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		<title>Houthis - UnHerd</title>
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					<title>Will the Gulf war claim another victim?</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2026/09/will-the-gulf-war-claim-another-victim/?edition=us</link>
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										<unherd:main_theme>Geopolitics</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Malise Ruthven]]>
					</dc:creator>
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																<unherd:article_ranking>2</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[Andy Burnham put the national-interest case directly. (Henry Nicholls/Getty)]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Malise Ruthven</strong> is an author and journalist. He has worked at the BBC World Service, and has taught at universities on both sides of the Atlantic. He is the general editor of <em><a href="https://www.amazon.co.uk/Carving-Up-Globe-Atlas-Diplomacy/dp/067497624X" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Carving up the Globe: An Atlas of Diplomacy</a></em>.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
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						<unherd:twitter_handle></unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is an author and journalist. He has worked at the BBC World Service, and has taught at universities on both sides of the Atlantic. He is the general editor of <em><a href="https://www.amazon.co.uk/Carving-Up-Globe-Atlas-Diplomacy/dp/067497624X" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Carving up the Globe: An Atlas of Diplomacy</a></em>.

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					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Tue, 22 Sep 2026 23:02:21 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Wed, 23 Sep 2026 11:53:01 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Geopolitics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Houthis]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Middle East]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Saudi Arabia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Yemen]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://stage.unherd.com/?p=1075620</guid>
																												<description>
								<![CDATA[Backing Saudi could strand Burnham]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p dir="ltr">In February 1940, my godmother, Freya Stark, arrived in Sana&#8217;a carrying a forbidden cinematograph projector. Her mission was to loosen Fascist Italy&#8217;s influence over Imam Yahya, the formidable ruler of Yemen&#8217;s Zaidi imamate. Fortunately for Stark and the British, scratchy Ministry of Information footage of Royal Navy ships in Portsmouth made what she called a tremendous impression, with Yahya and his court unable to resist this display of naval might. The Italian legation was furious, and talked of importing a projector of its own. But it was too late. Within a fortnight, Stark believed, Italian influence in Sana&#8217;a had been broken.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Some 86 years later, Britain is back Arabia, wooing a very different set of rulers. The Government has agreed to send an RAF Voyager tanker from its base in Cyprus to provide in-flight refueling for Saudi aircraft defending the kingdom against Houthi missiles and drones. Unlike Britain&#8217;s earlier direct strikes on the Houthis, in which RAF Typhoons took part, the present commitment is described as limited, time-bound and defensive. British support is not, officials insist, intended for Saudi strikes inside Yemen. Yet aerial refueling is never just symbolic. It enables aircraft to remain airborne longer, carrying Britain a little further into a war from which Saudi Arabia has spent years trying to extricate itself.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Britain supposedly withdrew from &#8220;east of Suez&#8221; more than half a century ago. In practice, though, it never entirely left, retaining close military relations with Jordan and Oman; a naval presence in Bahrain and the Gulf; and a defense industry tied intimately to the Saudi armed forces. As Sir William Patey, the former British ambassador to Riyadh, recently told the BBC, Saudi Arabia is Britain&#8217;s largest defense export market, while Britain is its leading supplier of advanced fighter aircraft. The relationship includes British-supplied Typhoons and air-defense systems, as well as continuing support for Saudi air operations under existing contracts. When Iran attacked Saudi Arabia, Patey added, Britain helped with the kingdom’s air defenses. The flags came down with the “winds of change”, then, but the infrastructure of influence survived.</p>
<p dir="ltr"><div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/09/how-shakespeare-explains-the-taliban/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/09/how-shakespeare-explains-the-taliban/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/GettyImages-2290557153.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/09/how-shakespeare-explains-the-taliban/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/09/how-shakespeare-explains-the-taliban/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>How Shakespeare explains the Taliban</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/09/how-shakespeare-explains-the-taliban/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Malise Ruthven</a></p></div></a></div>
<p dir="ltr">The Voyager&#8217;s mission may not be the return of former imperial power so much as the exposure of a continuing relationship normally hidden behind contracts, advisers and joint exercises. The Saudis, having been turned down by the United States, asked Britain to demonstrate that it remained a reliable partner. Andy Burnham then put the national-interest case more directly. “I go back to the point I made about cost-of-living pressures and acting to secure the interests of Britain and the wider region,” he said, “because of course Saudi Arabia has been experiencing attacks, is looking at potential further disruption, and we need to keep those pathways open.” The Houthis have seized the port of Mocha, and strategic Red Sea islands, tightening their grip on the approaches to the Bab al-Mandab, through which roughly a tenth of global trade normally passes. Their missiles have also reached Saudi territory, while attacks on energy infrastructure threaten pipelines designed to bypass the Strait of Hormuz. Altogether, that creates the possibility of a pincer squeeze on the world economy. What happens in the Gulf and Red Sea enters British and European politics through petrol prices, inflation and the cost of borrowing.</p>
<p dir="ltr">The crisis represents not simply the return of Mohammed bin Salman&#8217;s disastrous Yemeni war, but also the re-emergence in revolutionary form of Yemen&#8217;s ancient Zaidi political tradition. To treat the Houthis merely as an Iranian appendage threatening Western commerce is to misunderstand why bombing has repeatedly failed to subdue them. Iranian technology, components, training and revolutionary language have increased their power, and tied them to the so-called “axis of resistance”. Yet Tehran did not invent the movement and probably does not issue its daily orders. Its strength rests on the religious memory and political dispossession of Yemen’s northern highlands.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Zaidism differs significantly from the Twelver Shi&#8217;ism of Iran. Its name derives from Zayd ibn Ali, who died in revolt against the Umayyads in 740. In classical Zaidi doctrine, an imam did not inherit office automatically through an unbroken, divinely designated line. Rather, he had to be a qualified descendant of the Prophet through Hasan or Husayn, as well as learned, just, and also courageous enough to “come forth” against unlawful rule. The choice was elective only within this restricted sacred lineage. Armed resistance was not an accidental feature of legitimacy; it helped constitute it.</p>
<p dir="ltr"><div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;Armed resistance was not an accidental feature of legitimacy; it helped constitute it.&#8221;</div>
<p dir="ltr">Zaidi imams ruled varying portions of the Yemeni highlands from the 9th century. Imam Yahya, who fought the Ottomans and consolidated an independent kingdom after 1918, was the last truly formidable representative of his order. His state was isolated and administratively thin, but he balanced tribes, including the Sunnis of the Tihama lowlands, dynastic claims, and foreign powers with considerable skill, including flirtation with Mussolini in the Horn of Africa. Italian connections alarmed the British in Aden, hence Freya Stark&#8217;s films and her appeal to the aristocratic pride of Yahya&#8217;s court. She contrasted Yemen’s hereditary religious hierarchy with a rampant appeal to dynastic snobbery, explaining that Hitler had been a paperhanger and that Mussolini&#8217;s father had been a blacksmith. Such details, she told her husband, “carry unexpected weight”.</p>
<p dir="ltr">The monarchy survived Yahya&#8217;s assassination in 1948, but not the republican coup of September 1962. Nasser sent an Egyptian army to defend the new republic. In one of the region&#8217;s more instructive confessional paradoxes, Saudi Arabia supported the Zaidi royalists. Wahhabi hostility to Shia belief mattered less than fear of revolutionary Arab nationalism. Britain also played a characteristically deniable role. Colonel David Smiley, an SOE veteran who had commanded the Sultan of Oman&#8217;s armed forces, advised Imam al-Badr&#8217;s royalists, and from 1964 directed a band of foreign soldiers that included former SAS men.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Britain is thus again assisting Saudi Arabia in a Yemeni war: but this time against Zaidi power rather than in its defense. The republic abolished the imamate but not the society that had sustained it. Zaidi scholars and descendents of Muhammad lost authority; Saudi-backed Salafi teaching expanded into the northern province of Saada; central government brought neglect, manipulation and intermittent repression. The “Believing Youth” movement began as a cultural and educational revival. Under the eponymous Hussein Badreddin al-Houthi, however, it acquired a fiercely political theology and the now notorious slogan against America, Israel and the Jews. When President Ali Abdullah Saleh tried to crush it, Hussein was killed, and six wars followed between 2004 and 2010. Saleh, the master tactician who boasted of dancing on the heads of snakes, later allied with the enemies he had persecuted. Forces loyal to him helped the Houthis seize Sana&#8217;a in 2014. When, in 2017, he changed sides again, and sought an accommodation with the Saudis, they killed him. The movement had swallowed the snake-charmer.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Saudi Arabia intervened in 2015 expecting a short campaign. Years of air strikes devastated Yemen — without dislodging the Houthis. Yet it would be their attacks on Red Sea shipping following the Gaza war that brought a local movement and international stage. Sympathy for Palestinians is genuine and consistent with Houthi ideology. It is also politically useful. Palestine lets the movement mobilize a war-weary population, humiliate Arab governments and claim a stature beyond Yemen&#8217;s borders. A missile need not hit its target to work. The credible threat alone diverts ships, raises insurance costs, and turns a sectarian militia into an actor capable of taxing the global economy.</p>
<p dir="ltr"><div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/09/can-anyone-stop-the-houthis/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/09/can-anyone-stop-the-houthis/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/GettyImages-2281295825.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/09/can-anyone-stop-the-houthis/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/09/can-anyone-stop-the-houthis/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Can anyone stop the Houthis?</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/09/can-anyone-stop-the-houthis/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Reuel Marc Gerecht</a></p></div></a></div>
<p dir="ltr">Britain therefore confronts a genuine danger. But it also risks repeating an old error: mistaking superior machinery for political control. Freya Stark&#8217;s projector succeeded because it formed part of diplomacy. It flattered, persuaded and communicated. The Saudi air campaign, by contrast, showed the limits of firepower, especially when there is no plausible Yemeni order waiting to replace the people being bombed. As the Yemen specialist Elisabeth Kendall has warned, air strikes may degrade Houthi capabilities while increasing their popularity. Britain can help intercept drones; it cannot refuel its way to a legitimate government in Sana&#8217;a. Nor is the alternative to the Houthis a single coherent state. The internationally recognized camp contains Saudi clients, former Saleh loyalists, Islamists, southern separatists and competing tribal and regional forces. The UAE has sponsored secessionist allies, especially in the south, while Saudi Arabia has generally insisted on formal unity. The regions of Hadhramaut and al-Mahrah have their own identities and patrons. Oman, with its long experience of discreet mediation and its own British military history, fears disorder on its frontier.</p>
<p dir="ltr">In short, an east-of-Suez strategy built on royal relationships may preserve regimes more readily than it creates states. The Government&#8217;s distinction between refueling defensive Saudi missions and enabling offensive operations is therefore crucial but fragile. Patey assumed that Riyadh had not asked Britain to join direct strikes on the Houthis. Saudi oil and civilian installations were being attacked, he argued, and helping the kingdom defend them was legitimate. That is persuasive as far as it goes. But tankers do not decide the purposes for which an alliance is used; ministers do. The record of the earlier Saudi campaign gives little cause for confidence. Jeremy Hunt, then foreign secretary, spoke of his “frank conversations” with Saudi counterparts about human rights, while the Government defended British arms sales by citing the “extensive British training” given to Saudi pilots and the programmers of its “smart bombs” to limit civilian casualties. RAF liaison officers worked in the Saudi air operations center, ostensibly to help the kingdom comply with international humanitarian law. A former British official who had worked with the Saudis dismissed that claim in a single word: “bollocks.”</p>
<p dir="ltr">Britain now needs transparent rules, parliamentary scrutiny and an answer to the obvious question of what happens if the aircraft sustained by the RAF Voyager move from intercepting missiles to striking targets inside Yemen. Humanitarian law cannot be outsourced to the adjective “defensive”. In 1940, British power appeared in Sana&#8217;a as flickering images; today it arrives as invisible fuel. All the while, the Houthis warn that east of Suez, history never stays offshore for long.</p>
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									<item>
					<title>Why Trump can&#039;t beat the Houthis</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2025/03/why-trump-cant-beat-the-houthis/?edition=us</link>
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										<unherd:main_theme>signalgate</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Reuel Marc Gerecht]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/blued-1-300x300-1.jpg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>2</unherd:article_ranking>
																<unherd:image_caption>
							<![CDATA[Iran doesn't care for the Houthis. Mohammed Hamoud/Getty Images]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Reuel Marc Gerecht </strong>is a Resident Scholar at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and a former Iranian-targets officer in the Central Intelligence Agency.</p>
]]>
						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>ReuelMGerecht</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[is a Resident Scholar at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and a former Iranian-targets officer in the Central Intelligence Agency.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Fri, 28 Mar 2025 00:01:41 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Fri, 28 Mar 2025 14:33:57 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Donald Trump]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Houthis]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Iran]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[signal]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[The Atlantic]]></category>
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																												<description>
								<![CDATA[Attacking proxies won't wound Iran]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>Donald Trump took to Truth Social last week to give <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cwyd2l17ygpo" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Iran a violent warning</a>: “Every shot fired by the Houthis will be looked upon, from this point forward, as being a shot fired from the weapons and leadership of IRAN. IRAN will be held responsible, and suffer the consequences and those consequences will be dire!” It didn’t sound as if he was pondering another round of sanctions.</p>
<p>A few days later came <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2025/03/24/trump-putin-bromance-could-finally-topple-irans-ayatollahs/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">a shift in tone</a>, as Trump’s Middle East envoy, Steve Witkoff, extended an olive branch: “Our signal to Iran is let’s sit down and see if we can, through dialogue, through diplomacy, get to the right place,” he said. “If we can’t, the alternative is not a great alternative.” This followed a letter Trump sent to the Iranian supreme leader Ali Khamenei on 7 March, which supposedly set a two-month deadline for a new nuclear deal to be signed.</p>
<p>As Iran gets closer and closer to building a bomb, Trump will have to decide whether to avert the coming nuclear crisis using military or diplomatic might. His team is divided. The Signal exchange published this week in <em>The Atlantic</em>, in which high-ranking officials discussed plans for air strikes against Houthi rebels in Yemen, revealed a split within the Trump administration over Yemen — and, more importantly though indirectly, over Iran.</p>
<p>In one camp is Vice President JD Vance and the President’s consigliere, Stephen Miller, who together head up the isolationists. Vance has repeatedly expressed strong reservations about Middle Eastern engagements, even those with Israel against Iran, which might lead the United States into conflict. Vance wants the US to do less, and its allies to do more — though not anything that would oblige Washington to intervene militarily. In the other camp is Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth, whose more confrontational views on Yemen echo those of the President. Hegseth’s stance reflects the President’s seeming willingness to extend US power into the Middle East to protect Israel vis-à-vis Iran. Though in other areas of foreign policy, Trump’s reluctance to protect traditional allies and avoid “forever wars” is more in line with his Vice President’s sentiments.</p>
<p>Vance’s and Miller’s animosity towards “free-loading” Europeans, as exposed in the leaked messages, reflects a widespread Right-wing allergy towards any dangerous American commitment in the Middle East. These isolationists oppose America bombing Yemen because they think that Suez Canal trade routes, which are continuously harassed by the Iran-allied Houthis, supposedly benefit Europe more than the United States. So why should America be the one to police them?</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;The Signal exchange revealed a split within the Trump administration over Yemen — and, more importantly though indirectly, over Iran.&#8221;</div>
<p>This aversion to protecting international shipping lanes in the Middle East can be traced back to 2019, when Trump failed to respond militarily to Iranian missile-and-drone and mine attacks on Saudi oil facilities and Gulf shipping. In doing so, he put the so-called Carter Doctrine of 1980— which stipulated that Washington would go to war to protect Persian Gulf oil — on life-support. The decision to sit tight badly damaged US credibility, and might explain Trump’s recent hawkish makeover.</p>
<p>However, one suspects that the Signal debacle was less about shipping lanes, and more about the potential for the Yemen imbroglio to trigger a conflict with Iran. Vance and Miller surely see the Middle Eastern momentum.</p>
<p>The Signal discussion didn’t touch on how the Yemen bombings would affect Washington’s current diplomatic overture to Tehran. Hegseth and the President likely think it can’t hurt: Tehran will see Trump’s Washington as tougher for it, and capable of coercing the Iranians into nuclear negotiations. Meanwhile, Vance may not care: the Vice President doesn’t believe Washington should go to war with Tehran over the nuclear issue, let alone Suez Canal traffic. If he isn’t willing to bomb an Iranian proxy for fear of a slippery slope, then he is surely unlikely to want to bomb its sponsor.</p>
<p>In August 1998, President Bill Clinton fired cruise missiles at al-Qaeda in Khost, Afghanistan, in retaliation to the US embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania. I recall speaking to my old professor, the Anglo-American historian Bernard Lewis, about the barrage. This was his wry assessment: “I was in Khost in 1956. I don’t think it’s changed. Not sure we will be able to see much difference between the before and after shots.”</p>
<p>What was true in Afghanistan then is undoubtedly true in Yemen now: attacking the Houthis, who have always given Tehran a big strategic bang for their buck, isn’t likely to cause significant long-term damage. After all, peasant societies repair infrastructure pretty quickly. Ten years ago, the Saudis and Emirates tried to bomb the Houthis into better behaviour. Despite their overwhelming air power and American targeting assistance, they failed abysmally.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/03/how-rearmament-can-make-us-rich/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/03/how-rearmament-can-make-us-rich/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/GettyImages-1245740406.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/03/how-rearmament-can-make-us-rich/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/03/how-rearmament-can-make-us-rich/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>How rearmament can make us rich</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/03/how-rearmament-can-make-us-rich/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Edward Luttwak</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>This is partly because Yemen has been at war with itself for decades, and the years of fighting have shredded Yemeni communitarian restraint — the social, political, and economic capital of older men that checks the aggressive passions of younger men. Violence is now the norm in a deeply fractured society. The only military actions against Yemen that might be more effective would entail constant, scorching assaults by US naval and land forces that would turn the littoral into a wasteland — a more destructive version of what British imperial forces did to quiet the Wahhabi-inspired Gulf pirates of the early 19th century. However, even under Trump, Washington is surely unprepared to support such sustained devastation, and to commit manpower and money to it.</p>
<p>Nor are US military actions in Yemen likely to provoke much fear in Tehran. The whole point of Iranian-backed proxies is to absorb pain. The Islamic Republic has been clandestinely nurturing foreign militants since its inception — and for all this time it’s never cared much about allied-Arab casualties.</p>
<p>All this means that American, European, and Israeli reprisals against the Houthis are likely refortifying an old Iranian doctrine: that the Islamic Republic’s enemies are willing to attack the clerical regime’s proxies, but not Iran directly. The Israelis discombobulated this in October 2024, but now it seems to be back in force.</p>
<p>Yet until Iranian supplies are cut off directly, check-mating the Houthis is impossible. The US and allied navies and air forces have so far failed to stop the Houthis harassing shipping. And they are unlikely to do better until the United States is willing to attack Iranian ports — the primary entrepôts for the Houthis — while also hitting Yemeni targets.</p>
<p>Unlike the Houthis, the clerical regime has much to lose in a duel with the United States. By Middle Eastern standards, Iran has a fairly advanced society, cursed with an incompetent government. The Iranian currency, the rial, now appears to be in free-fall, which, given the history of economic protests in the country morphing into violent political protests, must give the theocracy pause. In this context, US military power is a threat to its capacity to govern. If sustained, US military action against the clerical regime will surely convulse the theocracy at the very least, and disrupt its support to its proxies.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/12/how-syria-will-shape-europes-future/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/12/how-syria-will-shape-europes-future/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/Screenshot-2024-12-16-at-11.56.41.png?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/12/how-syria-will-shape-europes-future/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/12/how-syria-will-shape-europes-future/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>How Syria will shape Europe&#039;s future</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/12/how-syria-will-shape-europes-future/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Aris Roussinos</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>For now, however, Trump still believes that a nuclear deal with Khamenei is possible. And until he abandons this idea, he’ll likely have no more success against the Houthis than his predecessor. The quest for a nuclear deal handicapped Washington’s willingness to counter Tehran in the past. A limited nuclear agreement, which exchanges sanctions relief for some easily reversible diminution of uranium enrichment, would just give Tehran the cash to fortify its proxies again. Trump would become Obama redux.</p>
<p>During the first Trump administration, Tehran essentially stopped the growth of its enriched-uranium stockpile. This time round that doesn’t appear to be happening, and Tehran’s mass of highly enriched, near-bomb-grade uranium is growing larger by the month. Senior officials in the Biden administration more or less operated under the assumption that Iran only had a few technical hurdles left to jump; if provoked, Khamenei could cross the nuclear red line.</p>
<p>But what about Trump? If the President decides to attack the Islamic Republic’s ports and missile factories because of its Yemeni machinations, then hitting the nuclear sites will surely follow. The Trump administration’s intentions on a lot of issues are challenging to assess since the President isn’t captured by consistency and humbled by contradiction. But he does seem to understand that the nuclear issue cannot be separated from the Islamic Republic’s proxy imperialism. They are solved together, or they are lost separately.</p>
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					<title>China is winning the battle for the Red Sea</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2024/02/china-is-winning-the-battle-for-the-red-sea/?edition=us</link>
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										<unherd:main_theme>New world order</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Nathan Levine]]>
					</dc:creator>
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																<unherd:article_ranking>3</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[Members of the Chinese Navy (VCG/VCG via Getty Images)]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Nathan Levine</strong> is a Visiting Fellow in the B. Kenneth Simon Center at the Heritage Foundation and a non-resident Research Fellow with the Asia Society Policy Institute.</p>
]]>
						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle></unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is a Visiting Fellow in the B. Kenneth Simon Center at the Heritage Foundation and a non-resident Research Fellow with the Asia Society Policy Institute.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Sun, 11 Feb 2024 00:02:47 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Mon, 12 Feb 2024 15:49:46 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[American Empire]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[China]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[global trade]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Houthis]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Middle East]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Politics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[red sea]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[UK]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://old.unherd.com/?p=498315</guid>
																												<description>
								<![CDATA[America has retired as world policeman]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>Hardly for the first time, remote Arab tribesmen are reshaping the world. Piratical attacks on international shipping by Yemen-based Houthi rebels have created a significant security crisis in the Red Sea. The world’s largest shipping lines have been forced to <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2024/01/02/maersk-red-sea-pause-shows-operation-prosperity-guardian-limits.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">suspend</a> transit through the Red Sea and thus the Suez Canal. And with nearly a third of global container traffic typically flowing through Suez, this has seriously disrupted world trade. Yet the most enduring impact of the crisis may be on the geopolitical balance between two great powers, each many thousands of kilometres away from the scorching sands of the Arabian Peninsula: China and the United States.</p>
<p>As the world’s largest trading nation, China has much at stake in the Red Sea. Europe is China’s top trade partner, and more than 60% of that trade by value <a href="https://www.thewirechina.com/2024/01/21/containing-the-risk-cosco-red-sea-shipping-suez-canal/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">usually</a> flows through the Suez Canal. With that route disrupted, cargo vessels are diverting around Africa’s Cape of Good Hope, adding up to two weeks in additional travel time and vastly increasing shipping costs. By 25 January, the average cost of shipping a 40-foot container from Shanghai to Genoa <a href="https://www.drewry.co.uk/supply-chain-advisors/supply-chain-expertise/world-container-index-assessed-by-drewry" target="_blank" rel="noopener">spiked</a> to $6,365, an increase of 464% from two months earlier. Insurance rates have also skyrocketed. What’s more, Chinese companies have in recent years poured billions of dollars’ worth of investment into assets in the region, such as the 20% stake in the East Port Said container terminal of the Suez Canal that is now <a href="https://doc.irasia.com/listco/hk/coscoship/annual/2022/ar2022.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">owned</a> by Chinese state shipping giant COSCO. At a time when China’s growth rate is already struggling, the crisis risks imposing a serious further drag on its economy.</p>
<p>Apparently perceiving this vulnerability, Washington has tried to use it as leverage to convince Beijing to help end the crisis. China is the top economic and geopolitical backer of Iran, which in turn backs the Houthis, using them as a proxy to needle Israel, the United States and its allies. Some officials in Washington are convinced that, if it really wanted to, Beijing could quickly pressure Tehran into ending the Houthi attacks. Biden administration officials have “repeatedly raised the matter with top Chinese officials in the past three months”, <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/bba68661-6c9b-41b5-ab74-d573b3a27c54" target="_blank" rel="noopener">according</a> to the <em>Financial Times</em>, and US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan recently flew to Thailand to directly <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/f4fe30ce-3cbf-47f0-a1ad-7574b59f6f04" target="_blank" rel="noopener">plead</a> the administration’s case in a meeting with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi.</p>
<p>This diplomatic effort seems to have <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2024/01/27/sullivan-chinese-fm-meeting-fails-to-produce-breakthrough-on-red-sea-shipping-attacks-00138213" target="_blank" rel="noopener">failed</a>. Aside from a tepid public statement calling on “all relevant parties” to “ensure the safety of navigation in the Red Sea”, Beijing appears to have made no move whatsoever to remedy the situation. Instead, it called on Washington to “avoid adding fuel to the fire” in the Middle East. The attacks continue.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/09/the-west-is-overreacting-to-chinese-spies/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/09/the-west-is-overreacting-to-chinese-spies/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/GettyImages-862702934-1-1.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/09/the-west-is-overreacting-to-chinese-spies/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/09/the-west-is-overreacting-to-chinese-spies/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The paranoia behind China&#039;s spy war</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/09/the-west-is-overreacting-to-chinese-spies/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Nathan Levine</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Some in Washington are pouting. Rep. Jake Auchincloss (D-Massachusetts), for instance, slammed China in a Congressional <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=h3hvxUgYXoE&amp;ab_channel=T%26ICommitteeRepublicans" target="_blank" rel="noopener">hearing</a> in late January for being “not only missing in action as a purported upholder of international commerce and rules, but… in fact actively undermining the potential for a peaceful resolution to this issue”. This failure to intervene was just “another example of the malign and malicious attempts at global leadership from the Chinese Communist Party”.</p>
<p>But Auchincloss and others of like mind in Washington should perhaps be careful what they wish for. For decades — indeed, arguably for the better part of two centuries — it has been the United States that has served as the world’s “upholder of international commerce and rules”. In fact, it was a determination to protect the flow of maritime commerce from pirates that induced the young United States into its first foreign intervention, the Barbary Wars of 1801 and 1815, and permanently forged its identity as an international actor. If the nation were truly to become and remain a merchant republic that meant that it must, as then-President Thomas Jefferson <a href="https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-34-02-0122" target="_blank" rel="noopener">declared</a>, “superintend the safety of our commerce” through “the resources of our own strength and bravery in every sea”.</p>
<p>Two centuries later, the US Navy was still operating under the slogan of “<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TiQODFm3IFg&amp;ab_channel=POWERAMERIKA" target="_blank" rel="noopener">A Global Force for Good</a>”. Which is to say that the whole image — and reality — of America as a superpower largely rests, like the British Empire before it, on its ability to secure global trade. If there is any remaining shred of the “Pax Americana” on which the whole recent era of globalisation was built, this is it.</p>
<p>It is in this context that Washington officials ought to consider what it would mean if Beijing were to listen to their pleas and actually take over America’s role as a security provider. If the nations of the world were to begin turning to China for “global leadership” rather than the United States whenever their merchant ships were in need of protection, it would decisively mark the transition from an American century to a Chinese one, much as Britain once yielded the seas to its former colony. Washington should count itself lucky that Beijing has so far declined to try out for the role.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/10/is-china-about-to-turn-on-russia/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/10/is-china-about-to-turn-on-russia/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/2GettyImages-1230428940-scaled.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/10/is-china-about-to-turn-on-russia/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/10/is-china-about-to-turn-on-russia/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Is China about to turn on Russia?</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/10/is-china-about-to-turn-on-russia/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Nathan Levine</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Meanwhile, America’s own effort to perform its old job of securing the sea lanes has proved little more than a fiasco. With the US Navy severely <a href="https://news.usni.org/2023/06/28/navy-recruiting-increasing-work-week-to-six-days-to-combat-recruitment-shortages" target="_blank" rel="noopener">undermanned</a> and <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/us-navy-maintenace-aircraft-carriers-russia-china-1846058" target="_blank" rel="noopener">overstretched</a> around the globe, it attempted to assemble “<a href="https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3621110/statement-from-secretary-of-defense-lloyd-j-austin-iii-on-ensuring-freedom-of-n/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Operation Prosperity Guardian</a>”, a multinational coalition of forces under its command meant to patrol the Rea Sea. But this effort functionally collapsed almost immediately when France, Italy and Spain — all of whom Washington prematurely announced would be members — <a href="https://gcaptain.com/spain-italy-france-decline-us-command-of-red-sea-operation-prosperity-guardian/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">declined</a> to participate, saying they wouldn’t accept US command. No Middle Eastern countries other than Bahrain signed up either. In a throwback to yesteryear, navies are instead each going solo and escorting the vessels sailing under their own flags and titles. What we are seeing, then, is a true breakdown in the “international order” — in the sense of there being any order — that was once imposed by American power. We are returning to an older, more typical world in which there is no world policeman, and everyone is obliged to protect their own national interests.</p>
<p>The Chinese are well prepared to capitalise on this situation. Although COSCO has for now also abandoned the Red Sea route, other smaller Chinese shippers have spotted commercial opportunity and <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/41b3491c-d6b3-4da0-a272-239e51cfd7c6" target="_blank" rel="noopener">leapt</a> to fill the gap. China United Lines (CULines), for example, has rushed to start up a “Red Sea Express” service linking Saudi Arabia’s Jeddah to Chinese ports. They are able to do so because the Houthis seem to be under strict orders to try to avoid attacking China-linked vessels. Ships still running the straits into the Red Sea now regularly make sure to prominently display Chinese flags and use their satellite identification data to announce that they have Chinese owners, or even just Chinese crew members. The number of vessels transiting the area while preemptively broadcasting that they carry Chinese crew has <a href="https://www.economist.com/china/2024/02/01/is-china-a-winner-from-the-red-sea-attacks" target="_blank" rel="noopener">surged</a> from less than two per day to more than 30 in late January. Apparently this is the magic talisman to keep pirates at bay — though China’s navy has at least three warships in the area to escort its vessels, should it prove insufficient.</p>
<p>The reason Beijing seems so relaxed about the crisis is obvious: this is a situation in which China wins either way. Either the threat continues but shipping is safer for Chinese vessels than for others, in which case sailing under the protection of the red and gold flag may become a coveted competitive advantage, or Beijing finally tells Iran to knock it off, in which case China becomes the principal beneficiary of the security vacuum left by the United States. Both outcomes would be geopolitical coups. No wonder China is willing to accept a little short-term economic pain as the situation plays out.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, the crisis also provides China with a real justification for continuing to rapidly build out a “blue water” navy able to project power far from its own shores. As it happens, this is the same justification traditionally been offered by the United States: that, in the absence of security and stability, it needs the ability to protect global sea lanes and the lives of its citizens abroad. The military base China built in Djibouti in 2016 to enable the deployment of its warships across the Indian Ocean and around the Horn of Africa now looks prudent.</p>
<p>This is how the “world order” has always been shaped and reshaped: by nations and empires acting abroad to protect their own interests — or progressively failing to do so while others move to fill the void. The crisis in the Red Sea is therefore both symbolically and practically meaningful. Unless the United States and its allies can get their act together, we may look back on this as a moment when a vast geopolitical shift was revealed for all to see. As for everyone else, it’s likely that the crisis will serve as a sign that the time to prepare for the harsh realities of a far more “multipolar”, less globalised world has by now well and truly arrived.</p>
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					<title>Should America strike back at Iran?</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2024/02/should-america-strike-back-at-iran/?edition=us</link>
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					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Reuel Marc Gerecht]]>
					</dc:creator>
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																<unherd:article_ranking>3</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[ U.S. Army/Getty Images]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Reuel Marc Gerecht </strong>is a Resident Scholar at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and a former Iranian-targets officer in the Central Intelligence Agency.</p>
]]>
						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>ReuelMGerecht</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[is a Resident Scholar at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and a former Iranian-targets officer in the Central Intelligence Agency.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Fri, 02 Feb 2024 00:00:09 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Fri, 02 Feb 2024 00:00:09 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Foreign Policy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Hamas]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Hezbollah]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Houthis]]></category>
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								<![CDATA[Tehran knows that it's winning its proxy wars]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>There’s no denying Iran’s proxy forces are great value for money. The regime’s support for its allied militias, including the Lebanese Hizbollah, Hamas and the Houthis, probably doesn’t exceed a few billion dollars per annum — perhaps even less, given that many have their own sources of income. The Hizbollah, for instance, moves a lot of drugs, controls imports, takes cuts on Lebanese businesses, and has a mafioso-like tithing system on the diaspora Shiite community in developing countries.</p>
<p>Such proxies are far cheaper than Iran’s own conventional military, and more useful in the region’s many conflicts. They are also less politically divisive. Iran’s foreign wars aren&#8217;t popular among the young, who have already destabilised the theocracy through mass protests. And this is especially difficult given that Iran relies on conscription to fill at least half the ranks of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Long-term foreign deployments of resentful draftees would be a risky strategy.</p>
<p>But proxy warfare is not only good politics — it is also essential to upholding Iran’s theocracy. As their religious and political legitimacy has collapsed at home, the ruling elite has sought it abroad. Iran’s clerics were ecstatic when allied militias defeated both the Sunni Arab jihadists and the United States in Iraq, and relieved when they helped to save the dictatorship in Syria in 2012. If the Assad dynasty had fallen, it could have triggered the collapse of Tehran’s entire anti-American, anti-Zionist, enfeeble-the-Sunnis strategy, which it had been cultivating since the Islamic revolution in 1979.</p>
<p>More recently, October 7 and the Gaza War have served as an unparalleled <em>frisson</em> to the antisemitic Iranian political elite, and a seductive clarion call to others in the region who thought they couldn’t make the Jews bleed. The war, with its growing Palestinian civilian death toll and the vast destruction in the Gaza Strip, may have given the clerical regime, and its overwhelmingly Shiite “axis of resistance”, a means of restoring its standing with faithful and secular Sunnis alike. Relations have been tense since the Syrian civil war, when Iran helped to slaughter tens of thousands of Sunni Arabs.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/01/should-britain-lead-the-war-in-yemen/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/01/should-britain-lead-the-war-in-yemen/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/GettyImages-1920153598.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/01/should-britain-lead-the-war-in-yemen/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading </span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/01/should-britain-lead-the-war-in-yemen/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Should Britain lead the war in Yemen?</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/01/should-britain-lead-the-war-in-yemen/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Tom McTague</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>If Israel fails to destroy Hamas, if the outfit rises like a phoenix from the Gazan rubble after an Israeli withdrawal, then Iran will take credit for successfully resisting Zion and America. And a prolonged Hamas insurgency — a definite possibility if Israel reoccupies Gaza — will offer Tehran an inspirational theatre of operations. Trouble in the Gaza Strip could embolden Tehran to encourage its proxies to wound Israel and America further. The death of three US soldiers in Jordan in a <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/0b8c0038-b15e-4874-8ced-260ce2cbd733" target="_blank" rel="noopener">drone attack last week</a> may be just the start of it.</p>
<p>Yet America is unlikely to seek vengeance. Clerical meddling has so far failed to provoke Israeli and US retaliatory strikes against Iran; at the most, it has led to attacks on Iran’s Arab partners. That’s because Washington and Jerusalem dread escalation — the former, out of fear of another Middle Eastern “forever war”; the latter, because it doubts its missile defence and air power are capable of defending Tel Aviv from Hizbollah and Iran. Indeed, Tehran’s supply of missiles to its friends in Lebanon may have deterred Israel from mounting another ground invasion to secure its northern border. And the feebleness of the US and Israeli response may well have emboldened Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Iran’s supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, knows now that the power lies in his hands.</p>
<p>Historically, there are no Islamic parallels to what the clerical regime has pulled off. Shiism, unlike Sunnism, is a charismatic path, which lends itself more easily to revolution. Its leaders have occasionally appealed to heterodox Muslims who combined Sunni and Shiite sympathies. On conquering Iran, Ismail I (1487-1524), the first shah of the vast Safavid empire, forcibly converted his realm to Shiism. He managed for a time to win the hearts of heterodox Sufi orders in the rival Ottoman empire — that is, until defeat in war shattered his religious allure.</p>
<p>Today, Iran’s proxies are less ecumenical: hardcore Sunnis and Shiites feature in the “axis of resistance”. The clerical regime has developed a powerful pan-Islamic call, promising to drive the US from the Middle East, destroy Israel, humble the wealthy Western-backed Sunni Gulf Arab monarchs, and create a new Islamic culture that can withstand Westernisation. This has considerable appeal among many Arabs, as well as Shiite Afghans and Pakistanis. Such anti-American, anti-Zionist and antisemitic messaging has great sway among many young Muslim men.</p>
<p>But Iran doesn’t just rely on ideology. It also rewards loyalty. The idea of taking back “stolen” property has always proved alluring: just consider the first Islamic conquests, which promised booty as well as paradise, or the Crusades. The French Marxist description of Israel as a “colonial-settler state” has been fully absorbed into the Islamic lexicon. And Iran’s hope that Zion can actually be defeated in a long, bloody struggle by the faithful helps to strengthen the Islamic Republic’s credibility in the region.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/01/how-the-west-can-stop-the-houthis/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/01/how-the-west-can-stop-the-houthis/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/GettyImages-1826914452-1-e1704978468215.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/01/how-the-west-can-stop-the-houthis/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading </span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/01/how-the-west-can-stop-the-houthis/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>How the West can stop the Houthis</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/01/how-the-west-can-stop-the-houthis/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> David Rundell</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>The Houthis, Shiites who are doctrinally close to Sunnis and were once spurned by Iran’s clerics, have signed up to this fight. And now they’re giving the US, Israel and their European allies a hard time in the Red Sea. Even though Tehran probably fears escalation more than anyone else, neither Washington nor Jerusalem have been willing to play on these fears by striking Iran directly. The occasional assassination of Iranian nuclear scientists and senior Revolutionary Guard officers, including the dark lord, Qasem Soleimani, doesn’t really count. Nor has Washington shown any desire to hit the Islamic Republic where it’s still likely the weakest: Syria. The Revolutionary Guard general, Hossein Hamedani, who died in the battle for Aleppo in 2015, wasn’t exaggerating when he said that “to protect the accomplishments of the Islamic revolution, we had to intervene” in Syria and Iraq.</p>
<p>Even so, neither America nor Israel seems willing to rearm the Syrian Sunnis. A return of the Syrian civil war is just too ugly to contemplate: the refugee crisis it sparked empowered Right-wing populist parties across Europe and gave Turkey’s president, the philo-Islamist Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, extraordinary leverage within the European Union. Syrian Sunni militancy, an unavoidable by-product of a Sunni Arab rebellion, also strengthened Sunni jihadists.</p>
<p>But the slow-motion implosion of the Middle East dates back even further, to the aftermath of the Second World War. Since then, military autocracies have gutted traditional mores, basic decency and functioning economies. The Great Arab Revolt further shattered the region. This has left militias practically invincible since Western powers, now allergic to ground campaigns, can’t effectively use air power to extirpate them.</p>
<p>It is, however, still possible to shut down Iran’s proxies, but it would require significant military commitments. It’s hard to imagine any scenario — apart from a direct attack on Iran — in which the clerical regime ceases and desists. And any assault would need to be highly destructive, as a direct Western strike that leaves Iran’s nuclear-weapons programme unscathed doesn’t make much sense.</p>
<p>Jerusalem appears willing to pay a high price in Gaza. But given that the Gaza operation may permanently tank Israel’s reputation among Western Leftist political parties, Jerusalem may not wish to take on the even more arduous task of neutering the Lebanese Hizbollah. The group’s massive stockpile of Iranian-supplied missiles could pin-cushion Tel Aviv no matter how quickly Israel’s air force and anti-missile batteries reacted. The Hizbollah is the only Iranian proxy force whose demolition would grievously wound, perhaps cripple, the clerical regime’s ambitions in the Middle East.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/01/the-chaos-behind-irans-grand-strategy/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/01/the-chaos-behind-irans-grand-strategy/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/GettyImages-1898120668.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/01/the-chaos-behind-irans-grand-strategy/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading </span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/01/the-chaos-behind-irans-grand-strategy/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The chaos behind Iran&#039;s grand strategy</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/01/the-chaos-behind-irans-grand-strategy/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> David Patrikarakos</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>America is unlikely to lend a hand — despite the most recent deadly provocation in Jordan. The White House’s truly muddled response to this surely reflects the continuing intellectual confusion of the Biden administration about Iran since Khamenei rejected another nuclear deal last summer. “We are not looking for a war with Iran,” US National Security Council spokesman John Kirby said on Monday. “We’ll keep looking at the options&#8230; We want these attacks to stop.”</p>
<p>But these attacks won’t stop. They’re too much fun. And they’re strategically effective: the Islamic Republic has become the dominant power in the Middle East. To give Khamenei the credit that he deserves, he has taken a weak hand and played it brilliantly. Even with Russian and Chinese patronage, the Islamic Republic doesn’t possess a lot of hard power in the face of the US and Israel. But even the greatest of the Safavid shahs, Abbas I, who defeated the Ottomans in Mesopotamia, didn’t have the influence that Khamenei now has through a motley collection of poorly-educated, young Arab men who have probably never set foot in Iran and may not have even met a Persian.</p>
<p>Tehran will surely keep pushing the envelope unless the United States or Israel pushes back far harder. The clerical regime may pause its operations or claim that proxies are beyond its control — but success breeds aggression. So does the regime’s conception of itself as an Islamist paladin battling American and Zionist imperialism. To paraphrase Major General Hossein Salami, the commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the clerical regime isn’t “looking for a war” that it will lose.</p>
<p>As a result, if Washington responds to the attack in Jordan with just another air strike against Iranian-supported militias, or even Iranian deployments in Syria, this likely won&#8217;t alter Khamenei’s calculations. Only something shockingly different — US attacks against Revolutionary Guard targets inside Iran, and the openly declared threat of insurmountable American escalation — has a decent chance of convincing the clerics that the past is no longer prologue.</p>
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					<title>The chaos behind Iran&#8217;s grand strategy</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2024/01/the-chaos-behind-irans-grand-strategy/?edition=us</link>
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						<![CDATA[David Patrikarakos]]>
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																<unherd:article_ranking>1</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[Raisi speaks during a commemoration ceremony marking the anniversary of the 2020 killing of Soleimani Iraqi commander Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis (ATTA KENARE/AFP via Getty Images)]]>
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							<![CDATA[<p><strong>David Patrikarakos</strong> is <em>UnHerd</em>&#8216;s foreign correspondent. His latest book is <em>War in 140 characters: how social media is reshaping conflict in the 21st century. </em>(Hachette)</p>
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						<unherd:twitter_handle>dpatrikarakos</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is <em>UnHerd</em>'s foreign correspondent. His latest book is <em>War in 140 characters: how social media is reshaping conflict in the 21st century. </em>(Hachette)]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Sat, 27 Jan 2024 00:10:56 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Mon, 29 Jan 2024 11:39:59 +0000</updated>
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		<category><![CDATA[Ayatollah Khamenei]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Hamas]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Houthis]]></category>
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								<![CDATA[A weakened regime is being forced to look tough]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>Reporting from Israel at the end of last year stirred various emotions in me, not least a constant feeling of mild claustrophobia. Not from the Hamas rockets that incrementally forced me to duck into bomb shelters, nor from the colossal Israeli response I heard thundering overhead. Rather, wherever I travelled, be it to Gaza’s fringes in the south or the Lebanese border in the north, I felt surrounded by Iran.</p>
<p>Right now, Iranian proxies — from Hamas to Hezbollah to its flunkies in Syria, as well as the Houthis — are attacking Israel and its interests. Iran has also kicked off against Pakistan, with the two spending recent weeks lobbing missiles and accusations at each other. It is, some might argue, illogical behaviour. Iran is regarded as generally belligerent, and it is. But as Iranians never tire of telling me, they have not invaded a country or started any wars for centuries. And Iran’s leadership is most certainly not illogical. So why all the violence?</p>
<p>All foreign policy is a product of domestic factors; the internal <em>always</em> creates the external. You cannot understand Brexit without understanding the conflicting personalities that fuelled it. And you cannot understand Iranian behaviour in the Middle East (and beyond) without understanding its corrupt, faction-ridden revolutionary dictatorship, and the degree to which these factors shape its foreign policy. At its core, Iran’s foreign policy rests on a doctrine of “forward defence”. Loosely speaking, it seeks to fight abroad so it doesn&#8217;t have to do so at home. It bases this strategy on two things: long-range ballistic missiles and proxy warfare using local groups. And it has proved successful ever since it was conceived in the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War.</p>
<p>I have always considered those eight years to be the Islamic Republic’s War of Independence. So much of its identity was forged then. All nations are shaped by the accretive wisdom of their history and the unchanging determinants of geography (even if they often ignore one or both). For the Islamic Republic, much of what drives its policy was learned through its experience of being a revolutionary state that had to fight for its existence throughout almost all of its first decade. In particular, the War of the Cities in 1984, during which Iran found itself repeatedly struck by long-range Iraqi missiles with no ability to respond in kind, burned the need for a ballistic missile capability into Iran’s leaders. Now, 40 years later, missiles sit at the centre of Iranian deterrence and state pride. The second thing that the war taught Iran was the value of using proxy forces to fight your enemies. And key to that was a man named Qasem Soleimani.</p>
<p>Soleimani was the head of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’s (IRGC) expeditionary Quds Force until the United States droned him in 2020. In his early twenties at the start of the war, he became commander of a <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep28480.5.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">volunteer force </a>that was deployed to Iraqi Kurdistan — the centre of anti-Saddam separatist activity in Iraq — to work with the Kurds against Baghdad. It was his first taste of using foreign forces to attack an enemy by proxy, and it shaped him.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/12/is-the-west-bank-heading-for-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/12/is-the-west-bank-heading-for-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/GettyImages-1758010446-scaled-e1703245385720.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/12/is-the-west-bank-heading-for-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author </span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/12/is-the-west-bank-heading-for-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Is the West Bank heading for war?</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/12/is-the-west-bank-heading-for-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> David Patrikarakos </a></p></div></a></div>
<p>It was also, at least in spirit, the beginning of the Quds Force, which began life as “Department 900”, specialising in cross-border raids and recruiting Iraqis against Saddam. But as it grew, what made the Quds so effective was its understanding that two things were needed for the kind of leverage it sought. The first was pragmatism. Despite its Shia sectarianism, Tehran was happy for the Quds to find Sunni partners, from the Iraqi Kurds to the Afghan Northern Alliance to Hamas in Gaza. The second, and this was crucial, was the need to expand beyond the military realm. In Afghanistan, Soleimani became a quasi-diplomat, spending years mediating between the various factions — he ultimately became so vital to Afghan politics that the country’s first post-Taliban government might well not have emerged without him. By the time of the 2001 US invasion, Tehran held such political sway in the country that it was able to help Washington against their mutual enemy, the Taliban.</p>
<p>Iran assumed this <em>modus operandi</em> everywhere it went, helping to create a Lebanese Hezbollah that, beyond a terror group, is an effective political party and social-care provider. In Iraq, as well as helping its various Shia militia proxies — collectively known as Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) or Al-Hashd al-Shaabi — to kill coalition soldiers, he also organised them into a political grouping, the Fatah Alliance, to considerable electoral success. In the 2021 general elections, the first after he was killed, Fatah dropped from 48 to 17 seats. This wasn’t even because it received significantly fewer votes, but without Soleimani to guide it, the parties failed to understand recent boundary changes while their opponents instructed followers to vote tactically and hoovered up seats accordingly.</p>
<p>And there was something else, too. During the Eighties, Soleimani struck up a friendship with Khamenei (then the President). When the latter became Supreme Leader, Soleimani had a direct line to the seat of power. The Quds Force, and its doctrine of forward defence has formed the centrepiece of Iran’s foreign operations ever since. This nexus of military, historical and political factors is the broader cause of turmoil we see right now. Beyond its ideological, often lurid rhetoric, Iran sees Israel as the most powerful state in the region and a threat accordingly. For Tehran, the Gaza War is an opportunity to strike Jerusalem via its various proxies — especially when it sees Washington caught up in Ukraine and suffering internal squabbles.</p>
<p>As ever, it retains (admittedly implausible) deniability. In his first <a href="https://www.tabnak.ir/fa/news/1201173/%D8%AC%D9%86%DA%AF-%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%88-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A6%DB%8C%D9%84-%DA%86%D9%82%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D9%85%D8%AD%D8%AA%D9%85%D9%84-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA" target="_blank" rel="noopener">speech </a>after 7 October, Khamenei set out the official position: “Some of its own people [of the Israeli government] have been gossiping in these two or three days… indicating Iran is introduced behind this movement. They are wrong about this, we of course defend Palestine and the struggles… but those who claim that the work of Palestinians is the result of non-Palestinians… are making a wrong calculation.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/12/meet-the-iranians-supporting-israel/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/12/meet-the-iranians-supporting-israel/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/2N8KPPB-1.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/12/meet-the-iranians-supporting-israel/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/12/meet-the-iranians-supporting-israel/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Meet the Iranians supporting Israel</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/12/meet-the-iranians-supporting-israel/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Nicole Lampert</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>But with its strikes in Pakistan, Iranian actions are starting to look incontinent. There is a real chance of a broader mass war, which it has consistently said it does not want, and which logic dictates it must avoid. Once more, to understand this inconsistency, look inside Iran. “The Islamic Republic’s primary goal has always been self-preservation,” Ali Ansari, Professor in Modern History with reference to the Middle East at the University of St Andrews, told me. “But they have now unleashed all these proxy units. Iran doesn’t want to escalate too much and now, if you look at the rhetoric coming out of Hamas and Hezbollah and the Houthis, it’s along the lines of ‘where are you?’ They were expecting Iran to come to their aid, and they haven&#8217;t.”</p>
<p>Part of this is simply the way power operates in the Islamic Republic. “It’s not just their proxies, even within Iran, you have a range of non-state actors, of which the IRGC is one,” Ansari said. “But it is also the nature of the way command and control works there. It is very much totalitarian. Everyone has plausible deniability. And you are expected to be able to read the leader’s mind.” In a time where the regime has faced several years of mass protests to its rule, there are those within the political and military establishment who think now is the time to look tough, and there is no better way of doing this than striking at Israel. And it can all be justified if it is couched in the guise of carrying out the leader’s will (if not his actual words)</p>
<p>Part of the problem, though, is that the Islamic Republic never successfully created a body that could effectively manage elite relationships — and the result is near perennial discord. The Foreign Ministry and the Quds Force have spent 20 years <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/iran/irans-coming-succession-crisis" target="_blank" rel="noopener">squabbling</a> over who handles the foreign affairs portfolio in Pakistan, Afghanistan and the wider Middle East. In August 2022, for instance, the Quds Force excluded the foreign ministry from a meeting with one of Iraq’s most important Shia figures, Muqtada al-Sadr. Instead, what has emerged to fill the bureaucratic void is a series of informal power bases congealed around important figures. The result is that interpersonal disputes and alliances dominate state politics. Throw 120 registered political parties into the mix and chaos is the logical result.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/12/inside-the-hamas-media-operation/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/12/inside-the-hamas-media-operation/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/GettyImages-818461710-1-scaled-e1702575473271.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/12/inside-the-hamas-media-operation/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author </span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/12/inside-the-hamas-media-operation/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Inside the Hamas media operation</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/12/inside-the-hamas-media-operation/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> David Patrikarakos </a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Now add the prospect of an imminent change of leadership. Khamenei is 84 and peppered with cancer. Rumours of his looming death have circulated for years, but this time it seems to be true. He was treated for prostate cancer in 2014; two years ago, after visiting a shrine, he reportedly <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/iran/irans-coming-succession-crisis" target="_blank" rel="noopener">told</a> his entourage that it might be his last visit. The choice of his successor is largely in the hands of the Assembly of Experts, which vets the potential candidates. It is, of course, stuffed with warring factions and opaque feuds, and yet one more centre of infighting.</p>
<p>It will come down to two candidates. First there is Mojtaba Khamenei, Khamenei’s second son, who is the senior IRGC chaplain, which puts him right at the heart of the establishment’s twin power centres: the military and the clergy. Like all revolutionaries, the Mullahs once disavowed notions of hereditary succession; and like all revolutionaries, they have taken on many of the characteristics of the regime they despised. The second candidate is Ebrahim Raisi, but he is unlikely to win. The incumbent President and so-called Butcher of Tehran, a reference to his role as a judge in the mass execution of political prisoners in 1988, is thunderously uncharismatic — no one really likes him.</p>
<p>But the problem of Khamenei’s death remains. “Even if the issue of the succession is settled,” says Ansari, “it’s more the fact that Khamenei doesn&#8217;t have quite the grip he had in the past. Normally he would be able to manage things but with a transition looming, they’re all on manoeuvres, and some people are trying to appear tougher than they are.” The regime, in other words, is losing its authority. And with its credibility diluted, it’s forced to look tough. Of course, as games go, it is a dangerous one, the result is uncertain, and it could well end up being a wider war that nobody really wants — and nobody can escape.</p>
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					<title>Hamas and the Houthis have emboldened Isis</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2024/01/hamas-and-the-houthis-have-emboldened-isis/?edition=us</link>
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										<unherd:main_theme>War</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Lucas Webber]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/GettyImages-2147852249.jpg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>3</unherd:article_ranking>
																<unherd:image_caption>
							<![CDATA[Isis are using the Palestinians as propaganda. (GIANLUIGI GUERCIA/AFP via Getty Images)]]>
						</unherd:image_caption>
						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><span style="font-weight: 400;"><strong>Lucas Webber</strong> is the co-founder and editor of <a href="https://www.militantwire.com/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Militant Wire</a></span></p>
]]>
						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>LucasADWebber</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is an investigative journalist, photographer and researcher focused on violent and extremist movements across the globe.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Mon, 15 Jan 2024 00:01:14 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Thu, 11 Apr 2024 12:35:13 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[democrat primary]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Houthis]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[ISIS]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Islam]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Islamic State]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Israel]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Israel Hamas War]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[row]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Terrorism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[War]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://old.unherd.com/?p=496045</guid>
																												<description>
								<![CDATA[A resurgent Islamic State has continued to plot]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>While the public’s focus on non-state actor threats is shifting to military action against the Houthis, a resurgent Islamic State (Isis) threat abroad and within the West continues to fester. Three days into 2024, the Islamic State reminded the world of its ability to conduct international attacks with a coordinated pair of suicide bombings in Kerman, Iran, that left <a href="https://apnews.com/article/iran-islamic-state-soleimani-attack-killed-b6f1fee20401e0520fc0c1b7a042a7b2">91 people dead</a>. US officials <a href="https://english.alarabiya.net/News/middle-east/2024/01/05/US-intelligence-confirms-ISIS-Afghanistan-branch-behind-Iran-blasts-Sources">asserted</a> that communication intercepts provided “clear cut and indisputable” evidence that the Islamic State Khurasan Province (ISKP) — Isis&#8217;s Afghanistan-Pakistan branch — carried out the operation.</p>
<p>Since the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan in August 2021, ISKP has worked to <a href="https://www.militantwire.com/p/rising-international-threat-islamic" target="_blank" rel="noopener">build up its external operations capabilities</a> as well as its propaganda arm to incite violence against its enemies. And this project has largely been successful: ISKP has now carried out multiple <a href="https://www.npr.org/2024/01/05/1223036572/an-afghan-branch-of-isis-claims-responsibility-for-a-deadly-attack-in-iran" target="_blank" rel="noopener">attacks inside Iran</a>, fired rockets into <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/islamic-state-khorasan-claims-rocket-attack-on-uzbekistan-/6534866.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Uzbekistan</a> and <a href="https://eurasianet.org/tajikistan-iskp-claims-new-cross-border-attack-officials-deny" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Tajikistan</a><u>,</u> and has been <a href="https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1659" target="_blank" rel="noopener">involved in</a> multiple violent incidents in the Maldives. The branch also had plots foiled in Iran, India, Turkey, the Maldives, Tajikistan, and Qatar. Most recently, a plan to attack a central square and church in Jalal-Abadin, Kyrgyzstan, during New Year celebrations was disrupted by special services.</p>
<p>Closer to home, ISKP has <a href="https://www.militantwire.com/p/islamic-state-khurasan-mocks-us-hysteria?utm_source=%2Fsearch%2F9%252F11&amp;utm_medium=reader2" target="_blank" rel="noopener">overtly stated its intention to target the West</a>, adding a new dynamic to the pre-existing threat from Isis’s central apparatus in Iraq and Syria and its supporters abroad. Only last week, it was revealed that a robust transnational ISKP-linked network was the focus of a coordinated series of raids across Europe after foreign intelligence services tipped off the governments of Spain, Germany, and Austria. The Austrian and German cell <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/tajikistan-terror-charges-germany-austria-cathedrals/32765844.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">reportedly</a> sought to target Cologne Cathedral and Vienna’s St. Stephen&#8217;s Cathedral. It followed a similar operation last July, when Germany and the Netherlands co-ordinated to dismantle an <a href="https://apnews.com/article/germany-netherlands-terror-group-arrests-20856495d2f7530df8cf4635b26d3fb6" target="_blank" rel="noopener">ISKP-linked network</a> reportedly plotting attacks in Germany.</p>
<p>Ever since March 2019, when the flags of the Syrian Democratic Forces were raised over Isis’s final stronghold in Baghuz, the terror group has been focusing on leveraging events abroad to galvanise and incite its supporters. One such opportunity presented itself last June when an Iraqi asylum seeker in Sweden burned a copy of the Quran outside of the country’s largest mosque. Almost immediately, <a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/02/the-spectre-of-terror-returns-to-scandinavia/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Isis propagandists</a> tried to use the incident to ignite followers into action. Their weekly <em>al-Naba</em> newsletter, for instance, told its readers to begin “carrying out attacks in the heartland of the kuffar” by “striking their necks and spilling their blood”. ISKP even published a pamphlet critical of the Taliban for failing to <a href="https://www.militantwire.com/p/sweden-and-denmark-face-international?utm_source=%2Fsearch%2Fsweden&amp;utm_medium=reader2" target="_blank" rel="noopener">condemn the act harshly enough</a>.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/04/the-kurds-fighting-the-isis-resistance/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/04/the-kurds-fighting-the-isis-resistance/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/GettyImages-497290456-1.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/04/the-kurds-fighting-the-isis-resistance/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading </span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/04/the-kurds-fighting-the-isis-resistance/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The Kurds fighting the Isis resistance</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/04/the-kurds-fighting-the-isis-resistance/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> David Patrikarakos </a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Nor did its rhetoric fall on deaf ears. After a similar burning last January, Swedish police detained five men on suspicion of conspiracy to commit terrorist crimes, all of whom were reportedly tied to “international calls for attacks”. In Germany, meanwhile, two brothers were detained for planning a bombing against Swedish targets. One of the two men allegedly told a supporter of Isis that he intended to <a href="https://www.newarab.com/news/germany-charges-syrian-brothers-over-sweden-plot" target="_blank" rel="noopener">attack a church</a> in retaliation for the Quran burning. Similar arrests took place in Turkey.</p>
<p>Yet it wasn’t until October 7 that this Islamist impetus really burst into the open, with Isis suddenly finding itself on fertile soil for cultivating new followers in the West. Shortly after Israel commenced its military response to Hamas’s attack, <em>al-Naba</em> ran an editorial titled “<a href="https://www.memri.org/jttm/issue-31-iskp-magazine-voice-khurasan-offers-practical-steps-fight-jews-limiting-ourselves" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Practical Steps to Fight the Jews”.</a> The article criticised Israel’s military action in Gaza, its historical oppression of Palestinians, and scorned the West for its past and present support for Jerusalem. It then went on to call for a “rapid field effort to target the Jewish presence in the entire world”, specifying the need to “target and attack Jewish and Crusader embassies everywhere”. As for desired targets, it identified “the Jewish neighborhoods, in America and Europe”, as they “constitute the backbone of the Jewish economy and the hotbeds of control in Western Crusader decision-making circles supporting the Jewish statelet”.</p>
<p>ISKP, in the latest issue of <em>Voice of Khurasan</em>, its flagship English-language magazine, reproduced a translation of <em>al-Naba</em>’s editorial, as well as a full page exalting various Isis-inspired attacks. Furthermore, it threatened the “Crusader governments” of the West, telling them to prepare for many more such occurrences in the future. The issue also featured a call to “kill the Jews where ever you find [them]” and included an infographic advising its supporters to target tourist sites, educational institutions and music events, as well as what weapons to use: Molotov cocktails, petrol bombs, crossbows, nail guns, knives, and vehicles.</p>
<p>Within a week of October 7, these calls appeared to bear fruit, when a 20-year-old Russian Muslim fatally stabbed a teacher in France outside of a school in Arras. In a video posted beforehand, the alleged perpetrator highlighted <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/france/20231017-killer-of-french-school-teacher-claims-attack-for-islamic-state-group" target="_blank" rel="noopener">the Hamas attack</a> and expressed support for Isis. Three days later, two Swedish soccer fans were <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/en/sweden/article/2023/10/16/two-swedes-fatally-shot-in-central-brussels_6179647_213.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">gunned down</a> in Brussels by a 45-year-old Tunisian man who claimed to be acting on behalf of the Islamic State. He was later killed by authorities at a cafe. And in Paris, on December 3, a man claiming allegiance to Isis fatally stabbed a German tourist and injured two other people near the Eiffel Tower.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/12/the-truth-about-the-ethnic-cleansing-in-gaza/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/12/the-truth-about-the-ethnic-cleansing-in-gaza/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/GettyImages-1718506746-scaled-e1702652972842.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/12/the-truth-about-the-ethnic-cleansing-in-gaza/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading </span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/12/the-truth-about-the-ethnic-cleansing-in-gaza/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The truth about the ethnic cleansing in Gaza</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/12/the-truth-about-the-ethnic-cleansing-in-gaza/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Aris Roussinos </a></p></div></a></div>
<p>This year, all the signs suggest that Isis will only further ramp up its rhetoric. On 5 January, in a speech titled “And kill them wherever you find them”, spokesman Abu Hudhayfa al-Ansari announced a <a href="https://www.kyleorton.com/p/isis-abu-hudhayfa-al-ansari-second-speech" target="_blank" rel="noopener">new campaign of violence</a><u>,</u> calling for jihadists to target “Jews, Christians or their allies, on the streets and roads of America, Europe, and the world”. He encouraged supporters to “detonate explosives, burn them with grenades and fiery agents, shoot them with bullets, cut their throats with sharp knives, and run them over with vehicles” in order to “let them know that their crimes in Palestine, Iraq, Sham, and other Muslim countries are being retaliated for in their homes in Washington, Paris, London, Rome, and other Kaffir lands”.</p>
<p>The territorial power base of Isis may be far smaller than 10 years ago, when it was its zenith, but it still presents a heightened threat — and to Europe in particular. The attacks and high number of foiled plots in the West signal that these trends will persist. Combined with Western security and intelligence resources stretched to focus on developments involving China, Russia, Iran, and now the Houthis, Isis and its followers may find new opportunities to carry out operations.</p>
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					<title>How the West can stop the Houthis</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2024/01/how-the-west-can-stop-the-houthis/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://stage.unherd.com/2024/01/how-the-west-can-stop-the-houthis/?edition=us#comments</comments>
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										<unherd:main_theme></unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[David Rundell]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/Blue-1000x1000-9.png?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>2</unherd:article_ranking>
																<unherd:image_caption>
							<![CDATA[Pirates or resistance fighters? Mohammed Hamoud/Getty Images]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>David Rundell</strong> served as an American diplomat in the Middle East for 30 years. He is a former Chief of Mission at the American Embassy in Saudi Arabia and the author of <em>Vision or Mirage, Saudi Arabia at the Crossroads.</em></p>
]]>
						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle></unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ served as an American diplomat in the Middle East for 30 years. He is a former Chief of Mission at the American Embassy in Saudi Arabia and the author of <em>Vision or Mirage, Saudi Arabia at the Crossroads.</em>]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Sat, 13 Jan 2024 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Sat, 13 Jan 2024 00:00:00 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[America]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Don't miss]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Foreign Policy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Gaza]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Houthis]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Israel]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Middle East]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[palestine]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://old.unherd.com/?p=496031</guid>
																												<description>
								<![CDATA[Escalation is not the answer]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>With armed Houthi rebels prowling the Red Sea, attacking cargo ships and holding crew at gunpoint, America and its allies appear to be preparing for war. When asked about potential strikes in Yemen earlier this week, the UK Defence Secretary, Grant Shapps, said: &#8220;Watch this space.&#8221; Last night, any uncertainty about what this might mean evaporated as the US and UK launched military strikes in Yemen.</p>
<p>Today, as the dust settles, the global community cannot afford to let this threat escalate. The Houthi attacks, combined with the worsening Israel-Iran confrontation, have raised oil prices and forced <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-67932725" target="_blank" rel="noopener">20% of the world’s</a> container ships to avoid the Red Sea — instead taking the far longer route around the southern tip of Africa. Increased insurance rates and freight charges will soon be passed on to consumers. There is a clear need for international action to restore freedom of navigation — yet the West finds itself with few good options.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/12/why-mbs-wants-peace-with-israel/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/12/why-mbs-wants-peace-with-israel/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/GettyImages-1499019596-1-e1701271392865.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/12/why-mbs-wants-peace-with-israel/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/12/why-mbs-wants-peace-with-israel/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Why MBS wants peace with Israel</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/12/why-mbs-wants-peace-with-israel/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> David Rundell</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>But before we go to war with the Houthis, or launch further strikes, it is probably a good idea to understand exactly who they are. “Houthi” is a derogatory name for Yemen’s Ansar Allah or Supporters of God movement, which was founded in the Nineties by Hussein al-Houthi and, since his death in 2004, led by his brother, Abdul Malik al-Houthi. Hussein was a gifted orator whose message found many listeners in Yemen’s neglected and impoverished northern Sa’dah province, where most inhabitants belong to the Zaydi branch of Shia Islam. The Houthi brothers called for a Zaydi religious revival, opposition to Yemen’s central government, and hatred of Israel. Their signature chant remains “Death to America, Death to Israel, Curse the Jews, God is Great”.</p>
<p>In 2011, when Arab Spring protests brought Yemen’s government down, the Houthis seized control of Sa’dah province. Then, in 2014, they joined forces with the deposed dictator Ali Abdullah Saleh to overthrow the internationally recognised transition government of Abdu Rabbu Hadi. With Saleh’s help, they advanced from their homeland in the north all the way to Aden in southern Yemen in just two months. Then the Houthis turned on Saleh and killed him. The United Nations condemned the Houthi’s coup and human rights violations, while also authorising the inspection of vessels bound for Yemen in order to confiscate weapons.</p>
<p>Today, the Houthis nominally control most of Yemen, where they have imposed a vicious police state — although much of the country is in fact ruled by local tribes and war lords. The multinational naval blockade has caused great suffering in a nation that imports most of its food, fuel and medicine, and rampant corruption in Houthi-controlled ports has made delivering foreign assistance difficult. Thousands of Yemenis have died from fighting, disease and malnutrition; millions have been made homeless and unemployed. The Yemeni people are not looking for another war.</p>
<p>Iran did not create the Houthis but, recognising them as fellow Shia Muslims, it has long provided the movement with funds, arms, training and advice. And for more than a decade, Iran has aggressively used the Houthis — along with other paramilitary proxy militias, including Hamas in Gaza and Hezbollah in Lebanon — as a vehicle to expand its influence in the Arabian Peninsula and undermine its traditional rival Saudi Arabia.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/12/the-truth-about-the-ethnic-cleansing-in-gaza/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/12/the-truth-about-the-ethnic-cleansing-in-gaza/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/GettyImages-1718506746-scaled-e1702652972842.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/12/the-truth-about-the-ethnic-cleansing-in-gaza/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/12/the-truth-about-the-ethnic-cleansing-in-gaza/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The truth about the ethnic cleansing in Gaza</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/12/the-truth-about-the-ethnic-cleansing-in-gaza/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Aris Roussinos</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Yet Washington also bears some responsibility for today’s Houthi crisis due to its failure to maintain its longstanding security partnership with Saudi Arabia. In 2015, the Saudis tried to prevent the Houthi takeover of Yemen. They had numerous reasons for doing so: they wanted to limit the smuggling of weapons, drugs and people across their southern border; they did not want al-Qaeda terrorists fleeing from Saudi Arabia to find a haven in Yemen; and they did not share the Houthi’s view that much of southern Saudi Arabia should belong to Yemen. Above all, the Saudis did not want Iran to expand its influence in Yemen.</p>
<p>The Saudi effort was largely confined to an air campaign which at various times relied on American weapons, refuelling and intelligence. Like all bombing campaigns, this resulted in civilian casualties — remember that more French civilians died on D-Day as a result of the pre-invasion allied bombardment than allied troops died on the Normandy beaches. While it seems unlikely that the Saudis spent expensive munitions deliberately targeting school buses, such incidents prompted harsh criticism of Riyadh, the termination of some US military assistance, and eventually the effective end to their campaign.</p>
<p>Washington’s tepid support for the Saudi-led coalition against the Houthis caused the Saudis to doubt the credibility of US security commitments, especially when threats to cut off arms sales became almost routine. And American hesitancy to supply the Saudis with drone technology forced them to turn to Italy and China. When the Biden administration removed the Houthis from the list of designated terrorist groups and withdrew Patriot air defence systems from Saudi Arabia, the Saudis had even more reason to doubt America.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/12/is-the-west-bank-heading-for-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/12/is-the-west-bank-heading-for-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/GettyImages-1758010446-scaled-e1703245385720.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/12/is-the-west-bank-heading-for-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/12/is-the-west-bank-heading-for-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Is the West Bank heading for war?</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/12/is-the-west-bank-heading-for-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> David Patrikarakos</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>The Saudis soon found themselves in a difficult situation, wishing to devote financial resources to economic development rather than an endless war in Yemen. With Washington appearing to ignore their security concerns and facing persistent Houthi missile attacks, the Saudis changed course. In 2023, Mohammed bin Salman, Saudi Arabia&#8217;s Crown Prince, renewed diplomatic relations with Iran, reopened his country&#8217;s Embassy in Tehran after seven years and welcomed a series of high-level Iranian officials to Riyadh. The reconciliation between Tehran and Riyadh was brokered by Beijing, not Washington. Part of this process involved a ceasefire in Yemen which continues today.</p>
<p>It would have been much wiser for America to have supported Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates when they were willing to commit their own troops to defeat the Houthis. Now, these two states benefit from a fragile peace with Iran and are not interested in a renewed confrontation with Iran’s proxies in Yemen. As a result, although the Saudis and Emiratis have a long history of cooperation with the US Navy, they have politely declined to join Operation Prosperity Guardian, the US-led attempt to protect Red Sea shipping. They are even less likely to participate in any offensive actions against the Houthis.</p>
<p>The broader problem is the emergence of a multipolar global order in which the United States is no longer the controlling superpower. In 1990, when America successfully led an international coalition to liberate Kuwait from Iraq’s invasion, Russia supported Operation Desert Storm, China remained neutral, Saudi Arabia underwrote the costs and Israel stayed on the sidelines. None of that is likely to happen today if the United States goes to war against the Houthis. Indeed, both Russia and China abstained from voting for Wednesday’s UN resolution demanding a ceasefire.</p>
<p>America’s hands have been also tied by the war in Gaza. By claiming that their attacks are made in support of the Palestinians, the Houthis have transformed themselves from pirates into resistance fighters. Much of the world agrees with them that Israel should withdraw its forces from Gaza, which has made forming a multinational coalition against them difficult: not wishing to be accused of supporting Netanyahu, the rest are happy to free ride.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, Tehran’s quest for regional hegemony is also influencing events in the Red Sea. Without Iranian missiles and drones, the Houthis&#8217; attacks would be much less effective. However, dealing with Iran is a long-term problem. The immediate issue for the West is protecting commercial shipping in the Red Sea. There are no good solutions: doing nothing poses serious risks for global trade; taking offensive action against the Houthis risks igniting a larger war that could jeopardise Middle East oil production.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/12/human-rights-died-in-gaza/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/12/human-rights-died-in-gaza/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/GettyImages-1718089816-2-scaled-e1701954247102.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/12/human-rights-died-in-gaza/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/12/human-rights-died-in-gaza/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Human rights died in Gaza</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/12/human-rights-died-in-gaza/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Yehudah Mirsky </a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Most probably, the war in Gaza will end, and when it does, the Houthis&#8217; justification for their attacks will evaporate. If they continue after the war is over, most nations will regard them as dangerous terrorists. Yet, once started, a war with the Houthis may not end quickly or easily. Before beginning another “as long as it takes” conflict, Washington should consider less risky options: expanding a formal convoy system such as the one used to protect Kuwaiti tankers during the Iran-Iraq War (1980-88) appears to be the least bad option, at least initially.</p>
<p>And with this, there is no reason why protecting freedom of navigation in the Red Sea should be the sole responsibility of the United States, Britain and a few willing partners. Most of the cargoes transiting the Suez Canal are bound for Europe and Asia, not the United States or Great Britain. Many nations, including China, Japan, Korea and Germany, do not want their trade disrupted by Houthi attacks on commercial shipping. Nor do they want their energy supplies disrupted by a large-scale war to eliminate the Houthis. They have very tangible interests in finding a peaceful solution to the Houthi problem.</p>
<p>Transforming Prosperity Guardian into a truly multinational operation would increase its effectiveness, reduce its costs for each participant and isolate the Houthis. Perhaps more important, it would demonstrate clearly that all options short of war had been tried and thus help to justify any offensive military action in the eyes of global public opinion.</p>
<p>But creating a more multinational operation is a political and economic problem, not a military one. Finding a solution is a job for creative diplomats, not admirals. Support for a more multinational operation need not involve sending ships: statements of public support condemning maritime terrorism would help, so would financial contributions and logistical support. The justification to emphasise is that the war in Gaza and piracy in the Red Sea are two different issues and that secure global trade is in everyone’s interest. Before we enter yet another easily expandable armed conflict, we should use diplomacy to convince the rest of the world of this.</p>
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					<title>Israel&#8217;s war is about to escalate</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2023/11/israels-war-is-about-to-escalate/?edition=us</link>
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						<![CDATA[David Patrikarakos]]>
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							<![CDATA[Israel faces war on five fronts. (Christopher Furlong/Getty)]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>David Patrikarakos</strong> is <em>UnHerd</em>&#8216;s foreign correspondent. His latest book is <em>War in 140 characters: how social media is reshaping conflict in the 21st century. </em>(Hachette)</p>
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						<unherd:twitter_handle>dpatrikarakos</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is <em>UnHerd</em>'s foreign correspondent. His latest book is <em>War in 140 characters: how social media is reshaping conflict in the 21st century. </em>(Hachette)]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Tue, 28 Nov 2023 00:03:47 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Tue, 28 Nov 2023 12:47:26 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Hezbollah]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Houthis]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[IDF]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Iran]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Israel Hamas War]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Lebanon]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Saudi Arabia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Yemen]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://old.unherd.com/?p=492320</guid>
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								<![CDATA[A global conflict cannot be discounted]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>As I look out over Lebanon from high up on Israel’s northern border, I see undulating hills dappled with hedgerows and green brush that glows golden in the winter sun. But this is far from an idyll. Lebanese Hezbollah have been firing into Israel since October 7. And it is from here that a regional, possibly global, war is most likely to start.</p>
<p>On the ground, with the ceasefire extended for another two days, relations between Israel and Hamas seem to be progressing. The temporary truce, however, is just a plaster on a gangrenous wound. If Hamas releases all of its hostages, then its leverage evaporates and it has nothing to deter Israel from its assault. If Israel ceases military operations now, then its promise that Hamas will never again be able to launch another attack is just empty rhetoric. Neither its traumatised population nor its desperate Prime Minister will allow that.</p>
<p>So, the war continues, with Israel completing its operation in northern Gaza and turning to the south. And along with its horrific cost, the chances of broader escalation will increase.</p>
<p>But the war with Hamas has already expanded. Hezbollah are firing from the north, Syrian groups from the northeast, the Houthis from Yemen in the south — and behind them all, Iran. Israel is now fighting a war on five fronts. But it’s in the north that the greatest threat lies.</p>
<p>“What we’ve been experiencing on the northern border are a few kinds of Hezbollah approaches,” says a source in the IDF’s Northern Command. “Number one: infiltration attempts on the border itself. Two: using anti-tank missiles to target Israeli soldiers, outposts, tanks and armoured vehicles. Three: using aerial vehicles [drones]. This did not really exist in [the Lebanon war of] 2006. The investment in aerial vehicles began in 2009.” Hezbollah, they tell me, is targeting a narrow strip just a few kilometres from the border, rather than cities further south such as Haifa. “From that we assess that the current decision of Hezbollah is not to escalate.”</p>
<p>But Hezbollah also needs to manage its optics. It cannot spend decades railing against the “Zionist Oppressor” and then do nothing when it is at war with the group’s supposed brethren in Hamas. “Hezbollah has activated a few Palestinians from the refugee camps in Lebanon,” I am told. “There is cooperation when interests converge when their interests converge, and Hezbollah is using Palestinians to fire anti-tank missiles at us.” Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah’s leader, seemingly confirmed these assessments when he congratulated Hamas on its attack last month, while stressing he had no idea it was coming. The signal was clear: we had nothing to do with this; beyond saving face, we don’t want to get involved.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/10/israel-wont-wait-for-long/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/10/israel-wont-wait-for-long/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/GettyImages-1725071471-1-e1698253770455.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/10/israel-wont-wait-for-long/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading </span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/10/israel-wont-wait-for-long/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Hamas is playing for time</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/10/israel-wont-wait-for-long/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Edward Luttwak</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>But while 1914 is an overwrought analogy, here, with so many moving parts, escalation cannot be discounted. And beyond the trauma of October 7, many Israelis want action. The northern city of Qiryat Shemona is a mile from the Lebanese border. Today, after local authorities ordered civilians to leave in the face of daily rocket attacks, it is almost deserted. One man who hasn’t left is Moshe Peretz, 63, who owns a garage. He works with the IDF and local farmers and is, he tells me, an essential service provider. “I’ve been here 58 years and I’m used to this sort of stuff — sometimes Hezbollah would fire over 100 Katyusha rockets in one day. Back then we had to cram into small shelters.”</p>
<p>He continues, “if we pass this problem onto our children, then we haven’t achieved anything. We will have suffered 60 years for nothing. We can end it now – and we must.”</p>
<p>We drive up into the mountains, towards the border, through forest where IDF soldiers and tanks line the roads. At the summit, stands a thick metal barrier. It has been erected to protect us from fire from Lebanon. I cannot film it: it’s a new type of armour, I’m told. If I publish photos, the enemy will be able to analyse its thickness and adjust its fire accordingly.</p>
<p>The Hezbollah threat is incredibly potent. In 2019, <a href="https://www.dia.mil/Portals/110/Images/News/Military_Powers_Publications/Iran_Military_Power_LR.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">US intelligence</a> estimated the group had 150,000 projectiles in its arsenal, which includes<a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/erictegler/2023/11/15/hezbollahs-rocket-missile-and-drone-arsenal-is-huge-and-varied/?sh=243459cd2d21" target="_blank" rel="noopener"> Iranian Fateh-110 and Syrian M-600</a> satellite-guided missiles with a range of up to 186 miles, putting Tel Aviv in reach. Added to this are its anti-ship missiles, particularly the Iranian Noor and Russian Yakhont, as well as the 100,000 fighters <a href="https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/what-does-hezbollahs-arsenal-look-like/articleshow/105154647.cms" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Nasrallah claimed</a> to have in 2021 — a figure which, while almost certainly inflated, is not entirely divorced from reality.</p>
<p>That said, Lebanon is also suffering its worst financial crisis in modern history. The last thing it needs is another war with Israel, especially since the one in 2006 brought such destruction to the country. And internally, Hezbollah is powerful right now — why throw it all away?</p>
<p>Meanwhile, the Houthis have launched several drone and missile attacks against Israel: a show of solidarity with the Palestinians and a display of strength to its domestic audience. Though not as powerful as Hezbollah, the group has Iranian Quds-351 cruise missiles, which it has used against Saudi oil fields and which have a reported range of 1,650km. It also has the Iranian Toufan ballistic missile that has a range of up to 1,950km (though unlike the Iranian original it is not precision guided). Finally the Houthis have a drone capability, notably the<a href="https://amwaj.media/media-monitor/interview-inside-the-houthi-arsenal-that-can-reach-israel" target="_blank" rel="noopener"> Samad UAV</a>.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/11/the-defiance-of-israels-border-towns/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/11/the-defiance-of-israels-border-towns/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/GettyImages-1733609128-1-e1698942939407.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/11/the-defiance-of-israels-border-towns/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading </span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/11/the-defiance-of-israels-border-towns/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The defiance of Israel&#039;s border towns</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/11/the-defiance-of-israels-border-towns/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> David Patrikarakos</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>While their missiles are slow and inaccurate, they could theoretically overwhelm Israel&#8217;s Iron Dome if launched in conjunction with Hamas and Hezbollah. Before October 7, the most missiles Israel had faced in a day was 470 in May 2021. On October 7, it faced 5,200 in 20 minutes. Throw drones into the equation, and the picture becomes disconcerting. That said, the Houthis main fight is with Saudi Arabia. If it were to use all its weapons against Israel, the Saudis might sense opportunity, and move in for the kill.</p>
<p>In the end, though, the state that matters most is the one that stands behind Hamas, Hezbollah and the Houthis: Iran. Tehran bases its regional strategy on a doctrine of “Forward Defence” that, loosely speaking, means using regional non-state terror groups to fight its opponents abroad and retain stability at home.</p>
<p>Right now, Iran’s proxies are well-positioned around the borders of its two main regional rivals, Israel and Saudi Arabia — including a joint <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/11/10/iran-proxy-militias-syria-israel-hamas-war-irgc-escalation/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">operation room</a> with Hezbollah in the Golan Heights — which give it a degree of regional security it seems unwise to risk. After Israel and the United States bombed its Revolutionary Guard (IRGC) base in Syria in October, Iran has <a href="https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/will-hezbollah-hold-back-or-escalate" target="_blank" rel="noopener">shifted many of</a> its missile production facilities to Lebanon. Ultimately, these proxies deter direct attacks from Israel. If they are smashed, which will happen with escalation, the threat to Iran gets serious.</p>
<p>But Iran has other options. The IRGC has recently set up two new proxies in Syria: the Afghan Fatemiyoun and Pakistani Zainabiyoun groups whose stated goal is to destroy Israel. Iran can have them continue to attack the “Zionist Entity” at a limited level, while remaining largely unconcerned about retaliation as they are fundamentally expendable.</p>
<p>But in the end, while the Mullahs are happy for Hamas to hurt Israel, there is a limit to their support for it. Reuters <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/irans-axis-resistance-against-israel-faces-trial-by-fire-2023-11-15/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">reported</a> that at a recent meeting in Tehran, Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei complained to Hamas boss Ismail Haniyeh that his country was not warned of the October 7 attacks and that it would not enter the war on their behalf.</p>
<p>For their part, the Israelis are immovable on the eradication of Hamas but also wary of a broader war. The IDF was clear: the end of Hamas serves everyone. Anything short of a decisive defeat, they say, would embolden every terror group in the Middle East.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/10/why-peace-in-israel-failed/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/10/why-peace-in-israel-failed/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/GettyImages-178320128.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/10/why-peace-in-israel-failed/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading </span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/10/why-peace-in-israel-failed/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Why peace in Israel failed</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/10/why-peace-in-israel-failed/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Thomas Fazi</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>This is partly why the UK and US have both deployed forces in the area. But, in truth, it is unintended escalation that is the greatest concern — especially when Hamas is still holding so many hostages. Standing in the mountains of northern Israel, I peer down at the roads below and imagine the domino effect a stray Katusha accidentally hitting an Israeli school bus would have.</p>
<p>One act begets another in a region where no one can back down in the face of their own, often oppressed populations. Dictatorships are better at sustaining wars — and casualties — than democracies, and worse at avoiding them. From al-Houthi to Nasrallah to Khamenei, they continue to fight because policy and rhetoric cannot allow otherwise.</p>
<p>On 3 August, 1914, as the United Kingdom entered World War I, the British foreign secretary, Sir Edward Grey, remarked darkly that “the lamps are going out all over Europe, we shall not see them lit again in our lifetime”. Today in the Middle East, a return to 1914 seems, if not yet imminent, then no longer beyond the realms of possibility either.</p>
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