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		<title>Nuclear War - UnHerd</title>
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		<description>think again</description>
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					<title>Hiroshima could happen again</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2025/08/hiroshima-could-happen-again/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://stage.unherd.com/2025/08/hiroshima-could-happen-again/?edition=us#comments</comments>
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										<unherd:main_theme>Apocalypse</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Christopher Harding]]>
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																<unherd:article_ranking>3</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA['Does Hiroshima still have the power to shock us?' Bettmann/Contributor.]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<div>
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<div><strong>Christopher Harding</strong> is a cultural historian of India and Japan, based at the University of Edinburgh. His latest book is <a href="https://www.penguin.co.uk/books/448290/a-short-history-of-japan-by-harding-christopher/9780241563199" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em>A Short History of Japan </em></a>(Pelican, 2025). He also has a Substack: <a href="https://www.chrishardingjapan.com/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Japan and the World.</a></div>
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						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>drchrisharding</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is a cultural historian of India and Japan, based at the University of Edinburgh. His latest book is <a href="https://www.penguin.co.uk/books/448290/a-short-history-of-japan-by-harding-christopher/9780241563199" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em>A Short History of Japan </em></a>(Pelican, 2025). He also has a Substack: <a href="https://www.chrishardingjapan.com/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Japan and the World.</a></div>
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					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Tue, 05 Aug 2025 23:00:39 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Tue, 05 Aug 2025 23:00:39 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[A-bomb]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[America]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Hiroshima]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Japan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Nuclear War]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Second World War]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[US]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[War]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://stage.unherd.com/?p=698128</guid>
																												<description>
								<![CDATA[We’re forgetting the horrors of nuclear war]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>Eighty years ago today, at around 8:15 on the morning of 6 August 1945, the world’s first atomic weapon detonated in the skies above Hiroshima. Survivors used a grimly understated bit of onomatopoeia to describe what happened. They called it <em>p</em><em>ika-don: </em>a blinding flash of light (<em>pika</em>), bleaching the whole world white, followed by a thunderous explosion (<em>don</em>).</p>
<p>Hiroshima was transformed in an instant. The bomb exploded around 600 meters above the city’s industrial district, and most of that area either disappeared completely or began to be consumed by fire. Some 70,000 buildings in total were destroyed.</p>
<p>Soon after the explosion, people began journeying into the city center to look for relatives, pushing carts in the hope of carrying home the injured. What they saw reminded them of images of Buddhist hell. The artwork at the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum, which I visited in recent days, captures these real-life scenes in unforgiving detail. In one drawing, people are slumped over the sides of a large fire cistern, with bright-red burn marks across their backs. Desperately seeking water, they made it to the cistern and then died or passed out when they got there. In another, ghoulish figures stagger along the road, heads bowed and arms outstretched. Their clothes are in tatters; their flesh drips from their bodies.</p>
<p>Elsewhere in the city, bizarre sights could be picked out through the blood-colored smoke: the pattern from someone’s kimono imprinted on a wall; a pink cavalry horse standing alone in the street, its hide stripped away by the blast. The steps running up to the Hiroshima branch of Sumitomo Bank were bleached white, save for a patch where someone had been sitting when the bomb went off. Those steps are now kept behind glass in the museum, and you can see the dark patch marking the spot where that person was incinerated. Nearby, a photo reveals the bathos of wartime Japanese bureaucracy carrying on despite it all: just hours after the bomb was dropped, a policeman sits at a table in improvised bandages issuing disaster certificates to people who have suffered property damage in the blast.</p>
<p>At this point, of course, no one knew what was coming next: vomiting, hair loss, rapidly worsening skin conditions and hopeless attempts by bewildered relatives to stop their loved ones slipping away — all signs of the enormous quantities of radiation released by the bomb. Most people on 6 August naturally put the blast down either to a very powerful conventional weapon or, given that American B-29s had not been sighted in the numbers required to inflict carnage of this kind, some kind of devastating accident.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;At this point, of course, no one knew what was coming next: vomiting, hair loss, rapidly worsening skin conditions&#8221;</div>
<p>Japanese scientists were swiftly dispatched to Hiroshima to investigate. They soon concluded, based on tests of sand and bone, that the Allies had beaten Japan to an atomic weapon. The “prompt and utter destruction” threatened in the Allies’ ultimatum to Japan just a few days earlier took on a terrifying new dimension. A single bomb had done all this. And who knew how many more the Allies possessed?</p>
<p>Eight decades on, the question of whether or not the United States ought to have resorted to using its new weapon at this late stage of the war is as far as ever from being resolved. The most compelling argument in favor was, and remains, the enormous loss of life — both Allied and Japanese — thought likely to occur if a ground invasion of the Japanese home islands went ahead as planned in the autumn of 1945.</p>
<p>Projected casualties were sometimes exaggerated after the war, as a way of justifying Hiroshima and Nagasaki amidst worldwide revulsion. Nevertheless, the ferocity with which minor Pacific islands and other territories were defended by the Japanese naturally pointed to an enormous death toll if the Japanese military and ordinary civilians decided to defend their country to the very last. It seemed plausible that a threat of prompt and utter destruction, combined with a taste of its awful reality, might tip even Japan’s military hardliners into agreeing to the surrender terms set out by the allies at Potsdam.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/06/fiona-hill-the-world-is-going-nuclear/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/06/fiona-hill-the-world-is-going-nuclear/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/GettyImages-1368277861.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/06/fiona-hill-the-world-is-going-nuclear/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/06/fiona-hill-the-world-is-going-nuclear/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Fiona Hill: The world is going nuclear</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/06/fiona-hill-the-world-is-going-nuclear/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Freddie Sayers</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Instead, in the hours and days after the atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima, those hardliners argued that if Japan could withstand firebombing then it could — and must — withstand atomic bombings, too. Stalemate within the Japanese leadership, split between would-be peace-makers — who still held out hope of persuading the Soviets to act as intermediaries with the other Allies — and military officers who refused to countenance surrender, remains perhaps the best argument against the use of the atomic bomb in August 1945.</p>
<p>The Allies were aware of the somewhat uncertain position of the Emperor in Japan’s modern constitution. He was, in theory, the supreme authority in every area of Japanese life. At the same time, his elevated status — descended from the gods — meant that he was not to be troubled with everyday decision-making. A relatively late convert to the cause of peace, Emperor Hirohito had always preferred to give his blessing to decisions made by civilian and military leaders rather than force his will upon them. He tended to make his feelings known by asking pointed questions or by employing strategic silences. After the Soviet declaration of war against Japan and invasion of Manchuria on 8 August, and the bombing of Nagasaki a day later, the emperor’s subordinates still had to make two requests for a <em>seidan</em> — “sacred decision” — before he broke the ministerial deadlock by calling decisively for the war to be discontinued.</p>
<p>It was far from clear at the time that the use of an atomic weapon could somehow overcome these institutional barriers to peace-making in Japan. Then again, would any of the alternative options, including an extended naval blockade, have fared better? How hungry would people in Japan have needed to become before their leaders — who had, so far, regarded ordinary citizens more as raw material for achieving strategic objectives than as human beings whose lives were precious — decided that enough was enough?</p>
<p>There is some merit to the claim that Hiroshima was partly about showing the Soviet Union what America was now capable of. It is true, too, that the Americans feared the Soviets getting their hands on large chunks of Japan, if the war was not concluded swiftly and on terms favorable to the United States. But that doesn’t change the fact that, for America, there was no obviously superior means of ending the war in the summer of 1945.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/09/nuclear-horror-still-haunt-us/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/09/nuclear-horror-still-haunt-us/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/THREADS.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/09/nuclear-horror-still-haunt-us/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/09/nuclear-horror-still-haunt-us/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Nuclear horror still haunts us</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/09/nuclear-horror-still-haunt-us/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Paul Heron</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Reluctant supporters of America’s decision to use an atomic weapon might add that, distasteful though such arguments may be, it is difficult to draw a clear moral distinction between napalm — itself a relatively new weapon, used to devastating effect against Japan&#8217;s wood and paper buildings in the spring and summer of 1945 — and an atom bomb. The latter is vastly more powerful and has after-effects that dwarf those of firebombing in their horror and longevity. And yet it remains the case that far more Japanese people died, suffered injuries or were rendered homeless by firebombs in the Second World War than by atomic weapons.</p>
<p>The arguments over Hiroshima and Nagasaki will no doubt change in the decades to come, depending on the role that nuclear weapons play in shaping our world. Up until now, it has been possible to argue that the sort of devastation to which the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum bears grisly witness served as the clearest possible warning against allowing conflicts ever to go nuclear. But 80 years from now, people may look back and conclude that we simply got lucky for a while: proliferation was limited and, among powers who possessed atomic weapons, a combination of cool heads and good fortune prevented the unthinkable.</p>
<p>Already, memories of the disaster are fading. The numbers of <em>hibakusha</em> — people directly affected by the atomic bomb — are dwindling, their stories in danger of vanishing with them. The Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum is already advertising talks both by the families of survivors and by “successors”. The classics of Japanese cinema and literature that the bomb helped to inspire are meanwhile now firmly in the past, from the first <em>Godzilla</em> film — whose eponymous monster was envisaged as atomic disaster “made flesh” — to the harrowing animated movie <em>Barefoot Gen</em>.</p>
<p>Does Hiroshima still have the power to shock us, and to stop people with access to nuclear buttons from pushing them if they feel they really must? We must hope so. Perhaps another 80 years of relative peace between the world’s great powers is possible. But no one should underestimate the potential of nuclear brinksmanship gone wrong, or the steadily escalating deployment of tactical nuclear weapons to take us to a point where the extraordinary suffering visited on the people of Hiroshima and Nagasaki breaks the bounds of history and comes for us all.</p>
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									<item>
					<title>Nuclear horror still haunts us</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2024/09/nuclear-horror-still-haunt-us/?edition=us</link>
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					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Paul Heron]]>
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																<unherd:article_ranking>3</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[The movie was unrelenting in its depiction of the effects of Nuclear War. Credit: A still from the film threads]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Paul Heron </strong>is a Welsh writer based in Poland. His Substack is <a class="c-link" href="https://someprivatediagonal.com/" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer" data-stringify-link="https://someprivatediagonal.com" data-sk="tooltip_parent">someprivatediagonal.com</a>.</p>
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						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>Paul_Heron_</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[is a Welsh writer based in Poland. His Substack is <a class="c-link" href="https://someprivatediagonal.com/" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer" data-stringify-link="https://someprivatediagonal.com" data-sk="tooltip_parent">someprivatediagonal.com</a>.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Sun, 22 Sep 2024 23:00:47 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Mon, 23 Sep 2024 08:10:38 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Nuclear]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Nuclear War]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Sheffield]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Society]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[The Bomb]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Threads]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[UK]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://stage.unherd.com/?p=620635</guid>
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								<![CDATA[<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">On 13 September, Vladimir Putin issued a sobering threat. If Ukraine used Nato-supplied missiles against targets deep inside Russia, the president warned, the alliance would be  “directly participating in the conflict” — and the US and its allies would be “fighting with Russia”. Putin’s comments echoed another threat, two years ago, when he drew several ”red lines” for Nato, adding that he was prepared to use nuclear weapons if they were crossed.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Here, then, we have the one of the least welcome developments of the 2020s: the return, after decades of absence, of the terrible spectre of nuclear war. And for those old enough to remember what it was like the first time round — or for their children who’ve watched the clips on YouTube — surely the most disturbing example of what atomic catastrophe might actually look like was first broadcast 40 years ago today. Shown by BBC Two on 23 September 1984, </span><a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=p5IAXoOfFf0" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">Threads</span></i></a> <span style="font-weight: 400;">is more horrifying and urgent than ever.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The scenario imagined in </span><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">Threads</span></i><span style="font-weight: 400;"> is troublingly familiar. After an American-backed coup in a strategically important nation — in this case Iran — the Soviets invade. The US then moves to deploy troops. In unemployment-hit Sheffield, meanwhile, ordinary life goes on. A young couple prepares to become parents. The husband’s middle-aged father has been laid off; his redundancy money will go toward the renovation of the family’s home. Elsewhere, the local council is quietly making preparations in the event of war. Sheffield’s size, and the proximity of RAF Finningley, make the South Yorkshire town a prime target.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">It is, by common consent, one of the darkest films ever made. There’s a disturbing sense of logical inevitability about the way the world moves step-by-step toward the precipice. The attack, when it comes, is unflinching, unsentimental and horrifyingly believable. </span></p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/08/can-labour-avoid-the-stench-of-scandal/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/08/can-labour-avoid-the-stench-of-scandal/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/GettyImages-2167921784-e1724941763959.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/08/can-labour-avoid-the-stench-of-scandal/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/08/can-labour-avoid-the-stench-of-scandal/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Can Labour avoid the stench of scandal?</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/08/can-labour-avoid-the-stench-of-scandal/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Paul Heron</a></p></div></a></div>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Writer Barry Hines — best-known for his novel </span><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">A Kestrel for a Knave</span></i><span style="font-weight: 400;">  — sketches his native milieu with deft assurance. Hines, who died in 2016, was from the mining village of Hoyland, just outside Sheffield. In his career, he often focused on Northern England’s working class, and </span><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">Threads</span></i><span style="font-weight: 400;"> is no different. As the Iran crisis escalates, for instance, we see protesters taking to the streets in a Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament march (most of the film’s actors were in fact CND members). Days later, there’s a moment of black humour when a speaker at a much more fraught protest calls for a general strike, as if that could have any effect whatsoever. It’s tempting to read the scene as a subtle comment on the eclipse of traditional Left politics in the age of Thatcherism.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Indeed, the whole film takes on added depth when viewed within that context: I think the film’s darkness has its roots not simply in the terrifying subject matter, but also in the broader political context of the Eighties. Labour had taken a radical turn under Michael Foot, with predictably dire consequences for the British Left. In 1983, after all, the Tories won a bumper majority, even as Labour slumped to their worst defeat since 1931. Success at the ballot box in turn ensured that the Thatcherite economic revolution would continue, and that resistance would largely be futile. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">By 1984, the great dismantling of British social democracy was proceeding apace: businesses were privatised, unions were crushed, and social houses were being flogged to ex-tenants. Importantly for Hines, moreover, most of the pain was happening to northerners like him: by September 1986, 94% of the jobs that had been lost under Thatcherism were north of a line stretching from the Bristol Channel to the Wash.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">For Leftists like Hines, Western defence policy doubtless explains </span><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">Threads</span></i><span style="font-weight: 400;">’ grim flavour too. Early in her premiership, Thatcher allowed the Americans to base nuclear-armed cruise missiles at RAF Greenham Common near Newbury, prompting protestors, almost exclusively women, to establish a “peace camp” at the base. The missiles were rightly seen as geopolitically destabilising since they could, in theory, be used to launch a surprise attack on Soviet targets like Moscow. That was echoed by instability elsewhere. The early Eighties saw a number of dangerous incidents — including the downing of a Korean Air passenger plane that had strayed into Soviet airspace, as well as provocative military exercises and false nuclear alarms — any one of which could easily have produced a crisis like that dramatised by </span><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">Threads</span></i><span style="font-weight: 400;">.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">It hardly helped that, at the point the film came out, communication between East and West was minimal, with neither side having an accurate idea of what the other was thinking. In a June 1984 diary entry, for instance, Ronald Reagan recorded his shock at learning that Yuri Andropov, his by-then late Soviet counterpart, had genuinely suspected the president of plotting his own Operation Barbarossa: a pre-emptive nuclear strike on the USSR. </span></p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/06/why-putin-will-use-nuclear-weapons/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/06/why-putin-will-use-nuclear-weapons/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/GettyImages-1251865990-1-e1685636003648-1.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/06/why-putin-will-use-nuclear-weapons/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/06/why-putin-will-use-nuclear-weapons/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Why Putin will use nuclear weapons</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/06/why-putin-will-use-nuclear-weapons/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Kevin Ryan</a></p></div></a></div>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Economic upheaval at home and geopolitical tensions abroad, dovetailed with the ever-present threat of a mushroom-cloud disaster, all explain the movie’s distinctive style. And revisited today, </span><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">Threads</span></i><span style="font-weight: 400;"> certainly manages to startle with its modernist aesthetic and bleak, eerie mood. It completely lacks the music that hamstrings so many modern docudramas. Hines, for his part, was even reluctant to include a narrator in his film, arguing that Paul Vaughan’s voiceover detracted from the drama. But Vaughan’s contribution works superbly. A familiar voice from BBC arts and science programmes, his terse descriptions of terrors like the impact of radiation lend authority to the film — by tying it to a familiar and cosy televisual world, </span><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">Threads</span></i><span style="font-weight: 400;"> becomes all the more disquieting.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Yet more than its narrator, it’s surely the denouement of </span><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">Threads </span></i><span style="font-weight: 400;">that makes it so enduring. </span><span style="font-weight: 400;">When, after ratcheting up the tension, we’re finally shown the actual bombing, it is genuinely frightening. There are no heroics, only suffering and death, either instantaneous or slow. Later, the nuclear exchange having run its course, a stark computer readout informs us that 3,000 megatons have been exploded globally, with 210 falling on Britain. Needless to say, the film’s second half isn’t easy to watch. </span><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">Threads</span></i><span style="font-weight: 400;"> explores severals aspects of desperate postwar life: the hazards of radiation; the search for loved ones in the ruins; shortages of food and water; the collapse of law and order; the shooting of looters; the impossibility of treating the multitudes of sick and injured; the coming of nuclear winter. Just as powerful is the film’s final</span><span style="font-weight: 400;"> minutes, which shows the world years after the bombs have fallen. Almost everyone seems to be under eighteen, the clear implication being that no one lives very long anymore. Technology is at near-medieval levels.</span></p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;Almost everyone seems to be under eighteen, the clear implication being that no one lives very long anymore.&#8221;</div>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">This wretched narrative is hammered home by an utter lack of sentimentality. </span><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">Threads</span></i><span style="font-weight: 400;"> has no heroes and major characters die abruptly. What viewers get instead are wordless montages, and blunt facts delivered in cyan text on a black screen. As in Brecht’s theatre, interpreting what is put before us in our usual clichéd, complacent way is made impossible.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Taken together, there’s even a sense in which the film strikes even at the religious convictions then loudly professed by many in the radical conservative movement that carried Reagan to the White House. </span><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">Threads</span></i><span style="font-weight: 400;">’ modernist vision of the universe is uncompromising: austere, matter-of-fact, devoid of metaphysical consolations. Even the Apocalypse, when it comes, appears to have no religious significance. The Rapture looked forward to by Evangelicals is nowhere to be seen. Life struggles on, but under massively worse conditions.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Docudramas as accomplished as </span><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">Threads</span></i><span style="font-weight: 400;">, so full of dark passion and righteous anger, are rare today. The gravity and urgency of the political situation in the mid-Eighties inspired a superb example of British cinematic modernism. The defenders of social democracy knew their world was disappearing, but faced an infinitely worse possibility: the destruction of the world, <em>tout court</em>. It’s clear this threat has in some way returned — thanks to Putin’s threats, but also events in the Middle East and Asia-Pacific — though I have my doubts whether our governing or creative classes fully grasp what that means. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Today there is a lack of vision. </span><span style="font-weight: 400;">Perhaps the Cold War is distant enough that its lessons are being forgotten. Watch </span><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">Threads</span></i><span style="font-weight: 400;"> and you’ll recall them soon enough. </span></p>
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					<title>It&#8217;s time to send Nato troops to Ukraine</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2024/04/its-time-to-send-nato-troops-to-ukraine/?edition=us</link>
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										<unherd:main_theme>Nato at 75</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Edward Luttwak]]>
					</dc:creator>
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																<unherd:article_ranking>2</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA['Regardless of quality... the Russian army already outnumbers the Ukrainian, and the gap is becoming wider every day.' (Jaap Arriens/NurPhoto via Getty Images)]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Professor Edward Luttwak</strong> is a strategist and historian known for his works on grand strategy, geoeconomics, military history, and international relations.</p>
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						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>ELuttwak</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is a strategist and historian known for his works on grand strategy, geoeconomics, military history, and international relations.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Wed, 03 Apr 2024 23:02:07 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Mon, 29 Apr 2024 15:52:49 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Defence Sector]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Nato]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Nuclear bombs]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[row]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ukraine]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ukraine war]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[War]]></category>
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																												<description>
								<![CDATA[After 75 years, the alliance is locked in the nuclear age ]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>In 1944, Leslie Groves, the US army general who managed the Manhattan Project, asked its chief scientist, J. Robert Oppenheimer, just how powerful their new bomb might be. Would it be 10 times as powerful as the largest bomb of the time, the RAF’s Tallboy “earthquake bomb”? Or 50 times, or even 100 times? Oppenheimer replied that he could not be sure — at the time, there were even fears that the explosive chain reaction might <em>never</em> stop — but he expected a bomb much more powerful than 100 Tallboys. Groves immediately replied that such a powerful weapon would not be of much use to anyone, because the “politicians” would never dare to use it.</p>
<p>In the short run, Groves was wrong, while Oppenheimer’s guess was correct. The Hiroshima uranium bomb was in fact more powerful than 1,000 Tallboys, with the Nagasaki plutonium bomb exceeding even that. But only five years later, Groves’s prediction came to pass. First the United States, and then the Soviet Union, and then each successive nuclear power came to the realisation that their nuclear weapons were too powerful to be used in combat. This has remained true in the decades since — all the way up to the invasion of Ukraine. For, despite Putin’s atomic sabre-rattling, he too is subject to the logic of Groves’s prediction. Decades after his conversation with Oppenheimer, a brief historical summary of nuclear war has much to teach us about the situation in Ukraine — and how victory might only be attainable there through much more conventional means.</p>
<p>The first test of the nuclear age came with the Korean War. In December 1950, hundreds of thousands of Chinese soldiers crossed the River Yalu to support their North Korean allies against the US. With America in immediate danger of losing tens of thousands of men, General Douglas MacArthur decided that he had to use nuclear weapons to stop the Chinese. By far the most respected US military leader of the time — he had led American forces in the Pacific from humiliating defeat to total victory, and then acted as Japan’s de facto Emperor in reforming the country — MacArthur expected Truman to assent to his superior military judgment. Instead, the answer was a flat no. MacArthur insisted, and he was dismissed.</p>
<p>Truman recognised that the nature of warfare had fundamentally changed since Hiroshima and Nagasaki. When he authorised those strikes, neither he nor anyone else knew that the explosions would also cause radiation fallout, which would sicken and even kill thousands of people miles from the site of the detonation. Moreover, in 1945, Truman was facing the prospect of losing many more American troops in the conquest of Japan than in the entirety of the Second World War up to that point. The Japanese really did fight to the last man, and still had 2 million troops to expend. Truman would have been thrown out of the White House if he had allowed the deaths of hundreds of thousands of Americans by refusing to use the bomb.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/03/israels-victory-will-be-netanyahus-downfall/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/03/israels-victory-will-be-netanyahus-downfall/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/GettyImages-2084796134-e1710783795724.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/03/israels-victory-will-be-netanyahus-downfall/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/03/israels-victory-will-be-netanyahus-downfall/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Israel&#039;s victory will be Netanyahu&#039;s downfall</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/03/israels-victory-will-be-netanyahus-downfall/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Edward Luttwak </a></p></div></a></div>
<p>But five years later, the situation was very different. Facing catastrophe in Korea, Truman had the alternative of evacuating US troops to Japan if all else failed — and therefore never even considered using atomic weapons. Under the next president, his fission bombs evolved into thermonuclear fusion bombs at least 100,000 times more powerful than Tallboy. But that only made Truman’s “No” of 1950 even more definitive. Nuclear abstinence became the only possible choice for Americans and Russians alike, as the Cuban Missile Crisis precariously but definitively showed.</p>
<p>However, it would take much longer for this logic to develop into a definitive doctrine. Following the establishment of Nato 75 years ago today, and especially in the Sixties and Seventies, exhaustive efforts were made to extract some additional advantage from nuclear weapons and somehow gain the upper hand for the new Western alliance. So-called “tactical” nuclear weapons were made not more, but much <em>less</em> powerful, supposedly to enable their use on the battlefield. Their advocates claimed that they could provide firepower very cheaply, with small nuclear warheads replicating the effect of hundreds of howitzers. Both the US and Soviet armed forces duly acquired thousands of nuclear weapons: not only “small” bombs for fighter-bombers, but also bombardment rockets (some small enough to be carried in a jeep), anti-aircraft missiles, torpedoes, and even portable demolition charges.</p>
<p>But this illusion could not be sustained. Military planners came to understand that if US commanders tried to defend Nato territory by attacking invading Soviet forces with small “tactical” nuclear weapons, the Russians would use their own arsenal to destroy the defending Western forces. The same would apply for any attempt to replace conventional military force with nuclear weaponry. And so it was understood that, while nuclear weapons are a useful deterrent, they can only be used to strike back against a prior nuclear attack — and never to achieve any kind of victory. Thus in the Seventies, when the United States and the Soviet Union were engaged in the elaborate and highly publicised “Strategic Arms Limitation” negotiations, officials on both sides quickly agreed to quietly stop developing, manufacturing and fielding new “tactical” nuclear weapons, before equally quietly disassembling tens of thousands of these weapons.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/02/how-europe-can-lead-ukraine-to-victory/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/02/how-europe-can-lead-ukraine-to-victory/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/GettyImages-2003732157.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/02/how-europe-can-lead-ukraine-to-victory/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/02/how-europe-can-lead-ukraine-to-victory/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Why Russia isn&#039;t winning in Ukraine</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/02/how-europe-can-lead-ukraine-to-victory/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Rajan Menon</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>But in the end, it was the newest nuclear powers, India and Pakistan, that conclusively demonstrated the redundancy of their own nuclear weapons for anything beyond reciprocal deterrence. In the Kargil War of 1999, which involved multiple full-scale battles and thousands of casualties, neither side attempted even a <em>sotto voce</em> threat of a nuclear strike. And this is still true today. When Putin‘s loudest attack dog, Dmitry Medvedev, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russias-medvedev-wed-have-use-nuclear-weapon-if-ukrainian-offensive-was-success-2023-07-30/#:~:text=Medvedev%2C%20who%20has%20cast%20himself,existence%20of%20the%20Russian%20state." target="_blank" rel="noopener">started barking</a> about the use of “tactical” nuclear weapons after the failure of the initial Russian invasion in 2022, it was only the least competent journalists and those obedient to Moscow who echoed his warnings. Eventually, after several months of this foolishness, Putin came out <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/putin-says-russia-ready-nuclear-war-not-everything-rushing-it-2024-03-13/#:~:text=Putin%20reiterated%20the%20use%20of,against%20Russia%20%22when%20the%20very" target="_blank" rel="noopener">and said it</a>: Russia would only use nuclear weapons only “when the very existence of the state is put under threat” — meaning by a corresponding nuclear threat.</p>
<p>The situation in Ukraine has turned again, but the same logic holds. Instead of frustrated Russians bogged down in their trenches, now it is the Ukrainian position that looks precarious. Kyiv presents this as a question of materiel, and continually asks for more and better weapons from the West. Yet while more guns and missiles could be sent, it is clear that what is forcing Kyiv to retreat step by step is not a lack of firepower, but a lack of soldiers.</p>
<p>Until this week, conscription in Ukraine only started at the age of 27, as opposed to the global norm of 18. Zelensky has now <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2024/04/02/ukraine-lowers-conscription-age-acute-soldier-shortage/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">reduced this to 25</a>; but with many Ukrainians exempted from service, his total armed forces amount to less than 800,000 active personnel. Ukraine is hampered by the age distribution of its population, with children and older people over-represented when compared to young men in the 19-35 age bracket. But its troop total is still too low for a population that exceeds 30 million by most estimates, considering that Israel can rapidly field an army of around 600,000 from a population of around 8 million. This means that, unless Putin decides to end the war, Ukraine’s troops will be pushed back again and again, losing soldiers in the process who cannot be replaced. Russia doesn’t even have to send its finest troops to achieve this — merely volunteer contract soldiers attracted by good pay, or Russian prisoners serving ordinary criminal sentences, recruited straight from their prison cells. Regardless of quality, though, the Russian army already outnumbers the Ukrainian, and the gap is becoming wider every day.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">“Nato countries will soon have to send soldiers to Ukraine, or else accept catastrophic defeat.”</div>
<p>This arithmetic of this is inescapable: Nato countries will soon have to send soldiers to Ukraine, or else accept catastrophic defeat. The British and French, along with the Nordic countries, are already quietly preparing to send troops — both small elite units and logistics and support personnel — who can remain far from the front. The latter could play an essential role by releasing their Ukrainians counterparts for retraining in combat roles. Nato units could also relieve Ukrainians currently tied up in the recovery and repair of damaged equipment, and could take over the technical parts of existing training programmes for new recruits. These Nato soldiers might never see combat — but they don’t have to in order to help Ukraine make the most of its own scarce manpower.</p>
<p>Crucially, with China coming ever closer to an attack on Taiwan, the US cannot provide more troops than the roughly 40,000 who are already in Europe. Thus a momentous decision is in the post for the other Nato members, especially the most populous: Germany, France, Italy and Spain. If Europe cannot provide enough troops, Russia will prevail on the battlefield, and even if diplomacy successfully intervenes to avoid a complete debacle, Russian military power will have victoriously returned to Central Europe. At that point, Western European powers will have to rebuild their armed forces, whether they like it or not, starting with the return of compulsory military service. Perhaps in those circumstances, we might even witness an outbreak of nuclear nostalgia, foolishly harking back to the illusion that apocalyptic weaponry might be enough to keep the peace.</p>
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					<title>Why Putin will use nuclear weapons</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2023/06/why-putin-will-use-nuclear-weapons/?edition=us</link>
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										<unherd:main_theme></unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Kevin Ryan]]>
					</dc:creator>
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							<![CDATA[He is ready to use nuclear weapons whenever he wants to. Credit: Contributor/Getty Images]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<div>Retired Brigadier General<strong> Kevin Ryan</strong> served as US defense attaché to Moscow and deputy director for strategy, plans and policy on the Army Staff.  He commanded air defense units from platoon to brigade.</div>
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						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle></unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ served as US defense attaché to Moscow and deputy director for strategy, plans and policy on the Army Staff.  He commanded air defense units from platoon to brigade.</div>]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Thu, 01 Jun 2023 23:03:57 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Fri, 02 Jun 2023 14:08:39 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Nato]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Nuclear War]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Russia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ukraine]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ukraine war]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Vladimir Putin]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[War]]></category>
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								<![CDATA[All the signs suggest Russia has made up its mind]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p dir="ltr">However you try to spin it, the drone strikes that struck Moscow’s wealthiest neighbourhoods on Tuesday night represented a grim turning point in Putin’s flagging campaign against Ukraine. The surprise attacks — which killed eight people, and for which Kyiv has denied all responsibility — were the first against <span class="il">Russian</span> civilians since the war began. They were also the most significant incursion into <span class="il">Russian</span> territory since the Second World War.</p>
<p>Putin was quick to brand the strikes a “terrorist” act, while a rattled Yevgeny Prigozhin, head of the Wagner mercenaries, gave war chiefs a dressing-down for their inability to prevent three of eight drones from evading Russian air defences. Yet while this all provided a morale boost for the Ukrainian war effort, the question of retaliation hangs in the air.</p>
<p>Fifteen months into the war, Putin&#8217;s bombs have not broken Ukraine. An influx of 300,000 new soldiers over the winter has done little to improve the fighting of Russian units, and the reported deployment of <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/05/08/europe/russia-t-55-tanks-ukraine-intl-cmd/index.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">tanks from the Fifties</a> has added fuel to the rumour that Russian munitions are running out. Indeed, Russian military commanders appear to have exhausted their ability to effectively respond to Ukrainian escalation. It is becoming clear, in my view, that the only way Russia can meet escalation with escalation is by <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/11/02/us/politics/russia-ukraine-nuclear-weapons.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">introducing nuclear weapons</a>.</p>
<p>Many Western experts say they take the threat of a Russian nuclear strike in Ukraine seriously, but make the mistake of asserting that the <a href="https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/3937285-why-do-we-think-putin-wont-use-the-bomb/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">odds are low</a>. Last month, for instance, <a href="https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/23-44_05-04-2023.pdf">Avril Haines</a>, the US Director of National Intelligence, told a Senate hearing that Putin&#8217;s weakened conventional force would make the Russian President more reliant on &#8220;asymmetric options” for deterrence, including nuclear capabilities — but he also said it was &#8220;very unlikely&#8221; that Moscow would do so. Speaking at <a href="https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/23-44_05-04-2023.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">the same hearing</a>, the director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, Lieutenant General Scott Berrier, also assessed the chances as &#8220;unlikely&#8221;.</p>
<p>And yet, there is strong evidence that Putin has resolved to use a tactical nuclear weapon in his war in Ukraine. In recent <a href="https://www.russiamatters.org/blog/nuclear-messaging-west-and-ukraine-putin-plays-bad-and-good-cop" target="_blank" rel="noopener">speeches and interviews</a>, he has argued that Russia faces an existential threat — a situation, under Russian policy, that warrants the use of nuclear weapons. He has also reshuffled his military leadership, so that the three generals responsible for the employment of tactical nuclear weapons now command his “special military operation” in Ukraine.</p>
<p>Moreover, while Nato has made it clear that it <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/oct/02/us-russia-putin-ukraine-war-david-petraeus" target="_blank" rel="noopener">will not sanction the use</a> of its members’ <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/deterring-nuclear-weapons-use-ukraine" target="_blank" rel="noopener">nuclear weapons</a> to defend Ukraine, Putin already has tactical reasons to deploy them: to save Russian soldiers’ lives, to shorten the war, to destroy Ukrainian forces. He also has strategic reasons: to rejuvenate the deterrent value of his nuclear arsenal and to prove that he is not a bluffer. We must therefore assume he is ready to use them, most likely in response to his faltering military&#8217;s inability to sufficiently escalate by conventional means. In other words, the nuclear genie is out of the bottle.</p>
<p>For much of the last 80 years, Russia’s security has rested on two pillars whose relative strength has waxed and waned — its conventional ground forces and its nuclear weapons. The conventional forces have been used to influence, bully and force Russia’s neighbours and adversaries to bend to its will. The nuclear forces were intended to deter the United States and the West from interfering militarily in Russia and its perceived zone of influence. Since the end of the Cold War, however, Russia’s conventional forces have at times struggled with their share of the task. To compensate, Russian leaders have had to rely on their nuclear forces to do both: strategic nuclear weapons to deter the West and tactical nuclear weapons to threaten neighbours.</p>
<p>Today, a single nuclear strike in Ukraine could thwart a Ukrainian counterattack with little loss of Russian lives. For Moscow, this consideration is as much practical as it is moral: last year&#8217;s large-scale mobilisation and increase in military units showed that Putin&#8217;s army was too small for its task. Nevertheless, Russia has managed to create only a few new battalions because most new personnel and equipment simply replaced losses in existing units. Putin and his military leaders are running out of the people and material needed to achieve his goals.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/05/how-war-became-a-spectator-sport/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/05/how-war-became-a-spectator-sport/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/GettyImages-1485059981.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/05/how-war-became-a-spectator-sport/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/05/how-war-became-a-spectator-sport/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>How the Ukraine war became a spectator sport</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/05/how-war-became-a-spectator-sport/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Aris Roussinos</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>At the start of this year, Putin took several public steps to demonstrate that he is not bluffing about using nuclear weapons. In February, he signed a <a href="https://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001202302280004" target="_blank" rel="noopener">law</a> “suspending” Russia’s participation in New Start, the strategic nuclear arms treaty. This step officially <a href="https://www.russiamatters.org/analysis/new-start-setbacks-challenging-arms-control-us-must-work-reduce-chances-nuclear-war-or" target="_blank" rel="noopener">ended joint inspections</a> of American and Russian nuclear weapons sites and released Russia from the obligation to limit its number of strategic nuclear weapons — though Russia promised to do so.</p>
<p>Then, in March, Putin <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/what-did-putin-say-tactical-nuclear-weapons-belarus-2023-03-25/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">announced</a> that he would station tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus, with a storage facility set to be built as early as July. Since Russia has already deployed nuclear-capable Iskander missile systems there — as well as thousands of troops — this would put nuclear delivery systems and warheads in close proximity to one another, greatly reducing the warning time of their use. Putin also suggested that Belarussian forces would be trained to use the weapons.</p>
<p>The Kremlin has taken these increasingly threatening steps in the belief that Nato and the West — in particular, the United States — is not paying attention to Russian demands on the global stage. In 2018, when Putin unveiled a bevy of new nuclear weapons, he warned: “You will listen to us now!” Except many didn&#8217;t: four years later, his invasion of Ukraine was a wake-up call for those who had ignored him.</p>
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<p>Despite this, some in Russia undoubtedly fear that the threat of a nuclear strike has begun to ring hollow. And for Putin, whose regime is vulnerable, to threaten a tactical nuclear attack without following through now carries perhaps as much risk as striking. As a result, besides warning the West that he <em>might</em> use a nuclear weapon, the Kremlin has, step by step, prepared the Russian people with reasons why he <em>should</em> use nuclear weapons. Among these justifications, Putin has repeatedly invoked &#8220;<a href="https://www.russiamatters.org/blog/2-decades-russian-whataboutism-partial-rundown" target="_blank" rel="noopener">whataboutist</a>&#8221; comparisons to the United States. When announcing plans for deployment of Russian nuclear weapons to Belarus, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/what-did-putin-say-tactical-nuclear-weapons-belarus-2023-03-25/">he said</a>: &#8220;The United States has been doing this for decades. They have long… deployed their tactical nuclear weapons on the territory of their allied countries, Nato countries, in Europe, in six states… We are going to do the same thing.&#8221; Putin has also repeatedly <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/extracts-putins-speech-annexation-ceremony-2022-09-30/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">referenced</a> American nuclear strikes on Hiroshima and Nagasaki and equated American goals then — to save soldiers’ lives and shorten the war — with Russian goals today.</p>
<p>He has, for instance, made clear to the Russian people that Moscow&#8217;s red lines for the use of nuclear weapons, spelled out in its <a href="https://www.russiamatters.org/russian-strategic-documents" target="_blank" rel="noopener">official documents</a>, have all been crossed since the invasion. These <a href="https://rg.ru/documents/2014/12/30/doktrina-dok.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">include</a> the claim that the very survival of Russia is at stake in the current struggle — and at last month’s Victory Day parade, Putin <a href="https://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/71104" target="_blank" rel="noopener">declared</a> that the West’s “goal is to achieve the collapse and destruction of our country”. Another of Russia&#8217;s officially designated <a href="https://archive.mid.ru/en/web/guest/foreign_policy/international_safety/disarmament/-/asset_publisher/rp0fiUBmANaH/content/id/4152094" target="_blank" rel="noopener">red lines</a> is attacks “against critical governmental or military sites of the Russian Federation, disruption of which would undermine nuclear forces&#8217; response actions”. Perhaps in light of this, Moscow has alleged that Ukrainian drones have struck <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/12/05/explosions-hit-two-bases-russia-moscow-fires-new-missile-barrage/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">strategic nuclear bomber planes</a> inside Russia, and that Ukraine and the US are responsible for <a href="https://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/71091" target="_blank" rel="noopener">drones</a> launched to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/russia-accuses-us-being-behind-alleged-kremlin-drone-attack-2023-05-04/">assassinate Putin</a>. All these claims, the real and the fabricated, are used to establish the pretext for Putin to use nuclear weapons.</p>
<p>In response, a number of Western observers have pointed out that, since we have not seen any movement of nuclear weapons, we have no tangible signs of intent to use them. I disagree. Last autumn, officials in Kyiv <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraine-says-russia-distracting-air-defences-with-dud-nuclear-capable-missiles-2022-12-01/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">reported</a> that Russia was firing “Kh-55 nuclear cruise missiles” with dummy warheads. Observers suggested these missiles — which are designed to carry only a nuclear weapon — were launched to erode Ukrainian air defences by &#8220;decoying&#8221; them into destroying the Kh-55s rather than missiles with conventional explosives. This claim makes little sense: missiles, even unarmed, would be too valuable for Russia to use as decoys. What does make sense, however, is launching Cold War-era missiles with dummy warheads to test their reliability for use in a real nuclear strike.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/03/inside-putins-torture-chambers/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/03/inside-putins-torture-chambers/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/GettyImages-1245983245-copy.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/03/inside-putins-torture-chambers/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/03/inside-putins-torture-chambers/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Inside Putin&#039;s torture chambers</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/03/inside-putins-torture-chambers/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> David Patrikarakos</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>But what will trigger Putin’s decision to launch? Most likely it will be the inability of the Russian military to meet his demands by conventional means. If a Ukrainian offensive threatens, for example, the loss of Crimea, Putin would seek an escalation of the fighting to prevent that loss. If the conventional forces could not successfully respond, a nuclear strike against the Ukrainian forces would be deployed. As he <a href="https://en.zona.media/article/2022/09/21/Putin" target="_blank" rel="noopener">announced</a> last September, on the night he illegally added four Ukrainian provinces to Russia: “If the territorial unity of our country is threatened, in order to protect Russia and our nation, we will unquestionably use all the weapons we have. This is no bluff.”</p>
<p>At home, too, there are push factors that may further embolden Putin. Most urgently, he is under pressure from Russian nationalists, who supported him in his rise to power, but are now vocal in their dissatisfaction. Some, like former FSB officer Igor Girkin, have openly <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/putin-has-no-goal-strategy-ukraine-former-russian-commander-warns-1798870" target="_blank" rel="noopener">criticised</a> the senior military leadership, even Putin. That criticism may be morphing into opposition, forcing him to consider escalating his war before his conventional forces are ready.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, claims that Putin would be dissuaded from using nuclear weapons by important allies, such as China or India, are not borne out by the war thus far. Although Putin values the support of others, he has not shied away from <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/turning-point-putin-xi-russian-invasion-ukraine" target="_blank" rel="noopener">putting that support at risk</a> to get what he wants.</p>
<p>None of this is to say that we in the West should pressure Ukraine to forgo its goal to liberate all seized territory. But it does mean that we should anticipate a nuclear attack and develop possible responses. As soon as Russia uses a nuclear weapon in Ukraine, the fallout will start to spread. Tens of thousands of Ukrainians will be dead, suffering or dealing with the effects of the explosion. Hundreds of millions of Europeans will be bracing for war. But 7 billion others around the globe will go about their business, alarmed but physically unaffected.</p>
<p>Ultimately, this may prove more dangerous to the international order. The image that many people have of nuclear arms as civilisation-ending weapons will be erased. In its place, such weapons will have been “normalised” and, although tragic, acceptable in war. In this dramatically changed world, the burden is on the West to decide how to respond.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><i data-stringify-type="italic">A version of this </i><i data-stringify-type="italic"><a class="c-link" href="https://www.russiamatters.org/analysis/why-putin-will-use-nuclear-weapons-ukraine" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer" data-stringify-link="https://www.russiamatters.org/analysis/why-putin-will-use-nuclear-weapons-ukraine" data-sk="tooltip_parent">article</a></i><i data-stringify-type="italic"> first appeared on </i><i data-stringify-type="italic">RussiaMatters</i><i data-stringify-type="italic">.</i></p>
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					<title>We are already at war with Russia</title>
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						<![CDATA[Thomas Fazi]]>
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							<![CDATA[Are they looking where he's going? (Chip Somodevilla/Getty Images)]]>
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							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Thomas Fazi</strong> is an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist and translator. His latest book is <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/the-covid-consensus/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">The Covid Consensus</a>, co-authored with Toby Green.</p>
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						<unherd:twitter_handle>battleforeurope</unherd:twitter_handle>
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						<![CDATA[ is an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist and translator. His latest book is <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/the-covid-consensus/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">The Covid Consensus</a>, co-authored with Toby Green.]]>
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										<pubDate>Thu, 09 Feb 2023 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Thu, 09 Feb 2023 00:00:00 +0000</updated>
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								<![CDATA[Never-ending escalation will result in catastrophe]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>Now and then, even the most seasoned politician happens to slip up and accidently speak the truth. This is what occurred during a recent debate at the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, when the German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=U7XV-ujwuu4" target="_blank" rel="noopener">openly stated</a> that “we are fighting a war against Russia”. The German government was quick to say her words had been <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/germany-says-it-is-not-a-warring-party-in-ukraine/a-64541484" target="_blank" rel="noopener">“misinterpreted”</a>, but the truth is that she did nothing more than say it how it is.</p>
<p>Almost a year into the conflict, the narrative of Western intervention in Ukraine — that “Nato is <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/115204.htm" target="_blank" rel="noopener">not at war with Russia</a>” and that “the equipment we’re providing is <a href="https://www.realclearpolitics.com/video/2022/03/16/psaki_the_equipment_weve_provided_is_defensive_not_offensive_and_we_see_that_as_being_a_difference.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">purely defensive</a>” — is being revealed for what it always was: a fiction. Last month, at Ramstein Air Base in Germany, another kernel of truth slipped through the cracks at a <a href="https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/3273771/secretary-of-defense-lloyd-j-austin-iii-and-general-mark-a-milley-press-confere/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">briefing</a> by US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Mark Milley. Austin and Miller stated in no uncertain terms that the US was committed to going “on the offensive to liberate Russian-occupied Ukraine” — which, according to the United States, includes both the entire Donbas and Crimea.</p>
<p>The admission that the weapons being provided by the US and Nato are of an offensive, not defensive, character marks a significant U-turn for the Biden administration. In March last year, Biden <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2022/03/11/remarks-by-president-biden-at-the-house-democratic-caucus-issues-conference/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">promised</a> the public that the US would not send “offensive equipment” and “planes and tanks” to Ukraine, because this would trigger “World War III”. Indeed, just a few months ago, the provision of tanks to Ukraine was still deemed unthinkable.</p>
<p>Yet in the coming months, the US is planning to deliver 31 Abrams tanks, and even Germany, after weeks of reluctance, has caved in to the immense <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2023/01/21/germany-ukraine-leopard-tanks-biden/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">pressure</a> coming from Washington and other allies. The German government has agreed to send 14 of its Leopard 2 tanks to Ukraine, and has also given the go-ahead to a number of other European countries which want to send their own German-made Leopard 2 tanks. Meanwhile, the UK has committed 14 of its own tanks. In total, Ukraine is set to receive around 100 tanks, but the number is likely to go up (Zelensky <a href="https://kyivindependent.com/news-feed/zelensky-ukraine-needs-300-500-tanks" target="_blank" rel="noopener">has asked</a> for 300-500).</p>
<p>This is simply the latest in a long list of red lines that the US and Nato have crossed since the start of the conflict. At the start of the war, the <em>New York Times</em> <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/02/world/europe/nato-weapons-ukraine-russia.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">cautioned</a> that the overt supply of even small arms and light weaponry — initial provisions were limited to rocket launchers and anti-tank and surface-to-air missiles — “risks encouraging a wider war and possible retaliation” from Russia, while US officials ruled out more advanced weaponry as too escalatory. Just two months later, the Biden administration backtracked and announced that it would in fact be sending Mi-17 helicopters, 155-mm Howitzer cannons and Switchblade “kamikaze” drones.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/12/is-america-still-europes-ally/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/12/is-america-still-europes-ally/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/GettyImages-1245290791-e1670609544387.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/12/is-america-still-europes-ally/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author </span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/12/is-america-still-europes-ally/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Is America still Europe&#039;s ally?</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/12/is-america-still-europes-ally/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Thomas Fazi </a></p></div></a></div>
<p>At that point, a new red line was drawn: despite Kyiv’s requests, the US said it would <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20220530-biden-rules-out-sending-rocket-systems-that-can-strike-into-russia-to-ukraine" target="_blank" rel="noopener">not provide</a> Ukraine with long-range rocket systems capable of striking inside Russian territory (the M270 MLRS and the M142 HIMARS) due to <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2022/05/18/biden-resists-ukrainian-demands-long-range-rocket-launchers-00033473" target="_blank" rel="noopener">concerns</a> in Washington that this “could be seen as an escalation by the Kremlin”. It took the administration just two weeks to change its mind, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/06/01/us/politics/the-us-is-sending-advanced-weapons-to-ukraine-but-conditions-apply.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">on the condition</a> that Ukraine would not use them against targets on Russian territory — until, in December, that line was crossed as well, when Ukraine hit airfields hundreds of kilometres into Russia (with <a href="https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/ukraine-drone-warfare-russia-732jsshpx" target="_blank" rel="noopener">the US’s approval</a>). The about-face over the shipment of battle tanks was just as quick, as we’ve seen.</p>
<p>In this apparently never-ending escalation, the only question is: what’s next? Ukraine is now <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraine-sets-sights-fighter-jets-after-securing-tank-supplies-2023-01-25/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">pushing</a> for Western fourth-generation fighter jets, such as the US F-16s. Biden and Nato Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg have <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-64461613" target="_blank" rel="noopener">ruled this out</a>, but there’s no reason to believe they won’t backpedal on the F-16s as well, just as they’ve done on every other self-imposed red line. The Ukrainians, for their part, seem pretty confident. As the Ukrainian Defense Minister, Oleksii Reznikov, <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2022/10/24/inside-the-us-effort-to-arm-ukraine" target="_blank" rel="noopener">recently stated</a>: “When I was in DC in November [2021], before the invasion, and asked for Stingers, they told me it was impossible. Now it’s possible. When I asked for 155-millimeter guns, the answer was no. HIMARS, no. HARM [missiles], no. Now all of that is a yes. Therefore, I’m certain that tomorrow there will be…F-16s.”</p>
<p>We can, therefore, expect fighter jets to be on the agenda at the Nato meeting next week. Several European countries, <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/4678ec97-bdff-4dfa-9507-dd6f6cb3dcc4" target="_blank" rel="noopener">including France</a>, have already signalled their openness to sending fighter jets to Ukraine and, according to <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2023/01/28/pentagon-send-f-16s-ukraine-00080045" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em>Politico</em></a><em>, </em>Ukrainian pilots could soon start training on the F-16s in the United States. In the meantime, Lockheed Martin — one of the many US defence companies <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2023-01-21/us-arms-industry-military-spending-profits-ukraine-war-russia/101843752" target="_blank" rel="noopener">making a killing</a> thanks to the conflict — <a href="https://kyivindependent.com/news-feed/lockheed-martin-ready-to-increase-f-16-production-as-allies-seek-to-send-fighter-jets-to-ukraine" target="_blank" rel="noopener">has announced</a> that it is going to ramp up production to meet the extra demand.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/01/germany-is-in-denial-about-ukraine/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/01/germany-is-in-denial-about-ukraine/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/GettyImages-1242704016-e1674143628438-copy.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/01/germany-is-in-denial-about-ukraine/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading </span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/01/germany-is-in-denial-about-ukraine/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Germany is in denial about Ukraine</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/01/germany-is-in-denial-about-ukraine/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Maurice Frank </a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Jet fighters aside, however, we need to acknowledge that we are <em>already</em> at war with Russia, as the German Foreign Minister inadvertently admitted. The fact that there has been no formal declaration of war is beside the point: the United States has not officially declared war since the Second World War, but this has not stopped it from intervening militarily in dozens of countries. The presence of actual American or Nato soldiers on the ground (though there have been <a href="https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2022/10/18/us-special-operations-forces-are-on-the-ground-in-ukraine/">reports</a> of the presence of US special operations forces in Ukraine) is also, ultimately, of secondary importance. By providing increasingly powerful military equipment as well as financial, technical, logistical and training support to one of the warring factions, including for offensive operations (even within Russian territory), the West is engaged in a <em>de facto</em> military confrontation with Russia, regardless of what our leaders may claim.</p>
<p>Western citizens deserve to be told what is going on in Ukraine — and what the stakes are. Perhaps the wildest claim being made is that “if we deliver all the weapons Ukraine needs, they can win”, as former Nato Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/fighter-jets-west-eu-us-ukraine-wait-planes-f-16-russia-war/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">recently asserted</a>. For Rasmussen, and other Western hawks, this includes retaking Crimea, which Russia annexed in 2014 and which it considers of the utmost strategic importance. Many Western allies still consider this an uncrossable red line. But for how long? Just last month, the <em>New York Times</em> <a href="https://archive.is/xNMl1#selection-391.0-391.43" target="_blank" rel="noopener">reported</a> that the Biden administration is warming up to the idea of backing a Ukrainian offensive on Crimea.</p>
<p>This strategy is based on the assumption that Russia will accept a military defeat and the loss of the territories it controls without resorting to the unthinkable — the use of nuclear weapons. But this is a massive assumption on which to gamble the future of humanity, especially coming from the very Western strategists who disastrously botched every major military forecast over the past 20 years, from Iraq to Afghanistan. The truth is that, from Russia’s perspective, it is fighting against what it perceives to be an existential threat in Ukraine, and there is no reason to believe that, with its back against the wall, it won’t go to extreme measures to guarantee its survival. As Dmitry Medvedev, deputy chairman of Russia’s Security Council, <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/europe/medvedev-says-russias-defeat-in-ukraine-may-lead-to-nuclear-war/2791488" target="_blank" rel="noopener">put it</a>: “The loss of a nuclear power in a conventional war can provoke the outbreak of a nuclear war. Nuclear powers do not lose major conflicts on which their fate depends.”</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/11/why-is-america-provoking-china/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/11/why-is-america-provoking-china/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/x.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/11/why-is-america-provoking-china/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author </span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/11/why-is-america-provoking-china/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Why is America provoking China?</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/11/why-is-america-provoking-china/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Thomas Fazi </a></p></div></a></div>
<p>During the Cold War, this was widely understood by Western leaders. But today, by constantly escalating their support for Ukraine’s military, the United States and Nato appear to have forgotten it, and are instead inching closer to a catastrophic scenario. As Douglas Macgregor, the former advisor to the Secretary of Defense in the Trump administration, <a href="https://www.theamericanconservative.com/this-time-its-different/">has written</a>: “Neither we nor our allies are prepared to fight all-out war with Russia, regionally or globally. The point is, if war breaks out between Russia and the United States, Americans should not be surprised. The Biden administration and its bipartisan supporters in Washington are doing all they possibly can to make it happen.” According to <a href="https://jacobin.com/2022/10/nuclear-accident-ukraine-russia-putin-nato-negotiations?utm_source=substack&amp;utm_medium=email" target="_blank" rel="noopener">a number of experts</a>, a Ukrainian offensive on Crimea is one of the most likely ways this conflict could lead to nuclear warfare. Excluding a such extreme outcome, and barring a peaceful resolution to the conflict, the most likely scenario is the “Afghanistanisation” of Ukraine: a protracted conflict that could potentially last years, given that it is just as unlikely that Nato will allow Ukraine to be militarily defeated — whatever that would entail.</p>
<p>The simple truth, then, is that no one can “win” this war. Meanwhile, a protracted war only increases the likelihood of a direct conflict between Russia and Nato. This is now even acknowledged by the RAND corporation, the very influential and ultra-hawkish US military think tank. In a new report titled <a href="https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PEA2510-1.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em>Avoiding a Long War</em></a>, the authors warn against the risk of a “protracted conflict”, saying that this would lead to “a prolonged elevated risk of Russian nuclear use and a Nato-Russia war” that would seriously jeopardise US interests. “Avoiding these two forms of escalation”, they argue, is therefore “the paramount US priority” — also higher than “weakening Russia” or “facilitating significantly more Ukrainian territorial control”. This means that US interests would be best served by focusing on reaching “a political settlement” that might deliver a “durable peace”, for example by “condition[ing] future military aid on a Ukrainian commitment to negotiations”.</p>
<p>Ultimately, catastrophic scenarios aside, this is the most likely way in which the war will end — with a deal in which <a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/02/modern-socialism-has-no-class/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">neither side loses or wins</a>. Delaying this inevitable outcome simply means imposing more unnecessary death and destruction on Ukraine — and more economic suffering on a continent that is fast reaching breaking point.</p>
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					<title>Were Russians working in Zaporizhzhya?</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2022/12/were-russians-working-in-zaporizhzhya/?edition=us</link>
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					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Norma Costello]]>
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							<![CDATA[At Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, the workers are ready for war. Credit: DIMITAR DILKOFF/AFP via Getty Images]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Norma Costello </strong>is an award-winning Irish journalist who has been covering Isis since 2014.<strong> </strong></p>
]]>
						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>normcos</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is a war reporter and visiting Research Fellow at Harvard University.]]>
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										<pubDate>Tue, 13 Dec 2022 00:02:40 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Thu, 16 Feb 2023 09:50:34 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Energoatom]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[EU]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Europe]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[nuclear energy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Nuclear War]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Putin]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Rosatom]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Russia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ukraine war]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Zaporizhzhya]]></category>
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								<![CDATA[The Ukrainian nuclear power plant was suspiciously vulnerable]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">As the Ukrainian army continues fighting to reclaim its territory, inch by inch, in brutal winter conditions, European leaders are scrambling to manage the continent&#8217;s diminished energy resources. Ukraine was once seen as the great hope on this front. The nation&#8217;s nuclear energy has been posited as a potential green power supply for a region overly reliant on Russia to meet its energy needs. Now, with Europe’s largest nuclear power plant under Russian control, the stability of nuclear alternatives and their potential to reduce Europe’s carbon footprint is marred by unbridled Russian aggression towards its neighbour. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Last week, Rishi Sunak and Joe Biden pledged to tackle energy price volatility through <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-and-us-announce-new-energy-partnership" target="_blank" rel="noopener">a new gas deal</a>, known as the UK-US Energy Security and Affordability Partnership. The aim is to mitigate the fallout from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, which caused international energy prices to surge, and put a disastrous amount of pressure on European consumers. The deal also promoted the use of nuclear energy as “a safe and reliable part of the clean energy transition” — which is ironic, given that one of the deal’s key beneficiaries, Germany, is in the process of closing its three remaining nuclear plants over safety concerns.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Ukraine has 15 nuclear reactors</span><b>, </b><span style="font-weight: 400;">which</span> <span style="font-weight: 400;">provide over half the country’s energy supply. This is convenient for the EU. Just last February, despite criticism from environmentalists, it classified nuclear energy as “green”. Ukraine joined the European Energy Community in 2010, intending to integrate into the European energy market, and in 2015 an ambitious agreement was signed between its Ukrenergo energy distribution company and Polenergia, a Polish counterpart, to export electricity to the EU as part of the Ukraine-Europe “energy bridge”. Despite a general distaste for nuclear energy in several EU countries, the move was seen as a good source of revenue for Ukraine and a move away from what was perceived as its dependence on Russian gas.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The integration, which had been planned for 2023, became urgent in February. Following the Russian invasion, Ukraine requested immediate synchronisation to the European power grid. (</span><span style="font-weight: 400;">Ukrainian Energy Minister, Herman Galushchenko, pleaded with EU leaders,</span> <span style="font-weight: 400;">&#8220;I appeal to our European partners&#8230; We need your support and solidarity with the Ukrainian people more than ever!&#8221;) </span><span style="font-weight: 400;">Russia, meanwhile, quickly took control of the power plant at Chernobyl.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Russian troops also pushed into Zaporizhzhya, home to the biggest power plant in Europe. It was here that</span><span style="font-weight: 400;">, six years ago, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and the </span><a href="https://bankwatch.org/blog/dont-turn-ukraine-into-a-nuclear-energy-source-for-the-european-union" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">EIB</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> coughed up one billion euros to support the construction of high-voltage transmission lines. </span><span style="font-weight: 400;">But according to a government briefing document sent by those working in Ukraine’s nuclear sector, some people in the plant were working with Russia <em>before</em> the annexation of Zaporizhzhya. Seen exclusively by <em>UnHerd</em>, the briefing reads:</span></p>
<p style="padding-left: 40px;"><span style="font-weight: 400;">“There was a failed personnel policy, which over the past few years has concentrated the leadership — in key areas in the field — of people who are professionally and morally worthless, with dubious qualifications, unprofessional experience and without institutional memory, mostly citizens of the Russian Federation. They destroyed the system for documenting the managerial decision-making by closing access and classifying documents, which does not allow timely identification and correction of violations or bringing to responsibility for violations of nuclear legislation.”</span></p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/12/the-ukrainian-priests-fighting-for-putin/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/12/the-ukrainian-priests-fighting-for-putin/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/2GettyImages-1076584166-e1669726985933.png?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/12/the-ukrainian-priests-fighting-for-putin/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/12/the-ukrainian-priests-fighting-for-putin/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The Ukrainian priests fighting for Putin</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/12/the-ukrainian-priests-fighting-for-putin/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Norma Costello</a></p></div></a></div>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Indeed, sources who were inside the plant told me</span><span style="font-weight: 400;"> that, when Russian authorities swept into Zaporizhzhya, some workers met them with the greeting, “welcome to your new Rosatom plant” — Rosatom being the Russian state nuclear corporation. Recent reports now allege that staff at the plant were “encouraged” to sign contracts with </span><a href="https://www.euronews.com/2022/12/10/ukraine-crisis-nuclear-zaporizhzhia" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Rosatom</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">There are also allegations that the management of Ukraine’s National Nuclear Energy Company, Energoatom, left the staff of Zaporizhzhya without support during the Russian invasion. Despite working in an industry that would obviously be targeted by Putin, no measures were taken to promote their safety, even though many stayed voluntarily to work in the plant, in an attempt to help the war effort. </span><span style="font-weight: 400;">Allegations of corruption at Energoatom have been raised at a national level.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">There has also been criticism of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), </span><span style="font-weight: 400;">the world&#8217;s central intergovernmental organisation for nuclear power. Last <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/ukraine-pitch-export-power-europe-nuclear-safety-snag/">March</a>, it adopted Putin&#8217;s terms to refer to the invasion of Ukraine as a </span><span style="font-weight: 400;">“special military operation in Ukraine”,</span><span style="font-weight: 400;"> infuriating some members of Ukraine’s political leadership, who accused it of</span><span style="font-weight: 400;"> placating Russia. </span><span style="font-weight: 400;">In an interview with </span><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">Politico</span></i><span style="font-weight: 400;"> in August, Galushchenko said the Russians had pushed the IAEA to visit the Zaporizhzhya plant, to see how well it was being managed, and to encourage the agency to accept Russian annexation of the plant.</span></p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/10/did-america-cause-europes-energy-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/10/did-america-cause-europes-energy-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/GettyImages-1230850511-scaled-e1665411106867-1024x637-1.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/10/did-america-cause-europes-energy-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/10/did-america-cause-europes-energy-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Did America cause Europe&#039;s energy war?</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/10/did-america-cause-europes-energy-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Thomas Fazi</a></p></div></a></div>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">As the invasion advanced, last spring, images of shelling in Zaporizhzhya found their way into Western media outlets. The international community looked on in horror at what could have been a nuclear Armageddon. Sources inside the plant described the consequences of a shell hitting the plant as potentially &#8220;far worse than Chernobyl or Fukushima&#8221;. And r</span><span style="font-weight: 400;">ecent comments by President Vladimir Putin about Russian attacks on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure have once again stoked fears of nuclear disaster.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Speaking at an awards ceremony for &#8220;Heroes of Russia&#8221; at the Kremlin last week, <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-63907803" target="_blank" rel="noopener">he said</a>: </span><span style="font-weight: 400;">“Right now there has been a lot of noise about our attacks on the enemy infrastructure of the neighbouring country. Yes we are doing it.” He gave no indication that he intends to stop. </span><span style="font-weight: 400;">Some in Ukraine’s energy sector are concerned that a “false flag” nuclear event could be staged in the country. In other words, Russia could fake a nuclear accident and then blame it on Ukraine. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Over in the West of the country, rumblings of a ground invasion from Belarus have been a cause for concern for those in Rivne. </span><a href="https://oilprice.com/Latest-Energy-News/World-News/Satellite-Images-Show-Russian-Troops-Building-Up-In-Belarus.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Industry insiders fear for the city’s nuclear plant</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">, which provides energy to the major urban centres of Kyiv and Lviv. But Pavel Pavlishin, its former chief, said that, despite the bleak picture, it is unlikely that Russia will damage the plant even if they take control.</span> <span style="font-weight: 400;">“They developed this technology and they know how it works mainly.” One saving grace might be that the Ukrainian systems are significantly more advanced than the Russian — “We have made changes and upgraded our sites, they have not&#8221; — meaning it takes time for the invaders to understand.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">A war is now being waged for the very Ukrainian plants that were supposed to be Europe’s ticket to a carbon-neutral future. Instead, they have become the stage for scenes from a horrifying sci-fi film. Last week, Ukrainian authorities accused Russian forces of installing multiple rocket launchers at Zaporizhzhya’s power plant. Could Europe’s largest nuclear plant be used to fire on Ukrainian troops?</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">It’s not out of the question that the plants could become weapons. Civilians fleeing the shelling in nearby regions have converged in the Zaporizhzhya area to access humanitarian aid. If the bombs get any closer, they could be caught in the crosshairs of a potentially unprecedented environmental catastrophe. </span><span style="font-weight: 400;">Meanwhile, for workers in Europe’s biggest nuclear plant, the future is bleak. Some have, according to </span><span style="font-weight: 400;">Energoatom, been taken by Russian authorities and &#8220;disappeared&#8221;. There&#8217;s no denying that Europe’s big plans for exporting green nuclear energy from Ukraine are now held, like much of the nation, in the hands of the Russian state.</span></p>
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															<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">454021</post-id>				</item>
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					<title>Will America end Zelenskyy&#8217;s dream?</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2022/10/will-america-end-zelenskyys-dream/?edition=us</link>
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					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Thomas Fazi]]>
					</dc:creator>
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							<![CDATA[Absolutism won't win (RONALDO SCHEMIDT/AFP via Getty Images)]]>
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							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Thomas Fazi</strong> is an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist and translator. His latest book is <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/the-covid-consensus/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">The Covid Consensus</a>, co-authored with Toby Green.</p>
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						<unherd:twitter_handle>battleforeurope</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist and translator. His latest book is <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/the-covid-consensus/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">The Covid Consensus</a>, co-authored with Toby Green.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Tue, 18 Oct 2022 23:02:28 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Tue, 18 Oct 2022 23:02:28 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[America]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Joe Biden]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Nuclear War]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Russia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ukraine]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[Vladimir Putin]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Volodymyr Zelenskyy]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://old.unherd.com/?p=448149</guid>
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								<![CDATA[The pro-war consensus seems to be weakening]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>Even as &#8220;<a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-63280523" target="_blank" rel="noopener">kamikaze</a>&#8221; drones rain down on Kyiv, the mood over Ukraine is shifting in the US. Between May and September, <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2022/09/22/as-war-in-ukraine-continues-americans-concerns-about-it-have-lessened/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">the share of Americans</a> who are extremely or very concerned about a Ukrainian defeat fell from 55% to 38%. Among Republicans and Republican-leaning independents, 32% say the US is providing too much support for the war — up from 9% in March.</p>
<p>But rifts are emerging within the American establishment as well. The list of high-profile media and policy figures who are starting to question the wisdom of the US strategy in the conflict grows longer every day.</p>
<p>Why is the US administration continuing to pour tens of billions into a war that is ravaging Ukraine and causing thousands of deaths (and triggering <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-war-children-poverty-unicef/32087719.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">massive collateral damage</a> globally) when, according to <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/10/11/biden-ukraine-winter-gas-prices/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">the <em>Washington Post</em></a>, “privately, US officials say neither Russia nor Ukraine is capable of winning the war outright”? If so, why is the US prolonging the bloodshed and destruction, pledging to support Ukraine <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/russia-will-respond-in-kind-to-nato-expansion-putin-warns-11656582672" target="_blank" rel="noopener">“for as long as it takes”</a>, rather than working towards a diplomatic solution that, barring nuclear war, is the only possible outcome anyway? The madness of this policy has become even more apparent in recent weeks, as fighting on both sides has continued to dangerously escalate — with Biden himself warning of the very real possibility of a nuclear “Armageddon”.</p>
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<p>As Josh Hammer <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/us-needs-change-course-right-now-ukraine-opinion-1749740" target="_blank" rel="noopener">wrote in <em>Newsweek</em></a>, the time has come for the US to abandon its overly simplified position of supporting Zelenskyy’s dream of retaking “every square inch of territory in the Donbas and Crimea from its nuclear-armed adversary, seemingly no matter the cost to the US taxpayer”. At this stage in the conflict, Hammer notes, it is not in America’s interests to endorse all of Ukraine’s unrealistic territorial claims. Rather than semi-permanent war and destabilisation, what is needed is “de-escalation, detente, and peace”. Mike Mullen, who served as the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of staff for George W. Bush and Barack Obama, <a href="https://www.defenddemocracy.press/mike-mullen-says-us-should-push-for-negotiations-to-end-the-war-in-ukraine/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">put it</a> even more bluntly: “As is typical in any war, it’s got to end and usually there are negotiations associated with that. The sooner the better, as far as I’m concerned.”</p>
<p>But this, of course, means facing down Zelenskyy’s absolutist stance — which includes refusing to come to the negotiating table until Putin is removed from power, <a href="https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/nine-nato-countries-back-fast-track-membership-ukraine-205151" target="_blank" rel="noopener">continuing to demand</a> Ukraine’s immediate accession to Nato, and refusing to compromise on the recently annexed regions of Luhansk and Donetsk, or even on Crimea. Interestingly, the same concerns were even voiced by David E. Sanger, the chief Washington correspondent for the traditionally pro-war <em>New York Times</em>, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/10/07/us/politics/biden-putin-armageddon-nuclear-threat.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">who wrote</a>: “No one in the [Biden] administration wants to suggest, in public or private, that the government of President Volodymyr Zelenskyy should avoid chasing Russian troops out of every corner of Ukraine, back to the borders that existed Feb. 23, the day before the invasion began. But behind closed doors, some Western diplomats and military officials say, that is exactly the conversation that may have to happen.”</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/10/will-russia-push-the-nuclear-button/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/10/will-russia-push-the-nuclear-button/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/21GettyImages-1243959234-scaled-1.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/10/will-russia-push-the-nuclear-button/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/10/will-russia-push-the-nuclear-button/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Will Russia push the nuclear button?</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/10/will-russia-push-the-nuclear-button/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Swift Superforecasters</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>A possible solution in this sense was articulated by Elon Musk — a member of the US establishment himself, albeit an eccentric one — in <a href="https://twitter.com/elonmusk/status/1576969255031296000" target="_blank" rel="noopener">a hugely controversial tweet</a> in which he offered his idea for a peace deal, which involved re-running referendums on annexation under UN supervision in Russia-occupied areas; recognising Russian sovereignty over annexed Crimea; and giving Ukraine neutral status.</p>
<p>Musk’s proposal echoes the peace plan <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2022/05/25/ukraine-rejects-kissinger-suggestion-it-should-cede-land-to-russia.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">put forward by Henry Kissinger</a> earlier this summer. Kissinger <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/05/24/henry-kissinger-ukraine-russia-territory-davos/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">warned</a> that if negotiations did not restart by the end of July, then we risked “upheavals and tensions that will not be easily overcome” — such as those that have now come to fruition.</p>
<p>Several military analysts agree that the conflict has reached a stage where the situation could easily spiral out of control, regardless of what the political or even military leadership of the two countries may want. They point to the fact that <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/10/05/opinion/ukraine-russia-nuclear-war.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">during the 1962 Cuban missile crisis</a>, nuclear war was avoided not only because of skilful diplomacy, but also, and perhaps even more important, <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/00471178221094726" target="_blank" rel="noopener">due to sheer luck</a> — such as when a Soviet submarine captain, who believed the war had begun, decided to fire his nuclear torpedo at US ships, but was convinced otherwise by a fellow officer; or when US forces in Okinawa received a mistaken order to fire 32 nuclear missiles on Russian targets, again only being stopped by one quick-thinking captain.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/10/what-if-russia-uses-a-nuclear-weapon/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/10/what-if-russia-uses-a-nuclear-weapon/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/GettyImages-1243828790-1.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/10/what-if-russia-uses-a-nuclear-weapon/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/10/what-if-russia-uses-a-nuclear-weapon/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>How the West should respond to nuclear war</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/10/what-if-russia-uses-a-nuclear-weapon/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> David Patrikarakos</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>The lesson from the only nuclear confrontation the world has ever known is therefore clear: the longer the tension lasts, the greater the risk of accidents and miscalculations. Hence the need for de-escalation. As David Ignatius observed <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2022/09/22/putin-ukraine-threats-biden-cuban-missile-crisis/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">in the <em>Washington Post</em></a>: “Leaders must think now with the same combination of toughness and creativity that President John F. Kennedy showed during the Cuban missile crisis in 1962. That means drawing a firm line — Kennedy never wavered on his demand that Soviet missiles be removed from Cuba — but it also means looking for ways to de-escalate.”</p>
<p>Ignatius also highlighted an uncomfortable truth: that the refusal to engage in any diplomatic process has, so far, come from Ukraine, and even more so from the US (and UK) — not Russia. On the contrary, Ignatius recalled that “Russia had been prepared for a ‘peaceful settlement’ in the negotiations brokered by Turkey in Istanbul in late March, but that Ukraine and the West had balked”. Then, in April, <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/russian-federation/world-putin-wants-fiona-hill-angela-stent?check_logged_in=1">according to multiple US officials</a>, Russia and Ukraine had agreed on a tentative deal to end the war — only for Boris Johnson to fly to Kyiv to bring the negotiations to an end, <a href="https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2022/05/5/7344206/">according to</a> Ukrainian pro-Western sources. This raises several questions: why did Western leaders want to stop Kyiv from signing a seemingly good deal with Moscow? And how many lives might have been saved, on both sides, if the peace talks hadn&#8217;t been derailed?</p>
<p>That said, Ignatius, along with others, interprets Biden’s recent “Armageddon” speech as a signal that the President may finally be pivoting towards the need for a diplomatic solution. The fact that Biden hasn’t ruled out the possibility of meeting Putin at next month’s G20 meeting in Bali — an option he wasn&#8217;t willing to consider until recently — also indicates a potential change of strategy on the US administration’s behalf.</p>
<p>But if this is the case, much will depend on Biden’s ability to stand up to the powerful forces of the US military-industrial complex pushing for the continuation and escalation of the war (as Kennedy had to do during the Cuban missile crisis). <a href="https://www.defenddemocracy.press/its-time-to-tell-biden-we-say-no-to-nuclear-war/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Some</a> are even suggesting that the increasingly brazen attacks against Russia — the recent bombing of the bridge connecting mainland Russia to Crimea, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/10/08/russia-ukraine-war-latest-updates/">likely</a> at the hands of the Ukraine’s SBU security service, for example — might be attempts by America’s pro-war faction to escalate the conflict.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/10/did-america-cause-europes-energy-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/10/did-america-cause-europes-energy-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/GettyImages-1230850511-scaled-e1665411106867-1024x637-1.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/10/did-america-cause-europes-energy-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/10/did-america-cause-europes-energy-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Did America cause Europe&#039;s energy war?</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/10/did-america-cause-europes-energy-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Thomas Fazi</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>After all, how realistic is it, as <a href="https://www.defenddemocracy.press/its-time-to-tell-biden-we-say-no-to-nuclear-war/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">the former congressman Ron Paul</a> asks, to assume that the Ukrainian government and intelligence services were able to conduct these operations behind America’s back? This leaves a couple of possibilities: either the Biden administration is fully on board with these actions, and supports the escalation; or there are elements actively working against the administration to derail any diplomatic solution — it certainly wouldn’t be the first time sections of the US intelligence had <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Prelude-Terror-Americas-Private-Intelligence/dp/0786714646">gone rogue</a>. Of course, there is also the third possibility: the US has completely lost control of the Ukrainians, who are now engaging in terrorist activities behind the US’s back; it wouldn’t be the first time that had happened either, if we were to consider America’s role in <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/ghost-wars-the-secret-history-the-cia-afghanistan-and-bin-laden-the-soviet-invasion-to">the birth of al-Qaeda</a>, for example.</p>
<p>All three prospects are equally terrifying. Whatever the case, the pro-war consensus is weakening, and that represents an opportunity. Now is the time for everyone who believes in a diplomatic solution to the conflict to speak out — and to put pressure on their leaders to stop the madness.</p>
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															<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">448149</post-id>				</item>
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					<title>Will Russia push the nuclear button?</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2022/10/will-russia-push-the-nuclear-button/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://stage.unherd.com/2022/10/will-russia-push-the-nuclear-button/?edition=us#comments</comments>
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						<![CDATA[Swift Centre Forecasters]]>
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							<![CDATA[Finger on the button. Credit: Contributor/Getty]]>
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							<![CDATA[<p><strong>The Swift Centre</strong> publishes <a href="https://www.swiftcentre.org/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">forecasts</a> from a panel of highly experienced and accurate forecasters including Good Judgment Project Superforecasters and financial industry professionals.</p>
]]>
						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>swift_centre</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ publishes <a href="https://www.swiftcentre.org/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">forecasts</a> from a panel of highly experienced and accurate forecasters including Good Judgment Project Superforecasters and financial industry professionals.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Sun, 16 Oct 2022 23:01:55 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Sun, 16 Oct 2022 23:01:55 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Nuclear bombs]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Nuclear War]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Nuclear Weapons]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Putin]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ukraine]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ukraine war]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Vladimir Putin]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://old.unherd.com/?p=447868</guid>
																												<description>
								<![CDATA[We assess the chances of a catastrophic escalation ]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>Ukrainian forces have recently retaken much of the ground that was captured by Russia in the first months of this year, and the Russian government and military response has looked increasingly panicked. Hundreds of thousands of civilian men have been drafted, with large numbers fleeing the country to avoid conscription, and dozens of cruise missiles fired at civilian targets in Ukrainian cities, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/eleven-killed-64-hurt-russian-attacks-ukrainian-state-emergency-service-2022-10-10/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">killing at least 11 people.</a></p>
<p>Most alarmingly, perhaps, Vladimir Putin has discussed the possibility of using nuclear weapons and his subordinate, the Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/qa-will-russia-use-nuclear-weapons-putins-warnings-explained-2022-10-04/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">has called for the use of a “tactical” nuclear weapon</a> on the battlefield in Ukraine. We wanted to assess how likely it is that a nuclear bomb might be used in the war. As well as that, what factors might increase the chance of that happening — if Ukraine continues to retake territory, or if Putin begins to lose his grip on power, will that increase or reduce the likelihood of a nuclear attack? Our forecasters were asked:</p>
<p><strong><em>Will a nuclear weapon be detonated in Europe as an act of hostility before 30 April 2023? </em></strong></p>
<p><em>Median forecast: 9%</em></p>
<p>That’s an extraordinarily high risk for a (just-over)-six-month period — if that level of danger was constant, there would be less than 20% chance of making it through any given decade without a nuclear explosion. The likelihood that the 75 years since the Second World War would have passed without any atomic bombs going off would be minuscule. But that group’s forecast hides a reasonable amount of variation. Some felt it was as low as 5%; others as high as 20%.</p>
<p>Forecasters were asked several questions about possible milestones in the war, such as Ukraine taking a particular city or region. How likely are those milestones, and if they happen, what will they say about the risk of a nuclear detonation? We asked four pairs of questions about the possible fall of four different cities: Sievierodonetsk, Melitopol, Chaplynka, and Mariupol. For each, we asked:</p>
<p><strong><em>What is the probability that Ukraine’s armed forces will take control of the city before 1 April 2023?</em></strong></p>
<p><strong><em>If Ukraine&#8217;s armed forces do take control of the city before 1 April 2023, will a nuclear weapon be detonated in Europe as an act of hostility within the following 30 days?</em></strong></p>
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<p>If the risk of a nuclear weapon being detonated between now and 30 April 2023 is uniform over time, then our 9% forecast implies there is a rolling risk of 1.3% over a 30-day period for the foreseeable future. Here, we use 1.3% as our benchmark for examining the effect of each milestone.</p>
<p>All the forecasters felt that more cities were likely to return to Ukrainian hands. The aggregate forecast was 71% that Sievierodonetsk, just a few miles behind the Russian lines, would fall. One forecaster felt that its loss was “already factored in” to Russian military thinking. Melitopol, in the south-east, and Chaplynka, on the border of the Crimean peninsula in the south, were almost as likely — 48% and 44% likely, respectively.</p>
<p>Sievierodonetsk is a “test” of the risk of nuclear weapons, said one forecaster — it is likely to fall soon, and tactical nuclear weapons could easily be targeted at Ukrainian supply lines, and be used in a comparatively low-stakes way. But another felt that “if Russia was going to use nuclear weapons because of Sievierodonetsk, they probably should have already”. The likelihood of a nuclear weapon being detonated in Europe in the 30 days following the recapture of Sievierodonetsk, Melitopol, and Chaplynka is 3.3%, 5.1%, and 5.5% according to our forecasters. The implication here — with its risk elevated up to four times higher than our baseline monthly figure — is that a nuclear exchange is more likely to occur following exchanges in territorial control.</p>
<p>Mariupol, on the other hand, deep behind Russian lines and symbolically important after its long resistance, was deemed unlikely to fall, with an aggregate estimate of 21%. “In this case, it seems likely that the whole Russian lines have collapsed&#8221;, wrote one forecaster. “If Mariupol is taken, it probably means the war is completely lost for Russia, with the possible exception of Crimea”, wrote another.</p>
<p>Most of the forecasters felt that, if nuclear weapons were to be used, it would happen before Mariupol fell: “If they haven&#8217;t been used prior to this event, then I highly doubt this would be the turning point”, said one, although another sounded a note of caution: “If Mariupol is re-taken, it would be a devastating blow to Putin, so the risk of a hostile nuclear detonation after the re-capture of Mariupol wouldn&#8217;t be entirely eliminated.” Accordingly, if this takes place, our forecasters assign a 1.6% chance of a nuclear weapon being used over the subsequent 30 days — similar to our baseline rolling risk.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/07/will-putin-use-wmds/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/07/will-putin-use-wmds/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/GettyImages-1241324227-copy-scaled-e1657644869547.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/07/will-putin-use-wmds/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author </span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/07/will-putin-use-wmds/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Will Putin use WMDs?</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/07/will-putin-use-wmds/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Swift Centre Forecasters </a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Forecasters were also asked two pairs of questions about wider regions, the oblasts of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhia:</p>
<p><strong><em>Will Russia be completely driven from Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts before 1 April 2023?</em></strong></p>
<p><strong><em>Will Russia lose all of Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts before 1 April 2023?</em></strong></p>
<p><strong><em>What effect would the realisation of these scenarios have on the chance of a nuclear attack over the subsequent 30 days?</em></strong></p>
<p>Driving Russia entirely out of the Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts, in the south of Ukraine, seemed unlikely to most forecasters — with an aggregate forecast of 31% — but it would be a major humiliation if they were. “If Zaporizhia and Kherson fall, Putin is also likely to have few days left,” wrote one. “His troops would be thoroughly demoralised. I would suspect that he would want to make a desperate last stand at the border of Crimea.”</p>
<p>Whether it would increase the risk of nuclear weapons was unclear. “Again, this comes well after the point at which a tactical nuclear weapon ought to be used,” wrote one, although another felt that one might still be used “to deter any further Ukrainian gains in the (more important to Russia) territories of the Donbas and Crimea”. The aggregate forecast of the probability of a nuclear attack in the following month was 3.2%.</p>
<p>The loss of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts — in the east of Ukraine, bordering Russia, filled with Russian-speaking ethnic Russians, and the parts that Russia initially occupied in February — would be especially damaging to Russia’s self-image. “The loss of them would be catastrophic for Putin,” wrote one forecaster, “because it would signal that he could not even hold territory where many of the locals may not oppose his forces”.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/10/what-if-russia-uses-a-nuclear-weapon/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/10/what-if-russia-uses-a-nuclear-weapon/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/GettyImages-1243828790-1.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/10/what-if-russia-uses-a-nuclear-weapon/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/10/what-if-russia-uses-a-nuclear-weapon/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>How the West should respond to nuclear war</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/10/what-if-russia-uses-a-nuclear-weapon/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> David Patrikarakos </a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Again, though, it was considered unlikely that both oblasts would be recaptured by Ukraine in the next six months, forecasted to be 18% likely. The risk of nuclear weapon usage 30 days after the realisation of this condition, 1.2%, was deemed to be lower than the baseline risk of 1.3%. “By this point”, according to one forecaster, “Russia will have essentially lost the war, and would have no incentive to launch a nuclear weapon.”</p>
<p>Turning toward the leadership of the countries directly involved in the conflict, we asked the forecasters whether either Vladimir Putin or Volodomyr Zelenskyy leaving office would affect the chance of a nuclear attack.</p>
<p>The chance of Zelenskyy leaving office was considered low — 5%, — without much variance. The only plausible reason the forecasters thought he would leave was if he was killed. If he was killed by a nuclear blast, that might make a second attack more likely, but in general it wasn’t thought that it would increase the risk: “If Zelenskyy dies then everything is up in the air,” said one. “Seems Putin no longer needs to resort to nuclear weapons.”</p>
<p>The chance of Putin leaving office, on the other hand, was thought to be higher — 10.5% — and with much greater variance, with one forecaster as high as 38%. If he leaves, it will not be in triumph. “If Vladimir Putin leaves office, it is likely due to a massive and humiliating defeat in Ukraine,” said one forecaster. It would also mean, they felt, that a nuclear detonation would be less likely. “The cases where Putin leaves office will almost universally involve the invasion being regarded as a complete failure,” said one, “and any replacement is almost certainly not going to escalate it”. They put the chance of a nuclear strike in the month after Putin leaves office at 2%.</p>
<p>A more complex scenario is one in which Putin faces a coup attempt. Forecasters were asked:</p>
<p><strong><em>Will there be an attempted coup to remove Putin resulting in more than five arrests before 1 April 2023?</em></strong></p>
<p>The forecasters again thought this to be unlikely but not vanishingly so: 15% (with significant variation — one put it at 33%). But they were unsure about whether it would raise or lower the risk of a nuclear blast: some felt it would make Putin edgy; others felt it would make him less willing to do anything that would further undermine his standing, such as starting a nuclear war.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/09/who-will-stop-putin-from-going-nuclear/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/09/who-will-stop-putin-from-going-nuclear/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/GettyImages-1328372-scaled-e1663159102917.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/09/who-will-stop-putin-from-going-nuclear/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/09/who-will-stop-putin-from-going-nuclear/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Who will stop Putin from going nuclear?</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/09/who-will-stop-putin-from-going-nuclear/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Philip Cunliffe </a></p></div></a></div>
<p>While the forecasters considered a broad range of factors that affect escalatory scenarios (from Russian military doctrine to the chance of nuclear launch orders being disobeyed), we have not identified any highly probable scenarios that turn the possibility of nuclear escalation into an inevitability. However, our forecasters clearly associate major losses in Russian-controlled territory with a higher chance of nuclear escalation. Ukrainian recapture of cities in the Kherson and Zaporizhia Oblasts, for instance, may coincide with increasingly desperate responses from Russia.</p>
<p>It’s important to note that this is only forecasting the chance of at least one bomb going off, somewhere in Europe. The obvious follow-up question would be: if one does, what are the likely outcomes? Will it lead to reprisals by NATO and the West on Russia? If so, will they be conventional or nuclear?</p>
<p>***</p>
<p><em>A version of this research first appeared on the Swift Centre.</em></p>
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					<title>How the West should respond to nuclear war</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2022/10/what-if-russia-uses-a-nuclear-weapon/?edition=us</link>
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						<![CDATA[David Patrikarakos]]>
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							<![CDATA[Putin will never stop (DIMITAR DILKOFF/AFP via Getty Images)]]>
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							<![CDATA[<p><strong>David Patrikarakos</strong> is <em>UnHerd</em>&#8216;s foreign correspondent. His latest book is <em>War in 140 characters: how social media is reshaping conflict in the 21st century. </em>(Hachette)</p>
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						<unherd:twitter_handle>dpatrikarakos</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is <em>UnHerd</em>'s foreign correspondent. His latest book is <em>War in 140 characters: how social media is reshaping conflict in the 21st century. </em>(Hachette)]]>
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										<pubDate>Tue, 11 Oct 2022 23:02:30 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Wed, 12 Oct 2022 10:37:13 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Nuclear War]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Russia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ukraine]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Vladimir Putin]]></category>
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								<![CDATA[Putin can't afford to throw in the towel]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>Talking about nuclear war used to be taboo. Even during the Cuban Missile Crisis, both Nikita Khrushchev and John F. Kennedy refused to invoke the idea of it. But the story of 21st-century international affairs is, in certain regards, one rooted in the erasure of political norms. Now, any despot with a chip on their shoulder and a bomb in their hands can mouth off about nuclear Armageddon and hope it provides some protection to whatever heinous behaviour they are engaged in.</p>
<p>How did we get here? The answer is, once more, Vladimir Putin. On Sunday, he went on Russian TV to fulminate over a “terrorist act” he claimed was carried out by Ukraine’s security services the day before. Early that morning, an explosion on the Kerch Bridge linking the Crimean Peninsula to Krasnodar Krai in Russia caused parts of it to collapse. The Russians are saying it was caused by a truck bomb. Kyiv has neither claimed nor denied responsibility.</p>
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<p>Either way, once Putin spoke of “terrorism”, my Ukrainian friends knew what was coming. “He was going to hit us hard,” one in the south told me. “We knew it would be our schools and hospitals.” And so it proved. Yesterday, another in Odesa described the extent of the attack:</p>
<p>“Three waves of attacks hit us in a one-hour period. Our Air defence announced [the presence of] 83 missiles (of which 43 were intercepted) and 12 kamikaze drones (nine were intercepted). The strikes came from the Black Sea, from Astrahan, from Belarus and from Russia. Our MoD is saying that three missiles even crossed Moldovan airspace. All the big cities and several small towns were hit. The Russians targeted energy infrastructure, specifically electricity and heating. Many cities are now lacking in both.”</p>
<p>I also spoke to a military contact on the ground in Kyiv. “I was near one of the strikes and it was strange,” he told me. “The missiles came in almost vertically, which means they leave huge craters but there isn’t a huge amount of shrapnel flying around. This was a poorly planned attack. Whatever coordinates they entered, they made a legitimate attempt to knock out comms and infrastructure across the country. But here in Kyiv they seem to have just fired as a form of intimidation.”</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/09/why-ukraines-counter-offensive-is-working/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/09/why-ukraines-counter-offensive-is-working/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/b.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/09/why-ukraines-counter-offensive-is-working/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/09/why-ukraines-counter-offensive-is-working/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Why Ukraine&#039;s counter-offensive is working</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/09/why-ukraines-counter-offensive-is-working/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> David Patrikarakos</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Shortly after the attacks, Putin went on television<a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/putin-says-ukraine-planned-crimea-bridge-explosion-calls-terrorism-rcna51400" target="_blank" rel="noopener"> to announce</a> the completion of a &#8220;massive strike&#8221; on Ukraine&#8217;s “energy, military command and communications facilities”. It was, he told his long-suffering Security Council, revenge for Ukraine’s long history of “terrorist” actions, including its attack on Kerch Bridge. He also made a threat: &#8220;If attempts to carry out terrorist attacks on our territory continue, Russia’s responses will be tough and will correspond in scale to the level of threats posed to Russia&#8230; No one should have any doubts about this.” Putin was once again alluding to nuclear weapons&#8217; use — something he has done several times throughout the war.</p>
<p>The taboo, it seems, has been shattered. Now, Russian TV talks about this prospect regularly. For chat show host and Kremlin blowhard Dmitry Kiselyov, blowing up the UK has become a favoured topic. One Russian nuke could “sink [Britain] once and for all” or turn it into a “radioactive desert”, <a href="https://www.vice.com/en/article/5dgxmq/russian-tv-nuke-britain" target="_blank" rel="noopener">he said</a> with customary restraint over the summer. He also <a href="https://www.scottishdailyexpress.co.uk/news/uk-news/russian-tv-says-uk-could-26851926" target="_blank" rel="noopener">claimed</a> a single bomb would cause a 1,600ft radioactive tidal wave &#8220;plunging Britain to the ocean&#8217;s depths&#8221;.</p>
<p>Kiselyov obviously doesn’t control Kremlin nuclear policy — he’s a TV star. But as a <em>de facto</em> official Kremlin mouthpiece, he would never have said something so inflammatory without official sign off. This points to a further truth. The Russian military playbook in Ukraine is a variegated thing. It has consistently evolved in the face of Moscow’s repeated defeats and is, accordingly, one born not of strategy and foresight, but of emotion: generally, anger and the unceasing desire for revenge.</p>
<p>Ukrainian officials now consider nuclear war, or more realistically, the possible use of a tactical nuclear bomb — loosely defined as nuclear weapon of limited power designed to be used on the battlefield with friendly forces close by — a real possibility. When I was in the country earlier this year, I lost count of the number of conversations I had with Ukrainians who feared this. And the more the Ukrainian army pushed Russia back on the battlefield, the greater the frequency of these conversations.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/10/did-america-cause-europes-energy-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/10/did-america-cause-europes-energy-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/GettyImages-1230850511-scaled-e1665411106867-1024x637-1.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/10/did-america-cause-europes-energy-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/10/did-america-cause-europes-energy-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Did America cause Europe&#039;s energy war?</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/10/did-america-cause-europes-energy-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Thomas Fazi</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>This is the paradox facing Ukraine — and the paradoxical nature of much of military strategy. Sometimes, the more you succeed the more vulnerable you become. The classic example of this is an army that keeps defeating its enemy, pushing it further and further back into its own territory. But the further the successful army goes into enemy territory, the further it is from home, and the harder it is to supply, and thus the weaker it becomes. The same principle is clearly at work here: the more Ukraine defeats Russia on the battlefield, the greater the possibility it drives Putin into using a tactical nuclear weapon to even the score. The more it wins, the greater the chance it can lose spectacularly.</p>
<p>Ukrainians are bitter about this, not least because when the Soviet Union collapsed, a substantial part of its nuclear arsenal was on the territory of the newly independent Ukraine. Kyiv agreed — under the Budapest Memorandum — to give up the weapons in exchange for guarantees on its territorial integrity. And who made these guarantees? Principally, Russia, the United States and the United Kingdom. No wonder they’re bitter. Had Kyiv nukes of its own, things might look different. But they don’t and this is what they are facing.</p>
<p>But it’s not simple for Russia either. If it decides to use a tactical nuke then it needs to, theoretically at least, avoid killing its own soldiers (not that Moscow has ever really cared about this) — and to achieve this it has to use the weapon competently. After what we’ve seen of its performance throughout the war, this is not a given. Then there are the wider issues. Ukraine is bordered by, among other countries, Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, and Romania — all of which are Nato powers. If any of the nuclear fallout entered one or more of these countries, it would be considered an attack against a Nato state and thus — because of Article 5, which is the binding principle of collective defence — against every Nato ally.</p>
<p>Would Moscow risk war with Nato, which it would unquestionably lose? Not even Putin is that insane. Former US General David Petraeus has suggested that, in the event of nuclear weapons’ use, the US would sink Russia’s Black Sea fleet. It sounds equally nuts — but Washington could do it. That’s the point.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/10/is-china-about-to-turn-on-russia/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/10/is-china-about-to-turn-on-russia/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/2GettyImages-1230428940-scaled.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/10/is-china-about-to-turn-on-russia/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/10/is-china-about-to-turn-on-russia/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Is China about to turn on Russia?</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/10/is-china-about-to-turn-on-russia/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Nathan Levine</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Then, of course, there would be the wider political and economic fallout. If Putin uses a nuke on the European continent, the international reaction would be beyond anything we have seen before. To take just one critical example: for decades, Russian energy has heated Berlin — and made it docile. But if Moscow went nuclear, even the Germans would have to go to wage economic war with Moscow and wean themselves off Kremlin gas, further crippling Russia.</p>
<p>Perhaps it&#8217;s unsurprising, then, that the past few days have ushered in a new phase of heightened tension that even Moscow can’t escape. Since the bridge attack, Putin has <a href="https://twitter.com/ArmandDAngour/status/1578740570096181248" target="_blank" rel="noopener">replaced</a> several army commanders and defence officials. He has also seemingly <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-63205446" target="_blank" rel="noopener">placated</a> Chechen leader and general psychopath, Ramzan Kadyrov, who had expressed public dissatisfaction with the trajectory of the war, but is now mollified — clearly delighted at the indiscriminate violence of the revenge strikes.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/russia-open-putin-meeting-biden-g20-lavrov-says-2022-10-11/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">says he wants to open</a> negotiations with the West, while the UAE (a close US ally) <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/33e1f9b6-79e4-4f58-a080-4c9ceba4cab3" target="_blank" rel="noopener">has agreed to meet with Putin</a>. These are most likely moves to gain time for Russia to train up and integrate men from its recent mass mobilisation into something at least approximating a fighting force.</p>
<p>Putin is a dictator and dictators, especially in Russia, cannot afford to lose wars if they wish to remain in power. Whatever is happening on the battlefield — or bridges — of Ukraine, he is not about to throw in the towel. He can’t afford to — even if deploying a tactical nuclear weapon is the only alternative.</p>
<p>If this happens, it would be more dangerous than perhaps any act in history. And it is for this very reason that we would have to remain steadfast despite the horror. We would have to continue to resist Putin and his genocidal dreams.</p>
<p>If he were to use nuclear weapons and see them achieve all his goals, he will never stop. Neither, for that matter, would North Korea or China. And every despot — from the Mullahs down — would dash for a bomb to achieve their goals of conquest and perennial autocracy. Facing down a tyrant who has used a nuke would be the most terrifying thing we have ever had to face, but it would be necessary for the sake of all of us — Ukrainians and non-Ukrainians alike.</p>
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