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		<title>German politics - UnHerd</title>
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					<title>The AfD storm has only just begun</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2025/10/the-afd-storm-has-only-just-begun/?edition=us</link>
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										<unherd:main_theme>Lawfare</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Wolfgang Streeck]]>
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																<unherd:article_ranking>2</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA['The NRW election result will only add momentum to efforts to have the AfD banned by the Constitutional Court.' Photo: Ralf Hirschberger/AFP via Getty.]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Wolfgang Streeck</strong> is an economic sociologist.</p>
]]>
						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle></unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is an economic sociologist.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Wed, 15 Oct 2025 23:02:36 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Wed, 15 Oct 2025 23:02:36 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[AfD]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[friedrich merz]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[German politics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Germany]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[lawfare]]></category>
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																												<description>
								<![CDATA[Liberal lawfare will fail]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>German fiscal austerity may have kept debt service low and soothed — for now — capital markets. But there have been drawbacks — many of them felt increasingly at the local level, in the everyday lives of ordinary people. Under-financed local governments have been unable to stem the rapid deterioration of public services, repair crumbling roads or maintain communal sports facilities. Public transportation has declined, there is a shortage of affordable housing, and local schools are unable to cope with new demands, such as teaching classes in which only a minority understand the national language.</p>
<p>As such problems accumulated, so too did discontent with public policy and democratic politics. As a result, there has been a growing fragmentation of the postwar political party system, a decline of the established parties on both the center-right and the center-left, along with a Right-wing “populist” challenge to the political system inherited from the postwar era, in the form of the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD).</p>
<p>Relatively little attention has been paid, though, to whether and how declining trust in political institutions extends to local government, which has traditionally been less politicized, with local families and networks allegedly making for a less ideological, less confrontational, and more socially embedded politics of pragmatic consensus and cooperation. It is from this perspective, then, that the recent local elections in the state of Nordrhein-Westfalen (North Rhine-Westphalia, NRW) may be of more than just local interest.</p>
<p>With 18 million inhabitants, 14 million of whom are eligible to vote, NRW is by far the largest state of the Federal Republic. With elections held every five years, voters elect local parliaments for cities and counties as well as county administrators (<em>Landrat</em>) and mayors (<em>Bürgermeister, Oberbürgermeister</em>) for the cities. If no candidate for county administrator or mayor wins more than 50% of the vote, a French-style run-off is held.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2021/12/angela-merkels-empty-leadership/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2021/12/angela-merkels-empty-leadership/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/GettyImages-1181053830-scaled.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2021/12/angela-merkels-empty-leadership/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2021/12/angela-merkels-empty-leadership/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Angela Merkel&#039;s empty leadership</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2021/12/angela-merkels-empty-leadership/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Wolfgang Streeck</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>The NRW local elections of 14 and 28 September were the last major elections of the year in Germany, and have been intensively studied by election strategists. Looking at the first round, one finds a considerable increase in turnout, from 51.9% to 56.8%, as is always the case when new “populist” challengers mobilize both friends and foes. More surprising was a remarkable regional stability in both CDU and SPD support, which at 33.3% and 22.1% respectively, lost no more than 1.0 and 2.2 percentage points — both ending up far above their Bundestag results of February 2025 and a national poll (by Forschungsgruppe Wahlen) taken around election day (see Table). The Greens fared far worse than the SPD, falling 6.5 percentage points to 13.5%, despite being in a governing coalition with the CDU at the state level. Finally, there were two winners compared with 2020, the populist Left Linkspartei (5.6% up from 3.8%) and, above all, AfD, which almost tripled its result, from 5.1% to a striking 14.5%.</p>
<table style="height: 450px;width: 99.9038%;border-collapse: collapse;border-radius: 15px 15px 0px 0px;border: 5px solid #aec8bb;margin-bottom: 25px" border="1">
<tbody>
<tr style="height: 30px">
<td style="width: 99.5785%;font-size: 20px;font-family: Newsroom, sans-serif;height: 30px;background-color: #aec8bb;border-color: #aec8bb" colspan="5"><strong>Recent Performance of German Political Parties </strong></td>
</tr>
<tr style="background-color: #aec8bb">
<td style="width: 12.6448%;height: 82px;text-align: center;background-color: #aec8bb;border-color: #aec8bb"></td>
<td style="width: 19.8104%;height: 82px;background-color: #aec8bb;border-color: #aec8bb"><span style="font-size: 10pt"><strong>North Rhine-Westphalia local election 2025</strong></span></td>
<td style="width: 20.7588%;height: 82px;background-color: #aec8bb;border-color: #aec8bb"><span style="font-size: 10pt"><strong>North Rhine-Westphalia local election 2020</strong></span></td>
<td style="width: 21.6016%;height: 82px;background-color: #aec8bb;border-color: #aec8bb"><span style="font-size: 10pt"><strong>German Federal Election 2025</strong></span></td>
<td style="width: 24.7629%;height: 82px;background-color: #aec8bb;border-color: #aec8bb">
<div>
<div><span style="font-size: 10pt"><strong>Nationwide poll from September 2025</strong></span></div>
</div>
</td>
</tr>
<tr style="height: 67px">
<td style="width: 12.6448%;height: 67px;text-align: center;border-color: #adadad"><span style="font-size: 10pt"><strong>CDU</strong></span></td>
<td style="width: 19.8104%;height: 67px;text-align: center;background-color: #ffffff;border-color: #adadad"><span style="font-size: 10pt">33.3%</span></td>
<td style="width: 20.7588%;height: 67px;text-align: center;border-color: #adadad"><span style="font-size: 10pt">34.3%</span></td>
<td style="width: 21.6016%;height: 67px;text-align: center;border-color: #adadad"><span style="font-size: 10pt">22.6%</span></td>
<td style="width: 24.7629%;height: 67px;text-align: center;border-color: #adadad"><span style="font-size: 10pt">26%</span></td>
</tr>
<tr style="height: 67px">
<td style="width: 12.6448%;height: 67px;text-align: center;border-color: #adadad"><span style="font-size: 10pt"><strong>SPD</strong></span></td>
<td style="width: 19.8104%;height: 67px;text-align: center;background-color: #ffffff;border-color: #adadad"><span style="font-size: 10pt">22.1%</span></td>
<td style="width: 20.7588%;height: 67px;text-align: center;border-color: #adadad"><span style="font-size: 10pt">24.3%</span></td>
<td style="width: 21.6016%;height: 67px;text-align: center;border-color: #adadad"><span style="font-size: 10pt">16.4%</span></td>
<td style="width: 24.7629%;height: 67px;text-align: center;border-color: #adadad"><span style="font-size: 10pt">15%</span></td>
</tr>
<tr style="height: 67px">
<td style="width: 12.6448%;height: 67px;text-align: center;border-color: #adadad"><span style="font-size: 10pt"><strong>Grüne</strong></span></td>
<td style="width: 19.8104%;height: 67px;text-align: center;background-color: #ffffff;border-color: #adadad"><span style="font-size: 10pt">13.5%</span></td>
<td style="width: 20.7588%;height: 67px;text-align: center;border-color: #adadad"><span style="font-size: 10pt">20%</span></td>
<td style="width: 21.6016%;height: 67px;text-align: center;border-color: #adadad"><span style="font-size: 10pt">11.6%</span></td>
<td style="width: 24.7629%;height: 67px;text-align: center;border-color: #adadad"><span style="font-size: 10pt">10%</span></td>
</tr>
<tr style="height: 67px">
<td style="width: 12.6448%;height: 67px;text-align: center;border-color: #adadad"><span style="font-size: 10pt"><strong>AfD</strong></span></td>
<td style="width: 19.8104%;height: 67px;text-align: center;background-color: #ffffff;border-color: #adadad"><span style="font-size: 10pt">14.5%</span></td>
<td style="width: 20.7588%;height: 67px;text-align: center;border-color: #adadad"><span style="font-size: 10pt">5.1%</span></td>
<td style="width: 21.6016%;height: 67px;text-align: center;border-color: #adadad"><span style="font-size: 10pt">20.8%</span></td>
<td style="width: 24.7629%;height: 67px;text-align: center;border-color: #adadad"><span style="font-size: 10pt">26%</span></td>
</tr>
<tr style="height: 70px">
<td style="width: 12.6448%;height: 70px;text-align: center;border-color: #adadad"><span style="font-size: 10pt"><strong>Linke</strong></span></td>
<td style="width: 19.8104%;height: 70px;text-align: center;background-color: #ffffff;border-color: #adadad"><span style="font-size: 10pt">5.6%</span></td>
<td style="width: 20.7588%;height: 70px;text-align: center;border-color: #adadad"><span style="font-size: 10pt">3.8%</span></td>
<td style="width: 21.6016%;height: 70px;text-align: center;border-color: #adadad"><span style="font-size: 10pt">8.8%</span></td>
<td style="width: 24.7629%;height: 70px;text-align: center;border-color: #adadad"><span style="font-size: 10pt">11%</span></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p><span style="font-size: 8pt"> Credit: Polling data: Forschungsgruppe Wahlen. Table: Wolfgang Streeck.</span></p>
<p>North Rhine-Westphalia, which contains the populous cities of Cologne, Dortmund, Essen and Düsseldorf, has always been socially and politically on the more conservative side. This may well explain why the CDU and SPD, Germany’s legacy parties, held up relatively well — regardless of the looming social spending reductions at federal level under the no-longer-so-grand CDU/SPD coalition. But it does make the result of the AfD all the more impressive — especially given the fact that, at the time of the election, there were hardly any AfD members yet in political offices in local communities, where local ties tend to be at least as important as party programs, and the fact the AfD suffers in NRW from fierce public infighting. Moreover, as the AfD had been unable or unwilling to put up candidates in around 40% of constituencies, the official election result, computed on the basis of all constituencies, inevitably underestimates the AfD’s real support, probably by some margin. Where the AfD did not join the race this may have been because potential candidates were afraid of the social ostracism they might suffer after identifying themselves as AfD members. Or the party deliberately avoided constituencies where it could not expect to win a minimum of votes. In any case, both factors may have changed by the next election, which may explain the satisfaction of the party leadership after the first round.</p>
<p>Nonetheless, in spite of its gains, the AfD still did not manage to capture even one of the key trophies: the 52 regional positions of <em>Landrat</em> and <em>Oberbürgermeister</em>. But it did manage to disrupt traditional voting patterns. As a result of the AfD advance, 36 of the 52 races, many more than last time, had to go to a runoff. The AfD, however, was among the final two in only three of those races. There all the other parties united against the AfD candidate, leaving them with no chance of winning. The <em>Brandmauer</em> (firewall) remained intact. This, too, may no longer be the case five years from now, with the AfD currently present in all major local assemblies and in a position to build alliances with other parties and groups of voters.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;The AfD is in a position to build alliances with other parties.&#8221;</div>
<p>If the AfD was the winner, the Greens were the losers — with the exception of Münster, where the Green candidate for mayor narrowly defeated the CDU candidate in the run-off. Münster is a beautiful and prosperous university town that has long been governed, and governed well, by Christian Democrats of the Merkel sort, in an informal coalition with the Greens — an alliance between a well-to-do liberal-Catholic bourgeoisie and a large international student community. In Cologne, the fourth-largest city in Germany, with one million inhabitants, and easily the worst-governed, the Greens lost, after having been in a formal coalition with the CDU for a decade. In the run-off, their candidate, of Turkish descent, vice chair of the state legislature, lost to a Social Democrat supported by the CDU, whose candidate had come in only third in the first round. Generally, the party paid the price for the last federal government’s climate-change policy, which tried to legally force homeowners to install new heating systems that could easily cost more than their houses; buy overpriced electric cars; and make local communities accommodate an open-ended number of refugees and asylum seekers assigned to them by <em>Länder</em> governments.</p>
<p>Of the two traditional majority parties, the CDU and SPD, the former did better than the latter, notwithstanding the record low national support for the CDU and its Chancellor, Friedrich Merz (see the table above), after barely six months in office. This may be due in part to the Minister-President of NRW, Hendrik Wüst, also CDU, who is Merz’s main internal rival. Governing with the Greens, who do not have much to say under him, he radiates a friendly competence and calmness that Merz all too obviously lacks. More importantly, the CDU can cohabit more easily with the AfD than can the SPD, not necessarily for programmatic reasons but because its social milieu, lower-class and middle-class Catholic communities, common in the Rhineland and Westphalia, continues to be more resistant to AfD rhetoric than the SPD’s working-class milieu. This may explain why in Dortmund, an old industrial center that the SPD had governed for the past 80 years, the AfD inflicted such heavy losses on the SPD that the CDU candidate won in the runoff. That so few SPD voters turned to the Linkspartei instead of the AfD may be due to the traditionally low presence of the Linke in local politics, and to SPD voters having grown too old to be attracted by the radicals&#8217; youthful image.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/08/how-merkel-fuelled-the-afd/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/08/how-merkel-fuelled-the-afd/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/08/afd.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/08/how-merkel-fuelled-the-afd/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/08/how-merkel-fuelled-the-afd/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>How Merkel fuelled the AfD</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/08/how-merkel-fuelled-the-afd/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Katja Hoyer</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>All in all, the NRW election result will only add momentum to efforts to have the AfD banned by the Constitutional Court, by those in the SPD parliamentary party who consider <em>Kampf gegen rechts</em> (Battle against the Right) to be their party’s foremost political mission. Under the German constitution, a party can be found unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court if it is found be hostile to &#8220;the liberal-democratic basic order&#8221;. There is a long legal literature on what this could mean. In the past, two parties were declared unconstitutional: the Sozialistische Reichspartei Deutschlands in 1952, a self-declared successor organization to the NSDAP, and the Kommunistische Partei (Communist Party) in 1956. Once found unconstitutional, a party is formally dissolved by the government, its funds confiscated, and attempts to continue it or establish a substitute organization become punishable under criminal law, with imprisonment from six months to five years, or from one to ten years &#8220;where the offender acts as a ringleader or instigator&#8230; Attempt shall also be punishable&#8221; (Section 84 of the Criminal Code).</p>
<p>There are good political reasons for the SPD to wish the AfD banned as soon as possible. After all, if the SPD’s decades-long decline continues, it may end up under 10% in the next federal election in early 2029, with the AfD the strongest party by far. As the Court will need time to investigate and deliberate, those in the SPD that want to see the AfD banned will have to ensure that the case is brought to the Court very soon, given that the Court may be hesitant to render a decision in the midst of the next federal election campaign, which will begin roughly in the spring of 2028. While two new judges, recently appointed on the SPD ticket, might support a ban in time, other judges under the influence of the CDU might not. Of course, if the Court were to decide only after the election, the fact alone that the AfD could then be found unconstitutional might damage its electoral prospects; expect the court proceedings to be professionally orchestrated by the government’s public relations machinery and dutifully dramatized by the public and private media. Potential AfD candidates might be scared away, and potential party members might not join for fear of being disqualified from jobs in the public sector after a party ban. Not least, <em>Kampf gegen rechts</em> before the Constitutional Court might also help hide the inability of the new federal government’s U-turn to fiscal profligacy to solve the local problems accumulated over decades of austerity, and it might divert attention from the cuts in social spending that will be necessary to finance the war in Ukraine.</p>
<p>Even if the Constitutional Court were to decide in favor of the established parties — and it could hardly decide otherwise in the midst of a highly politicized election campaign — the huge political and legal problems of banning and enforcing a party representing at least a third of the electorate would not disappear. While the Court can outlaw a political party, it cannot remove its members of parliament from their seats, at any level, federal, <em>Länder</em>, or local. In fact, if the AfD were banned, one third if not even more of all seats might be occupied by MPs elected on the AfD ticket after the next election, and all would be legally safe for the rest of the legislative term unless found to have engaged in something that government prosecutors considered &#8220;continuation&#8221; or &#8220;substitution&#8221; of the AfD. Accusations to this effect by political competitors could be expected en masse. (According to Section 46 of the Constitutional Court Act, details of how a party ban is to be executed are determined by the federal government by statutory order, without need for legislation.)</p>
<p>With a verdict after the next election, this would make a new, early election inevitable. In it, former AfD MPs could run as individual candidates or on lists of new Right-wing parties, unless excluded from running by the <em>Länder</em> electoral boards or, of course, in prison for continuation or substitution. There would be litigation galore. During an election campaign in the wake of a party ban, the Office of the Federal Prosecutor (<em>Bundesanwaltschaft</em>) would be busy day and night, observing suspicious candidates’ every move to determine whether they were in violation of the AfD ban, which would be a statutory offense. If they were found to be, they would have to be immediately disqualified from running and taken to the courts where they would face imprisonment. What a spectacle that would be.</p>
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															<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">1031964</post-id>				</item>
									<item>
					<title>Are we all Gaullists now?</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2025/02/are-we-all-gaullists-now/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://stage.unherd.com/2025/02/are-we-all-gaullists-now/?edition=us#comments</comments>
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										<unherd:main_theme>Europe</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Tom McTague]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/Tom-McTague-Website.jpg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>1</unherd:article_ranking>
																<unherd:image_caption>
							<![CDATA[Is de Gaulle history? Photo by Henri Bureau/ Getty.]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Tom McTague</strong> is UnHerd&#8217;s <strong>Political Editor.</strong> He is the author of <em>Between the Waves: The Hidden History of a Very British Revolution 1945-2016,</em> due to be published in September 2025</p>
]]>
						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>TomMcTague</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is UnHerd's <strong>Political Editor.</strong> He is the author of <em>Between the Waves: The Hidden History of a Very British Revolution 1945-2016,</em> due to be published in September 2025]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Tue, 25 Feb 2025 00:03:39 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Tue, 25 Feb 2025 09:27:37 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[EU]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Europe]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[friedrich merz]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[Keir Starmer]]></category>
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																												<description>
								<![CDATA[Strategic autonomy is having a moment]]>
							</description>
																		
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								<![CDATA[<p>A conventional wisdom is sweeping across much of Europe as indignity is heaped upon it by the new imperator in Washington. Maybe Charles de Gaulle was right after all. Finally, it seems, France’s age-old push for “strategic autonomy” has found its moment. No longer simply an aspiration of the usual sovereigntists in Paris, but the stated ambition of the continent’s most stalwart Atlanticists in Berlin — and even, perhaps, London too.</p>
<p>The scale and speed of this geopolitical shift was captured by the incoming German chancellor, Friedrich Merz, when, responding to his party’s victory at the weekend, declared that his priority would be to “achieve independence from the US”. Once the archetype of a solid West German realist, Merz declared that Trump’s behavior had left Europe with little choice. Two days previously, the CDU leader had even argued that Germany needed to begin discussions with Britain and France about “nuclear sharing” because the US could no longer be relied upon.</p>
<p>Nor is Britain quite as allergic as it once was to such talk. Following the emergency summit called by Emmanuel Macron last week to discuss the Trump administration’s opening of peace talks with Russia, Keir Starmer declared that Europe could no longer “cling to the comforts of the past”; it needed to take responsibility for its own security.</p>
<p>In Paris, were it not for France’s own political crisis, there might have been a sense of delayed gratification. For as early as 1962, de Gaulle had been clear about the purpose of what was then the Common Market. “What is the point of Europe?” the general asked. “The point is that one is not dominated by either the Russians or the Americans.” And so it seems today.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/02/germany-is-stuck-in-a-centrist-trap/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/02/germany-is-stuck-in-a-centrist-trap/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/GettyImages-2200461141.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/02/germany-is-stuck-in-a-centrist-trap/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/02/germany-is-stuck-in-a-centrist-trap/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Germany is stuck in a centrist trap</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/02/germany-is-stuck-in-a-centrist-trap/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Wolfgang Munchau</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>For most of the French presidents who followed de Gaulle, this central vision remained the unrealized — but axiomatic — purpose of what became the EU. In one of his first major interventions after being elected in 2017, Macron called for the continent to rapidly carve out its own autonomy from the US. “We cannot blindly entrust what Europe represents [to] the other side of the Atlantic,” he declared, only to be mocked for his apparent naivety. Macron claimed that the central reality Europe needed to face up to was the “gradual and inevitable disengagement by the United States” from the continent, which, in turn, demanded Europe develop its own “autonomous operating capabilities”.</p>
<p>If anything, Macron’s speech has proved too timid. Back in 2017, he was calling for an autonomous European force capable of “complementing” NATO. Today, Germany’s Merz is questioning whether the trans-Atlantic alliance even exists in practical terms any longer.</p>
<p>The appeal of the Gaullist argument always lay in its apparent moral clarity and dignity. As Thomas Paine might have put it: There is something absurd in supposing a continent be perpetually governed by an Empire on the other side of the ocean. Perhaps, but the problem has never really been one of morality — rather the reality of national ambition lurking underneath. As de Gaulle said, Europe was not so much the means to make Europe great again, but France. It was, he said, the means for France to “become again what she has ceased to be since Waterloo: First in the world”.</p>
<p>Macron’s 2017 speech is a reminder that just beneath the European surface of French foreign policy lurks that old Gaullist national interest. As well as calling for European autonomy to protect the continent’s interests from an American withdrawal, Macron also called for the EU to develop a foreign policy focused above all on the Mediterranean and Africa, and for the euro to be placed at “the heart of Europe&#8217;s economic power in the world”. Neither of these priorities speaks in any way to the one country France would need to support a policy of European autonomy from the United States: Poland. In fact, the focus on the Mediterranean and Africa is a transparent attempt to use the power of the EU to pursue what are, in effect, French strategic concerns.</p>
<p>A regular complaint from American officials over the years has been that, despite repeated demands for European autonomy, there was never much interest shown in the practical realities of turning this into genuine continent-wide integration supporting any war for survival against Russia. It is notable, for instance, that Macron’s speech from 2017 focuses on threats from terrorism and instability in Africa but not Russia, despite the fact that it had already invaded and annexed land from Ukraine.</p>
<p>Even today, many of the old instincts remain. Starmer’s hopes for a new defense and security pact, for example, are currently being held up by discussions over<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2025/feb/02/keir-starmer-european-defence-security-eu-leaders"> fishing rights</a>. Those close to Starmer remain deeply skeptical that there will be any significant change in the EU’s willingness to compromise its single-market “red lines” in order to forge a closer relationship with Britain’s defense industry — something which could be a key asset in developing European military-industrial capacity. “The French see no benefit opening up the market to British competition,” one British official put it. The simple fact remains that whatever the rhetoric coming out of Berlin, Paris or Brussels about nuclear deals and “resets”, the old red-lines of the Brexit negotiations remain: if Britain wants more than it has today, it will have to accept the EU’s rules.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/02/can-starmer-exploit-europes-crisis/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/02/can-starmer-exploit-europes-crisis/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/GettyImages-2199580413.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/02/can-starmer-exploit-europes-crisis/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/02/can-starmer-exploit-europes-crisis/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Can Starmer exploit Europe&#039;s crisis?</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/02/can-starmer-exploit-europes-crisis/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Tom McTague</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Amid Trump’s disregard for Europe’s interests — and sensitivities — it is understandable why the allure of de Gaulle has returned to the continent’s politics. As Julian Jackson put it in his biography of the general, although much of what he stood for was built on the myth of French victory in the Second World War — ”throwing dust in the Allies’ eyes so that they might be blinded into thinking that France was great” as he put it — de Gaulle really did save the honor of France, while posing many the questions which continue to dominate Europe’s discussions today, including, most pertinently: How to create ‘Europe’ itself?</p>
<p>Yet, de Gaulle was also a deeply flawed prophet, casting his country “into a role which was beyond her power”, as Britain’s ambassador at the time, Gladwyn Jebb, remarked. This remains a core challenge for Europe today. While there are questions of indignity and morality, there are also questions of means and will. France, Germany and Britain remain bound by fiscal and political constraints — many of their own making — which make any serious push towards strategic autonomy hard to take seriously.</p>
<p>Right now, Germany is in the fifth year of an unprecedented post-war economic stagnation, having seen each of the core planks of its geopolitical strategy ripped apart following the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Having bet the house on its export-led industrial economy, it was ultimately dependent on Russian gas, Chinese trade and American defense. Today the German economic model faces the existential challenge of losing all three of these core pillars in one go. Having also removed all nuclear energy in a gamble on renewables, and tied itself to the most extreme form of fiscal conservatism imaginable by shoehorning a “debt brake” into the German constitution, the incoming government’s room for maneuver is extraordinarily limited.</p>
<p>The initial results of the election suggest that Merz will not have the required two-thirds majority in the Bundestag necessary to remove the debt brake, making any significant uplift in defense spending extremely difficult. In July last year, the previous coalition government agreed to cut military aid to Ukraine by almost half to €4 billion in its draft budget for 2025, despite Olaf Scholz’s Zeitenwende — or turning point — speech declaring a whole new attitude to defense following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022.</p>
<p>In France, meanwhile, Macron has no majority in the National Assembly to pass any budget, and lost three prime ministers last year trying to do so. Faced with a blocking majority of the hard-Left and hard-Right, much of which is skeptical of the war in Ukraine and opposed to significant cuts to pensions or welfare, it is similarly difficult to see a path to significant defense spending increases in the foreseeable future — unless new elections later this year can break the impasse.</p>
<p>Even in Britain, which has the most parliamentary powerful government of the three major European powers, there are severe fiscal constraints against any rapid increase in defense spending of the sort required to achieve independence from the US. According to senior British officials, even increasing the budget to 3% of GDP would only strengthen the conventional forces we already have, allowing London to fulfill the role demanded of it by Nato. To fill the hole left by the United States — including, as Merz suggested, an independent European nuclear deterrent against Russia — would require an uplift of the order Trump has demanded: to 4-5% of GDP.</p>
<p>For any British government, such a choice is not only politically unfeasible, but far from obviously militarily desirable. As one senior official put it, in some of the core aspects of modern defense — from space, to drones and AI — European states dreaming of autonomy from the US could quickly look markedly unattractive to the UK, which may choose to partner with fast-moving, well-funded American programs, rather than speculative, expensive and unproven European alternatives. These also come with the added risk that Britain could be “blocked at the last minute because Breton langoustine fishermen are unhappy”.</p>
<p>But as the spectre of de Gaulle looms over a Europe bickering over seafood, the continent should find inspiration in another figure: not the great man of France, but the founding father of modern Europe, Jean Monnet.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;In the summer of 1945, with Europe lying in ruins, Charles de Gaulle and Jean Monnet were the two dominant Frenchmen of the day.&#8221;</div>
<p>In his biography of the great statesman, François Duchêne sets out how Monnet used moments of crisis to pursue new ideas, rather than simply leaning on those old maxims of foreign policy: &#8220;He suspected history of being a crutch,&#8221; Duchêne wrote, &#8220;for those who hoped relying on it would be easier than thinking for themselves.&#8221;</p>
<p>Indeed, one of the interesting things about Jean Monnet is that he is not simply revered by Europe’s federalists as the founding father of modern Europe, the first to be given named an honorary &#8220;citizen of Europe&#8221;, but that he is also held up as icon among eurosceptic revolutionaries such as Dominic Cummings who see him as one of the geniuses of modern politics, able to give institutional life to his ideals. Monnet led a remarkable life: French official and European hero, but also a man of the Western order who was knighted by the British, worked for Churchill, proposed the union of Britain and France and was seen by de Gaulle as being too much of an anglo to be trusted.</p>
<p>The highest praise Monnet had for any statesman was that they were &#8220;generous&#8221;, the opposite of which he called the &#8220;spirit of domination&#8221; whereby these men seek only to further their immediate interests within their narrow positions of power. Looking out across Europe today, it is hard to see much generosity among its statesmen — or indeed any of Monnet’s genius for taking an idea such as &#8220;strategic autonomy&#8221; and making it real For Monnet, in fact, one of the central purposes of the &#8220;Europe&#8221; he created was to keep together the Atlantic world and what he originally saw as its three component parts: the continent; the British Commonwealth; and the might of the United States.</p>
<p>There were, for Monnet, very few politicians who combined the skill of high office with the &#8220;generosity&#8221; to achieve results that went beyond immediate national interest. Without that generosity, Monnet argued, men turned too often to what he called &#8220;little solutions to big problems&#8221;. If there is a description of modern Europe’s predicament, it is this: a continent stuck in its old ways of thinking, still focused on its old red lines and petty nationalisms — and still lacking the generosity required to break free from the indignity of Trump’s domination.</p>
<p>In the summer of 1945, with Europe lying in ruins, Charles de Gaulle and Jean Monnet were the two dominant Frenchmen of the day. Having returned from a visit to Washington, the general and the &#8220;inspirer&#8221; as de Gaulle dismissively referred to Monnet, held a long discussion about the state of the continent. &#8220;You speak of greatness,&#8221; Monnet told de Gaulle, &#8220;but today the French are small. There will only be greatness when the French are of a stature to warrant it… For this purpose they need to modernize.&#8221; De Gaulle had returned from American stunned by the prosperity — and power — of the new hegemon. &#8220;You are certainly right,&#8221; he replied. &#8220;Do you want to try?&#8221;</p>
<p>The rest is history. But some things remain unchanged. Europe today is small and it will only achieve greatness when it assumes the stature to warrant it. Instead, no doubt, Berlin, London and Paris will argue about fish and plead for America to stay just a bit longer.</p>
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