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		<title>Peace - UnHerd</title>
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		<description>think again</description>
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					<title>Why Ukrainian liberals love conscription</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2026/07/why-ukrainian-liberals-love-conscription/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://stage.unherd.com/2026/07/why-ukrainian-liberals-love-conscription/?edition=us#respond</comments>
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										<unherd:main_theme>War</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Marta Havryshko]]>
					</dc:creator>
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																<unherd:article_ranking>2</unherd:article_ranking>
																<unherd:image_caption>
							<![CDATA['No amount of “intellectual mobilisation” will be enough to contain public fury.' (Scott Peterson/Getty)]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<div><strong>Marta Havryshko</strong> is a US-based author and researcher focused on Ukrainian nationalism, the far Right, and the Russia-Ukraine war. She holds a PhD in history from the Ivan Franko National University of Lviv in Ukraine.</div>
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						<unherd:twitter_handle></unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is a US-based author and researcher focused on Ukrainian nationalism, the far Right, and the Russia-Ukraine war. She holds a PhD in history from the Ivan Franko National University of Lviv in Ukraine.</div>
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					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Sun, 19 Jul 2026 23:01:45 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Sun, 19 Jul 2026 23:33:39 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Conscription]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Peace]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Putin]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[Ukraine war]]></category>
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					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://stage.unherd.com/?p=1067717</guid>
																												<description>
								<![CDATA[Hypocritical propagandists aren’t forced to fight]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>&#8220;No!&#8221; the woman cries. “May you be damned!&#8221; You can hear the despair in her voice, as masked men grab her husband, then bundle him into a waiting van. Within seconds, she’s alone, weeping in the middle of the street. This is Odesa, but scenes like it, captured on phones and posted online, hammer Ukrainian cities as relentlessly as Russian missiles. Since Putin&#8217;s full-scale invasion began, over a million Ukrainians have been conscripted to defend their homeland. And, as voluntary recruits have dried up, the army has begun resorting to the same methods faced by that couple in Odesa. People even have a term for it: “busification”.</p>
<p>The process is brutally simple. Draft officers, often accompanied by police, snatch military-age men off the streets, before delivering them to recruitment centers. There, many are pressured through threats, intimidation, and physical abuse to pass military medical examinations and sign draft papers. Men with serious conditions — including HIV, tuberculosis and even cancer — are routinely declared fit for service. Whether they like it or not, the recruitment officers must meet quotas; the only question is who fills them. Yet with Ukraine’s wealthy elite reluctant to heed the call, Kyiv’s recruitment crisis is becoming a class crisis too, one that could cause chaos long after the guns fall silent.</p>
<p>Ukraine currently mobilizes around 30,000 men each month — yet many never make it to the front. Some flee training centers at the first opportunity, while others are later discharged as medically unfit. By autumn 2025, according to official figures, roughly 300,000 servicemen had gone AWOL or deserted. The numbers have become so politically sensitive that the authorities now keep the data secret. But the direction of travel is clear: Ukraine’s pool of willing fighters is shrinking. As a result, coercion has moved from the margins to the very center of national life.</p>
<p>Straightforward coercion, however, is only part of the story, as mobilization becomes a social scourge too. Today&#8217;s Ukrainian army is, increasingly, an army of the poor. Members of the upper-middle class — and especially the political and economic establishment — possess the resources, connections, and influence necessary to shield themselves from military service. Through a combination of legal work-arounds and bribes, they can avoid donning uniforms for a range of reasons, from illness, to having several children, to caring for disabled relatives. Others are exempt because they’re university students or academics, or work at strategic companies, particularly those linked to the defense sector.</p>
<p>A significant portion of Ukraine&#8217;s cultural and academic intelligentsia belongs to this privileged group. Many have received exemptions from military service while continuing their professional activities uninterrupted. In return, the state expects ideological loyalty and intellectual labor in support of the war effort. This includes promoting &#8220;decolonization&#8221; narratives that often amount to anti-Russian ethnonationalism. It also means deliberately ignoring the deep penetration of far-Right groups into the military, and remaining silent about the normalization of Nazi symbols within parts of the armed forces. But, most importantly, it means justifying coercive mobilization as a necessary instrument of national survival in what is routinely described as an &#8220;existential war”.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/04/why-i-went-to-moscow/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/04/why-i-went-to-moscow/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/GettyImages-2268768339-1.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/04/why-i-went-to-moscow/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/04/why-i-went-to-moscow/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Why I went to Moscow</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/04/why-i-went-to-moscow/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Yanis Varoufakis </a></p></div></a></div>
<p>A substantial number of Ukrainian intellectuals have willingly embraced this arrangement, placing themselves in the service of state interests while convincing themselves that they’re fighting on the &#8220;information front&#8221; in a war for independence from Russia. Others are motivated by more pragmatic considerations: preserving the privileges that come with exemption from military service. Still others remain loyal out of fear.</p>
<p>Fear, after all, is not an abstract concern. The costs of dissent have become increasingly visible. A recent example is the Ukrainian-Canadian political scientist Ivan Katchanovski, who became the target of a public campaign of denunciation by Ukrainian and Western scholars over his interpretation of the war. Katchanovski has argued for a more nuanced explanation of the conflict — one that looks beyond Russian imperialism and Putin&#8217;s ambitions to include the role of the Ukrainian far-Right, Nato, and a post-Cold War security architecture that excluded Moscow. Rather than confronting these arguments on their scholarly merits, many of his critics simply accused the scholar of spreading <a href="https://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2026/04/28/8032087/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">“Kremlin propaganda”</a>. Whatever one thinks of Katchanovski’s views, the episode sent a clear message: questioning dominant wartime narratives can carry serious professional and reputational consequences.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, justifying mobilization, regardless of how coercive, violent, or degrading it may be, has become a central task of Ukraine’s liberal intelligentsia. In May 2026, for instance, the prominent historian and public intellectual <a href="https://expert.in.ua/suspilstvo/istoryk-zayavyv-shho-mobilizatsiya-potrebuye-strahu-j-osudu-shho-vin-zaproponuvav/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Yaroslav Hrytsak</a> argued that patriotic appeals and financial incentives alone are insufficient to sustain effective mobilization in the country. In his view, society must also rely on fear and moral condemnation. As an example, Hrytsak invoked Britain’s experience during the First World War, when women handed white feathers to men who didn&#8217;t enlist, publicly shaming them as cowards.</p>
<p>What is striking is that Hrytsak offered no criticism of this practice, despite its deeply controversial legacy. The white-feather campaign stigmatized not only those unwilling to fight, but also veterans, disabled men, the seriously ill, and countless others who were unfit for military service. Yet in contemporary Ukraine, this history is increasingly presented not as a cautionary tale but as a model worthy of emulation.</p>
<p>In reality, of course, the public shaming of men who avoid military service is already deeply embedded in Ukrainian public discourse. For example, the popular singer <a href="https://www.obozrevatel.com/ukr/shou-oboz/ya-zahischala-sebe-alyona-alyona-potrapila-v-skandal-cherez-komentar-pro-ttsk-i-poyasnila-svoyu-pozitsiyu.htm" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Alyona Alyona</a>, who represented the country at the 2024 Eurovision, mockingly referred to such men as “Mama’s little boys” and publicly defended the harsh measures employed against draft evaders. <a href="https://tsn.ua/ukrayina/parad-licemirstva-nardepka-ustinova-rozkritikuvala-uhilyantiv-ale-ye-nyuans-2655345.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Oleksandra Ustinova</a>, an MP, has similarly attacked men who leave Ukraine to avoid service, arguing that the current civil penalties should be replaced by criminal prosecutions. Yet there’s an irony here. Ustinova’s own draft-age husband left Ukraine for the US after Russia’s invasion in March 2022, bought a house and a car there, and has shown little intention of returning.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;The public shaming of men who avoid military service is already deeply embedded in Ukrainian public discourse.&#8221;</div>
<p>There are other ironies too. In September 2024, Yaroslava Kravchenko, a celebrity TV host, published a report on male artists who had left Ukraine under the telling title <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YJJnD-kZ5lw&amp;t=1s" target="_blank" rel="noopener">&#8220;Those Who Escaped from Ukraine&#8221;</a>. Like many women who publicly denounce supposed draft dodgers, Kravchenko herself enjoys unrestricted international travel for both work and leisure. Many other female celebrities are in the same boat. Women, after all, remain exempt from the travel restrictions imposed under martial law — restrictions that prevent millions of Ukrainian men from leaving the country regardless of their personal circumstances, political views, or willingness to fight.</p>
<p>This asymmetry lies at the heart of growing social tensions. Those who champion moral condemnation often do so from positions of relative safety and freedom. They can cross borders, pursue careers abroad, and retain control over their own lives. The men they shame cannot. From the very first days of the war, Ukraine has cultivated the image of the ideal man: self-sacrificing, strong, courageous, and unfailingly committed to defending his family, his home, his nation. He is prepared, if necessary, to give his life for this cause.</p>
<p>His opposite is the <em>ukhyliant</em> — the draft evader. In the dominant narrative, he is portrayed as a coward who’ll resort to any means necessary to evade what is presented as his “natural” masculine duty. Public shaming of such men has become normalized, routine, and Ukrainian media has played a significant role in this process. Flippant headlines like “Draft Dodger Stopped by a Bear at the Romanian Border” or “Grandma Draft Dodger: Odesa Man Dressed as an Elderly Woman to Cross the Border” have now become commonplace. And though Article 35 of Ukraine&#8217;s constitution theoretically guarantees the right to alternative service for conscientious objectors, that right has effectively ceased to exist. A recent <a href="https://babel.ua/texts/127938-shturmoviy-polk-skelya-maye-boyovi-zaslugi-i-dobre-zabezpechennya-a-shche-kazhut-ochevidci-tam-katuyut-i-zabivayut-lyudey-na-smert-rozsliduvannya-babelya?utm_source=chatgpt.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">investigation</a> into the &#8220;Skala&#8221; regiment alleged that some men who refused to serve were beaten into compliance.</p>
<p>All the while, some Ukrainian feminists have directed their criticism at draft evaders while largely overlooking a wartime system that casts men as protectors and women as those in need of protection — precisely the gender hierarchy feminism claims to oppose. This flirtation with militaristic nationalism has left many feminists blind to the women whose lives are shattered by busification. Behind every man dragged into a recruitment van, then tortured or beaten to death by draft officers, let alone killed at the front, stands a mother, a daughter, a wife, bearing the fear, grief, and trauma that follow. But because their suffering complicates the dominant wartime narrative, this reality is largely met with silence.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/07/the-ukraine-wars-big-lie/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/07/the-ukraine-wars-big-lie/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/GettyImages-1468579963.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/07/the-ukraine-wars-big-lie/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/07/the-ukraine-wars-big-lie/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The Ukraine war&#039;s big lie</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/07/the-ukraine-wars-big-lie/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Thomas Fazi </a></p></div></a></div>
<p>A similar silence greets another group of inconvenient women — those who have become active in the grassroots struggle against forced mobilization. <em>Gender in Detail,</em> Ukraine&#8217;s leading gender website, has had remarkably little to say about the women standing in the way of busification. These women are threatened, attacked, prosecuted, and publicly shamed for defending relatives — or complete strangers — from recruitment vans. The courage of these women, from teenage girls to pensioners, can be seen in countless videos confronting recruitment officers and the police. Their courage is visible, their suffering documented. Yet their invisibility, in the end, is political.</p>
<p>That, of course, raises a broader question. With the frontlines mostly stagnant, and with the meatgrinder war <a href="https://www.europeandatajournalism.eu/cp_data_news/depopulation-and-war-threaten-ukraines-demographics/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">annihilating</a> Ukraine&#8217;s demographics, why is the government so intent on continuing with busification at all costs? Ukraine no longer appears to have the final say over its own future. That decision is increasingly shared with — or subordinated to — its Western sponsors, who view Ukrainian men less as citizens than as expendable military assets. The EU&#8217;s plan to refuse protection to Ukrainian men of draft age exposes this logic. By denying them refuge, Europe is effectively forcing them back to the front. Their bodies have become instruments in a larger geopolitical project: bleeding Russia. That’s further suggests that the war has become a Western proxy war against Putin. In return, Ukraine&#8217;s venal political elite, led by Volodymyr Zelensky, enjoys Western political protection — whatever the moral and legal problems with busification.</p>
<p>There’s another question here too. If Ukraine is being bled dry for Brussels, why not end militarization altogether? Unfortunately, those who suggest this path, advocating diplomacy or negotiations, are marginalized. When Yuliia Mendel, Zelensky&#8217;s former press secretary, told Tucker Carlson that the Ukrainian president had sabotaged peace talks with Russia, much of Ukraine&#8217;s mainstream media and a number of prominent liberal commentators responded not with debate but with a coordinated effort to discredit her, branding her a purveyor of &#8220;Russian narratives”.</p>
<p>Liberal intellectuals share responsibility for silencing these unwanted voices. Yet neither the state nor its intellectual allies can suppress these realities forever. Beneath the surface, they are fueling growing resentment and social anger. Every attempt to silence grievances only deepens the sense of injustice, and if the pressure continues to build, it may eventually spark a political and social explosion.</p>
<p>There are signs of this already. In the village of <a href="https://sud.ua/uk/news/ukraine/355297-vybili-steklo-travmirovali-voennykh-na-volyni-7-mashin-zablokirovali-avto-ttsk-chtoby-osvobodit-muzhchinu" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Ozero</a>, for instance, locals blocked a military recruitment vehicle, smashed its windows, and freed a mobilized man. Elsewhere, confrontations between recruitment officers and civilians have involved dozens of people, often escalating into verbal abuse and physical violence. Attacks on recruitment officers with knives, shovels, and clubs have become increasingly common too. As the military&#8217;s manpower crisis deepens, mobilization grows more coercive — and public resistance more intense. The way things are going, no amount of “intellectual mobilization” will be enough to contain public fury.</p>
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									<item>
					<title>Could defeat radicalize Ukraine?</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2025/08/could-defeat-radicalise-ukraine/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://stage.unherd.com/2025/08/could-defeat-radicalise-ukraine/?edition=us#comments</comments>
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										<unherd:main_theme>Alaska summit</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Ian Garner]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/Blue-thumb.jpg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>2</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[The Ukrainian far-Right is currently a tiny minority.  Sergei Supinsky/AFP via Getty.]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Dr. Ian Garner</strong> is assistant professor of totalitarian studies at the Pilecki Institute in Warsaw. His latest book is <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/z-generation/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em>Z Generation: Russia&#8217;s Fascist Youth</em></a> (Hurst).</p>
]]>
						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>irgarner</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is assistant professor of totalitarian studies at the Pilecki Institute in Warsaw. His latest book is <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/z-generation/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em>Z Generation: Russia's Fascist Youth</em></a> (Hurst).]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Thu, 14 Aug 2025 23:01:47 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Thu, 14 Aug 2025 23:01:47 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Alaska]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Donald Trump]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Europe]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Peace]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Putin]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[russia ukraine war]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ukraine]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[War]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Zelensky]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://stage.unherd.com/?p=700703</guid>
																												<description>
								<![CDATA[Dishonored nations turn violent]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Humiliation on the battlefield is one of the most reliable catalysts for an ultranationalist backlash. From the Freikorps in Germany to Russian “violence merchants” — the embittered veterans of the Afghan War and the brutal conflicts of the Nineties — rage, criminality, and organized violence have a habit of spilling back into society when wars end in dishonor. Disappointed, traumatized troops return home with the conviction that only force can redeem the nation, spreading chaos and revanchist politics as they go. And, if Vladimir Putin </span><a href="https://www.barrons.com/articles/putin-will-get-what-he-wants-in-alaska-his-long-game-353680aa"><span style="font-weight: 400">manages</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400"> to draw Donald Trump into agreeing to a one-sided peace deal that will reward his war of aggression and leave thousands of Ukrainians stranded under a brutal Russian occupation, history could yet repeat itself in Kyiv. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Today, Putin and Trump are expected to meet and, if Trump is to be taken at his word, hammer out the terms of a peace deal over Ukraine. The stakes could hardly be higher. Trump, ever the showman, </span><a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/crev9ep2vdgo"><span style="font-weight: 400">hails</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400"> the Alaska meeting as a decisive moment to “end the war”. Across the table, two men whose own political fortunes have been bound up with nationalist spectacle may soon decide Ukraine’s future. Regardless of what they agree, one thing is missing: Ukrainian representation. And without that representation, any deal may fuel Ukrainian veterans’ disappointment, damning its society to years of political turmoil.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">The phrase doing the rounds around the proposed deal is “</span><a href="https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-land-swap-trump-summit-e8e869d5d5ec672fee3e86022b20d11a"><span style="font-weight: 400">land swap</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400">” — a euphemism that, in practice, means no swap at all. In reality, it would involve Ukraine ceding a vast swathe of territory now under Russian occupation. Should that happen, and should Zelensky be bludgeoned into selling the deal to his own people, Ukraine’s near future could be defined less by recovery than by a smoldering, violent response to perceived defeat.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Unsurprisingly, Ukrainians across the political spectrum are furious with the outline of the deal. Zelensky himself, who is under immense pressure from the country’s political class and civil society not to hand Putin a victory, would find it all but impossible to sell any deal to the public, even if he wanted to. As he has </span><a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/aug/12/ukraine-russia-donbas-springboard-for-war-zelenskyy"><span style="font-weight: 400">made</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400"> this clear: “Ukraine won’t cede land that could be used as a springboard for war.” He has been similarly bullish about being frozen out of the Alaska summit, warning that “they cannot decide anything about Ukraine without us”.</span></p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">“Ukraine’s near future could be defined less by recovery than by a smoldering, violent response to perceived defeat.”</div>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Ukrainians remember the failures of the Minsk I and II agreements made with Putin a decade ago, and Russia riding roughshod over the Budapest Memorandum that promised them safety in return for giving up their nuclear arms in the Nineties. Above all, they remember the images of murdered civilians in Bucha and Irpin that shocked the world in early 2022. Soldiers on the front, where the death and casualty rate soars ever higher, and where at least 50,000 Ukrainians have died, bristle at the idea of giving in to Russia. As one frontline soldier put it, fighting will </span><a href="https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/ukrainian-troops-doubt-quick-ceasefire-reject-territorial-concessions-2025-08-12/?utm_source=chatgpt.com"><span style="font-weight: 400">continue</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400"> “until Russia suffers big enough losses”. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">A deal that therefore fails to grapple either with the causes or the effects of the war — which have never been limited to Nato expansion — will only ever result in backlash from the Ukrainian population. Indeed, it is important to stress that the war against Ukraine stems from the Kremlin’s increasingly paranoid, imperialist messianism, a worldview in which Ukraine’s independent existence is an existential affront. Ever since the humiliation of seeing his favored candidate, Viktor Yanukovych, lose Ukraine’s 2004 presidential election to the Western Ukrainian Viktor Yushchenko, Putin’s state media has peddled myths about Ukrainian “nationalists” and “Nazis” plotting against Russian-speakers in Ukraine. After the Maidan Revolution of 2014, Russia’s dictator acted on those fictions, invading Crimea and parts of Donbas under the pretext of stopping an imagined “genocide” against Russian speakers.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">By 2022, Putin’s language had become even more wild. After all, Ukraine’s far-Right held only a sliver of the electoral vote, and no seats in parliament. It had little following on social media and no discernible cultural sway. Indeed, the country’s president was a Russian-speaking Jewish entertainer popular on both sides of the border, elected not to build a nationalist utopia but on a promise to ease the war in the east. Putin’s war against “fascists” has always been Quixotic — a tilting at windmills in service of an imagined imperial conquest by a man who increasingly </span><a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/peace-is-impossible-while-vladimir-putin-denies-ukraines-right-to-exist/"><span style="font-weight: 400">sees</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400"> himself as a new Peter the Great, or even a new Stalin.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">However dim the prospects of regaining territory currently occupied by Russian forces, agreeing to formally surrender it would be a deep psychic wound. Russian forces have committed war crimes on an industrial scale. They have flattened cities like Mariupol, where 85% of the housing stock was destroyed and tens of thousands of civilians killed. In place of a functioning if corrupt democracy, Russia has established a system of totalitarian </span><a href="https://t4pua.org/en/2869"><span style="font-weight: 400">torture</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400"> and control that sees objectors beaten, jailed, and murdered. All the while, </span><a href="https://instytutpileckiego.pl/pl/instytut/aktualnosci/raport-skradzione-dziecinstwo-zbrodnie-przeciwko-dzieciom"><span style="font-weight: 400">children</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400"> are torn from their parents and sent to Russia, to be adopted and “Russified”. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Moscow </span><a href="https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.15715194"><span style="font-weight: 400">taunts</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400"> Ukrainians online with glossy footage of rebuilt apartment blocks and new public facilities — much of it in fact shoddy — and grotesque images of sites where Ukrainian children are put up for adoption. Toss resentment against an unjust peace into the mix and the response could be severe. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">A “stab in the back” myth — built around the belief that Washington and Europe have always been slow to back Ukraine, before abandoning Kyiv when the fight became inconvenient — is already simmering in Ukrainian discourse. Trump is certainly unpopular in this regard, but his predecessor Joe Biden was the </span><a href="https://theconversation.com/why-did-the-us-change-its-mind-on-ukraine-firing-missiles-into-russia-and-will-it-impact-the-war-243920"><span style="font-weight: 400">target</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400"> of much ire for slow-pedaling on first providing, then giving permission to use, the ATACMS missile system.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">The roots of this narrative go back to 2014, when Germany’s business-as-usual policy with Moscow brushed over the seizure of Crimea. From there, the “betrayal” of Ukraine seems set to dominate every nook and cranny of Ukrainian society over years to come, should the Trump-Putin deal become a reality. Nor is this really surprising: what was the sacrifice of tens of thousands of Ukrainian lives worth if the outcome is not merely lost land but a diminished sense of nationhood — and thousands more Ukrainians abandoned to their fates under Moscow’s thumb? </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Some Ukrainians might still look to Europe for answers. The pro-Nato, pro-EU bloc, which sees them as bulwarks against Putin’s war on individual freedom, remains the largest and most powerful force in Ukrainian politics. For its part, Zelensky’s Servant of the People party still leads the polls by some distance. Yet Europe looks to many like a house divided: Keir Starmer and Emmanuel Macron’s “coalition of the willing” has talked up its willingness to help, but in practice has done little to prepare for a defense of either Ukraine or the European continent. Instead, leaders have </span><a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QoiDzhpfpQQ"><span style="font-weight: 400">gazed</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400"> on as Trump’s Ukraine policy has oscillated, even as the Kremlin has </span><a href="https://nationalinterest.org/feature/russias-hybrid-war-on-poland?fbclid=IwY2xjawMJHxVleHRuA2FlbQIxMQABHlZ7mLVNRntMcj9nHzSGMdUZtw7YRXcva24ypCv674KCxA7y-SiKq5NyOL4u_aem_rduGPHuUnO8ntZKzN3S16Q"><span style="font-weight: 400">conducted</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400"> a hybrid war against Europe. An extraordinary 90% of Ukrainians favored EU membership last summer. Surely that number will not hold if the stab-in-the-back narrative spreads. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">The darkest scenario here is an ultra-nationalist turn, and a politics dominated by embittered, violent veterans in a demographically and economically decimated country hungry for scapegoats. And scapegoats there will be. In some corners of Ukrainian society — including pro-European and liberal factions, but especially among the armed forces — names are already circling: Western leaders are first among the </span><a href="https://www.bangkokpost.com/world/2972828/stab-in-the-back-ukrainians-in-shock-after-us-aid-halt"><span style="font-weight: 400">villains</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400">, blamed for choosing short-term and commercial interests over saving Ukraine. But Ukrainian military leaders and politicians are not without blame. That means above all military commanders such as Oleksandr Syrskyi, the commander-in-chief blamed by ordinary soldiers for the worsening frontline situation in recent months. Should Zelensky be seen to sell his forces down the river, the reaction will be extreme, regardless of how little choice he actually had.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">The optics of the Alaska summit will not help here. A camera-friendly meeting between Putin and Trump — two strongmen casually hashing out Ukraine’s future without a single Ukrainian in the room — has justifiably enraged Ukrainians across the political spectrum. If the deal is rammed through over Kyiv’s objections, nationalists will mine the “betrayal” for decades: it’ll be another Munich, when Hitler was allowed to annex the Sudetenland, with today’s Ukraine betrayed by a West that simply didn’t care. Ukrainians could thus prime themselves for another war, choosing leaders whose reputation and politics rests on war — or find themselves watching as those leaders, from among a corps of embittered veterans, force their way to power.</span></p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">“Should Zelensky be seen to sell his forces down the river, the reaction will be extreme, regardless of how little choice he actually had.”</div>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Support for nationalist factions today is still limited. The far-Right remains a minority in politics. In a June poll, the ultranationalist National Corps reached 6%, its highest ever rating. But Servant of the People did not even exist a decade ago, and Ukraine’s political scene is not dominated by entrenched parties. Especially in the wake of a devastating war, it is deeply susceptible to whirlwind forces transforming nations everywhere: online mobilization, norm-shattering rhetoric, the rise of new parties from nowhere, and the demolition of old political truths. Not long ago, most Ukrainians opposed Nato membership. Indeed, not long ago, Zelensky was a TV comedian. There is nothing to prevent an ultra-nationalist rise in Ukraine. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">The question, then, is not where public opinion stands today but where it might go in the next few years, turbocharged by disappointment, social collapse, economic devastation, and a Europe increasingly inclined to slam the door shut on a fragile and unstable Ukraine. The Ukraine that could emerge would be defined by military paranoia. Veterans alone would have “earned” the right to set the national agenda. Indeed, rumors now abound that figures like Valerii Zaluzhnyi, the popular former commander-in-chief now serving as Ukraine’s ambassador in the United Kingdom, might enter politics. Zaluzhnyi is no extremist, but others with more hardline views might explode from the ranks of the army into the public consciousness should widespread resentment take hold. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Indeed, Zelensky’s decision to welcome and thus implicitly endorse nationalist soldiers in the military, desperate for anyone willing to fight, may turn out to be a major strategic error. This Ukraine would look neither to Brussels nor to Washington but inward — rebuilding its forces, militarizing society, and, as some voices around the country are already advocating for, seeking nuclear weapons to reverse the “mistake” of giving up its arsenal in the Nineties. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Putin claimed he was forced to invade Ukraine to destroy the threat of Ukrainian “fascism”. Yet in February 2022, the far-Right in Ukraine was a negligible force: indeed Russia’s neo-Nazi problem far exceeded Ukraine’s. But do a deal with Trump over his enemy’s head, and Putin could soon find that his fantasy of a fascist Ukraine becomes reality. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">I am not arguing that this is the most likely scenario. Ukraine’s democracy has repeatedly resisted the pull of extremes — from Russian interference and invasion to internal politicking and corruption — since independence from Moscow in 1991. Its commitment to reinforcing democratic norms, bolstered by the EU, other nations, and a large, vocal civic block willing to take to the streets, most recently against Zelensky’s targeting of anti-corruption laws, suggests that liberal democracy may yet prevail.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">But nationalists will not hesitate to use force if they see an opening. Complacent Western leaders, and Trump most of all, seem uninterested in this risk. Ironically, this was the very mistake made in Russia in the Nineties, when the West adopted a <a href="https://www.npr.org/sections/money/2022/03/22/1087654279/how-shock-therapy-created-russian-oligarchs-and-paved-the-path-for-putin" target="_blank" rel="noopener">shock economic policy</a> to “repair” post-Soviet Russia while ignoring worrying trends in the country’s culture and identity. Putin, for his part, knows all about the psychologically scarred veterans of the Afghan and Chechen wars. After all, in the early 2000s, he channeled their trauma and propensity for violence into support for his own nationalist myth. Today, his government and security services are full of these men, still willing to use any means to secure and hold power.</span></p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/08/the-new-cold-war-will-divide-the-west/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/08/the-new-cold-war-will-divide-the-west/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/08/GettyImages-2212294858.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/08/the-new-cold-war-will-divide-the-west/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/08/the-new-cold-war-will-divide-the-west/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The new Cold War will divide the West</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/08/the-new-cold-war-will-divide-the-west/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Philip Cunliffe</a></p></div></a></div>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Reining in such forces in a post-conflict Ukraine will be a vital task. Peace can be salvaged even from the most brutal and bitter conflicts, but only with hard work, serious negotiation, mutual compromise, and above all, a focus on what comes </span><i><span style="font-weight: 400">after</span></i><span style="font-weight: 400"> the ink dries. The Dayton Accords, which ended the Yugoslav wars in 1995, were the product of three months of intense talks built on years of groundwork, strong-arming from Europe and the Americans — and input from all sides. And even then, the Accords left the roots of nationalism and factionalism intact.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">The mooted Alaska plan is long on promises and short on detail. A made-for-social-media deal is unlikely to last. Even those Ukrainians most inclined to peace are unlikely to be placated by a “land surrender” agreement while Russia remains unbowed. At any moment, Moscow could return to the battlefield, retooled and remanned, this time without the blunders of February 2022. Putin shows no signs of making real concessions. His propagandists continue their maximalist talk, and his army continues its scorched-earth advances. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Indeed, the further Ukraine moves towards ultranationalism to hedge against this continued threat — or in response to the disappointment of a peace deal forced down the population’s throats — the more Putin will claim he is justified in launching new aggression against his western neighbor. The peace deal, far from ending the fight, might only encourage Russia to assault the fragile remainder of a free Ukraine in a few years’ time.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Nonetheless, nobody in the White House, publicly at least, seems to be thinking beyond the next move. Signing a peace deal will not make the problem of Russian aggression disappear; it may even exacerbate the problem. As heart-rending images of burned-out Ukrainian cities and murdered Ukrainian families fade from our screens, we may be tempted to believe the problem is gone. But Moscow will still be fighting — and a resentful, traumatized Ukraine will still remember. </span></p>
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					<title>Trump never wanted peace in Ukraine</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2025/04/trump-never-wanted-peace-in-ukraine/?edition=us</link>
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										<unherd:main_theme>Ceasefire</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Michal Kranz]]>
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																<unherd:article_ranking>1</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA["What the Americans want is clear: unilaterally normalising ties with Russia." Chip Somodevilla/Getty Images.]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<div><strong>Michal Kranz</strong> is a freelance journalist reporting on politics, society and defence in Eastern Europe and the Middle East. He runs <i><a href="https://theeasternflank.substack.com/" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://theeasternflank.substack.com/&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1737473225062000&amp;usg=AOvVaw1ymYD5AVcHVPGcry_zwCIQ">The Eastern Flank</a>,</i> a Substack newsletter focused on Eastern European geopolitics.</div>
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						<unherd:twitter_handle>Michal_Kranz</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is a freelance journalist reporting on politics, society and defence in Eastern Europe and the Middle East. He runs <i><a href="https://theeasternflank.substack.com/" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://theeasternflank.substack.com/&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1737473225062000&amp;usg=AOvVaw1ymYD5AVcHVPGcry_zwCIQ">The Eastern Flank</a>,</i> a Substack newsletter focused on Eastern European geopolitics.</div>
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										<pubDate>Thu, 24 Apr 2025 23:03:12 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Fri, 25 Apr 2025 08:17:25 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Europe]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[Putin]]></category>
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								<![CDATA[Will Europe abandon Zelensky too?]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>Nothing says &#8220;peace talks&#8221; like a barrage of Russian missiles. Seventy have just hit Kyiv — alongside 145 drones — even as Donald Trump can do little but post in response. After absurdly blaming Volodymyr Zelensky for holding up a ceasefire, setting him up as the scapegoat for the imminent collapse of his beloved peace process, he&#8217;s now switched his guns to his Russian counterpart. &#8220;Vladimir, STOP!&#8221; Trump begged, in the aftermath of the <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2025/04/24/europe/russia-strikes-kyiv-trump-zelensky-crimea-intl-hnk/index.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">deadliest assault</a> on the Ukrainian capital since the summer of 2024. So dire are the negotiations that Nato’s Secretary General Mark Rutte has <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wsZ9FRfXa2g" target="_blank" rel="noopener">jetted off to Washington</a> to meet with high-ranking members of the Trump administration, in a desperate attempt to bring the talks back from the brink.</p>
<p>But unfortunately for Rutte, it is likely too late. In the two months since the last major blow-up between Trump and Zelensky, that infamous Oval Office fight, almost no progress has been made in the Trump administration’s talks to end the Ukraine war. And though the contours of the current standoff are slightly different than they were in February, the crux of the problems remains the same. The only terms Russia is willing to accept amount to the neutering of Ukraine as a sovereign state, something Kyiv is unlikely to ever accept.</p>
<p>For Trump, that leaves just one alternative: abandoning Ukraine to its fate and rushing ahead to reconfigure the geopolitical map with Putin unilaterally. The real question, then, is what’s next for Kyiv’s hapless European partners — whether they’re ruthless enough to finally take the continent’s defense into their own hands, and whether they’ll even be able to focus on Ukraine now that other new threats emerge much closer to home.</p>
<p>Spirits had been high going into last week’s <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2025/04/17/europe/us-ukraine-talks-europe-peace-intl/index.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">talks</a>, where European leaders were finally given a seat at the negotiating table. But shortly before flying back from Paris, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio admitted the truth: that if no significant progress is made in the coming days, the Trump administration <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2025/04/18/europe/rubio-russia-war-in-ukraine-us-talks-intl-hnk/index.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">may walk away</a> from the talks altogether. A week later, the funeral dirge duly sounded. The Ukrainians have <a href="https://www.axios.com/2025/04/22/trump-russia-ukraine-peace-plan-crimea-donbas" target="_blank" rel="noopener">rejected</a> Trump’s &#8220;final offer&#8221;, which apart from handing Crimea to Moscow, included a &#8220;de facto&#8221; acceptance of Russia’s occupation of 20% of Ukrainian territory, a pledge that Kyiv would never join Nato, and the lifting of all sanctions imposed on Russia since 2014.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/04/we-need-to-resurrect-eastern-europe/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/04/we-need-to-resurrect-eastern-europe/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/GettyImages-1251803733-scaled-e1682357765581.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/04/we-need-to-resurrect-eastern-europe/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/04/we-need-to-resurrect-eastern-europe/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>We need to resurrect Eastern Europe</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/04/we-need-to-resurrect-eastern-europe/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Michal Kranz</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Given these concessions would effectively extinguish Ukraine as an independent state, and leave it deeply vulnerable to future Russian aggression, it’s little wonder that Kyiv promptly dismissed them. It’s also unsurprising that, after Rubio <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/ukraine-talks-rubio-witkoff-london-putin-zelenskyy-trump-russia-war-rcna202525" target="_blank" rel="noopener">refused</a> to attend, planned talks in London were hastily downgraded to meetings between minor diplomats, and that the European leaders who were beaming in Paris <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/0e1bee19-5f56-4186-b54f-ac19314d8dba" target="_blank" rel="noopener">are now</a> panicking.</p>
<p>Of course, understanding the failure of the talks goes far beyond the Ukrainians themselves. Trump’s entire approach was colored by domestic political concerns, a warped understanding of the nature of the conflict, and his own personal agenda. Certainly, the President misunderstood his counterpart in the Kremlin. One mistake was imagining Putin would accept a post-war European peacekeeping force in Ukraine. Another involved dispatching separate envoys to Kyiv and Moscow, which not only led to contradictory messages being sent to both sides, but also made it easier for Steve Witkoff, Trump’s Russia envoy, to buy Putin’s narrative on the war hook, line, and sinker.</p>
<p>That all hints at a broader strategic failure. By jumping haphazardly from preliminary ceasefire agreements to an overarching peace deal, both were doomed to fail, as fundamental disagreements between the Russians and Ukrainians on issues large and small never had space to be resolved. Despite its frequent and determined shuttle diplomacy, the Trump team was never willing to undertake the subtle, painstaking work that conflict resolution of this sort requires, attempting instead to force through particular outcomes rather than figuring out if they actually made sense.</p>
<p>Putin himself also underestimated the role of Trump’s narcissism in the negotiation process. Though he succeeded in getting Trump and his clique to swallow much Kremlin propaganda on Ukraine, Trump’s willingness to regurgitate Russian talking points was superseded only by his desire to feel in control. Zelensky, with few other options, was forced to bend to Trump’s will, while Putin, negotiating from a position of strength, never felt compelled to offer Trump anything more than diplomatic flattery.</p>
<p>Even so, the Russian leader has on several occasions made gestures to appeal to Trump’s ego, including most recently <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/ukraine-russia-war-invasion-trump-putin-ceasefire-peace-talks-b2737712.html/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">offering</a> to “give up” his aim to annex the parts of Luhansk, Donetsk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia Oblasts that Russian troops don’t currently occupy — a performative “concession” that European diplomats <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/0e1bee19-5f56-4186-b54f-ac19314d8dba" target="_blank" rel="noopener">believe</a> may be just another ruse. Putin knows that any negotiated settlement would have likely ended with a freeze of the conflict along existing frontlines anyway, making it hard to read his offer as a genuine attempt at compromise. That’s especially given he has continued to refuse to budge on every other major issue at play in the peace talks.</p>
<p>Nevertheless, the move was a retreat from Putin’s most maximalist aims, and clearly signalled that he would prefer to reach a deal on Ukraine under Trump’s auspices if at all possible. All the while, the Russian president is clearly aware he has other, less elegant, ways of reaching his goals, as Russian forces have so brutally demonstrated throughout three years of war. Unlike Trump and Zelensky, then, Putin not only has no incentive to end the conflict. He also has the added luxury of time. Failing to understand both of these facts has been Trump’s mistake from the start.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;Putin not only has no incentive to end the conflict. He also has the added luxury of time.&#8221;</div>
<p>So if the talks have failed, what next? What the Americans want is clear: unilaterally normalizing ties with Russia. Both Trump and Putin would have much preferred to settle the issue of Ukraine diplomatically before moving on to the <a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/02/why-putin-needs-a-new-yalta/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">grand bargain</a> on Europe’s future, something that the Russian leader has wanted to pursue for years. Putin has long seen Trump as the ideal partner through whom he might finally be able to end Russia’s international isolation from the West, establish new rules of play between Russia and the US in Europe, and at last clarify what sort of relationship Moscow will have with Washington on the world stage. Ever the businessman, Trump’s goals are slightly less lofty — opening up trade and gaining access to Russia’s <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/russia-us-start-talks-rare-earth-metals-projects-russia-putin-envoy-says-2025-03-30/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">wealth of rare earth metals</a> top his agenda, as does driving a wedge between Moscow and Beijing.</p>
<p>Yet without the easy end to the war that Trump had promised, he’s characteristically likely to sidestep the problem instead, moving to remake the US-Russia relationship and establish the limits of American involvement in European affairs — leaving Ukraine and its neighbors to deal with Russia alone.</p>
<p>Based on progress so far, that’ll be challenging. For one thing, the continent has struggled to develop a comprehensive plan to support Ukraine. In summit after summit, well-intentioned proposals have fallen flat on their face. That&#8217;s most stunningly last month when, during a session of the European Council, a €40 million aid plan for Ukraine was whittled down to just an eighth of that, before further divisions led the idea being <a href="https://www.theparliamentmagazine.eu/news/article/eu-credibility-at-stake-as-leaders-fail-to-agree-on-military-ukraine-aid" target="_blank" rel="noopener">abandoned altogether</a>. The Europeans have equally found it hard to develop their own defense industries since Trump’s election. Though they’ve taken several <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/brussels-exempt-defence-spending-eu-budget-constraints-2025-02-14/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">notable steps</a> here, for instance exempting defense spending from EU budget caps, creating a unified security industry across the continent is difficult precisely because the bloc continues to be an amalgamation of different governments and economies. Whatever the EU’s detractors may say about Brussels overreach, the truth is that Europe is still far too disunited to build a single defense sector — without significant bureaucratic hand-wringing anyway. Even so, as hope for any additional American weapons shipments is effectively nil, the long-running pressure on Europe to fill at least some of that void is only growing.</p>
<p>To be fair, there are bright spots amid the litany of failed summits. One is the Danish <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/nato-member-finds-way-more-weapons-ukraine-avoid-snags-2025-3" target="_blank" rel="noopener">model</a> of using frozen Russian assets and other sources to fund domestic weapons production in Ukraine. That might make it easier for Ukraine to get desperately needed ammunition and artillery to the frontlines, while European militaries are increasingly <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2025/04/22/world/europe/europe-weapons-investment.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">moving away</a> from American suppliers to domestic ones. Giving Ukraine the cash it needs to arm itself might also prevent a looming EU schism, with countries like Hungary increasingly unwilling to fund the Ukraine war. By funnelling aid for Ukraine’s domestic arms production through individual EU states, rather than the bloc itself, European countries can let Hungary have its cake and eat it too.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/02/only-poland-can-save-nato/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/02/only-poland-can-save-nato/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/GettyImages-2183777691.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/02/only-poland-can-save-nato/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/02/only-poland-can-save-nato/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Only Poland can save Nato</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/02/only-poland-can-save-nato/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Michal Kranz</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Even so, there are only so many ways that European military aid can replace America’s. The US, after all, has the power to dictate life and death on the Ukrainian battlefield beyond merely cutting off weapons shipments, as it so cynically demonstrated in March when it <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2025/03/05/world/trump-cut-ukrainian-aid-patriot-missiles-intl/index.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">turned off</a> the targeting systems of the Ukrainian army’s HIMARS, Patriots, and other missile batteries. Without such basic capabilities, which Europe would hardly be able to replicate, it is very possible that Ukraine’s ability to resist Russian advances, even in its current limited capacity, would be greatly jeopardized.</p>
<p>Not that Ukraine is the only calculation here. There’s already an unspoken logic taking hold among some states in Nato’s east that, if push comes to shove, they too may have to abandon Ukraine to protect themselves. The departure of American <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/us-pull-presence-key-ukraine-arms-aid-hub-poland-jasionka/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">troops</a> from a key base in Poland only heightens these worries, as do Pentagon proposals to withdraw up to 10,000 soldiers from right <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/national-security/pentagon-considering-proposal-cut-thousands-troops-europe-officials-sa-rcna199603" target="_blank" rel="noopener">across</a> Eastern Europe. Despite working with its regional partners to build a wall of fortifications along Russia’s border, and strengthen itself militarily, Lithuania for one is not taking any chances — its capital city Vilnius has just <a href="https://www.standard.co.uk/news/world/lithuania-vilnius-evacuation-plan-putin-zelensky-trump-b1223947.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">unveiled</a> a sweeping plan to evacuate its entire population in the event of a Russian invasion.</p>
<p>Regardless of how unified Europe ultimately becomes on defense in the years to come, countries with the most to lose from an unrestrained Russia — from Poland to the Baltics — are already coming to the conclusion that acting unilaterally will be the only way to protect themselves. Latvia’s <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2025/04/16/world/europe/latvia-land-mine-convention-russia-ukraine.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">recent exit</a> from the Ottawa Treaty banning anti-personnel mine deployment is only one example, with more European states likely to take matters into their own hands as Brussels keeps prevaricating. With competing agendas weakening the EU and NATO at this pivotal moment of crisis, regional alliances that act independently of both are likely to arise. There are already clear precedents for this. In 2020, after all, Poland, Lithuania, and Ukraine created an alliance called the Lublin Triangle, which has remained active throughout Russia’s war against Ukraine. Though its function is currently diplomatic, it isn’t hard to imagine the Lublin Triangle, or alliances like it, taking on security functions too.</p>
<p>Nor can you blame the Europeans for such frantic action. After all, they may soon find themselves facing a resurgent Moscow — for the first time able to act with impunity on the continent with the tacit blessing of the world’s premier power. Another D-Day is obviously unlikely anytime soon, indeed, but the Europeans may eventually need to consider the US itself as a rival power. And just as the US has increasingly abandoned them, the Europeans may need to face the fact that there may come a day when they too might have to abandon Ukraine — not out of selfishness, but out of cold, hard necessity.</p>
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					<title>Erdogan&#8217;s Turkey won&#8217;t save Ukraine</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2022/03/erdogans-turkey-wont-save-ukraine/?edition=us</link>
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					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[David Patrikarakos]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/David-Patrikarakos.jpg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
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							<![CDATA[Let me tell you about my drones (ADEM ALTAN/AFP via Getty Images)]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>David Patrikarakos</strong> is <em>UnHerd</em>&#8216;s foreign correspondent. His latest book is <em>War in 140 characters: how social media is reshaping conflict in the 21st century. </em>(Hachette)</p>
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						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>dpatrikarakos</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is <em>UnHerd</em>'s foreign correspondent. His latest book is <em>War in 140 characters: how social media is reshaping conflict in the 21st century. </em>(Hachette)]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Mon, 28 Mar 2022 23:02:28 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Fri, 01 Apr 2022 16:17:52 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Diplomacy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Europe]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Istanbul]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Peace]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Recep Tayyip Erdogan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Russia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Turkey]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ukraine]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Vladimir Putin]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Volodymyr Zelenskyy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[War]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://old.unherd.com/?p=401552</guid>
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								<![CDATA[The prospect of peace rests solely in Putin's hands]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p style="font-weight: 400;">The Bayraktar Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) TB2 looks like the malformed<strong> </strong>lovechild of a small plane and a large, angry wasp. But if the armed drone looks weird, there’s nothing strange about its performance. Over the past few weeks, the Ukrainians have been using their fleet of just 12 to churn up Russian hardware. By all accounts — most of which are set to video and posted on social media — they’ve <a href="https://qz.com/2135820/the-cheap-tb2-drone-gives-ukraine-an-edge-against-russia/">taken out </a>a Russian command post, a bunch of military vehicles (including a tank); various types of truck; a load of surface-to-air missile systems and a couple of Russian fuel trains.</p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;">Ukrainians write <a href="https://euromaidanpress.com/2022/03/22/ukrainians-love-the-turkish-combat-drone-bayraktar-so-much-they-wrote-a-song-about-it/">songs</a> about their beloved Turkish drones. Ankara is feted in Kyiv. Now, not content with helping to kill Russians, Turkey’s President Recep Erdoğan is now trying to negotiate with them. Erdoğan spoke to Putin over the phone on Sunday <a href="https://www.dailysabah.com/politics/diplomacy/erdogan-discusses-russia-ukraine-talks-in-turkey-with-putin">and stressed</a> the palpable need for a ceasefire on humanitarian grounds, saying Turkey was happy to help. He also — and this is important — made clear that Turkey will not jeopardise its relations with Russia or Ukraine. His ability to speak to both sides was, he said, an asset. They both agreed to hold more talks in Istanbul.</p>
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<p style="font-weight: 400;">Turkey has offered to mediate between the two sides ever since the Russian army<strong> </strong>barrelled into Ukraine, following Putin’s hour-long televised meeting in which it became quite clear he was in the grip of despotism’s true curse: an utter detachment from the reality that would, under normal circumstances, restrain him. Thousands have now died in a war that is now over a month old and that Putin told everyone would last three days. Then again, he also told everyone — including Ukraine&#8217;s Jewish President — that he was going to “denazify Ukraine”, which his troops chose to do last week by shooting up the Holocaust Memorial in Drobitsky Yar on the outskirts of Kharkiv.</p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;">So Putin now finds himself in a tricky spot. His soldiers are getting shredded by Ukrainians buoyed by Western weaponry and the motivation that comes with defending their homeland . <a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/03/russia-will-never-want-peace/">My concern</a> has always been that Moscow has never cared about the lives of its soldiers — it’s not like their families can complain or the government is accountable to its citizens. Besides, there are plenty more where they came from and, despite some reports, plenty more Russian hardware to wheel into play.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/03/russia-will-never-want-peace/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/03/russia-will-never-want-peace/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/2GettyImages-1238924342-scaled-e1647966212670.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/03/russia-will-never-want-peace/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/03/russia-will-never-want-peace/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Russia will never want peace</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/03/russia-will-never-want-peace/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> David Patrikarakos</a></p></div></a></div>
<p style="font-weight: 400;">But for now, Russia flounders. There is much talk of “off-ramps”, a phrase used in geopolitical circles to mean giving someone a way out of a disastrous situation (usually of their own making). The problem is: how do you do it? Putin cannot talk to the United States or to Britain or even the EU — all of whom are doling out weapons and cash to Ukraine and sanctions on Russia — without looking pathetically weak.</p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;">Any Western state is a problem for him, which is a problem for us because we’re not going to trust China to do it. And no country in the non-Western world has the relationships or political clout to do it, apart from maybe India, which is more concerned with keeping things sweet with Moscow and is therefore clearly unacceptable to the Ukrainians. Such is the desperation for mediators that last month saw the yarmulke-wearing Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett jetting off to Moscow to try to make some progress (“see how Putin big-dicked him by making him fly on Shabbat,&#8221; observed an Israeli friend to me). It didn’t seem especially serious.</p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;">Turkey, though, is different. “Turkey is kind of unique here,” Ziya Meral, a Senior Associate Fellow at RUSI tells me. “It borders Ukraine and Russia in the Black Sea and has made sure to have good relations with both. It has consistently condemned Russian aggression in Ukraine — especially the seizure of Crimea. It is supplying the Ukrainians with drones. But at the same time it has strong relations with Russia, especially around energy, defence and tourism.”</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/03/will-chechnyas-gamble-in-ukraine-backfire/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/03/will-chechnyas-gamble-in-ukraine-backfire/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/2GettyImages-76717125-scaled-1.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/03/will-chechnyas-gamble-in-ukraine-backfire/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/03/will-chechnyas-gamble-in-ukraine-backfire/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Will Chechnya&#039;s gamble in Ukraine backfire?</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/03/will-chechnyas-gamble-in-ukraine-backfire/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Harold Chambers</a></p></div></a></div>
<p style="font-weight: 400;">He continues: “For the Russians, there are obvious advantages. First of all, it allows them to sit down and say they are negotiating. They can claim they are trying to find a solution — but not with the West. That is vital to them: to show they are engaging for peace but on their own terms. They are not bowing to anyone.”</p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;">It does seem the Kremlin is exploring this possible off-ramp seriously. The Russian oligarch Roman Abramovich, who is personally close to Putin, was on the ground in Turkey over the weekend, acting as an unofficial plenipotentiary for Moscow and will report back to his President personally. To be fair, he is by all accounts now living there anyway after being forced to scuttle out of both London and Israel. It’s not the type of forced exile that millions of Ukrainians are suffering right now, but it’s something.</p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;">For Turkey, the war in Ukraine presents both danger and opportunity. Erdoğan wants his country to form part of an energy route across the European continent — something that has become much more likely following the EU energy sanctions on Russia, as well as the fact that no one now wants to rely on Moscow for gas anymore anyway. Erdoğan has also always insisted that Turkey is an important global player that needs to be involved in the world&#8217;s major events. And the one now playing out in Ukraine folds all his neuroses into it. For him, Turkey must never be too reliant on Russia and China but he is also perennially mistrustful of Nato. A middle course is the only way. Do this right and that might be possible.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/03/what-zelenskyy-got-wrong-about-israel/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/03/what-zelenskyy-got-wrong-about-israel/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/GettyImages-1239366179-1-scaled-e1648054901722.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/03/what-zelenskyy-got-wrong-about-israel/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/03/what-zelenskyy-got-wrong-about-israel/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>What Zelenskyy got wrong about Israel</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/03/what-zelenskyy-got-wrong-about-israel/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Lahav Harkov</a></p></div></a></div>
<p style="font-weight: 400;">But as skilful a negotiator he may be and as open to resolution as Putin may be — and I have reservations over the veracity of both of those claims — there is a limit to what can be achieved. Putin is only talking so much because the Ukrainians fought so well. If they hadn’t, he wouldn’t be negotiating. He’d be gloating.</p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;">And so it won’t be Turkey, or Erdoğan, that brings about peace in Ukraine. In the coming weeks, it might play a supporting role, but that’s it. As Meral concludes: “It’s not the men in suits but the ones on the battlefield that will ultimately decide what happens — as they always do.”</p>
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					<title>British imperialism didn&#8217;t destroy India</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2021/06/british-imperialism-didnt-destroy-india/?edition=us</link>
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					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Razib Khan]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/Screenshot-2026-10-27-at-17.04.55.jpg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
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							<![CDATA[Indian Independence Day Credit: Arindam/Dey/AFP/Getty]]>
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							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Razib Khan</strong> is a geneticist. He has written for <em>The New York Times, India Today </em>and <em>Quillette</em>, and runs two weblogs, Gene Expression and Brown Pundits. His newsletter is <i>Razib Khan&#8217;s Unsupervised Learning.</i></p>
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						<unherd:twitter_handle></unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is a geneticist. He has written for <em>The New York Times, India Today </em>and <em>Quillette</em>, and runs two weblogs, Gene Expression and Brown Pundits. His newsletter is <i>Razib Khan's Unsupervised Learning.</i>]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Wed, 23 Jun 2021 23:00:10 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Thu, 24 Jun 2021 06:30:54 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Colonialism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[History]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[imperialism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[India]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Peace]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Poverty and Betrayal]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[white supremacy]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://old.unherd.com/?p=154412</guid>
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								<![CDATA[Colonial rule brought relative peace to the subcontinent]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>British rule of the Indian subcontinent has been blamed for a lot: the rise of predatory capitalism, the centuries-long decline of South Asia into deep poverty with the concurrent industrialisation of England and, of course, the flowering of the ideology of white racial domination over non-white peoples.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.amazon.co.uk/Peace-Poverty-Betrayal-History-British/dp/1787383857" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em>Peace, Poverty and Betrayal: A New History of British India</em></a> puts the kibosh on these assertions. In it, Roderick Matthews argues that there was no fixed plan, either in the inception of British India or the hasty exit; the vaunted connection between the British and Indian economies was marginal at best; and though the rise of racial supremacism was a feature of the cultural landscape of Victorian England, the colour hierarchy in India had roots prior to the 19th century, and was caught up in a roiling vortex of broader currents in the Western world.</p>
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<p>Matthews, who has written extensively on British India, contends that while the jewel in the crown was a glittering signal to the world of British power, it did not make that power. And yet he presents little coherent explanation for these centuries when the decisions made by the British gave us the modern nation-states of India and Pakistan. <em>Peace, Poverty and Betrayal </em>would have us think that these were incidental, but even without a plan, the decisions made by India’s colonial overlords have shaped the lives of 25% of the world’s population.</p>
<p>In the realm of British-Indian historiography, the centuries between 1600 and 1947 are divided into three neat subunits. The East India Company&#8217;s (EIC) era of assimilationist age of “White Mughals”, to use William Dalrymple’s phrase, is followed by an evangelical Christian one, with the British Raj closing out a three-act tragedy. To Matthews, the overarching themes applied to justify these three eras can be forced and misleading, overly reductive. I take his point.</p>
<p>He kicks off the narrative conventionally enough in 1600, when the East Indian Company (EIC) was founded, and ends it in 1947, when the British Raj transferred power to the newly independent states of India and Pakistan. In <em>Peace, Poverty and Betrayal</em>, the EIC never transcends its 17th-century origins, when it was a tool of the British monarchy battling the Portuguese and Dutch on the high seas, skulking around the margins of the Mughal Empire to obtain minor trading concessions. Despite the later pomp and circumstance, Matthews argues persuasively that the EIC remained an institutionally weak organisation from its beginning to its very end.</p>
<p>The nature of the EIC for most of its history can be illustrated by the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anglo-Mughal_War" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Child’s War of the 1680’s</a>, when it first confronted the Great Mughal directly. The conflict did not go well for the EIC, and eventually a surrender was negotiated where the company&#8217;s envoys prostrated themselves before Emperor Aurangzeb and paid a substantial indemnity. It is easy to forget that for generations, British merchants and soldiers were almost beneath the notice of the rulers of India.</p>
<p>How, then, did the British become masters of the subcontinent by 1800? Well, Robert Clive conquered Bengal for the EIC at the Battle of Plassey in 1757. But again, this was not part of any plan. Clive looted what would today be billions of pounds, and was put on trial by Parliament for his actions. Clive’s protégé, Warren Hastings, was impeached by Parliament for extortion, embezzlement and committing judicial murder against a personal enemy. The fall of India to the EIC was a conspiracy of individual greed rather than a coordination of imperial power.</p>
<p>Clive and Hastings’s ignoble careers illustrate the institutional capture of the EIC, where they burdened the company with quasi-imperial responsibilities and risks, while personally hoarding the gains. No surprise that in 1772 the British taxpayers bailed out the EIC, extending a loan to stave off bankruptcy.</p>
<p>But British hegemony in India was born of more than the private interests of rapacious aspiring nabobs. The total chaos of the mid-18th-century Mughal collapse was such that India fell into their laps. In the war of all against all that defined India in the 18th century, Clive and Hastings were only exceptional in that they were British. By the second half of the century, India was divided between warring Mughal vassals bickering over who could manage to hold the emperor hostage.</p>
<p>Across the vast centre of the subcontinent, an array of warlords allied to create the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maratha_Empire" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Maratha Confederacy</a>, which persisted as a power across the whole of the 18th century. Though lionised by modern Hindus for defeating Muslim invaders, at the time the Maratha playbook of raids geared toward looting and destruction left only fear and loathing in its wake. The Maratha invasion of Bengal in the 1750s resulted in hundreds of thousands of deaths.</p>
<p>Yet while men such as Clive and Hastings clearly operated purely on the basis of selfishness, a widely agreed fact, their leadership of the EIC arguably brought relative peace to the Indian subcontinent. Matthews notes that during the 1857 Indian Rebellion, the cities of Bengal stayed loyal to the EIC and the British, as did most of the native princes. Both factions preferred the peace of British India to the potential chaos — something akin to China under the warlords — that might have been unleashed by a rebel victory.</p>
<p>Nevertheless, <em>Peace, Poverty and Betrayal </em>chronicles the gradual disillusionment of India&#8217;s forward-looking urban elite with British rule, contrasted with the complacent satisfaction of the innumerable maharajas. By the time of the Indian Rebellion, a modernising native professional and capitalist class had emerged. When EIC governor-general William Bentinck <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lord_William_Bentinck#Abolition_of_Sati" target="_blank" rel="noopener">banned</a> <em>sati</em>, the ritualised burning of widows, in 1839, Indian objections were minimal. In fact, <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ram_Mohan_Roy" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Ram Mohan Roy</a>, a prominent Bengali cultural reformer and wealthy financier, had campaigned for banning the practice.</p>
<p>This cultural liberalisation within India in the 19th and 20th centuries was not just a tone-deaf top-down imposition from the Anglo-Indian elites, but a process that occurred in concert with native professionals. Much of the urban elite of India was educated in the British system, realising Thomas Babington Macaulay’s vision of “a class of persons Indian in blood and colour, but English in tastes, in opinions, in morals and in intellect”. Jawaharlal Nehru and Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the first leaders of India and Pakistan, both trained as lawyers in London.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2021/05/the-mongols-invented-multiculturalism/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2021/05/the-mongols-invented-multiculturalism/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/horsepeople.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2021/05/the-mongols-invented-multiculturalism/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2021/05/the-mongols-invented-multiculturalism/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>What the Mongols did for us</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2021/05/the-mongols-invented-multiculturalism/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Razib Khan</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>The leadership of the Raj did remain the exclusive preserve of British aristocrats— though the EIC officers routinely mixed with and assimilated into the conservative Indian ruling class, while some Indian women became the ancestors of prominent British notables. Robert Jenkinson, 2nd Earl of Liverpool and Prime Minister from 1812 to 1827, likely had an Indian great-great-grandmother. In the 1820s, EIC major-general David Ochterlony took his 13 Indian wives on a promenade atop 13 elephants around the Red Fort of Delhi.</p>
<p>Ochterlony, however, was the last of his kind, as officials and officers started to reflect 19th-century British cultural triumphalism and a more sober Christian outlook. The sharp turn away from synthesis and assimilation was even felt in the homes of company officials; the standard curries of the early 19th century gave way to vegetarian Indian cooks attempting to master the art of the roast.</p>
<p>But Matthews rejects standard histories which chronicle a transition from an EIC infinitely accommodating of local custom and tradition to one dominated by evangelical zeal and utilitarian calculation. The EIC still understood that active attempts to convert Hindus and Muslims would only result in hostility from the population they ruled. The business of the East India Company was business. Excessive evangelistic enthusiasm was tamped down. In 1847, those who served in the company were forbidden to engage in missionary work in any official capacity.</p>
<p>The toxicity of mixing religion and rule in India was illustrated by the infamous trigger for the Indian Rebellion of 1857. Rumours swirled that the Enfield rifle cartridges distributed among the <em>sepoys</em> were greased with cow or pig fat. Soldiers needed to prise out the cartridges with their lips or teeth before use, a gross violation of the religious taboos of both Muslims and Hindus. Later investigations proved that the grease was indeed from pigs and cows, but the reason was self-interested cost-cutting by obtuse contractors. In other words, a rebellion was sparked by capitalist avarice, not insensitivity of zealous Christians bent on trampling the beliefs of Hindus and Muslims. The British blundered into conquest and rule, and they blundered into a rebellion. Venality was far more common than malevolence.</p>
<p>The subsequent betrayal of India&#8217;s political and cultural elites after 1857 was due to short-sightedness. The British crown developed a much closer relationship to the conservative Indian princes, who were very positively disposed toward undemocratic rule on the subcontinent. The EIC conquest brought peace in the early 19th century, but the transfer to the British Raj in 1858 and the crowning of Queen Victoria as the Empress of India in 1877 consolidated and ossified an imperial system which remained fixed in the past, shutting out the rising Indian middle class from political power.</p>
<p>In addition to its political conservatism, the British Raj did little to alleviate poverty, inspired by the same economic theories which led to the calamitous Irish potato famine. India was subject to 24 major famines between 1850 and 1899 and millions died of starvation. Nobel-Prize-winning economist Amartya Sen argues that these tragedies were caused by a lack of accountability in an undemocratic regime, rather than the vicissitudes of the monsoons.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2021/04/the-culture-wars-of-post-colonial-india/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2021/04/the-culture-wars-of-post-colonial-india/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/modimasks.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2021/04/the-culture-wars-of-post-colonial-india/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2021/04/the-culture-wars-of-post-colonial-india/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Why the West lost India&#039;s culture wars</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2021/04/the-culture-wars-of-post-colonial-india/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Razib Khan</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>And so by the early 20th century, the Indian National Congress, precursor of modern India’s Congress Party, was agitating for full independence and national self-determination, while Mahatma Gandhi led campaigns of civil disobedience against the British colonial administration. The children and grandchildren of the prosperous burghers who had remained loyal in 1857 were no longer satisfied with just peace and order; they wished to govern themselves.</p>
<p>In the decades up to 1947, the Anglo-Indian ruling elite understood the looming future in the abstract, but refused to acknowledge the necessity of concrete steps. The tragedy of a hasty partition, and the death of millions, can be attributed to these attitudes and policies. Britain unwound its Indian responsibilities in haste, rather than in an ordered fashion. Matthews’s heterodoxy in treating the 18th and 19th centuries swerves back to expected orthodoxies in the 20th. Anyone familiar with the late stages of the British Raj will not be surprised by the depictions of the regime’s bumbling and missteps, but this unplanned improvisation was foundational to British rule in India, rather than a new development.</p>
<p>The reality of permanent chaos in decision-making leads us to the conclusion that the great prosecutions of British misrule in India are off-base. India as a part of the British Empire was a matter of prestige and pride for the ruling gentry, but its economic connections to the metropole have been greatly exaggerated. India’s poverty in the 20th century had more to do with the fact that its economic basis, subsistence agriculture, did not change much from the 18th century.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2021/05/how-the-culture-wars-came-for-history/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2021/05/how-the-culture-wars-came-for-history/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/admin-ajax.jpeg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2021/05/how-the-culture-wars-came-for-history/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2021/05/how-the-culture-wars-came-for-history/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>How the culture wars came for history</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2021/05/how-the-culture-wars-came-for-history/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Dominic Sandbrook</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>In contrast, Britain was at the forefront of  industrialisation <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Textile_manufacture_during_the_British_Industrial_Revolution#Elements_of_the_Industrial_Revolution">before</a> the conquest of India. Nationalist Indian observers such as Shashi Tharoor in his polemical <em>Inglorious Empire: What the British Did to India</em> argue for a zero-sum world of wealth redistribution, but European nations without extensive colonies also underwent rapid development in the 19th century. The EIC itself was marginally profitable, and made many of its largest windfalls in the China trade. Taxation and goods remitted to Britain were always minimal.</p>
<p>The true impact of the British relationship with India was not economic, but cultural and social. It is an undeniable fact that the political and legal systems which constitute the machinery of the modern Indian state to this day are inherited from the British. The economic “great divergence” between the West and the rest of the world was a universal feature of the 19th and 20th centuries, not something special and peculiar to the relationship between India and Britain.</p>
<p>There was no need for transfer of wealth from India to Britain, because Western economies were all shifting toward higher value manufactured goods that ushered in a middle-class society well before the apex of the Raj. Nineteenth-century English historian John Robert Seeley observed that the British “seem, as it were, to have conquered and peopled half the world in a fit of absence of mind.” But despite the lack of forethought, India inherited a salubrious set of institutions and norms from the Raj in terms of maintaining and keeping a liberal democratic republic. The modern Republic of India is a testament to this fact.</p>
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					<title>The drawbacks of Japan&#8217;s cult of peace</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2020/08/the-drawbacks-of-japans-cult-of-peace/?edition=us</link>
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						<![CDATA[Eri Hotta]]>
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							<![CDATA[A student wait to float a lanterns on Hiroshima's river during the 71st anniversary activities. Credit: Richard Atrero de Guzman/NurPhoto via Getty Images]]>
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							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Eri Hotta</strong> is the author of <i class="">Japan 1941: Countdown to Infamy</i>, which examines the Japanese leadership in the run-up to the Pacific War.</p>
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															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is the author of <i class="">Japan 1941: Countdown to Infamy</i>, which examines the Japanese leadership in the run-up to the Pacific War.]]>
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										<pubDate>Wed, 05 Aug 2020 23:04:45 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Thu, 06 Aug 2020 10:53:16 +0000</updated>
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		<category><![CDATA[Atom bomb]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Hiroshima]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Japan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Nagasaki]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[North Korea]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Nuclear Weapons]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Pacifism]]></category>
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								<![CDATA[75 years after the atomic bomb, it may be time for the nation to outgrow pacifism]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p class="a">At 8.15 am on 6 August 1945, the USAAF B-29 Bomber<span lang="IT"> Enola Gay</span> dropped an atom bomb on Hiroshima. The innocuously nicknamed &#8220;Little Boy&#8221; obliterated the city’s urban centre, instantly killing an estimated 80,000 people, and claiming 60,000 more lives by the year&#8217;s end. An atomic attack on Nagasaki followed three days later. 75 years after those horrific events — just in time for today&#8217;s anniversary of the bombing of the city — the Hiroshima District Court, on 29 July, made <a href="https://au.news.yahoo.com/japan-court-recognises-more-hiroshima-bomb-survivors-082708736--spt.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">a widely reported ruling</a>.</p>
<p class="a">It extended to 84 plaintiffs, with ages ranging from late 70s to 90s, the certification of atomic bomb victims. In other words, it recognised them as having been exposed to radioactive “black rain”. These plaintiffs were just outside the area, officially designated after the fact, where radioactive droplets from the nuclear explosion fell. In spite of their long struggles with radiation-linked diseases, they had been denied the same level of medical benefits that were given to “certified” atom bomb survivors.</p>
<p class="a">For those plaintiffs and other survivors, the nuclear summer of 1945 is never a distant memory. For most Japanese today, it is. Nevertheless, all Japanese people grow up with ample knowledge of the horror and cruelty of nuclear weapons — be it from obligatory lessons at schools, or from popular manga and movies. (<i><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Barefoot_Gen" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">Barefoot Gen</a>, </i>a semi-autobiographical manga by Keiji Nakazawa that has sold 10 million copies worldwide, is but one example.) As a result, Hiroshima — Hiroshima more than Nagasaki, for being the “first” — has become a quasi-religious abstraction that reigns at the heart of Japan’s pacifist ideology.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2020/06/trumps-unpredictable-nuclear-policy/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2020/06/trumps-unpredictable-nuclear-policy/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/GettyImages-956350648-1.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2020/06/trumps-unpredictable-nuclear-policy/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2020/06/trumps-unpredictable-nuclear-policy/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Trump&#039;s unpredictable nuclear policy</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2020/06/trumps-unpredictable-nuclear-policy/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Gerard DeGroot</a></p></div></a></div>
<p class="a">During the Second World War, Japan’s national ideology revolved around the cult of emperor worship. After Japan’s defeat, the cult of peace worship took its place. This worship draws its moral strength from two interconnected sources. One is Article 9 of the US-drafted postwar constitution, which renounces <span dir="RTL" lang="AR-SA">“</span>war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes”. The other is Japan’s broad-based anti-nuclear arms sentiments, of which Hiroshima is the most potent symbol. And so every year, on 6 August, the city makes national headlines as Japan commemorates the anniversary of the bombing.</p>
<p class="a">“Peace” is everywhere on that occasion. The “Hiroshima Peace Memorial Ceremony” is held in the “Hiroshima Peace Memorial Park”, built near the bomb’s detonation point. Top politicians and dignitaries join in silent prayers with ordinary citizens at 8.15 am, followed by the tolling of “peace bells”, the mayor’s “peace declaration”, and a releasing of doves into the sky once shrouded by a mushroom cloud. Around the anniversary, many commemorative events are held, including art exhibitions, flower shows and concerts featuring the world’s top musicians. (The late pianist <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peter_Serkin" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">Peter Serkin</a>, in 2017, played with the Hiroshima Symphony Orchestra at its “Music for Peace Concert”. He also gave a moving private performance on a Baldwin piano that once belonged to Akiko Kawamoto, an American-born teenager. The piano survived the bombing. Akiko didn’t.)</p>
<p class="a">Due to fear that Covid-19 will spread, many of this year’s 75th anniversary events have had to be cancelled, and the main ceremony will be drastically downsized. Even so, Hiroshima’s essential importance as a galvanising point of postwar Japanese identity will remain unchanged.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2020/05/how-we-rewrote-the-second-world-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2020/05/how-we-rewrote-the-second-world-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/GettyImages-1223455249.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2020/05/how-we-rewrote-the-second-world-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2020/05/how-we-rewrote-the-second-world-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>How we mythologise the Second World War</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2020/05/how-we-rewrote-the-second-world-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Niall Gooch</a></p></div></a></div>
<p class="a">Three is nothing inherently wrong with a country valuing and praying for peace. Peace is hard not to like, and it is also unifying. It can act as the lowest common denominator to bring together people of different political persuasions — as well as former enemies. (The Japanese welcomed Barack Obama when he made a peace-making visit to Hiroshima in May 2016, the first US President to do so while in office.) Adopting pacifism as a national ideology also helped Japan regain its international legitimacy in the Cold War era. Going pacifist meant that Japan, an erstwhile rogue state with expansionist designs, could begin identifying itself as a reformed, benign power — and the most dependable US ally in East Asia.</p>
<p class="a">But peace, or more precisely, the kind of pacifism that Japan has cultivated over the past three quarters of a century, has its drawbacks. For one, it has hindered a meaningful political debate. By emphasising Japan’s own wartime sufferings and its current desire for peace, the conservative Japanese regime, in power for most of the postwar period, has tended to downplay Japan’s record as an imperialist aggressor, first in East Asia, and later in the Pacific and Southeast Asia. And until recently, the Right&#8217;s narrative generally overlooked the fact that the nuclear casualties included Allied POWs, as well as Chinese and Korean forced labourers.</p>
<p class="a">The vociferous Right — for some time now represented by the hawkish leadership of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe — insists that a revision of the postwar pacifist constitution is necessary so that Japan can become a truly sovereign nation-state. Unless it becomes an active military power, this line of argument goes, Japan cannot preserve peace. But that same need to preserve peace is invoked by the political Left too, which regards any intimation of a constitutional revision as a sacrilege.</p>
<p class="a">“Peace”, in this instance, is tautological. It serves as a reason for Japan to have an active military and at the same time, to continue rejecting that option. A lack of dialogue between those two opposite camps is worrying, when changing conditions — primarily in the forms of China’s rise and a nuclear-armed North Korea — are making it necessary for Japan to examine what kind of peace Japan wants and how best to achieve it. Does Japan need to alter its constitution? How active should the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Japan_Self-Defense_Forces" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">Japan Self-Defense Forces</a> be? Can Japanese peace — and by extension, regional peace — be secured without the strong backing of the United States? If pressed on any of these questions, Japanese individuals would likely have different answers. Yet, the Japanese version of pacifism, anchored in the horrific experience of the atom bombings, has long created a misleading sense that the nation is more united than it really is.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2019/11/ban-the-bomb-the-worlds-moved-on-mr-gorbachev/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2019/11/ban-the-bomb-the-worlds-moved-on-mr-gorbachev/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/GettyImages-155478884.jpg?w=238" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2019/11/ban-the-bomb-the-worlds-moved-on-mr-gorbachev/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2019/11/ban-the-bomb-the-worlds-moved-on-mr-gorbachev/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Ban the bomb? The world&#039;s moved on, Mr Gorbachev</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2019/11/ban-the-bomb-the-worlds-moved-on-mr-gorbachev/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Mary Dejevsky</a></p></div></a></div>
<p class="a">Another disadvantage of Japanese pacifism is the selective historical memory it has helped to forge. In this retelling, nuclear weapons become overly exceptional. In 1945, they were an extension of strategic preferences that had led all the belligerent parties to bomb their enemies&#8217; civilians. The world was initially shocked by the German bombing of Guernica in April 1937. But all the powers would adjust to the dehumanising idea that civilian deaths were a necessary part of total warfare, either because precision-bombing of military targets was deemed too difficult, or because targeting civilians was regarded as an effective demoralising strategy — or, more and more, as the war dragged on, both.</p>
<p class="a">Before the Blitz, Japan was one of the first countries to bomb civilians, <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bombing_of_Chongqing" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">most notably</a> in Chiang Kai-shek’s relocated capital Chongqing from late 1938 onwards. Once the Allied forces, too, got started, they went all out — in Hamburg, Berlin, Dresden, and many other cities, followed by a series of B-29 fire-bombings of Japan. Too few Japanese individuals nowadays, even those who whole-heartedly preach “No More Hiroshima”, remember that Tokyo sustained the biggest air-raid <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bombing_of_Tokyo_(10_March_1945)" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">on the night of 9/10th March 1945</a>: 80,000 to 100,000 people perished in one night.</p>
<p class="a">This is not to minimise the exceptionally destructive power of the nuclear weapons or the subsequent moral controversy that emerged as radioactivity’s horrifying and long-lasting effects became known. It is only to stress that one cannot assume, from what we have learned since, that explicit calculations of an immoral or an even racist nature propelled the US decision to drop those atomic bombs on Japanese cities. While those calculations could have existed alongside more urgent strategic preferences. The foremost US priority in the summer of 1945 was to win the war with Japan through extensive bombing, be it incendiary or atomic.</p>
<p class="a">By the time Japan surrendered on 15 August 1945, more than 200 Japanese cities of various sizes had been bombed. Okinawa had fallen. And the civilian population had been thoroughly starved by a blockade of US-planted sea mines that prevented the transportation of food supplies. The prospect of a two-fronted invasion by the Soviet Union and the United States terrified the Japanese leadership. (Stalin was poised to declare war on Japan even before Hiroshima.) With the Soviet Union’s entry into the war on 9 August, Japan’s surrender was imminent. The atomic bombs might have influence the timing somewhat, but the fear of the Soviet invasion and a potential revolution were compelling enough reasons for Japan to give up the fight.</p>
<p class="a">With more than 80% of Japan’s population having grown up in peacetime, war is understandably a remote notion. It is also understandable that for most of today’s Japanese, “peace” — or at the very least, the absence of war — feels like a <i>sui generis </i>condition given to them in response to their earnest prayers for it. But without an active political debate, based on a more balanced view of history, that peace might not last.</p>
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