On Tuesday, the conflict deepened further, with Iran launching missile and drone attacks at multiple American bases in the region. </span>On Wednesday, Iran accused America, whose strike was reported to have hit a wedding party, of a “war crime”. <span style="font-weight: 400">If the exchange continues, with neither side making a show of retreating, the effects could multiply in severity. That’s because all of this is happening at a time when financial strains are beginning to become visible in the world economy — in both stock and bond markets, and in economies where growth is slowing but inflation remains stubborn. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">The AI bubble had already moved into a delicate phase. The hyperscalers who have driven the investment boom sustaining the US economy — counting among their number Anthropic, OpenAI, Amazon, Google and Microsoft — have burned through their ample reserves of cash and, to maintain the massive build-out of data centers and infrastructure, have now started turning to credit markets. They’ve been able to borrow on favorable terms because the rapid rise of their share prices has provided them with ample collateral. Those rising share prices have, in turn, been swollen by huge profits, creating a virtuous upward cycle which makes the new debt being taken on appear eminently manageable.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Unfortunately, though, all is not as it appears. A</span> <a href="https://bobeunlimited.substack.com/p/the-shit-returns-coming-on-all-this?utm_campaign=email-half-post&amp;r=59u5y&amp;utm_source=substack&amp;utm_medium=email" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400">close look</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400"> at the numbers reveals that tech leaders are making big money only because they’re spending big money. The actual rate of return on their investments is so far barely sufficient to cover the cost of depreciation of their assets, and from a long-term perspective they are essentially breaking even. Meanwhile, to justify their current very generous share valuations, the hyperscalers would need to see continued rates of profit growth that would amount to more than a doubling every year. This may be too much to ask: </span><a href="https://adamtooze.substack.com/p/in-ai-revenue-just-caught-up-with?utm_source=post-email-title&amp;publication_id=192845&amp;post_id=206486485&amp;utm_campaign=email-post-title&amp;isFreemail=true&amp;r=59u5y&amp;triedRedirect=true&amp;utm_medium=email" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400">total revenues</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400"> (not profits) from global AI sales have only just begun to surpass depreciation costs, which suggests that margins remain very tight</span><span style="font-weight: 400">.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Most importantly, the hyperscalers’ ascent has been underwritten by a massive expansion in the US national debt, with federal fiscal deficits expanding </span><a href="https://atlantic-books.co.uk/book/icarus-economics/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400">faster</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400"> than the economy itself. </span><a href="https://www.ft.com/content/362ccc0a-d6e5-40df-817f-64aea4717cc8?syn-25a6b1a6=1" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400">More than half</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400"> of US corporate profits have been funded by these deficits. Further flattering profit growth is that many more companies are today </span><a href="https://www.ft.com/content/362ccc0a-d6e5-40df-817f-64aea4717cc8?syn-25a6b1a6=1" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400">private</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400"> than was the case a few decades ago, funded by private equity and venture capital, where creative accounting can keep weak performance “off the books”. But as depicted in Warren Buffett’s famous analogy of skinny dippers being exposed by a retreating tide, that sort of sleight of hand gets quickly exposed in a downturn.</span></p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/09/how-the-euro-elite-helps-trump/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/09/how-the-euro-elite-helps-trump/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/Copy-of-lead-images-2.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/09/how-the-euro-elite-helps-trump/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/09/how-the-euro-elite-helps-trump/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>How the Euro elite helps Trump</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/09/how-the-euro-elite-helps-trump/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Samuel Rubinstein</a></p></div></a></div>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Two things could bring the blistering AI rally to halt: a drop in demand for its products, or a drop in the supply of the credit sustaining the boom. It is the latter which may now be coming into play. The fundamental driver of rising bond yields is falling bond prices, since the two move in opposite directions to one another: as bond investors demand lower prices on the bonds they buy, the effective rate of interest paid by the issuer goes up.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Over the last few years, Western governments have issued so many bonds to fund their spending that investors are getting stuffed to the point they can take no more. It began during the Covid pandemic, when governments borrowed an average </span><a href="https://www.penguin.co.uk/books/313711/why-empires-fall-by-heather-john-rapley-and-peter/9780141991160" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400">fifth of GDP</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400"> just to keep their economies from collapsing. It then continued during the recovery phase, and in the US was turbocharged by a bipartisan consensus to thereafter throw caution to the wind. Through both the Biden and Trump administrations, the US government ran large fiscal deficits in order to fund an investment boom, the former directly through government programs and the latter through tax cuts. But the end result is a national debt that has doubled in just the last ten years, and whose growth shows no signs of slowing down.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Add to that mix, then, the shift of hyperscalers from investing their savings to raising money in corporate bond markets, and the global demand for credit now exceeds its supply by a significant margin. Central banks could plug the gap by “monetizing” the debt — essentially, printing new money and then using it to buy government bonds — but are reluctant to do so because inflation remains above their target rates. And inflation has remained so sticky in large measure because of the same fiscal stimulus that is pumping money into the economy without producing equivalent growth.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Inflation had, however, shown signs of moderating over the summer, in part because the ceasefire between the US and Iran had allowed energy prices to fall back down. Had that continued into the autumn, we might have seen central banks lower interest rates further. Instead, due to the resumption of hostilities in the Middle East, oil prices are once again rising. Although this will raise gas prices, the greater damage will come through the prices of distillates like diesel, which are driving up transportation and farming costs just as the northern harvests are coming in. So the fertilizer shortages caused by the war are now starting to turn up in food prices on store shelves.</span></p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/07/the-great-net-zero-showdown/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/07/the-great-net-zero-showdown/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/GettyImages-2287045125.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/07/the-great-net-zero-showdown/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/07/the-great-net-zero-showdown/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The great Net Zero showdown</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/07/the-great-net-zero-showdown/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> John Rapley</a></p></div></a></div>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">This price resurgence comes at a most inopportune time. If it persists, the autumn inflation readings could prod central banks to further raise interest rates, raising credit costs for everyone. No G7 country will feel the weight of this expense more acutely than Britain. UK gilts have carried a premium for the last few years, imposed initially after the 2022 Liz Truss moment and then worsening after the 2024 election, when the incoming Labour government’s implausible tax and spending commitments caused investors to doubt the financial acumen of the British Treasury. The impact of perceived British mismanagement is that UK gilt yields are now the highest of any G7 country, and each day’s inching further upwards makes the government’s difficult situation even worse.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">So pity the Chancellor, John Healey, who at the end of October will deliver his first Budget. Healey’s fiscal headroom, the gap between revenues and budgeted expenditure that he can “play with”, was tight to begin with and is now narrowing towards zero. At this rate, come Budget day, he will have to deliver bad news — either further spending cuts or tax increases. Either would probably bring an end to Andy Burnham’s honeymoon period, which has seen his </span><a href="https://yougov.com/en-gb/articles/55382-political-favourability-ratings-august-2026" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400">net approval rating</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400"> rise steadily since he became Prime Minister.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">And if Andy Burnham faces a cold new reality, Donald Trump may become a lame duck. The odds of a Democratic sweep of Congress in the November elections, currently tilted slightly in their favor, will probably lengthen if gas prices go back up, inflation rises and credit card costs become more burdensome. Inflation that has been running over 3% has now begun to erode the incomes of ordinary Americans, and the bottom half of the economy can be forgiven for thinking there’s already a recession.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">What has kept the economy from contracting has been the heavy consumption of the top half, fueled by the wealth effect of the stock market rally. So, if interest rates were to choke off the supply of credit and slow that growth, the market might fall as prices realign with the new reality. In that event, the reversal of the wealth effect could tip the US economy into recession, accelerating slowdowns elsewhere.</span></p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">“It seems unlikely that the rise in bond yields we’ve seen over the last week could continue much longer without something cracking.”</div>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Worryingly, the capacity of Western governments to tackle recessions is not what it once was. As the Bank for International Settlements noted in its </span><a href="https://www.bis.org/publ/arpdf/ar2026e.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400">annual report</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400">, recent years have seen government debt rise during downturns, but without a concomitant decline during economic recoveries. The rainy-day funds of Western governments have then been further depleted by the rising demands of defense expenditure, aging populations and adaptation to climate change.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">It seems unlikely that the rise in bond yields we’ve seen over the last week could continue much longer without something cracking. As debt-laden governments are forced to commit ever more of their revenues to interest payments — in the UK, they now suck out more money than the defense and Home Office budgets combined — they will have to either cut spending or raise taxes. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">In the US, such fiscal austerity would drain the supply of money that has kept the economy revving. That, in turn, would hit the profits of the tech companies inflating the bubble just as their access to credit dries up. In short, the scale of the recession could stand in direct proportion to the scale of the boom which preceded it, at a time western governments would be more constrained in their ability to engage in counter-cyclical policies. </span>With the American economy already slowing and the job market at a virtual standstill, a slide into negative territory could deepen the hardship already being felt by many working people, strengthening the wind now filling the sails of political populists.</p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Thus, between the limited fiscal firepower of Western governments and the chariness of their central banks, reluctant to stimulate amid persistent inflation, this is not the time for a recession. Let us hope that Trump soon finds a different way out of his Middle East quagmire.</span></p>
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					<title>Andy Burnham’s missing economic strategy</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2026/07/wheres-the-economic-strategy-andy/?edition=us</link>
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										<unherd:main_theme>Politics</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Wolfgang Munchau]]>
					</dc:creator>
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																<unherd:article_ranking>1</unherd:article_ranking>
																<unherd:image_caption>
							<![CDATA['Burnham inherits a problem that his predecessors failed to address.' (Henry Nicholls/Pool/AFP/Getty)]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Wolfgang Münchau</strong> is the Director of <a href="https://www.eurointelligence.com/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Eurointelligence</a> and an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist.</p>
]]>
						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>EuroBriefing</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is the Director of <a href="https://www.eurointelligence.com/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Eurointelligence</a> and an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Sun, 19 Jul 2026 23:03:55 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Mon, 20 Jul 2026 13:20:51 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Andy Burnham]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Economics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Emmanuel Macron]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[number 10]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Tony Blair]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://stage.unherd.com/?p=1067847</guid>
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								<![CDATA[Britain’s new premier has no plan]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>At the World Cup, a single misjudgment by the manager ended the England team’s hopes of reaching the final. In politics, Keir Starmer never recovered from sending Peter Mandelson onto the pitch. Luck, too, played a role in the downfall of both the Three Lions and the outgoing prime minister. But when football teams or politicians keep on failing, it cannot be explained by fortune alone.</p>
<p>When Bill Clinton got elected in 1992, a newspaper dispatched me to Washington, where I followed his first two years in office. He had a lucky break during the election campaign, but did not owe his victory and political success to that. This was the new era of post-communist financial globalization. Many of the smart people at the time were on the center-left of politics, and Clinton was their man. He was a reactionary on law and justice, but his welfare-to-work policies were inspiring. The center-left of Clinton’s generation saw welfare as an insurance policy, but also as a poverty trap. As a result, they pushed for people to get back into work. Clinton committed his own share of policy errors, like the deregulation of the financial industry. But he started off with an intelligent agenda.</p>
<p>Clinton was also a politician with a keen interest in macroeconomics. He was not an economist, but shortly after he got elected, he assembled a group of experts to help him draft his program for his time in the White House. His strategic goal was to reform welfare and the health system while at the same time eliminating the fiscal deficit.</p>
<p>Today, 34 years later, Andy Burnham will become Britain’s latest prime minister. What do we know about him? It is true that he did not have a lot of time to prepare his agenda. The time between a US presidential election to the inauguration is a little over two months — with a Christmas and New Year’s break in between. This is a little, but not much more, than the time between Burnham’s victory in the Makerfield by-election and his arrival at No. 10. Certainly, it does not take years to formulate an economic strategy.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/07/why-you-cant-crush-populism/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/07/why-you-cant-crush-populism/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/GettyImages-2233172331.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/07/why-you-cant-crush-populism/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/07/why-you-cant-crush-populism/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Why the campaign against Farage will fail</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/07/why-you-cant-crush-populism/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Wolfgang Münchau</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>It is the implementation that takes longer. Clinton did not have it all worked out, but he set goals and intermediate targets, and developed a clear idea of the political and real-world obstacles that would stand in the way. Burnham has expressed a lot of ideas about British society. He has policies — but I&#8217;d struggle to identify an overarching strategic objective beyond the usual platitudes of social justice.</p>
<p>Burnham inherits a problem that his predecessors failed to address. Productivity growth in the UK collapsed directly after the global financial crisis in 2008 and never recovered. Until then, the City of London was the gift that kept on giving. In Germany, it was the car industry. One European country after another lost its business model. What happened in all of these countries, including the UK, is that more and more people become dependent on welfare. It became normal. Germany renamed its welfare program a “citizen’s income”, as though it were a basic human right. But the shift from welfare as an insurance policy to a welfare as a personal choice has trapped European societies in a vicious circle. The greater their welfare dependency became, the more they fell behind in investment and innovation.</p>
<p>Burnham has not given us any plan to fix this problem, let alone one I could disagree with. There are socialist ways of raising productivity growth, and libertarian ways. But let’s not get hung up on ideology. The fall in productivity growth is not about who gets what. It’s about investment, and most investment comes from the private sector. Companies invest to become more productive and innovative.</p>
<p>What does Burnham think about private-sector investment? I haven&#8217;t the foggiest, and nor does anyone else. I don’t get a sense that this is a question that keeps him up at night.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/07/burnham-faces-an-insurgent-britain/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/07/burnham-faces-an-insurgent-britain/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/GettyImages-2285819009.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/07/burnham-faces-an-insurgent-britain/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/07/burnham-faces-an-insurgent-britain/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Burnham faces an insurgent Britain</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/07/burnham-faces-an-insurgent-britain/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Wolfgang Münchau</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>He has, however, thought a lot about public-sector investment. But the two are not the same. About 80% of all investment in the UK is from the private sector. So if Burnham pushes ahead with his public investment plans by raising taxes, what I&#8217;d expect to see is a fall in private investment that exceeds the rise in public investment. It’s basic math.</p>
<p>Granted, we&#8217;d all like to have better trains. But fixing the trains has nothing to do with productivity. The US is a country with a terrible railway network, and with high private-sector productivity. France has Europe’s best railway system, but the trains have not stopped the French economy from becoming increasingly dysfunctional. Everybody needs to get to work, but the comfort and speed of the journey is at most marginally related to our productivity.</p>
<p>The productivity problem can only be solved through strategic action — just like Clinton addressed structural fiscal deficits and welfare dependence. Emmanuel Macron, too, was a welfare reformer, but he had no fiscal strategy. This is what has rendered his presidency a failure. A recent estimate from the French High Commission for Strategy and Planning found that France’s debt could rise from a current level of 118% of economic output to between 186% and 245% by 2050.</p>
<p>The center-left used to be good at strategy. Clinton was. So were Tony Blair and Gordon Brown. To be clear, I am not endorsing anyone here. This is not about whether we agree or disagree with their policies. My point is that these people had some strategy. But since Burnham has not told us what his strategy is, we can safely assume that he does not have one. Macron had one, but as I say it failed the fiscal test. This is a bit like going to war and being shocked that the enemy fights back, which is what happened when the US and Israel attacked Iran.</p>
<p>As for Starmer, he clearly was not a reformer, but at least Rachel Reeves imposed fiscal rules that kept the show on the road. But, again, have no clear idea where Burnham really stands on those rules. He said he would follow them, but this is easier said than done unless you have a clear idea of what to do when the numbers no longer add up.</p>
<p>So rather than leaking the names of Cabinet ministers, maybe Burnham should have told us about how he intends to fix the productivity problem while keeping the country solvent. At this point, we don’t need details. We need direction.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;It borders on delusion to think that you can draw lessons from the governance of Manchester for the UK.&#8221;</div>
<p>Burnham has lots of policies, for example on devolution. I am not against this. It is possible that local governments spend money more wisely than central government. The other way around is also possible. Either way, there is no link between the degree of decentralization and innovation. Silicon Valley is not where it is because of Californian politics. It is there because of Stanford University, and because some of its most brilliant entrepreneurs, like Steve Jobs, grew up there.</p>
<p>Burnham knows local politics better than most politicians do: and maybe it is easier to fix some problems locally. But it borders on delusional to think that you can draw lessons from the governance of Manchester for the UK as a whole. Cities don’t have bond markets, nor currencies that can devalue. And the mayor of Manchester does not have to put up with Donald Trump. The idea of a Northern No. 10 is a nice publicity stunt; but it is about appearances, not substance. I therefore make one specific and confident prediction: Burnham will not solve the UK’s underlying economic issues.</p>
<p>That said, he may still succeed politically. Elections, after all, are zero-sum games. Someone has to win. Starmer got his whopping majority not because he had a brilliant plan, but because people preferred his lack of a plan to the Tories’ version of a lack of plan.</p>
<p>Electoral success and problem-solving are not the same thing, of course. Margaret Thatcher would probably have lost the 1983 elections had it not been for the Falklands War. Angela Merkel managed to win four elections in a row and yet failed to address her country’s economic problems.</p>
<p>But the importance of problem-solving (or lack thereof) does not mean that you should keep ignoring the economy. The persistent failure of the previous generation to address the problems of a permanent decline in productivity has made European countries harder to govern. And the longer people are trapped in the welfare system, the harder it will be to get them out again. If you fail to solve a problem for long enough, eventually it catches up with you.</p>
<p>The odds of a successful Burnham premiership are shortening precisely because previous prime ministers have prioritized short-term expediency over long-term strategic action — and because it looks like he will do exactly the same. But we are already living in the long-term. The fact that politicians like Cameron or Johnson succeeded politically without solving the country&#8217;s deep-seated problems does not mean that the current generation of politicians will enjoy the same luxury.</p>
<p>In politics, as in football, outsiders can win, and favorites can lose. But we should not fool ourselves about Burnham. He does not have a strategy to fix the British economy. Those who are hoping he will do it by chance will be disappointed.</p>
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					<title>Why populism fails</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2026/07/why-populism-fails/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://stage.unherd.com/2026/07/why-populism-fails/?edition=us#respond</comments>
										<unherd:featured_image>https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/GettyImages-2213109092.jpg?w=525</unherd:featured_image>
										<unherd:main_theme>Excerpt</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Richard Hanania]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/image-7.jpg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>3</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[President Trump and HHS Secretary RFK Jr. exemplify populist dysfunction. Credit: Getty]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p>Richard Hanania<b data-stringify-type="bold">,</b> an <i data-stringify-type="italic">UnHerd </i>columnist, is the president of the Center for the Study of Partisanship and Ideology and blogs at <a class="c-link" href="https://www.richardhanania.com/" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer" data-stringify-link="https://www.richardhanania.com/" data-sk="tooltip_parent">Substack</a>.</p>
]]>
						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>RichardHanania</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[Richard Hanania<b data-stringify-type="bold">,</b> an <i data-stringify-type="italic">UnHerd </i>columnist, is the president of the Center for the Study of Partisanship and Ideology and blogs at <a class="c-link" href="https://www.richardhanania.com/" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer" data-stringify-link="https://www.richardhanania.com/" data-sk="tooltip_parent">Substack</a>.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Sun, 05 Jul 2026 23:00:06 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Tue, 14 Jul 2026 21:11:58 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Brexit]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Corruption]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Decline]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Donald Trump]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Economics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[elites]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Graham Platner]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[javier milei]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Kakistocracy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[kash patel]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[nick shirley]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Populism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[RFK Jr.]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Richard Hanania]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Tucker Carlson]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://stage.unherd.com/?p=1065607</guid>
																												<description>
								<![CDATA[In a kakistocracy, the worst people come out on top]]>
							</description>
																		
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								<![CDATA[<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The rise of President Donald Trump has transformed the Republican Party, moving it in a populist direction. On the Left, we see the rise of figures like Maine senatorial candidate Graham Platner and other DSA-affiliated candidates, indicating that the Democrats might not be far behind.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">While much has been written about the rise of populism from the American perspective, what we are witnessing in the United States is part of a global phenomenon.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Just months before Americans first elected Trump, the British public voted to leave the European Union, a move that had practically no support among media, academic, and political elites. The Populism in Power database shows an approximately fivefold increase in the number of populist leaders and parties ruling over democracies between 1990 and 2019. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">An analysis of six major democracies — the UK, the US, Australia, Germany, France, and Canada — reveals a significant decline in support for traditional center-Left and center-Right parties, dropping from about three-quarters of the vote share in 2000 to just over half in 2024.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Latin America is also seeing one of its perennial populist waves, and populism is even making inroads into Asia. Ruling elites even in nondemocracies, such as Putin’s Russia, are adopting aspects of populist rhetoric as legitimization strategies. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Beyond how we feel about any particular candidate or party, perhaps the political question of our time is whether we should embrace or reject this trend. Approaching this topic from a social science background, my inclination is to first look for data. Practically all of it points to the lesson that countries should avoid populist leaders if they want to maintain freedom and achieve economic growth. How do we know this? Ideally, you’d have randomized experiments where you assign some countries to be ruled by populists and others by normal leaders. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Since we can’t do that, we have to go by theory and observation. When theory and observational outcomes point in the same direction, then we might think we know something about the world, though it depends on the plausibility of the theory and the strength of the relevant correlations. There have never been randomized controlled trials establishing that smoking causes lung cancer, but I would bet my life that it does. </span></p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/04/how-ai-will-cure-populist-paranoia/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/04/how-ai-will-cure-populist-paranoia/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/GettyImages-2204064825.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/04/how-ai-will-cure-populist-paranoia/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author </span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/04/how-ai-will-cure-populist-paranoia/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Will AI kill off populism?</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/04/how-ai-will-cure-populist-paranoia/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Richard Hanania</a></p></div></a></div>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Before we even begin on this topic, however, the first thing we have to do is ask: what even is populism? The political scientists Cas Mudde and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser settle on the </span><a href="https://www.amazon.com/Populism-Very-Short-Introduction-Introductions/dp/0190234873/ref=tmm_pap_swatch_0?_encoding=UTF8&amp;dib_tag=se&amp;dib=eyJ2IjoiMSJ9.jFP5GP7QEYKLNuRGAx1hG2bCy4xFx4V1R9XiWWUR8PNsPDqJSaM1JXHFSmsNcj4QqH9C4mogGOUD7qlhBvRqTHzMYfavazYCpL2RFvacKHOBq5zf5x0JoxilEl0v9ndRDxVkL3P-6VfKNszh4RBllM2_hXZWt80lBuXG4puvs7SfMUIIu9cRZRBP8eoDihRY_1AkfUzTsBZWXr1ziY8kI3-_6N5WWLemLFfC6NUKwhU.SpSoiUd1C9VQHnQR-eiFUsQ-IkmreUYrhnNTmn6ld54&amp;qid=1781387053&amp;sr=8-1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">definition</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> of “a thin-centered ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic camps, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite,’ and which argues that politics should be an expression of the </span><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">volonté générale</span></i><span style="font-weight: 400;"> (general will) of the people.” This seems like it would lead to a lot of debates. Was President Barack Obama a populist because he talked about rich people and the working class? Did he present each class as “homogenous” enough and did he do enough to declare them “antagonistic”? Maybe you can make a case that every major politician this side of retired US Sen. Mitt Romney (R-Utah) is populist according to this definition.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">In practical terms, however, when scholars make lists of populist leaders, they basically agree on who qualifies, and examples come from the Right and the Left, which means we can’t tell a simple story of political bias. Trump, former Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, former Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez, and former Bolivian President Evo Morales all count, no matter who you ask. Standard definitions of populism are fuzzy and create edge cases, and often disagree with one another, but this is a common issue in politics, and one can say similar things about concepts like democracy and nationalism. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">“I know it when I see it” can be fine as a standard in social and political analysis. There is definitely an essence that Trump and Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro, currently in US custody, share, which former US President Joe Biden and current German Chancellor Friedrich Merz do not. Since analysts agree on who populists are, we can undertake observational studies and see whether such leaders being in power is associated with worse outcomes. Perhaps the most comprehensive paper to do this is </span><a href="https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.20202045"><span style="font-weight: 400;">“Populist Leaders and the Economy”</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">, published in the </span><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">American Economic Review</span></i><span style="font-weight: 400;">, arguably the most respected journal in economics. The authors found that between 1990 and 2020, a country being ruled by a populist is associated with a 10% lower GDP after 15 years relative to a reasonable counterfactual.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Left-wing populists do worse, which is not surprising, given that they have a deeply flawed understanding of economics. So ideology as traditionally understood matters a lot, but populist rule still has its own independent negative effect. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">What about non-economic indicators? Here the news seems to be even worse. In a </span><a href="https://institute.global/insights/geopolitics-and-security/populist-harm-democracy-empirical-assessment"><span style="font-weight: 400;">report</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> for the Tony Blair Institute, journalists Jordan Kyle and Yascha Mounk investigated the period from 1990 to 2018. Populists over that time degraded checks and balances, and were four times more likely than other leaders to preside over democratic backsliding. In fact, of the breakdowns of democracy that the world has seen since the end of the Cold War, excluding those involving foreign interference or in countries with a GDP per capita of less than $1,000 a year, two-thirds occurred under populist leaders. Such leaders were also bad for freedom of the press and civil liberties. Perhaps most remarkable of all: 40% of populist leaders ended up charged with corruption. This is despite the fact that they often try to stack institutions in their own favor. </span></p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">“The political question of our time is whether we should embrace or reject this trend.”</div>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">When </span><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">The Economist </span></i><span style="font-weight: 400;">made a list of countries with the highest ratio of negative to positive years of growth between 1950 and 2023, the </span><a href="https://www.richardhanania.com/p/why-the-technocapital-machine-is"><span style="font-weight: 400;">top eight</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> were Libya, Argentina, Syria, Iraq, Chad, Congo, Sudan, and Venezuela. As I’ve previously written, “This is not a list anyone wants to be on. That’s six countries in Africa and the Middle East that have experienced civil wars, and two Latin American nations that did it to themselves through Leftist economic policies.” Venezuela and Argentina have mostly been democratic throughout this time period, without suffering anything close to the level of intrastate violence seen in the other nations on that list. Interestingly, most communist countries have shown a better ability to correct their issues than Venezuela and Argentina. Populist democratic socialism seems to be an unusually good way to keep a country economically dysfunctional in the long term, since communist regimes usually end up collapsing like they did in Eastern Europe or reforming as China and Vietnam have. Of course, when they don’t do either of these things — think North Korea and Cuba — their outcomes are worse than what you get with any form of populism even in the long term. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Another data point is what has happened in the UK since Brexit. Stanford economics professor Nicholas Bloom and his coauthors found that by 2025, simulations based on the performance of comparable countries indicate that GDP per capita was 6% to 8% lower in the UK than it would have otherwise been, with investment down 12% to 18%. Firms that were most exposed to European markets were hardest hit. The UK was at about the tenth percentile for growth among the 33 other countries analyzed since the second quarter of 2016. The authors note that their paper likely underestimates harms, since the countries they compare the UK to were themselves hit by Brexit, making the one that actually left the EU look better by comparison. Brexit did not involve the victory of a populist leader, but it was a shock that caused the enactment of a major populist policy, one that had practically no support among traditional elites. The results look similar in kind to what we get when publics elect populists into office.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">That’s the empirical evidence. What about theory? It’s much easier to come up with a plausible story of why populism would be bad than one showing why it would be good. Let’s say you believe that elites have made a lot of mistakes. They are self-dealing and corrupt, the media is lazy and has a Left-wing bias, and intellectuals write to impress one another and are cut off from reality. That can all be true. The question is why anyone would think that a leader whose only claim to power is a direct connection to a mass audience would be better. Or that the kinds of people such a leader should be expected to mobilize would be preferable to old elites.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Experts who abuse their authority to push a political agenda should certainly be held to account. At the same time, it is impossible to deny that gatekeepers are usually right. There is a general tendency to focus too much on the man-bites-dog cases, such as claims made by credentialed elites that trans women have no advantage over biological women in athletic competitions, or that the US is a white supremacist nation. Most of the time, media and academic elites are gatekeeping views that are clearly false and often harmful. Among these, to take a handful of examples of beliefs promoted or given a respectful hearing on </span><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">The Joe Rogan Experience</span></i><span style="font-weight: 400;">, the most successful podcast in the country, are the following ideas: there is an ancient city beneath the Giza pyramids; HIV doesn’t cause AIDS; there were advanced human civilizations that predated those accepted by archaeologists and historians; 9/11 may have been a government operation; mind reading is real; Covid vaccines are more dangerous than the disease itself; and humans became more susceptible to polio due to vaccination. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">You might oppose elites on completely reasonable grounds, but creating a political culture in which expertise is rejected as a general matter leads to a decline in intellectual and moral standards, as we’ve seen happen in populist movements across the world. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Sometimes, the elites of a country truly are bad enough to justify grabbing onto almost any alternative. We have seen this in the case of Argentina. It is the one nation that has such a deep history of populism that populists themselves became the establishment. And we have seen the results: a country that, in the early 20th century, was as wealthy as major European powers is now no longer even in the category of advanced nations. So President Javier Milei comes along as a populist with a libertarian agenda, and is probably worth supporting. Even though he is surrounded by the kinds of scandals that dog other populist leaders, the combination of his sensible economic views and the degree to which Argentine elites have failed makes this an unusual case. Populism usually being bad doesn’t mean it is always a negative, and we have to exercise judgment in individual cases. </span></p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/06/a-second-milei-rises-in-colombia/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/06/a-second-milei-rises-in-colombia/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/GettyImages-2282096534.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/06/a-second-milei-rises-in-colombia/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/06/a-second-milei-rises-in-colombia/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>A second Milei rises in Colombia</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/06/a-second-milei-rises-in-colombia/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Juan David Rojas</a></p></div></a></div>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">More typical than Milei is someone like Trump, whose critique of the establishment of his country is that they are too pro-market and globalist. While Milei slashes tariffs, Trump enacts new ones and goes beyond any previous president in taking ownership stakes in major corporations. Even if Trump enacts more sensible economic policies than his opponents on average, that has to be balanced against the costs of higher levels of corruption and institutional decay, along with generally opening up the government to cranks, from anti-vaxxers to nativists who believe that America belongs to white Christians alone.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Populist movements don’t simply reduce the power of elites, but raise the status and influence of a new group of people. Ten years ago, it would have been rational to criticize </span><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">The New York Times </span></i><span style="font-weight: 400;">for getting things wrong and to not worry too much about what conspiracy theorist personalities were saying. Today, the Joe Rogan Experience and other low-quality sources of information have influence comparable to that of the mainstream media. Independent journalist Nick Shirley’s video on Somalis in Minnesota ended up having major policy consequences, leading the Trump administration to open investigations and begin a crackdown on illegal immigrants in Minneapolis. This made little sense as a policy matter, since Shirley’s shoddy reporting had nothing to do with the immigration status of people living in that state, and few Somalis are here illegally. But this is the kind of policy-by-word association you get under populist rule.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The fact that alternative media and influencers are increasingly powerful means that you now have to apply a more critical eye to their beliefs and behaviors. Is US Health and Human Services Secretary Robert F. Kennedy, Jr. more or less important than the American Medical Association? The latter might still matter more in the long run. But their power levels are at least in the same ballpark. Same thing if you are weighing the virtues and flaws of </span><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">The Wall Street Journal </span></i><span style="font-weight: 400;">versus political commentator Tucker Carlson, or Federal Bureau of Investigation Director Kash Patel versus the American Civil Liberties Union. Conservatives could once laugh off these comparisons, adopting the argument that the establishment had more power so its flaws are the only ones that matter — ironic, given conservatives’ hatred of these types of arguments when made by postmodernists. One can imagine them adopting the mantra: “misinformation is poor journalism plus power.” But we’re not in that world anymore, and sometimes populism achieves so much success that its figures must be judged by the same standards we once applied to organic elites. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">We have now arrived at that moment. And the historical record is clear. Whatever problems your country is facing, populist parties and candidates are rarely the answer. </span><span style="font-weight: 400;"><br />
</span><span style="font-weight: 400;"><br />
</span><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">This essay was adapted from the author’s book, </span></i><a href="https://www.amazon.com/Kakistocracy-Why-Populism-Ends-Disaster/dp/0063479990/ref=sr_1_1?crid=290VD8GGK1220&amp;dib=eyJ2IjoiMSJ9.qg9YGCdjGaUX2UTiGrrMdiExbpNzgHL1VFNsGBMWQo26Nm9GUpRSNtkL7eHsjyqG5OJk0VjB_fJgwNfygBe47sTKRLg5dqfNPvPxXe4oDS0.FSCCoTVSB7TJhB7xn64H8bdKEqx579glbWkedRPUGqQ&amp;dib_tag=se&amp;keywords=Richard+Hanania&amp;qid=1782920888&amp;sprefix=richard+hanania%2Caps%2C186&amp;sr=8-1"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Kakistocracy: Why populism ends in disaster</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">,</span><i><span style="font-weight: 400;"> published July 7 by Broadside Books. </span></i></p>
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					<title>Why Burnhamomics will fail</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2026/06/why-burnhamomics-will-fail/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://stage.unherd.com/2026/06/why-burnhamomics-will-fail/?edition=us#comments</comments>
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										<unherd:main_theme>Bond Vigilantes</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Wolfgang Munchau]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/Blue-thumbnail-example-1.jpg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>1</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[Beware the bond vigilantes. (Christopher Furlong/Getty)]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Wolfgang Münchau</strong> is the Director of <a href="https://www.eurointelligence.com/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Eurointelligence</a> and an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist.</p>
]]>
						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>EuroBriefing</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is the Director of <a href="https://www.eurointelligence.com/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Eurointelligence</a> and an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Sun, 28 Jun 2026 23:03:41 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Mon, 29 Jun 2026 15:37:34 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Burnham]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Economics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Labour]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Politics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Starmer]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://stage.unherd.com/?p=1065132</guid>
																												<description>
								<![CDATA[The Left has abandoned economic theory]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>Britain’s political journalists have already settled on a narrative for Keir Starmer and Andy Burnham. Starmer, they’ve decided, was simply not a politician. He entered politics late in life and was never comfortable with its rhythms. Burnham, conversely, is a people’s politician, a natural leader, a winner.</p>
<p>I don’t believe that story, no matter how often it’s repeated. Starmer pulled off a number of remarkable coups over his short political career. Between 2016 and 2019, he changed Labour’s position from reluctantly backing Brexit to supporting a second referendum. Then he ruthlessly cleared Labour of his political opponents. That helped him win a landslide victory with only 34% of the vote. There are reasons why Starmer failed — but lack of political instinct isn’t one of them.</p>
<p>Bond markets, too, have stories. And not all of <em>them</em> are true or consistent either. After all, “bond vigilantes”, as bond market speculators are sometimes called, haven’t attacked France, a country with an even bigger public debt problem than the UK. France’s annual deficit, and its total stock of debt, are higher than Britain’s too, even as successive French governments have failed to stabilize public spending. So if France is safe, might it not be reasonable to think that the UK has a bit of headroom left too?</p>
<p>Unfortunately not. An attack on France would carry incalculable risks for the vigilantes. France is backed by the European Central Bank: an immensely powerful institution, with the ability to bail out countries of any size. I would hope this never happens. But I can’t rule it out, and the bond vigilantes can’t either. If you bet on a rise in French bond prices, and the ECB intervenes to lower them, a speculator could potentially face massive losses.</p>
<p>The UK obviously doesn’t have the protections that come with membership of a large monetary union. That’s precisely why the country needs a solid fiscal framework, as well as a rules-based central bank. And, here, Rachel Reeves’ fiscal rules have proved decent enough. They are certainly conservative, but importantly distinguish between current spending and long-term investment.</p>
<p>If, in other words, Andy Burnham and his next chancellor were to scrap Britain’s fiscal framework, the bond market vigilantes would have every incentive to attack. Jim O’Neill, a former Goldman Sachs chief economist and now an adviser to Burnham, has reportedly come out in favor of a German-style multi-annual public investment fund.  To make his idea palatable to the bond markets, O’Neill has suggested that the UK get rid of the pensions triple lock. I don’t think this will impress the vigilantes unless and until Burnham actually started freezing pensions — and that’s before you factor in the <em>political</em> challenges.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/05/friedrich-merz-europes-wormtongue/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/05/friedrich-merz-europes-wormtongue/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/ChatGPT-Image-May-1-2026-12_07_01-PM.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/05/friedrich-merz-europes-wormtongue/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/05/friedrich-merz-europes-wormtongue/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Friedrich Merz: Europe’s Wormtongue</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/05/friedrich-merz-europes-wormtongue/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Wolfgang Munchau</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Under the triple lock, pensions must increase by whichever’s highest: inflation, earnings growth, or 2.5%. This year, earnings came out top, informing the 4.8% jump in pensions. If Burnham were to cap pension increases at 2.5%, that may make an impression on the bond markets, but he’d also lose the support of many pensioners.</p>
<p>In other words, policy choices are difficult, and far beyond the triple lock too. Taxing property sounds fine, for instance, until you discover how many of your own voters would be paying the tax. Many Labour voters in the South of England own high-value properties. Reeves has already imposed a mansion tax on homes worth £2 million or more. If you slashed that to £1 million, you would invariably hit a lot of Labour voters in places like London, particularly when not everybody who is asset-rich is also income-rich.</p>
<p>To put it another way, there are no low-hanging fruits left to pick. Reeves and her Conservative predecessors have already stripped the orchard clean.</p>
<p>If you don’t want to cut military or welfare spending, and have no scope to raise borrowing, the only alternative left would be to raise taxes. But that doesn’t work either. A good example of how difficult it is to raise tax on high-income earners is the story of the UK’s now-abolished scheme for non-domiciled employees — the infamous “non-dom” regime. Classic non-domers used to be American investment bankers, seconded to the City of London for five or 10 years.</p>
<p>Successive Tory governments already scaled it down, and when Reeves came to office, she abolished the little that remained. But then she discovered that she lost out on tax revenues. Some foreign workers went home. Others went to Italy, which has successfully set up its own non-dom regime. Today, Milan is booming for that very reason.</p>
<p>This is what happens when your tax policies meet the complex reality of a world in which high-income earners are exceptionally mobile. Alas, Burnham and his team don’t live in this world. He may have been prepared for his power grab, but he hasn’t thought about the gritty details of economic policy.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;He may have been prepared for his power grab, but Burnham hasn’t thought about the gritty details of economic policy.&#8221;</div>
<p>Contrary to the stereotypes, Starmer and Reeves were prepared for power, economically speaking anyway. What they failed to do was translate a fiscal strategy into a political one. Traditionally, the Labour Party was the party of work. Rather than accepting the welfare state in its current unsustainable size, Starmer and Reeves could have framed their economic policy as a welfare-to-work program, with a strong emphasis on productive public-sector jobs. To that extent, their failure had nothing to do with day-to-day political nous — what they lacked was an overarching political <em>agenda</em>.</p>
<p>To be fair, Burnham has an agenda: just not a very inspiring one. Let’s go through some possible scenarios. He may do what I just suggested Starmer should have done: he might conclude that boosting Britain’s low productivity is key to winning the next election. Productivity is the money we earn per-hour-worked. It is a better metric than the more common statistic of gross domestic product, which conflates a lot of other stuff. GDP might go up because we work longer hours — or because of higher immigration.</p>
<p>But this does not make us feel better. Productivity is the better metric for politicians, too, because it explains how the median voter actually feels about the economy. The reason people are struggling to make ends meet, let alone afford to buy property, is closely related to the fall in productivity growth.</p>
<p>The one forecast I will make is that without a rebound in productivity growth, no prime minister can succeed. Even if he doesn’t have his own productivity agenda, Burnham may still be lucky. There are some tentative signs that productivity is rising again. For instance, payroll data shows an increase in output-per-hour to levels not seen since the financial crisis. But if that were to happen, Starmer, too, would have been lucky.</p>
<p>I am, however, struggling to see any scenario in which Burnham succeeds on the basis of what he is offering. Productivity doesn’t increase because railways are in public ownership, while higher taxes would actually impede productivity growth. There may be reasons to support more public-sector investment — but productivity is not one of them. If Burnham were to deliver his promises, indeed, the impact on productivity growth would be negative.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/03/trumps-gamble-with-the-wests-future/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/03/trumps-gamble-with-the-wests-future/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/GettyImages-2265861664.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/03/trumps-gamble-with-the-wests-future/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/03/trumps-gamble-with-the-wests-future/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Trump’s gamble with the West’s future</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/03/trumps-gamble-with-the-wests-future/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Wolfgang Munchau</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>A smarter strategy would be old-school, Left-wing radicalism. I myself would hate it — but don’t let that get in the way of our discussion. A socialist with a brain might just do the following. You’d start by taking back control of the Bank of England and imposing a governor who supports your policies. The bond market vigilantes would get ready to attack immediately. But then you’d fight back, warning them you’re ready to default on all of Britain’s debt.</p>
<p>This is the “Kim Jong Un scenario”: a mad dictator with a few nuclear bombs is more powerful than a centrist people-pleaser with thousands. If the UK were to default on its debt, it would bring down the global financial system. The UK is not Argentina. It is too big to fail. So if you hold the nerve, and your MPs don’t panic and replace you in the meantime, you can dictate any deal you like. In practice, that might mean restructuring your debt, giving you breathing space on interest payments.</p>
<p>Back on Earth, though, we can all rest assured that none of this is going to happen because, as is increasingly clear from Burnham’s putative plan, the Leftists of our generation are mostly uninterested in economics, unlike their 20th-century predecessors.</p>
<p>In the Seventies, the Labour Party, and European social democratic parties, were focused on Keynesian economics. Gordon Brown, shortly after he became chancellor, famously talked about endogenous growth theory. Reeves and O’Neill may be trained economists, yet I’d struggle to identify any economic <em>thinkers</em> in the Labour Party today. Together with Germany’s SPD, and the French Socialists, the modern Left is focused primarily on income redistribution.</p>
<p>This leaves us with a scenario where Burnham might succeed because of luck, or where he fails. As so often in life, though, there are more ways to fail than succeed. My expectation is that in a year from now, Labour MPs will look in the mirror and ask: “what did we do?” And political journalists will have a neat narrative to explain why Burnham was always bound to fail.</p>
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					<title>The Thomas Piketty doctrine is already here</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2026/06/the-thomas-piketty-doctrine-is-already-here/?edition=us</link>
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										<unherd:main_theme>Economics</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[John Rapley]]>
					</dc:creator>
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																<unherd:article_ranking>2</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[Is the tide turning against the ultra-wealthy? (Martin Pope/Getty)]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>John Rapley</strong> is an author and academic who divides his time between London, Johannesburg and Ottawa. His books include <i>Why Empires Fall: Rome, America and the Future of the West </i>(with Peter Heather, Penguin, 2023) and <i>Twilight of the Money Gods: Economics as a Religion</i> (Simon &amp; Schuster, 2017).</p>
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						<unherd:twitter_handle>jarapley</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is an author and academic who divides his time between London, Johannesburg and Ottawa. His books include <i>Why Empires Fall: Rome, America and the Future of the West </i>(with Peter Heather, Penguin, 2023) and <i>Twilight of the Money Gods: Economics as a Religion</i> (Simon &amp; Schuster, 2017).]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Wed, 10 Jun 2026 23:01:41 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Wed, 10 Jun 2026 23:01:41 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Economics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[global south]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Thomas Piketty]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://stage.unherd.com/?p=1063022</guid>
																												<description>
								<![CDATA[His critics ignore his prescience]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Academics need to get out a bit more. That, at least, is the impression one might form from the recently-released report of the </span><i><span style="font-weight: 400">Global Justice Project, </span></i><span style="font-weight: 400">the fruit of a research team led by the star economist Thomas Piketty, whose monumental study of global inequality </span><i><span style="font-weight: 400">Capital in the 21st Century</span></i><span style="font-weight: 400"> made him a household name. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">A handsome and detailed study, the report offers a set of ambitious proposals that could only have from the minds of people enjoying the comfort of tenured positions: cap the growth of western economies at current levels; raise investment by rich countries in poor ones to 10% of GDP (a 25-fold increase over current aid levels); ensure per capita incomes converge to a common average across the world by 2100; reduce the consumption of material goods; cut the working week in half; tax the rich to equalize incomes across the globe; create a new international currency regime. Have these people spent any time canvassing in a by-election? Do they have any idea how this will sell in Peoria, Illinois?</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">In short, it seems difficult to picture this supposed action plan making it into the daily grind of retail politics. Not surprisingly, mainstream economists have been quick to pounce, the widely-read blogger </span><a href="https://substack.com/home/post/p-201096801" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400">Noah Smith</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400"> calling it “total nonsense”, the taxation expert </span><a href="https://x.com/DanNeidle/status/2063892911909994813" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400">Dan Neidle</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400"> dismissing it as “potty.”</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">And yet: step back and reflect on the document, and you see that Piketty and his co-authors might just be onto something. However impractical their solutions may appear, the authors have channeled an emerging zeitgeist in this age of polycrisis. The old neoliberal orthodoxy has fallen from grace but, like a zombie that keeps coming at you no matter how many times you kill it, it still dominates policy. The document at least offers an alternative vision of where things might be going. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">One striking thing, missed in the rush to dismiss this as fantasy, is the fact many of the things the report calls for in the future have already begun to happen. Cap economic growth in the developed economies at current levels? Check. Western economies have been slowing for decades and several have now approached virtual stasis. Indeed, there are signs that growth ultimately produces degrowth, regardless of what governments do. As I found in my </span><a href="https://atlantic-books.co.uk/book/icarus-economics/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400">recent book</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400">, economic growth triggers a cycle of behavioral and social changes whose effect, when aggregated, is to progressively inhibit a society’s economic dynamism while imposing new costs on that society, with the strength of these effects rising as a country grows richer. Western economies are now close to peak productivity. The one principal exception to the broadly-based slowdown of the rich countries is the US — but it has continued expanding thanks not to some internal dynamism, as is often supposed, but because of a massive run of debt-fueled stimulus. Take that added input out of the economy and the US too would be no outlier at all. In fact, real per capita income is already </span><a href="https://www.bls.gov/news.release/realer.nr0.htm" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400">going backwards</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400"> for all but the wealthiest Americans.</span></p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/04/when-will-the-hormuz-recession-hit/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/04/when-will-the-hormuz-recession-hit/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/GettyImages-2264958486.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/04/when-will-the-hormuz-recession-hit/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/04/when-will-the-hormuz-recession-hit/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>When will the Hormuz recession hit?</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/04/when-will-the-hormuz-recession-hit/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> John Rapley</a></p></div></a></div>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Raise investment in developing countries? Check. It’s not nearly at the scale that the authors call for, but investors have been pouring money into developing countries </span><a href="https://www.penguin.co.uk/books/313711/why-empires-fall-by-heather-john-rapley-and-peter/9780141991160"><span style="font-weight: 400">for decades</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400">, lured by the higher average returns on offer in comparatively low-wage economies. Although the business story of the last couple of years has been about the &#8220;American exceptionalism&#8221; that has powered the boom in New York’s stock markets, the really exceptional performers have been in the </span><a href="https://tradingeconomics.com/stocks" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400">developing world</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400">. Turkey’s stock market is up 40% over the last year, Taiwan’s has doubled, and Ghana’s has increased by over 130%. Forget AI, the big money’s in the Global South. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Bring about a global convergence of per capita income? Also check. This mirrors the investment wave in the ascendant global periphery. While incomes </span><i><span style="font-weight: 400">within </span></i><span style="font-weight: 400">rich economies have diverged in recent years, the </span><a href="https://wir2022.wid.world/chapter-2/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400">gap between rich and poor countries</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400">, which peaked at the turn of the millennium, has been </span><a href="https://wid.world/document/longrunpaper/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400">steadily narrowing</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400">. For a while this finding was skewed by the extraordinary rise of China, but in recent years other countries have begun rising rapidly as well. Whether incomes could converge on a common level is another matter, and some war-torn countries have got stuck on the banks of the development stream. But all told, the old distinction between First and Third Worlds looks set to grow less relevant with time.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Reduce the consumption of material goods? Check. Consumers in Western countries have been substituting experiences for things for decades, with the result that the </span><a href="https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/support-materials/2019/02/global-material-resources-outlook-to-2060_g1g98d7d/highlights-global-material-resources-outlook-to-2060.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400">material intensity</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400"> of developed economies has steadily declined. That is to say, the material component of each dollar’s worth of economic consumption is falling as people buy less stuff and spend more money on things like health and beauty, dining out, streaming videos and taking vacations. With most of the world economy’s future economic growth coming from developing countries, rising incomes are already causing a shift away from goods and towards services in consumption.</span></p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;Cut the work week in half? The average work week in Western countries has already nearly halved since the Industrial Revolution.&#8221;</div>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">The other key proposals in the GJP report do not, when placed in the context of the century-long transition the authors envision, look all that unrealistic. Cut the work week in half? The average work week in Western countries has already nearly halved since the Industrial Revolution, so there’s no reason not to expect this trend to continue. It really comes down to whether productivity increases are used to raise income or free time: Americans have been more inclined to favor the former, Europeans the latter. This helps to explain the supposed “poverty” of Europe one reads about in the US business press; but outside of America, people have happily accepted more time off as a fruit of development.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Tax the rich to equalize incomes? There is a rising populist tide in many Western countries that advocates wealth taxes and greater limits to oligarchic power. With Elon Musk, a man described by one polling analyst as “</span><a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BNCWxCSKsLg" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400">political kryptonite</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400">”, on track to become the world’s first trillionaire, public patience with the ultra-wealthy is wearing thin.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Create a new international currency regime? Although the Western-based dollar order remains in place, it is </span><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/newsroom/gold-rush-threatens-us-financial-hegemony/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400">rapidly eroding</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400"> at the margins as the world moves towards a more pluralistic monetary system involving bilateral exchange, alternative payment systems like China’s CIPS, and the shift away from dollar reserves into other currencies.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">In sum, it may be that the world economy is already moving in the direction advocated by the Global Justice Project, but organically rather than as a result of policy or an international revolution. Mind you, on current trends, the world will still face an ecological crisis. Many will take issue with the assumptions made in the report regarding the extent and impact of future climate change. However, there is little serious doubt that on current trends, the world faces a future of increasingly severe ecological crises. These, in turn, will hamper economic growth. Even though the material and energy intensity of production and consumption are declining, the sheer growth of both in the developing world over the next century will blow through all targets. </span></p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/03/thomas-pikettys-failed-revolution/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/03/thomas-pikettys-failed-revolution/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/GettyImages-595295964-e1710417776279.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/03/thomas-pikettys-failed-revolution/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/03/thomas-pikettys-failed-revolution/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Thomas Piketty&#039;s failed revolution</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/03/thomas-pikettys-failed-revolution/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> William Davies</a></p></div></a></div>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">So in that regard, the Global Justice Project is a timely intervention. Admittedly, it doesn’t land at a propitious time. Western politicians are retreating from global campaigns, sweeping visions and anything that smacks of social engineering. It’s all about bringing gas prices down now. Thus as an action program, which it purports to be, the document seems out of touch with the times. In the chapter on political strategies the authors acknowledge there will be pushback from powerful vested interests to their proposals, before admitting there is “no magic bullet to address this issue, except trying to be more convincing and as precise as possible regarding the benefits of the GJP.” Erm, OK.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">The problem, even for those who share Piketty and Co&#8217;s aims, is that there’s little evidence that the average citizen is moved by grand schemes. Indeed, as the success of Zohran Mamdani in New York attests, even self-declared socialists succeed best when they connect with voters around local, visceral issues, Mamdani&#8217;s focus on rental costs and grocery prices being no less ideological than Vladimir Lenin&#8217;s pledge of bread, land, peace and electricity.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">But still. As an intellectual agenda, the document offers something sorely lacking in most modern political discourse, namely: ambition. Most mainstream economic commentary amounts to either fatalism that anything at all can be done, or a Pollyanna-ish optimism that technology will magically solve everything. The first option is a cop-out on the part of intellectuals whose job should be to solve problems; the second is as fanciful a belief as the most utopian assumptions in the radical literature. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Yes, the energy-intensity of our economy has dropped dramatically as our technology becomes more efficient. But rather than bank those efficiency gains </span><a href="https://www.rienner.com/title/Understanding_Development_Theory_and_Practice_in_the_Third_World_3rd_Edition" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400">we have spent them</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400">. When, for instance, gas demand drops because our cars are made more efficient, we’ve spent the savings on adding bells and whistles to the cars, the result being a reduction in our carbon use that is much less than imagined. And that’s before we factor in the ravenous demand for energy that AI data centers are expected to add.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Building a sustainable path to the future will require both technological progress and human change. Economists have so far focused largely on the first and neglected the second. Even if it doesn’t provide the right answers, therefore, the Global Justice Project is at least asking the right question.</span></p>
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															<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">1063022</post-id>				</item>
									<item>
					<title>Welcome to the age of uncertainty</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2026/04/forecasts-are-for-losers/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://stage.unherd.com/2026/04/forecasts-are-for-losers/?edition=us#comments</comments>
										<unherd:featured_image>https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/Orb2.jpg?w=495</unherd:featured_image>
										<unherd:main_theme>Geopolitics</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Wolfgang Munchau]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/Blue-thumbnail-example-1.jpg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>1</unherd:article_ranking>
																<unherd:image_caption>
							<![CDATA[A crystal ball won't help them. (Saudi Press Agency)]]>
						</unherd:image_caption>
						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Wolfgang Münchau</strong> is the Director of <a href="https://www.eurointelligence.com/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Eurointelligence</a> and an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist.</p>
]]>
						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>EuroBriefing</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is the Director of <a href="https://www.eurointelligence.com/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Eurointelligence</a> and an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Sun, 19 Apr 2026 23:03:22 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Mon, 20 Apr 2026 09:08:16 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Economics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Europe]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Geopolitics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Iran]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Statistics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Trump]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://stage.unherd.com/?p=1056774</guid>
																												<description>
								<![CDATA[Geopolitical forecasts are for losers]]>
							</description>
																		
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								<![CDATA[<p>Sometimes, you’ve just got to admit that you don’t know the answer to a question. When will the Iran war end? I don’t know. What will it do to the global economy? I haven’t the foggiest. I may have a hunch that it is going to run a little longer than we expected. Then again, something unexpected is bound to intrude and change things. And I’ve no clue what that might be.</p>
<p>But what I can do — rather than offer a range of uncertain forecasts — is assess the range of plausible outcomes to this conflict and consider how each will affect countries and people in different ways. There’s no scientifically accurate way of eliminating uncertainty; so let’s embrace it. This is not a trivial exercise: I can recall only a few times in my own life when the range of possible geopolitical and economic outcomes, good or bad, has been as wild as it is today.</p>
<p>With his “known-unknowns” and “unknown-unknowns”, Donald Rumsfeld has actually provided us with a useful starting place to assess outcomes. The unknown-unknowns are often more important, but they are beyond our reach. “Whereof one cannot speak,” said Wittgenstein, “thereof one must be silent”. These are what economist Frank Knight was referring to when he coined the notion of “unquantifiable uncertainty”, or true uncertainty, as distinct from outcomes that carry a small probability.</p>
<p>So while little of value can be said about the unknown-unknowns, known-unknowns are generally worthy of deeper reflection. We all know about the truly bad scenarios stemming from the war. Airlines may run out of kerosene in six weeks; the world could run out of fertilizer and basic chemicals if the blockade continues for much longer. We know that Asia would be hit the hardest, followed by Europe, with the US affected least.</p>
<p>There are also potentially good outcomes. Europe has been offered a reminder that its investments in energy independence are worthwhile — and this includes both nuclear and renewables. The European Greens were mad to oppose nuclear power, but they were right about renewables, if only from the perspective of energy independence.</p>
<p>Beyond the war, which should end eventually, there are other positive economic scenarios coming down the track. The most interesting part of the latest World Economic Outlook by the International Monetary Fund was not the central forecast, the risk of global recession: but, rather, the wide range of possible scenarios it also weighed up. We truly live in a world of Knightian uncertainty.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/03/trumps-gamble-with-the-wests-future/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/03/trumps-gamble-with-the-wests-future/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/GettyImages-2265861664.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/03/trumps-gamble-with-the-wests-future/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/03/trumps-gamble-with-the-wests-future/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Trump’s gamble with the West’s future</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/03/trumps-gamble-with-the-wests-future/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Wolfgang Munchau</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>I’m talking here about plausible scenarios, those that have a reasonable chance of occurring: the known-unknowns. Of particular interest are those scenarios at the extreme ends of the spectrum. Some middle-of-the-road scenarios are plausible, of course: economic forecasters always use them for their forecasts. But they have no higher probability of occurring than the good or bad ones. What you really want is information about the spread of outcomes, not the average.</p>
<p>If you want to understand uncertainty, after all, the mean is your enemy. Politicians should care about the voter with the median income; the voter who, when income is ranked from poorest to richest, is sitting in the middle. He would be a different person from the man with the <em>average</em> income, because the super-rich distort the picture. It’s the “Bill Gates walks into the pub” problem, where a single billionaire raises the average income of a group.</p>
<p>There&#8217;s an old joke about the statistician who died crossing a river that was three foot deep on average. Real statisticians, of course, know about this stuff. The people most at risk of such misjudgments are those with a Statistics 101 background, who have been taught some powerful techniques they then unleash on an unsuspecting public: economists, journalists, doctors, epidemiologists and unfortunately also climate scientists.</p>
<p>One of the most catastrophic uses of averages is represented by the communication strategy of climate scientists, when, 10 years ago this week, they set a target to keep the increase in average global temperature to below 2°C. But what kills us is not the average temperature — the 2°C extra — but the extremes: floods, heat, forest fires.</p>
<p>These are the metrics the climate community should have communicated. When you’re told, after all, that the temperature is going to rise by a few degrees, you get the deckchairs out. Indeed, I heard one well-known political commentator claiming that it might be nice for the weather to be a little warmer in Northern Europe. When, on the other hand, you receive a flood warning, you get the sandbags out.</p>
<p>In short, how we communicate risk determines how we act, and misusing statistics inevitably leads to misjudgments.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;How we communicate risk determines how we act&#8221;</div>
<p>So rather than making sweeping average claims about the future, whether about the climate or war with Iran, a better way of thinking about our planet in the medium term is by reflecting on how different plausible scenarios could affect regions in different ways.</p>
<p>The most important positive scenario we might consider is the AI-led productivity boom. It has not happened yet — but there are data points suggesting that it may be starting to happen. If it does, it would benefit the US a lot more than the rest of the world. After all, America invented the technology; Silicon Valley’s foundational AI models are ahead of everyone else’s; and the US’s AI infrastructure is far and away the global leader. China, for its part, is next in line. The People’s Republic may not have invented AI: but it was easily the most successful second mover.</p>
<p>Unsurprisingly, Europe will gain least from the AI revolution. The EU is still in data-protection mode, as much a function of its cultural stance as individual government policies. From LLMs to driverless vehicles, indeed, the Europeans have decoupled from most of our century’s cutting-edge technologies. Pharmaceuticals is the one important exception, but here too China is catching up fast. China also is ahead on renewable investments, but here, at least, the Europeans do better than the Americans.</p>
<p>When it comes to bad outcomes, then, Europe is at greater risk than its rivals. And I don’t just mean technologically. There is a plausible scenario that the war in Ukraine could spread, for instance to the Baltic states, and the US would almost certainly not come to Europe’s rescue. Donald Trump’s line about how the Europeans “weren’t there for us” when the US attacked Iran will keep ringing in our ears as the scenario of a European war grows — in my opinion, a non-trivial tail risk.</p>
<p>Similarly, the Iran ceasefire could break down and the violence spread across the Middle East. Yet while there’s a lot of uncertainty about all these scenarios, we can say with some confidence that there is no realistic scenario of war hitting America’s shores.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/02/europe-will-lose-the-ai-century/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/02/europe-will-lose-the-ai-century/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/GettyImages-2213485223-e1769960829190.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/02/europe-will-lose-the-ai-century/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/02/europe-will-lose-the-ai-century/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Europe will lose the AI century</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/02/europe-will-lose-the-ai-century/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Wolfgang Munchau</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Absent any definitive forecasts, from this brief analysis, I can make some sharp observations. First: the US is clearly in a better position than everyone else. Second: the US is more likely to benefit from any upside scenario, and less likely to be hit by a downside one. I’d therefore warn against those heralding the end of US global dominance, let alone the end of Trump’s presidency. This is mostly wishful thinking. The President has certainly made some foolish decisions, but the US is still at the head of the pack.</p>
<p>Things don’t look so rosy for Europe: it will not benefit from a global productivity boom and will be disproportionately exposed to the bad scenarios. And in those areas where it is strong, it is under attack by China. East and South East Asia sit somewhere in between the two polar opposites — beneficiaries of 21st-century technologies, but not as much as the US. But even though Asia is at greater risk of disruption from the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, it is still more resilient to shocks than Europe.</p>
<p>Whatever happens, one single forecast, or even a focus on two or three scenarios, can’t hope to capture the deep asymmetry of the uncertainty we’re currently facing.</p>
<p>But people who embrace uncertainty don’t think in terms of baselines. They don’t look for polls or projections. Nor do they seek to control that uncertainty. They seek to learn from it. Perhaps we could all learn from them. Forecasts are for losers, and once you’re comfortable admitting that you just don’t know — you might end up seeing things more clearly.</p>
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															<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">1056774</post-id>				</item>
									<item>
					<title>How shipowners are getting rich off Hormuz</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2026/04/how-to-get-rich-off-the-strait-of-hormuz/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://stage.unherd.com/2026/04/how-to-get-rich-off-the-strait-of-hormuz/?edition=us#comments</comments>
										<unherd:featured_image>https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/GettyImages-2207620148.jpg?w=526</unherd:featured_image>
										<unherd:main_theme>Blockade</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Rose George]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/LADY.jpg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>2</unherd:article_ranking>
																<unherd:image_caption>
							<![CDATA[In ship shape? (CN-STR/ AFP/Getty)]]>
						</unherd:image_caption>
						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Rose George </strong>is a British journalist and author. An expert on shipping, her most recent book is <em>Every Last Fish: What Fish Do for Us And What We Do To Them</em>.</p>
]]>
						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle></unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[is a British journalist and author. An expert on shipping, her most recent book is <em>Every Last Fish: What Fish Do for Us And What We Do To Them</em>.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Sun, 19 Apr 2026 23:02:29 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Wed, 22 Apr 2026 10:01:22 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Crisis]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Economics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Hormuz]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Iran]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Shipping]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[War]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://stage.unherd.com/?p=1056758</guid>
																												<description>
								<![CDATA[They have the world over a barrel]]>
							</description>
																		
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								<![CDATA[<p dir="ltr">“We have no idea what on earth will happen,” admits one shipping expert. It’s a common response if you ask anyone in the industry about the crisis in the Strait of Hormuz. How will it impact trade? Will there be long-term damage to oil routes? Will terrified seafarers leave their jobs? Nobody has a Scooby.</p>
<p dir="ltr">People still think shipping is an old-fashioned business. After all, even giant container ships usually travel slower than your grandparent drives. But overseas trade has increased fourfold since 1970 and it is still growing. Today, 90% of everything we consume comes to us by 100,000 ships and 1.5 million seafarers, though you wouldn’t know it until a crisis comes along. When the Icelandic volcano Eyjafjallajökull erupted in 2010, and all aviation stopped, supermarket shelves didn’t empty. That’s because we rely on shipping: but just don’t realize it.</p>
<p dir="ltr">In this latest crisis, there are thought to be more than 800 ships stuck on either side of the Strait of Hormuz, a narrow waterway that Iran has essentially invaded — the Strait’s waters belong half to Iran and half to Oman — with threats of mines and drones. Despite Donald Trump’s dubious claim that 34 ships had gone through the strait on Monday, and despite muddled talk of closures and reopenings, for now hardly anything is moving. Before the crisis, after all, traffic through the Strait averaged 100-150 vessels a day. On Saturday, it was less than 20.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Only a fifth of the world’s oil supply is at issue here — but from the noise you’d think it was all of it. In fact, the blocked supply disproportionately affects nations that get most of their oil from the Gulf. South East Asia and Japan are suffering most. Even so, this is a problem that affects us all. As the International Energy Agency recently warned yet again, this is the largest disruption in history, adding that demand for oil is likely to fall by 88,000 barrels per day, as buyers adjust to a depleted supply and find alternatives. In economics, this is known as “demand destruction”, and it’s the surest outcome in a very unsure situation. At the worst point so far, the price of a barrel of oil surged to $150.</p>
<p dir="ltr"><div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/04/can-i-ever-escape-the-strait-of-hormuz/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/04/can-i-ever-escape-the-strait-of-hormuz/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/GettyImages-1250649650.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/04/can-i-ever-escape-the-strait-of-hormuz/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/04/can-i-ever-escape-the-strait-of-hormuz/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Will I ever escape the Strait of Hormuz?</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/04/can-i-ever-escape-the-strait-of-hormuz/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Anonymous Seafarer</a></p></div></a></div>
<p dir="ltr">All the while, the crisis is expensive in other ways too: idle ships still cost money to run; crew members have to be paid, sometimes double their wages as hazard pay; charterers (who rent ships) have to pay rental even if the ship is going nowhere fast. Factor in port rates — several thousand dollars a day  — and ships can cost thousands of dollars to operate, even when they are idle. Cruise ships face higher costs because while a modern tanker can operate with a crew of a dozen, cruise ships employ thousands of people, and they all need to be fed and paid.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Nor does anyone know when this will end. In its latest World Economic Outlook released last Tuesday, the International Monetary Fund stated that in an “adverse scenario with larger and more persistent increases in energy prices”, global growth will slow to 2.5%, compared to a 3.4% growth rate in 2024-5.</p>
<p dir="ltr">As is always the way, the pain would not be distributed evenly. Of richer countries, the UK gets the worst forecast, with a growth rate of 0.8%, down from the IMF’s January prediction of 1.3%. (The IMF pointed to Britain being a net energy importer and therefore being more exposed.) In its very worst scenario, the Hormuz crisis might push the world into recession.</p>
<p dir="ltr">What is less widely reported, however, is that, for some, this crisis is actually good for business. Consider freight rates, which for ships operating away from the warzone have increased dramatically. Some tankers now cost $100,000 a day to charter. That’s some 10 times the average — but they’re still being chartered. “No shipowner is going through a slump as such,” says Willmington. “It’s actually been beneficial for ship owners.”</p>
<p dir="ltr">It helps, too, that global sea lanes are very much a seller’s market. While shippers can offload cargo safely away from the war region, they’ll struggle to transport it overland. Modern container ships can carry some 20,000 containers — and no one has 20,000 trucks at hand to transport that much cargo. Local rail services are also poor.</p>
<p dir="ltr"><div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;Modern container ships can carry some 20,000 containers — and no one has 20,000 trucks at hand&#8221;</div>
<p dir="ltr">A <em>Reuters</em> investigation into how 17 containers of two-by-four planks of timber were sent to their destination is sobering. The Austrian wood should have left Croatia by ship, then traveled straight to Dubai. Then, a smaller feeder ship would have taken it to Qatar, making the total journey time about 45 days. The war has wrecked these arrangements, with the Austrian timber now not expected to reach Doha for another month. Meanwhile, each container was surcharged $3,600, on top of usual freight costs, another boon for owners.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Another option is to pay for expensive storage, with no idea of how long the situation will last. Oxford Economics, a think tank, suggests that the crisis will last two months. “We assume that traffic levels will rise to around 50% in May and June,” it’s stated, “before gradually recovering to normality over the following six months.”</p>
<p dir="ltr">Then there’s the human element: tankers, after all, don’t drive themselves. On those 800 trapped ships are an estimated 20,000 seafarers. Most come from the developing countries that supply shipping’s labor pool: largely the Philippines and India. They are stuck on their ships, with no end to their sentence in sight. Some but not all crew are on double “hazard” pay. Shipping managers can in theory change crews, as most ships are anchored on either side of the Strait and are therefore accessible. But there are very few people willing to sign up to sit in waters where drones fly overhead and they can hear explosions, yet another challenge for hard-pressed industry accountants.</p>
<p dir="ltr">To be fair, the shipping industry has weathered crises before, though with varying success. It took nearly two decades for shipping to fully recover from the 2008 financial crisis, and only then because Covid increased consumer demand massively, helping shipping too. During the years of awful Somali piracy, when hundreds of seafarers were taken hostage in the Indian Ocean, one of the most common shipping routes, ships began to pass around the Cape of Good Hope instead: it took longer and cost more, but there were no attackers in small boats.</p>
<p dir="ltr">For Hormuz, though, geography limits options. Two large pipelines, in Saudi Arabia and the UAE respectively, can send oil to ports on the Red Sea. But their much smaller capacity can’t replace the pre-crisis 20 million barrels a day that transited the Strait. That, at least, leaves one certainty: business as usual is not returning for a very long time.</p>
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															<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">1056758</post-id>				</item>
									<item>
					<title>Why the US economy beats Europe</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2026/04/why-the-us-economy-beats-europe/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://stage.unherd.com/2026/04/why-the-us-economy-beats-europe/?edition=us#comments</comments>
										<unherd:featured_image>https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/GettyImages-85504143.jpg?w=517</unherd:featured_image>
										<unherd:main_theme>Weekend Essay</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Michael Lind]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/2_f4eb36.jpg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>1</unherd:article_ranking>
																<unherd:image_caption>
							<![CDATA[Protests against large corporations are misguided. Credit: Getty]]>
						</unherd:image_caption>
						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p>Michael Lind is a columnist at <em>UnHerd</em>.</p>
]]>
						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle></unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[Michael Lind is a columnist at <em>UnHerd</em>.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Fri, 17 Apr 2026 23:15:37 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Sun, 19 Apr 2026 15:03:48 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[anti-trust]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Corporations]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Economics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Europe]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Margrethe Vestager]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://stage.unherd.com/?p=1056667</guid>
																												<description>
								<![CDATA[Big Business is good, actually]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">President Trump’s war in Iran is petering out inconclusively. But the smart money — judging by US equity prices — is that American economic resilience will win the day. Many analysts are betting that Iran’s closure of the Strait of Hormuz and other turbulence generated by the recent Persian Gulf war are much more likely to squeeze Europe than either the United States or its Chinese rival.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Which raises a larger question: why is Europe falling behind? The average European is much better off than the average Chinese, and the EU population of 450 million is larger than that of America, with its 324 million. And yet in one industry after another, Chinese or US firms dominate world markets and global rankings. Between them, Chinese and American firms are responsible for 40% of</span><a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounders/contentious-us-china-trade-relationship"> <span style="font-weight: 400;">global output</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Even worse, Europe is</span> <a href="https://www.wipo.int/en/web/global-innovation-index/w/blogs/2025/end-of-year-edition"><span style="font-weight: 400;">lagging</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> behind the United States and the People’s Republic in fast-growing, innovative industries, not least artificial intelligence — in part because European R&amp;D spending is half that of  its Chinese and American rivals. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The upshot, then, is that the lack of pan-European champion firms that can invent and invest in new technology, dominate the European market, and make inroads abroad, is the fundamental cause of Europe’s lack of competitiveness with the United States and China — not the costs of the European welfare state, or higher labor union density, or export surpluses, or high energy costs, or other factors that are often cited.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Some degree of relative decline by Europe is unavoidable. The economic development of China and other parts of the world naturally is causing both the American and European shares of global GDP to shrink. While shares of world GDP are important for military power, in the long run, progress in an advanced society depends not on overall output, which can be boosted merely by population growth, but on productivity growth — making goods and providing services with less labor and other material inputs over time, thanks to technological innovation. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">That’s why Europeans should be concerned by the fact that, between the outset of the pandemic in late 2019 and 2024, labor productivity per hour grew by only 0.9% in the eurozone (in the United States, by contrast, it grew nearly 7%).</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Since the Industrial Revolution, labor productivity has mostly been driven by technological innovation. Today’s libertarians, trust-busters, and populists don’t want to hear it, but </span><span style="font-weight: 400;">modern technological progress isn’t incremental and driven by constant competition for customers among many similar firms. Rather, it is transformational and driven by radical technological breakthroughs whose development and deployment must be paid for by the deep pockets of giant firms, along with governments and huge pools of venture capital.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Laptops didn’t evolve incrementally as a result of free-market competition among manual typewriters; they drew on new technologies, originally developed by the US government and big firms like IBM, rendering typewriters obsolete. </span></p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/02/the-lie-of-the-white-collar-job/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/02/the-lie-of-the-white-collar-job/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/GettyImages-72096250-1.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/02/the-lie-of-the-white-collar-job/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/02/the-lie-of-the-white-collar-job/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The lie of the white-collar job</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/02/the-lie-of-the-white-collar-job/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Michael LInd</a></p></div></a></div>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The economist Joseph Schumpeter coined the term “creative destruction” to mean the replacement of entire products and entire industries by technological innovation, which he described as a </span><span style="font-weight: 400;">“process of industrial mutation that incessantly revolutionizes the economic structure from within, incessantly destroying the old one, incessantly creating a new one.” In the words of Schumpeter: </span><span style="font-weight: 400;">“</span><span style="font-weight: 400;">The capitalist achievement does not typically consist in providing more silk stockings for queens, but in bringing them within reach of factory girls.”</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Nylon stockings for women were made possible by corporate chemistry labs and mass-production factories — Big Chemistry and Big Factory, to use the pejorative language of today’s antitrusters — not by competition among small businesses. Contra Hollywood and business-school mythology, </span><span style="font-weight: 400;">the next big breakthrough technology isn’t going to come from a college dropout in his parents’ garage or an eccentric solitary inventor with Einstein hair.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">When laptops wiped out typewriters, and nylon stockings replaced cotton and wool stockings, they wiped out a lot of jobs. That’s OK. A dynamic technological economy doesn’t have to be anti-worker. On the contrary, high wages give employers an incentive to substitute technology for labor. But it must be easy to close down failing businesses and shrink obsolescent industries, while transferring workers as painlessly as possible to dynamic firms and growing sectors. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Economists call this “labor-market churn.” According to the</span> <a href="https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/notes/feds-notes/why-is-the-u-s-gdp-recovering-faster-than-other-advanced-economies-20240517.html"><span style="font-weight: 400;">US Federal Reserve</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">, </span><span style="font-weight: 400;">during the recession that came in the wake of Covid, three times as many American as European workers changed jobs, even though the workforces of the United States and the European Union are comparable in size.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">While the European social model has much to teach America in terms of social insurance and sectoral collective bargaining, all too often, the attempt to preserve specific jobs means preserving specific companies and specific industries, as well, and this reactionary preservationism comes at a price in an era of transition from one techno-economic paradigm to another.</span></p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">“Reactionary preservationism comes at a price in an era of transition from one techno-economic paradigm to another.”</div>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The reason is simple. There are two ways that technological innovation can spread throughout the economy. One is the brutal Darwinian method — the early adopters of innovation wipe out their less-innovative rivals and replace them. A gentler alternative to mass extinction is for government to diffuse technological innovations to small businesses, which, unlike big firms with deep pockets or promising startups with rich backers, lack the ability to invest in R&amp;D and new machinery or software.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">As a guest of the French government some years ago, I met with local officials seeking to create their version of Silicon Valley. Using a 1960s-vintage overhead projector, they showed me a diagram of links and partnership among a dozen local firms and educational institutions and asked what I thought of their plan. I explained: “In the United States, we are much more Darwinian. A few successful firms drive the others out of business and absorb their workers and assets.” An official smiled ruefully and said, “In France, no institution can ever be allowed to die.”</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">It is true that there have been successful examples of this kinder and gentler, non-Darwinian approach to the diffusion of new technologies. In America, land-grant universities helped modernize American agriculture by diffusing scientific and engineering breakthroughs to existing family farmers with the help of county extension agents. In Germany, the Frauenhofer Institute offers R&amp;D and technological instruction to small and medium enterprises that otherwise might not be able to afford them.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">As a practical matter, however, the Darwinian, winner-take-all method is the quickest and most efficient way to bring about a technological upgrade of an economy. The permissive attitude toward firm destruction in the United States has allowed firms with new internet-based models — Amazon (retail), Office Depot (hardware), Lowe’s (home supplies) — to annihilate many of their struggling and technologically primitive Mom-and-Pop store rivals. And America’s permissive approach to mergers and acquisitions allows startups to grow by incorporating other companies and likewise permits entrepreneurs to sell innovations to existing big firms that can provide scale.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The Darwinian method of technological development and diffusion by individual firms only works if the baby tyrannosaur, after hatching, can grow to great size. The most technologically advanced sectors of the economy, like manufacturing and software and telecommunications, are characterized by increasing returns to scale or network effects that reward sheer size. In these sectors, free-market competition will quickly result in the elimination of many firms and the domination of an industry by one or a few winners — not because the winners are cheating monopolists, but because they benefited as lucky first movers from the ability to scale up rapidly.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The ability of dynamic firms to scale depends not only on permissive competition laws that allow some firms to die and others to grow or merge, but also on the size of the market, both at home and abroad. Populous countries, including China and the United States, tend to dominate the Olympic games and other international sports competitions. Darwinism again! The best soccer players from Brazil (213 million people) tend to be better than the best soccer players from Suriname (population 645,000). </span></p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">“Within Europe, there is growing recognition that scale matters in productivity growth and global commerce.”</div>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">As with athletes, so with corporations. Companies from Japan and Germany do well in global trade in part because Japan and Germany are the two most populous democratic capitalist industrial nations, after the United States. And</span> <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/cache/digpub/european_economy/bloc-3b.html?lang=en"><span style="font-weight: 400;">as a rule in Europe</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">, the wealthier nations have the largest shares of their workforces employed by large and medium firms, like Sweden, France, and Germany, while the countries with the highest employment by small businesses tend to be poorer (Greece, Italy).</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">China’s national champions are supported by the state in various ways intended to minimize the Middle Kingdom’s reliance on foreign technology and foreign firms. They include Huawei in telecom, Xiaomi in consumer electronics, and the Aviation Industry Corporation of China. Both Europe and the United States have imposed tariffs to protect their own automobile companies from China’s state-sponsored electric-vehicle champion, BYD.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Having lost global market dominance to China in many manufacturing industries, the United States holds its own in IT thanks to American champions like Microsoft, Apple, Alphabet, Meta, and IBM. In the AI race with China, the American team is led by giant firms including Nvidia, Anthropic, and OpenAI.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">What about Europe? Apart from Airbus, there is no pan-European techno-industrial giant comparable with these Chinese and American titans. To be sure, there are national champions based in individual European nations: France’s Dassault Rafale in defense, Germany’s BMW and Volkswagen in auto. As</span><a href="https://worksinprogress.co/issue/how-airbus-took-off/#:~:text=Europe%20is%20a%20graveyard%20of,operated%20in%20a%20unique%20industry"> <span style="font-weight: 400;">one observer notes</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">, “Europe is a graveyard of failed [pan-European] national champions. They span from the glamorous Concorde to obscure ventures like pan-European computer consortium Unidata or notorious Franco-German search engine Quaero” (googling became a verb; no one remembers Quaero).</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Attempts to create purely national, rather than pan-European, champions have often failed, as well. After World War II, the British government sought, by means of mergers and industrial policy, to consolidate inefficient industries and create colossal British national champions that could compete with the big American firms: British Steel (steel), British Leyland (auto), International Computers Limited (IT). The execution was a failure, but the strategy was sound, as we can see from the success of immense Chinese and American firms.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Unfortunately, European “competition policy” — what in the United States is called antitrust — is a major obstacle to the scaling up of European firms that can boost productivity and compete with those of China and the United States at the global level. In 2019, the European commission refused to allow a merger between the two biggest train-signaling and railcar systems companies, Germany’s Siemens and France’s Alstom, even though the new corporation might have dominated markets outside of Europe as well as within. </span></p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/04/the-pope-versus-the-president/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/04/the-pope-versus-the-president/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/image-10-1.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/04/the-pope-versus-the-president/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/04/the-pope-versus-the-president/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The Pope versus the President</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/04/the-pope-versus-the-president/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Sohrab Ahmari</a></p></div></a></div>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Unable or unwilling to understand the industrial economics of imperfect markets and economies of scale, European competition-policy advocates (along with American progressive and populist antitrusters) cling to pre-industrial free-market dogma.</span> <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/europe-needs-competition-not-national-champions/#:~:text=In%20recent%20years%2C%20European%20leaders,But%20not%20everyone%20agreed"><span style="font-weight: 400;">According to Margrethe Vestager</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">, a former EU competition policy officer, “competitiveness within a single market translates into external competitiveness.” On the contrary, as China’s and America’s national champions demonstrate, dominance of a single market translates into competitiveness in global markets, and that kind of dominance can never be obtained if a national or bloc government insists on mechanically breaking up successful companies or preventing mergers in order to keep companies small. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Within Europe, there is growing recognition that scale matters in productivity growth and global commerce. French President Emmanuel Macron has proposed that companies be allowed to increase their scale by consolidation, and the lowering of barriers to a single truly integrated European market in strategic sectors. In Germany in 2019, at the time of the EC anti-merger ruling,</span> <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/peter-altmaier-railbus-germany-promotes-champions-as-eu-moves-to-kill-railbus/"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Economy Minister Peter Altmaier</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> proposed an industrial policy involving the creation of European national champions.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">From a technocratic point of view, creating a genuine European single market in which pan-European national champions can be born and grow to compete with Chinese and American titans in global markets makes sense. Is it politically realistic? It will be difficult.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Viktor Orbán may have lost his bid for re-election, and Trump may have alienated his European allies on the Right, but “national sovereigntism” will remain a major force in European countries.  The attempt to create a single European market in labor, in which Albanians and Poles willing to work for lower wages could move to Britain, backfired and motivated Brexit. And while pseudo-populists may campaign as nationalists and then govern as pro-business transnational neoliberals, nationalism is likely to ensure that the project of creating genuine “single markets” in European labor, services, banking, and energy is doomed.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">But a compromise between a single European superstate and a nationalist Tower of Babel might be found in the idea of a “multi-speed Europe” in which some member nations can agree to greater integration in certain sectors without requiring others to join them.  Already membership in the Eurozone currency bloc and the Schengen Agreement governing border checkpoints are examples of differential integration. If a few of the larger European countries like Germany and France agree to support European champions in particular strategic industrial sectors, it should not be necessary to give Malta, Luxembourg, and Cyprus a veto. The inspirational success of Airbus should negate the paralyzing memory of failures like the Concorde.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">To call a company or an industry a “dinosaur” is usually to dismiss it as doomed to extinction. But in today’s global Jurassic Park, to avoid extinction, Europe needs some young, vigorous dinosaurs of its own.</p>
<p><strong>Correction: </strong>An earlier version of this essay misstated the population of Suriname.<br />
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					<title>Is it too late to reindustrialize?</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2026/04/is-it-too-late-to-reindustrialise/?edition=us</link>
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										<unherd:main_theme>Sovereignty</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Rian Chad Whitton]]>
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																<unherd:article_ranking>2</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[Steelworkers have become a rarity in the British economy. (Ina Fassbender/AFP via Getty Images)]]>
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							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Rian Chad Whitton</strong> is an analyst at Bismarck Analysis. He specialises in automation, energy, and industrial policy. His personal writings can be found on his newsletter <a href="https://riancwhitton.substack.com/">Doctor Syn</a>.</p>
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						<![CDATA[ is an analyst at Bismarck Analysis. He specialises in automation, energy, and industrial policy. His personal writings can be found on his newsletter <a href="https://riancwhitton.substack.com/">Doctor Syn</a>.]]>
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										<pubDate>Wed, 08 Apr 2026 23:02:12 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Thu, 09 Apr 2026 06:59:57 +0000</updated>
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		<category><![CDATA[British Steel]]></category>
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								<![CDATA[Britain faces painful tradeoffs]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>At a sprawling Texan-owned oil refinery overlooking Milford Haven, an estuary town in Pembrokeshire, crude oil from America and Norway is distilled inside 200-foot steel towers. The oil is heated to 400℃. Hydrocarbons with low boiling points, like gasoline and kerosene, rise to the top of the column, while heavier chemicals like asphalt remain at the bottom. Out of the towers come the fuels that power cars, trucks, shipping, aircraft, and much of the chemical industry, not to mention almost all military vehicles. Britain was formerly home to over a dozen refineries. Yet the Milford Haven site is now one of just four refineries left in Britain, with two closing in 2025 alone, one in Scotland and another in Lincolnshire. Similar scars are borne by many towns and cities across the country. Just recently, we’ve lost production of salt in <a href="https://news.sky.com/story/why-ending-the-manufacture-of-a-humdrum-substance-would-be-final-nail-in-the-coffin-of-an-industry-that-was-once-britains-pride-13494625">Runcorn</a>, synthetic textiles in <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cp80l716yzyo">Brockworth</a>, steel in <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cy0818y4jdlo">Rotherham</a>, bearings in <a href="https://www.nsk.com/company/news/2026/notice-regarding-proposed-withdrawal-of-production-en/">Newark-on-Trent</a> and ceramics in <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/business/2026/mar/31/denby-pottery-call-in-administrators">Denby</a>. British Steel in Scunthorpe <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/business/2026/mar/30/british-steel-on-track-to-be-fully-nationalised-within-weeks">limps on</a>, if only with government support.</p>
<p>It has been a steep decline. At the turn of the millennium, Britain possessed the fourth-largest industrial economy in the world. More than 800,000 people worked in foundational sectors: oil and gas extraction, refining, metals, chemicals, and inorganics. Contrary to popular belief, Britain’s energy-intensive production did not peak in the Seventies — but in 2002, supported by relatively cheap energy and booming global demand.</p>
<p>Then, between 2006 and 2008, Britain’s output and productivity began to fall. Globally, heavy industry shifted decisively toward China, hollowing out Western industrial employment. Britain, like its peers, lost jobs — but suffered more acutely. Heavy industry employment has halved from over 800,000 workers in the early 2000s to just over 400,000 today. Since 2008, Britain’s steel sector has nearly collapsed multiple times; the ammonia industry has died out; salt production has ended and aluminum production has rapidly declined. Production of cement and glass is down, while imports of the same materials are up. Those jobs were lost during a time of perceived economic and political stability, where countries would specialise and become ever more integrated. But due to tariffs, wars, pandemics and a general sense of insecurity, talk of reindustrialisation, once dismissed as pangs of nostalgia, is becoming de rigueur in Westminster. Robert Jenrick, who stands a good chance of being the next chancellor, has <a href="https://policymogul.com/key-updates/52820/robert-jenrick-reform-will-be-careful-with-your-money-speech-in-full">argued</a> for “creating the conditions for Britain to reindustrialise, restore our proud industrial heritage and create good jobs for British workers once again.”</p>
<p>For different parties, “reindustrialisation” means different things. Ed Miliband envisages a “green industrial revolution” where Britain’s reindustrialisation is directly tied to his ambitious carbon reduction targets. For Nigel Farage, the term means cutting red tape and <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qJpK3TdBI-g">reopening the mines</a>.</p>
<p>If reindustrialisation has cross-party appeal, it is because it intuitively makes sense that being able to manufacture complex equipment makes a nation stronger, more productive and more prosperous. This intuition has been tempered by economists who argue for economic specialisation and enjoying the reduced cost of goods by offshoring manufacturing to cheaper locations. But recent global events — Covid’s effect on supply chains; the Ukraine war’s effect on energy prices; the Iran war’s effect on shipping — have made this view increasingly hard to defend. Deindustrialised Britain grows its economy anaemically, if at all. The same is true of its productivity. As a result, the country’s hard power has rapidly diminished.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/04/why-china-will-beat-the-west/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/04/why-china-will-beat-the-west/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/gettyimages-2011425280-594x594-1.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/04/why-china-will-beat-the-west/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/04/why-china-will-beat-the-west/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Why China will beat the West</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/04/why-china-will-beat-the-west/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Wessie du Toit</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Hence the cheerleading for reindustrialisation. This high-spirited rhetoric rarely acknowledges tradeoffs, but it ought to. This is because deindustrialisation was a price willingly paid for cheaper consumer goods from imports, increased welfare spending, periodic tax cuts, and progress towards meeting Britain’s environmental and emissions targets — or, at least, those targets that pertained to onshore activity rather than activity handed off to the developing world. Reindustrialisation, then, might require some of those dividends to be relinquished. Partly for that reason, none of the cheerleaders have yet made firm commitments for how much of our economy should be manufacturing, or what level of growth they would aim for. Currently, the concept of “reindustrialisation” is comparable in rigour to “soft power” and “clean energy superpower”.</p>
<p>Granted, the country has industrialised before. But the Britain of Pitt and Lord Liverpool, with its high wages, captive markets and cheap energy, was primed for such a transformation. Modern Britain, with its expensive energy, low levels of investment, and asymmetric openness to foreign goods, is certainly not. Reversing decades of insufficient investment and making Britain a major manufacturing power is going to be a mammoth task.</p>
<p>Some argue that it is a task not worth pursuing. The staple criticism has come from free-marketers like Daniel Hannan, who argues there is “<a href="https://conservativehome.com/2025/04/23/daniel-hannan-the-conservative-case-for-globalisation-in-six-simple-points/">nothing special about manufacturing</a>”, and that globalisation is good for the consumer and the economy. Prior to becoming an MP, Labour thinktanker Torsten Bell <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2022/jul/10/why-be-a-poor-version-of-germany-instead-of-doing-what-we-do-best">argued</a> that Britain should stay focused on being a world-leader in services. But the productivity statistics are on the side of the reindustrialists. Beyond the most rudimentary wood and textile craftsmanship, manufacturing is more productive per worker than average. Britain’s energy-intensive and resource-extractive industries employed 1% of the workforce, but accounted for nearly 3% of gross value added (GVA), an important metric of economic value. The average heavy industry employee contributes  77% more in GVA than the average worker.As for the <a href="https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-7682/CBP-7682.pdf">advanced manufacturing</a> sector — defined in the Government’s 2025 industrial policy as chemicals, transport, aerospace, machinery, and electrical equipment — it accounts for just 2% of jobs (721,000) but 6% of GVA (£80 billion). For context, London’s creative sector, the most culturally prestigious sector in the country, encompassing computer programming, video game development, film and TV production, generates just <a href="https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/grossvalueaddedgva">£64 billion with 730,000 workers.</a></p>
<p>If we accept that some level of reindustrialisation is desirable for economic and extra-economic reasons, how do we achieve it? First, we must understand why British manufacturing is in the doldrums. For many, the blame lies with Thatcher’s reforms. For others, it is the mismanaged mergers of the Sixties and Seventies.</p>
<p>I would argue that the real evidence of industrial decline, the kind that is most relevant today, occurred much later. Britain’s industrial malaise is not simply the delayed aftermath of the Eighties, nor an inevitable by-product of a modern service economy. It stems from three big problems arising over the last 30 years: high energy prices, underinvestment in capital equipment, and the uneven nature of global trade, where some countries are far more open to imports than others.</p>
<p>While the Thatcherite consensus had allowed for industrial growth, it was growth that was incredibly uneven. Pharmaceuticals, automobiles and aerospace prospered, but increasingly under the ownership of foreign investors. Heavy industry, like chemicals, metals and the machining of components, was offshored as a result of generating lower marginal returns. This partial atrophication made manufacturing in general much more dependent on imports. It also made it harder to scale up new industries. As a result, there have been almost no new British industrial giants formed in the 21st century. Successful new corporations like Ineos and Astrazeneca were formed from the scraps of previous giants like Imperial Chemical Industries.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;There have been almost no new British industrial giants formed in the 21st century&#8221;</div>
<p>The strength of the pound, and lenders&#8217; demands for ever-higher margins in shorter timeframes, certainly did not help. Studies <a href="https://hbr.org/2015/06/robots-seem-to-be-improving-productivity-not-costing-jobs?utm_source=chatgpt.com">have shown</a> that the UK during this period saw a uniquely significant contraction in jobs and a uniquely low investment in automation. We were coasting on the momentum of the 20th century.</p>
<p>That momentum is rapidly dissipating. Glass factories, refineries, and ethylene plants are closing. North Sea oil and gas production began declining in 2004, and the need for substantial investments in the electricity grid, which had been deferred for decades, drove up energy costs rapidly from 2005 onwards. These increases were compounded by the expansion of levies to support intermittent renewables.</p>
<p>Arguably as important as energy prices is the decline of the capital stock in manufacturing. This is a term that refers, essentially, to the total value of all the machinery, equipment and infrastructure accumulated to power Britain’s industrial base. The country is well below its peers in the purchase of industrial machinery. Some commentators have blamed the relative lack of industrial investment on the financial sector and private equity, both of which, it is argued, are overly focused on short-term returns. The decline of capital stock can also be seen as a supply-side problem: in other words, it is too hard to build and do business in Britain. For that reason, companies are unwilling to make large, capital-intensive bets on future manufacturing orders.</p>
<p>On that front — the supply side — policymakers could at least have worked toward making energy cheaper and capital expenditure more appealing. But a third great force has been hurting British manufacturing: the overcapacity of global manufacturing, exacerbated by uneven trade practices which benefit producers in some countries over others. Overall, global growth in manufacturing has slowed in the 21st century. But, some countries, most notably China but also Thailand, Vietnam and Taiwan, have, in mercantilist fashion, prioritised market share over profit margins. This has led to massive overcapacity, which has deflated global prices for consumers but also pushed out Western producers.</p>
<p>British firms have weathered this harsh environment stoically, increasing worker productivity and keeping overall value roughly stable in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis. But the consequence of this efficiency has been a degradation of overall capacity and the ability to compete in new markets. Being a major manufacturer of electric vehicles is a non-sequitur: Britain has little capacity to refine the chemicals that make lithium-ion batteries. Given that our government has decided to ban petrol vehicles in the near future, this means we could conceivably lose most of our car industry within a decade.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/03/rolls-royce-is-soaring-britain-is-indifferent/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/03/rolls-royce-is-soaring-britain-is-indifferent/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/gettyimages-619875760-594x594-1.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/03/rolls-royce-is-soaring-britain-is-indifferent/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/03/rolls-royce-is-soaring-britain-is-indifferent/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Rolls-Royce is an engine of prosperity</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/03/rolls-royce-is-soaring-britain-is-indifferent/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Aled Maclean-Jones</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>With other Western countries increasingly adopting a dirigiste stance toward protecting their own industries, British companies are being lured elsewhere. The German government, in a new spirit of fiscal profligacy, has actively courted major manufacturers, attempting to lure British Rolls-Royce with the implicit promise of subsidies. The company has urged the UK to subsidise its engine production, arguing it will otherwise be forced to move abroad.</p>
<p>Whether the Government will give in to Rolls remains to be seen. No. 10 is already grappling with steel production, which has become the most visible industrial challenge. In 2024, Britain produced four million tonnes of steel, down 33% from 2023. This was less than Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands, Australia, and Saudi Arabia — and only twice the output of Luxembourg. This might be seen as the fag-end of a long decline, but up until relatively recently, steel production was viable. It is worth noting that in Wales, which has been particularly hit in recent years, steel production peaked as late as 1997.</p>
<p>The Government’s recently published steel strategy will protect the industry through subsidies and tariffs. It sets a target to use domestic steel for 50% of consumption, up from 30% today. It also tightens the quota for excess imports and increases tariffs on those imports. Through the National Wealth Fund, the Government will provide £2.5 billion in funding to upgrade steel plants. The Government has also confirmed it will be a major buyer of steel for public procurement needs. This is a fairly meaty support package, and necessary to keep a steel industry here, but it leaves out the penalty of expensive energy. For as long as Britain’s industrial energy is among the most expensive in the world, the steel sector — which is highly energy-intensive — will suffer.</p>
<p>British industrial decline, then, is most visible in energy-intensive industry, but the decay is just as pronounced in the secondary stage of production: fabrication. Once manufacturing material has been produced in its primary form, it must be fabricated into products. This includes casting, forging and machining of components through the use of machine tools. Here, the importance of energy costs begins to give way to a lack of capital.</p>
<p>As an example of the fabrication stage, some components have to be forged using enormous hydraulic presses. A handful of facilities worldwide can produce 500-tonne steel ingots, required for nuclear reactor pressure vessels. Britain — through the Ministry of Defence’s ownership of Sheffield Forgemasters — remains one of only five such locations on Earth where such ingots can be forged.</p>
<figure id="attachment_1055574" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-1055574" style="width: 1024px" class="wp-caption aligncenter"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="wp-image-1055574 size-full" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/GettyImages-83813013.jpg" alt="" width="1024" height="777" srcset="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/GettyImages-83813013.jpg 1024w, https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/GettyImages-83813013.jpg?resize=300,228 300w, https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/GettyImages-83813013.jpg?resize=768,583 768w, https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/GettyImages-83813013.jpg?resize=267,203 267w, https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/GettyImages-83813013.jpg?resize=253,192 253w, https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/GettyImages-83813013.jpg?resize=250,190 250w, https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/GettyImages-83813013.jpg?resize=660,501 660w, https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/GettyImages-83813013.jpg?resize=480,364 480w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" /><figcaption id="caption-attachment-1055574" class="wp-caption-text">Prince Charles, as he was then, visits Sheffield Forgemasters in 2008. (Pool/Anwar Hussein Collection/WireImage)</figcaption></figure>
<p>While Forgemasters is a large operation, the majority of machining in Britain is done by thousands of small machine shops, which rely on repeat orders from longstanding clients. When Jaguar Land Rover (JLR) suffered a cyberattack, the existential threat was felt not only by JLR but also by suppliers such as Genex UK, which derives up to 70% of its business from JLR contracts.</p>
<p>This hidden economy is built around thousands of machine tools: a catch-all term for machines that cut and form components that are then assembled into products. Britain was once a major producer of such equipment. Today, most tools are imported from Germany, Japan, Korea, and increasingly, China. Despite having a similar industrial base, Britain consumes less than half as many machine tools as France.</p>
<p>The problem is stagnant demand and poor access to capital. Consolidation sounds appealing, but it is structurally complex. Most machine shops fabricate a low volume of highly variable components on thin margins. Yet their economic impact is disproportionate to their size. While a component may represent a tiny fraction of a nuclear plant’s cost, the ability to procure it quickly and locally could dramatically reduce project timelines and capital costs. There is <a href="https://www.nathanielbullard.com/presentations">circumstantial evidence</a> from Korea and China that nuclear plant costs dramatically fall in line with higher domestic content.</p>
<p>These machine shops are the ligaments of Britain’s industrial body: small, numerous, and under severe strain. Start-ups like Ealing-based Isembard, which franchises software across machine shops, offer a glimpse of renewal.</p>
<p>To what extent could that renewal be made national? There are no obvious examples of major countries that industrialised rapidly, deindustrialised and subsequently reindustrialised. Rather than envisioning a second British Empire, an incoming government could credibly commit to make manufacturing 10% of GVA by the end of its first term, and 12-14% thereafter. This would represent a 25-50% expansion from today’s 8% figure, restoring Britain to its early-2000s position — not some imagined golden age. This would mean a larger industrial base, higher productivity, and greater capacity to complete significant infrastructure projects and defence orders quickly.</p>
<p>The price of this improved capacity: more costs for consumers for intermediate and finished manufactured goods, since industry is currently costlier here than abroad. Additionally, Britain will shed some jobs in the “creative” and “business services”, as an increase in domestic production will increase demand for labour, even with automation. While painful and politically difficult, these developments will be manageable and even desirable. While some increased consumer prices will make us poorer in the short term, this would be meaningfully offset by higher productivity jobs, higher wages, more exports and greater R&amp;D spending.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/06/the-net-zero-backlash/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/06/the-net-zero-backlash/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/GettyImages-2211058841.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/06/the-net-zero-backlash/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/06/the-net-zero-backlash/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The Net Zero backlash</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/06/the-net-zero-backlash/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Rian Chad Whitton</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>How can the Government get us there? Supply-side reform remains essential. Lower energy prices, reduced carbon levies, and R&amp;D tax credits can help, but would require the end of the Net Zero project as it is currently constituted. The <a href="http://t.co/slddFCfBGq">discretionary carbon taxes</a> that inflate the cost of gas, and therefore electricity, should be scaled back. Allowing for more exploration and drilling in the North Sea would have a limited impact on prices, but would improve our balance of trade and keep high-paying jobs in Scotland. More ambitious plans to frack in Northern England could have a much more significant impact on prices. In the short term, nuclear power development would be costly, but in the long term would provide firm power at acceptable prices.</p>
<p>But cheap energy alone is not sufficient. Despite lower electricity prices, France has only marginally outperformed Britain since 2008. The primary benefit will be that key heavy-industry sites will not require government bailouts. Nearly three times more R&amp;D tax relief is claimed by “office administrative and business support activities” than by machinery and equipment manufacturing. Much of this is thinly disguised tax arbitrage. Britain’s industrial R&amp;D intensity is about half the global average, while its financial sector is nineteen times more research-intensive than said average.</p>
<p>An eminently achievable policy would be to provide grants for industrial machinery. This should be a key focus: the country’s manufacturing sector has a lower capital stock of equipment now than in 1995. Rather than spend billions chasing speculative technologies or subsidy wars with the EU, US, and China, Britain would gain more by directly <a href="https://riancwhitton.substack.com/p/the-british-machine-tools-gap">financing capital equipment</a> purchases — modernising workshops across the country. A £1 billion annual grant (under 2% of the £60 billion spent annually on industrial policy) for machine tools would double British purchasing capacity overnight. Those free-marketeers suspicious of a return to Sixties-style grants could be buttered up through cuts to energy levies, dubious R&amp;D tax credits, and unmeritorious university funding.</p>
<p>But even with a government committed to reindustrialisation, trade imbalances make the task uphill. The rise of Chinese industrial power, now accounting for more than 30% of global manufacturing value, has depressed production in the West. While <a href="https://riancwhitton.substack.com/p/how-is-us-manufacturing-doing">Trump’s US</a> has been the most avowedly protectionist, the truth is <a href="https://cepr.org/voxeu/columns/dont-swap-tariffs-minimum-prices-chinese-electric-vehicles">Europe</a> and <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-india-trade-deal-car-industry-goal/">India</a> have joined the East Asians in using tariffs and subsidies to hold on to industry.</p>
<p>As the most open, least competitive industrial base in the developed world, British producers are the least well-placed to thrive in an environment where trade is fractured yet globalised. There are no solutions; only trade-offs. In my view, plenty should be sacrificed to make industry competitive again. The current government has accepted protectionism for steel. Though far from ideal, it is the least worst decision and bides us time to make Britain more competitive through reduced energy costs.</p>
<p>While a manufacturing boom would not be a panacea to all Britain’s maladies, it would improve our ability to meet those challenges. It would mean greater prosperity outside of London, a wider tax base and greater security. With greater wealth in the regions, it could allow for the reduction of welfare spending. The establishment of large, modern British manufacturers would give the nation a chance to compete across high-value sectors like drones and rocketry. This, in turn, would allow us to field a stronger armed forces without periodically raising our defence spending.</p>
<p>It is unlikely that the credit for such dividends would be monopolised by one statesman or government. In fact, those determined to make reindustrialisation happen will face significant opposition. A strong industrial base is rarely attributed to a singular individual, but to general good governance.</p>
<p>Reindustrialisation is anything but an easy win. Yet if politicians and civil servants continue to act like there are no hard choices, expect the stagnation of the 21st century to turn into absolute decline.</p>
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					<title>Will Nigeria steal Britain&#039;s crown?</title>
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										<unherd:main_theme>State Visit</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Remi Adekoya]]>
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																<unherd:article_ranking>3</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[A new world. (Chris Jackson/Pool/AFP/Getty)]]>
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							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Dr Remi Adekoya</strong> is a Polish-Nigerian writer and political scientist. His book Biracial Britain: A Different Way of Looking at Race, is <a href="https://www.amazon.co.uk/Biracial-Britain-Different-Looking-Race-ebook/dp/B0859VRHXS" target="_blank" rel="noopener">available now</a>.</p>
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						<unherd:twitter_handle>RemiAdekoya1</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is a Polish-Nigerian writer and political scientist. His book Biracial Britain: A Different Way of Looking at Race, is <a href="https://www.amazon.co.uk/Biracial-Britain-Different-Looking-Race-ebook/dp/B0859VRHXS" target="_blank" rel="noopener">available now</a>.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Thu, 19 Mar 2026 00:00:35 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Thu, 19 Mar 2026 00:00:35 +0000</updated>
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								<![CDATA[We need friends in an unstable world]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p dir="ltr">The last time Britain hosted Nigeria for a state visit, the world felt almost impossibly different. Just look at the pictures: Queen Elizabeth, a spry 63; Ibrahim Babangida, an old-school military hardman who took power in a coup and clung on for nearly a decade. Yet more than the principals, it is the context of the last grand meeting between a British monarch and a Nigerian president that now feels so strange.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Back then, after all, the United Kingdom was a fairly prosperous, settled nation, and would soon be on the winning side of the Cold War. As for Nigeria? A dictatorship with some crude oil. Now, of course, everything has changed. As Elizabeth’s son welcomes Bola Tinubu today, it&#8217;s Nigeria, not Britain, that holds the best cards. Indeed the UK&#8217;s long-term prospects feel rather uncertain — precisely why courting Nigeria, and countries like it, is so important to its future.</p>
<p dir="ltr">For much of the post-Cold War period, Britain and its Western allies could sort the world into two broad zones: stable and unstable. In the stable countries, money was safe, governments were predictable and the future discernible enough for long-term bets. In the unstable places, governance was erratic, investment risky, and violence never far off. This mental mapping had real consequences, shaping where capital, attention and diplomatic respect all flowed.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Nigeria long sat on the wrong side of that divide. With Marxist-Leninism just about still a going concern, the anti-communist Babangida was an important friend to have, likely explaining the 1989 state visit. At the same time, though, Nigeria&#8217;s economy was taken far less seriously. Through the Eighties and Nineties, after all, the country lurched through coups, aborted transitions and IMF austerity schemes, while its politicians acquired a reputation for predation and volatility. As late as 2016, David Cameron was filmed <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-36260193" target="_blank" rel="noopener">describing</a> Nigeria as a “fantastically corrupt” country.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Over recent years, of course, our neat ideas of stability and corruption have started to collapse. A major war has raged on European soil for four years now, with the Baltics and Poland fearing for their very sovereignty. The Gulf, long an oasis of affluent calm, suddenly looks much less secure. America, hitherto the chief guarantor of Western stability, is now a country whose Capitol can be stormed by an angry mob, and whose president can levy tariffs or launch foreign adventures overnight. As for Britain, one-in-three Britons <a href="https://yougov.com/en-gb/daily-results/20240806-a113b-1" target="_blank" rel="noopener">now believe</a> civil war could occur here in the next decade.</p>
<p dir="ltr">This does not mean that Britain or America are “just like” Nigeria. But it does mean that disorder, or at least the serious prospect of it, is no longer something that simply happens over there. That in turn changes the relative position of countries like Nigeria. Their problems hardly vanish, but they no longer look like uniquely disqualifying flaws in an otherwise ordered world. Now, Britain’s Business and Trade Secretary Peter Kyle <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/news/hundreds-of-new-uk-jobs-as-nigerian-companies-confirm-millions-in-investment" target="_blank" rel="noopener">says</a> that “the UK and Nigeria share a belief in the power of enterprise, innovation and education” — with a new strategic partnership between the two countries promising a flourishing of finance and fintech jobs.</p>
<p dir="ltr">To be clear, Nigeria still remains a difficult, exasperating country, whose promise has long been squandered by its own elites. Tinubu himself is hardly the personification of clean government, with allegations of corruption trailing him throughout his <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-61732548" target="_blank" rel="noopener">career</a>. In this, Nigeria’s president shares much with the country’s broad political class. For instance, a court in London is currently hearing bribery charges against Diezani Alison-Madueke, Nigeria’s former petroleum minister, who supposedly <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/ckglpd167n9o" target="_blank" rel="noopener">spent</a> £2 million at Harrods gotten from industry figures keen on government contracts.</p>
<p dir="ltr"><div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/02/the-threat-to-nigerias-political-elite/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/02/the-threat-to-nigerias-political-elite/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/3-2.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/02/the-threat-to-nigerias-political-elite/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/02/the-threat-to-nigerias-political-elite/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The threat to Nigeria&#039;s political elite</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/02/the-threat-to-nigerias-political-elite/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Remi Adekoya</a></p></div></a></div>
<p dir="ltr">Meanwhile, though wealthier now than they were in 1989, most Nigerians <a href="https://peoplesdispatch.org/2025/10/13/world-bank-acknowledges-poverty-increase-in-nigeria-but-doubles-down-on-the-reforms-causing-it/#:~:text=According%20to%20the%20World%20Bank%2C%20Nigeria's%20poverty,Strong%20external%20position%20*%20Gradually%20declining%20inflation" target="_blank" rel="noopener">remain</a> poor, even as the state struggles to deal with a plethora of jihadist terrorists and criminal gangs. Kidnapping for ransom is so rife that <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/e05d7c87-b2ae-494f-9c97-48771cc51c0a?syn-25a6b1a6=1" target="_blank" rel="noopener">it’s become</a> a multimillion dollar industry of its own. The country’s size and natural resources have often made outsiders assume its eventual success is somehow inevitable. It never was — and isn’t now.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Yet it’s also true that Tinubu’s government, in power since 2023, has done something previous Nigerian administrations long avoided: embarking on reforms that acknowledged the country’s economic model was bust. Oil rents, import dependence, the sheer hustle of its citizens — none of these make an advanced economy. The broad direction of Tinubu’s changes, including lifting fuel subsidies and generally liberalizing the economy, have won <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/imf-praises-nigerias-reforms-warns-poverty-still-high/a-72285052#:~:text=What%20did%20the%20IMF%20say,Edited%20by:%20Darko%20Janjevic" target="_blank" rel="noopener">praise</a> from the IMF and World Bank. This matters not because their approval is all that matters, but because many Nigerians agree that the old system was unsustainable. The year before they were removed, the fuel subsidies consumed a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/nigerias-nnpc-spent-10-billion-fuel-subsidy-2022-2023-01-20/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">quarter</a> of Nigeria’s budget.</p>
<p dir="ltr">What many Nigerians rightly <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2024/8/2/nigerians-are-tired-protesters-fed-up-with-bad-governance-soaring-costs" target="_blank" rel="noopener">complain</a> about is the brutal way in which Tinubu’s reforms were implemented. For instance, the sudden removal of fuel subsidies has drastically raised costs, with some basic staples now costing two or three times what they used to. That’s a big deal in a country where poor households <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/nigerias-economy-growing-high-food-prices-burden-world-bank-says-2025-10-08/#:~:text=The%20cost%20of%20a%20basic,Ohuocha%20Editing%20by%20Alexandra%20Hudson" target="_blank" rel="noopener">spend</a> up to 70% of their income on food. In other words, then, measures that look rational on an IMF spreadsheet can feel like punishment to regular citizens, especially if they’re already distrustful of their rulers. With 8-in-10 Nigerians expressing little to no <a href="https://africapolling.org/2025/07/08/api-releases-2025-social-cohesion-report/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">trust</a> in Tinubu’s government, he certainly has his work cut out for him.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Yet if Tinubu’s reforms succeed, Nigeria’s strategic position offers reasons to cheer. Aside from the country’s transition to democracy, the country’s GDP has also jumped eightfold since 1989, while its population has tripled to around 230 million, roughly 60% of whom are <a href="https://nigeria.unfpa.org/en/publications/united-nations-population-fund-country-programme-document-nigeria" target="_blank" rel="noopener">under</a> 25. This makes Nigeria one of the youngest nations in the world, in sharp contrast to the aging societies of Britain and the wider West. That youthfulness offers both opportunities and risks in a land where <a href="https://www.afrobarometer.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/AD998-Nigerian-youth-want-government-action-on-jobs-and-cost-of-living-Afrobarometer-16june25.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">some estimates</a> put youth unemployment at around 50%. Fail to create enough jobs and the government is in trouble.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Nonetheless, Nigeria’s youthfulness remains a strategic fact. And besides, it has other strengths Britain can only dream of. Alongside the crude oil reserves it’s long been famous for — especially helpful given events in the Middle East — Nigeria also enjoys significant <a href="https://www.sfa-oxford.com/lithox/critical-minerals-policy-legislation/all-countries/africa/nigeria/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">deposits</a> of lithium, beryllium, zinc and other metals critical to technology supply chains. Britain needs access to critical minerals to power its renewable, high-tech and defense industries, even as it <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-critical-minerals-strategy/vision-2035-critical-minerals-strategy#:~:text=critical%2Dminerals%2Dstrategy-,Ministerial%20foreword,disasters%2C%20war%20or%20geopolitical%20fallout.">actively seeks</a> to “full-proof” its supply chain over the years ahead.</p>
<p dir="ltr"><div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/09/we-need-to-talk-about-empire/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/09/we-need-to-talk-about-empire/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/GettyImages-613471398-scaled-e1663012566668-1024x553-1.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/09/we-need-to-talk-about-empire/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/09/we-need-to-talk-about-empire/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The truth about Elizabeth&#039;s empire</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/09/we-need-to-talk-about-empire/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Remi Adekoya</a></p></div></a></div>
<p dir="ltr">Britain has more basic reasons to cultivate economic ties with Africa’s most populous nation too. Since 2008, its <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.KD.ZG" target="_blank" rel="noopener">GDP per capita growth</a> has fallen to a sluggish 0.46% per year, hardly enough to cover the galloping rise in living costs. The country’s long-run economic story is hardly cheering either. In that context, a fast-growing market of over 200 million people looks less like a realpolitik ally — and more like an opportunity. Britain and Nigeria already do about £8 billion of <a href="https://punchng.com/uk-nigeria-trade-hits-unprecedented-7-9bn-high-commissioner/">trade</a> a year, and British ministers have spent the last two years pushing new agreements in legal services, finance, education and energy. And why not? This is precisely the kind of fast-growing, English-speaking market Britain cannot afford to dismiss.</p>
<p dir="ltr">The feeling is mutual. For decades, and despite being such a vast oil producer, Nigeria imported much of the refined petroleum it consumed: its own state-run refineries barely functioned. Now, though, Aliko Dangote, Nigeria and Africa’s richest man, has built one of the world’s largest oil refineries in Lagos, spearheading <a href="https://www.thisdaylive.com/2026/03/03/in-new-industrialisation-push-dangote-plans-investment-in-steel-power-generation-ports/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">investments</a> in steel as part of a broader industrialization push. These are the most serious recent attempts to drag Nigeria up the value chain, and Britain can prod things along with targeted investment.</p>
<p dir="ltr">All the while, Nigerian immigration to the UK, <a href="https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationandmigration/internationalmigration/bulletins/longterminternationalmigrationprovisional/yearendingdecember2023#:~:text=There%20were%20approximately%2062%2C000%20more,international%20students%20update:%20May%202024.&amp;text=YE:%20year%20ending.,Section%209:%20Strengths%20and%20limitations." target="_blank" rel="noopener">reckoned</a> to be around 300,000 over the last five years, means that the country’s cultural influence has blossomed too. Afrobeats stars now fill arenas and top music <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/09/06/africa/burna-boy-i-told-them-uk-album-chart-number-one-history-spc#:~:text=Epstein%20Files-,Burna%20Boy%20is%20'thrilled%20and%20humbled'%20after%20making%20UK%20chart,name%20is%20Damini%20Ebunoluwa%20Ogulu." target="_blank" rel="noopener">charts</a> the world over, while the Nigerian diaspora is helping shape British society from <a href="https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCGmnsW623G1r-Chmo5RB4Yw" target="_blank" rel="noopener">KSI</a> to Bukayo Saka — to Kemi Badenoch.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Altogether, then, it’s clear that Britain needs meaningful relationships in the rising global south, relationships based on more than postcolonial guilt, paternalism or nostalgia. In our increasingly dangerous geopolitical age, friendship is not ornamental. Rather, it shapes supply chains, diplomatic leverage and investment decisions. Britain can no longer simply announce its importance everywhere. It has to work out where history, language, and diaspora networks give it a real foothold, then build out from there.</p>
<p dir="ltr"><div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;Britain needs meaningful relationships in the rising global south&#8221;</div>
<p dir="ltr">Nigeria is one of those places. And while some on the fringes of British politics — both the radical Right and Left — are uncomfortable with that fact, Nigerians themselves seem far more relaxed. As a 2020 Ipsos survey of young Nigerians found, Britain’s people, government and institutions are the most <a href="https://www.ipsos.com/sites/default/files/ct/news/documents/2022-04/perceptions-of-the-uk-nigeria-may-2020-ipsos.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">trusted</a> among foreign nations. Tinubu’s office has described Nigeria and Britain as <a href="https://statehouse.gov.ng/president-tinubu-begins-historic-state-visit-to-the-united-kingdom-tomorrow/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">sharing</a> a “special bond”, while many wealthy Nigerians send their children to British universities, maintain homes here, and consider London a serious place to do business. Nigerians who live or spend most of their time in Nigeria itself have little time for the performative anti-colonial waxing some British-Nigerians indulge in here.</p>
<p dir="ltr">That, in turn, should prompt a change in British sensibility. A mature relationship with Nigeria cannot be conducted as though London still dispenses order while Nigeria merely receives it. The old imperial habit — part condescension, part nostalgia — is now not only unattractive but also impractical. If Nigerians are prepared to engage Britain as an equal, Britain will have to learn to reciprocate.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Whitehall is already learning these lessons in its dealings with countries like India, where capital, demography and strategic leverage increasingly matter more than inherited assumptions of rank. That is likely to become one of the century’s governing patterns: former imperial subjects, or once dismissed peripheries, gaining influence as Western states lose their monopoly on confidence. The sensible response is neither sentimentality nor resentment, but realism.</p>
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					<title>Trump&#039;s betrayal of his base</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2026/03/trumps-betrayal-of-his-base/?edition=us</link>
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										<unherd:main_theme>MAGA</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Mary Harrington]]>
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																<unherd:article_ranking>2</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[Trump affects loyalty to the working class. But is it genuine? (Chip Somodevilla/Getty)]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Mary Harrington</strong> is a contributing editor at <em>UnHerd</em>.</p>
]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_handle>moveincircles</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is a contributing editor at <em>UnHerd</em>.]]>
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										<pubDate>Tue, 17 Mar 2026 00:02:23 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Tue, 17 Mar 2026 11:41:51 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Donald Trump]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[Immigration]]></category>
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								<![CDATA[The New Right revolution has stalled]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">In the bleak final chapter of Orwell’s </span><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">Animal Farm</span></i><span style="font-weight: 400;">,</span> <span style="font-weight: 400;">the animals look through the farmhouse window, and can no longer distinguish the pigs from the humans they originally overthrew. Somehow, by degrees, the pigs have found themselves reproducing the very conditions that prompted their uprising in the first place. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">By now, some of the Right-wing radicals in Trump’s MAGA coalition must be likewise wondering what it was all for. Trump was going to end foreign military adventures, and clamp down on low-wage and illegal immigration. But now America appears to be two weeks into a war of choice in the Middle East, and has just announced </span><a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2026/03/15/us/politics/farm-labor-trump-migrant-workers-h2a.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">plans</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> to ease restrictions on the H2A visa, which allows American farms to hire foreign seasonal workers. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">How did we end up here again? The whole point of Trump, to his base, was supposed to be ending forever wars and clamping down on immigration. And in fairness, Trump really has reduced American expenditure in Ukraine, and has been more effective than his predecessor on some aspects of migration. Notably, Trump has reduced crossings at America’s southern border by an order of magnitude. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">But his administration’s attempts to find, detain, and deport those already in the US have been more of a mixed bag. The White House </span><a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/articles/2025/11/promises-made-promises-kept-one-year-later/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">boasts</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> of over 600,000 deported and a further 1.9 million “self-deporting”, claiming negative net migration to the USA in 2025 for the first time in 50 years. But other policies have been less effective — or had more impact in the media than on actual numbers. Notably, high-profile standoffs between ICE officials, migrants, and protesters across progressive strongholds such as Minneapolis and Los Angeles have been received with distaste everywhere except inside the Right-wing filter bubble, especially after the deaths of Renée Good and Alex Pretti. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">This combative approach arguably did more to catalyze domestic opposition to immigration enforcement than to deport migrants. Critics have </span><a href="https://eu.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2025/06/19/obama-trump-deportation-numbers/84257245007/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">pointed out</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> that Barack Obama managed to do more actual deporting over his presidency than Trump has to date, without all the “</span><a href="https://www.economist.com/united-states/2025/09/07/the-sinister-brilliance-of-donald-trumps-security-theatre" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">security theater</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">” and controversy. </span></p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/03/the-paradox-of-maga-populism/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/03/the-paradox-of-maga-populism/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/GettyImages-2194420492.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/03/the-paradox-of-maga-populism/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/03/the-paradox-of-maga-populism/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The paradox of MAGA populism</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/03/the-paradox-of-maga-populism/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Richard Bourke</a></p></div></a></div>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">But if the argument has focused on ICE, Trump’s real sticky wicket is low-wage labor. I’m just about old enough to remember when </span><a href="https://www.cato.org/blog/poor-defense-bernie-sanders" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">the Left considered immigration a workers’ rights issue</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">, and Left-wing old-timers such as Bernie Sanders can still sometimes be found </span><a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2025/mar/24/bernie-sanders-trump-biden-immigration" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">pointing out</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> that the biggest beneficiaries of mass migration are the corporations that use foreign labor to depress domestic wages. In this context, as Matt Stoller </span><a href="https://www.thebignewsletter.com/p/monopoly-round-up-what-the-ice-raids?" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">noted</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> recently, a leader whose goal really </span><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">was</span></i><span style="font-weight: 400;"> mass deportations might begin not with high-profile street raids, but by quietly targeting the corporations that employ illegal workers. And yet, under Trump there has been much hue and cry about criminals, and considerably less about raiding construction firms, warehouses, or farms. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Against this mixed report card, recent changes to seasonal worker visa rules have been received with outrage by Trump’s migration-restrictionist base. And no wonder: last year, Trump officials </span><a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2025/07/08/politics/agriculture-secretary-medicaid-no-amnesty" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">promised</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> a “100% American” workforce enjoying “</span><a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/11/11/us/politics/trump-2025-immigration-agenda.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">higher wages and better benefits</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">”, and a deportation programme with “</span><a href="https://x.com/ReallyAmerican1/status/1942978705283834345?s=20" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">no amnesty</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">” for farmworkers. So why is he reneging on this now? </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">It’s perhaps fairer to see this policy as evidence not of betrayal but of a wicked problem — one that is, in truth, faced by most Western economies. The technical term for the dilemma is “</span><a href="https://www.ebsco.com/research-starters/economics/baumols-cost-disease"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Baumol’s cost disease</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">”, which describes the way productivity doesn’t increase at the same pace, in every sector. This causes problems over time, as even low-productivity sectors still have to raise wages, unless they want all their workers to leave. This means that wages in sectors where work can’t easily be automated either become increasingly unaffordable, or else the sector itself becomes bizarrely costly. </span></p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;What is a farmer to do when national average wages have risen to the point where it costs more to pay strawberry-pickers than you can earn selling the strawberries?&#8221;</div>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Classic examples are healthcare, childcare, and education. The high-touch human component in such work can’t easily be automated, and because of this has become increasingly cost-pressured and expensive over time. But the same dynamic also applies to some aspects of food production, especially where a task is routine but also requires delicacy and human judgment. Across agriculture in general, innovation has rendered many kinds of work much more efficient; but while you can do this with plowing or crop irrigation, it’s much more difficult to do the same thing to (say) harvesting strawberries. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Here, Baumol’s cost disease is rampant. So what is a farmer to do when national average wages have risen to the point where it costs more to pay strawberry-pickers than you can earn selling the strawberries? The answer, latterly, has increasingly been migrant workers from countries with lower wage expectations. </span><a href="https://www.essex.ac.uk/news/2024/10/10/strawberry-picking-robot-to-speed-up-harvest-and-tackle-labour-crisis" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Fruit-picking robots do exist</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">, but not every farmer has a spare £150,000. And in any case that pays a lot of wages — especially where these are low-wage foreign seasonal workers, or illegal migrants willing to work cash in hand for a pittance. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Already last year, as Trump’s border reforms began to bite, American Big Ag was warning last year that </span><a href="https://www.rawstory.com/trump-farmers-2672410822/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Americans would not be willing to do this work</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">. This is sometimes treated as excuse-making, or expressing contempt for native populations. But a more neutral explanation is that farmers can only afford to pay wages at a level well below what would be necessary for subsistence in modern America. And as they’re not offering this, Americans don’t want the work. This is Baumol’s cost disease in a nutshell. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The only way to change this would be to increase farmworkers’ wages sharply, which would in turn either mean farms went bankrupt or the price of food would have to go up. Perhaps unwisely, last year the </span><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">New York Times</span></i><span style="font-weight: 400;"> tackled this dilemma by </span><a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/12/11/opinion/trump-tariffs-immigration-inflation.html#:~:text=Opinion%20%7C%20Trump's%20Tariff%20and%20Immigration,Guacamole%20%2D%20The%20New%20York%20Times" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">warning</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> that Trump’s border policies would end up by forcing up the price of avocados, prompting much </span><a href="https://x.com/jollyairplane/status/1867385380728614933?s=20" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">derision</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> about coastal libs and their luxury problems. But the core of the argument stands even for those who don’t care for guacamole; after all, pushing up the cost of farm labor and thus of farm produce, doesn’t just affect avocados. It affects the whole grocery basket, for everyone. And while it’s possible to get by without eating avocados, it’s not possible to get by without eating. And along with ending forever wars and lowering immigration, the third leg in Trump’s electoral stool was tackling the cost of living. This is not compatible with doubling the cost of a weekly grocery shop by tossing a bomb into the economics of farming. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">This is all now further complicated by Trump’s war in Iran. Trump </span><a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2026/02/25/takeaways-trump-state-of-the-union-2026.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">insists</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> — or at least, insisted in February — that inflation is falling. His media opponents </span><a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2026/02/26/trump-beef-egg-chicken-food-prices.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">disagreed</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> even then; since the war in Iran began, oil prices have fluctuated so dizzyingly that many economists have given up trying to make predictions beyond </span><a href="https://www.ft.com/content/d4f1c4a8-ed5f-4f2a-8b70-436b93f9052b" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">a weary expectation</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> that the overall effect is likely to be inflation. </span></p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/02/jeffrey-epsteins-corrupt-overclass/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/02/jeffrey-epsteins-corrupt-overclass/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/Screenshot-2026-02-02-at-17.48.43.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/02/jeffrey-epsteins-corrupt-overclass/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/02/jeffrey-epsteins-corrupt-overclass/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Jeffrey Epstein&#039;s corrupt overclass</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/02/jeffrey-epsteins-corrupt-overclass/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Mary Harrington</a></p></div></a></div>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">As a major energy producer, the United States is somewhat insulated from these effects, at least by comparison with Europe. But gasoline and diesel prices have risen in the USA as well, with </span><a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/business/personal-finance/iran-war-tax-refunds-inflation-gas-rcna263337" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">knock-on effects throughout the economy</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">. We can assume that this will in turn push the cost of living in the wrong direction for ordinary Americans. And we can perhaps understand that Trump might be reluctant to pile further misery on his electorate by clamping down on the only relief available to the cost-diseased fruit picking sector — foreign seasonal workers — and thus spiking the cost of living still further. </span></p>
<p><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">Animal Farm </span></i><span style="font-weight: 400;">is usually read as a warning about the theory and practice of communist revolution. But perhaps Trump’s looming failure on all three legs of the MAGA electoral stool — wars, migration, and prices — points to a still bleaker reading about the futility of revolutions full stop. After all, even though prices and low-wage immigration seem linked by the wicked dilemma of Baumol’s cost disease, bombing Iran would seem, at least to an outsider, to be optional.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Indeed Trump campaigned on not taking this option. And yet here he is, again. Meanwhile the sheer variety of half-baked Trumpian rationales offered so far for the attack suggests he’s just decided to do it, and is throwing explanations at the electorate in the hope that one will stick. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">It is tempting to conclude either that he’s bonkers, or that a reason for the attack exists which is not available to the general public, and that perhaps wouldn’t be accepted if it was made known — but which, once you’re in the driving seat, is inescapable. This is the only possible explanation for the way presidency after presidency ends up in the same place, and the same conflicts, even after insisting they won’t. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Would it be fair to say, in the pigs’ defense, that the structural pressures of their role in the overall farm nudged them, by degrees, into patterns of behavior that increasingly resembled the humans they deposed? Is that an excuse, or just an explanation? Either way, it bodes ill for any putative future revolutionaries hoping to seize the machinery of some state or other, and point it in new directions — including every populist government-in-waiting currently aspiring to emulate Trump by reforming, restoring, advancing, or otherwise making their own country great again.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">For if such dilemmas exist, then even the most well-intentioned pig will, once he takes the role of the farmer, eventually become him. In this sense, the New Right’s revolutionaries have discovered, unhappily, that you can’t both promise lower food prices and also lower migration without eventually disappointing someone. Similarly, it seems at least possible that comparable wicked problems exist in foreign policy, such that bombing Iran seems as necessary and prudent from inside the White House as it seems from without a reckless betrayal of the base. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">But in a sense, too, we should hope that this bleak reading of </span><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">Animal Farm</span></i><span style="font-weight: 400;"> is true. For the only other possible explanation is bleaker still: that Trump simply doesn’t care about his base, and perhaps never really did. </span></p>
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															<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">1052585</post-id>				</item>
									<item>
					<title>Why the West is getting poorer</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2026/03/why-the-west-is-getting-poorer/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://stage.unherd.com/2026/03/why-the-west-is-getting-poorer/?edition=us#comments</comments>
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										<unherd:main_theme>Economics</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[John Rapley]]>
					</dc:creator>
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																<unherd:article_ranking>2</unherd:article_ranking>
																<unherd:image_caption>
							<![CDATA['If you deduct debt from growth to come up with a true picture of the economy’s dynamism, the country would have already started going backwards.' (Mario Tama/Getty)]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>John Rapley</strong> is an author and academic who divides his time between London, Johannesburg and Ottawa. His books include <i>Why Empires Fall: Rome, America and the Future of the West </i>(with Peter Heather, Penguin, 2023) and <i>Twilight of the Money Gods: Economics as a Religion</i> (Simon &amp; Schuster, 2017).</p>
]]>
						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>jarapley</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is an author and academic who divides his time between London, Johannesburg and Ottawa. His books include <i>Why Empires Fall: Rome, America and the Future of the West </i>(with Peter Heather, Penguin, 2023) and <i>Twilight of the Money Gods: Economics as a Religion</i> (Simon &amp; Schuster, 2017).]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Tue, 03 Mar 2026 00:01:37 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Tue, 03 Mar 2026 00:01:37 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[COVID-19]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Developing world]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Economics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Geopolitics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Poverty]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://stage.unherd.com/?p=1050135</guid>
																												<description>
								<![CDATA[Wealth doesn’t mean resilience]]>
							</description>
																		
																			<content:encoded>
								<![CDATA[<p>What happens when the money runs out but you still have promises to keep? Take the Reform Party’s recent <a href="https://inews.co.uk/news/politics/jenrick-state-pension-triple-lock-split-farage-4243348?srsltid=AfmBOooKU3LQFBWJr4ntdGbE30qZ-jIKe5TSefxTvL8uH_yZDvQ8wllR" target="_blank" rel="noopener">suggestion</a> that it will join the political consensus to preserve the triple lock on pensions. Here we have a policy designed to keep a share of the British population in the style to which it’s grown accustomed, or even better, and whose price tag is growing faster than the economy meant to fund it. That widening gap forces spending cuts elsewhere — in basic services, investment or spending on higher education — all of which inhibit future economic growth.</p>
<p>In short, we get a policy that will over time make the UK poorer in a quest to keep it rich. Yet as damaging as it is to the country’s long-term economic prospects, nobody can bring themselves to end it. And so, logically, amid economic stagnation or reversal, if some groups can maintain or even grow their wealth and income, as is the case with the triple lock, others must experience falls in their living standards and life opportunities. So even amid tepid growth, degrowth has started for some — namely, those whose livelihoods depend on income from labor rather than proceeds from capital.</p>
<p>Mind you, this revived class struggle now brings a novel twist: the owners include not just the uber-rich but people with comparatively modest incomes, such as pensioners whose capital is tied up in the funds that are today among some of the world’s biggest investors. Nevertheless, their livelihoods require preserving asset values no matter how sluggish the growth. The inevitable outcome is that workers get squeezed, both directly and indirectly: directly through higher taxes on labor — out with free tuition, in with the triple lock — and indirectly through fiscal and monetary policies that ensure asset values rise faster than the economy.</p>
<p>At the heart of this deepening political rift between capital and labor, driving a resurgence of anti-systemic populism on both the Left and Right and a turn against democracy by <a href="https://researchonline.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/128007/1/The_kids_are_Alt_right_Age_authoritarian_attitudes_and_far-right_support_in_Europe.pdf#:~:text=We%20find%20that%20young%20people%20are%20not,not%20be%20a%20bulwark%20against%20democratic%20backsliding." target="_blank" rel="noopener">young people</a>, is a reality that few whatever their politics want to confront. The rapid economic growth rates of the postwar period, which made possible the expansion of the welfare state and promises of future benefits that presumed an endlessly rising supply of resources, are not returning — because, as with the pursuit of the triple lock, we’re now trapped in a cycle where the pursuit of growth produces degrowth.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/02/is-this-the-end-of-private-equity/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/02/is-this-the-end-of-private-equity/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/wolf.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/02/is-this-the-end-of-private-equity/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/02/is-this-the-end-of-private-equity/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Is this the end of private equity?</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/02/is-this-the-end-of-private-equity/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> John Rapley</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Western economies have been slowing for decades, and a handful of rich countries have crossed the threshold between growth to degrowth in per-capita terms: while gross domestic product has kept rising in <a href="https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/NYGDPPCAPKDDEU" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Germany</a> and <a href="https://fred.stlouisfed.org/graph/?g=dbn6" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Canada</a>, real per-capita income has begun declining. Almost everywhere else in the developed world, including <a href="https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/NYGDPPCAPKDGBR" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Britain</a>, growth has been close to stagnant since before the pandemic. And even the supposed star performer of developed economies, the US, whose real per-capita income has continued rising steadily, hasn’t escaped this trend towards deceleration, because its added growth results from added debt. If you deduct debt from growth to come up with a true picture of the economy’s dynamism, the country would have already started going backwards.</p>
<p>This partly has to do with profound shifts in the world economy, and in particular the <a href="https://www.penguin.co.uk/books/313711/why-empires-fall-by-heather-john-rapley-and-peter/9780141991160" target="_blank" rel="noopener">relative decline of the West</a> compared to the rising global periphery. But increasingly, there’s evidence of endogenous forces which act to inhibit growth — something I refer to as the “Icarus effect”. Simply put, as an economy grows richer, its growth rate slows, because it encounters forms of natural resistance that slow and eventually reverse growth.</p>
<p>The growth-retarding effect of Covid-19, the first truly global pandemic in history, has been obvious, but the bigger threat will come from climate change, whose deleterious effects are already creeping up on us. With the average annual number of extreme weather events having so far increased sevenfold since the Sixties, not only will capital be depleted but inflation will remain permanently higher due to the rising costs of production (the recent <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/8504b1a8-dcf6-43b7-8816-fdaac8b30f12" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Mediterranean storms</a> being just the latest event likely to jolt food prices this winter).</p>
<p>Yet while such feedback loops inhibit growth for the whole world, there also appear to be changes which specifically affect the countries where growth has advanced the furthest: the rich ones. Because in addition to external pressures, we’re now starting to better understand changes which occur in the internal environment — which is to say, within us, as individuals and societies. As a society grows richer, it undergoes social, political and cultural changes which reduce dynamism, raise vulnerabilities and diminish resilience, all while increasing the cost of preserving wealth.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;As a society grows richer, it undergoes social, political and cultural changes which reduce dynamism&#8221;</div>
<p>To begin with, fertility declines, which raises a society’s average age. From there, the economically productive share of the population declines. As a proportion of total economic output, consumption therefore rises and investment declines. Meanwhile, the investment which does occur shifts in character, becoming more focused on dividends rather than long-term growth (which favors legacy industries). It also becomes more risk-averse, one manifestation of which is a shift towards real-estate investment: and real estate, of course, produces nothing. Consider <a href="https://www.theglobeandmail.com/investing/personal-finance/article-canada-capital-wrong-places-investment-real-estate/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Canada, Germany and Italy</a>, all which have been among the slowest performers, even as real estate now accounts for a third of fixed capital formation.</p>
<p>Adding to this, fiscal and monetary policies become increasingly oriented towards preserving asset values, through such measures as Nimbyism and the shoring up of asset values after market corrections with bailouts and easy money — real interest rates were kept near or below zero for years after the financial crisis — since any fall in asset values would hurt the growing share of the population which lives off them. The anti-growth measures which follow are thus more a symptom than a cause of the Icarus effect, but the consequent rising cost of capital makes it harder for new businesses to form, reducing dynamism in the economy.</p>
<p>In addition to these changes, vulnerability to external shocks rises as a society grows richer. For starters, the more capital you have, the more there is to be destroyed in natural disasters, and while mitigation measures can reduce risks, they further increase the price of wealth preservation. But just as importantly, and in contrast to the prevailing assumption that “rich is resilient” — the assumption being that wealth provides you with the resources needed to adapt to and bounce back from exogenous shocks — there’s compelling evidence that the reverse may be the case.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/02/the-cost-of-trumps-tariffs/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/02/the-cost-of-trumps-tariffs/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/GettyImages-2173511741.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/02/the-cost-of-trumps-tariffs/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/02/the-cost-of-trumps-tariffs/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The cost of Trump’s tariffs</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/02/the-cost-of-trumps-tariffs/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> John Rapley </a></p></div></a></div>
<p>The first hints of this came during the Covid pandemic, when it was widely expected that poor countries would do far worse than rich ones. The latter, so the theory went, could not only care for their sick but pay people to stay home and reduce transmission. In fact, on balance, poor countries emerged no worse from the pandemic than rich ones, and in many cases actually did better, all at a fraction of the cost borne by rich countries. For every dollar spent per capita in a developing country fighting the pandemic, developed countries spent 12; for all that money, the average death rate in the rich countries was only marginally better than in poor ones, while many of the poorest nations on Earth — especially in Africa — were star performers.</p>
<p>This probably shouldn’t surprise us. There’s a growing body of research in public health which suggests that regular exposure to disease prompts stronger immune response. Known as the <a href="https://atlantic-books.co.uk/book/icarus-economics/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">hygiene hypothesis</a>, this theory suggests that frequent exposure to natural shocks, from storms to floods, forces people to be adaptable and flexible. This research has been widened to look at societal resilience and finds exposure to shocks makes societies more resilient — in part because the weak states of poor countries make for strong societies, providing individuals with adaptive support through stressful times. Anyone who has lived in a developing country will be familiar with the community groups that form in neighborhoods or at churches, mosques and temples, and which provide everything from basic welfare and storm preparedness to watch groups in under-policed areas.</p>
<p>The upshot is that the mix of declining economic dynamism and resilience with rising vulnerability will mean rich countries take bigger economic hits from ecological feedback loops. Given their already slowing growth, moreover, this means they’re especially at risk of getting knocked backwards — when a country’s annual economic growth rate is around 1%, a shock like a pandemic or severe flooding can quickly tip it into recession.</p>
<p>Degrowth isn’t inevitable, but two things could make it so. The first is if Western countries try to carry on as we always have in the expectation growth will somehow return to past levels. That would only hasten the degrowth that has begun. The second is if we neglect the externalities of growth, especially climate change, in a quest to prioritize growth. That will produce the perverse outcome of accelerating our decline.</p>
<p style="text-align: center">***</p>
<p><em>Icarus Economics: Why Rich Economies Are Struggling &#8211; and How to Fix Them</em> (Atlantic Books) is out now.</p>
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															<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">1050135</post-id>				</item>
									<item>
					<title>Why politicians should fear AI</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2026/03/politicians-should-fear-ai/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://stage.unherd.com/2026/03/politicians-should-fear-ai/?edition=us#comments</comments>
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										<unherd:main_theme>Revolution</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Wolfgang Munchau]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/Blue-thumbnail-example-1.jpg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>2</unherd:article_ranking>
																<unherd:image_caption>
							<![CDATA[Sam Altman, CEO of OpenAI, has warned that the world of work will be upended by AI. (Andrew Harnik/Getty Images)]]>
						</unherd:image_caption>
						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Wolfgang Münchau</strong> is the Director of <a href="https://www.eurointelligence.com/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Eurointelligence</a> and an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist.</p>
]]>
						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>EuroBriefing</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is the Director of <a href="https://www.eurointelligence.com/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Eurointelligence</a> and an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Mon, 02 Mar 2026 00:04:21 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Mon, 02 Mar 2026 12:36:38 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[AI bubble]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Economics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[white-collar workers]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://stage.unherd.com/?p=1050664</guid>
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								<![CDATA[It will radicalize the middle class]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p dir="ltr">You have to hand it to the folks at Citrini Research. Their <a href="https://www.citriniresearch.com/p/2028gic" target="_blank" rel="noopener">story</a> of an AI-induced global economic meltdown had a big impact. The stock market almost crashed. It was a dystopian tale of how by 2028 AI will take over a growing proportion of white-collar jobs. Unemployment will rise, people will spend less money, and they will no longer afford their mortgages. The financial system will collapse.</p>
<p dir="ltr">As brilliant as the story is, I think it is wrong. But it is wrong in a good, useful way. What it got spot-on is the observation that AI will change our lives like nothing before. The Luddites of this world, including members of my own profession, have persistently underestimated the impact of AI. The financial media, especially here in Europe, has been associating the term “AI” with the word “bubble”. Jason Furman, Barack Obama’s chief economic advisor, and now a Harvard economics professor, tweeted recently: “A few months ago the discourse was about whether or not AI was a bubble. Now it&#8217;s shifted to whether or not we&#8217;re about to enter a dramatically new era.”</p>
<p dir="ltr">This may have been the discourse in his profession, and the echo-chamber media like the <em>Financial Times</em>, <em>The Economist</em>, and Bluesky where all the economists hang out. But anybody who has seriously engaged with AI and its underlying technology has known for a long time that AI is not a bubble. Some market valuations may have been too optimistic, but the thing itself is rock-solid.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Take a look at the technology behind modern AI: the neural network. What it does is pattern recognition on an unimaginable scale. In 2012, a team led by the British computer scientist Geoffrey Hinton tested a neural network called AlexNet by tasking it with identifying 1,000 everyday objects from a collection of over one million pictures. Each picture came with a label, like “cup” or “spoon”. When the machine was fed the first picture, it made a random guess. Every time it got something wrong it changed the algorithm. Do this a million times, and you will eventually get there.</p>
<p dir="ltr">This is not how humans learn. But pattern recognition is also an important component of human intelligence. We think of chess grandmasters as very intelligent. A lot of their skill is memorization of a large number of moves combined with superior pattern recognition. One of the things AI has taught is to be much more careful in the way we think about human intelligence.</p>
<p dir="ltr"><div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;Anybody who has seriously engaged with AI and its underlying technology has known for a long time that AI is not a bubble.&#8221;</div>
<p dir="ltr">AI can even do things we would have previously classified as logical reasoning. But logical reasoning, too, includes, at least to some extent, memorization and pattern recognition. The mathematician Terence Tao recently reported that AI managed to find a mistake in one of his proofs. It also managed to come up with the proof of a conjecture in discrete mathematics. But AI is still a pattern recognition technology at its heart.</p>
<p dir="ltr">There is stuff that AI struggles with. It cannot do “context” in the way humans do. Tao made the point that if a human asks for tea, someone puts a cup in front of them and pours the tea into the cup. An AI robot, on the other hand, might take your demand literally and just pour the tea over your head. It is also not creative. It cannot be a Leonardo da Vinci, Vincent van Gogh or Pablo Picasso. But it can do cliché art, just as  humans can.</p>
<p dir="ltr">The question now becomes: will AI replace the bottom 10% of artists or 90% of them? This is where our story intersects with economics. If the answer is at the higher end of that range, most of us should probably start growing vegetables. I think the answer is more likely to be in the lower or the middle range.</p>
<p dir="ltr">In some sectors, AI has already started to replace humans. If you are a freelance advertising copywriter, chances are that you are struggling to find commissions. When the AI company Anthropic introduced legal plugins for its Claude Cowork platform, it took over the work of junior lawyers and legal assistants. It makes the senior lawyers more productive, but it did not get rid of lawyers.</p>
<p dir="ltr"><div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/02/inside-the-ai-resistance/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/02/inside-the-ai-resistance/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/GettyImages-1257740282.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/02/inside-the-ai-resistance/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/02/inside-the-ai-resistance/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Inside the AI resistance</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/02/inside-the-ai-resistance/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Farahn Morgan</a></p></div></a></div>
<p dir="ltr">A fateful prediction came from Hinton himself, the godfather of the neural network.  In 2016, he predicted that within five years, AI would replace all radiologists. Back then, AI had become very good at detecting tumors on X-rays or other medical images. Hinton must have thought that looking at pictures is what radiologists do all day.</p>
<p dir="ltr">His prediction was completely wrong. One of the best&nbsp;<a href="https://www.rcr.ac.uk/media/4imb5jge/_rcr-2024-clinical-radiology-workforce-census-report.pdf#:~:text=However%2C%20it%20remained%20a%20challenging%20year.%20Though,on%20radiologists%20is%20only%20set%20to%20increase." target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.rcr.ac.uk/media/4imb5jge/_rcr-2024-clinical-radiology-workforce-census-report.pdf%23:~:text%3DHowever%252C%2520it%2520remained%2520a%2520challenging%2520year.%2520Though,on%2520radiologists%2520is%2520only%2520set%2520to%2520increase.&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1772467005420000&amp;usg=AOvVaw2e1VE1lGpthgoHVSs4Napz">datasets we have</a>&nbsp;is from the Royal College of Radiologists in the UK. In 2015, the UK had 3,318 consultant radiologists. By 2024, that number has jumped to 4,923.</p>
<p dir="ltr">In a way, Hinton fell for the classic “lump of labor” fallacy — the idea that the supply of jobs in an economy is fixed. In our case, the fallacy is the idea that if AI takes half of our jobs, the rest of us have to share the remaining half. This is essentially what the Citrini report did too. It fell for the fixed pie fallacy.</p>
<p dir="ltr">When radio was introduced in the UK in the Twenties, people predicted the end of newspapers. When TV came in the Thirties, they predicted the end of radio and of newspapers. That did not happen because the new media expanded the overall market.</p>
<p dir="ltr">But today, a hundred years later, the newspaper industry finds itself in an existential crisis. This is not because the pie has stopped growing, but because newer business models replaced old ones. A lot more people work in the wider media industry today than they ever did before.</p>
<p dir="ltr">So, instead of asking how AI will affect the economy, we should ask three separate questions. What effect will it have on existing white-collar employment? Over what period? And will it eventually create more jobs than it destroys?</p>
<p dir="ltr">Citrini is probably right about the impact on existing white-collar jobs, but wrong about the timing and the creation of new ones. Machine learning is a long process. “I&#8217;m so old I remember when fully autonomous cars were going to be ready for mass deployment by late 2017,” tweeted the AI software developer and computer scientist François Chollet a few years ago.</p>
<p dir="ltr"><div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/02/maga-will-win-the-media-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/02/maga-will-win-the-media-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/GettyImages-2198812886.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/02/maga-will-win-the-media-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/02/maga-will-win-the-media-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>MAGA will win the media war</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/02/maga-will-win-the-media-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Wolfgang Münchau</a></p></div></a></div>
<p dir="ltr">The robotaxi industry has made progress, but autonomous driving is stuck at level four out of five. By September last year, Waymo robotaxis had clocked 127 million miles collecting data without a driver in the car. When they reach level five, or full automation, they will be ready for a bigger rollout. They will still lack human intuition. They will not be perfect, but they will be better, on average, than humans because they don’t get angry, they don’t speed, they don’t send text messages while driving or fall asleep. When we get to the final level, Waymo will have been collecting data for some 20 years.</p>
<p dir="ltr">The American futurologist Roy Amara in the Seventies said that “we tend to overestimate the effect of a technology in the short run and underestimate the effect in the long run”. That applies to AI too. Just like how the discovery of electricity killed off the jobs of people who made a living by walking around the streets in the evening to ignite our streetlights, AI will destroy entire sectors. But its main economic effect is that it will make us more productive over time.</p>
<p dir="ltr">An economic meltdown is much less worrying than a political one. The de-industrialization of the early part of this century drove workers to support politicians of the Right. Now imagine if the same were to happen to sections of the white-collar middle classes.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Countries with flexible labor markets, such as the US, China, and to a lesser extent the UK, will be more affected by this, both positively and negatively, than countries with high degrees of employment protection such as France and Germany. The latter will probably avoid some of the disruptions in the short run, but the quid-pro-quo is that they will not benefit from the productivity gains that come from AI later.</p>
<p dir="ltr">All over the Western world we have seen a trend away from centrist politics to the extremes of the Right and Left. The middle class are the median voters. If they lose their jobs, so will their constituency MP or congressperson.</p>
<p dir="ltr">But the economy as a whole is going to be fine if only because it takes time for AI to replicate human skills. My more optimistic scenario rests on the fact that even the Luddites have finally caught on to this. We all have time to prepare.</p>
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					<title>Why Trump will win the tariff war</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2026/02/why-trump-will-win-the-tariff-war/?edition=us</link>
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										<unherd:main_theme>Supreme Court</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Wolfgang Munchau]]>
					</dc:creator>
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																<unherd:article_ranking>1</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA['Trump may no longer have his tariff gun, but an economic bazooka remains'. (Nathan Howard/Getty)]]>
						</unherd:image_caption>
						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Wolfgang Münchau</strong> is the Director of <a href="https://www.eurointelligence.com/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Eurointelligence</a> and an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist.</p>
]]>
						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>EuroBriefing</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is the Director of <a href="https://www.eurointelligence.com/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Eurointelligence</a> and an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Mon, 23 Feb 2026 00:03:12 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Mon, 23 Feb 2026 09:36:25 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Donald Trump]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Economics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Protectionism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Tariffs]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[USA]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://stage.unherd.com/?p=1049670</guid>
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								<![CDATA[Lawfare has never stopped him]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p dir="ltr">Before we all start celebrating, it is worth reflecting for a moment on what the Supreme Court’s tariff ruling did — and what it didn’t. The only positive I can see is that it takes us outside the realm of threat. Donald Trump will no longer be able to point a tariff gun at the rest of us. The era of the tariff tweet, too, will end. Yet amid the bluster and the late-night posts, nothing of substance will change.</p>
<p dir="ltr">After all, virtually all the tariffs will survive unaltered. In the short-run, the President is covered. On Friday night, immediately after the Supreme Court ruling, he invoked Section 122 of the 1974 Trade Act, signing an executive order to impose an immediate 10% tariff on the rest of the world. On Saturday, he raised that figure to 15%, the maximum allowed under the Act. The tariffs will kick in tomorrow — but despite what some journalists have claimed, none of this is “defying” the judges. On the contrary, Trump is merely implementing their ruling.</p>
<p dir="ltr">The catch is that Section 122 has a time cap of 150 days. That takes us until late July. At that point, Trump could get Congress to extend the period further. It may be possible, and legally more risky, for him to reset the clock. Or he could let the tariffs lapse before applying a new 150-day batch. Whether or not this holds up in court, it will buy him time to get ready for his real tariff fightback.</p>
<p dir="ltr">The point, here, is that all the Supreme Court did on Friday was tell the President that he should have picked a different legal basis for his tariffs. This is still a big deal — but not quite as big as you might imagine.</p>
<p dir="ltr">To understand exactly what happened requires a deep-dive into US trade law. When, on 2 April last year, Trump stepped into the White House Rose Garden to declare “Liberation Day”, he used a law dating from the Jimmy Carter era. The 1977 International Emergency Economic Powers Act, or IEEPA, was a response to the two oil crises of that decade. IEEPA gave the president unprecedented rights to act in response to a crisis, from freezing foreign assets to confiscating foreign property.</p>
<p dir="ltr"><div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/01/why-trump-will-get-greenland/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/01/why-trump-will-get-greenland/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/GettyImages-2255969993.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/01/why-trump-will-get-greenland/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/01/why-trump-will-get-greenland/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Why Trump will get Greenland</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/01/why-trump-will-get-greenland/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Wolfgang Munchau</a></p></div></a></div>
<p dir="ltr">Importantly, though, IEEPA says nothing about tariffs. Yet Trump picked it as the legal basis for his Liberation Day tariffs — and this is what the Supreme Court objected to. In essence, the Court ruled that the US faces no immediate emergency, unlike in the Seventies. In any case, tariffs fall under a different set of laws. The Court decided against the US administration with a majority of six to three, with Brett Kavanaugh one of the dissenting justices, and the legal disagreement essentially about who decides what constitutes an emergency.</p>
<p dir="ltr">In his minority opinion, Kavanaugh made one point that is not contested: that the ruling would have little effect in real life. As he puts it “numerous other federal statutes” allow Trump to impose tariffs legally — “albeit perhaps with a few additional procedural steps”.</p>
<p dir="ltr">What are those procedural steps? Quite simply the two big trade acts through which presidents normally levy tariffs on other countries. They’re hardly arcane: Joe Biden used them too. The first is the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, specifically Section 232 on national security. It allows the president to levy tariffs on products he deems to be a potential threat to national security. The Trump administration already levied tariffs on several products under this act — cars and trucks, steel and aluminum. There is also copper, furniture, lumber, and timber. The Supreme Court ruling has no effect whatsoever on these Section 232 tariffs, and indeed the Trump administration may yet use it to stick tariffs on foreign airline parts and pharmaceuticals. If this happened, the Canadians and the Europeans would suffer most.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Section 232 tariffs only concern goods for which a national security argument can be made: notably critical raw materials. Dolls imported from China, or French luxury handbags, clearly do not fall into that category. The heavy lifting that yielded most of America’s tariff revenue before Trump’s Liberation Day announcement came from Section 301 of the 1974 Trade Act. That’s also where most of the action on future tariffs will come from, now that the Court has blocked the IEEPA route. Section 301 is about unfair trading practices, like violations of trade agreements, or any policies that are deemed to discriminate against US businesses. Trump will have little difficulty here, with Section 301 playing into his rhetoric that foreign trading partners are out to cheat America.</p>
<p dir="ltr"><div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/11/trump-has-called-europes-bluff/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/11/trump-has-called-europes-bluff/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/GettyImages-2247393568.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/11/trump-has-called-europes-bluff/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/11/trump-has-called-europes-bluff/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Trump has called Europe&#039;s bluff</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/11/trump-has-called-europes-bluff/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Wolfgang Munchau</a></p></div></a></div>
<p dir="ltr">That, of course, still leaves one question: why did Trump go down the IEEPA route to start with, when he had these other laws at his disposal? The answer involves understanding the President himself. Trump is a man of transactions, not procedures — and both the 1962 and 1974 acts are heavy on procedure, typically taking about a year to enact. In the case of Section 232, the Department of Commerce must first investigate the effects of the relevant imports on national security. There are maximum, but no minimum, time limits. There are no formal appeal procedures, but there are legal safeguards in place to prevent the process from being cynically short-circuited. The investigation takes at most 270 days, after which the president has 90 days to decide whether to act. In practice, the process is a little faster, but not much. Back in 2017, Trump’s tariffs on steel and aluminum took almost a year to enact.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Section 301, too, requires a formal procedure, in this case by the US Trade Representative. A typical 301 investigation takes 6-12 months from start to finish. Those investigations come with depositions and hearings, and end with a long report. After four years, the tariffs must be reviewed.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Bureaucracy, in short, intrudes. This explains why Trump first chose IEEPA as the legal basis for its tariffs: for its speed and what we might therefore call its “threat factor”. Not for nothing did Scott Bessent, the US treasury secretary, once refer to tariffs as the gun on the table.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Yet if the 1962 and 1975 acts are big on paperwork, Kavanaugh is again right that Trump will ultimately be able to get his way — and Congress will be unable to stop him. Another advantage of both laws, after all, is that they are firmly in the president’s gift to enact.</p>
<p dir="ltr"><div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;Trump will ultimately be able to get his way — and Congress will be unable to stop him.&#8221;</div>
<p dir="ltr">Here, then, is the timeline: the temporary 15% tariffs will kick in this week, buying Trump the space to impose the bureaucratic procedures that make them permanent. He could even end up raising the total level of tariffs if he so wished; I myself foresee a scenario where tariffs on cars from the EU and the UK go up by a tenth. That is even as he uses the law to bolster his broader argument about America’s economic position. “They rip us off,” he said of the EU a year ago. Well, that is precisely what Section 301 is about.</p>
<p dir="ltr">So if you hate Trump, you may well celebrate the Supreme Court ruling as a symbolic defeat. If, however, you hate the tariffs, you have no reason to cheer: the powers of the President to impose tariffs unilaterally are not affected at all.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Why, then, are people celebrating? I’m reminded here of the lawfare against Trump ahead of the 2024 election. I remember the BBC in particular expressing gleefully confidence that the New York criminal case against Trump would deprive him of the means of launching an effective campaign. In that particular case, the US Supreme Court came to Trump’s rescue. What has always helped Trump is a tendency by his opponents to overestimate the effect of legal games.</p>
<p dir="ltr">A deluded German commentator described the ruling as an “embarrassment of historic proportions”. There is an awful lot of “peak Trump” commentary about. Statements such as these may be designed to make us Europeans feel better, but they just don’t hold up to scrutiny. The tariffs were Trump’s most important economic policy decision — and they will stay, even as he has almost three more years of his four-year term.</p>
<p dir="ltr">The real problem with Trump is not that he is a buffoon, but that he learned how to game the political system. Not all of the mud he throws will stick. But a lot will. The President may no longer hold his tariff gun, but an economic bazooka remains, and it is pointing at the rest of us.</p>
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									<item>
					<title>How Britain gets its future back</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2026/02/how-britain-gets-its-future-back/?edition=us</link>
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										<unherd:main_theme>Weekend Essay</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Jonny Ball]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/Blue-34.jpg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>1</unherd:article_ranking>
																<unherd:image_caption>
							<![CDATA['In light of the recent outbursts from a mercurial White House, British bank bosses have begun to plan for an alternative to the US’s Visa and Mastercard systems'. (Leon Neal/Getty Images)]]>
						</unherd:image_caption>
						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><b>Jonny Ball </b>is a Contributing Editor at <em>UnHerd</em>. He formerly wrote under the name Despotic Inroad.</p>
]]>
						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>DespoticInroad</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[<b>Jonny Ball </b>is a Contributing Editor at <em>UnHerd</em>. He formerly wrote under the name Despotic Inroad.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Sat, 21 Feb 2026 00:10:08 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Sun, 22 Feb 2026 09:15:32 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Economics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Labour]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[National Sovereignty]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Reform]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[reindustrialisation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Starmer]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://stage.unherd.com/?p=1049498</guid>
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								<![CDATA[Cheap energy is just the start]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>“It’s only when the tide goes out”, says the legendary investor Warren Buffet, “that you find out who was swimming naked”. Any second-rate trader can look like a financial whizzkid in a bull market — but when leaner times return we learn about everyone’s true mettle. The same applies to countries. The chatterati despair, grasping their thinning, graying heads of hair: where has the easy charm of elected politicians gone; why does nothing work; why are we consumed by permacrisis; why can’t we go<em> back to normal</em>? But the normalcy of which they speak, the end-of-history ascendency of liberal politics at home and global integration abroad, is gone and not returning. And without a post-Cold War peace dividend, the unipolar moment, Pax Americana, financialization, free-flowing North Sea energy, and ever-more transnational markets, Britain has been caught skinny-dipping.</p>
<p>We rely on the developmentalist economies of the Far East for our manufactured goods, on the Norwegians for our oil and gas-powered energy, on Europe for our food, Wall Street for our payments systems, Silicon Valley for our digital worlds, and on a diverse caste of cheap, subaltern labor to staff our care homes, serve us coffee, clean our offices, and deliver our meals. In light of the recent outbursts from a mercurial White House, British bank bosses have <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/business/2026/feb/16/uk-bank-bosses-plan-visa-mastercard-alternative" target="_blank" rel="noopener">begun to plan</a> for an alternative to the US’s Visa and Mastercard systems. And not a moment too soon: when the President threatened a Nato ally with annexation last month, all we could offer was bland platitudes, a humiliating prostration before hard power.</p>
<p>Even those few sectors in which we do excel — the consultancies, and the legal and financial services that we still export to the world — seem designed for a softer-edged era. <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/av/uk-politics-36781883" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Like Tony Blair himself</a>, the “knowledge economy” was the future once, or so we were told. The real value was created through the immaterial labor practiced in the metropoles. Globalization was non-negotiable; “you might as well debate over whether autumn should follow summer”, in the words of its leading evangelist, and Britain would ride the wave, prospering at the cutting edge of international bullshit artistry. Once the birthplace of the Industrial Revolution has surrendered its economic autonomy to the whims of global finance capital, there’s nothing left to do but turn the art of corporate jargon and consultant-sophistry into its unique specialism — right before the glossy reports and PowerPoints are automated by AI.</p>
<p>But now the tide hasn’t so much gone out as receded past the horizon. Not only is automation coming for the white-collar service class, but the transatlantic alliance is more frayed than in its whole history. The “normal” of liberal-technocratic triumphalism looks like a one-time-only blip, a bubble punctured by the collapse of Lehman, its final illusions extinguished by Covid-19. A world of Great Power rivalry has returned — the Americans proving Lord Palmerston’s old <a href="https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/acref/9780191826719.001.0001/q-oro-ed4-00008130" target="_blank" rel="noopener">maxim</a> that there are “no eternal allies or perpetual enemies, only eternal interests”, and judging that it is not in Washington’s eternal interests to simultaneously confront the rising giant of Beijing while being locked into conflict with Russia on a declining continent that cannot defend its own peripheries.</p>
<p>And so, a political consensus is forming: we must reindustrialize. We must rebuild our national productive capacities. Without a solid manufacturing base, we are dangerously exposed in a hostile world of geopolitical contestation. In his first speech as the putative “shadow chancellor” this week, Robert Jenrick <a href="https://policymogul.com/key-updates/52820/robert-jenrick-reform-will-be-careful-with-your-money-speech-in-full" target="_blank" rel="noopener">told us</a> that Reform would “restore our proud industrial heritage and create good jobs for British workers once again”. “We do believe in industrial strategy”, he assured any listeners confused by his about-turn away from the party of the sovereign individual and free and open markets.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/11/will-we-ever-escape-the-echr/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/11/will-we-ever-escape-the-echr/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/GettyImages-2239301599.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/11/will-we-ever-escape-the-echr/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/11/will-we-ever-escape-the-echr/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Will we ever escape the ECHR?</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/11/will-we-ever-escape-the-echr/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Thomas Fazi </a></p></div></a></div>
<p>In this, Jenrick is only echoing his leader Nigel Farage, a man who Maurice Glasman once described as “a saloon-bar Thatcherite”, but who has now taken to floating the idea of public ownership and equity stakes in British engineering firms, <a href="https://policymogul.com/key-updates/52601/nigel-farage-s-speech-at-the-birmingham-nec" target="_blank" rel="noopener">lamenting</a> the loss of “shipbuilding, cement making, chemicals, steel”. “It’s all gone off to India and China”, he says, articulating all the cultural-political sovereigntist themes of post-industrial Britain — lost identity, lost purpose, lost control. Yet all those on-the-ground resentments are ultimately the result of conscious macroeconomic decisions on the part of the monetarists: a strong sterling is a boon for the City but blows a hole in the UK’s balance of trade that can only be filled by constant rounds of inward foreign investment; the unedifying and unending ritual of flogging the <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G1ssGrq5S3w" target="_blank" rel="noopener">family silver</a>, until every old family firm and former national champion is in the portfolio of a Gulf state.</p>
<p>Gone are those days, Farage and Jenrick promise. Instead, Reform will pursue something called the “politics of national preference”, at least according to one of the party’s ideological gurus, James Orr, the national-conservative theologian and disciple of the patrician, communitarian Toryism of Roger Scruton.</p>
<p>And if all of this sounds familiar, that might be because it echoes the lines of our current party of government. Chancellor Rachel Reeves <a href="https://labourlist.org/2021/07/rachel-reeves-sets-out-labour-plan-to-make-sell-and-buy-more-in-britain/#:~:text=Rachel%20Reeves%20sets%20out%20Labour,the%20jobs%20of%20the%20future;" target="_blank" rel="noopener">promised</a> to “make, sell and buy more in Britain”. Her economic philosophy would be rooted in “<a href="https://labour.org.uk/updates/press-releases/rachel-reeves-securonomics/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">securonomics</a>”: the doctrine of maximized efficiency would give way to the new watchword of resilience, and the local, national provenance of goods would be prioritized over their price. If Thatcher’s heirs have seen the writing on the wall, the second-generation of Blairism have too: a country that makes things, that has a trade surplus in goods, will fare better in an age of chaotic, global fragmentation.</p>
<p>Yet if we’re heavy on the diagnostics, we’re light on the prescription. Jenrick might position his vision as a “new political economy”, but nothing that’s so far been proposed will go any further towards “reindustrialization” than Reeves’ defunct “securonomics”. The latter was, more-or-less, dead on arrival, always to be sacrificed on the altar of the Labour leadership’s innate caution and overdue respect for established procedures. It is not in the nature of the apolitical, robotic meeting-chair-in-chief to challenge any of the orthodoxies repeated from the mouths of a recalcitrant, Treasury-brained senior civil servant, let alone the Confederation of British Industry.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;If we’re heavy on the diagnostics, we’re light on the prescription&#8221;</div>
<p>To be fair, Jenrick’s “new political economy” differs from Labour’s take on industrial renaissance in one crucial respect. For Reform, the net-zero project is the primary blockage to the resuscitation of heavy manufacturing, particularly in high-carbon, energy-intensive sectors being crushed under the weight of subsidized renewables and grid costs. For Labour, the green transition is the exact opposite: the catalyst for the transformation of the British economy. In place of the dark Satanic mills of Victorian industry, and the monotowns of Fordist mass production, the new industrial revolution will restore England’s reputation as a green and pleasant land, a global leader in wind power with a sideline in batteries, solar cells and nuclear energy.</p>
<p>Both parties are peddling a fantasy. The seeds of deindustrialization were sown long before decarbonization became a uniparty dogma. The loss of much of Britain’s heavy industry took place even as we were net energy exporters. Besides, the Chinese economic miracle was built on more than cheap coal. The aggressive industrial policy contained in the Communist Party’s <em><a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/made-china-2025" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Made in China 2025</a> </em> has transformed the country from the world’s sweatshop into a high-tech center of advanced manufacturing, with massive, state-directed investment into highly competitive, strategic and innovative sectors, complementing a long-term policy of strict capital controls, high tariff walls, and a central bank that militantly supports investment-led growth. That’s reflected in Chinese exports: no more the crowded production lines of cliche, with the PRC instead becoming a global leader in high-tech sectors, robotics and AI.</p>
<p>In response, the US first <a href="https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/mckinsey/industries/public%20and%20social%20sector/our%20insights/the%20inflation%20reduction%20act%20heres%20whats%20in%20it/the-inflation-reduction-act-heres-whats-in-it_final.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">mobilized debt-financed subsidies</a> to “reshore” jobs to the American Rust Belt. “Bidenomics”, as it was called, attempted to lure back manufacturers in high-tech sectors by handing them taxpayer bungs. The results were mixed. Hundreds of billions were spent, but restive voters rewarded the Democrats by electing Donald Trump. The irony, of course, is that Trump has continued with the same “decoupling” strategy pursued by his predecessor, along the way hiding American industry behind a new and belligerent protectionism. That has now been hampered by the strength of the US constitution&#8217;s separation of powers, and a Supreme Court ruling that the President’s Liberation Day and subsequent tariffs are unconstitutional. Nevertheless, the idea that the UK, in this international context, could start a new industrial revolution simply by abandoning net zero targets is risible. Another latter-day Reformer Suella Bravermen <a href="https://www.gbnews.com/politics/suella-braverman-nigel-farage-socialist" target="_blank" rel="noopener">might want us to believe</a> she has undergone a Damascene conversion to Reform’s apparent “socialism” with a Faragist face, but Jenrick’s desire to <a href="https://x.com/realBenBloch/status/2024478285044789453" target="_blank" rel="noopener">demonstrate subservience</a> to the strictures of the OBR and its originator George Osborne precludes any radical rupture with decades of economic failure.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/10/britains-wage-slaves-are-revolting/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/10/britains-wage-slaves-are-revolting/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/GettyImages-2237851338.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/10/britains-wage-slaves-are-revolting/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/10/britains-wage-slaves-are-revolting/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Britain’s wage slaves are revolting</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/10/britains-wage-slaves-are-revolting/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Jonny Ball</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Meanwhile, Labour’s positioning of net zero as a catalyst for industrial growth is equally a chimera — our expensive adoption of renewables is destroying the margins of what remains of heavy industry while propping up Scandinavian social democracy and Chinese developmentalism via the rapid import of Danish wind turbines and Chinese solar cells and electric vehicles. All of this while our reliance on Norwegian and US shale gas continues unabated. As with many of the thin promises of Starmerism, “securonomics” has never been translated from rhetoric to reality.</p>
<p>And so Britain remains buffeted by forces beyond its control, unwilling or unable to reassert itself. A genuine plan for national sovereignty would combine the dynamism of markets with the strategic direction that can only be provided by an agile, active state, one willing to do away with shibboleths that were built for a bygone world. In practice, yes, that means driving down energy costs as a matter of priority, but also supporting capital spending with unified fiscal and monetary policy. Primary budget surpluses would maintain market confidence while extra borrowing for long-term, pro-growth capital projects could be facilitated by a reformed Bank of England. The deep pools of capital in the nation’s pension pots could be re-domesticated and mobilized towards infrastructure and industrial investment.</p>
<p>This would be shadowed by other changes. For one thing, chancellors would set budgets that move us away from short-term cash transfers and, again, towards long-term investments. Welfare and pensions bills would be brought under control, moving from means-tested to contributory systems, while the tax revenue burden would shift away from work and patient, productive capital, and towards rent-seeking, unproductive assets, land, and real estate.</p>
<p>Core to this project would be an empowered executive, with a restoration of ministerial authority unencumbered by unaccountable bureaucracies, or an activist judiciary, and unafraid of disciplining and managing footloose capital to direct it towards strategic goals. The era of free movement of capital, labor, goods and services is giving way to one in which nations prosper with enforced capital controls, tariffs and an industrial policy that maintains a strictly <em>national economy</em>. Here, the success of the national payments system will be instructive. But resilience on other spheres should follow. The government last year intervened to rescue domestic steel-making capacity in Scunthorpe, and has since made noises about defense-industrial rejuvenation as a fulcrum for manufacturing revival. But signs that they can turn words and sentiment into concrete action are few; the future will belong to those states that act, that “just do things”, not those paralyzed by their own ideological quietism.</p>
<p>Nations, like Buffet’s investors, are truly tested when the tide goes out. It’s only now, in an age of tumult, that we discover that our embrace of hyper-globalization depended on geopolitical conditions that no longer exist. We bred over-dependency, and are now learning that true strategic autonomy is far harder to rebuild than it was to sell off to the highest bidder.</p>
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					<title>The cost of Trump’s tariffs</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2026/02/the-cost-of-trumps-tariffs/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://stage.unherd.com/2026/02/the-cost-of-trumps-tariffs/?edition=us#comments</comments>
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										<unherd:main_theme>weekend analysis</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[John Rapley]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/blued-up-fella.jpg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>1</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[Springfield, Ohio. (Dominic Gwinn / Middle East Images / AFP / Getty)]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>John Rapley</strong> is an author and academic who divides his time between London, Johannesburg and Ottawa. His books include <i>Why Empires Fall: Rome, America and the Future of the West </i>(with Peter Heather, Penguin, 2023) and <i>Twilight of the Money Gods: Economics as a Religion</i> (Simon &amp; Schuster, 2017).</p>
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						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>jarapley</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is an author and academic who divides his time between London, Johannesburg and Ottawa. His books include <i>Why Empires Fall: Rome, America and the Future of the West </i>(with Peter Heather, Penguin, 2023) and <i>Twilight of the Money Gods: Economics as a Religion</i> (Simon &amp; Schuster, 2017).]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Sat, 14 Feb 2026 00:05:53 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Sat, 14 Feb 2026 00:05:53 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[2026 midterms]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Economics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Republicans]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Tariffs]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://stage.unherd.com/?p=1048641</guid>
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								<![CDATA[Workers feel betrayed]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>“They’re screwing over their own constituents,” <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-02-10/house-republicans-move-to-keep-putting-off-vote-on-trump-tariffs" target="_blank" rel="noopener">said a House Democrat</a> about the Republicans on Tuesday. There are street protests against ICE and real fury at the administration’s handling of the Epstein files. But the first chink in Donald Trump’s hitherto impregnable Congressional armor came from elsewhere. The tariff agenda has now run into obstacles which look likely to only get bigger.</p>
<p>Earlier this week, House Republicans moved a motion which would have put off a vote on Trump’s tariffs. Three of their members, however, crossed party lines to join all their Democratic colleagues to block the motion. The Democrats will now be to table motions to roll back the tariffs and, in fact, did so promptly, passing a resolution the next day to terminate the ones imposed on Canada. And while the measures are unlikely to succeed — Trump can simply veto the resolutions, even if the Senate can be persuaded to back them — the Democrats will keep jabbing at this fissure like a boxer targeting an opponent’s eye’s wound. They won’t stop driving home the message that Republicans are on board with Trump’s trade war.</p>
<p>It therefore seems likely that more Republican dissidents will surface in the months ahead — the total already rose to six on the Canadian vote — because the tariffs are becoming a political albatross. With polling suggesting that a <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2026/02/04/americans-largely-disapprove-of-trumps-tariff-increases/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">large majority of Americans</a>, and even a quarter of Republicans, oppose tariffs, the future of Trump’s trade policy is undecided.</p>
<p>The risk that the Republicans would lose their slender majority in November’s House elections was always high. But until recently it was considered a near impossibility for the Republicans to lose the Senate majority. Now, though, the <a href="https://kalshi.com/markets/controls/senate-winner/controls-2026" target="_blank" rel="noopener">betting markets</a> give Democrats a better than one-in-three chance of seizing the upper chamber too, and the odds have been slowly narrowing. Amid this febrile atmosphere, a growing number of Republicans caught between the monster of Trumpian wrath and the whirlpool of an angry electorate are opting to take their chances taming the latter.</p>
<p>Quite apart from the fact that Trump’s tariffs overturn decades of the party’s free-trading principles, Republicans are also uneasy with them for the simple reason that they’re not doing what they’re meant to. If the President has always held one belief consistently, it’s that tariffs could make the American economy great again — reducing the gaping trade deficit, returning manufacturing jobs to America and boosting workers’ wages, all while costing Americans nothing, since foreign producers eager to sell to America would have to pay them.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/02/is-this-the-end-of-private-equity/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/02/is-this-the-end-of-private-equity/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/wolf.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/02/is-this-the-end-of-private-equity/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/02/is-this-the-end-of-private-equity/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Is this the end of private equity?</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/02/is-this-the-end-of-private-equity/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> John Rapley</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>But none of these things have happened yet. Assessing the state of the US’s trade deficit isn’t straightforward, since the figures can vary from month to month, not least when trade policy is as volatile as it has been since last April’s Liberation Day. However, the US’s <a href="https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/BOPGSTB" target="_blank" rel="noopener">most recent figures</a> suggest the trade deficit isn’t improving.</p>
<p>The same is true of the employment situation. Plainly put, manufacturing jobs show no sign of coming back. On the contrary, <a href="https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/MANEMP?utm_source=substack&amp;utm_medium=email" target="_blank" rel="noopener">manufacturing employment</a> continued falling through Trump’s first year back in office while in the wider economy, good jobs are getting harder to find. As Wednesday’s <a href="https://www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.nr0.htm" target="_blank" rel="noopener">employment report</a> revealed, in all of 2025 only 181,000 new jobs were created in the US, a monthly average that would have translated into a rapidly rising unemployment rate were it not that Trump’s immigration crackdown has removed so many workers from the workforce.</p>
<p>That, the administration retorts, is just the point — the deportations are reserving jobs for Americans and thereby boosting their earning power. But in fact, instead of workers seeing gains, the labor share of income has fallen to an <a href="https://x.com/BobEUnlimited/status/2009985888739307747?t=Q1_tOX3LVklY7_gWuhWodQ&amp;s=03" target="_blank" rel="noopener">all-time low</a>. <a href="https://www.atlantafed.org/research-and-data/data/wage-growth-tracker" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Wage growth</a> slowed throughout 2025; especially for workers at the lower end of the income scale, the sort of voters who played such an important role in bringing the MAGA coalition to power, it is now barely keeping pace with inflation.</p>
<p>Most ominously, there’s no reason to expect a manufacturing renaissance will come at all under existing policies. For all the White House’s grandiose boasts about the massive investments other countries have pledged in the US — the amount varies but most recently Trump offered a figure of <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/donald-trump/fact-check-trump-interview-nbc-news-rcna257084" target="_blank" rel="noopener">$18 trillion</a> — <a href="https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/TLMFGCONS" target="_blank" rel="noopener">construction of new factories</a> is currently declining, with no end in sight.</p>
<p>As for being costless, ever since Liberation Day the administration has pointed to a steady inflation rate as proof that the critics were wrong, Americans aren’t paying higher prices for their imported products. It’s true that since Trump started his trade war, consumer price inflation hasn’t got worse. But as the recent <a href="https://www.bls.gov/news.release/ppi.nr0.htm" target="_blank" rel="noopener">producer price index</a> revealed, businesses are paying higher prices. <a href="https://www.kielinstitut.de/publications/americas-own-goal-who-pays-the-tariffs-19398/#:~:text=Related%20Topics,%E2%80%A2" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Research</a> by the Kiel Institute has shown that almost the entire cost of tariffs has been absorbed by businesses, with foreign exporters paying an average of a paltry 4% of the cost of tariffs. <a href="https://libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org/2026/02/who-is-paying-for-the-2025-u-s-tariffs/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Federal Reserve economists</a> have come up with a similar estimate.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/09/why-economists-get-trumpism-wrong/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/09/why-economists-get-trumpism-wrong/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/GettyImages-2236959554-e1759154018511.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/09/why-economists-get-trumpism-wrong/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested Reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/09/why-economists-get-trumpism-wrong/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Why economists get Trumpism wrong</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/09/why-economists-get-trumpism-wrong/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Wolfgang Munchau</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>It makes sense that businesses should have chosen to absorb the tariffs rather than pass them on to their customers. When the Liberation Day tariffs were first announced, importers rushed to frontload shipments before they took effect, building up good stocks then running them down over the next several months. Thereafter, given the legal challenge to the tariffs before the Supreme Court and Trump’s frequent flip-flopping, with postponements, carve-outs and changes to rates amid trade deals, businesses were reluctant to raise prices and lose market share to rivals, only to find their own tariffs were later lifted.</p>
<p>However, the longer the trade war persists, and that it grows apparent the tariffs are here to stay, the pressure on businesses to pass costs onto consumers will rise. Ironically for the administration, a heads-they-win-tails-we-lose logic may now apply here. As things stand, working Americans have borne the brunt of tariffs not through price increases but through wage growth that has trailed the booming asset gains of richer Americans. The effect has shown up in <a href="https://www.census.gov/retail/sales.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">retail sales</a> that appear to be weakening, all while consumer credit is rising, suggesting ordinary Americans are feeling stretched.</p>
<p>But amid stronger-than-expected job gains in the most recent employment report, some (if not all) economists now think 2026 may finally see an improvement in the earning power of working Americans. But if such came to pass, it seems likely that businesses would feel more confident to raise prices, secure in the conviction that consumers will be better able to afford them.</p>
<p>We might then expect consumer inflation to begin rising in the coming months. This wouldn’t come as a surprise to everyone. <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/a3d233ae-4943-49b8-9d68-4ce2dc0ac44c" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Adam Posen</a> of the Peterson Institute for International Economics has consistently maintained that it would take about a year for tariffs to work their way into consumer prices and if they do, whatever workers gain in better wages may get eaten up in higher prices. What would make such inflation especially fraught is that the <a href="https://www.clevelandfed.org/publications/economic-commentary/2025/ec-202511-did-inflation-affect-households-differently" target="_blank" rel="noopener">inflation rate</a> on the basket of goods consumed by working Americans is higher than that on their wealthy compatriots, who are benefiting disproportionately not only from comparatively lower inflation but from rising stock markets.</p>
<p>Donald Trump’s remarkable achievement was to build a political coalition that united two classes once seen to be in conflict — owners and workers. Owners with deep pockets powered the Republican Party’s fundraising edge, which currently sees the party raising <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2026/02/10/us/politics/republicans-democrats-midterms-fund-raising.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">twice the funds</a> of the Democrats. Meanwhile the working class, and especially the white working class, which traditionally was a Democratic constituency, were won over by his populist pledges and provided the bedrock of Republican support.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;Donald Trump’s remarkable achievement was to build a political coalition that united two classes once seen to be in conflict.&#8221;</div>
<p>The owners are as happy as ever — why wouldn&#8217;t they be? Their asset values and profits rise by the day and their taxes are falling. But workers appear to be growing disgruntled. What may yet save the Trump coalition is that the attachment of the white working class to the Republican Party appears to be as much <a href="https://centerforpolitics.org/crystalball/its-not-the-economy-stupid-the-ideological-foundations-of-white-working-class-republicanism/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">cultural</a> as economic, so voters may be willing to swallow their discontent. On the other hand, Trump’s success owed also to his ability to motivate low-propensity voters, and rising discontent at their economic lot could cause many of them to just stay home in November.</p>
<p>If the Republicans consequently lose control of Congress in November, Trump’s entire agenda will get bogged down in inquiries and legislative obstruction. When Bill Clinton lost Congress in the 1994 elections, his political program largely came to an end, and he was forced to govern as a soft Republican. Trump wouldn’t likely shift towards the other side, but he would find his room for maneuver, particularly on the home front, constantly reined in. Democrats could de-fund ICE, launch impeachment proceedings against administration members, block his appointments and pass anti-tariff resolutions.</p>
<p>Along with immigration, trade was to be a signature policy that defined the second Trump administration. At the moment, he appears to be losing control of both narratives, with polls suggesting growing disapproval of his performance on both immigration and the economy. He has less than nine months to turn that around, and for that to happen his policies will need to deliver on the pledges he made. When it comes to tariffs, he needs manufacturing employment to pick up, wage gains to grow and inflation to stay low. Right now, the omens don’t look good for him.</p>
<p>But then, if a week is a long time in politics, nine months could feel like an eternity — for better, or for worse.</p>
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					<title>How to unleash Cuba</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2026/02/how-to-unleash-cuba/?edition=us</link>
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										<unherd:main_theme>Donroe Doctrine</unherd:main_theme>
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						<![CDATA[John Masko]]>
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							<![CDATA[Cuba needs change (Carol M. Highsmith/Buyenlarge/Getty)]]>
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							<![CDATA[<p><strong>John Masko</strong> is a journalist based in Boston, specialising in business and international politics.</p>
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						<![CDATA[ is a journalist based in Boston, specialising in business and international politics.]]>
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										<pubDate>Mon, 02 Feb 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Mon, 02 Feb 2026 00:33:34 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
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								<![CDATA[The island is ripe for investment]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Weeks after the Trump administration arrested Venezuelan tyrant Nicolás Maduro, US officials are training their sights on a familiar next target: Cuba. Late last week, Trump </span><a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/fact-sheets/2026/01/fact-sheet-president-donald-j-trump-addresses-threats-to-the-united-states-by-the-government-of-cuba/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400">issued</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400"> an executive order requiring that any country supplying oil to the beleaguered island dictatorship face US sanctions. Reports now </span><a href="https://www.wsj.com/world/americas/the-u-s-is-actively-seeking-regime-change-in-cuba-by-the-end-of-the-year-1d0f178a?gaa_at=eafs&amp;gaa_n=AWEtsqd710XC7F9rSzfUdJpp8doN2_0vL5Gyt3nfZnu3ZvclCCezs6b7BPRWhUQcrCc%3D&amp;gaa_ts=6978a3c9&amp;gaa_sig=5jnzzwSoLoK5wOzxL8wHt5Qk9RjEvGtjSI181Tn79c9XNSG1HgsujPaU4p-rp3Ikjqng0g3BqMgb3wgB87Shkg%3D%3D" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400">suggest</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400"> that the Trump administration aims to depose the communist regime by the end of the year, and is searching for Cuban government insiders who can help cut a deal. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">The administration’s reasoning is not merely that momentum is on its side, but that Maduro’s Venezuela — particularly its oil — had long served as one of very few lifelines available to a Cuban economy teetering on the edge of collapse. Now that Venezuela under Delcy Rodríguez has cut off that supply, an energy crisis is adding to an already bleak economic picture on the island. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">By 1 January, two days before Maduro’s removal from Venezuela, Cuba had </span><a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/cuba/cuba-brink?check_logged_in=1&amp;utm_medium=promo_email&amp;utm_source=lo_flows&amp;utm_campaign=article_link&amp;utm_term=article_email&amp;utm_content=20260123" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400">lost</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400"> over 10% of its population over the previous five years. Over the same period, the country’s GDP declined by 11%. Around the country, Cubans are today frequently in the dark, owing not only to energy shortages but a disintegrating power grid. Cuba continues to sort through the rubble of Hurricane Melissa, which last October damaged almost 100,000 homes and much of eastern Cuba’s farmland, while the country also faces an epidemic of dengue fever. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">To topple the government of Cuba — one which has held its population to early-20</span><span style="font-weight: 400">th</span><span style="font-weight: 400"> century living standards, repressed all political dissent, and been a thorn in the side of US policy for six decades — has long been an impossible dream for American presidents. Only two years after Fidel Castro and Che Guevara’s revolution, in 1959, President Kennedy failed multiple times to dislodge the new regime, whether by covert invasion force or assassination. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Eventually, the US settled on an indefinite extension of the 1960 trade embargo, a policy designed to ensure that if a longtime friend and ally of Washington was suddenly going to embrace a political ideology antithetical to American values and interests, it would have no support from American commerce in doing so. The policy, which has persisted to this day, succeeded in washing America’s hands of communist Cuba. It failed entirely, however, to pressure Cuba to pursue a different course. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">The embargo’s failure would become synonymous with the axiom that one cannot starve revolutionaries out of their ideologies merely by disengaging with them. As both Cuba and the hermit kingdom of North Korea have shown, communist leaders can use their control over the flow of information to blame their citizens’ poverty on the very nations they have alienated, t</span><span style="font-weight: 400">hus instilling an “us against the world” mentality that dulls the gnaw of poverty, keeps counterrevolution at bay, and preserves leaders’ power.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">But even despots cannot ignore the needs of their people forever. After the Soviet Union’s fall in 1990 deprived Havana of a longtime source of international aid, Cuba’s GDP </span><a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/cuba/cuba-brink?check_logged_in=1&amp;utm_medium=promo_email&amp;utm_source=lo_flows&amp;utm_campaign=article_link&amp;utm_term=article_email&amp;utm_content=20260123" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400">fell</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400"> by a third. Its economy limped along for two decades. Desperate Cubans regularly left the island on unseaworthy crafts to seek asylum in America, in a manner reminiscent of the South Vietnamese “Boat People” of the Seventies. By 2010, Castro’s brother and successor Raúl was </span><a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/cuba/cuba-brink?check_logged_in=1&amp;utm_medium=promo_email&amp;utm_source=lo_flows&amp;utm_campaign=article_link&amp;utm_term=article_email&amp;utm_content=20260123" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400">declaring</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400"> that “we reform, or we sink”. </span></p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/01/china-doesnt-fear-the-donroe-doctrine/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/01/china-doesnt-fear-the-donroe-doctrine/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/GettyImages-2243556893.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/01/china-doesnt-fear-the-donroe-doctrine/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested Reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/01/china-doesnt-fear-the-donroe-doctrine/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>China doesn’t fear the Donroe Doctrine</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/01/china-doesnt-fear-the-donroe-doctrine/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Rana Mitter</a></p></div></a></div>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">In the early 2010s, Cuba conducted a surface-level political and economic reform sufficient to convince US President Barack Obama to normalize diplomatic relations with the island in 2014, for the first time since the Kennedy presidency, in exchange for Cuba allowing American investment in the island. But over the years that followed, most of those investments went nowhere, waylaid by a command-and-control economy that government insiders still controlled. There was therefore little American political resistance when President Trump cut off diplomatic relations again in 2017. In 2021, Cuba experienced its widest-reaching anti-government protests since the 1959 revolution. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Today, Cuba — as a nation, a polity, and an economy — is at its lowest ebb since the collapse of the Soviet Union. With Fidel dead and Raúl retired, the family that held the Cuban communist project together is now gone. President Trump is right to see an opportunity. But to take advantage of that opportunity, he will need to bear in mind that Cuba is nothing like Venezuela. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">For one thing, Cuba is a bureaucratic government with power diffused among a large group of party elites. President Díaz-Canel was hand-picked by Cuba’s Communist Party apparatus, and elected by a congress controlled by it. While Venezuela also has a congress, Maduro was a strongman elected by popular (sometimes rigged) elections. Because Maduro was the main locus of political power, a “decapitation” strategy of removing him from the country stood a chance of drastically changing Venezuelan government policy even as the rest of the government structure remained intact. In the few weeks since Maduro’s arrest, this does indeed seem to be happening. But in Cuba, there is no Maduro figure to remove. Power resides in Cuba’s Communist Party and its congress. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Another difference is ideology. Cuba is a one-party state. Venezuela, at least officially, is not. Venezuelan Chavists follow a populist socialist program with considerable ideological flexibility, whereas Cuba is notorious for its legalistic interpretation of Marxist-Leninist communism. While both nations have always had their share of graft, Chavist Venezuela’s lodestar is self-enrichment for the politically connected, whereas Cuba’s is Marxism-Leninism, even when it impoverishes everyone. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">And then there’s the question of historical memory. Whereas Venezuela was a functional democratic country within the memory of most Venezuelans, Cuba has been a communist dictatorship for as long as most Cubans have been alive. And even those few born during the reign of Cuba’s pre-revolutionary dictator Fulgencio Batista will find few lessons from that grim era.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Based on these contrasts, the Trump administration should instead base its Cuba policy on six decades of US experience with the country — as well as a century of experience with other communist regimes. These encounters might suggest that neither decapitation nor further economic sanctions are, in themselves, viable pathways to change in Cuba. An effective strategy, if it involves a stick in one hand, must be balanced by a carrot in the other.</span></p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;The Trump administration should base its Cuba policy on six decades of US experience with the country&#8221;</div>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">The most powerful carrot in our arsenal is the prosperity that comes from friendship with the United States. American strategy must make it painfully clear to Cuban leaders and citizens alike what they are missing by not being full members of the international community and the Western Hemisphere specifically. Today’s American leaders can learn a great deal here from the statesmen of the late Cold War, particularly men like Secretary of State George Shultz, who used Western economic dynamism to persuade the Soviet Union’s leaders essentially to legislate themselves out of existence.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Creating a functional democratic government in Cuba is going to require hand-holding. Cuba has been steeped only in communist political philosophies for the lifetimes of most Cubans. To learn anything else will take a great deal of external commitment. Cuba — like many other communist adversaries — also has a history of feigning reforms to attract concessions: as President Obama learned to his cost in 2014. To stick with the late Cold War theme, then, “Trust but Verify” will need to be the watchword of any US strategy toward Cuba, just as it was for Ronald Reagan and the Soviet Union.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Yet if the administration’s current strategy as widely reported, covertly convincing a critical mass of public officials to turn on the government is unlikely to work. If the Cuban Communist Party knows one thing, it is how to sniff out and imprison counterrevolutionaries. And even were this strategy to succeed, pandemonium would be the likeliest result in a nation that has known nothing but one-party rule for the better part of a century. Far better would be a policy that unequivocally shows an exhausted people the perks of friendship with the United States, and persuades them to leave communism behind. No coups required; a whimper, not a bang. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Trump’s first priority, then, should be to open the information environment in Cuba. An advantage here is Elon Musk’s Starlink, which could connect the whole island cheaply (or even, knowing Musk’s tendencies toward political philanthropy, for free). Reliable internet needs electricity, and Cubans are struggling with broken-down power grids. Happily, American firms have the dollars to help them rebuild. All Cuba’s government would need to do to receive these fabulous benefits would be to end online censorship. Were Cuba to do so and then go back on its word, meanwhile, those benefits could be taken away just as easily. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Once information is flowing more freely, the Trump administration should set to work on two initiatives at once — one economic, one political. First, Trump should work with US businesses to put together a massive package of potential investment for Cuba. In doing so, it should pretend to be living in a parallel universe with no trade embargo. It is difficult to overstate just how much American imports could contribute to the Cuban economy were the embargo to be lifted, even in part. One might compare Cuba to the Dominican Republic, a US ally with a similar population but which </span><a href="https://tradingeconomics.com/dominican-republic/exports-by-category" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400">earns</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400"> seven times as much export income as Cuba.</span></p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/01/agatha-christies-red-scare/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/01/agatha-christies-red-scare/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/Untitled-design-1.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/01/agatha-christies-red-scare/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested Reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/01/agatha-christies-red-scare/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Agatha Christie and the red scare</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/01/agatha-christies-red-scare/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Alwyn Turner</a></p></div></a></div>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">How might trade with the US uplift Cuba? Take the example of cigars. Cuba remains, in the estimation of most aficionados, the undisputed quality king. At the moment, though, Cuba’s total international cigar </span><a href="https://www.reuters.com/business/retail-consumer/cubas-top-cigarmaker-breaks-record-with-sales-827-million-2024-2025-02-24/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400">sales</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400"> are around $1 billion. The country’s total exports, in all categories, are barely above $2 billion. The US </span><a href="https://www.grandviewresearch.com/horizon/outlook/cigar-and-cigarillos-market/united-states" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400">market</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400"> for premium cigars alone is $4 billion. Were American cigar smokers to choose Cuban cigars even half the time, US demand for Cuban cigars alone would equal the total exports of the entire island of Cuba. And that’s just cigars. Cuba also has some of the world’s best land for the cultivation of sugar and fruit, and some of the world’s largest deposits of nickel — a metal vital for producing electronics from phones to electric vehicles.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Once Trump puts together a suitably impressive list of hypothetical commitments, he can begin selling them to the Cuban government and its people. He could offer those investments individually, alongside matching abatements of the embargo, in exchange for specific political changes in Cuba. These could start with concessions in economic policy — allowing private businesses to compete with state-owned monopolies, for instance, or else setting exchange rates, tax policies, and legal frameworks to encourage foreign investment. As the economic rewards get bigger, meanwhile, Trump might exchange them for ever-greater political reforms ending, finally, with the abolition of Cuba’s one-party state, the freeing of political prisoners, and free movement between Cuba and the US. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Cuba is a once proud and vibrant country that has been hollowed by 65 years of Marxist-Leninist dictatorship. Rebuilding will take time, and such an ambitious program might seem optimistic given the long decades of failure. Yet here it’s useful, perhaps, to return to Venezuela, which the US currently controls. Maduro’s regime was Cuba’s closest ally, and Havana is watching what happens in Venezuela very carefully. If Trump can prove that by bringing a longtime enemy into alignment with Washington, and is able to better the lives of Venezuela’s people, Cubans are likely to be far more receptive to similar ideas for their own country. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">President Trump is an extraordinarily effective salesman, and this is fundamentally a strategy of salesmanship. The greatest obstacle to its success might be the President’s own capriciousness. Rebuilding Venezuela is a years-long project, and at times it seems that Trump has already lost interest in it. Cuba will take far longer, and will require a new level of patience for his administration. But if Trump can retain focus on the long haul of rebuilding Venezuela and Cuba, however, he will have done more to advance American leadership in its near-abroad than any president in decades. And conversely, he will not be able to achieve his goal of reasserting the Monroe Doctrine and reestablishing US dominance over the Western Hemisphere with a blood enemy in Cuba.</span></p>
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					<title>An alternative budget for Britain</title>
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										<unherd:main_theme>Economics</unherd:main_theme>
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							<![CDATA[Rachel Reeves, centre, has been offered advice by Yanis Varoufakis, Arthur Latter, Rian Chad Whitton, Julia Garayo Willemyns and others. Credit: Tom Ough and Jamie Tomlinson]]>
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										<pubDate>Tue, 25 Nov 2025 00:03:27 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Tue, 25 Nov 2025 00:24:37 +0000</updated>
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		<category><![CDATA[Autumn Budget]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Economics]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[rachel reeves]]></category>
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								<![CDATA[Economists and iconoclasts offer Rachel Reeves some help]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">As she presents her Autumn Budget on Wednesday, Chancellor Rachel Reeves must contend with sluggish productivity, restrictive fiscal rules and restive backbenchers. The likelihood is that she will again raise the tax burden. Stray but a little, and she will trigger a sell-off of gilts — posing further danger to the economy and to Keir Starmer’s government.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Are there more imaginative ideas out there? Gathered by </span><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">UnHerd</span></i><span style="font-weight: 400;">, a selection of economists and other experts — including the Reagan adviser Arthur Laffer, the guerrilla pro-growth activist Joe Reeve, and the former Greek finance minister Yanis Varoufakis — offer suggestions of their own. </span></p>
<p style="text-align: center;">***</p>
<p><strong>Abolish the OBR</strong></p>
<p><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">By Jonny Ball, contributing editor at UnHerd</span></i></p>
<p dir="ltr"><span data-darkreader-inline-color="" data-darkreader-inline-bgcolor="">In 2016, a referendum was won under the slogan “Take Back Control”. Brexit was a project framed around a restoration of sovereignty, for the decisions of the elected legislature to override those of a bureaucratic supranational state.</span></p>
<p dir="ltr"><span data-darkreader-inline-color="" data-darkreader-inline-bgcolor="">Having extricated ourselves from the opaque, undemocratic rule of Brussels and Strasbourg, we remain shackled to another undemocratic mess: a bizarre, byzantine patchwork of quasi-autonomous bodies that limit the ambitions of the executive and constrain the decision-making of elected politicians. No other organization encapsulates this trend better than the Office for Budget Responsibility.</span></p>
<p dir="ltr"><span data-darkreader-inline-color="" data-darkreader-inline-bgcolor="">This week’s Budget should be the last written under the de facto control of this failed Cameroon creation. Established to prevent government profligacy in the wake of the financial crisis, it has instead tied the hands of successive chancellors to a rigid fiscal orthodoxy based on wildly inaccurate forecasts. </span><span data-darkreader-inline-color="" data-darkreader-inline-bgcolor="">It has a remit to scrutinize policy costings and evaluate the government’s performance against its own fiscal targets, with Rachel Reeves strengthening its powers upon entering No 11 by legislating so that no Treasury can bypass its bean-counting processes (her so-called “fiscal lock”).</span><span data-darkreader-inline-color="" data-darkreader-inline-bgcolor=""> But its interpretations are notoriously fallible, conforming to the famous description of economics as “the dismal science”. Governments are left chasing their own tails, fighting to fill “black holes” that refer to (invariably incorrect) OBR predictions about tax and non-discretionary spending years into the future. These predictions have about as much accuracy as could be gleaned from reading tea-leaves.</span></p>
<p dir="ltr"><span data-darkreader-inline-color="" data-darkreader-inline-bgcolor="">The sins of the OBR’s modeling are many. It consistently underestimates the multiplier effects of infrastructure projects. It fails to take into account the true level of private sector activity that results from having properly functioning national assets. </span><span data-darkreader-inline-color="" data-darkreader-inline-bgcolor="">This means that it does not adequately distinguish</span><span data-darkreader-inline-color="" data-darkreader-inline-bgcolor=""> between day-to-day revenue spending (on public sector wages, pensions and benefits, for example), and making long-term investments (in areas such as road and rail networks, energy generation and grid upgrades, digital connectivity, or even R&amp;D). As a result, we overspend on the things we won’t get a return on, and underspend on investments of lasting benefit.</span></p>
<p dir="ltr"><span data-darkreader-inline-color="" data-darkreader-inline-bgcolor="">Rather than taking into account the full value of long-term investment, the parsimonious approach of the OBR turns book-balancing and debt reduction into a quasi-religious exercise spread over narrow five-year periods. To once again take back control, the Chancellor should exit a doom-loop that locks us into perennially low productivity, low growth, and a rapidly depleting public realm.</span></p>
<p style="text-align: center;">***</p>
<p><strong>Cut taxes and welfare</strong></p>
<p><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">By Arthur Laffer, Reagan adviser who gave his name to the “Laffer Curve”</span></i></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Independence from Britain is celebrated on average every seven days around the world. Britain’s descent has been almost as great as her preeminence once was — all due to taxing and regulating those who produce and indulging and paying people not to produce. Think of it — which do you think is better for Britain? a) paying people not to work, or b) cutting tax rates on people who do work? Your choice. </span></p>
<p style="text-align: center;">***</p>
<p><strong>Make nuclear power viable again</strong></p>
<p><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">By Joe Reeve, co-founder of Looking for Growth</span></i></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Every time you put the heating on, you’re paying for Britain’s broken energy system. We were the first country to build nuclear power, but now it takes decades and costs more here than anywhere else. So we buy power from abroad — and every family pays for it in higher bills.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Cheap energy is the foundation of prosperity. The UK pays four times more for energy than the USA. That&#8217;s why our economy has flatlined while theirs grows.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The government just spent £1 billion subsidizing energy bills for millionaires because we failed to build cheap energy. This is backwards. We need to stop subsidizing demand and start fixing supply.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The Nuclear Regulatory Review just declared Britain’s nuclear regulator “broken” and showed how to fix it: merge eight fragmented bodies into one, have the Government set risk standards instead of risk-averse regulators, use a fleet approach to approve designs once and roll them out nationwide, and stop legal delays by eliminating duplicative processes.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Rachel Reeves can make this happen. Treasury approval and fiscal rules determine whether nuclear gets built, and the Chancellor can put pressure on the Prime Minister. Even better for Labour, they can claim a win before 2029: streamlined approvals mean small modular reactors can break ground and create jobs within this Parliament.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">This unlocks everything. Cheap power means competitive energy for business, AI data centers, and real growth. It means there will be no need for winter fuel payouts. Labour must accept all the recommendations of the report.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Stop subsidizing failure. Let Britain build. Nuclear power is how we cut bills for good.</span></p>
<p style="text-align: center;">***</p>
<p style="text-align: left;"><strong>Bite the bullet</strong></p>
<p><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">By John Rapley, political economist</span></i></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The original sin of the Chancellorship of Rachel Reeves was committed in the 2024 election campaign, when she made a promise she could never keep: to grow the economy and improve public services without raising taxes on working people. Ever since, she’s been bedeviled by a game of whack-a-mole in which she fiddles constantly with the tax system in ways that never seem to raise enough money but do little to stir growth.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The result is that both her tenure and the premiership of Keir Starmer now look imperiled. On its current path, the Labour Party is headed for a trouncing in the spring elections, whereupon a rebellion against Starmer looks likely. Given how closely Starmer and Reeves are bound together, her time as Chancellor may thus be running out.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">So why not secure her legacy now? Reeves can make a major change which, if sufficiently unpopular to almost guarantee the end of her tenure, would put Britain on a more solid footing for the long term: raise income taxes. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">As Scandinavian countries show, the most sustainable welfare states are those which are based on a broad social contract — that the price of citizenship secures its benefits. Polls repeatedly show that Britons want good pensions and healthcare but also want someone else to pay for it. Someone must resolve that tension, and doing it might send Reeves down in flames, but secure her place in history. But I won’t be placing any large bets on it.</span></p>
<p style="text-align: center;">***</p>
<p><strong>Introduce tiered reserve payments</strong></p>
<p><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">By James Meadway, economist </span></i></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Through a happy coincidence, the £20 billion that Rachel Reeves is likely to need to find in order to meet her own self-imposed and badly-written fiscal rules this week is the same amount the Government will hand over to the Bank of England to cover its notional losses on its quantitative easing program. If Reeves wants to do one useful thing next week, rather than a smorgasbord of badly judged ones, she could cut these payments dramatically. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Launched in 2009, as a novel wheeze to support a flailing economy in the teeth of the global financial crisis, QE involves the Bank of England issuing new money in the form of its reserves, which it then uses to buy (mostly) UK government bonds from the financial institutions holding them. The idea, originally, was to encourage panicked banks to lend more; in 2020, with the exceptional spending demands of the pandemic, the same QE process was used as a backdoor means of financing government borrowing. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The result was that the Bank was paying interest to commercial banks on the reserves that it had given them, while receiving interest payments on the bonds it had bought. As interest rates have risen, the interest payments on those reserves have risen far above the payments it receives on bonds: by the Bank’s estimates, this difference is around a £150 billion loss over the lifetime of the QE program. The only beneficiaries of these payments are the commercial banks, whose already substantial profits have been inflated by the Bank of England’s generosity.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The Bank claims the payments are necessary to allow its interest rate setting to work effectively. But as its own former deputy governor Paul Tucker has pointed out, these payments don’t need to be made on the whole amount held. A “tiered reserve” system, where the Bank pays interest on a small part of the reserves, would work just as well. Savings could be very substantial: perhaps, on calculations by the New Economics Foundation, £11.5 billion a year could be saved. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The commercial banks won’t like it. They lose interest payments. But for the rest of us, and surely for a Chancellor desperately scrabbling for cash, it’s close to a no-brainer.</span></p>
<p style="text-align: center;">***</p>
<p><strong>Break the triple lock, bring in optional property tax</strong></p>
<p><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">By Julia Willemyns, co-founder of the Centre for British Progress</span></i></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The arithmetic is brutal. Gilt yields are climbing, the OBR’s headroom has evaporated, and the government has boxed itself in with pledges not to raise major taxes. Our debt interest payments are larger than our defense budget. Demographic pressures are intensifying. The Chancellor needs to find billions without breaking promises, raise revenue without killing growth, and keep bond markets onside.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Most Budget choices in this environment involve painful trade-offs. But two reforms could improve both fiscal position and economic efficiency: fixing the triple lock formula and replacing stamp duty with an annual property tax.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The triple lock is broken. It double-counts price increases: when inflation spikes one year and feeds into wage growth the next, pensions rise twice for the same underlying cost increase. Pensions have risen far faster than forecast. The OBR projects it will add 1.6 percentage points of GDP to state spending over 50 years (£46 billion annually in today’s money).</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">My preferred solution measures earnings growth and the 2.5% floor over 10 years rather than 12 months, while keeping the annual inflation lock unchanged. This makes the earnings component more stable and prevents double-counting. Pensions would match inflation annually and increase with earnings. Modeling suggests savings of £6.2 billion by 2030, rising to £36 billion by 2040. Crucially, it makes future spending more predictable.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">We should also reconsider stamp duty. It is textbook bad tax. It punishes economically beneficial activity (moving house), creates massive deadweight loss, and can be entirely avoided. We should replace stamp duty with an optional property tax: buyers choose upfront stamp duty or switch to a modest annual charge. You could phase this over 10 years and add a 0.5% rate on property values above £2 million to ensure immediate revenue positivity.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The math works. Modeling shows this generates £1.7 billion above the Stamp Duty Land Tax baseline in year one, rising to £8 billion annually by 2050. It also transforms volatile, pro-cyclical revenue into predictable, stable receipts.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">This is what good fiscal policy looks like: reforms making politically popular institutions sustainable, and revenue that grows the economy rather than strangling it.</span></p>
<p dir="ltr" style="text-align: center;">***</p>
<p><strong>Help companies buy machine tools</strong></p>
<p><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">By Rian Chad Whitton, industrial analyst</span></i></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Britain spends a remarkable amount on industrial policy. The OECD claims we spend 2.7% of GDP on industrial policy measures. Compared to other countries, we are heavily weighted toward providing tax reliefs and grants for small businesses, research and development, and funding for “skills”. But despite all of this, we have a massive problem with capital equipment spending. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Currently, </span><a href="https://www.mta.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2023/08/CECIMO-Global-Machine-Tool-Report-2022-May-23.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">UK machine tool consumption</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> is just 61% of France’s, 40% of Turkey’s, and 15% of Germany’s. We spend under £500 million on industrial robots annually, and we have a lower</span> <a href="https://www.themanufacturer.com/articles/fanuc-calls-for-wider-automation-uptake-to-realise-true-value-of-uk-manufacturing/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">robot-to-worker</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> ratio than the global average. This shortfall limits our productive capacity and our attractiveness as a location for manufacturers to invest in. We need these machines, and we need them fast. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">I propose a £1 billion machine financing fund to help companies buy machine tools and industrial robots. This would effectively double British industry’s spending capacity for automation. This would mean a rapid uptake in installations, as well as allowing firms to spend more freely on new employees and facilities. These investments are initially challenging for companies, as they usually take a short hit in profits. Targeted government support in this space would provide much-needed stability. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Though not a large amount of money in budgetary terms, it should still be financed by making cuts elsewhere. The government could cut the</span><a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/contracts-for-difference-cfd-allocation-round-7-statutory-notices" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;"> £900 million</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> earmarked for the seventh CfD auction, which will lock in expensive electricity generation. There could also be a significant tightening up on R&amp;D tax credit relief. This year, over</span><a href="https://www.rossmartin.co.uk/sme-tax-news/8711-nao-flags-fraud-and-error-at-hmrc?utm_source=chatgpt.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;"> £400 million</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> was lost in R&amp;D relief-related error and fraud. We could also cut the boiler upgrade scheme subsidy of</span><a href="https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/environmental-and-social-schemes/boiler-upgrade-scheme-bus" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;"> £205 million</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Importantly, this £1 billion would not be dressed up as an investment in innovation or start-ups. Its purpose would be to provide capital equipment to established companies, whether they be large multinational or family-run machine shops. This is a notable area of weakness for Britain, and the situation can be rapidly improved through a simple reallocation of spending.</span></p>
<figure id="attachment_1038543" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-1038543" style="width: 1024px" class="wp-caption aligncenter"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="wp-image-1038543 size-full" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/GettyImages-1087870890.jpg" alt="" width="1024" height="683" srcset="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/GettyImages-1087870890.jpg 1024w, https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/GettyImages-1087870890.jpg?resize=300,200 300w, https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/GettyImages-1087870890.jpg?resize=768,512 768w, https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/GettyImages-1087870890.jpg?resize=267,178 267w, https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/GettyImages-1087870890.jpg?resize=253,169 253w, https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/GettyImages-1087870890.jpg?resize=250,167 250w, https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/GettyImages-1087870890.jpg?resize=660,440 660w, https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/GettyImages-1087870890.jpg?resize=480,320 480w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" /><figcaption id="caption-attachment-1038543" class="wp-caption-text">Should the Chancellor support investment in robotics? Photo: Mason Trinca for <em>The Washington Post</em> via Getty Images</figcaption></figure>
<p><strong>Establish a national investment bank</strong></p>
<p><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">By Yanis Varoufakis, economist and former Greek Minister of Finance</span></i></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Upon winning office, the Government should have established a national investment bank (NIB) to finance green and advanced technology enterprises to the tune of no less than 3% of national income (or around £90 billion) annually. </span><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/11/the-delusions-of-the-centrist-chancellor/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">As I wrote last week</span></a><b>,</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> the money would not come from the sale of UK government bonds but from bonds issued by NIB itself, to be repaid not from taxation but from the future profits of the green projects it funds. All it would take for NIB bonds to sell like hot cakes would be an announcement by the Bank of England that it is standing by, ready, if need be, to purchase these bonds on the secondary market.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The NIB should still be established. By now, Reeves should know that it is foolish to allow fiscal rules and narrow cash calculations to prevent necessary enterprise. “Anything we can do, we can afford,” J.M. Keynes said in 1942. The problem in the UK today is that, after decades of reducing the state’s capacity to do things, there is little that can be done well. Only by investing public money can Britain’s productive frontier expand again, drawing in private investment in pursuit of common goals.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Development and prosperity will not come because Reeves peppers every speech with a hundred mentions of the word “growth”. It will not happen because she appeases the City by continuing to sign bankers’ welfare checks at the behest of the Bank of England. And it certainly won’t transpire if she remains determined above all else to prove her fiscal orthodoxy to conservative critics who will never give her the light of day anyway. Mindless fiscal rules will only worsen the country’s stagnation.</span></p>
<p style="text-align: center;">***</p>
<p><strong>Boost public sector investment</strong></p>
<p><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">By David Owen, founder and chief economist of Saltmarsh Economics </span></i></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">In ideal circumstances, pre-Budget purdah would have been strictly enforced. And, as others like the National Institute of Economic and Social Research (NIESR) have recommended, Rachel Reeves would move to only one major fiscal event a year, with the OBR focused much more on long-term debt sustainability. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The fiscal rules would be tweaked to give much more headroom for the Chancellor to boost long-term public sector investment, helping crowd in private sector spending and improve the UK’s dire productivity performances. Public sector net worth would be targeted, not net financial liabilities of the public sector — for the current measure that does not take account of any value of long-term investment projects, only the debt incurred in undertaking them. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Former heads of the Civil Service would have advised on what really went wrong on their watch, in terms of contracts struck with the private sector, and with privatizations. How come so many of them down the years have proved so costly and led to such bad outturns? Why is public sector productivity so dismal? Lessons would have been learned. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Long-term enhanced capital allowances and other measures would be introduced specifically targeted on the eight sectors that the government’s June 2035 industrial strategy document singled out as key in improving the UK’s productivity performance: namely advanced manufacturing, clean energy, the creative industries, defense, digital and technologies, financial services, life sciences and professional and business services. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">It is telling how few people appear to have even heard about the 19th industrial strategy review unveiled since New Labour came to power in 1997, earlier in the summer. Up to now, all such industrial strategies have sunk without trace, despite all the work and effort that has gone into them. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Of course, diagnosing the UK’s problem is not the issue; whole forests have been cut down ever since Harold Wilson’s “White Heat of Technology” speech of 1963. But, as things stand, the UK economy seems to be stuck in a loop of disappointing productivity growth, endless discussion revolving around this cycle of two fiscal events a year, and whether the BofE will or will not cut rates at the next meeting. In my fantasy Budget, Rachel Reeves finally moves the dial. </span></p>
<p style="text-align: center;">***</p>
<p><strong>Give big cities fiscal freedom</strong></p>
<p><em><span style="font-weight: 400;">By Tom Forth, Leeds-based startup founder</span></em></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">In the financial year ending March 2024, Leeds completed nearly 4,500 homes. That was the most in four decades and 35% above its nationally-set local target. If replicated everywhere this building rate would deliver well over 300,000 homes nationally. The rate has kept up since.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Britain’s desperately needed extra homes aren’t the only things getting built in Leeds. The proposed expansion of Elland Road stadium to 53,000 was instantly backed by the city council and has received over 1,000 letters of public support and fewer than 100 in opposition. Microsoft are building a hyperscale data center on a site that will soon also hold one of the largest grid-scale batteries in a British city. The city’s economic vision includes nearly a dozen similar large sites with similarly grand ambitions. All of them will require infrastructure investment to succeed.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Leeds and cities like it need two things from the Budget: stability and freedom.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">For decades cancellations, delays, and curtailments to projects like HS2, Northern Powerhouse Rail (NPR), British Library North, and the rebuild of the Leeds General Infirmary have held back growth here. Local plans encouraged to be built around national investments ended up being held hostage by Westminster and Whitehall. A Budget that canceled investment in a mass transit system for Leeds for a fourth time in three decades would be a disaster as would continued dithering on NPR.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Even more importantly, Leeds needs freedom. Freedom to raise a workplace parking levy without the fear of a central government veto. Freedom like London to raise a business rates supplement without a referendum of local businesses. Freedom to raise a hotel tax as cities across Europe and the USA already do.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The ambitions of cities like Leeds have always exceeded the ambitions of central government for them. Unless we can raise money locally to invest in the infrastructure needed to underpin that ambition we will remain at the mercy of others and continue to achieve less prosperity than we could. Such asks are strictly beyond the scope of a Budget, but that would be a good place to start.</span></p>
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					<title>The delusions of UK fiscal centrists</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2025/11/the-delusions-of-the-centrist-chancellor/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://stage.unherd.com/2025/11/the-delusions-of-the-centrist-chancellor/?edition=us#comments</comments>
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										<unherd:main_theme>budget</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Yanis Varoufakis]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/yanis.jpg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>1</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[Leon Neal / Getty Images]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Yanis Varoufakis</strong> is an economist and former Greek Minister of Finance. He is the author of several best-selling books, most recently <em><a href="https://www.penguin.co.uk/books/475548/raise-your-soul-by-varoufakis-yanis/9781529970210" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.penguin.co.uk/books/475548/raise-your-soul-by-varoufakis-yanis/9781529970210&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1783678148958000&amp;usg=AOvVaw1NxNKwGArRJCAgzL7ZSnY4">Raise Your Soul! A personal history of resistance</a>.</em></p>
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						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>yanisvaroufakis</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is an economist and former Greek Minister of Finance. He is the author of several best-selling books, most recently <em><a href="https://www.penguin.co.uk/books/475548/raise-your-soul-by-varoufakis-yanis/9781529970210" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.penguin.co.uk/books/475548/raise-your-soul-by-varoufakis-yanis/9781529970210&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1783678148958000&amp;usg=AOvVaw1NxNKwGArRJCAgzL7ZSnY4">Raise Your Soul! A personal history of resistance</a>.</em>]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Wed, 19 Nov 2025 00:03:27 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Wed, 19 Nov 2025 00:03:27 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Bank of England]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Budget]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Economics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[rachel reeves]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Treasury]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://stage.unherd.com/?p=1037738</guid>
																												<description>
								<![CDATA[Mindless rules cause stagnation]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>If you’ve ever thought Rachel Reeves appears impotent, it’s because she willfully chose impotence last year. Before she even moved into 11 Downing Street, the incoming Chancellor <a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/01/rachel-reeves-is-a-pound-shop-george-osborne/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">acquiesced</a> to the straitjacket of constraints imposed on her by the Bank of England, the City of London and the Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR). But, to be fair, Reeves is not the first chancellor to undermine her own powers. In 1997, in a bid to project an image of economic responsibility, Gordon Brown granted the Bank of England independence to set monetary policy. And in 2010, George Osborne went a step further, establishing the OBR, another constraint on the Chancellor’s fiscal choices.</p>
<p>According to the logic of the radical center, politicians are easily lured by a siren’s song: the electorate’s demands for higher spending and lower taxes. And so they must bind themselves to a Ulysses pact. Homer’s hero tied himself to his ship’s mast and ordered his sailors to plug their ears with wax while sailing past the sirens’ coast. Similarly, centrist chancellors tie themselves to the mast of the Bank of England and the OBR — whose technocrats, their ears stuffed with the wax of economic models, are only too happy to run the economy on our behalf.</p>
<p>The problem with this centrist delusion is that, unlike meteorology or other hard sciences, there are no real experts to turn to on macroeconomic matters. As John Kenneth Galbraith once put it: &#8220;[t]he only function of economic forecasting is to make astrology look respectable.&#8221; There is a reason why not once in the history of capitalism have economic models predicted any major turning point: unlike the weather, which does not give a damn about our predictions or theories, what we call “the economy” is profoundly influenced by our predictions and theories regarding “the economy”.</p>
<p>In other words, economic models are constitutionally incapable of predicting economic phenomena reliably. Consider the Bank of England’s econometric models, which predict every quarter that inflation will fall below the Bank’s maximum target of 2% by the end of the year. These models are built on the assumption that inflation will revert to 2%, which is why they predict that it will. Mistaking an assumption for a forecast is a mistake that would be laughable if it were not so dangerous. And it is not just that.</p>
<p>If you look under the hood of the Bank of England’s models, you will find something else that is very strange. There is an assumption that there exist well-defined relationships linking the rate of interest with investment and with inflation: for example, if interest rates jump to, say, 6%, investment will fall by, say, 1% and inflation by, say, 0.8%. Unfortunately, these relationships are not just difficult to quantify — they are, in fact, impossible to define. The reason is that prices (and inflation) depend far more on variables that the Bank of England neither observes nor controls (such as the fluctuating monopoly power of businesses or overseas energy prices) than on the overnight interest rate that it controls. Similarly with the OBR’s medium- and long-term projections of growth: like sausages, if you knew how they were made, you would not want to touch them.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/10/javier-milei-is-no-libertarian/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/10/javier-milei-is-no-libertarian/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/GettyImages-1803109853.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/10/javier-milei-is-no-libertarian/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/10/javier-milei-is-no-libertarian/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Javier Milei is no libertarian</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/10/javier-milei-is-no-libertarian/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Yanis Varoufakis</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>This is why Rachel Reeves’ predecessors took the Bank of England and OBR forecasts with a massive pinch of salt, seldom hesitating to <a href="https://www.newstatesman.com/business/economics/2016/03/why-it-doesn-t-matter-all-george-osborne-breaking-yet-another-fiscal-rule" target="_blank" rel="noopener">break their own rules</a> when their best-laid plans were derailed. But not Reeves: paralyzed by the specter of Liz Truss re-emerging from the netherworld of financial catastrophes, the Chancellor is not only choosing to remain within her self-imposed straitjacket but is also reluctant to loosen its straps even a little to give herself some room to maneuver. Two examples illustrate this self-defeating reluctance.</p>
<p>First, Reeves claims she has no alternative than to raise taxes by around £30 billion, or 1% of national income, annually. Why? Only because the OBR says so. And why does the OBR say this? Because, in an attempt to repair its awful reputation for overestimating growth, the OBR suddenly downgraded its productivity growth estimate for the next decade. In short, taxes will go up because a panel of experts, known for their appallingly wrong forecasts, are now forecasting that their forecast was wrong.</p>
<p>If the OBR were similar to the Met Office, and the economy the weather, perhaps Reeves would have cause to stick to the OBR’s advice. But productivity depends on investment, which depends on the Chancellor’s choices: its path cannot be predicted by the OBR independently of the Chancellor’s policy choices. By deferring to the OBR to raise new taxes to an arbitrary number, Rachel Reeves is abdicating her responsibility for the economy.</p>
<p>Second, let’s say, for argument’s sake, that she really must find an additional £30 billion of so-called fiscal space annually. Why raise taxes when she can simply end the £34-billion annual payment the Treasury advances to the City of London for precisely nothing in return? As I <a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/01/rachel-reeves-is-a-pound-shop-george-osborne/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">explained</a> earlier this year, Reeves has actively allowed the Bank of England to damage the Treasury’s bottom line in two unconscionable ways. By selling off UK Government bonds at a lower price than the Bank purchased them for, she incurred an accounting loss that the Treasury is now plugging and increased the Government’s borrowing costs. Additionally, by choosing to pay private bankers the higher interest rate on every pound they keep in their Bank of England reserve account, the Government has been subsidizing the bankers to avoid lending out billions to the private sector.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;Taxes will go up because a panel of experts, known for their appallingly wrong forecasts, are now forecasting that their forecast was wrong.&#8221;</div>
<p>Could Reeves have prevented this madness? Is she not bound by the independence of the Bank of England? In the same way that Gordon Brown granted independence to the Bank, Rachel Reeves could have restricted its powers: by insisting it adopt two of the European Central Bank’s sensible policies. Firstly, hold the Bank’s stock of UK Government bonds until maturity to avoid losses from selling them cheaply on the secondary bond market. Secondly, pay interest to bankers only for a small portion of the money they deposit.</p>
<p>What if the Bank of England refused to comply with the Chancellor’s demands? Then she could respond by passing a bill that prevents the Treasury from reimbursing the Bank of England for such self-inflicted losses. Would this not cause the Bank of England to seek insolvency? Of course not. Central banks are not like private banks: as long as they issue the state’s currency, they cannot go broke even if they have negative equity for years on end.</p>
<p>Instead of confronting the Bank of England and showing less deference to the OBR&#8217;s predictions, Reeves resorts to acts of total self-sabotage: allowing bracket creep to tax more people whose purchasing power has shrunk; penalizing those who sacrifice salary for future pensions; and impeding the green transition with an absurd per-mile tax on electric vehicles.</p>
<p><iframe loading="lazy" title="Will Labour bankrupt Britain? - Yanis Varoufakis &amp; Wolfgang Munchau | The Econoclasts" width="640" height="360" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/_MMJK2III5k?start=33&#038;feature=oembed" frameborder="0" allow="accelerometer; autoplay; clipboard-write; encrypted-media; gyroscope; picture-in-picture; web-share" referrerpolicy="strict-origin-when-cross-origin" allowfullscreen></iframe></p>
<p>The worst part is that Reeves has forced us to debate matters that do not matter, such as foolish fiscal rules, while ignoring those that do. Since at least the 2008 financial crisis, Britain has been caught in a terrible situation of low investment, low wages, low productivity and, crucially, low expectations. Every government since 2008 has failed in its one key task: to convert the vast sums of money sloshing around in the City into productive investments.</p>
<p>For 17 years now, this failure has exacerbated the country’s “finance curse”. Britain is plagued by a process whereby high liquidity and low investment bolster Britain’s assetocracy, draw more foreign capital into the City (which is not invested in manufacturing), increase the UK’s current account deficit (a consequence of growing wealth disparities and declining domestic manufacturing), and cause even greater capital inflows to finance it. And so on. How can this vicious cycle be broken without causing a breakdown in either public confidence or the City?</p>
<p>What the Liz Truss debacle demonstrated is that Britain needs a more political government. To fund the production of things Britain desperately needs — such as green energy, cloud capital, a capacity to build infrastructure well, economically and on time — requires raising some taxes and issuing debt so as to crowd in the private money that has been hitherto reluctant to fund anything socially worthwhile. Sadly, Rachel Reeves, along with Keir Starmer, concluded instead that Britain needs less politics and more rules of the type that reality is bound, sooner or later, to violate.</p>
<p>Turning from Reeves’ sins of commission to her sins of omission, here is an example of what Labour should have done upon winning office. The Government should have established a national investment bank (NIB) to finance green and advanced technology enterprises to the tune of no less than 3% of national income (or around £90 billion) annually. The money would not come from the sale of UK Government bonds but from bonds issued by NIB itself, to be repaid not from taxation but from the future profits of the green projects it funds. All it would take for NIB bonds to sell like hot cakes would be an announcement by the Bank of England that it is standing by, ready, if need be, to purchase these bonds on the secondary market.</p>
<p>By now, Reeves should know that it is foolish to allow fiscal rules and narrow cash calculations to prevent necessary enterprise. “Anything we can do, we can afford,” J.M. Keynes said in 1942. The problem in the UK today is that, after decades of reducing the state&#8217;s capacity to do things, there is little that can be done well. Only by investing public money can Britain’s productive frontier expand again, drawing in private investment in pursuit of common goals.</p>
<p>Development and prosperity will not come because Reeves peppers every speech with a hundred mentions of the word “growth”. It will not happen because she appeases the City by continuing to sign bankers’ welfare checks at the behest of the Bank of England. And it certainly won’t transpire if she remains determined above all else to prove her fiscal orthodoxy to conservative critics who will never give her the light of day anyway. Mindless fiscal rules will only worsen the country’s stagnation.</p>
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															<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">1037738</post-id>				</item>
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					<title>Nigel Farage’s identity crisis</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2025/11/nigel-farages-identity-crisis/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://stage.unherd.com/2025/11/nigel-farages-identity-crisis/?edition=us#comments</comments>
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										<unherd:main_theme>weekend analysis</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Jonny Ball]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/Blue-34.jpg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>1</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[Benjamin Cremel / AFP via Getty Images]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><b>Jonny Ball </b>is a Contributing Editor at <em>UnHerd</em>. He formerly wrote under the name Despotic Inroad.</p>
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						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>DespoticInroad</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[<b>Jonny Ball </b>is a Contributing Editor at <em>UnHerd</em>. He formerly wrote under the name Despotic Inroad.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Sat, 08 Nov 2025 00:05:53 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Sun, 09 Nov 2025 10:17:54 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Antonio Gramsci]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Economics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Nigel Farage]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Reform]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Thatcherism]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://stage.unherd.com/?p=1036364</guid>
																												<description>
								<![CDATA[The old ideologies won’t work]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">From the confines of a fascist prison cell, t</span><span style="font-weight: 400;">he Sardinian Marxist, Antonio Gramsci, made his judgment on the political and economic cataclysms of the Thirties. “</span><span style="font-weight: 400;">The crisis,” he wrote, “consists precisely of the fact that the inherited is dying — and the new cannot be born; in this interregnum a great variety of morbid symptoms appear.” </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Over the past 15 years, Gramsci’s so-called “interregnum” passage has been quoted and </span><a href="https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/article/comment/old-dying-new-could-yet-be-born" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">repeated</span></a> <i><span style="font-weight: 400;">ad infinitum</span></i><span style="font-weight: 400;">. This is because it speaks so appositely to our current condition: an era of economic stagnation, </span><span style="font-weight: 400;">collapse in liberal norms, and destruction of old party loyalties. There’s </span><span style="font-weight: 400;">a sense of permanent flux, of implosion. We are in a void between the old regime of globalized economic and social liberalism, which began crashing down in 2008, and whatever system eventually emerges to take its place. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">But for now, nobody is in control. Growth remains elusive to Western governments of all political stripes. State capacity is shot, which means that governments are finding it increasingly difficult to deliver on projects or promises. As a result, economic stagnation has been corrosive to the authority of both the Tories and Labour.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">And so Nigel Farage has the opportunity to end the interregnum by leading a new type of government in 2029. For now, he sits at the head of a top-down, personalized party. If Reform wins, it would be the first government in over a century not headed by a Labour or Tory politician, and it would enter office on the basis that it would reconstitute the British state: rewired for harsher, harder times. </span><span style="font-weight: 400;">Liberal Britain, watching Farage’s ascent in horror, has not yet processed the full implications of a Reform government. The commentators read the polls, and know the numbers, but on some level still think of a Farage majority as an outlandish nightmare scenario. Yet it is a Farage majority that is the likely outcome of the next general election, even though the contours of Farageism are still being formed. We still do not know whether the British New Right would govern in the vein of a Giorgia Meloni or a Victor Orbán. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">These two respective leaders of Italy and Hungary represent two poles of possibility for Reform. Orbán’s self-described “illiberal democracy” in Budapest has combined big-state interventionism, and pro-natalist, pro-welfare policies, with economic nationalism and authoritarian creep. Meloni, meanwhile, has eschewed her roots on the fringes </span><span style="font-weight: 400;">as part of </span><span style="font-weight: 400;">Italy’s neo-fascist movement, and has instead governed as a traditional center-right politician — reserving additional rhetorical venom for migration and the culture wars. Farage has </span><a href="https://www.gbnews.com/news/uk/nigel-farage-giorgia-meloni-migrant-crisis-plan" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">praised both</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> leaders at different moments: Orbán, he </span><a href="https://www.valaszonline.hu/2019/02/14/orban-is-the-future-of-europe-nigel-farage-tells-valasz/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">once said</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">, is “the future of Europe”, while he </span><a href="https://www.gbnews.com/news/uk/nigel-farage-giorgia-meloni-migrant-crisis-plan" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">has also praised</span></a> <span style="font-weight: 400;">Meloni’</span><span style="font-weight: 400;">s uncompromising stance on migration. His policy prescriptions veer unpredictably between Meloni’s relative </span><span style="font-weight: 400;">moderation and </span><span style="font-weight: 400;">Orban’s more robust, statist, </span><span style="font-weight: 400;">abrasive</span><span style="font-weight: 400;"> populism. </span></p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;The supposedly competent moderates, the sensible &#8216;adults in the room&#8217;, have themselves created the warm petri dish in which Farageist populism flourishes.&#8221;</div>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">But Farage, like the best continental populists, has managed to successfully crystallize into a single issue all the fears, anxieties, and collective fantasies of a desperate public. Crime, dilapidated high streets, shoddy public services, falling real incomes, ballooning state spending — all have been distilled into the symbolic subject of the Migrant. Progressives still object, but within every creation myth is a kernel of rationality. In recent years, inward migration has hit an unprecedented scale. The electorate has made repeated injunctions to keep migration within sustainable limits, but the Left-liberal cultural and political establishment has refused to listen. The supposedly competent moderates, the sensible “adults in the room”, have themselves created the warm petri dish in which Farageist populism flourishes.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Reform’s task, therefore, has been to articulate a broad message that explains the country’s malaise. The party’s offering — big tent, low-migration patriotism — is enough for them to pose as a “none-of-the-above” option for the growing proportion of the electorate that is now prepared to reject technocracy. </span><span style="font-weight: 400;">But beyond Farage’s intuitive communicative flair, and his instinctive penchant for projecting good-humored but no-nonsense defiance towards Labour and the Conservatives, Reform still does not quite know what the party is</span><span style="font-weight: 400;"> for</span><span style="font-weight: 400;">. This week, the party </span><a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cMlTEg4qDsE" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">attempted</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> to add a veneer of economic credibility to its fiscal plans, abandoning the last manifesto’s promise to replay Trussomomics with a splurge of deficit-financed tax cuts. Instead, Reform promises that spending reductions will now precede any changes to the tax code. Deregulation will summon the animal spirits of British entrepreneurialism, Reform claims, and the state’s ever-expanding welfare commitments will be scaled back. This is a strategy of Meloni-ism writ large.</span></p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/10/the-green-partys-shallow-revolution/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/10/the-green-partys-shallow-revolution/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/GettyImages-2238975087.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/10/the-green-partys-shallow-revolution/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/10/the-green-partys-shallow-revolution/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The Green Party&#039;s shallow revolution</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/10/the-green-partys-shallow-revolution/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Jonny Ball</a></p></div></a></div>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">And yet it is a model of political economy that is wildly unsuited to our age of chaos. New political forms are emerging from the interregnum. For decades, Chinese state planners have been administering breakneck growth and dirigiste development via industrial subsidy, currency and capital controls, state-owned enterprises and hard protectionism. In the US, Donald Trump has upended 50 years of globalization and open markets, embracing a dog-eat-dog American nationalism that brings the age of liberalized trade and economic integration to a close. On the continent, the formerly austerity-happy EU and Germany have belatedly adopted public investment in strategic industries. In a geopolitically febrile climate, they are “derisking” and “reshoring” domestic production of critical commodities.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Set against this global context, a dogmatic return to free-market fetishism appears inadequate. The Austrian School, and the disciples of Hayek and Friedman, no longer have the answers. Farage, a consummately protean politician, appears to have understood this. In his more Orbánite moments, he has parked his tanks on the fallow lawns of the Left. The steel sector could be </span><a href="https://www.facebook.com/nigelfarageofficial/posts/reform-uk-will-nationalise-british-steel-and-protect-british-workers/1201130578035385/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">nationalized</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">, he has mused, along with water and utilities. Domestic industry would be supported by public procurement, and an industrial strategy would aim to boost manufacturing. The two-child benefit cap would be lifted for working British couples: a policy </span><a href="https://leftfootforward.org/2025/06/reform-officials-met-with-viktor-orban-aides-for-advice-on-welfare-policy/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">reportedly</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> adopted after Reform’s meetings with Orbán officials. And, perhaps most radically, the Bank of England would be subject to political interference not seen since high Blairism’s granting of its independence in 1997. (The Old Lady would be instructed to end the loss-making rounds of quantitative tightening, and cancel the high interest rates paid to commercial banks.) </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Earlier this year, Farage even saw fit to </span><a href="https://www.thetimes.com/uk/politics/article/reform-uk-targets-northeast-labour-red-wall-vrw0lknbz" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">talk approvingly</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> of a fellow rebel from the other side of the political divide, Arthur Scargill. There’s a case to be made that during the miners’ strike it was, in fact, the “dry” cabinet monetarists who were the iconoclasts and radicals. In this view, it was the miners’ leader, fighting to protect provincial Britain’s traditional communities, families, and dignity of labor, who was the unlikely “small-C” conservative. </span><span style="font-weight: 400;">And yet all this tentative Left-coded positioning, as well as the reheated Thatcherism, is belied by this week’s more anodyne, conventional pronouncements. In a speech on Monday, Farage tried to calm the nerves of onlooking deficit-hawk think-tanks and quangos. With Reform consistently ahead in the polls, the party is trying to demonstrate its commitment to fiscal and monetary orthodoxy, lest the markets begin their dangerous jitters.</span></p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/09/why-farage-is-a-burkean/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/09/why-farage-is-a-burkean/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/GettyImages-1711917308.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/09/why-farage-is-a-burkean/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested Reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/09/why-farage-is-a-burkean/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Why Farage is a Burkean</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/09/why-farage-is-a-burkean/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Aris Roussinos</a></p></div></a></div>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">As the Farageists attempt to build their own grand coalition from the army of the dissatisfied, glaring questions are coming to the fore. How will commitments to a small state and lower tax be reconciled with improved public services? How will a commitment to lower the welfare bill go down in Reform’s own constituencies, in which an increased share of the populist vote </span><a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2025/10/30/reforms-biggest-problem-is-obvious/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">correlates strongly with</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> the share of adults who are dependent on benefits? How will the angling towards free-markets and low-regulation sit with public ownership, or robust industrial policy? And who will win in the inevitable clash between Reform’s pro-development, anti-planning law </span><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/09/the-war-over-englands-allotments/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Yimby</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> free marketeers, and the homeowning voters and local councillors in peri-urban England who oppose new building at every turn?</span><b> </b></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">If </span><a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/the-privilege-of-public-service-given-as-the-ditchley-annual-lecture" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Michael Gove’s favourite Marxist</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">, Gramsci, were alive today, in analyzing the chaos of our interregnum he may have identified Nigel Farage as an embodiment of “Caesarism” — a “great ‘heroic’ personality” that appears, in either a reactionary or progressive form, to either break an impasse or resolve a “historico-political situation characterized by an equilibrium of forces, heading towards catastrophe”. Our interregnum may be reaching such a Caesarist conclusion, or else reaching catastrophe. There is a space for a hard-edged, syncretic brand of politics that combines elements of an unleashed free-market with a statist reflation of national production, critical industries and infrastructure: just imagine a mixture of Chinese, Singaporean and East Asian developmentalism. But this is yet to be articulated; Reform is still without a governing ideology. And if the party absorbs all the trappings of respectability that launched us into the age of perma-crisis in the first place, they will merely be placeholders, the next in the queue to manage decline. And in that case, our long interregnum will stretch out further.</span></p>
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															<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">1036364</post-id>				</item>
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					<title>The rot at the heart of Europe</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2025/11/the-rot-at-the-heart-of-europe/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://stage.unherd.com/2025/11/the-rot-at-the-heart-of-europe/?edition=us#comments</comments>
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										<unherd:main_theme>Geopolitics</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Wolfgang Munchau]]>
					</dc:creator>
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																<unherd:article_ranking>1</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[Neither Germany nor France are the innovative nations of yore. Photo by MANON CRUZ/POOL/AFP via Getty Images]]>
						</unherd:image_caption>
						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Wolfgang Münchau</strong> is the Director of <a href="https://www.eurointelligence.com/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Eurointelligence</a> and an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist.</p>
]]>
						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>EuroBriefing</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is the Director of <a href="https://www.eurointelligence.com/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Eurointelligence</a> and an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Mon, 03 Nov 2025 00:03:16 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Mon, 03 Nov 2025 09:53:26 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[China]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Economics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[EU]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Geopolitics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Innovation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Joel Mokyr]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://stage.unherd.com/?p=1035606</guid>
																												<description>
								<![CDATA[It has forgotten how to create]]>
							</description>
																		
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								<![CDATA[<p>It is all about attitude and aptitude. Joel Mokyr, an economic historian and one of the recipients of this year’s Nobel Prize, writes in his 2016 book, <i>A Culture of Growth</i>: “The drivers of technological progress and eventually economic performance were attitude and aptitude.”</p>
<p>Attitude and aptitude explain why the US and China are the sole superpowers of the 21st century. They also explain where it went wrong for Europe. We had aptitude and still mostly do. But we lost the attitude. We are the global virtue-signalers who lost our appetite for cutting-edge research a long time ago.</p>
<p>The China of the Nineties had the attitude, but lacked the aptitude, and sent its best students to Western universities to make up for it. The US has both — aptitude and attitude — and will continue to be a dominant global power for a long time to come.</p>
<p>Mokyr writes: “Unless accompanied by innovations and productivity growth, growth exclusively based on a cooperative ethic will eventually peter out.” He is a critic of the self-styled intellectuals in our societies who are motivated by reputation and peer recognition. This is a swipe at his own profession, and other pseudosciences like epidemiology that gave us the Covid lockdown, based on dubious models, and statistics that fail to meet professional standards. The mathematician and author Nassim Nicolas Taleb dismissed the economics profession as a “citation ring” — very much in the spirit as Mokyr.</p>
<p>There was a time when the Europeans had them both — aptitude and attitude. But that was a long time ago. Gottlieb Daimler invented the motor car, probably the single most successful product of the industrial age, in 1885. It would be several decades until the car revolutionized how we live. Modern suburbia would have been unthinkable without it. For the German economy in particular, the car was an invention that kept on giving — until this decade. We have reached the end of this long cycle of innovation. Germany still has a big car industry, but it is no longer making a lot of money. The future of cars is electric, digital and, in particular, Chinese.</p>
<p>The computer is the only other single product that has ever managed to rival the car — and surpass it — in terms of its economic impact. But that, too, took a long time. The computer did not have any discernible impact on productivity growth until quite recently. We are already seeing the impact of AI in some pockets of the labor market. AI is bad news if you are a wedding photographer, a freelance writer, or a legal assistant. It will end up killing millions of mid-tech jobs while creating new jobs in other areas.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/04/why-china-will-beat-the-west/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/04/why-china-will-beat-the-west/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/gettyimages-2011425280-594x594-1.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/04/why-china-will-beat-the-west/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/04/why-china-will-beat-the-west/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Why China will beat the West</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/04/why-china-will-beat-the-west/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Wessie du Toit</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>When China embarked on modernization under Deng Xiaoping in the Eighties, it pursued a strategy of export-led economic growth and invested the proceeds into innovation and modernization. The West misunderstood China’s strategy as one moving towards Western-style democracy or capitalism. In reality, it was always about strengthening the communist system, even under Deng, and making it more successful and resilient.</p>
<p>China also defied another Western economic policy consensus — that governments should never pick winners. Those old enough may remember how we all laughed about the Soviet Union’s five-year plans. No one was laughing last week when the Fourth Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party agreed the 15th Five-Year Plan. It has been through these five-year plans that China managed to dethrone the German car industry, and to monopolize the technologies that would turn rare-earth minerals into magnets that are indispensable for high-powered engines. When Europeans tried picking winners, more often than not they ended up picking losers.</p>
<p>I remember a meeting I had in the early 2000s with the famous economist Edmund Phelps, who won the economics Nobel Prize in 2006. He gave me a daring prediction: Germany would decline relative to the rest of the world and to the rest of Europe. He said the reason was Germany’s obsession with old technologies like the car. His forecast ran counter to conventional wisdom, like those of the financial media, which upheld Germany as a virtuous role model. Phelps turned out to be right, but it took another two decades until Germany’s decline became visible to a lot more people. And it took two decades for the Nobel Prize committee to recognize the importance of innovation and disruption.</p>
<p>For four decades now, Europe has been falling behind the US, and now China, in all things digital. The EU has made matters worse with a string of legislation that weighs down digital technology. This deadweight began with data protection regulation from the 2010s, and stretched to more recently applied AI and crypto regulations, alongside laws to restrict the business of the US tech giants, and to force social media platforms to moderate their content. Europe still has good engineers, but we are a digital desert.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;What China realized early on — and what Europeans in particular are mostly in denial of — is that there is a link between innovation and geopolitical power.&#8221;</div>
<p>What China realized early on — and what Europeans in particular are mostly in denial of — is that there is a link between innovation and geopolitical power. It is interesting that the capitalist US and communist China both agree with Mokyr’s worldview, whereas the Left-liberal consensus in Europe and Canada is on the other side of that argument — the losing side. It is the tragedy of the political center that the radical ends of the political spectrum are more innovation-friendly.</p>
<p>Where can we observe that link? The US and its allies dominate advanced semiconductors; China dominates rare earths and their downstream products. Both superpowers therefore have geopolitical chokeholds on each other. Last week’s deal between Xi and Donald Trump was a ceasefire in a continuing cold war.</p>
<p>But by far the single most important link between innovation and geopolitical power is through the military. The geopolitical dominance of the US today had its origin in the postwar collaboration between the military and science. In the postwar era, the military became the biggest sponsor and customer of the rapid engineering developments of the electronic age. The internet was based on a communication protocol that was developed for the US military — a technology to allow data to be transmitted when communication got physically interrupted in one channel and re-routed through another. The single most important algorithm of the 20th century — the Discrete Fourier transform, without which modern digital devices would be unthinkable — had its origin in a meeting in the White House when a scientist decided he needed a faster way to identify signals from Soviet underground nuclear testing.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/10/europes-ukraine-loan-is-a-bad-bet/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/10/europes-ukraine-loan-is-a-bad-bet/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/europe.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/10/europes-ukraine-loan-is-a-bad-bet/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/10/europes-ukraine-loan-is-a-bad-bet/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Europe’s Ukraine loan is a bad bet</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/10/europes-ukraine-loan-is-a-bad-bet/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Wolfgang Munchau</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Europe will clearly not regain geopolitical dominance, but there are second-best strategies. In AI, for example, most of the benefits will come from using it — not from making it. Some AI algorithms are open-source. In theory, Europe should still have a chance. In practice, it does not. Its tech regulation frustrates not only AI startups, but also broader use of AI. This is what Mokyr meant by “attitude and aptitude”. You need both to succeed. And Europe’s attitude is anti-innovation. Don’t be fooled by the EU’s overhyped Horizon Europe program, which is a pork-barrel spending program for second-rate universities. Europeans like to think of themselves as being innovative and “pro-science” — but they keep falling further behind the US and China. Europe’s priorities are to protect workers and existing industries.</p>
<p>Outside the EU, things look a little brighter. The largest European country most likely to succeed in this category is the UK. The UK is way ahead of the EU in AI investments. Yet after Brexit, the UK did not follow the EU in its generalized anti-tech crusade. The UK has a higher concentration of research universities that specialize in areas relevant to 21st-century science. One of the most exciting prospects is the development of a science corridor between Oxford and Cambridge. It will take a long time, but it is the right way to proceed.</p>
<p>The history of innovation since the 19th century holds two important lessons. The first is that the economic benefits of innovation are massive and can last for more than 100 years. The great European inventions of the 19th and early-20th centuries were not the result of luck, but of attitude and aptitude. The second lesson — the one that Germany is learning the hard way now — is that things end unless you keep innovating.</p>
<p>This is where the other half of this year’s Nobel Prize for economics comes in. It went to Philippe Aghion and Peter Howitt, who produced an economic model for “creative destruction”. This is a term coined by the Austrian economist Joseph Schumpeter in 1942. Creative destruction is the mechanism through which new innovation can replace old. As every gardener knows, you have to let things die to grow something new. In the world of mainstream economics, this is a controversial statement. In the world of European politics, it is total anathema.</p>
<p>You can still see Daimler’s contraption on display at a museum in Stuttgart. This is where you have to go to get a whiff of attitudes and aptitudes lost a long time ago. It is in museums, and Grade A-listed buildings, where Europe still excels.</p>
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					<title>Will Rachel Reeves tackle the Bank?</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2025/10/will-rachel-reeves-tackle-the-bank/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://stage.unherd.com/2025/10/will-rachel-reeves-tackle-the-bank/?edition=us#comments</comments>
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										<unherd:main_theme>Economics</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Leah Downey]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/images-7.jpeg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>2</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[An intervention by Reeves would require significant political capital. Photo by Peter Cziborra – WPA Pool/Getty Images]]>
						</unherd:image_caption>
						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Leah Downey</strong> is a political theorist at Cambridge, and the author of <a href="https://press.princeton.edu/books/hardcover/9780691244433/our-money?srsltid=AfmBOoo6uqWyoafS_ylXvQoRcKP9JnUwYCvk0TpF6lvaO18GrIF_YSgh"><em>Our Money</em></a>.</p>
]]>
						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle></unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is a political theorist at Cambridge, and the author of <a href="https://press.princeton.edu/books/hardcover/9780691244433/our-money?srsltid=AfmBOoo6uqWyoafS_ylXvQoRcKP9JnUwYCvk0TpF6lvaO18GrIF_YSgh"><em>Our Money</em></a>.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Wed, 22 Oct 2025 23:02:07 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Thu, 23 Oct 2025 10:37:17 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Bank of England]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Cental banks]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Economics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[federal reserve]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Labour Party]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://stage.unherd.com/?p=1034003</guid>
																												<description>
								<![CDATA[Its powers are undemocratic]]>
							</description>
																		
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								<![CDATA[<p>Are central banks, tasked primarily with securing price stability, being asked to do too much or too little? Have their tools, such as Quantitative Easing (QE), been overindulged in since 2008? Or has their immense power to steer the macroeconomy been put to good use in the face of crises like climate change, severe inequality, and sluggish productivity?</p>
<p>US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent has made his <a href="https://www.international-economy.com/TIE_Sp25_Bessent.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">view on the matter clear</a>: central banks are asked to do too much. But others have argued the opposite. Earlier this month, economic historian Adam Tooze wrote <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/761508c9-4d7b-47c2-ad60-7c6b4bf9e703">in the <em>Financial Times</em></a> that the monetary policymaking arrangement in the UK isn’t working well, and should be revisited. In essence, the Bank of England is not helping, and perhaps even hindering, the government’s efforts to grow the economy. Suffering from a severe period of economic malaise, the UK needs all the help it can get, from every part of the state, independent or not.</p>
<p>Without delving too deeply into the quagmire of central bank independence, Tooze called for a “new concordat” between the Bank and the Government. Others on the progressive end of politics have, along similar lines, <a href="https://greencentralbanking.com/2025/05/08/monetary-fiscal-policy-coordination/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">advocated for</a> more fiscal and monetary <a href="https://neweconomics.org/2025/06/a-coordinated-macroeconomic-framework-for-europe" target="_blank" rel="noopener">coordination</a>. Personally, I don’t like the term “coordination”, because it hides the real question: who should be in charge, the Bank or the Government? The answer to that question, in the context of a modern <a href="https://www.amazon.co.uk/Our-Money-Monetary-Democracy-Matters/dp/069124443X">democracy</a>, would seemingly have to be the Government.</p>
<p>So, whether you think that we should junk central bank independence altogether (a point I’ll return to) or merely that the nature of the relationship between the Bank and Parliament, which was set down in 1997, needs revisiting, it’s worth considering what such a new concordat might address. In other words, what should the Government consider changing about how the Bank of England operates?</p>
<p>The concordat should address four things. First, the Bank’s mandate which is currently to secure price stability and then to support government policy. On this basis, one could argue that the central bank is already failing. Currently, it is engaged in a process known as Quantitative Tightening (QT), which is effectively the unwinding of the better-known Quantitative Easing, which was first used after the financial crisis. During QE, the Bank purchased bonds in order to inject money into the economy. QT involves selling off those bonds, or simply letting them mature without reinvesting. In so doing, the Bank of England is shrinking its balance sheet and affecting the gilt market. QT is not necessary for price stability, and — far from supporting government policy — it is, by some accounts, making things fiscally tighter for the government. This might lead one to ask: is the Bank’s decision to engage in QT, particularly right now, in line with its mandate?</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;Is the Bank’s decision to engage in quantitative tightening, particularly right now, in line with its mandate?&#8221;</div>
<p>That is not even to mention all the things that the Bank is choosing not to do, which could support the Government’s aims and are unlikely to prejudice price stability. Consider, for instance, changes in bank regulation to encourage investment —particularly domestic growth driving investment, even green investment, or investment in particular regions of the country. Other central banks have deployed programs designed to support credit creation in particular regions and sectors — India, Japan, and the Eurozone, for instance. The Bank itself, prior to the recent bout of inflation, had committed to tilting its own bond purchases, meaning skewing them toward “green” rather than “dirty” bonds. It later abandoned this program.</p>
<p>A concordat could change the way we understand price stability. Instead of instructing the Bank to aim for 2% inflation precisely, a target that is widely accepted as itself arbitrary, the Government could instruct the Bank to seek price stability understood as the absence of highly volatile price levels or hyperinflation. We might imagine this as keeping inflation roughly below 10%, as much empirical evidence suggests inflation doesn’t do lasting harm to the real economy until it gets into double digits.</p>
<p>Some would undoubtedly object: we’ve just had a bout of inflation below this level and it was very painful. This is, of course, true, but even with a precise target, the central bank was unable to prevent the pain and its solution was far from painless, as many at the time <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/02/16/the-fight-against-inflation-is-becoming-a-class-war/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">pointed out</a>. In fact, it was government action, not central bank policy, that was required to ease the inflationary hurt, something we’d be more likely to get if there was no pretense that solving the issue was the central bank’s sole responsibility in the first place.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/07/how-independent-is-the-fed/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/07/how-independent-is-the-fed/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/GettyImages-2226860627.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/07/how-independent-is-the-fed/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/07/how-independent-is-the-fed/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>How independent is the Fed?</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/07/how-independent-is-the-fed/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Leah Downey</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>The second area I’d suggest considering in a potential new concordat would be the Treasury indemnity of central bank losses. The UK is unusual among central banks for two reasons: first, the Bank of England considers itself capable of making a loss, and second, the Treasury has committed to an indemnity covering any central bank losses. That is: the Treasury, if need be, will bail out the Bank.</p>
<p>Not all central banks consider themselves capable of making a loss. The most obvious counter-example is the US Federal Reserve System, which does not register central bank losses in its official records. Instead, it has adopted a practice of deferred asset accounting. This means that anything which might be otherwise logged as a loss for the Fed is balanced off against the assumption of future gains — this assumption is not unrealistic, given the history of regular gains in the past that are remitted to the Treasury. In short, it is a choice for the Bank of England to account for “losses” in the way it does, and it is a choice for the Treasury to indemnify them. The alternative would be for the central bank to simply cover the losses itself, as in the US, based on future gains, or by virtue of its power to print money.</p>
<p>MPs involved in this new concordat should consider changing the Bank’s accounting practices and/or eliminating the indemnity. Or at the very least, they could force the publication of the legal terms of the indemnity. At the moment the conditions for the Treasury covering central bank losses are unknown to those outside the Treasury. Many have called for the release of the details; among them is <a href="https://lordslibrary.parliament.uk/economic-affairs-committee-report-making-an-independent-bank-of-england-work-better/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">the House of Lords committee on Economic Affairs</a>, <a href="https://hansard.parliament.uk/lords/2021-11-15/debates/9124C980-531B-4688-BEA0-D439C5D04703/QuantitativeEasing(EconomicAffairsCommitteeReport)" target="_blank" rel="noopener">twice</a>. Without knowledge of how the current indemnity works, it’s hard to understand why it should exist at all.</p>
<p>The third area ripe for reconsideration is the way the Bank of England conducts monetary policy. Since 2009, the Bank has conducted interest rate policy by paying bank rate — that is, the interest rate paid by banks rather than consumers — on the reserves that private banks hold at the central bank. In 2024 it paid out approximately £40 billion to private banks, and such payments are <a href="https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/asset-purchase-facility/2024/2024-q4" target="_blank" rel="noopener">projected</a> to continue through 2033. As well as being large, these payments tend to be politically counter-cyclical. The central bank pays more to private banks when it is trying to raise the interest rate. This is usually a moment of economic pain for the average citizen. It’s hard to understand why the state should be giving huge sums of money, in such a tough moment, to private banks, and not using it to support public institutions. Some will claim that the answer is that we need to induce banks to hold reserves, and that paying them to keep their reserves at the central bank is the best way to do it. I’m not so sure. We don’t pay car companies to install seat belts, we just require it.</p>
<p>By paying interest on reserves to private banks since 2009, the Bank has effectively separated balance-sheet policy from interest rate policy, enabling the central bank to hold a large balance sheet without distorting interest rates. In practice, this has given the Bank a new and incredibly powerful policy tool — the balance sheet. But it’s not obvious what the Bank should be using this tool to achieve, given it is not technically necessary to secure price stability. One might suppose, based on the mandate, that it should be used to support government policy, but the Bank has not adopted such a view.</p>
<p>One way in which a new concordat could alter the contemporary payment on reserves mechanism would be for the Bank could adopt a tiered system of reserves — as many of <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/nigel-farage-reform-uk-debanking-bank-profits-tax-cut-bank-of-england/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">various</a> political <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/00467653-b2a3-4088-a9c1-d935010cf295" target="_blank" rel="noopener">stripes</a> have suggested and other central banks (like the European Central Bank) have implemented. This involves paying banks different rates depending on the amount of reserves they hold at the central bank. It could mean paying banks only for a certain level of reserves — and not for excess or even placing a negative rate on excess. Or it could mean not paying banks at all for the required level of reserves and perhaps implementing a negative rate for those above that level. Notably, for this to work, the bank would likely need to embrace, or re-embrace, reserve requirements — reserve requirements are rules that set out the minimum amount of liquid assets that a commercial bank must hold.</p>
<p>Questioned by Richard Tice about whether the Bank should introduce reserve requirements, Andrew Bailey <a href="https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/-/media/boe/files/letter/2025/letter-to-richard-tice-june-2025.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">dismissed</a> the idea. There is, in fact, no reason to dismiss the possibility of reserve requirements: they have been deployed historically by nearly every monetary jurisdiction and are still used (and encouraged) in many jurisdictions today.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/10/the-fall-of-the-crypto-oligarchs/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/10/the-fall-of-the-crypto-oligarchs/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/GettyImages-2208409748.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/10/the-fall-of-the-crypto-oligarchs/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/10/the-fall-of-the-crypto-oligarchs/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The fall of the crypto-oligarchs</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/10/the-fall-of-the-crypto-oligarchs/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> John Rapley</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Finally, the last specific area ripe for reconsideration as part of a new concordat is balance sheet policy itself. QE, as we all know by now, had a major impact on the economy, but also on our political and social life. This is not particularly surprising as it involved the government creating buckets of money and using it to buy particular assets and not others. What the Bank buys, and how much, matters. There is good reason to consider a means of political input into any such deployment of the balance sheet. In 2024, the House of Lords Committee on Economic Affairs issued a report which called for a memo of understanding between the Treasury and the Bank on such policy, suggesting that two were not in full accord on the matter. Each institution responded to the report effectively saying there was no need for such a memo because I know what I’m doing. Clearly that’s not sufficient, given the mess we’re in right now where the Treasury is desperate to initiate economic growth and the Bank is chuntering on with QT as if it can’t hear the Chancellor at all.</p>
<p>We should reflect for a moment on what all this adds up to. This is a list of pretty major aspects of the contemporary monetary policymaking system. All of them are in need of a re-think if we are to assemble a unified macroeconomic policy in the UK that is fit for the moment. But that might make you wonder: is this a one-off? Should we be engaging in an ad-hoc reconsideration of the system, and then go back to our respective corners (the Government and the central bank)? Or is it more sensible to consider a mechanism through which the Government and the central bank can more regularly “coordinate” policy?</p>
<p>The UK, unlike many other jurisdictions, already has a means for establishing more institutionalized, regular exchange between the Government and the central bank. Every year the Chancellor writes a letter to the Bank offering guidance. In recent decades, as a result of deference to central bank independence, this letter has largely been pro forma and not imbued with much coercive power. But that need not be the case. We could reinvigorate this mechanism, should the Chancellor decide to use this letter to inform the Bank of changes the Government wishes to see both in the structure and operation of the central bank, starting with the four I’ve discussed here.</p>
<p>Unfortunately, it seems unlikely that Rachel Reeves will announce anything like a new concordat at the budget in November, or anytime really. Labour seems committed to hewing as closely as possible to what they understand to be conventional economic and financial wisdom on the subject. I don’t understand why exactly, but right now, the party in government seems unable or unwilling to try anything the contemporary central bank hasn’t already embraced. Consequently, it’s easy to see who is in charge here. One agent hoards the conventional wisdom and the other bows to it. It’s a shame twice over. Doing things as they have been done since the late Nineties is not a recipe for economic success in the 2020s and a system of government in which the central bank is calling the shots is not a democracy.</p>
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					<title>Why economists get Trumpism wrong</title>
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										<unherd:main_theme>America First</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Wolfgang Munchau]]>
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							<![CDATA[Don't expect a new Pax Americana. Andrew Harnik/Getty Images.]]>
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							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Wolfgang Münchau</strong> is the Director of <a href="https://www.eurointelligence.com/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Eurointelligence</a> and an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist.</p>
]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_handle>EuroBriefing</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is the Director of <a href="https://www.eurointelligence.com/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Eurointelligence</a> and an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist.]]>
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										<pubDate>Sun, 28 Sep 2025 23:03:03 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Mon, 22 Dec 2025 12:16:29 +0000</updated>
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								<![CDATA[It will succeed before it fails]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>The great physicist Richard Feynman once wrote: “I think I can safely say that nobody understands quantum mechanics.”</p>
<p>I can say safely that nobody understands the economic and political consequences of Donald Trump. I am not likening his policies to one of the greatest scientific discoveries of all time. But what the two have in common is radical unpredictability. In quantum mechanics, unpredictability arises at the time of measurement. Economists have the same problem with Trump. We cannot look at the current slew of economic data to see where this is going. If you are an anti-Trump economic evangelist, you are very likely to get things wrong, just as economists did with Brexit or Trump’s first term.</p>
<p>I expect that the US economy will probably be fine. Before you jump to the conclusion that I am a Trump supporter, I can assure you that I am not. Nor was I a Brexit supporter, though I <a href="https://stage.unherd.com/newsroom/when-will-the-experts-apologise-for-their-brexit-predictions/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">was critical of</a> the self-defeating arguments of the Remain campaign. I see similar dynamics at work in the US right now. Trump’s critics, both in the US and Europe, keep on underestimating him with predictions of imminent gloom.</p>
<p>They predicted that his tariffs would raise inflation. So far that has not happened. I don’t think it will. Some also predicted that the US stock market would soon crash. In fact, Europeans celebrated the collapse in the S&amp;P 500 that followed the Liberation Day tariffs. They erroneously relied on the markets as a corrective mechanism to frustrate Trump’s tariffs. That did not happen. The markets recovered and never looked back. The overall level of tariffs today is at least as high as those announced by Trump on 2 April. They are bound to get higher still, now that he has slapped a 100% tariff on branded pharmaceutical products and a 50% tariff on Ikea furniture.</p>
<p>It does not look like the stock market will do us the favor of crashing during the Trump presidency. It is quite possible that the S&amp;P 500 will rise from its current level of around 6,400 to 10,000. Market valuations could rise from the stratospheric to the mesospheric to the exospheric. Prices will crash eventually. But that might not happen until the next Democratic president.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/09/trumps-monumentalist-aesthetic/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/09/trumps-monumentalist-aesthetic/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/GettyImages-1224641021.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/09/trumps-monumentalist-aesthetic/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/09/trumps-monumentalist-aesthetic/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Trump’s monumentalist aesthetic</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/09/trumps-monumentalist-aesthetic/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Adam Ellwanger and John J. Waters</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>The economic success I expect to see is that of a last hurrah of a declining power. It will be a hell of a party, with the fake glitter of a Mar-a-Lago ballroom: lights, music and attention-deflecting smoke and mirrors.</p>
<p>John Maynard Keynes once said all politicians were under the influence of long-defunct economists. We can safely say that Trump is not. The Left hates him, of course. But so does the old Right. Monetarists would have been aghast at his assault on the independence of the Federal Reserve. Virtually every school of conservative economic thought, from the ancient to modern, would have rejected his tariffs. Or his unfunded tax cuts. Or the stablecoins through which he wants to attract investment in the US debt markets. You can’t even caricature his policies as “businessman economics” either. Businesspeople tend to be fiscally conservative.</p>
<p>The reason I chose not to underestimate him is that his big tax cuts, extreme deregulation and tariffs will turn the US into a super-competitive economy at the expense of other Western countries. We Europeans still live in the technological Stone Age, but at least we used to have competitive industries. We are now being squeezed by the US and China both in innovation and competitiveness.</p>
<p>China’s economic policies could not more different than Trump’s, but they share one important trait: they both ignore the advice of mainstream macroeconomics. President Xi Jinping is an old-fashioned mercantilist. He maximizes exports and minimizes imports. He does not care what this does to the rest of the world. China has not freed up its capital markets. The Chinese renminbi is locked in a semi-fixed exchange rate against the dollar. China unashamedly picks winners. Were we not told that government should never, ever do this? China’s central planners picked the electric car, the entire battery supply chain behind it, and solar panels. The problem with picking winners is not the act of picking. It is about what you pick. We Westerners should perhaps not pick winners. China did better.</p>
<p>Trump is picking fossil fuels. If your time horizon is four years, this is going to be fine. Cheap oil and gas fuel the fire of American entrepreneurialism. But China’s energy policy is much more sophisticated. They still burn coal, but they invest into renewable energies like nobody else. One of the water dams being planned will have a capacity <a href="https://singularityhub.com/2025/01/15/china-is-about-to-build-the-worlds-biggest-hydropower-dam-with-triple-the-output-of-three-gorges/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">as large as the entire energy consumption of countries such as Greece</a>.</p>
<p>To use Trump’s own words: China has all the cards. It has more people; it has a work ethic that has been lost in the West; it has industrial supply chains; and it is willing to shift resources from one part to another in our economy with a ruthlessness that our democracies cannot replicate. I would rather live in Europe or the US than in China. But I am not optimistic about the long-term prospects of the West.</p>
<p>I have no doubt that Trump’s economics will fail in the end. It will not become the foundation of a new economic era; he will not match Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan in influencing economic policy in the West for decades after they left the stage. They both failed before they succeeded. With Trump, it is more likely to be the other way round.</p>
<p>What I am sure of, however, that he will fail in his foreign policies even in the short run. The reason is a complete lack of interest in strategic alliances, and in strategic action in general. The only chance the democratic West has against the rise of China and its global partners-in-crime is as a well-managed team.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;The only chance the democratic West has against the rise of China and its global partners-in-crime is as a well-managed team.&#8221;</div>
<p>I am not just talking about his delusional announcements: that it would take him 24 hours to cut a peace in deal in Ukraine. Or his claim at the end of last week that we are about to have a peace deal in Gaza. He claims to have ended seven wars. He has not. Nor has he saved millions of lives. His “America First” agenda is by definition not one of foreign policy. His only foreign policy objective is to get the Nobel Peace Prize.</p>
<p>Trump’s delusions are easy to dismiss, but they have will have serious effects. The first casualty of Trump’s foreign policy is Europe. Europe must be very careful about Trump’s latest policy u-turn on Ukraine. This looks like a setup to me. Don’t fall for the &#8220;Ukraine is winning&#8221; narrative that has recently popped up out of nowhere. Nothing substantive has changed on the ground. I think Trump is setting Europe up for failure by insisting that Ukraine can win the war, and that Europe should pay for it. If it fails, as I believe it will, he can blame Europe.</p>
<p>There is no way that Europe can make itself independent of Russian oil with the speed that Trump demands. He knows that, of course. Europe is financially too weak and politically too divided to be able to fund the Ukraine war on its own. This is still true if the EU commission ends up sequestering €200 billion in Russian reserve assets currently frozen in EU bank accounts. I concluded a long time ago that, because they all think in national terms, European political elites are incapable of strategic geopolitical thought. A Franco-German fighter project is on the rocks right now, because the two countries cannot agree on the work share. Pettiness has a habit of intruding all the time in European politics, even during emergencies.</p>
<p>Japan is as weak as Europe. It too has an outdated industrial base and a declining population. Under Trump, the West will fragment into a disparate collection of failed states. An inward-looking US will remain its most formidable power, but not a leader. The US will look like the Norma Desmond character from <em>Sunset Boulevard</em>, who thought that she was still big, and that it was the movies that got smaller.</p>
<p>Movie directors know about turning points — the <i>peripeteia </i>in classical Greek drama — where events shift, either in the positive or the negative direction. To his supporters, Trump may well the person who arrests the decline of civilization. They will end up disappointed. So may his detractors who see his presidency as a phase of comic relief, a moment that will eventually pass before the final happy ending sets in.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/09/europes-reckless-warmongering/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/09/europes-reckless-warmongering/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/GettyImages-1246326347.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/09/europes-reckless-warmongering/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/09/europes-reckless-warmongering/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Europe’s reckless warmongering</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/09/europes-reckless-warmongering/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Wolfgang Münchau</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>My guess is that America will not be great at the end of the MAGA episode. But America will be OK, if not great, whereas Europe will be neither. What we would really need is a reboot, but we are afraid. There was a tradition in European intellectual thought that started with the acknowledgment that you don’t know. <i>Scio nescio</i>, Plato wrote. Feynman’s comment about quantum mechanics is in that spirit too. That state of mind is a precondition for success. You start at zero. It is where the Age of Enlightenment began. It is where China started too.</p>
<p>Trump is the very opposite of this. The real tragedy is that his detractors, are too.</p>
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					<title>Javier Milei’s last chance</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2025/09/javier-mileis-last-chance/?edition=us</link>
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										<unherd:main_theme>Argentina</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[John Rapley]]>
					</dc:creator>
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																<unherd:article_ranking>1</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[Argentina's president has been beset by adversity. Photo by OSCAR DEL POZO/AFP via Getty Images]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>John Rapley</strong> is an author and academic who divides his time between London, Johannesburg and Ottawa. His books include <i>Why Empires Fall: Rome, America and the Future of the West </i>(with Peter Heather, Penguin, 2023) and <i>Twilight of the Money Gods: Economics as a Religion</i> (Simon &amp; Schuster, 2017).</p>
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						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>jarapley</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is an author and academic who divides his time between London, Johannesburg and Ottawa. His books include <i>Why Empires Fall: Rome, America and the Future of the West </i>(with Peter Heather, Penguin, 2023) and <i>Twilight of the Money Gods: Economics as a Religion</i> (Simon &amp; Schuster, 2017).]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Wed, 24 Sep 2025 23:03:26 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Wed, 24 Sep 2025 23:03:26 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Donald Trump]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Economics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[javier milei]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Karina Milei]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Politics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Scott Bessent]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[UK]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[White house]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://stage.unherd.com/?p=1029726</guid>
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								<![CDATA[Trump has thrown him a lifeline]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p><span style="font-weight: 400">“Argentina is a systemically important US ally in Latin America”, </span><a href="https://x.com/SecScottBessent/status/1970107351912075454" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400">tweeted</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400"> US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent on Monday morning. It was not a moment too soon for Javier Milei. “The US Treasury stands ready to do what is needed within its mandate to support Argentina,” wrote Bessent. “All options for stabilization are on the table.”</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">With this announcement, the US government indicated its readiness to do whatever was necessary to ensure the success of Milei’s agenda of economic reform. The next day, after his rambling address to the United Nations, Donald Trump met the Argentine President himself. Milei and his government didn’t need a bailout, said Trump, but he promised support. “We’re gonna help them.” </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">The effect was instantaneous. Investors who had been fleeing Argentina now began returning, if cautiously. The Argentine stock market rose from the lows it had hit on Monday. The Argentine peso, which hit a low at the end of last week, bounced back strongly this week. Argentine government bonds, whose prices had been nosediving, driving up interest rates, also rebounded — although interest rates still remain well into the double-digits. The White House has given Milei a bit of breather; it now hopes that respite will last until next month’s legislative elections. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">There’s been little evidence of contagion-risk from Argentina’s recent financial travails. Its plunging peso hadn’t dragged any other currencies down with it, and regional stock markets continued rising even as the Buenos Aires market shed a quarter of its value since early August. But Bessent’s stark choice of language was revealing. An awful lot has come to ride on the success or failure of the chainsaw-wielding libertarian in the leather jacket. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">The Trump administration has made Argentina its line in the sand, its Vietnam, the bastion that must hold lest it fall before the Leftist tide sweeping the region. It is a tide that has already washed over Brazil, Colombia, Mexico and Chile. The administration may not have intended to invest the Milei experiment with such significance, but the fact is that American Republicans, enthusiastically egged on by Elon Musk and celebrated by conservatives across the Western world, had already lionized the chainsaw-wielding libertarian as a hero. He can’t now be seen to fail.</span></p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;The Trump administration has made Argentina its line in the sand, its Vietnam.&#8221;</div>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">There was always going to be a lot of risk involved in putting so many eggs in the Milei basket. This is Argentina, after all, a country in which rescue packages repeatedly yield success, only to eventually unravel. It’s often said that Argentina is the most European country in Latin America, a place where Spanish is spoken with an Italian accent, and where the considerable degree of regulation in the country’s economy mirrors that of some European countries. But, like those countries, Argentina can be repeatedly crippled by inconsistent policymaking. It has a long history of boom-and-bust cycles, lancing inflation only to resume business as usual once the worst has passed.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Milei won election as president in 2023 on a platform of slashing the state and taming the country’s runaway inflation. Initially, things went better than hoped. By cutting public spending by the equivalent of 5%, Milei plunged the economy into recession. But that downturn reduced demand sufficiently to take the sting out of inflation, which fell from 300% in 2023 to 30% today. Whereas previously, the price of a cup of coffee could change by the time you finished it, now there is at least a growing predictability in household budgeting. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">After two years of economic contraction, the economy has rebounded strongly. While government spending remained tight, private consumption picked up the slack, and investment took off and exports resumed, </span><a href="https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/oecd-economic-surveys-argentina-2025_27dd6e27-en/full-report.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400">growing by 7%</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400"> this year. Milei’s voters liked what they saw, and his approval rating briefly touched 50% early last year. In Argentina, a country that is deeply divided, this is about as good as it gets. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">But thereafter, things started to sour. While exports have been strong this year, imports have surged past them, rising six times quicker. In no small part, this is due to Milei’s determination to maintain a currency peg. This means that the peso is allowed to trade within a fixed range of valuation. The Central Bank can maintain this valuation by buying or selling foreign exchange whenever the peso moves outside the band. Mindful that a sharp devaluation of the peso could reverse his progress on inflation, Milei has wanted to gradually adjust the band. But in recent months, increasing demand for hard currency has forced the government to dip into its reserves. With the Central Bank burning through cash, the risk of a self-fulfilling run on the peso had risen.</span></p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/09/is-britain-heading-for-a-financial-crash/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/09/is-britain-heading-for-a-financial-crash/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/GettyImages-83061416.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/09/is-britain-heading-for-a-financial-crash/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/09/is-britain-heading-for-a-financial-crash/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Britain is in the eye of the financial storm</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/09/is-britain-heading-for-a-financial-crash/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> John Rapley</a></p></div></a></div>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">But the resulting strong peso has enabled middle-class Argentinians to keep holidaying abroad. Meanwhile, imports remain affordable, helping to drive that surge in foreign purchases. By the late summer, pressure on these reserves was becoming acute, and the government ran the risk of running out of money. What made the situation especially delicate was that Argentina’s reserves had been swollen in April by a large disbursement from the </span><a href="https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/04/12/pr25101-argentina-imf-executive-board-approves-48-month-usd20-billion-extended-arrangement" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400">IMF</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400">. But this use of borrowed money to defend the currency has troubled bondholders, who have begun to worry whether the government will be able to meet its debt payments. After all, Argentina has form here: for fear that bondholders from previous defaults might seize the country’s assets, the government is still reluctant to fly its officials abroad in government airplanes.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Hoping to reduce the appetite for imports and make exports more competitive, Milei wanted to devalue the peso further. Knowing the move would be unpopular, he was holding out until after the legislative elections. But his hand was forced by a shock result in the Buenos Aires provincial election earlier this month, when his La Libertad Avanza coalition was soundly defeated. Although Buenos Aires is a bastion of the opposition Peronists, the province also holds 40% of the country’s people, so it’s a good bellwether of what to expect next month. Currency traders, pondering the possibility that Milei would suffer a setback and lose authority, started dumping their pesos.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Milei does not currently have a parliamentary majority. Because only half the legislature is up for election next month, there is no prospect of that changing, but he hoped to secure enough seats that he could govern in coalition with centrist parties. Thus the poor showing earlier this month raised the prospect that Milei could end up weaker than expected. Compounding matters is that Argentina’s federal system means the president must get provincial buy-in for many of his measures to be effective. Absent a strong mandate, Milei could find himself struggling to govern effectively.</span></p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/12/javier-milei-argentinas-darwinian-disrupter/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/12/javier-milei-argentinas-darwinian-disrupter/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/GettyImages-1498579712.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/12/javier-milei-argentinas-darwinian-disrupter/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/12/javier-milei-argentinas-darwinian-disrupter/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Javier Milei: Argentina&#039;s Darwinian disruptor</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/12/javier-milei-argentinas-darwinian-disrupter/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Ian Birrell</a></p></div></a></div>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">And that could impede his plans for further reform. In addition to liberalizing trade and allowing the currency to float, there are structural reforms Milei must implement if he’s to improve productivity. These reforms include a reduction in labor market regulation and social security taxes; reforming the tax system; reforming the rules by which revenue collected in Buenos Aires is transferred to provinces; and lowering the obstacles to new business formation. Yet all these existing barriers to economic activity have powerful constituencies behind them, from unions and business groups to political lobbies. Though Milei has made more progress on business deregulation, the road ahead is getting bumpier. Austerity eliminated many subsidies, on items such as gas, water, transport and electricity, all of which have hurt ordinary people. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">To top it all off, Milei’s brand — that of a fiercely new kind of politician — was tarnished by the news last month that his sister and close adviser was under investigation for corruption. Leaked audio recordings caught a former government official revealing a kickback scheme that Karina Milei was running on government contracts. Outrage erupted. Following the revelation, Milei found himself pelted with stones when he attended a party rally late in August.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">He has a narrow course ahead. A collapse in the peso now would jeopardize his hopes for gains in next month’s elections, and could thus be the death knell for his government. The White House’s rescue may therefore enable him to make it to election day, but it’s a gamble for Washington. If all the White House needs to do is offer the “whatever-it-takes” reassurance it has given Argentina, and it doesn’t actually have to bail the country out in any way, it will have been a well-judged intervention. But the US administration will have to hope that investors don’t call its bluff. If the run on Argentine markets resumes, Trump will have to decide whether he is prepared to back up words with money. And bailing out a foreign government at a time the US is cutting its spending on domestic programs could go down badly with American voters. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">As for Milei, he still has his date with the electorate next month. Endorsement and backing from the Trump administration may be all he needs to get his reform program back on track. Equally, in a country where nationalism runs strong, it could backfire. Javier Milei can breathe easier today, but only for long enough to resume the race.</span></p>
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