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		<title>IDF - UnHerd</title>
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		<description>think again</description>
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	<title>IDF - UnHerd</title>
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					<title>Israel can’t kill the Hezbollah hydra</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2026/06/israel-cant-kill-the-hezbollah-hydra/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://stage.unherd.com/2026/06/israel-cant-kill-the-hezbollah-hydra/?edition=us#comments</comments>
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										<unherd:main_theme>Middle east</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Mitchell Prothero]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/Screen-Shot-2026-06-02-at-15.53.48.jpg?w=62</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>2</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[Women mourn the Hezbollah commander Haytham Ali Tabatabai in Beirut, Lebanon. (Adri Salido/Getty)]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Mitchell Prothero</strong> has worked as a foreign correspondent across Europe and the Middle East for over two decades, with a focus on transnational crime and terrorism.</p>
]]>
						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle></unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ has worked as a foreign correspondent across Europe and the Middle East for over two decades, with a focus on transnational crime and terrorism.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Tue, 02 Jun 2026 23:01:26 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Tue, 02 Jun 2026 23:01:26 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Hezbollah]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[IDF]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Israel-Lebanon conflict]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[War]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://stage.unherd.com/?p=1061949</guid>
																												<description>
								<![CDATA[Cheap drones have changed the battlefield]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p dir="ltr">For 900 years, Beaufort Castle has dominated the villages and olive groves of South Lebanon. Yet even before its recent capture by the IDF, this crusader stronghold was far more than a medieval relic. For almost two decades, Beaufort became a symbol in stone of the futility of Israeli occupation. IDF troops first dislodged Palestinian militants from the fortress back in 1982, but then spent the next two decades trapped behind its walls, its tiny garrison often little more than prisoners of the Hezbollah fighters beyond. The steady stream of Israeli casualties at Beaufort helped spark the country’s peace movement, while movies and books vividly depicted what soon became known as the IDF’s very own Vietnam.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Now, this ancient castle has reprised its role: in what has become Israel’s largest incursion into South Lebanon since its 2000 retreat from the region. With IDF forces pushing past the Litani River, a natural barrier that’s played a major role in military operations dating back centuries, Benjamin Netanyahu seems intent on occupying South Lebanon once more. Yet with Hezbollah showing no sign of surrender, the risk is that Beaufort once again becomes emblematic of Israeli hubris.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Hezbollah has long been Israel’s more effective opponent. But after exploding pagers and airstrikes gutted the group’s leadership in September 2024, both Tel Aviv and Washington dismissed the Shia militants as a spent force. Following a ceasefire that autumn, giving IDF Northern Command a much-needed break, Netanyahu finally had the confidence to launch a ground invasion of Hezbollah’s stronghold in South Lebanon — especially after the cold war with Hezbollah’s patron in Tehran went hot. “There was an earned sense of satisfaction after decades of frustration in dealing with the most dangerous terrorists Israel has ever faced,” says Avi, a former Israeli intelligence operative specializing in Hezbollah, and who continues to consult the IDF as a reservist.</p>
<p dir="ltr">And so, in March 2026, IDF tanks rolled north once more. To be sure, Hezbollah retained significant military capabilities, not least thousands of rockets. Yet after eviscerating its leaders, Israel thought it would take years for the group to rebuild, particularly given a distracted Iran, and when the end of the Assad regime robbed the militants of strategic depth. As Avi now admits, however, “our enemies in Lebanon regrouped”. That’s something of an understatement. Now in its fourth month, Israel’s latest Lebanese incursion is proceeding far more slowly, and much more bloodily, than Tel Aviv expected. Over two-dozen IDF troops have been killed in South Lebanon since early March, with one medical captain dying near Beaufort just the other day.</p>
<p dir="ltr"><div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/04/is-belgium-a-narco-state/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/04/is-belgium-a-narco-state/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/GettyImages-1246128056.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/04/is-belgium-a-narco-state/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/04/is-belgium-a-narco-state/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Is Belgium a narco-state?</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/04/is-belgium-a-narco-state/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Mitchell Prothero and Max Daly</a></p></div></a></div>
<p dir="ltr">Israel’s problems are largely a matter of strategy. While IDF forces, backed by heavy armor and relentless air strikes, have made physical progress, pushing some 15 kilometers into Hezbollah’s rugged stronghold, two new tactics by the militants have greatly increased the cost.</p>
<p dir="ltr">The first is a flatter organizational structure, focused on small-unit guerrilla tactics. The second is an expanded campaign of cheap-but-deadly drones, ideal for harassing the Israelis at every turn. Beyond the human toll, this approach has damaged or destroyed dozens of tanks and other armored vehicles, while also targeting sophisticated radar, intelligence gathering, and missile-defense systems on Israel’s northern border.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Speaking by encrypted messenger last month, Has’n, a veteran Hezbollah commander based in Beirut, speaks with open confidence about the conflict. Technical innovations aside, he seems bullish about leading the enemy deep into Lebanon. Grudgingly respectful of IDF operations in Israel itself — they fight, Has’n says, “for their land” — just 500 meters across the border “the resistance” and its hit-and-run tactics are paying off.</p>
<p dir="ltr">This didn’t happen overnight. After the 2024 debacle — which saw Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah’s famous leader, killed alongside dozens of other commanders — the group didn’t attempt to restore its conventional military capacities. Instead, according to Israeli and Lebanese security officials, as well as Hezbollah commanders interviewed by <em>UnHerd</em>, the group pivoted back to its roots as a guerrilla group: deploying the same tactics that caused Israel grief back in the Eighties and Nineties.</p>
<p dir="ltr">This reorganization was directly led by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, which sent hundreds of operatives to Lebanon, and which for the first time in decades appears to directly command Hezbollah fighters in the field. “The IRGC sent officers to take a much more hands-on approach in the wake of the ceasefire,” says Nick Blanford, an analyst at the Atlantic Council. “And they’ve streamlined the group.”</p>
<p dir="ltr">The relationship between Hezbollah and the Iranian regime has always been public: Tehran funds Hezbollah, by some estimates to the tune of $700 million a year, and supplies much of its advanced arsenal of weapons. But the command and control structure of the group — the extent to which Iran directly runs its operations — has historically been less clear.</p>
<p dir="ltr">“Hezbollah has always been free to operate in Lebanon as it sees fit,” says one Lebanese security official. “Iran didn’t have any interest in micromanaging Hezbollah, and both leaderships had close personal relationships for decades. There’s no need to command when everyone is on the same page.” Avi makes a similar point, noting that there’s always been “a level of compartmentalization” between the Lebanese and Iranian wings of the operation.</p>
<p dir="ltr"><div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;Hezbollah has always been free to operate in Lebanon as it sees fit.&#8221;</div>
<p dir="ltr">But, by all accounts, this formerly opaque relationship changed after September 2024. As Blanford explains, the group’s earlier decimation offered opportunities, with the Revolutionary Guards replacing various aging commanders with younger alternatives, battle-hardened from fighting rebels in Syria.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Of course, Israel hardly missed these developments. IDF airstrikes have habitually targeted hotels and apartment blocks suspected of housing Iranian officials in Lebanon, ceasefires be damned. But these don’t seem to have disrupted Hezbollah’s transformation; both Iran and the militants showing an uncanny ability to replace slain leaders, highlighting the perils of equating organizational decapitation with reduced military capacity.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Competent institutions, particularly militaries, can easily account for casualties among both the leadership and the rank-and-file. To put it another way, competent institutions can heal. And even their enemies agree Hezbollah and Iran are competent — especially after more than 40 years of on-off conflict with Israel and the West. “Hezbollah has surprised Israel with its resilience,” Blanford says, “and is fighting much harder in South Lebanon than anyone, including the Israelis, expected.”</p>
<p dir="ltr">What of the future? Frustrated by Hezbollah’s drone campaign, Netanyahu this week threatened to expand military operations to Beirut — and Lebanon’s already creaky civilian infrastructure. Iran, for its part, promised to resume its operations in the Persian Gulf, alarming a Trump administration desperate to finally reopen the Strait of Hormuz. In an apparently angry phone call between Trump and Netanyahu, all sides have agreed to a renewed ceasefire. But few in either Beirut or Tel Aviv trust the deal, and expect fighting to continue for as long as the IDF remains in Lebanon.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/04/will-lebanon-implode-again/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/04/will-lebanon-implode-again/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/Untitled-design-13.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/04/will-lebanon-implode-again/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested Reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/04/will-lebanon-implode-again/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Will Lebanon implode?</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/04/will-lebanon-implode-again/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Jacob Russell</a></p></div></a></div>
<p dir="ltr">A longer campaign in the country would likely end in stalemate, as Hezbollah and Iran work together to bleed the IDF. As the Israeli reoccupation of Beaufort so vividly implies, this also would raise the ghosts of history. In 1982, at the height of Lebanon’s sectarian civil war, IDF troops invaded the country to combat the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and similar factions ensconced in the country. And if the result was 20 years of quagmire, Hezbollah’s evolving tactics imply a similar outcome today.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Even Israeli insiders now seem to accept this. “Obviously the fighting has been harder than expected,” says Avi, “but maybe it should have been predicted considering Hezbollah’s long history of resilience. They’ve rebounded quite impressively.”</p>
<p dir="ltr">And with Israel expressly stating it plans to reoccupy much of South Lebanon, just as they did through 2000, when it was finally driven out by Hezbollah’s resistance, it’s no wonder that militant commanders are increasingly optimistic — especially after a string of surprising defeats. “This occupation will be a gift to the resistance,” says Has’n. “It’s much easier to kill Israeli soldiers on our own land than in Palestine. We will fight like in the Nineties, and send them back their dead sons until they leave. We did it before and, God willing, we will do it again.” Expect more fighting at Beaufort — and soon.</p>
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															<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">1061949</post-id>				</item>
									<item>
					<title>How the IDF escapes justice</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2025/11/how-the-idf-escapes-justice/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://stage.unherd.com/2025/11/how-the-idf-escapes-justice/?edition=us#comments</comments>
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										<unherd:main_theme>Israel</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Omer Bartov]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Blue-81.jpg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>2</unherd:article_ranking>
																<unherd:image_caption>
							<![CDATA[Amir Levy / Getty Images]]>
						</unherd:image_caption>
						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Omer Bartov</strong> is an Israeli-American scholar and Dean’s Professor of Holocaust and Genocide Studies at Brown University.</p>
]]>
						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle></unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is an Israeli-American scholar and Dean’s Professor of Holocaust and Genocide Studies at Brown University.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Tue, 18 Nov 2025 00:01:35 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Tue, 18 Nov 2025 00:01:35 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Gaza]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Hamas]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[IDF]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Israel]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[West Bank]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://stage.unherd.com/?p=1037569</guid>
																												<description>
								<![CDATA[Netanyahu is dismantling Israeli law]]>
							</description>
																		
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								<![CDATA[<p>I recently caught up with an old Israeli friend who’s been living for decades in the United States. We last saw each other in the early months of 1973, when we were undergoing basic training as raw recruits into the Israel Defense Forces (IDF). We trained as combat infantry, and put that to use in the Yom Kippur War and the fighting that followed. But for much of our service, we either patrolled the borders or enforced the occupation. As my friend related, during one of those operations in the West Bank, his squad broke into a Palestinian home and he accidentally stepped on a small child. He doesn’t know what happened to the child — but, as he explained to me, he never quite recovered from the incident, which partly explains why he ultimately left Israel for a new life abroad.</p>
<p>I know of many other, no less traumatizing, events. In 1987, I published a Hebrew-language novel called <em>Border Patrol</em> — based on a case I had heard at the time — about a soldier who accidentally kills a pregnant woman in Lebanon, and is haunted by the ghost of the unborn child. Then there were such cases as the 1982 massacre of Palestinians in the refugee camps of Sabra and Shatila, carried out by Lebanese Christian militias supplied and supported by the IDF, with Israeli troops surrounding the camps and lighting up the area with flares. From wars to skirmishes to endless occupation, serving in the IDF has provided ample opportunities for violence, accidental or otherwise, against innocent civilians.</p>
<p>All the same, as I think back to my basic training, shortly before the hell of the Yom Kippur War, I must admit that we were taught to respect and fear the weapons we were given. The “purity of arms” of the IDF was always partly mythical — yet it was constantly drilled into us. To be victorious, we were told, we had to be just, and as soldiers we were issued clear instructions on when we were allowed to open fire: rules which were strictly enforced. The IDF could not be like those marauding, lawless, criminal armies that subjected Jews to wanton murder, rape, and humiliation during the long centuries of exile. As early as the Thirties, the prominent Zionist leader Berl Katznelson exhorted Jewish paramilitary troops in Palestine: “May our arms remain pure. We train to use weapons, we carry weapons and confront those who attack us. But we do not want our arms to be soiled by the blood of innocents.”</p>
<p>In reality, of course, since its formation in 1948, the IDF engaged in multiple war crimes, not least during the War of Independence itself. Most of these crimes were covered up or denied, from the now well-documented cases of executions in Palestinian villages in the Galilee, which were long denied, to the widely reported massacre of over 100 people, including women and children, in the village of Deir Yassin in April 1948, for which no one was eventually charged.</p>
<p>Even so, on occasion, a few have been prosecuted and held up as a warning about the potential of young armed men descending into savagery. This was the case of the massacre of over 40 civilians in Kafr Qasim in 1956, which resulted in an Israeli court ruling that a “black flag” flies over unlawful orders to kill innocents. But the occupation, which began following the Six Day War, brought with it growing dehumanization of the Palestinians and the ever-progressive loosening of rules on exercising violence against civilians, as can be seen now in the escalating attacks by Jewish settlers, often abetted by IDF troops, against Palestinians in the West Bank. The scandal that is currently roiling Israeli society — and the nature of the debate surrounding it — is the culmination of this process, with profound ramifications for the rule of law in Israel as a whole.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/10/will-israels-hardliners-win/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/10/will-israels-hardliners-win/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/GettyImages-1255902190.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/10/will-israels-hardliners-win/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/10/will-israels-hardliners-win/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Will Israel’s hardliners win?</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/10/will-israels-hardliners-win/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Omer Bartov</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>In July 2024, the IDF military police opened an investigation into reports of abuse of Palestinian prisoners in the notorious detention center of Sde Teiman. An initial attempt to arrest some of the suspected soldiers was met with demonstrations, and some protesters and far-Right politicians broke into the camp to protect the culprits. Eventually, five soldiers were indicted for causing severe abuse and injury to a prisoner who had to undergo emergency surgery. As protests reached a frenzy, a clip allegedly showing soldiers brutalizing a prisoner was leaked to the media, exposing to the public the severity of the abuse. Initially, the office of the Military Advocate General, tasked with running the investigation, insisted that it could not determine the identity of the leaker. But, in October this year, Military Advocate General Yifat Tomer-Yerushalmi resigned, conceding that she had authorized the leak to protect her office from false accusations that it was needlessly persecuting innocent soldiers merely carrying out their duty against Hamas operatives. She then disappeared, raising fears about her possible suicide. Fortunately, Tomer-Yerushalmi later resurfaced, only to be taken into custody herself. She is currently under investigation both for leaking the video and for lying to the Supreme Court about its provenance.</p>
<p>Israeli society is starkly divided over the scandal. Those who defend the arrested soldiers — <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/8/9/everything-is-legitimate-israeli-leaders-defend-soldiers-accused-of-rape" target="_blank" rel="noopener">notably</a> Minister of National Security Itamar Ben-Gvir — claim that Tomer-Yerushalmi and her office are part of a “deep state” plot: one that is trying to undermine the Israeli government, “tie the hands” of the IDF in its war against terrorism, and prevent it from accomplishing a “final victory” against Hamas. Those who defend Tomer-Yerushalmi say that while she might have made mistakes in how she conducted herself, what matters much more is that she and her office stood up for the rule of law and exposed the abuse of Palestinian prisoners by rogue IDF soldiers.</p>
<p>The truth is far more sordid — and troubling. The office of the Military Advocate General is charged with investigating and charging illegal conduct by members of the IDF. Yet for the past two years, as the IDF killed tens of thousands of civilians in Gaza, and as evidence mounted of attacks against aid workers — from a drone strike <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/c4g2g6w4109o" target="_blank" rel="noopener">against</a> the Aid Central Kitchen charity in April 2024, to the tank shells that <a href="https://www.reuters.com/investigations/visual-evidence-upends-israels-official-story-deadly-attack-gaza-hospital-2025-09-26/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">killed</a> 22 at a hospital in August 2025 — Tomer-Yerushalmi, the IDF’s top legal adviser, <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2025-11-02/ty-article/.premium/idf-legal-chief-avoided-gaza-war-crimes-probes-citing-right-wing-backlash-sources-say/0000019a-43a5-dec4-a7db-f7f70a240000?fromLogin=success" target="_blank" rel="noopener">did virtually nothing</a>.</p>
<p>This did not begin on October 7. For years, the office of the Military Advocate General has facilitated and obscured the crimes of Israeli soldiers. Created in 1948 to provide judicial advice, and to arrange military trials, the office is headed by an advocate general appointed by the Minister of Defense and is not directly subordinate to the army’s chief of staff. It also includes a department responsible for ensuring that the IDF operates in accordance with international law.</p>
<p>As a 2016 report by the Israeli human rights organization B’Tselem <a href="https://www.btselem.org/publications/summaries/201605_occupations_fig_leaf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">pointed out</a>, however, this entire military judicial apparatus gradually transformed into a mechanism for covering up crimes, what it called a “fig leaf of the occupation”. Indeed, after years of failed appeals to the military justice system, B’Tselem concluded that the Advocate General’s very existence was intended not to deliver justice — but to offer its semblance.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;The Advocate General’s very existence was intended not to deliver justice — but to offer its semblance.&#8221;</div>
<p>This conclusion is supported elsewhere too. As far back as January 2009, for instance, <em>Haaretz</em> <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/2009-01-29/ty-article/consent-and-advise/0000017f-e1a6-d9aa-afff-f9fe5e100000" target="_blank" rel="noopener">reported</a> that the office adopted highly controversial interpretations of international law to justify the IDF’s actions in Gaza <a href="https://www.amnesty.org.uk/gaza-operation-cast-lead" target="_blank" rel="noopener">during</a> Operation Cast Lead. That included the bombing of a graduation ceremony of a police course on the first day of the operation that killed dozens of policemen, and the killing of 40 people by a mortar shell aimed at a target next to a United Nations Relief and Works Agency school, where Palestinians were sheltering. “Our goal is not to fetter the army,” Daniel Reisner, the officer who established the department was even quoted as saying, “but to give it the tools to win in a lawful manner.” More than that, Reisner explained that his department backed policies that were “on the edge” of the legal void: demolishing houses, carrying out deportation, and conducting targeted assassinations. “What we are seeing now is a revision of international law,” Reisner added, a decade and a half before October 7. “If you do something long enough, the world will accept it.”</p>
<p>According to B’Tselem, Operation Cast Lead caused the death of 762 innocent civilians, including 318 children and over 100 women. But officials in the legal department insisted that these deaths, along with a great deal of indiscriminate destruction of property, had no impact on the legality of the operation. “The law has actually been stood on its head,” concluded Professor Orna Ben-Naftali, an Israeli legal scholar, even back then. “It has ceased to fulfill its purpose, and we have to admit that it has gone into dissolution procedures ahead of bankruptcy.”</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/10/the-splintering-of-british-jews/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/10/the-splintering-of-british-jews/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/lib.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/10/the-splintering-of-british-jews/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/10/the-splintering-of-british-jews/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The splintering of British Jews</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/10/the-splintering-of-british-jews/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> David Rose</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>The slippery slope of 2008 became even more pronounced during the IDF’s 2014 Operation Protective Edge, in which over 500 Palestinian children were killed. The plunge to the abyss, as is well known, came with Israel’s response to the October 7 massacre. Over the next two years, at least 68,000 Palestinians were killed, of whom up to 20,000 were children. As far as is known, no one has been brought to account. Indeed, the Advocate General’s office provided legal license for much of the killing. For one thing, it showed a high tolerance of civilian collateral damage in attacks on Hamas operatives — not only senior officers but low-ranking members too — by asserting that civilians who would or could not leave their homes as instructed could be considered enemy targets. For another, it refused to undertake all but the most superficial investigations of blatant crimes, adding to the sense of impunity among IDF troops.</p>
<p>Given all this, it is anyway difficult to feel sorry for Tomer-Yerushalmi, even if one must regret that she will pay a price for the wrong crime. What is more troubling, though, is that Prime Minister Netanyahu and his minions have pounced on the case as an opportunity to accelerate their campaign of dismantling what remains of Israeli law, installing their own people in positions of power and claiming that any accusations of wrongdoing are mere manifestations of “deep state” liberalism and foreign antisemitism. Most recently, the government has announced that it would launch its own inquiry into the fiasco of October 7 — which occurred under its watch — rather than establishing an independent state commission of inquiry.</p>
<p>All the while, one must wonder who now is left to stand in the breach? As I recall how all this began, with the progressive cheapening of Palestinian lives and the use of law to justify the unjustifiable, I can only conclude that, when some of us youngsters warned of the corrupting effects of the occupation in the years following the war of 1967, we had no idea how far Israeli democracy would finally be dismantled. Thanks to a military justice system that provides impunity to the IDF, the horror I described four decades ago in Border Patrol has now become the norm.</p>
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					<title>The Netanyahu paradox</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2025/06/the-netanyahu-paradox/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://stage.unherd.com/2025/06/the-netanyahu-paradox/?edition=us#comments</comments>
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										<unherd:main_theme>Middle East</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Yehudah Mirsky]]>
					</dc:creator>
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																<unherd:article_ranking>2</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[Netanyahu has played Israeli politics like a fiddle. Photo: Photo by Amir Levy/Getty.]]>
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							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Yehudah Mirsky </strong>served in the US State Department’s human rights bureau, is a professor at Brandeis University, a fellow of the Institute for Advanced Studies of The Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Among his books is <em>Rav Kook: Mystic In A Time Of Revolution</em> (Yale University Press).</p>
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						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>YehudahMirsky</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[served in the US State Department’s human rights bureau, is a professor at Brandeis University, a fellow of the Institute for Advanced Studies of The Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Among his books is <em>Rav Kook: Mystic In A Time Of Revolution</em> (Yale University Press).]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Wed, 25 Jun 2025 23:02:59 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Mon, 30 Jun 2025 12:34:34 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[America]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Benjamin Netanyahu]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Hamas]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[IDF]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Iran]]></category>
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					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://stage.unherd.com/?p=687586</guid>
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								<![CDATA[Even his opponents supported the war in Iran]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>“People who can’t be happy when something important happens for the country just because it gets Netanyahu good polling — their priorities are off.” <a href="https://x.com/ReshetBet/status/1936681790732640695" target="_blank" rel="noopener">So said</a> the Israeli Prime Minister’s most reliably ferocious critic. Opposition Leader Yair Lapid has worked tirelessly for years to unseat Netanyahu, but even he fundamentally supported the strikes on Iran. This shouldn’t, however, come as a surprise. It’s not about shared politics or flag-rallying in wartime — but about the unique threat that Israelis believe Iran poses to their very lives.</p>
<p>Israelis are famously disputatious, but not on one issue: Iran. A major regional power, whose government is openly sworn to, and invests immense efforts in, Israel’s literal destruction. Unlike the conflict with the Palestinians, Israel’s conflict with Iran is between states — not between peoples, not over independence, and not over territory. Israelis do not see Iran’s people as enemies but rather as a society groaning under a theocratic police state. In fact, Israel’s good relations with Iran before the Revolution are still a living memory. (Israel’s Iranian <a href="https://www.israel21c.org/who-are-the-iranians-living-in-israel/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">expats</a> have their own radio station, alongside Israel’s public radio’s daily programme in Farsi.) One of Israel’s most famous singers, Rita, is just one of any number of Iranian-Israeli artists who draw on the Iranian culture they grew up in.</p>
<p>Crucially, Israel and Iran are sovereign states, with all that that entails. Certainly, both see themselves as part of larger, more complicated projects beyond their own territories — Israel as a Jewish and democratic nation-state and Iran as regional successor to the Persian Empire, leader of global Shiism and, hopefully, of Islamism’s theocratic universalism too. But these adjectives jostle on top of a foundational basis that is the hallmark of sovereignty — they both are states which, by Max Weber’s celebrated definition, hold a territory’s monopoly of legitimate violence. It is this lowest common denominator that makes international law among states of wildly differing cultures, religions, world views, because they can justifiably hold one another to account.</p>
<p>Iran, then, is a state, large and powerful, with the avowed aim, and material and political resources, to wage a decades-long campaign for the elimination, pure and simple, of another state. Iran’s target is far away, and so it has for decades made use of skilful proxies — the Assad regime in Syria, and above all Hezbollah and Hamas, and now the Houthis, who, as non-state actors have worked to destabilise the region as a whole and were able in their struggle to adopt the language of resistance and liberation. October 7 made clear to everyone in Israel what this “liberation” means. Nobody can doubt anymore that the armed Islamist groups calling for death to Israel are saying exactly what they mean.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/10/israels-fragile-solidarity/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/10/israels-fragile-solidarity/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/GettyImages-2158088816.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/10/israels-fragile-solidarity/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/10/israels-fragile-solidarity/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Israel and the trials of liberal solidarity</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/10/israels-fragile-solidarity/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Yehudah Mirsky</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>This fundamental consensus on Iran runs through Israeli society. It also overwhelmingly shapes the approach of its long-running Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, and goes a long way towards explaining how a man, so truly despised by so many proud and patriotic Israelis, has stayed in power for so long.</p>
<p>Netanyahu’s signature style is strategic caution and tactical audacity in the service of grim realism. His father Benzion, opponent of the UN Partition Plan of 1947 and historian of the Spanish Inquisition, imparted a stark and pessimistic worldview <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/europe/strategic-europe/2012/05/the-enduring-influence-of-benjamin-netanyahus-father?lang=en" target="_blank" rel="noopener">to his son</a>: that Jews would never be accepted in non-Jewish society and that for Jews, optimism is suicidal.</p>
<p>A keen student of policy and history and astute observer of societal and economic trends, the younger Netanyahu, educated in the US, before and after his military service came to prominence in the Eighties as a government spokesman and UN Ambassador, mixing cosmopolitan eloquence with hardline militancy and ruthless ambition. His mix of caution and volubility has served him well, keeping generations of rivals off-balance and guessing. He has always been reluctant to make large decisions, wage full-fledged wars or pursue diplomatic gambits and their inevitable risks, preferring endlessly to tack between statesmanship and partisanship, making confederates, religious and secular, wealthy and poor, who all agree that he is their man, even if he is never to be trusted. This has been crucial to his remarkable political longevity as time and again he dances to the brink of outright extremism without ever quite stepping over, speaking the languages of diplomacy and rabble-rousing with equal fluency. Outlasting all his rivals and most of his proteges, he has come to see himself as Israel’s indispensable leader, the only one with the Churchillian vision, skill and world-class stature capable of confronting the uniquely existential threat of a nuclear Iran.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">“His mix of caution and volubility has served him well, keeping generations of rivals off-balance and guessing.” </div>
<p>Netanyahu is not a religious man. His creed does not teach about redemption, whether religious or socialist, but about apocalypse, and his destiny in trying to forestall it. And that’s clear from his mission, which has an urgency to it: to prevent Iran from having a nuclear weapon at all costs, a theme of his for decades (as when, in 2009, he stood at the rostrum of the UN, holding up the blueprints for Auschwitz, and castigating Iran’s then-President and chief Holocaust denier, Mahmoud Ahmanadinejad, “have you no shame?” In 2015, he breathtakingly addressed a joint session of Congress urging opposition to the Obama Administration’s Iran Deal from which Trump, with Netanyahu’s support, unilaterally withdrew in 2018. His disenchantment with anyone’s vision of redemption has given him plenty of room to maneuver. The end has for him justified every means. He has made and broken conventions with the religious and the secular, with Left and Right, even flirting with bringing Arabs into a coalition. He has been willing to exploit and abandon supporters and friends, to court dictators from Russia to Qatar, and to tolerate Hamas’s hold on Gaza until October 7. He, alone among the leaders responsible for that day’s catastrophic failure and the decisions leading up to it, has consistently refused to take responsibility; his legendary pettiness, arrogance and grandiosity aside, his chief justification, one openly shared by his fervent followers and tacitly by many others, is that only he was capable of taking on Iran.</p>
<p>His dogged avoidance of big moves and hard decisions has, the truth be told, well-suited an Israeli polity, whose defining dilemmas as a Jewish and democratic state in a treacherous neighborhood, fated to share with Palestinians a tortured past and radically uncertain future, can seem insoluble. And a polity which has become used to being roundly condemned in international fora and opinion for almost anything it does.</p>
<p>Netanyahu was never an idealist, but his early public decades were nonetheless marked by genuine commitment to neo-conservative democratic principles and free market reforms. But these gave way as his legal troubles mounted. <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trial_of_Benjamin_Netanyahu" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Facing multiple charges of corruption, self-dealing in arms purchases and illegally seeking to control the media,</a> he resolved to control the judiciary to make sure he could stay in power unchallenged and unrestrained. He increasingly characterized reasonable debates over necessary judicial reforms as threats to Israeli democracy by fifth columnists, knowing that only the fear of Iran could give such accusations any public traction.</p>
<p>Embracing a turbocharged Israeli version of the populism sweeping the democratic world, stoking resentments while exploiting sentiments of patriotism and self-sacrifice he became a charter member of the post-liberal democratic club, helping Viktor Orbán as well as Donald Trump. Over the years, he built a TV network and army of internet trolls, prominently featuring his Miami-based son, Yair, to hurl accusations of treason and worse against the judiciary, civil service and academia — and the military, intelligence and security services too.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/06/irans-devastating-hubris/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/06/irans-devastating-hubris/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/GettyImages-2219301340.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/06/irans-devastating-hubris/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/06/irans-devastating-hubris/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Iran’s devastating hubris</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/06/irans-devastating-hubris/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Sohrab Ahmari</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>The last vestiges of his earlier, genuinely held free market beliefs vanished when he aligned himself with the growing ultraorthodox bloc whose overwhelming issue is securing the military exemptions that keep their young men, along with the rest of their constituents in their own carefully insulated educational, social cultural institutions and out of the work-force as whole. Similarly, deeming it necessary for political survival, he gave senior cabinet ministries (International Security and Finance) to fire-breathing religious ultranationalists, Itamar Ben-Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich — the kinds he had avoided being seen or working with for years.</p>
<p>It all came to a head in 2023, well before October 7. His firebrand Justice Minister, Yuval Levin, put forward a stunning array of sweeping legal changes that would give the governing Coalition permanent control over the judiciary and media and much else.</p>
<p>The country was rocked for months by massive demonstrations against this perceived assault on the rule of law. They were attended by former generals, massive numbers of military reservists and even Netanyahu’s own former Likud Party colleagues, who saw him hijacking legal processes and institutions for partisan, personal, authoritarian ends and found themselves, too, denounced as traitors by Netanyahu’s spokesmen. In the days after October 7, Israelis <a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/10/israels-fragile-solidarity/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">rallied across partisan lines</a>, broadly supporting the war aims of removing Hamas and returning the hostages and enabling civilians driven from the South by terror and the North by Hezbollah’s rockets, to return to their homes. The devil was, however, in the details: removing Hamas would require creating some sort of Palestinian governing authority in Gaza, and returning the hostages would prioritize the lives of individual hostages over a national collective interest which Ben-Gvir and Smotrich define as Judaising Gaza. What’s more, Netanyahu’s ultraorthodox coalition partners demanded legislation that would enshrine their collective draft exemption and state welfare<strong> </strong>once and for all. Not surprisingly, the prewar protests began to return, featuring exhausted reserve soldiers and the wretched families of hostages — for whom Netanyahu didn’t hide his annoyance and disdain.</p>
<p>In recent months, the country had been shaken even further by revelations that Qatar had been financing not only Hamas, but members of Netanyahu’s staff, including, one deeply knowledgeable observer told me, the same one responsible for creating his legion of trolls. In response, he fired the head of the General Security Services, for putting loyalty to state institutions above his loyalty to him.</p>
<p>What, then, after all this could lead nearly the entire Israeli political spectrum, lead people like me who week after week demonstrated against Netanyahu, who truly see him as a would-be authoritarian and a mortal threat to Israel’s future as Jewish and Democratic state, to support his military campaign in Iran? It is the sheer threat of a nuclear Iran. The measure of the distance how many of us have to travel to say that we support Netanyahu in this war is the measure of the undeniable threat of a nuclear Iran, to Israel, to the Jewish people, and to the world.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">“Deeming it necessary for political survival, he gave senior cabinet positions to fire-breathing religious ultranationalists.” </div>
<p>Over the past year, the military and intelligence services whose patriotism Netanyahu regularly questioned, effectively disarmed the Syrian Army and Hezbollah, making it possible to turn, in a brief, stunningly successful campaign to turn against their Iranian patron, as the nuclear clock was ticking down.</p>
<p>Netanyahu is perhaps Israel’s greatest living sociologist, and has, for decades, played its politics like a fiddle. Everything that he has done emerges from his utterly sincere conviction that his personal political interest and the Israeli national interest truly are one and the same. And so anything that keeps him in power is justified. His moral justification has been the very real threat of Iran. Whether others could have done the same, or whether he could have done this without tearing Israeli society apart, is something we and historians will be trying to figure out for years to come.</p>
<p>Now that there is a ceasefire, Israel and Iran are licking their wounds and thinking of what comes next. Netanyahu’s sagging poll ratings have been ticking up, though the public still hopes to replace the current government. During the pre-war protests over the judicial overhaul, Israel’s center-left parties and civil society, after years of drift, found their voice, and it was thunderous. If, indeed, the immediate threat of Iran has for now passed, one hopes they will assert themselves and offer a weary public a patriotic, principled alternative. But it won’t be easy.</p>
<p>Netanyahu was in some ways a harbinger and one of the progenitors of the new, post-liberal world taking shape before our eyes. This new dispensation has arisen on the ruins of a liberal order that in many ways lost touch with its own deepest commitments, and its nerve. The proven courage and fortitude of the Israel’s center-left is facing a historic opportunity, and a new test.</p>
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					<title>What will replace Hezbollah?</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2024/09/what-will-replace-hezbollah/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://stage.unherd.com/2024/09/what-will-replace-hezbollah/?edition=us#comments</comments>
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					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Michal Kranz]]>
					</dc:creator>
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																<unherd:article_ranking>2</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[A man in Beirut waves Hezbollah's flag following last week's attack (ANWAR AMRO/AFP via Getty Images)]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<div><strong>Michal Kranz</strong> is a freelance journalist reporting on politics, society and defence in Eastern Europe and the Middle East. He runs <i><a href="https://theeasternflank.substack.com/" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://theeasternflank.substack.com/&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1737473225062000&amp;usg=AOvVaw1ymYD5AVcHVPGcry_zwCIQ">The Eastern Flank</a>,</i> a Substack newsletter focused on Eastern European geopolitics.</div>
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						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>Michal_Kranz</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is a freelance journalist reporting on politics, society and defence in Eastern Europe and the Middle East. He runs <i><a href="https://theeasternflank.substack.com/" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://theeasternflank.substack.com/&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1737473225062000&amp;usg=AOvVaw1ymYD5AVcHVPGcry_zwCIQ">The Eastern Flank</a>,</i> a Substack newsletter focused on Eastern European geopolitics.</div>
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					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Mon, 23 Sep 2024 23:02:01 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Tue, 24 Sep 2024 11:02:07 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Beirut]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Gaza]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Hezbollah]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[IDF]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Israel]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Lebanon]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[nasrallah]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[War]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[zionism]]></category>
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								<![CDATA[<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">In the summer of 2019, I took one of Beirut’s vintage Mercedes taxis to the city’s southern suburbs. I was in Dahieh to meet Lokman Slim, a prominent Lebanese researcher and fierce critic of Hezbollah. Slim, together with his German-born wife, lived and worked in a villa right under the group’s nose. I, like many locals, wondered how Slim was tolerated amid Dahieh’s rows of dense beige apartment blocks, less than a mile away from the infamous auditorium where Hezbollah broadcasts Hassan Nasrallah’s speeches to the world.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The quiet stillness of Slim’s villa, its libraries, its garden — all were a refuge from the hustle and bustle of Dahieh beyond. Slim, for his part, offered me coffee as we discussed Lebanon’s complex political existence, apparently unconcerned by his powerful armed neighbours. Yet less than two years later, in February 2021, he was dead, murdered by unknown assailants in his car outside Beirut. Though no perpetrators were ever identified, the assassination was obviously carried out by Hezbollah or one of its affiliates. Slim, like every Shi’a Muslim living in Dahieh, was ultimately swallowed by it.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">This is the reality for many people in Hezbollah-dominated areas of Lebanon: sooner or later, you’ll either need to tie your existence to the group, or else be consumed by it. This was made plain by Israel’s pager and walkie-talkie attacks last week, when communication devices exploded in supermarkets, offices, homes, and funerals across Dahieh, south Lebanon, and the Beqaa Valley, leaving no corner of Hezbollah’s state-within-a-state untouched. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Commentary on this revolutionary event has largely fallen into one of two camps. </span><span style="font-weight: 400;">While some have derided the pager operation as an indiscriminate attack on civilians, others have noted that those who carried pagers distributed by Hezbollah were by default bonafide members of the organisation. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The truth, however, is that both these viewpoints are accurate simultaneously. Hezbollah in 2024 is not just a militia fighting Israel — it is an entire parallel society, boasting a political party, a social welfare system and charitable religious institutions, </span><a href="https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/why-does-hezbollah-want-lebanons-health-ministry" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">alongside</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> five hospitals and hundreds of medical centres. Even the Beirut International Airport and </span><a href="https://nowlebanon.com/the-beirut-port-hezbollahs-gateway-to-corruption/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">the city’s commercial seaport</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> have for years been under Hezbollah’s sway. </span></p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/08/putin-wants-poland-to-invade-ukraine/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/08/putin-wants-poland-to-invade-ukraine/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/GettyImages-1238484977-1.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/08/putin-wants-poland-to-invade-ukraine/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/08/putin-wants-poland-to-invade-ukraine/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Putin wants Poland to invade Ukraine</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/08/putin-wants-poland-to-invade-ukraine/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Michal Kranz</a></p></div></a></div>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Altogether, these institutions serve a </span><span style="font-weight: 400;">living, breathing, multi-religious patchwork of communities. As Lebanon has weathered financial ruin, disasters like the 2020 port explosion, and the intransigence of the country’s sectarian politics, the Lebanese government has slowly collapsed, taking many social services with it. This has </span><a href="https://www.trtworld.com/magazine/lebanon-s-crisis-could-end-up-empowering-hezbollah-48191" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">pushed</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> Lebanese Shi’a, Hezbollah’s primary constituency, even closer to the group, where they’ve been able to provide much more for adherents than the state itself. Examples abound. As pharmaceutical supplies dried up amid Lebanon’s economic crisis, Hezbollah was able to </span><a href="https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/hezbollah-has-created-parallel-financial-and-welfare-systems-manage-current-crisis" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">provide life-saving medication</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> smuggled in from Syria and Iran to people living under its rule. As the value of the Lebanese lira plummeted, it opened supermarkets for its constituents that sold Iranian goods at lower prices than the competition.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The</span><span style="font-weight: 400;"> majority of those killed in the pager attacks were indeed Hezbollah fighters. Yet hundreds of people — </span><a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/09/19/israel-lebanon-pagers-attack-victims/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">working as medics and teachers, mechanics and shopkeepers</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> — were</span> <span style="font-weight: 400;">wounded too. Though they’d never held a rifle in service of the group, and were by most definitions civilians, they too were caught in the crossfire: Hezbollah’s hold on their daily lives was just too tight.</span> <span style="font-weight: 400;">It’s a situation with parallels elsewhere, </span><span style="font-weight: 400;">with Hamas in Gaza, the Taliban in Afghanistan</span><b>,</b><span style="font-weight: 400;"> and drug cartels in Latin America playing a similar social function.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Nor is all this merely relevant to Lebanon’s internal dynamics. Deciding where to draw the line between combatant and civilian has been and continues to be a vital matter in conflicts involving non-state actors, blurring as they do the line between guerilla movement and quasi-government. But with Israel seemingly setting the stage for an all-out war with Hezbollah </span><span style="font-weight: 400;">—</span><span style="font-weight: 400;"> having now </span><a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2024/sep/23/middle-east-crisis-live-hezbollah-israel-war-lebanon-evacuations-latest" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">conducted hundreds of air strikes</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> north of the border, which collectively have resulted in the </span><a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/sep/23/israel-lebanon-strikes-evacuation-hezbollah" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">single deadliest day in Lebanon</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> since hostilities began last year </span><span style="font-weight: 400;">—</span><span style="font-weight: 400;"> this unresolved ambiguity will continue to produce deadly consequences for the Lebanese people. To put it bluntly: many risk finding themselves declared guilty by association with Hezbollah and its vast, multifaceted network.</span></p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;Many risk finding themselves declared guilty by association with Hezbollah and its vast, multifaceted network.&#8221;</div>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">As the last year of warfare in Gaza has made clear to the world, Israel has little problem with inflicting devastating civilian casualties to achieve its battlefield goals. Indeed, the policy of bringing maximum pressure to bear on Hamas and Gaza was itself born in Lebanon. In 2006, the IDF smashed civilian infrastructure to bring Hezbollah to heel, ultimately producing the infamous </span><a href="https://www.inss.org.il/he/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/systemfiles/Armey%20-%202.1.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Dahieh doctrine</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">. Since the start of the current round of fighting, now almost a year old, Israel has hit Hezbollah-linked rescue teams, as well as the group’s medical services. This suggests that, for Israel, the distinction between civilian branches of Hezbollah’s infrastructure and its military wing is already null and void.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">From a purely military perspective, this brutal policy is understandable. All branches of Hezbollah’s network feed into the same coffers. These play a part in funding its armed wing, so working to incapacitate the entire organisation does make sense for Israel strategically, despite the immense ethical caveats involved. But then the question emerges: how far is Israel willing to go?  Who, to put it bluntly, will it decide is contributing to Hezbollah’s operations </span><span style="font-weight: 400;">— and therefore get</span><span style="font-weight: 400;"> a target on their back? Nor are random civilians the only ones at risk here. Since 1992, after all, Hezbollah has held seats in the Lebanese parliament, and is currently part of the country’s governing coalition. Though Israel </span><a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/idf-issues-rare-apology-after-strike-kills-lebanese-soldier/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">apologised</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> for killing a member of the Lebanese Armed Forces in late 2023, IDF commanders </span><a href="https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2018-09-06/ty-article/senior-idf-official-hezbollah-controls-lebanons-army/0000017f-e272-d568-ad7f-f37bcc170000" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">have previously stated</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> that they wouldn’t distinguish between Hezbollah and the formal state in any future war.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Over the past year analysts have </span><a href="https://www.newsweek.com/without-broader-strategic-goal-israels-military-victories-cannot-secure-it-victory-opinion-1937058" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">often noted</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> that while Israel may have achieved tactical victories against Hezbollah </span><span style="font-weight: 400;">—</span><span style="font-weight: 400;"> notably the pager attack or the recent </span><a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/09/20/world/middleeast/ibrahim-aqeel-hezbollah-commander-what-to-know.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">killing</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> of Ibrahim Aqeel — it has no strategic vision beyond these triumphs. The closest thing they have is the belief, apparently held by many within Israel’s national security and military leadership since October 7, that deploying overwhelming force will awe its enemies into capitulating. This calculus has in effect produced a policy of collective punishment against Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank for their closeness — voluntary or not — to Hamas. As we’re now seeing, Shi’a Muslims in Lebanon are now suffering a similar fate thanks to their (often unwanted) relationship with Hezbollah.</span></p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/05/europes-fate-rests-on-georgia/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/05/europes-fate-rests-on-georgia/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/GettyImages-2150384112.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/05/europes-fate-rests-on-georgia/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/05/europes-fate-rests-on-georgia/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Europe&#039;s fate rests on Georgia</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/05/europes-fate-rests-on-georgia/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Michal Kranz</a></p></div></a></div>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">From Fifties British Kenya, to post-2011 Syria, where powerful actors tried to tame guerilla forces and the restive populations that supported them, history shows that such a strategy is doomed. Basic group psychology agrees. In Lebanon, punishing people who just happen to be under Hezbollah’s thumb will do nothing but strengthen Nasrallah’s authority,</span><span style="font-weight: 400;"> and personalise support for a group that was hitherto more abstract.</span><span style="font-weight: 400;"> In the event that Hezbollah can be defeated militarily — and with some </span><a href="https://news.sky.com/story/what-is-hezbollah-how-powerful-is-its-military-and-will-it-play-a-role-in-war-breaking-out-in-the-middle-east-12999375" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">20,000 active personnel</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> and </span><a href="https://www.jpost.com/Arab-Israeli-Conflict/Analysis-Hezbollah-powerful-but-more-stretched-than-ever-457035" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">over 100,000 missiles</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">, that’s no sure thing</span><span style="font-weight: 400;"> —</span><span style="font-weight: 400;"> that inevitably means Lebanese antipathy toward Israel will linger. That, in turn, offers space to new rogue actors, especially in the absence of a fully functioning state.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">A brave new generation of Lokman Slims can only appear when Lebanese Shi’a can choose which political group they associate with. Hezbollah’s stifling repression is the most significant obstacle stopping this happening — but how Israel behaves is crucial too. If people working regular jobs in suburbs like Dahieh can expect to be attacked no matter what they do, why bother resisting Hezbollah at all?</span></p>
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					<title>The NYT is wrong about Israeli intelligence</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2023/12/the-nyt-is-wrong-about-israeli-intelligence/?edition=us</link>
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						<![CDATA[Edward Luttwak]]>
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							<![CDATA[The NYT is spinning 'bad Israel' stories. Roberto Schmidt/AFP/Getty Images. ]]>
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							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Professor Edward Luttwak</strong> is a strategist and historian known for his works on grand strategy, geoeconomics, military history, and international relations.</p>
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						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>ELuttwak</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is a strategist and historian known for his works on grand strategy, geoeconomics, military history, and international relations.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Fri, 08 Dec 2023 00:00:30 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Fri, 08 Dec 2023 00:00:30 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Gaza]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[The New York Times]]></category>
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								<![CDATA[The IDF knew of Hamas's plan — and made the logical call]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>The bad-faith reporting of Israeli news in <em>The New York Times</em> can overcome even the simplest arithmetic. Last month, there was a day-long rally for Israel in Washington that filled its Mall, with police attendance estimates ranging between 250,000 and 300,000. In <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/11/14/us/march-for-israel-washington-dc-rally.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">the pages</a> of the <em>NYT</em>, however, this became a gathering of “tens of thousands”.</p>
<p>As for Hamas’s recent attack, the <em>NYT</em> has already <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/18/opinion/netanyahu-israel-gaza.html">reported</a> that Netanyahu’s policies focused on the West Bank and neglected Hamas. Indeed, it seems that the <em>NYT</em> keeps one Ronen Bergman as its Staff Writer for in-depth “bad-Israel” stories, and he works hard to deliver the goods. Having actually served in the Military Police, the lowest-prestige Corps of the armed forces, Bergman claimed an intelligence background to write about intelligence operations. (He once wrote that my much-missed friend Meir Dagan, the later Mossad chief, would personally strangle captured terrorists in an elbow lock when serving in military intelligence — a physical impossibility for short-armed Dagan.)</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/11/30/world/middleeast/israel-hamas-attack-intelligence.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">latest</a> is a carefully contrived misrepresentation of the reason that Israel was caught by surprise on October 7. Headlined “Israel Knew Hamas’s Attack Plan More Than a Year Ago”, it was based on a fundamental misconception — that the Israeli army is an active-duty force, as most armies indeed are. But the Israel Defence Forces is radically different: it is a reserves-centered force, one of only three in the world, along with the Finnish and Swiss armies.</p>
<p>Instead of consisting of active-duty forces that are up and running around the clock, the IDF mostly consists of reserve units. When mobilised for refresher training or to fight a war, the reservists go to their specific depots scattered around the country to collect their uniforms, kit and weapons — everything from pistols to battle tanks — before moving out as combat units ready for action.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/12/can-the-media-trust-this-doctor-in-gaza/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/12/can-the-media-trust-this-doctor-in-gaza/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/d2ef1f34g.jpeg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/12/can-the-media-trust-this-doctor-in-gaza/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/12/can-the-media-trust-this-doctor-in-gaza/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Can the media trust this doctor in Gaza?</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/12/can-the-media-trust-this-doctor-in-gaza/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Nicole Lampert</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>That is how a country of some 7 million has more than 635,000 soldiers, airmen and sailors when fully mobilised, compared with the 2 million in all US armed forces, out of a population of some 330 million: that is, a ratio that is more than tenfold. Invented in 1948, the reserve system is the key to Israel’s military strength. Aside from allowing Israelis to work and raise their families while still being ready to fight, it also allows the Israeli troops who <em>are</em> on duty to train properly in unit exercises and larger manoeuvres, instead of being tied down to watch frontiers and hold outposts.</p>
<p>But there is a major catch: advance warning is needed to mobilise the reserves in time, and even with the best possible intelligence analysts, and all the best satellites, sensors and computers, the problem is not just hard… it is impossible. Had Israeli intelligence analysis, or the arrival of a complete war plan sold by an enterprising operative revealed Hamas’s plan for an attack on October 7, the Israelis would have sent much stronger forces to guard the Gaza perimeter. Instead of the lone <em>Merkava</em> tank whose capture by dozens of Hamas fighters was shown again and again in news videos, there would have been a company of 10 tanks in that position, which would have massacred the attackers with their machine-gun fire. As for the single mechanised infantry company with fewer than 100 solders that guarded a critical hinge position, there would have been a battalion or even two that would have crushed the attackers.</p>
<p>But then, of course, Hamas spotters would have seen Israeli troops ready to defeat them — and they would have called off the attack altogether. There is worse: once an attack warning is received and reinforcements are deployed so that the enemy calls off its planned attack, the intelligence indicators that got it right will be discredited as false alarms, while the intelligence officers who failed to heed the signs will be the ones everyone listens to the next time around.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/11/israel-is-turning-into-lebanon/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/11/israel-is-turning-into-lebanon/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/GettyImages-1176576300-1-e1700833875931.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/11/israel-is-turning-into-lebanon/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/11/israel-is-turning-into-lebanon/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Israel is turning into Lebanon</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/11/israel-is-turning-into-lebanon/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Ben Judah</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>That is how, almost exactly 50 years before Hamas’s recent invasion, President Anwar Sadat’s offensive across the Suez Canal caught the Israelis with only 411 soldiers holding the frontline forts. On the first day of the Yom Kippur War, they were attacked by a first wave of 20,000 Egyptian troops, with 10 ten times as many following behind them. Why were the Israelis surprised? Because they had got it right several months earlier, and had recalled reservists from their jobs and their families to take up their weapons and go to the front, which persuaded the Egyptians to call off their initial attack.</p>
<p>This is why, when a complete Hamas war plan was <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/11/30/world/middleeast/israel-hamas-attack-intelligence.html">captured</a> more than a year ago, identifying each target that would in fact be attacked on October 7 (the “rave” was a last-minute addition), there was no alarm and no mobilisation. The plan was one of many — Hamas was always fantasising about mass attacks, but would then limit itself to the launch of its rockets that Israel could reliably intercept.</p>
<p>In the half century between the intelligence failures of October 1973 and October 2023, the system worked so well that Israel could win its wars while still allowing Israelis to get on with their lives and build their country. That is how Israel, which started off in 1949 with a per capita income far below the European average, is now 13th in the world. Once in 50 years, the system fails — but the alternative, of mobilising in response to every possible threat, would be far worse.</p>
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					<title>Israel&#8217;s war is about to escalate</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2023/11/israels-war-is-about-to-escalate/?edition=us</link>
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					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[David Patrikarakos]]>
					</dc:creator>
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							<![CDATA[Israel faces war on five fronts. (Christopher Furlong/Getty)]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>David Patrikarakos</strong> is <em>UnHerd</em>&#8216;s foreign correspondent. His latest book is <em>War in 140 characters: how social media is reshaping conflict in the 21st century. </em>(Hachette)</p>
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						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>dpatrikarakos</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is <em>UnHerd</em>'s foreign correspondent. His latest book is <em>War in 140 characters: how social media is reshaping conflict in the 21st century. </em>(Hachette)]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Tue, 28 Nov 2023 00:03:47 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Tue, 28 Nov 2023 12:47:26 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Hezbollah]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Houthis]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[IDF]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Iran]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Israel Hamas War]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Lebanon]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Saudi Arabia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Yemen]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://old.unherd.com/?p=492320</guid>
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								<![CDATA[A global conflict cannot be discounted]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>As I look out over Lebanon from high up on Israel’s northern border, I see undulating hills dappled with hedgerows and green brush that glows golden in the winter sun. But this is far from an idyll. Lebanese Hezbollah have been firing into Israel since October 7. And it is from here that a regional, possibly global, war is most likely to start.</p>
<p>On the ground, with the ceasefire extended for another two days, relations between Israel and Hamas seem to be progressing. The temporary truce, however, is just a plaster on a gangrenous wound. If Hamas releases all of its hostages, then its leverage evaporates and it has nothing to deter Israel from its assault. If Israel ceases military operations now, then its promise that Hamas will never again be able to launch another attack is just empty rhetoric. Neither its traumatised population nor its desperate Prime Minister will allow that.</p>
<p>So, the war continues, with Israel completing its operation in northern Gaza and turning to the south. And along with its horrific cost, the chances of broader escalation will increase.</p>
<p>But the war with Hamas has already expanded. Hezbollah are firing from the north, Syrian groups from the northeast, the Houthis from Yemen in the south — and behind them all, Iran. Israel is now fighting a war on five fronts. But it’s in the north that the greatest threat lies.</p>
<p>“What we’ve been experiencing on the northern border are a few kinds of Hezbollah approaches,” says a source in the IDF’s Northern Command. “Number one: infiltration attempts on the border itself. Two: using anti-tank missiles to target Israeli soldiers, outposts, tanks and armoured vehicles. Three: using aerial vehicles [drones]. This did not really exist in [the Lebanon war of] 2006. The investment in aerial vehicles began in 2009.” Hezbollah, they tell me, is targeting a narrow strip just a few kilometres from the border, rather than cities further south such as Haifa. “From that we assess that the current decision of Hezbollah is not to escalate.”</p>
<p>But Hezbollah also needs to manage its optics. It cannot spend decades railing against the “Zionist Oppressor” and then do nothing when it is at war with the group’s supposed brethren in Hamas. “Hezbollah has activated a few Palestinians from the refugee camps in Lebanon,” I am told. “There is cooperation when interests converge when their interests converge, and Hezbollah is using Palestinians to fire anti-tank missiles at us.” Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah’s leader, seemingly confirmed these assessments when he congratulated Hamas on its attack last month, while stressing he had no idea it was coming. The signal was clear: we had nothing to do with this; beyond saving face, we don’t want to get involved.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/10/israel-wont-wait-for-long/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/10/israel-wont-wait-for-long/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/GettyImages-1725071471-1-e1698253770455.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/10/israel-wont-wait-for-long/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading </span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/10/israel-wont-wait-for-long/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Hamas is playing for time</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/10/israel-wont-wait-for-long/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Edward Luttwak</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>But while 1914 is an overwrought analogy, here, with so many moving parts, escalation cannot be discounted. And beyond the trauma of October 7, many Israelis want action. The northern city of Qiryat Shemona is a mile from the Lebanese border. Today, after local authorities ordered civilians to leave in the face of daily rocket attacks, it is almost deserted. One man who hasn’t left is Moshe Peretz, 63, who owns a garage. He works with the IDF and local farmers and is, he tells me, an essential service provider. “I’ve been here 58 years and I’m used to this sort of stuff — sometimes Hezbollah would fire over 100 Katyusha rockets in one day. Back then we had to cram into small shelters.”</p>
<p>He continues, “if we pass this problem onto our children, then we haven’t achieved anything. We will have suffered 60 years for nothing. We can end it now – and we must.”</p>
<p>We drive up into the mountains, towards the border, through forest where IDF soldiers and tanks line the roads. At the summit, stands a thick metal barrier. It has been erected to protect us from fire from Lebanon. I cannot film it: it’s a new type of armour, I’m told. If I publish photos, the enemy will be able to analyse its thickness and adjust its fire accordingly.</p>
<p>The Hezbollah threat is incredibly potent. In 2019, <a href="https://www.dia.mil/Portals/110/Images/News/Military_Powers_Publications/Iran_Military_Power_LR.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">US intelligence</a> estimated the group had 150,000 projectiles in its arsenal, which includes<a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/erictegler/2023/11/15/hezbollahs-rocket-missile-and-drone-arsenal-is-huge-and-varied/?sh=243459cd2d21" target="_blank" rel="noopener"> Iranian Fateh-110 and Syrian M-600</a> satellite-guided missiles with a range of up to 186 miles, putting Tel Aviv in reach. Added to this are its anti-ship missiles, particularly the Iranian Noor and Russian Yakhont, as well as the 100,000 fighters <a href="https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/what-does-hezbollahs-arsenal-look-like/articleshow/105154647.cms" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Nasrallah claimed</a> to have in 2021 — a figure which, while almost certainly inflated, is not entirely divorced from reality.</p>
<p>That said, Lebanon is also suffering its worst financial crisis in modern history. The last thing it needs is another war with Israel, especially since the one in 2006 brought such destruction to the country. And internally, Hezbollah is powerful right now — why throw it all away?</p>
<p>Meanwhile, the Houthis have launched several drone and missile attacks against Israel: a show of solidarity with the Palestinians and a display of strength to its domestic audience. Though not as powerful as Hezbollah, the group has Iranian Quds-351 cruise missiles, which it has used against Saudi oil fields and which have a reported range of 1,650km. It also has the Iranian Toufan ballistic missile that has a range of up to 1,950km (though unlike the Iranian original it is not precision guided). Finally the Houthis have a drone capability, notably the<a href="https://amwaj.media/media-monitor/interview-inside-the-houthi-arsenal-that-can-reach-israel" target="_blank" rel="noopener"> Samad UAV</a>.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/11/the-defiance-of-israels-border-towns/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/11/the-defiance-of-israels-border-towns/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/GettyImages-1733609128-1-e1698942939407.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/11/the-defiance-of-israels-border-towns/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading </span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/11/the-defiance-of-israels-border-towns/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The defiance of Israel&#039;s border towns</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/11/the-defiance-of-israels-border-towns/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> David Patrikarakos</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>While their missiles are slow and inaccurate, they could theoretically overwhelm Israel&#8217;s Iron Dome if launched in conjunction with Hamas and Hezbollah. Before October 7, the most missiles Israel had faced in a day was 470 in May 2021. On October 7, it faced 5,200 in 20 minutes. Throw drones into the equation, and the picture becomes disconcerting. That said, the Houthis main fight is with Saudi Arabia. If it were to use all its weapons against Israel, the Saudis might sense opportunity, and move in for the kill.</p>
<p>In the end, though, the state that matters most is the one that stands behind Hamas, Hezbollah and the Houthis: Iran. Tehran bases its regional strategy on a doctrine of “Forward Defence” that, loosely speaking, means using regional non-state terror groups to fight its opponents abroad and retain stability at home.</p>
<p>Right now, Iran’s proxies are well-positioned around the borders of its two main regional rivals, Israel and Saudi Arabia — including a joint <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/11/10/iran-proxy-militias-syria-israel-hamas-war-irgc-escalation/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">operation room</a> with Hezbollah in the Golan Heights — which give it a degree of regional security it seems unwise to risk. After Israel and the United States bombed its Revolutionary Guard (IRGC) base in Syria in October, Iran has <a href="https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/will-hezbollah-hold-back-or-escalate" target="_blank" rel="noopener">shifted many of</a> its missile production facilities to Lebanon. Ultimately, these proxies deter direct attacks from Israel. If they are smashed, which will happen with escalation, the threat to Iran gets serious.</p>
<p>But Iran has other options. The IRGC has recently set up two new proxies in Syria: the Afghan Fatemiyoun and Pakistani Zainabiyoun groups whose stated goal is to destroy Israel. Iran can have them continue to attack the “Zionist Entity” at a limited level, while remaining largely unconcerned about retaliation as they are fundamentally expendable.</p>
<p>But in the end, while the Mullahs are happy for Hamas to hurt Israel, there is a limit to their support for it. Reuters <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/irans-axis-resistance-against-israel-faces-trial-by-fire-2023-11-15/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">reported</a> that at a recent meeting in Tehran, Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei complained to Hamas boss Ismail Haniyeh that his country was not warned of the October 7 attacks and that it would not enter the war on their behalf.</p>
<p>For their part, the Israelis are immovable on the eradication of Hamas but also wary of a broader war. The IDF was clear: the end of Hamas serves everyone. Anything short of a decisive defeat, they say, would embolden every terror group in the Middle East.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/10/why-peace-in-israel-failed/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/10/why-peace-in-israel-failed/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/GettyImages-178320128.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/10/why-peace-in-israel-failed/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading </span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/10/why-peace-in-israel-failed/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Why peace in Israel failed</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/10/why-peace-in-israel-failed/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Thomas Fazi</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>This is partly why the UK and US have both deployed forces in the area. But, in truth, it is unintended escalation that is the greatest concern — especially when Hamas is still holding so many hostages. Standing in the mountains of northern Israel, I peer down at the roads below and imagine the domino effect a stray Katusha accidentally hitting an Israeli school bus would have.</p>
<p>One act begets another in a region where no one can back down in the face of their own, often oppressed populations. Dictatorships are better at sustaining wars — and casualties — than democracies, and worse at avoiding them. From al-Houthi to Nasrallah to Khamenei, they continue to fight because policy and rhetoric cannot allow otherwise.</p>
<p>On 3 August, 1914, as the United Kingdom entered World War I, the British foreign secretary, Sir Edward Grey, remarked darkly that “the lamps are going out all over Europe, we shall not see them lit again in our lifetime”. Today in the Middle East, a return to 1914 seems, if not yet imminent, then no longer beyond the realms of possibility either.</p>
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					<title>The defiance of Israel&#8217;s border towns</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2023/11/the-defiance-of-israels-border-towns/?edition=us</link>
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					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[David Patrikarakos]]>
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							<![CDATA[Soldiers gather in Sderot (Amir Levy/Getty Images)]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>David Patrikarakos</strong> is <em>UnHerd</em>&#8216;s foreign correspondent. His latest book is <em>War in 140 characters: how social media is reshaping conflict in the 21st century. </em>(Hachette)</p>
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						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>dpatrikarakos</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is <em>UnHerd</em>'s foreign correspondent. His latest book is <em>War in 140 characters: how social media is reshaping conflict in the 21st century. </em>(Hachette)]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Fri, 03 Nov 2023 00:02:48 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Fri, 03 Nov 2023 00:02:48 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Gaza]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Hamas]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[Israel]]></category>
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								<![CDATA[Residents face hourly attacks from Hamas]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Southern Israel is a region at war. Driving down from Tel Aviv to the border towns on the frontlines of the war with Hamas, I pass a truck with an open back carrying a load of heavily armed soldiers cradling automatic rifles in their laps. One looks up at me, sees that I&#8217;m press, extends two fingers, cocks his thumb, and shoots.    </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">I pass through Sderot. At its closest point, it is 840 metres from Gaza; it has suffered rocket attacks from Hamas for years. Sderot tells its own story of Israel. Founded in 1951 as a transit camp for refugees, it was built on the site of the Palestinian village of Najd that Israel seized</span> <span style="font-weight: 400;">in 1948. It became a hub for Moroccan Jews, those considered almost on the lowest rung of the Jews from Arab lands who were dumped in less desirable parts of the country — often onto border settlements designed to defend against possible infiltration</span><span style="font-weight: 400;">. Then came the Jews from the USSR and then from Ethiopia.</span><b> </b></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Like so many border towns, Sderot is a mixture of gloom and kitsch. On the way down, I</span><span style="font-weight: 400;"> pass a bollard with three poodles painted on it. </span><span style="font-weight: 400;">The city sign is bisected by green: a reference to the Zionist dream of &#8220;making the desert bloom”</span><span style="font-weight: 400;">. Inside, the streets are largely empty, and surrounded by dirty beige and white squat, concrete houses. Israeli flags line central street verges. A few run-down children’s playgrounds are scattered around the centre. They would be depressing at the best of times — now that the city has been largely emptied by rocket fire, they are eerie. Hamas appears to be firing rockets every hour. Their thuds echo through the almost deserted streets. This may well be the most attacked city in Israeli history. </span></p>
<p>On the outskirts of Sderot, I climb Kobe&#8217;s hill, which looks out over Gaza. Three disks of blazing gold burst up. Hamas is firing rockets at Israeli cities. A thick plume of smoke rises from the Strip and unfurls across the sky. Israel&#8217;s ground troops are fanning out below; the Air Force is pounding from the skies.</p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">I head out to Ashkelon, another border town that has also experienced sustained Hamas attacks; the sound of jets overhead is ferocious. A kippah-wearing soldier waves us through the checkpoint into the city. Again, the streets are largely deserted. On the pavement by the sea, rows of empty chairs stand forlornly outside shuttered cafes. </span><span style="font-weight: 400;">Cafe Seaview is open, however. Three men, one wearing a kippah, and a woman in an olive-green jumpsuit are sitting outside drinking black coffee and smoking. The man in the kippah is called Gabay and he tells me that the situation today is far worse than the 1973 Yom Kippur war. “Then they attacked our armies. But Hamas are the new Nazis. They target civilians,” he says. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">His friend interjects. “​​We haven&#8217;t been aggressive enough. We shouldn’t wait for something to happen to be aggressive. We should be aggressive all the time — like we used to be 30, 40 years ago.” </span><span style="font-weight: 400;">The people around the table blame the internal divisions in the country that followed Netanyahu’s attempted reform of the judiciary for the lapse in security that allowed thousands of Hamas terrorists to stream across the border and massacre over 1,400 Israelis on 7 October. Specifically, they blame “Leftists” for all this, not the man in overall charge. This is Netanyahu country; working class Mizrahim are his people.</span></p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/10/what-are-israels-next-moves/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/10/what-are-israels-next-moves/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/GettyImages-1749115006.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/10/what-are-israels-next-moves/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/10/what-are-israels-next-moves/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>What is Israel&#039;s next move?</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/10/what-are-israels-next-moves/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> David Patrikarakos </a></p></div></a></div>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">“In 1948, the Palestinians were offered a homeland, but they refused and tried to throw us into the sea. [Former Israeli Prime Minister] Golda Meir was right when she said, ‘if we lay down our weapons there will be no Israel. If they lay down their weapons, there will be peace.” </span><span style="font-weight: 400;">The atrocities took place just kilometres from where we sit, and I ask how they can live under such constant threat. Their answer is unanimous. We were born here. Our families are here. We don’t care about the rockets. We are </span><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">ragu&#8217;a! ragu&#8217;a</span></i><span style="font-weight: 400;">! </span><span style="font-weight: 400;">[calm].”</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">One of them starts singing the <em>Hatikvah</em>, the Israeli national anthem. The group links arms and joins in with the first verse. After they finish, Gabay yells “<em>Yallah</em>, Beitar!” Beitar Jerusalem is an Israeli football club associated with Right-wing Zionism and the Likud Party; its fanbase is notorious for its anti-Arab songs. The irony is that, as I look at these Moroccan Jews, drinking coffee and chain smoking, it could be a scene from any of the innumerable</span> <span style="font-weight: 400;">Arab countries I have visited across the region. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Back in central Ashkelon, the air raid siren sounds; explosions cut through the air. After taking shelter, I meet Tony. He works at the power plant in the city, a vital job that means he cannot leave. He was at home with his wife and three children when a rocket struck last week. “I heard the siren and ran to the shelter with my family. You get used to the sound of the rockets. Boom, boom, boom. And that&#8217;s it. But this time it was bada boom! We knew it was bad.” The rocket destroyed about five cars as well as uprooting a pillar on the pavement outside and smashing the front of the building. But they work fast here and most of the damage was repaired.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">In Shemesh’s cafe I meet Alon and Lior. “We need to eliminate every Hamas supporter,” Lior tells me. “I’m angry because we can’t live by their side because they want to kill us. Is it legitimate to kill children? To do what they did to their parents? What organisation in the world is like Hamas, if not Isis? We shouldn’t negotiate with them because they don&#8217;t want us here. Can you negotiate with a wall?” What about the hostages? “The hostages will not come back,” he replies. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;"> <div class="ad-insert-events"></div></span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Alon interjects. “Look, we need to separate Hamas supporters and regular Gazans — not every civilian in Gaza supports them,” he says. “What choice do many of them have? The media talks about how we want to kill all the civilians in Gaza, but it&#8217;s not true. We are talking about just Hamas.”</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">“I had a worker from Gaza in my construction business,” he continues. “He couldn&#8217;t come to work for five months but I still sent him money regularly.” This is something I have noticed here in Israel and in the Palestinian territories. When normal people from both sides encounter each other in everyday life, they generally get along, at least superficially. Humanising a conflict, giving a face to your enemy, almost inevitably means that much of the political and ideological noise fades away. But this is a conflict driven by extremes on both sides, and swathes of them have no interest in coexistence.</span><b> </b></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Soon, fire erupts once more in the skies. This time, though, it is on a different scale: this is the largest rocket attack yet and I am caught in the open. An orange ball streaks across the sky. It is the Iron Dome. I see it strike and the Hamas rocket explode, its threat extinguished. </span><span style="font-weight: 400;">A few minutes later, word comes through that one of the rockets has hit home. Several streets away, I arrive at the scene. A phalanx of white-shirted Orthodox Jews scampers past me to look. Medics thread their way through the crowds. Emergency servicemen carry rifles. I look down a road and see detritus in the street, but we cannot get any closer. A man looks at my press jacket and bearded dark features. “What channel are you from? He calls out laughing, “<em>Al Jazeera</em>?!”</span></p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/10/israel-wont-wait-for-long/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/10/israel-wont-wait-for-long/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/GettyImages-1725071471-1-e1698253770455.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/10/israel-wont-wait-for-long/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading </span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/10/israel-wont-wait-for-long/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Hamas is playing for time</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/10/israel-wont-wait-for-long/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Edward Luttwak</a></p></div></a></div>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">I drive down Menachem Begin Boulevard. On the radio Netanyahu is saying that the country is in a second war for its independence. Israel is a country self-consciously fashioned from history, and it cannot escape history as a result; it was born from trauma and cannot escape it. When I visit Palestinian towns and cities, I hear the same thing: endless references to the 1948 war, which they call the </span><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">Nakba </span></i><span style="font-weight: 400;">(catastrophe) and the 1967 Six-Day War, which they call the </span><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">Naksah</span></i><span style="font-weight: 400;"> (setback).</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">As the week ended, the IDF announced that its </span><span style="font-weight: 400;">troops had broken through its enemy&#8217;s defensive lines</span><span style="font-weight: 400;"> and </span><span style="font-weight: 400;">killed dozens of Hamas fighters. Hamas was reporting yet more civilian deaths and boasting that it had killed yet more Israeli soldiers. </span><span style="font-weight: 400;">It made me think back to something Gabay told me in Ashkelon when I asked him what the solution to all this was. </span><span style="font-weight: 400;">“Solution?” he replied. “Believe me, if there was a solution, we would have found it already.”</span></p>
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															<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">481779</post-id>				</item>
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					<title>What is Israel&#8217;s next move?</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2023/10/what-are-israels-next-moves/?edition=us</link>
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						<![CDATA[David Patrikarakos]]>
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							<![CDATA[Attacks intensify. (Ali Jadallah/Anadolu via Getty)]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>David Patrikarakos</strong> is <em>UnHerd</em>&#8216;s foreign correspondent. His latest book is <em>War in 140 characters: how social media is reshaping conflict in the 21st century. </em>(Hachette)</p>
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						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>dpatrikarakos</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is <em>UnHerd</em>'s foreign correspondent. His latest book is <em>War in 140 characters: how social media is reshaping conflict in the 21st century. </em>(Hachette)]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Fri, 27 Oct 2023 23:40:53 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Sat, 28 Oct 2023 17:23:30 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Gaza]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Hamas]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[IDF]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Israel]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[War]]></category>
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								<![CDATA[The first wave of the invasion has begun]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>The news that mobile networks had gone down in the strip was the clue that something was imminent. Then, last night, just under three weeks after the 7 October Hamas massacres, Israel announced that its ground forces were &#8220;expanding operations&#8221; in Gaza. Aerial bombardment of the strip was heavier than anything since the war began; more ground troops are pouring across the border.</p>
<p>It all came as a surprise. The government’s war cabinet is not even scheduled to meet until Sunday (which could, of course, be a deliberate misdirection). And I’m told soldiers on the Northern border are receiving weekend leave (subject to immediate recall), which would not normally suggest that a full-on invasion is happening.</p>
<p>One former IDF official I did speak to last night was unsure that this was the all-out invasion. Hamas reportedly offered 100 hostages for four-day ceasefire. Israel countered by offering two days for all hostages. “Then the talks collapsed,” they said. “So this can be one way to put pressure on them.”</p>
<p>The hostages have complicated everything. Hamas has 229 of them — something Israel has never had to deal with before. When Hamas kidnapped IDF soldier Gilad Shalit in 2006, Jerusalem traded over 1,000 Palestinian prisoners for his return. While Hamas holds these civilians, it has unimaginable leverage. Walking around Israeli cities, you see posters of hostages everywhere: on walls, lampposts, stuck to trees and flying from cars. Joe Biden and Benjamin Netanyahu met recently, and the hostages were at the centre of their discussions.</p>
<p>Central to this part of the war are the Qataris. Leant on by the United States, Doha managed to negotiate the release of Hamas’s four hostages earlier this week. “Qatar are the funders and hosts of Hamas leadership,” the former official explains. “When the Qataris call, the fucking pieces of shit Hamas answer the phone. They do not do things that piss off Doha.”</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/10/israel-wont-wait-for-long/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/10/israel-wont-wait-for-long/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/GettyImages-1725071471-1-e1698253770455.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/10/israel-wont-wait-for-long/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading </span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/10/israel-wont-wait-for-long/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Hamas is playing for time</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/10/israel-wont-wait-for-long/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Edward Luttwak </a></p></div></a></div>
<p>And so, on Friday night, a picture was emerging of the start of a gradual widening of operations. According to Peter Lerner from the IDF spokesperson’s unit, over the past few days IDF ground forces have carried out a number of targeted raids inside the Gaza Strip to prepare for future stages. “In the last few hours,” he told me, “the IDF has expanded strikes and struck underground targets and terrorist infrastructure…ground forces are expanding their ground activities this evening.”</p>
<p>The “delay” in starting, then, is not the result of hesitation but, rather, a systematic process the military has gone through. This began with an assessment of the 7 October massacres. From the IDF’s point of view these resulted from three failures. The first was intelligence: the security services and military were convinced that all the information coming out of Gaza indicated that Hamas did not want a confrontation with Israel.</p>
<p>The second was what might loosely be called the “physical failure”. For years, the threat to Israel was deemed to be from tunnels snaking under the border; for over a decade, Hamas and affiliates had spent around $30 to $90 million on that labyrinth. In response, Israel ​​constructed a barrier that reportedly reaches 100 metres depth in places, dotted with underground sensors. So their defence focus was almost entirely subterranean. But all the tonnes of cement and technology amounted to nothing. Terrorists went over the top, cutting through the barbed wire border fence with $20 bolt cutters. And when they didn’t directly attack the fence, they flew over it on paragliders or circumnavigated it by water. It was, an Israeli diplomat told me, “Biblically simple”.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/10/i-watched-hamas-unleash-hell/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/10/i-watched-hamas-unleash-hell/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/GettyImages-1738795069.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/10/i-watched-hamas-unleash-hell/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author </span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/10/i-watched-hamas-unleash-hell/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>I watched Hamas unleash hell</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/10/i-watched-hamas-unleash-hell/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> David Patrikarakos </a></p></div></a></div>
<p>The third failing was the lack of requisite forces to respond. With enough troops, regardless of the other shortcomings, the atrocity might have been prevented. But, in some cases, it was ten hours or longer before soldiers arrived, which gave a thousand terrorists more than enough time to murder, rape and burn.</p>
<p>“It was obviously planned and executed very well,” said Lerner. “In a way that challenged Israel&#8217;s conception of the arena.” This is instructive. The attack took place on the 50<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Yom Kippur war. And back then, Israeli laxity was much to blame. The security establishment in 1973 thought the Arab states would not try another attack after their decisive defeat in the Six-Day War seven years previously. Security experts were convinced that the Egyptian troop movements were merely exercises. Back then, they were overconfident. It seems the same was true on this Holy Day.</p>
<p>On Friday I visited a Tel Aviv institution — Halper’s English Bookstore. When not interrupted by air raid sirens and loud booms thundering through the skies, the owner Yossi Halper made his thoughts clear: “For a month, the TV here ran endless programs on the Yom Kippur War. Saying how we were caught with our pants down, and how that would never happen again. And it did.” He pauses. “In fact, literally: some of the soldiers killed were in their underpants, as they’d been sleeping.”</p>
<p>Much has been made of past year’s political divisions, stemming from the government’s proposed judicial reforms, which are blamed for being the distraction that resulted in the inadequate response. But officials reject this, assuring me that the intelligence community sits beyond politics. The necessary post-mortem, when it eventually comes, will have to take many things into account, not least what signs were missed and why. Back in 1973, the resulting inquest brought down Defence Minister Moshe Dayan and led to the emergence of the Likud as Israel’s dominant political party. By any normal laws of politics, Netanyahu should be finished. But these are not normal times.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/10/how-the-israel-hamas-culture-war-shames-us/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/10/how-the-israel-hamas-culture-war-shames-us/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/GettyImages-1714617710-e1698341718690.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/10/how-the-israel-hamas-culture-war-shames-us/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading </span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/10/how-the-israel-hamas-culture-war-shames-us/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>How the Israel-Hamas culture war shames us</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/10/how-the-israel-hamas-culture-war-shames-us/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Kathleen Stock </a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Recriminations are for tomorrow, though. Since 7 October, IDF and security services have focused on three core efforts. The first was restoring security to the south. The IDF caught a terrorist just last week, on day 14 in the southern sector. The situation there remains, if not active then vigilant, as far as the military is concerned. While most of the terrorists were killed, there is the possibility that a few remain, hidden in the fields around the border areas. So protection is the most important thing, with sufficient forces stationed there, unlike before. The second priority was rebuilding the border defences. The thought of another attack in the south is militarily, politically and above all psychologically impermissible. If Hamas broke through again, it would be too much for the people here to bear. The IDF is conducting small-scale cross border raids along the immediate perimeter of the barrier, looking for more bodies (10 people remain unaccounted for) and any Hamas targets they can find. On Thursday night Israeli forces carried out another raid.</p>
<p>Finally, there is what happened last night. The “escalation of the military operation”, or more simply, “taking the war to them”. The goal is clear, and stark. “Dismantle, destroy, hunt down the leaders, the organisations and the individuals who participated in the massacres. Tearing the whole system apart and changing the paradigm.”</p>
<p>This is beyond anything Israel has previously considered: to ensure that Hamas no longer exists as a governing force able to use Gaza as a staging post for attacks against Israel. What this means in practice is open to debate. It is clearly impossible for Israel to wipe out every Hamas operative in Gaza: they do not wear military uniforms and do not have bases or headquarters beyond the civilian buildings they operate from. While Israel has zero intention — or so I am told — of taking control of Gaza, it should not be forgotten that it was bogged down in Lebanon for 20 years after a supposedly quick operation to take out militants there; and of course, the lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan are now universal.</p>
<p>The war cabinet thrown together in the wake of 7 October includes Netanyahu’s former political rival Benny Gantz, who also IDF Chief of Staff from 2011 to 2015. He has insisted on a clear plan on how Israeli forces will leave Gaza after defeating Hamas there and what type of governmental structures should be left in place. By all accounts this plan is still being put together. But, as we saw last night, things tend to move quickly in this part of the world.</p>
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<p>Estimating that it will face around 30-40,000 Hamas terrorists, Jerusalem is mobilising over 300,000 reservists, the largest in its history — more than the Kremlin sent to invade Ukraine in February last year. There are two components to this mobilisation. First, the government must green-light it. There has, as of writing, been nothing official on this yet. Second, the optimal operational conditions must be reached: this means they need to take down the Hamas lookout posts, command and control structures, and the booby traps. “We will not jeopardise our forces for the sake of rapid mobilisation,” I was told.</p>
<p>Israel is a country that has always revered its soldiers. Reckless deployment and unecessary sacrifice is unconscionable in a small country that relies on every citizen taking up arms if necessary. As a result, this second component does not yet appear to have been fully completed. It is also complicated by the fact that so many hostages are still hidden. But thousands of soldiers are now fighting in Gaza. The first wave of the invasion has undoubtably begun. The defence establishment seems a step closer towards honouring its promise to take out Hamas and the war is about to get even bloodier than ever.</p>
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					<title>Ukraine is winning the online war</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2022/03/ukraine-is-winning-the-online-war/?edition=us</link>
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					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[David Patrikarakos]]>
					</dc:creator>
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							<![CDATA[The revolution will be meme'd (Chris McGrath/Getty Images)]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>David Patrikarakos</strong> is <em>UnHerd</em>&#8216;s foreign correspondent. His latest book is <em>War in 140 characters: how social media is reshaping conflict in the 21st century. </em>(Hachette)</p>
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						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>dpatrikarakos</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is <em>UnHerd</em>'s foreign correspondent. His latest book is <em>War in 140 characters: how social media is reshaping conflict in the 21st century. </em>(Hachette)]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Tue, 01 Mar 2022 00:04:53 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Tue, 01 Mar 2022 11:37:57 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Facebook]]></category>
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								<![CDATA[Kyiv has succeeded in reordering reality]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>The internet is a chaotic place, but it is nonetheless ruled by a series of iron laws, especially when it comes to what we put on it. Perhaps the most important one is that whatever you post, try to make it visual. Once that&#8217;s established it’s about what sort of image will best hoover up those likes and shares and retweets. Well, that&#8217;s down to where you are and who your audience is. But as a rule of thumb there are two things that generally never fail: blondes and guns.</p>
<p>Over the past few days, the very brave and very blonde Ukrainian MP Kira Rudik has been tweeting various pictures of herself posing with an AK47. She <a href="https://twitter.com/kiraincongress/status/1497264543428448260" target="_blank" rel="noopener">began</a> last Friday:</p>
<p>https://twitter.com/kiraincongress/status/1497264543428448260</p>
<p>What is striking about the photos is not that Rudik posted them: she is a people’s representative in a time of war — it’s exactly the sort of thing she <em>should</em> be posting. What’s so interesting, and smart, is how she did it. Rudik does not pose in a uniform, or even in camouflage fatigues. She does not salute or lift the AK triumphantly; in fact, the way she holds it makes it clear that she’s not used to holding a weapon of any sort. The photo is taken not in a base or even in an office, but clearly in the living room of her home, just by a window that looks out onto a small patio.</p>
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<p>The final touch though — and it’s a genius one — is that she doesn’t have shoes on; instead she stands barefoot, her toes painted a delicate pink.</p>
<p>In one sense, this all seems irretrievably amateurish — but that’s the point. Of the many things the internet craves, authenticity is sacrosanct. And this is a model of the genre. The tweet is designed to do two things: first, to show that Ukrainians will stand and fight for their homeland; and second, to humanise those whom we are told will be doing the fighting. And it does this by showing them to be the most ordinary of people; people standing in their bare feet, vulnerable and ordinary — just like civilians across the world. As such, they stand in total contrast to the stormtroopers invading their lands. It’s pink toenails versus mud-encrusted jackboots; smiling mothers versus bearded Chechens — all shorthand for the battle playing out between Ukraine and Russia.</p>
<p>It&#8217;s taken us a long time to get here. It was mid-2014, when I was in occupied eastern Ukraine, that I first realised that 21st-century warfare had finally come to the 21st century. Both the Afghanistan and Iraq wars may have been already fought, but they were, in their peak, largely 20th-century conflicts, fought out before the arrival of social media and the advent of the user-generated content Web 2.0.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/02/europe-must-prepare-for-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/02/europe-must-prepare-for-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/2GettyImages-1238751899-scaled-e1670846588535.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/02/europe-must-prepare-for-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/02/europe-must-prepare-for-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Europe must prepare for war</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/02/europe-must-prepare-for-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Aris Roussinos</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Back then, Russia was the only social media player in the conflict. The Ukrainians were outgunned on the ground and online. Back then, in the occupied east people told me that Kyiv was run by Nazis and hated everything Russian. Back then, I watched the Kremlin flood social media and Russian-language TV with endless narratives about Kyiv’s desire to kill Russian speakers. Back then, the Ukrainians offered little by way of response.</p>
<p>But boy have they learned. Yesterday, I spoke to Peter Lerner, former Head of the Israel Defence Force (IDF) social media unit, who headed up its online operations during 2014’s Operation Protective Edge. He was in no doubt as to who is winning this info battle. “The game plan from the beginning has been two languages: English and Ukrainian and to a lesser volume Russian for PsyOps needs,” he told me. “Their comms goal appears to be rallying international and public support. All of their official accounts are synchronised — the same messages, nuanced and amplifying each other. &#8216;#Ukraine&#8217; has been the number one trending hashtag since Thursday.” He continued: “And beyond the odd sporadic effort, there is very little social media personification beyond the president.”</p>
<p>Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelenskyy has become vital to Ukraine’s war effort on the ground and the star of its online battle. In a powerful 33-second video clip, filmed last week as he stood in a central Kyiv Street flanked by four other politicians, he announced he was not going anywhere. The clip was striking as an address from a state leader. It was unadorned by formality or rhetorical flourish, and it was designed to paint Zelenskyy as two things simultaneously: leader of his nation and (literal) man in the street.</p>
<p>Now contrast these images to those relentlessly broadcast of his enemy, Vladimir Putin, who sits far from the frontline, and therefore from danger, isolated not only from the battlefield but from those around him. Like a proper supervillain he sits alone, insistent on keeping everyone at least ten feet away from him. It’s Ukraine’s very own Jewish James Bond versus an ageing Blofeld with anger management issues and a Botox habit. There’s only ever going to be one winner in the popular imagination — and the court of Twitter.</p>
<p>This is the new grammar of statesmanship for the social media age and it’s about being brief, edgy and demotic. Our public sphere is curated by Big Tech platforms that are algorithmically geared toward virality; and what goes viral are not long speeches about having a dream or fighting people on beaches but short and arresting words and images. Gone are the lofty phrases and verbal curlicues; gone are the digressions on policy. What you say needs to work on a short YouTube or Instagram or Twitter clip — and it will ideally be easily remembered.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/02/vladimir-putins-reckless-gamble/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/02/vladimir-putins-reckless-gamble/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/GettyImages-1231851318.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/02/vladimir-putins-reckless-gamble/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/02/vladimir-putins-reckless-gamble/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Has Putin overplayed his hand?</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/02/vladimir-putins-reckless-gamble/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Edward Luttwak</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>This, then, is the central battle playing out. Lerner is shocked at how bad the Russian response has been. “This is all very strange,” he continues, “just like their perceived lack of battlefield accomplishments.” Lerner wonders if there is a rift in the government between Putin and those around him more reluctant to go to war, pointing to the recent fraught <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o9A-u8EoWcI" target="_blank" rel="noopener">exchange</a> between Putin and his head of intelligence who urges him to give Russia&#8217;s “Western partners” one more chance.</p>
<p>In the meantime, Russian State channel <em>RT</em> posts away as if in a different reality. “Video sequence of the development of Russia&#8217;s offensive in all directions in accordance with the operation plan,” it <a href="https://twitter.com/RT_com/status/1497647653882052611" target="_blank" rel="noopener">tweeted</a>, with footage of armoured vehicles moving bovinely across dirt tracks and over bridges. Of the actual realities of the war on the ground: not a trace.</p>
<p>It may well be, as Lerner speculates, that the Kremlin knows that the world doesn’t accept its case for war and sees little point in trying to push it. If so, the focus will now be on internal comms and shoring up Russian support. But one of the first things Lerner told me years ago when we first met was this: if you leave a void in online information wars, you cede it to the enemy. Russia has done exactly that — and Ukraine is reaping the rewards.</p>
<p>And it’s reaping them globally. I can’t think of a single country in the world with Ukraine’s soft power right now. Even <a href="https://stage.unherd.com/thepost/every-company-is-now-a-weapon-of-war/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Elon Musk</a> got involved after Ukraine’s Minister of Digital Transformation Mykhailo Fedorov urged him to support the country with his Starlink services, which not only provide higher internet speeds but, as internet delivered by satellite, would continue to provide coverage even were the Russians to cut off cables in Ukraine. “While you try to colonise Mars — Russia try to occupy Ukraine! While your rockets successfully land from space — Russian rockets attack Ukrainian civil people! We ask you to provide Ukraine with Starlink stations,&#8221; Fedorov tweeted at Musk. Ten hours later Musk replied. “Starlink service is now active in Ukraine… more terminals en route.”</p>
<p>In the background, the same narratives and counter-narratives that I have been studying for five years continue to dominate. Last week, when hostilities broke out, a video went viral. It carried a purported <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2022/02/25/europe/ukraine-russia-snake-island-attack-intl-hnk-ml/index.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">audio exchange</a> as a Russian boat approached Snake Island on the Ukrainian coast and demanded the soldiers stationed there to surrender. “This is a Russian military warship. I suggest you lay down your weapons and surrender to avoid bloodshed and needless casualties. Otherwise, you will be bombed.&#8221; the Russian officer says. A Ukrainian soldier responds: “Russian warship, go fuck yourself.”</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/02/sanctions-wont-save-ukraine/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/02/sanctions-wont-save-ukraine/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/GettyImages-1238762486-scaled.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/02/sanctions-wont-save-ukraine/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/02/sanctions-wont-save-ukraine/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Sanctions won&#039;t save Ukraine</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/02/sanctions-wont-save-ukraine/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Lee Jones</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Those were the final words heard from the island. Zelenskyy later announced that the warship had then killed all 13 Ukrainian defenders. The internet trilled with talk of the brave Ukrainian martyrs. Now, however, it appears the <a href="https://www.jpost.com/breaking-news/article-698897" target="_blank" rel="noopener">soldiers</a> are in fact alive and being held prisoner by the Russians.</p>
<p>Honest mistake or Ukrainian influence operation? If it were the latter, it worked: Snake Island galvanised Ukraine’s online army and cowed Russia’s. Perhaps the truth will come out, but then again maybe it won’t. Either way, it reordered reality online for a while, which was the point. It was another Ukrainian victory.</p>
<p>This is the nature of modern conflict, and it’s the way that all wars will be fought now — on the ground and online. The revolution may not be televised, but it will be meme’d.</p>
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