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					<title>India can’t win a war with Pakistan</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2025/05/india-cant-win-a-war-with-pakistan/?edition=us</link>
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										<unherd:main_theme>War</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Kapil Komireddi]]>
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							<![CDATA['A war with Pakistan would squander the energies and resources India needs to improve the lives of its citizens.' Photo: Lisa Maree Williams/Getty.]]>
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							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Kapil Komireddi </strong>is the author of <i></i><a href="https://www.waterstones.com/book/malevolent-republic/k-s-komireddi/9781787380059" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><i>Malevolent Republic: A Short History of the New India </i></a>(Hurst)</p>
]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_handle>kapskom</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[is the author of <i></i><a href="https://www.waterstones.com/book/malevolent-republic/k-s-komireddi/9781787380059" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><i>Malevolent Republic: A Short History of the New India </i></a>(Hurst)]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Thu, 08 May 2025 23:00:39 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Fri, 09 May 2025 09:19:05 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[India]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Kashmir]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Narendra Modi]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Pakistan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Politics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Terrorist attack]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://stage.unherd.com/?p=675675</guid>
																												<description>
								<![CDATA[Modi has everything to lose]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>Early on Wednesday, Indian missiles sailed into Pakistan and destroyed nine sites housing what New Delhi called “terrorist infrastructure”. With two nuclear-armed powers squaring up, the potential for war is obviously making the world nervous, with France and the US just two of the Western countries urging restraint. In truth, though, India’s military action is hardly surprising. After 26 tourists were savagely gunned down in Kashmir last month, the Indian government had to act. The objective of that gruesome assault — Hindus and Christians were singled out for slaughter on the basis of their faith and shot in the head in front of their wives — was to sow sectarian discord in India, paralyze Kashmir’s slow stride towards stability, and subject India to territorial mutilation in the name of faith.</p>
<p>Luckily, Indians did not take the bait. Tourists have continued to visit Kashmir, and there was no inter-religious violence in India. But New Delhi could scarcely be expected to tolerate what was the worst terror strike against its civilians since 2008, when Pakistani terrorists butchered their way through Mumbai for several days. The masterminds behind that atrocity remain free citizens in Pakistan, protected by its armed forces and intelligence agencies. “How much will India endure?” the <em>Washington Post</em> asked, almost two decades ago, in response to a series of Pakistan-backed terrorist assaults against India. At the time, India’s patience seemed Himalayan. The secular government that then ruled India, deeply invested in forging lasting peace with Pakistan through uninterrupted dialogue, withstood every act of aggression that sought to derail its economic progress and social cohesion.</p>
<p>India’s habits changed once Narendra Modi, a Hindu nationalist who campaigned on the promise to punish Pakistan for its sponsorship of terror, was elected prime minister in 2014. Modi agreed with those who believed that possession of nuclear weapons should not grant Pakistan impunity to bleed India through its jihadist proxies. Still, Modi at first went out of his way to improve relations with Islamabad, making an unscheduled stop in Lahore in 2015 to deepen ties with its civilian leadership. Within days of his return to India, however, an airbase was hit by a terrorist raid. India’s effort to launch a joint investigation with Pakistan went nowhere. When another terrorist strike targeted an Indian army outpost later that year, Modi ordered military action against terrorist installations across the Line of Control that divides Kashmir between Pakistan and India. Three years later, in 2019, he authorized a second cross-frontier operation in response to another terrorist provocation.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/06/narendra-modis-useful-idiot/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/06/narendra-modis-useful-idiot/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/GettyImages-1249393342-1.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/06/narendra-modis-useful-idiot/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/06/narendra-modis-useful-idiot/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Narendra Modi&#039;s useful idiot</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/06/narendra-modis-useful-idiot/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Kapil Komireddi</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>The magnitude of last month’s horror, however, meant that New Delhi had failed to establish deterrence and had to step up its response and heighten the costs for Pakistan. It therefore selected and struck targets not only inside Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, but also in the province of Punjab, the nucleus of power in Pakistan. Yet, despite this being the largest aerial assault suffered by Pakistan since the 1971 Indo-Pakistani War, none of the country’s military installations were affected. Indeed, India consciously spared them, hoping to avoid escalating the crisis into a full-blown conflict. If this was the off-ramp embedded in India’s operation, Pakistan seems unwilling to take it. Islamabad has already vowed retaliation, and there has been severe shelling of civilian areas on the Indian side of the LOC in Kashmir. India, for its part, has ordered nationwide drills in preparation for incursions from across the border. Today, a swarm of Indian drones appeared in the skies above major Pakistani cities; one destroyed an air defense battery in Lahore, the capital of Punjab; another crashed in Rawalpindi, the headquarters of the Pakistani army. While reiterating that it is committed to “non-escalation”, New Delhi is also emphasizing that the ball is in Pakistan’s court: if Islamabad refuses to back down, India is willing to intensify its operations.</p>
<p>Will there be a war? India and Pakistan have pulled back from the brink in the past, most notably in 2001 when Pakistan-backed terrorists attempted to storm the Indian parliament. There is, moreover, an unspoken conviction on both sides that the other will honor this tradition. Such confidence, alas, is misplaced — as is the belief that nuclear weapons will never enter the equation. In 1999, the Pakistani army deployed atomic weapons against India but withdrew them under intense pressure from the United States. At the same time, Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal is dangerously vulnerable to seizure by rogue elements: at least half a dozen Pakistani nuclear facilities have weathered attacks by jihadis bred by its own armed forces to bleed India. AQ Khan, the metallurgist who built Pakistan’s nuclear bomb using blueprints he stole from civilian nuclear facilities in the West that once employed him, tried to sell nuclear technology on the black market to a long list of customers that included Iran and North Korea.</p>
<p>India’s conventional superiority may tempt Pakistan to deploy its weapon of last resort. For the event of war, Pakistan has produced tactical nuclear warheads to hurl at columns of Indian soldiers punching into its territory. Even without the use of nuclear weapons, a full-scale war, while devastating Pakistan, would leave India worse off. Islamabad would lose relatively less because it has so little to lose. Its politics are riven by corruption; its economy has imploded; and the country effectively survives on the benevolence of foreign lenders.</p>
<p>India, with all its problems, is marching ahead economically. Between 2012 and 2022, the country lifted 170 million people out of poverty. A war with Pakistan would squander the energies and resources it needs to improve the lives of its citizens. The journalist Fareed Zakaria once described Pakistan as a burglar who enters your house and threatens to blow his brains out on your most precious carpet if you don’t give him what he wants. Pakistan’s greatest weapon against India is its ability to frustrate its rival’s progress by bogging it down in a war it can ill afford.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">“Pakistan’s greatest weapon against India is its ability to frustrate its rival’s progress by bogging it down in a war it can ill afford.”</div>
<p>India must therefore de-escalate this crisis — and not merely for its short-term prosperity. Avoiding further entanglement with Pakistan is equally vital for its future stability. The animosity between the two countries is a product of national ideologies that are irreconcilable: one regards itself as the authentic home of the subcontinent’s Muslims; the other sees itself, at least in theory, as the practitioner of a pluralistic secular nationalism that transcends religion. One nullifies the other, and the two can coexist only if they exist in isolation. This explains why the longest bouts of peace between the two nations occurred when they spurned each other. Like a divorced couple, both countries — especially Pakistan — need time apart to develop independent cultural identities. Sadly, to the detriment of their peoples, both countries have been in each other’s faces ever since the British left the subcontinent.</p>
<p>Invented to serve as a haven for India’s Muslim faithful, Pakistan has sought to legitimize its existence by remaking itself into a guardian of the faith. The people who make up Pakistan were, only a few generations ago, mostly lower-caste Hindus who converted — or were forced to convert — to Islam. But the state suppressed the pre-Islamic culture of the territories upon which it was grafted, and it glorified Arab Muslim figures from the past who had once pillaged, molested and murdered the forebears of modern-day Pakistanis.</p>
<p>Pakistan’s rulers invoked religion to unite its people against “Hindu India” almost from the moment of the state’s birth, dispatching “irregular” jihadists in 1947 — within weeks of India’s Partition — to annex Kashmir, which was then a sovereign kingdom. The Kashmiris, rather than surrender, fought back and sought India’s help to repel the invaders. After Kashmir’s accession to India, the state’s first democratically elected leader, Sheikh Abdullah, a wildly popular socialist, laid out the choices before Kashmiris. India’s commitment to “secular democracy based upon justice, freedom and equality,” he explained, negated the “argument that the Muslims of Kashmir cannot have security in India.” India’s constitution, Abdullah said, “has amply and finally repudiated the concept of a religious state, which is a throwback to medievalism.” Abdullah denounced Pakistan, a quasi-theocracy that had just waged a war to seize Kashmir, as “a feudal state” where “the appeal to religion constitutes a sentimental and a wrong approach.” But his rejection of Pakistan was also a reminder to New Delhi that secularism was the non-negotiable condition of Kashmir’s allegiance to India. Kashmiris, he said, “will never accept a principle which seeks to favor the interests of one religion or social group against another.”</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/05/will-india-and-pakistan-go-to-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/05/will-india-and-pakistan-go-to-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/GettyImages-2211073845.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/05/will-india-and-pakistan-go-to-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/05/will-india-and-pakistan-go-to-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Will India and Pakistan go to war?</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/05/will-india-and-pakistan-go-to-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Swift Centre Forecasters</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Over the past decade, India has come close to becoming what Jawaharlal Nehru, the country’s first prime minister, most feared: a Hindu Pakistan. The ongoing conflict with Pakistan appears to have reminded India’s current rulers of the value of Indian pluralism. New Delhi has gone out of its way to emphasize its composite nature. It even delegated the job of briefing the world about India’s military action to a female colonel who happens to be Muslim. If this confrontation with an explicitly ethno-religious state reminds Indians — and the Indian government — of the value of the religious, linguistic and cultural multiplicity at home, it will have been worth it.</p>
<p>But an India that is successful at holding together its diversity is regarded as a threat by Pakistan because it debunks its foundational logic that Muslims and Hindus are two immiscible nations that cannot live together. And so Pakistan perpetuates the harrowing memory of India’s Partition by keeping alive the conflict in Kashmir. Pakistan’s khaki-clad rulers do not care about the people of Kashmir — a fact they have demonstrated over and over by luring young Kashmiri men into terror training camps and returning them as human bombs. Neither does it care about Kashmir’s territory: in 1963, it ceded a portion of the state under its occupation to China. Its proclamations of Islamic solidarity, too, have its limits: for a state that endlessly denounces India, Israel and France for their treatment of Muslims, Pakistan is always happy to defend China’s treatment of Uighur Muslims in Xinjiang.</p>
<p>India cannot fix any of this. The best it can hope to do is isolate itself from Pakistan. New Delhi must clearly prepare itself for Pakistan’s counter-reaction. But if and when Pakistan retaliates, rather than responding, India should be prepared to move on, pursuing the diplomatic isolation of Pakistan and enhancing domestic security. Complete detachment from Pakistan, combined with strengthened defense at home, is what India owes its people.</p>
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					<title>Will India and Pakistan go to war?</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2025/05/will-india-and-pakistan-go-to-war/?edition=us</link>
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										<unherd:main_theme>Risk</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Swift Centre Forecasters]]>
					</dc:creator>
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																<unherd:article_ranking>1</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[Narendra Modi has been weighing up retaliation. Photo by Sachin KUMAR / AFP) (Photo by SACHIN KUMAR/AFP via Getty Images)]]>
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							<![CDATA[<p><strong>The Swift Centre</strong> publishes <a href="https://www.swiftcentre.org/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">forecasts</a> from a panel of highly experienced and accurate forecasters including Good Judgment Project Superforecasters and financial industry professionals.</p>
]]>
						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>swift_centre</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ publishes <a href="https://www.swiftcentre.org/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">forecasts</a> from a panel of highly experienced and accurate forecasters including Good Judgment Project Superforecasters and financial industry professionals.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Sun, 04 May 2025 23:30:19 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Tue, 06 May 2025 21:31:28 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[India]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Kashmir]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Nuclear Weapons]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Pakistan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[War]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://stage.unherd.com/?p=673961</guid>
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								<![CDATA[We assess the risk of a nuclear exchange]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Last week, militants killed 26 civilians, mostly tourists, in Kashmir, the disputed region between India and Pakistan. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The killing of 26 civilians would be bad news anywhere in the world, but in Kashmir, it could be far worse. Tensions between the two nations have always been high, ever since they were split up in the partitioning of British India in 1947, but in recent years they have increased still further.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Kashmir is often at the centre of those tensions. Although formally part of India, it has been granted special, largely autonomous status since partition, but in 2019 India effectively ended that, leading Pakistan to downgrade diplomatic relations and suspend trade. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Last week’s attacks have seemingly brought the two countries to the brink of conflict: India’s government accused Pakistan of supporting the attack, while Pakistan said it expected a retaliatory assault by Indian forces.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">A war could have profound consequences. India is increasingly a manufacturing powerhouse; notably, it is the world’s largest supplier of generic pharmaceutical drugs. India also sits upstream of its neighbor in the huge Indus river system, which Pakistan relies on for its agriculture and energy generation: after the attacks, New Delhi suspended the 65-year-old Indus Water Treaty pledging not to limit water flows, raising fears that it could use water as a weapon. And, of course, both countries have nuclear weapons: an escalating conflict between the two could lead to history’s first nuclear exchange.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">All that makes it vital to understand the likely outcomes of the attack. The Swift Centre, a not-for-profit which helps organisations improve their ability to predict and respond to the future, commissioned its global network of professional, award-winning forecasters to make rapid predictions of those outcomes. Specifically, the organisation’s forecasters looked at the chance of conflict itself; and then, if that conflict does happen, how likely a major escalation would be, the likely impacts on pharmaceutical exports, the Indus Water Treaty, and the risks of nuclear war.</span></p>
<p><em><b>Q1: Will the national military forces, militia, and/or law enforcement personnel of India and Pakistan engage in a lethal confrontation resulting in at least 100 uniformed casualties before May 15?</b></em></p>
<p><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">Average forecast: 8.5%, range 2% to 28%</span></i></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The forecasters were first asked how likely they thought a significant conventional conflict was: specifically, a conflict causing at least 100 uniformed casualties between the two countries in the next two weeks.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">They thought it was relatively unlikely, although not out of the question, and some thought the risk was significant.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Usually, forecasters start by trying to assess the </span><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">base rate</span></i><span style="font-weight: 400;"> of such events: how often they happen in ordinary times, an initial position which can then be updated with new information. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">One of them noted that while tensions are high and occasional border disputes happen, large armed conflicts between official state forces are rare: “the 1999 Kargil Conflict was the last time that fatalities reached three digits. Before that, it was in 1990.”</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">There have been smaller skirmishes since then, but deaths have never gone beyond double figures. As a starting point, then, some forecasters thought that the base rate should be low: In the 35 years since 1990 there have been only two conflicts that would have counted, giving an annual base rate of less than 6%. Since the forecast only looks ahead two weeks, the base rate should be correspondingly lower.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Others thought that since some cross-border skirmishing has already begun, a better way to find a base rate would be looking at how many such skirmishes turn into larger conflicts. Since the last official war between the two countries in 1971, one forecaster counted six smaller conflicts, of which, they argued, only one – 1999 – unambiguously reached the threshold for today’s forecast, giving a per-incident base rate of about 15%. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">But India has unequivocally said it would respond, and Pakistan has begun moving troops into Kashmir. “Clearly this is the most significant crisis facing the two countries since 2019,” one said. Another argued that “India-Pakistan conflicts have generally been nothingburgers over the last few decades” but there are reasons to think that this time is different: levels of nationalism are extremely high in both countries, and animosity has been growing; Pakistan is in the grip of a long-running economic and social crisis, and war with India could boost its regime’s faltering legitimacy; and Israel’s attack on Hamas has provided precedent for major cross-border attacks in response to terrorism incidents. Also, the US, usually a broker between the two, appears not to be engaging.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">On the other side of the ledger, two weeks is a very short time, and “nuclear deterrence, economic fragility, and third-party diplomatic pressure” all act as brakes on escalation, a forecaster argued.</span></p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/01/modi-has-created-a-new-theocracy-india/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/01/modi-has-created-a-new-theocracy-india/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/GettyImages-1943616446-1-e1705941590573.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/01/modi-has-created-a-new-theocracy-india/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/01/modi-has-created-a-new-theocracy-india/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Modi has created a new theocracy</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/01/modi-has-created-a-new-theocracy-india/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Pratinav Anil</a></p></div></a></div>
<p><em><b>Q2. Will the total combined number of fatalities among the national military forces, militia, and/or law enforcement personnel of India and Pakistan exceed 1,000 before June 30, 2025?</b></em></p>
<p><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">If there are 100 or more uniformed casualties by May 15: 19% (range 3.6% to 35%)</span></i></p>
<p><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">If there are fewer than 100 uniformed casualties by May 15: 2.3% (range 0.5% to 8.5%)</span></i></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The forecasters were also asked about the chance of a larger war breaking out this summer. Specifically they were asked the probability of it if the smaller 100-casualty conflict happened, and if it didn’t.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">In short, they thought that if there weren’t 100 casualties by May 15, it was very unlikely (2.3% chance). Some went as high as 8.5%, but on the whole they thought that it is “really unlikely that there will be nothing for 15 days then something this huge.”</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">But if there are 100 or more casualties, then the probability of a serious war starts to get very worrying. One of the more optimistic forecasters said that even if the number is reached, “the goal of both sides will be to tamp down hostilities before they get out of control,” but others were far less sanguine: 100 casualties would imply “fierce and fraught” fighting, and emotions would be running high in both countries, increasing the chance of escalation. “If there are 100 or more fatalities in the next two weeks, then I see a one-in-three probability of reaching four digits by June 30.”</span></p>
<p><em><b>Q3. Will the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) between India and Pakistan, which governs the distribution of water from the Indus River basin, be fully reinstated by December 31st, 2025?</b></em></p>
<p><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">If there are fewer than 100 uniformed casualties by May 15: 67% (range 40% to 98%)</span></i></p>
<p><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">If there are 100 or more uniformed casualties by May 15: 22% (range 2.3% to 66%)</span></i></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The IWT is a point of significant tension between India and Pakistan, as noted above. India’s cabinet announced on April 23, after the Kashmir attacks, that the treaty was “held in abeyance with immediate effect, until Pakistan credibly and irrevocably abjures its support for cross-border terrorism.”</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">It’s the first time the treaty has ever been suspended since its 1960 introduction, including during the 1965 and 1971 Indo-Pakistan wars and many smaller conflicts.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The forecasters therefore felt that assuming the skirmishing dies down before 100 deaths are reached, it is likely to be reinstated. However, if there is a significant conflict – as in the 100 deaths scenario – “it will be politically more difficult for both sides to reinstate the treaty before the end of the year,” one forecaster argued. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">One forecaster thought that India might see the conflict as a pretext to end a treaty which it no longer wants to abide by, “to claim more of the water for consumption and power generation.” A larger-scale attack makes that pretext stronger.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">On the other hand, there does not seem to be provision in the treaty for either side to unilaterally exit, making the pretext weaker, and China – which </span>controls the headwaters of the Indus<span style="font-weight: 400;"> and thus has leverage over India – would likely put pressure on New Delhi.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Some forecasters noted that the outcome is more likely to be symbolic than practical, since India probably does not have the capability to significantly alter the course of the Indus, but one argued that recent infrastructure improvements “provide the capacity to store the water on a massive scale, which allows India to more meaningfully leverage water as a weapon of war in the longer term.”</span></p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/09/nuclear-horror-still-haunt-us/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/09/nuclear-horror-still-haunt-us/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/THREADS.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/09/nuclear-horror-still-haunt-us/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/09/nuclear-horror-still-haunt-us/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Nuclear horror still haunts us</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/09/nuclear-horror-still-haunt-us/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Paul Heron</a></p></div></a></div>
<p><em><b>Q4. What will be the total value, in USD, of pharmaceutical exports from India during the calendar year 2025?</b></em></p>
<p><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">If there are 100 or more uniformed casualties by May 15: $29 billion (80% confidence interval: $22 billion to $34 billion)</span></i></p>
<p><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">If there are fewer than 100 uniformed casualties by May 15: $31 billion (80% confidence interval: $24 billion to $35 billion)</span></i></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">India’s generic pharmaceuticals industry accounts for around one-25th of its total exports, and the sector has been growing at spectacular rates for the last several years. If a war halted or significantly reduced them, it would hurt both India’s economy and several countries’ medical supply stocks. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The forecasters felt that even in the event of a conflict causing 100 or more casualties, the impact on Indian pharma was likely to be low. “Only a major, massively destructive full-blown war will significantly affect Indian pharmas and their exports,” one forecaster. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Partly that is because Pakistan is only a small export market, while the US accounts for around $7 billion of the roughly $30 billion exported a year, and Washington would be unlikely to reduce those purchases as a result of a war.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">One forecaster noted that two major Indian ports are in Gujarat, a state on the border with Pakistan, which might be a problem for exports should a war break out. But they also said that the bulk of pharmaceutical exports go through the port in Mumbai, further south and likely outside any naval conflict zones. They also said that the war would be unlikely to involve naval battles: “Air strikes and special forces/ground forces have been the preferred responses in previous conflicts.”</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Several forecasters thought that a much more imminent threat to the Indian pharma sector was US tariffs.</span></p>
<p><em><b>Q5. Will either India or Pakistan use a nuclear weapon, including tactical or battlefield nuclear weapons, in the context of a military conflict between India and Pakistan?</b></em></p>
<p><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">If there are 100 or more uniformed casualties by May 15: 3.3% (range: 0% to 5%)</span></i></p>
<p><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">If there are fewer than 100 uniformed casualties by May 15: 1.6% (range: 0% to 1.4%)</span></i></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Surely the question that weighs most heavily on people’s minds. Reassuringly, the forecasters felt that a nuclear war was unlikely even in the event of a significant conflict, although a one-in-30 chance is still worryingly high. “I just don’t think India and Pakistan want the current conflict to escalate,” one said, “and I can&#8217;t imagine either side wanting or planning to use a nuclear weapon first.” So unless the two sides misread each other’s intentions, or there’s some sort of accident – not impossible in a tense and volatile environment with two countries with poorly defined chains of command – then nuclear war is unlikely.</span></p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">“The forecasters felt that a nuclear war was unlikely even in the event of a significant conflict.&#8221;</div>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">One raised the possibility of a “mad major” scenario, in which a local commander has launch control over tactical nuclear weapons and uses one to slow an enemy advance, but “while there is uncertainty over Pakistan’s safety mechanisms on nuclear weapons,” it does seem that the warheads are kept separate from launch vehicles, making such an outcome less likely.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Another forecaster argued that the “mad major” might not be necessary: Pakistani military doctrine explicitly envisages using tactical nuclear weapons if they are losing a conventional war. And its threshold of when to use nuclear weapons is “unclear and relatively uncommunicated”, meaning India’s efforts to fight a limited war against it could accidentally trigger it.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">All that said, the forecasters all felt that in either scenario, nuclear escalation was an unlikely outcome. The two sides have had nuclear weapons for decades now, and even previous major conflicts, like 1999, did not lead to nuclear exchange. “The Kargil War has shown that it is possible to prevent nuclear escalation even at higher casualty levels in conventional conflict,” one said, although “a massive conventional escalation threatening the territorial status quo in Kashmir could indeed trigger a Pakistani nuclear reaction, even if only tactical.”</span></p>
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