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		<title>Populism 2025 - UnHerd</title>
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					<title>How the populist era could revive liberal democracy</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2018/08/populist-era-revive-liberal-democracy/?edition=us</link>
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						<![CDATA[Henry Olsen]]>
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							<![CDATA[<p>Henry Olsen is a Senior Fellow at the Ethics and Public Policy Center in Washington, DC. He is the author of <em>The Working Class Republican: Ronald Reagan and the Return of Blue-Collar Conservatism</em>.</p>
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						<unherd:twitter_handle>henryolsenEPPC</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[Henry Olsen is a Senior Fellow at the Ethics and Public Policy Center in Washington, DC. He is the author of <em>The Working Class Republican: Ronald Reagan and the Return of Blue-Collar Conservatism</em>.]]>
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										<pubDate>Fri, 24 Aug 2018 16:02:48 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Fri, 24 Aug 2018 16:47:24 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[America]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[Europe]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Liberalism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Populism 2025]]></category>
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								<![CDATA[<p>A decade of populism will be just the fix for a fracturing Europe and a faltering America, leading to greater peace and prosperity. Or maybe it will deliver darker times, greater social division and economic suffering. The contributors to our series #Populism2025 are themselves divided on the likely outcome. But there is nevertheless a common thread running through the pieces: the battle between the populists and the establishment is about identity, not policies.</p>
<p>There are, to be sure, dramatic differences between the specific policies of each side. Their approach to immigration policy being the most obvious example. The nature of the relationship between a nation and the global, supra-national entities that now wield power comes a close second. But these and other important differences, such as how to think about Vladimir Putin’s Russia, are applications of central principles whose seeming incompatibility are the real cause of the conflict. The real debate is about the meaning of Western civilization itself.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/08/welcome-populist-decade/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/08/welcome-populist-decade/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/GettyImages-632197932.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/08/welcome-populist-decade/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Introducing the series</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/08/welcome-populist-decade/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Welcome to the populist decade</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/08/welcome-populist-decade/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Henry Olsen</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Status quo defenders – ‘global elites’ in the populist parlance; ‘liberals’ in their own – tend to view the West as embracing a theory of solidarity that is universal, inevitable, and inalienable. Their concept of universality finds expression in various ways, such as the belief in an unrestricted obligation to help refugees, admit immigrants, or tackle global poverty. It also finds its expression in domestic affairs, with an emphasis on equality and socially liberal, or progressive, policies.</p>
<p>Their concept of inevitability finds it expressions in two ways, the ‘laws’ of economics and the ‘progressivity’ of history. It is an unquestioned premise that economics operates according to immutable laws and inevitably drives material progress forward. To interfere in the operation of these laws, through limits on free trade for example, is considered not simply wrongheaded but heretical. To even question the idea that trade with other peoples and nations is a matter of public debate, that one could choose to pursue other goods besides the fastest possible accumulation of aggregate wealth, is beyond debate or even polite discussion.</p>
<p>The fact that the application of this identical principle to domestic matters would also destroy the entire social democratic project of labour, wage, and social protections rarely occurs to them. The truth of this observation, however, is not lost on leftist populists such as Jeremy Corbyn, Bernie Sanders, and Pablo Iglesias. Their assaults on neoliberalism and the global order that underlies it are driven by the idea that, if left unchecked, this principle will inevitably impoverish or – to use the words of Marxist theorists, pauperise – the working-class masses.</p>
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	<div class="quote"><div class="inner">The final principle of the liberal elites, the inalienability of their positions, is perhaps the least recognised but most decisive of the three
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<p>The idea of the progressivity of history, once a hallmark of 19<sup>th</sup> Century liberal thought, has re-emerged in the context of social relations. The anti-discrimination principle that animates so much of liberal thinking is rarely seen as a choice. Rather, it is something that is as natural as any physical phenomenon. Opponents to elements of this social agenda, such as people who oppose same-sex marriage or abortion, and proponents of traditional values, are viewed as adherents of a bigoted and irrational past. We are all familiar with the epithets levied against them: ‘racist,’ ‘sexist, ‘illiberal’.</p>
<p>In many cases, especially on issues of personal morality, these people are traditionalist Christians, which leads to the modern phenomenon that to express views that once were mainstream is now to be shunned and cast out. Former Liberal Democrat leader <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/nov/28/christians-deemed-dangerous-tim-farron-speech">Tim Farron</a> discovered this when he was forced to resign because he would not affirm that he personally approved of homosexuality – despite his lifetime public commitment to the removal of anti-discrimination laws against same-sex practices. Fear of that happening in the United States is a significant reason why the religiously orthodox are Donald Trump’s biggest supporters: the enemy of my enemy is my friend.</p>
<p>Peter Franklin’s <a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/08/west-divided-populism-versus-liberalism-21st-century/?=refinnar" target="_blank" rel="noopener">thoughtful contribution</a> to the series puts this conflict, and the debate over the role of Christianity, front and centre. This is the reason for the animus directed towards Hungary’s Viktor Orban and Poland’s Law and Justice party (PiS). An American analog would be the culture wars that have increasingly polarised politics since the early 1990s, political wars that have at their core serious differences over the role of orthodox Christian belief in public life. Franklin persuasively contends that these debates presage, if not mark the start of, the New Populist Era.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/08/west-divided-populism-versus-liberalism-21st-century/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/08/west-divided-populism-versus-liberalism-21st-century/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/GettyImages-488754369.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/08/west-divided-populism-versus-liberalism-21st-century/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from the series</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/08/west-divided-populism-versus-liberalism-21st-century/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The West divided: Populism versus liberalism in the 21st century</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/08/west-divided-populism-versus-liberalism-21st-century/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Peter Franklin</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>If that is true, then the bitterness of the debates raging across the globe over Muslim immigration make more sense. The liberal elites tend to defend large-scale Muslim migration. And why shouldn’t they? Orthodox Muslims may share many cultural values with orthodox Christians, but they are among the most <a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/04/muslim-left-shaping-future-western-left/">ardent backers</a> of the centre-left. Populists, on the other hand, often obtain support from the religiously orthodox, or at least the socially traditional, and oppose Muslim immigration because they want to affirm the cultural heritage of their homelands. Both sides know that to admit or not admit Muslim immigrants matters for future electoral victories – and both sides are determined to win.</p>
<p>The final principle of the liberal elites, the inalienability of their positions, is perhaps the least recognised but most decisive of the three. It flows naturally from the other two principles, and bears a similarity to the liberal notion of human or natural rights. Since liberals believe that human action is motivated by universal, not particular, concepts, and since the results flowing from these concepts operate according to immutable economic or historical laws, it follows that resistance to these views is resistance to the very idea of human flourishing itself.</p>
<p>Thus, in America much social change has been instigated not by legislation but by court decree, and in Europe national votes against European Union preferences are overridden or circumvented. In this world view, the very idea that a people operating in a democratic capacity might choose to live in another way is unthinkable and unacceptable.</p>
<div class="inner-body-quote" data-type="quote">
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	<div class="quote"><div class="inner">The battle that characterises the New Populist Era is both very deep and very old. It is essentially a battle over both the definition and the possibility of liberal democracy itself
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<p>The populist revolt, and the intensity of its backers, can only be understood against this backdrop. For all the specific complaints about policies, the essence of their argument is easy to understand: we too are the people. Their explicit argument is that the nation state is both the appropriate place to decide political disputes and that the good of the nation as a whole is the standard by which those disputes should be judged. As a result, they explicitly deny the universality and inalienability principles, and implicitly deny the inevitability principle.</p>
<p>For populists, democracy is an act of choosing. The people debate competing views and choose to enact laws that are consistent with the dominant view of how to live. If such a debate means that homosexuals cannot marry, that women cannot access abortion, or that financiers are not free to invest their wealth in foreign labour or firms – well, that is the outcome of democracy.</p>
<p>It is thus no surprise that the authors of the two pro-populist pieces in the series emphasise the resurgence of democratic self-determination as a primary good flowing from populist victory. For Chris Buskirk, Trump’s victory will result in a return of power from appointed agencies and unelected judges to elected legislators. For John O’Sullivan, populist power leads to a Europe that looks a lot more like Switzerland in its high degree of decentralisation and less like an “ever more perfect union”. In both cases, the rule of the people is perhaps the greatest good that can come from a decade of populist victory.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/08/europe-2025-populism-saved-democracy/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/08/europe-2025-populism-saved-democracy/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/GettyImages-986975962.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/08/europe-2025-populism-saved-democracy/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from the series</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/08/europe-2025-populism-saved-democracy/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Europe 2025: how populism saved democracy</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/08/europe-2025-populism-saved-democracy/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> John O&#039;Sullivan</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>There is always a tension between the sovereignty of the people and the dignity of the individual. A people united in its vision of the good can force compliance, even death in some nations, on those who disagree. This is the heart of the drama in <em>Antigone</em> and Plato’s <em>Apology</em>, and why the modern mind sides with Socrates and Antigone against the power of the majority. This tension is also why the liberal elites fear the populists: power unconstrained by a fealty to the notion of individual dignity is often oppressive and terrible. Thus, they may see a Hitler behind assertions of national identity or an Inquisition behind claims of religious influence on public policy.</p>
<p>The battle that characterises the New Populist Era, then, is both very deep and very old. It is essentially a battle over both the definition and the possibility of liberal democracy itself.</p>
<p>Liberal democracy differs from ancient democracies in two important respects. First, it is liberal in its recognition of innate rights the denial of which makes a democracy both unjust and unstable. Second, it differs in the manner by which the judgment of the people is rendered. The principle of elected representation makes the passage of laws less susceptible to wild swings of mood and passion, and the principle of separation of powers makes it harder for a majority to subject a minority to its will. Modern despotism, no matter how democratic in form, always explicitly or implicitly reject one or more of these factors.</p>
<p>The modern populist fears that the prerogatives of democracy are being rejected by the pursuit of the ideas of liberalism. The modern liberal fears that the prerogatives of liberalism are being rejected by pursuit of the ideas of democracy. It seems, then, that the New Populist Era is a de facto civil war between competing camps of liberal democrats – and civil wars are notably both bloody and vicious.</p>
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	<div class="quote"><div class="inner">Those who genuinely care for their nation must ask themselves whether the differences between the two sides are so unbreachable that a multi-year political conflict needs to be both fought and uncompromisingly won
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<p>“A house divided against itself cannot stand.” So says both the <a href="https://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=Mark+3%3A25&amp;version=NIV">Bible</a> and the 16<sup>th</sup> American President, <a href="https://www.abrahamlincolnonline.org/lincoln/speeches/house.htm">Abraham Lincoln</a>. Lincoln said that such a house could only stand if the division ceased, if it became “all one thing or all the other”. Such a binary choice always leads to war and conflict as each side knows it cannot exist under the other’s rule. That is what followed Lincoln’s speech – the American Civil War flowed naturally from the consequences of such a declaration.</p>
<p>The current conflict won’t likely lead to bloodshed, but it could easily enfeeble and weaken every country affected for years to come. Those who genuinely care for their nation must ask themselves whether the differences between the two sides are so unbreachable, as the question over the morality of slavery was to the America of Lincoln’s time, that a multi-year political conflict needs to be both fought and uncompromisingly won.</p>
<p>To avoid such a harsh result, each side must answer some difficult questions. Liberal elites must ask themselves what role they see in their world for assertions of religion, protectionism, nationalism, and tradition. Populists must ask themselves what role they see in their world for the non-traditional, the non-orthodox, global trade, and multi-national cooperation.</p>
<p>One would think this is eminently possible: few people hold views entirely at one end of each extreme. Populists and liberal elite activists would likely see wider and more durable popular support if they present viable answers to these questions. Failure to do so, however, will force each side to embark on a battle to the death, with no quarter asked or given. It’s hard to see how liberalism or democracy could survive such a contest.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/08/america-2025-nation-violently-divided/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/08/america-2025-nation-violently-divided/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/GettyImages-830767670.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/08/america-2025-nation-violently-divided/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from the series</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/08/america-2025-nation-violently-divided/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>America 2025: a nation violently divided</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/08/america-2025-nation-violently-divided/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Michael Warren</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Sides threatened with defeat and extinction also seek outside aid to sustain their cause. The Spartans took Persian gold to stave off the Athenians, and the Americans received French support to defeat the British. For now, this partially explains the populist flirtation (or fascination, depending on the personality) with Putin’s Russia.</p>
<p>Volumes have been written for decades proclaiming the <a href="https://archive.org/stream/Decline-Of-The-West-Oswald-Spengler/Decline_Of_The_West_djvu.txt">decline of the West</a> or its impending defeat. So far, such predictions have proven at best extremely premature. But Western nations were faced with extremely serious challenges over the past century. At each step – the challenges posed by rapid industrialisation and urbanisation, the fascist challenge, the Cold War – Western peoples chose leaders who found a way out, who discovered a way to preserve the freedom, comfort, decency, and wealth that characterise Western civilization, against what sometimes seemed to be impossible odds.</p>
<p>But we should not forget that these were choices, choices that required sacrifice of things many within the affected nations held dear. Accommodating the needs of industrial labour, for example, required the owners of property and capital to cede a significant amount of their power and wealth, while fighting the Second World War and the Cold War required the creation of vast military and intelligence agencies that sapped national wealth and curbed personal liberty. The New Populist Era is forcing Western nations to again make choices, and as with all such choices, the outcome remains unclear.</p>
<p>Past choices were successful in large part because Western peoples and their leaders valued the core beliefs of Western civilization above other considerations. Social reformers were not tempted to dispense with freedom and democracy to achieve greater equality; the threat of defeat by the Nazis or the Communists did not lead to the rise of a police state to suppress agents of dissent. The West won these conflicts by evolving. Where faith in liberalism and democracy was weak, such as in 1930s Germany, Spain, and Central Europe, the choices led to the collapse of the regime itself. If our faith remains strong, if all sides can remain truly liberal and truly democratic, then we can hope, we can even expect, that the New Populist Era will lead not to our downfall, but rather to a renaissance.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/08/europe-2025-beginning-end/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/08/europe-2025-beginning-end/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/GettyImages-5046654370.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/08/europe-2025-beginning-end/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from the series</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/08/europe-2025-beginning-end/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Europe 2025: the beginning of the end</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/08/europe-2025-beginning-end/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> James Bloodworth</a></p></div></a></div>
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					<title>The West divided: Populism versus liberalism in the 21st century</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2018/08/west-divided-populism-versus-liberalism-21st-century/?edition=us</link>
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					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Peter Franklin]]>
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							<![CDATA[Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban and German Chancellor Angela Merkel. Credit: Sean Gallup/Getty Images]]>
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							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Peter Franklin</strong> is Associate Editor of <em>UnHerd</em>. He was previously a policy advisor and speechwriter on environmental and social issues.</p>
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						<unherd:twitter_handle>peterfranklin_</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is Associate Editor of <em>UnHerd</em>. He was previously a policy advisor and speechwriter on environmental and social issues.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Fri, 24 Aug 2018 05:50:18 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Fri, 24 Aug 2018 05:50:18 +0000</updated>
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								<![CDATA[<p>The European Union has a flag, an anthem, a parliament, a civil service and, for the most part, a single currency. What it doesn&#8217;t have, however, is a constitution. That&#8217;s not for want of trying. In the early part of the last decade, the institutions of the European Union poured all their efforts into the <a href="https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_establishing_a_Constitution_for_Europe">Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe</a>.</p>
<p>Things started to go wrong quite early on in the process, with an almighty backlash against the draft constitution. But it wasn&#8217;t the practical provisions of the draft – such as the expansion of qualified majority voting – that caused the biggest outcry, but the preamble.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/08/welcome-populist-decade/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/08/welcome-populist-decade/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/GettyImages-632197932.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/08/welcome-populist-decade/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/08/welcome-populist-decade/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Welcome to the populist decade</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/08/welcome-populist-decade/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Henry Olsen</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Preambles matter. The US constitution wouldn&#8217;t be the same without &#8220;We the people&#8230;&#8221; or the Declaration of Independence without &#8220;We hold these truths to be self-evident&#8230;&#8221; The most resonant phrase in the Treaty of Rome (and subsequent EU treaties) is &#8220;ever closer union among the peoples of Europe&#8221; – which echoes the US constitution&#8217;s reference to &#8220;a more perfect Union&#8221;.</p>
<p>And so a great deal of thought was put into the preamble to the EU constitution. What was required was so much more than a few warm words before the legally-enforceable stuff; rather, here was an opportunity to encapsulate the shared identity of Europe itself – and, by extension, the democratic legitimacy of the whole constitution. Unfortunately, what they came up with was a travesty:[1. Draft <a href="https://www.foreignpolicy.org.tr/documents/b_290503.pdf">preamble</a> to the Treaty establishing the Constitution, The European Convention, 28 May 2003]
<blockquote><p>&#8220;Drawing inspiration from the cultural, religious and humanist inheritance of Europe, which, nourished first by the civilisations of Greece and Rome, characterised by spiritual impulse always present in its heritage and later by the philosophical currents of the Enlightenment, has embedded within the life of society its perception of the central role of the human person and his inviolable and inalienable rights, and of respect for law.&#8221;</p></blockquote>
<p>Do you notice the gaping hole in this account of Europe&#8217;s origins? The narrative leaps in one bound from ancient Greece and Rome to the Enlightenment with no acknowledgement of what happened in between – i.e. more than a thousand years in which Christianity didn&#8217;t just come to define Europe, but, more than anything else, brought the very concept of Europe into being.</p>
<p>Nevertheless, the authors of the draft preamble thought it best to airbrush Christian Europe out of history. It was a blatant act of falsification – and the chorus of protest against it forced a redraft. But rather than mention Christianity, the &#8216;compromise&#8217; was to drop everything else instead. So no mention of Greece, Rome, the Enlightenment or anything else specific:[2. Preamble to the Lisbon Treaty, <i>Official Journal of the European Union</i>, C 115, Volume 51, on 9 May 2008]
<blockquote><p>&#8220;DRAWING INSPIRATION from the cultural, religious and humanist inheritance of Europe, from which have developed the universal values of the inviolable and inalienable rights of the human person, freedom, democracy, equality and the rule of law&#8230;&#8221;</p></blockquote>
<p>In the end, the constitutional treaty was abandoned (its place taken by the Lisbon Treaty]. Ironically, it was the secular French and the liberal Dutch who killed it off – in national referendums held on the 29 May and the 1 June 2005.</p>
<p>It&#8217;s worth reminding ourselves that the populist revolt against the political elites not only predates Brexit and the Eurozone crisis, but also the Global Financial Crisis. Though 2016, the year of Brexit and Trump, is seared in the political imagination, it is actually 2005 and the defeat of the EU constitution that marks the turning point against the globalising policies of the liberal establishment.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/04/u-ok-hungary/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/04/u-ok-hungary/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/BB5FF89D-939F-40F2-9751-C1B629092999-e1606126944170.jpeg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/04/u-ok-hungary/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/04/u-ok-hungary/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>U OK Hun(gary)?</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/04/u-ok-hungary/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Peter Franklin</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Now let&#8217;s fast-forward thirteen years: The Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán is giving a speech in eastern Transylvania. He sinks his teeth into those who can&#8217;t bring themselves to acknowledge Europe&#8217;s Christian roots. The whole speech is significant, but here&#8217;s the core of his argument:[3. Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s speech at the 29th Bálványos Summer Open University and Student Camp, 28 July 2018, Tusnádfürdő (Băile Tuşnad), <a href="https://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches/prime-minister-viktor-orban-s-speech-at-the-29th-balvanyos-summer-open-university-and-student-camp">Website of the Hungarian Government</a>, 29 June 2018]
<blockquote><p>&#8220;&#8230;.we must demonstrate that there is an alternative to liberal democracy: it is called Christian democracy. And we must show that the liberal elite can be replaced with a Christian democratic elite&#8230; Christian democracy is not about defending religious articles of faith – in this case Christian religious articles of faith. Neither states nor governments have competence on questions of damnation or salvation. Christian democratic politics means that the ways of life springing from Christian culture must be protected. Our duty is not to defend the articles of faith, but the forms of being that have grown from them.&#8221;</p></blockquote>
<p>For the record, I think he&#8217;s wrong. He&#8217;s especially wrong when he states that &#8220;liberal democracy is liberal, while Christian democracy is, by definition, not liberal: it is, if you like, illiberal.&#8221; Sorry, Viktor, but I don&#8217;t like. There&#8217;s a reason why liberal democracy sprang from the soil of Christian Europe – and that&#8217;s because liberalism, in all the best senses of the word, is derived from the Judaeo-Christian tradition and is not something fundamentally different.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2017/10/radicalism-reformation-luther-shaped-modern-europe/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2017/10/radicalism-reformation-luther-shaped-modern-europe/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/PA-33295019.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2017/10/radicalism-reformation-luther-shaped-modern-europe/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2017/10/radicalism-reformation-luther-shaped-modern-europe/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The radicalism of Reformation: How Luther shaped modern Europe</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2017/10/radicalism-reformation-luther-shaped-modern-europe/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Melanie McDonagh</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Of course, liberalism has, in many ways, turned against its parent. It has also had rebellious offspring of its own: murderous ideologies violently opposed to both liberalism and Christianity. And yet the Christian principle of human dignity is multifaceted – and it required the Enlightenment, and the good things that followed from it, for many of those facets to get the recognition and respect owed to them. To draw an absolute divide between Christian democracy and liberal democracy is, like the preamble to the EU constitution, a falsification of history.</p>
<p>However, just because Orbán and his enemies are both wrong (and for much the same reason), it doesn&#8217;t mean that the conflict between them isn&#8217;t real. It is undeniably real – a divergence in worldview that is in many ways much deeper than the split between the Brussels establishment and Brexit Britain. The only question is how consequential it is.</p>
<p>Liberal democracy has always contained a tension within it between traditionalists and progressives. And the nature of that conflict has been one of managed retreat on the part of the former – with only the thinnest of concessions offered by the latter. The negotiations over the preamble were a case in point – all that the progressives had to offer was a form of words that made their airbrushing of history less obvious.</p>
<p>But a lot has changed since then. In place of managed retreat on the part of cultural conservatives, there is a vigorous counter-attack by rampaging populists. And as Orbán makes clear, their intention is not just to challenge the liberal establishment, but to replace it. In a growing list of countries they are succeeding.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/08/europe-2025-beginning-end/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/08/europe-2025-beginning-end/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/GettyImages-5046654370.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/08/europe-2025-beginning-end/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from the series</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/08/europe-2025-beginning-end/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Europe 2025: the beginning of the end</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/08/europe-2025-beginning-end/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> James Bloodworth</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Orbán was in the vanguard, but he is no longer alone. In Poland, the populist right is nearly as dominant as it is in Hungary. West of the old Iron Curtain, a conservative-populist coalition governs Austria. And, this year, the biggest shock so far: a populist-populist coalition in charge of Italy.</p>
<p>It is not just that populists are gaining power that is significant, but that they are doing so across a geographically coherent chunk of Europe. If one includes the &#8216;broadtent populist&#8217; government of Czechia and the leftwing nationalist government of Slovakia, then most of what used to be the Austro-Hungarian Empire from Trieste to Krakow is now in populist hands. It&#8217;s a point not lost on Viktor Orbán. His speech makes numerous references to &#8220;Central Europe&#8221;. He specifically identifies his conception of &#8220;Christian democracy&#8221; with &#8220;Central European tenets&#8221;.</p>
<p>The geographical branding of Orbánism suggests an equidistance between Western Europe and Putin&#8217;s Russia to the East. To say this raises geopolitical concerns is putting it mildly.</p>
<p>During the Cold War, Finland was ostensibly part of the &#8216;free world &#8216; – though, like Sweden, officially neutral. However, the country had an unusually close relationship with the Soviet Union – so close, in fact, that western strategists coined the word &#8216;<a href="https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Finlandization">Finlandization</a>&#8216; to describe the process by which a smaller country acquiesces to the heavy influence of a larger neighbour without formally entering into an alliance with it. There are those who see Russian influence on populist movements in Europe as a new process of Finlandization – with Hungary a particular cause for concern.</p>

<p>The debate over how far this influence goes has generated more heat than light. Clearly, Putin will take any opportunity to mess with the West, but to view the rise of populism through this lens alone is shortsighted. Not every country in the populist bloc takes a soft line on Russia – just ask the Poles. Furthermore, it&#8217;s not as if western Europe is above cutting deals with the bear: Germany has helped Putin build gas pipelines that strategically bypass Russia&#8217;s neighbours and London is awash with Russian money.</p>
<p>The assertion of a central European identity isn&#8217;t just about telling western Europeans what they can do with their hypocritical political correctness, it&#8217;s also a reminder that eastern Europe does not start where western Europe stops: there is somewhere in between the two that&#8217;s quite distinct from both.</p>
<p>Central Europe is also defined by its southern borders. For centuries, the Austrians and Hungarians held the front line against the Ottoman Empire. The gates of Vienna were never breached, but Hungary suffered devastating defeat and occupation.</p>
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<p>Europe is not a distinct landmass like Africa or Australia. It&#8217;s borders have always been debatable – and there are points in its history where European civilisation might have been extinguished (indeed there are places where it was). Western Europeans, secure on their Atlantic islands and peninsulas, easily forget that the struggle to remain European went on for centuries longer in other parts of the continent than in their own.</p>
<p>It&#8217;s important not to portray this struggle as a simplistic clash between Christian and Islamic civilisations – because it never was. Europe has never been exclusively Christian and Christianity has never been exclusively European. And yet the histories of Europe and Christianity are intimately entwined – and especially where those identities have come under the greatest pressure.</p>
<p>The liberal disregard for historical and geographical sensitivities has already had dire consequences for the unity of Europe. This can be seen most dramatically in regard to immigration policy. While the nations of central Europe – together with their Italian and Balkan neighbours – find themselves on the front line of mass migration from the Middle East and North Africa, western Europeans have attempted dictate their response to this challenge from Brussels. One might have thought that the populist takeover of central Europe would give the EU establishment pause for thought, but there is little sign of it so far.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/08/europe-2025-populism-saved-democracy/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/08/europe-2025-populism-saved-democracy/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/GettyImages-986975962.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/08/europe-2025-populism-saved-democracy/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from the series</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/08/europe-2025-populism-saved-democracy/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Europe 2025: how populism saved democracy</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/08/europe-2025-populism-saved-democracy/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> John O&#039;Sullivan</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>So what if the ideological clash continues? I don&#8217;t believe we&#8217;ll see the EU break apart by 2025 – not unless there&#8217;s another, even more serious Eurozone crisis. However, I do think we&#8217;ll see the central European bloc – including Italy and Austria – solidify. The EU establishment will find it much harder to browbeat a whole region of Europe (including countries considered to be &#8216;western European&#8217;) than individual nations.</p>
<p>This will provide the context for a new dynamic of &#8216;populist statesmanship&#8217;. Though they’ll cover one another&#8217;s backs, we can expect see the likes of Viktor Orbán, Sebastian Kurz and Matteo Salvini competing among themselves to see who can go furthest in defying the European establishment. Previously, the only way to gain status as an EU leader was as a reinforcer of the establishment and its orthodoxies. Ambitious EU politicians now have an alternative career path.</p>
<p>I think this will transform populism in western Europe too – where populist parties, though growing in strength, are currently locked out of power. The outsider style of populist politics, as exemplified by Marine Le Pen and Geert Wilders, will give way to a new generation whose purpose is power not protest.</p>
<p>There are cases where a mainstream party inadvertently leaves itself open to a reverse takeover by a populist movement – the Labour Party in Britain and the Republicans in America being obvious examples. A different, and more likely, path to power is that pioneered by Sebastian Kurz in Austria: win the leadership of a mainstream political party, pull a hard right on an issue like immigration, and then, having stolen the populists&#8217; thunder, bring them into government with you.</p>
<p>There are a number of countries vulnerable to a such a manoeuvre. The most obvious is France, where the <i>cordon sanitaire</i> that has kept the National Front out of power could be breached by an ambitious centre-right politician – especially if the Front&#8217;s leadership passes to a more presentable figure (keep an eye on <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/may/25/marine-le-pens-niece-tipped-as-future-far-right-leader-drops-family-name">Marion Maréchal</a>, who has recently dropped the &#8216;Le Pen&#8217; from her name). Another possible scenario: Boris Johnson ousts Theresa May and consolidates the Conservative-UKIP vote. And how long before the Swedish centre-right welcomes the once far-right Sweden Democrats into the fold?</p>
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<p>It wouldn&#8217;t be the first time that populist parties have made it into government. But on previous occasions, they&#8217;ve found themselves either repulsed by the political establishment or absorbed into it. What the rise of the populist bloc in central Europe shows – and Trump&#8217;s America too – is that populists are now capable of taking power and using it to effect real and lasting change.</p>
<p>This is something new. Lacking genuine precedents, some anti-populists draw parallels with the rise of fascism and Nazism between the wars. I don&#8217;t think it will be anything that cataclysmic. Today&#8217;s populists – especially the ready-for-government version – aren&#8217;t trying to overthrow western democracy; they are  seeking to redefine it.</p>
<p>Unlike the establishment liberals, they don&#8217;t regard the western ideal of liberty as universal. It isn’t something that&#8217;s already &#8216;there&#8217;: ready-and-waiting to be discovered by all of humankind – as soon as the ancient clutter of nationhood, religion and tradition is swept away. Rather, populists see democracy as something nurtured within, and still attached to, specific traditions. Not all such politicians would describe those traditions in the same way as Viktor Orbán does – with his emphasis on cultural Christianity. For instance, Marine Le Pen places her preferred narrative in the French history of republicanism and <i>laïcité</i>. The pro-Trump intellectuals otherwise known as &#8216;<a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2017/12/pro-trump-intellectuals-yes-exist/">west coast Straussians</a>&#8216; base their worldview on the foundation, and nation-building project, of the United States of America. In the UK, some Brexiteers take an explicitly Whiggish view of history – a sort of flag-waving, red-white-and-blue liberalism.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2017/12/pro-trump-intellectuals-yes-exist/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2017/12/pro-trump-intellectuals-yes-exist/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/PA-26315574-scaled.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2017/12/pro-trump-intellectuals-yes-exist/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2017/12/pro-trump-intellectuals-yes-exist/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Pro-Trump intellectuals – yes, they do exist</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2017/12/pro-trump-intellectuals-yes-exist/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Peter Franklin</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>These aren&#8217;t so much competing narratives as parallel ones – because they&#8217;re deliberately specific to particular histories, nations and regions. There is, of course, an ever-present danger that some of these narratives could lend themselves to exclusionary politics based on cultural, ethnic or even racial identity. However, liberal universalism has its dangers too – its assumptions were instrumental in conflicts, like that in Iraq, that have killed hundreds of thousands of people. Less bloodily, there has been the widespread failure to control mass immigration and adequately integrate migrants into their new homes. Meanwhile, the globalisation of trade has opened-up deep class-based divisions within western societies.</p>
<p>That these and other failures have resulted in the rise of populism is obvious. However, establishment liberals are still catching up with the fact that their populist opponents are intent on power not just protest. And almost completely unrecognised is that the universalisation of liberalism – the attempt to cut it loose of its roots – has opened the way for the equal and opposite errors of populist ideology.</p>
<p>I don&#8217;t know which side will ultimately prevail. Perhaps new leaders will emerge with the wisdom and courage to defeat the false dichotomy and reintegrate the western tradition. For the foreseeable future, however, we are divided.</p>
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					<title>America 2025: a nation violently divided</title>
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						<![CDATA[Michael Warren]]>
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							<![CDATA[<p>Michael Warren is a senior writer at The Weekly Standard. He was a 2012 Robert Novak journalism fellow, and he has written for the <i>Wall Street Journal</i>, the <i>Washington Times</i>, National Review Online, and <i>City Journal</i>.</p>
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						<unherd:twitter_handle>MichaelRWarren</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[Michael Warren is a senior writer at The Weekly Standard. He was a 2012 Robert Novak journalism fellow, and he has written for the <i>Wall Street Journal</i>, the <i>Washington Times</i>, National Review Online, and <i>City Journal</i>.]]>
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										<pubDate>Thu, 23 Aug 2018 05:48:58 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Thu, 23 Aug 2018 05:48:58 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Democrats]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Populism 2025]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Republicans]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Trump]]></category>
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								<![CDATA[<p><em>This article is part of a series in which we have asked our contributors to imagine that populist movements continue to gain influence in the coming years. Here Michael considers what America looks like after a second Trump term. </em></p>
<p>–––</p>
<p>How would America look after eight years of a Donald Trump presidency? Well, that depends on a host of unknowables: Which parties control each house of Congress throughout the remaining years? Does the special counsel investigation produce anything damning or exonerating about Trump or his close associates? Will any major natural disasters or large-scale terrorist or military attacks dramatically reorient the country’s focus? Which Democrat will run against Trump in 2020 and (in this scenario) lose? Will Trump receive a credible challenge in the Republican primary?</p>
<p>Regardless of these unknowns, however, we can assume a few big constants: the president will not change his style or approach to public office. The political Left will become more radical in its response to an immovable Trump. The mainstream media will get more reflexively oppositional. The administration will continue pursuing recognisably conservative policy goals.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/08/welcome-populist-decade/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/08/welcome-populist-decade/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/GettyImages-632197932.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/08/welcome-populist-decade/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Introducing the series</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/08/welcome-populist-decade/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Welcome to the populist decade</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/08/welcome-populist-decade/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Henry Olsen</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>With Trump himself, we can expect the sort of tweets and public statements we’ve grown accustomed to, where his combativeness and pettiness achieve little in the way of advancing his policy agenda, but continue to consolidate his base around cultural issues. And we can expect continued inconsistency between the president’s rhetoric and his actions, whether he’s dealing with lawmakers on Capitol Hill or with foreign leaders.</p>
<p>In response, Trump’s opponents on the Left will only be more energised, not deflated, by their failures to oust Trump through democratic means. The cultural response to Trump will get more extreme. Popular culture will be saturated in anti-Trump content and themes. There will be more and larger mass demonstrations and counterdemonstrations, and they will be much more violence. The lingering memory of the deadly right-wing violence in Charlottesville has obscured the simmering rage on the Left, manifested in the antifa demonstrators in California and elsewhere during 2017. That ugly side of the left-wing response to Trump will only intensify.</p>
<p>The mainstream media opposition to Trump will become more radical as well, with the patina of objectivity fading more and more. Trump and many in the Washington-New York-based news media already view each other as enemies, and the war between them will heat up. Television anchors will be further drawn to pontificating on Trump’s sins, while reporters and editors will see a duty to focus even more of their fire on Trump, to the exclusion of other necessary stories and topics. The separate realities fostered by a more explicitly partisan mainstream media will mean even less agreement among voters about facts.</p>
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<p>Racial polarisation, too, will grow as Trump continues to make implicit appeals to an older, whiter America. His administration will continue stumbling through policy disasters like the 2017 travel ban and the family separation at the border that at best look insensitive to certain racial groups and at worst are intentionally targeted at them.</p>
<p>The new racial-grievance-based political correctness will spread beyond campuses and left-wing intellectual discussions as evidence piles up that one political party, under a racially problematic leader, favours whites over racial minorities. Politicians in both parties may begin to feel liberated to make more explicit racial appeals, the likes of which America hasn’t seen since the Civil Rights era.</p>
<p>Politically, all of this will have the effect of continually narrowing Trump’s base of support and building up political opposition from all other angles. It won’t just be the #Resistance on the Left; it will put off the educated suburbanites who lean Republican but find themselves increasingly unable to justify their support for a president and a party that antagonises racial and cultural resentments. These Americans may have been willing to ignore the Trump sideshow when the economy’s roaring and life is otherwise good, but an economic downturn, or a national security crisis, or some other major test for the country, will remove any incentive to stick with Trump.</p>
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<p>The effect on Trump will be like that of a cornered dog – he will get more ferocious and aggressive, not less. More divisive tweets and statements, more opposition from Americans – and repeat.</p>
<p>In terms of actual policy, however, where Trump has little personal interest, inertia means conservatives and right-leaning populists continue to dominate choices in many key areas, at least in the executive branch. The president’s second term will match that of the first – a hands-off approach to the federal realms of education, environmental regulations, and health care. Trump will continue to nominate conservatives to the federal bench, including to another Supreme Court seat. The coupling of Trump’s divisive style with conservative policy means those goals will become toxic with the growing number of Americans who find Trump and his party noxious.</p>
<p>Despite these constants, however, things will undoubtedly change over the course of Trump’s presidency in ways that will not only make the country worse off but will not satisfy the hopes right-leaning populists placed in this unconventional leader.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/08/europe-2025-populism-saved-democracy/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/08/europe-2025-populism-saved-democracy/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/GettyImages-986975962.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/08/europe-2025-populism-saved-democracy/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from the series</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/08/europe-2025-populism-saved-democracy/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Europe 2025: how populism saved democracy</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/08/europe-2025-populism-saved-democracy/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> John O&#039;Sullivan</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>The populists’ position within the political system (i.e. in the Republican party) will diminish considerably. Their economic goals – a broadening of opportunity for the working class, a manufacturing renaissance, wage increases – will crumble under the weight of a mismanaged trade war that ends with high consumer prices and growth stagnation. Their desire for a more humble foreign policy will not be realised as Trump ping-pongs between populist realism that weakens America’s hegemonic position, and a reckless hawkishness that exacerbates tensions with antagonists on the world stage.</p>
<p>For these reasons, it’s not hard to imagine Trump’s fragile coalition beginning to break apart the moment his re-election in November 2020 is confirmed. Because Trump’s political strength among Republicans is chiefly oppositional (he stands against liberal Democrats, against the liberal media), the president has done little to settle the disagreements among Republicans or make a strong empirical case for conservative populism. Economic populists clash with supply-side tax-cutters. Both national security hawks and realists try to wrest control of the party’s narrative on foreign policy. Small-government conservatives are outraged that government has continued to grow. Immigration hawks are split (as they already are) on whether Trump did enough to secure the border. There may be a wall by 2025, but Mexico will surely not have paid for it.</p>
<p>The trade wars which Trump has waged on the populists&#8217; behalf have erased the gains in the economy that were realised in his first term. There are higher prices for consumers thanks to tariffs and inflation. And a withdrawal of capital has been triggered by an economic downturn, meaning massive job losses in those parts of the country that needed employment opportunities the most – and placed their trust in Trump to deliver them. A bigger budget deficit as a result of Trump’s economic policies has forced cuts to social services.</p>
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<p>In terms of the Republican party itself, the political fracturing of the Trump coalition will be especially sharp if Republicans are not in control of one or both houses of Congress, and if they’ve lost significant electoral ground in the state governorships and legislatures. That was the result for the Democrats under Barack Obama, thanks to the former president’s own unwillingness to tend to his party while in the White House.</p>
<p>To the extent Trump bequeaths his political operation to someone else – to Mike Pence, or one of his children – it will be devalued. Much of Trump’s operation is centred around the man himself, and personality is impossible to transfer. There will be an open market on the centre-right for an alternative to Trump’s Republicanism, one that won’t necessarily be friendly to the economic populism preferred by the core part of the Trump base. This alternative could take over the Republican party or split off from the GOP to form a more centrist third party. It will likely be the former, given the structural barriers to third parties in the American system, but either way it leaves Trumpian populists in a weak political position.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/08/america-2025-made-great/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/08/america-2025-made-great/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/GettyImages-542979448.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/08/america-2025-made-great/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from the series</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/08/america-2025-made-great/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>America 2025: Made Great Again</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/08/america-2025-made-great/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Chris Buskirk</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>And that’s not even considering what will happen to the political coalition on the Left, which has continued to move toward a sort of populist democratic socialism in the mould of Bernie Sanders. Many of the swing voters from the Rust Belt that Republicans brought into the GOP fold with populist promises were Barack Obama voters in 2008 and 2012. Who’s to say a failure to Make America Great Again won’t push these voters back toward the Democratic party – one that’s interested in punishing millionaires and billionaires in the name of the people?</p>
<p>And so America faces a choice in 2024 among a more radical and populist left, a diluted centre-right coalition, and an exhausted right-wing populism that has little to show for its eight years in power. That political situation represents a failure of Trump and Trumpism, with the nation more divided and less prosperous than before he took office in 2017. Is that the future conservative populists want? Hardly.</p>
<p>The following scenario isn’t crazy: It’s January 2025, two months after a presidential election unlike any America had seen in more than a hundred years. Three major parties had vied for the White House. Had the Republican party found a way to hold together for just one more election cycle, perhaps it could have eked out a win. Instead, the split that seemed inevitable throughout Trump’s two terms – between Trumpian Republicans and the Never Trumpers – was unfixable.</p>
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	<div class="quote"><div class="inner">America faces a choice in 2024 among a more radical and populist left, a diluted centre-right coalition, and an exhausted right-wing populism that has little to show for its eight years in power
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<p>The Trump wing fully embraced its populist roots in selecting its nominee. The GOP dumped Vice President Mike Pence for House minority leader and ultra-conservative Mark Meadows after an eleventh-hour endorsement by President Trump. The outgoing commander-in-chief, who skipped the convention and retreated instead to his golf club in New Jersey, wrote in a series of late-night tweets that Meadows would continue the fight against both the ‘crazy socialists’ and the ‘hateful (and weak) RepubliCAN’TS who did everything to stop me for more than 8 years.’</p>
<p>The Meadows nomination was just the spark the anti-Trump New Federalist party and its nominee, former Trump Cabinet official-turned-critic Nikki Haley, needed. Although Haley’s party qualified for the ballot in all 50 states and had gained some prominent converts like Senators Mitt Romney and former House speaker Paul Ryan, polls showed Republican voters were planning on sticking with the GOP after Mark Meadows’s promise to reverse much of Trump&#8217;s second term trade policies. Haley’s poll numbers inched up over the summer until they were even with Meadows’. But the selection of moderate Democratic congressman and former marine Seth Moulton as her running mate wasn’t enough to overtake Meadows and the Republicans.</p>
<p>Most Democratic leaners stuck with the Democratic nominee – a resurgent Kamala Harris, the progressive Senator from California who after a second-place finish in the 2020 primaries came back stronger and more left-wing than ever. Buoyed by picking up those important big-state electoral votes in Georgia, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin, her plurality victory was enough to win. As 2025 begins, Harris looks set to turn the page as dramatically on the Trump era as Trump had done eight years earlier on the Obama era.</p>
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					<title>America 2025: Made Great Again</title>
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						<![CDATA[Chris Buskirk]]>
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							<![CDATA[<p>Chris Buskirk is the editor and publisher of <em>American Greatness</em>. He is also a contribution opinion writer for <em>The New York Times.</em></p>
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						<unherd:twitter_handle>thechrisbuskirk</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[Chris Buskirk is the editor and publisher of <em>American Greatness</em>. He is also a contribution opinion writer for <em>The New York Times.</em>]]>
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										<pubDate>Thu, 23 Aug 2018 05:44:42 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Thu, 23 Aug 2018 08:31:58 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[America]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Democrats]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Populism 2025]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Republicans]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Trump]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">http://old.unherd.com/?p=15914</guid>
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								<![CDATA[<p><em>This article is part of a series in which we have asked our contributors to imagine that populist movements continue to gain influence in the coming years. Here Chris considers what America looks like after a second Trump term. </em></p>
<p>–––</p>
<p>Exhausted. Exhilarated. Thankful. And ready to get back to work. Those are some of my feelings after watching President Kobach take the oath of office this morning. But more than anything else, today is a day of contented reflection. The past decade has been one of constant activity. Since the day Donald Trump descended his eponymous tower to announce his candidacy in June 2015, to the election of former Kansas Governor Kris Kobach – a strong, pro-Trump conservative whose 2017 leadership of Trump’s anti-voter fraud commission made him anathema to the Left – to what many are calling Trump’s third term last November. It’s been a decade of sharp conflict, some serious losses, but ultimately, one of victories that have re-established the foundations of the American republic.</p>
<p>What’s more, the concerted efforts of friendly governments across Europe as well as a few around the Pacific Rim, have made the world safer, more peaceful and more prosperous. Brexit was a resounding success for Britain. Once again, she led a coalition of European countries in a fight to retain their national sovereignty and the liberty and prerogatives of their people. And it’s led to an economic boom across Europe that has even seen a modest uptick in the continental birthrates.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/08/welcome-populist-decade/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/08/welcome-populist-decade/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/GettyImages-632197932.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/08/welcome-populist-decade/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Introducing the series</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/08/welcome-populist-decade/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Welcome to the populist decade</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/08/welcome-populist-decade/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Henry Olsen</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Following President Trump’s lead these countries also presented a united front against Chinese economic warfare and its aggression in the South China Sea. What tipped the balance was the collapse of the Chinese currency brought about by robust economic growth from her major trading partners, especially the United States. Under such duress, she could no longer afford to keep North Korea as a vassal. Kim Jong Un made a deal to keep his head, handing power to a military council of colonels that has aligned the country with the West. South Korea is leading the reconstruction of the North while Kim resides in the Philippines where he started a professional basketball league in partnership with longtime friend Dennis Rodman.</p>
<p>Interestingly, an America that under Trump forsook the moral imperialism of the Bush-Clinton-Obama triumvirate (the incessant utopian meddling in the affairs of other peoples and nations), saw its moral authority increase. The wisdom of President John Quincy Adams has rarely been more evident: “Wherever the standard of freedom and Independence has been or shall be unfurled, there will her heart, her benedictions and her prayers be. But she goes not abroad, in search of monsters to destroy.”</p>
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	<div class="quote"><div class="inner">It’s been a decade of sharp conflict, some serious losses, but ultimately, one of victories that have re-established the foundations of the American republic
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<p>Perhaps the most important thing President Trump did in his first term was breaking the ban on free thought. His own transgressive personality paved the way. This has been nowhere more important than on college campuses where legislation tying eligibility for federal student loans to free speech codes liberated students from the stifling orthodoxy of progressive-left thought that has dominated for generations.</p>
<p>President Trump’s achievements on the domestic front marked a new birth of freedom and the definitive beginning of a new American century: reducing the size and scope of the state, appointing constitutionalist judges, and ending the illegal immigration crisis. It’s easy to point to his construction of the border wall as his administration’s signal achievement – especially since it was completed in just three years and under budget. And this in spite of a hail of nuisance lawsuits filed by every leftist lobby group possible. They were all summarily rejected by the Supreme Court in a series of decisions affirming the President’s right to protect the border.</p>
<p>Of course, the ultimate irony is that Mexico City based Cemex provided all of the cement after Trump and Mexican President Manuel Lopez-Obrador agreed to a renegotiation of NAFTA. Perhaps inspired by Trump’s focus on the importance of citizenship, Lopez-Obrador initiated an anti-corruption campaign and a massive infrastructure program. He even borrowed Trump’s slogan: Make Mexico Great Again (¡Hacer que México vuelva a ser grandioso!).</p>
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	<div class="quote"><div class="inner">Perhaps the most important thing President Trump did in his first term was breaking the ban on free thought. His own transgressive personality paved the way
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<p>Without eight years of Donald Trump’s relentless, combative, ambitious presidency, a President Kobach would have been unthinkable. But so would have been the border wall which all but ended the misery and degradation of the trade in human beings that characterised the old, open borders world. In retrospect the only surprise is that we waited so long. What’s more, the open border had for years served as a magnet that drained developing countries of their most precious resource – their own people – thereby handicapping their ability to achieve political stability and economic prosperity.</p>
<p>Donald Trump also remade the American judiciary. Over eight years he appointed half of all federal judges and five Supreme Court Justices giving constitutionalist jurists a 7-2 majority. All of them, save for a very few misfires, are dedicated to judging the cases that come before them according to the law as written, not according to motivations known only to themselves.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/08/america-2025-nation-violently-divided/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/08/america-2025-nation-violently-divided/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/GettyImages-830767670.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/08/america-2025-nation-violently-divided/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from the series</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/08/america-2025-nation-violently-divided/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>America 2025: a nation violently divided</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/08/america-2025-nation-violently-divided/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Michael Warren</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>This has already had a salutary effect on American government. As the United States Supreme Court – the real seat of political power in the United State since the 1930s – is slowly ceding power back to the legislature and president, and returning to its constitutional limits as an unelected legislature. The full effects of this will only become apparent many years from now.</p>
<p>Trump was able to break the second term curse that has afflicted many post-World War II American presidents and notch significant political victories. There was no scandal to slow him down – his enemies threw everything at him in the first term, and lost – and he was supported by strong Congressional majorities of like-minded legislators swept into office in 2020. Not since Franklin Delano Roosevelt created the modern welfare state and crushed the power of state governments in the 1930s has an American president enjoyed such powerful majorities.</p>
<p>It was a mark of the remarkable weakness of the Democratic Party that they were forced to re-nominate Hillary Clinton in 2020. Bernie Sanders was unable to recapture the energy of 2016, and his young protégé, first term Congresswoman Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, fizzled on the national stage owing to her consistent failure to grapple with (or even acknowledge) basic facts about the country. Former California Senator Kamala Harris may yet re-emerge on the national stage, but for now she is a newly elected governor contending with the state’s massive debt, shrinking population, and one-state recession. We wish her good luck.</p>
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<p>The irony is that California’s economy is slowly shrinking at a time when the United States is enjoying a technology-led boom with much of the innovation happening outside of Silicon Valley.</p>
<p>Still, President Kobach has his work cut out for him. He has promised to close unnecessary government agencies and to continue his predecessor’s work of returning power from federal bureaucrats to state government, which are closer and more resposonsive to citizen needs.</p>
<p>Still undecided is the fate of the robust secession movement in California. The statewide referendum won with a supermajority of 65% – more than Hillary Clinton’s share of the 2016 vote in the state. Political and religious minorities in the state – especially Christians and Jews – are concerned about life in the nascent People’s Republic of California without the protections afforded under the United States Constitution, and have asked for a right of return to the United States. President Kobach’s suggestion of allowing California to remain part of a confederation with the United States seems to have been well received.</p>
<p>The world is safer, the West is more unified, and America is both peaceful and prosperous. President Kobach’s job is to build upon the foundations laid by President Trump.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/08/europe-2025-beginning-end/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/08/europe-2025-beginning-end/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/GettyImages-5046654370.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/08/europe-2025-beginning-end/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from the series</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/08/europe-2025-beginning-end/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Europe 2025: the beginning of the end</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/08/europe-2025-beginning-end/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> James Bloodworth</a></p></div></a></div>
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					<title>Europe 2025: how populism saved democracy</title>
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						<![CDATA[John O'Sullivan]]>
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							<![CDATA[<p>John O&#8217;Sullivan is a senior fellow of the National Review Institute and writes widely on politics.</p>
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						<unherd:twitter_handle>JohnOSullivanNR</unherd:twitter_handle>
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						<![CDATA[John O'Sullivan is a senior fellow of the National Review Institute and writes widely on politics.]]>
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										<pubDate>Wed, 22 Aug 2018 14:18:44 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Thu, 23 Aug 2018 09:00:53 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Brexit]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Democracy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Euro]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[Populism 2025]]></category>
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								<![CDATA[<p><em>This article is part of a series in which we have asked our contributors to imagine that populist movements continue to gain influence in the coming years – what do western democracies look like in 2025?</em></p>
<p>–––</p>
<p>“The unexpected always happens; the inevitable never,” wrote Keynes. Yet for Europe, inevitability had characterised the first 14 years of this millennium. Between 2014 and 2020, however, that began to stall, and by 2025 the ‘inevitable’ liberal consensus has been replaced by the unexpected in the form of de Gaulle’s “Europe des Patries”, with big national government’s leading the way, and Thatcher’s Anglosphere. The neutral term for these developments is the Return of History – critics would say ‘catastrophe’.</p>
<p>Even the catastrophists, however, concede that this progress from inevitable to unexpected is traceable to the over-reaching of the Europeanists in Brussels, Paris, and Berlin in the period 2000 to 2014: The introduction of the Euro without the fiscal and monetary structures needed to sustain it; the adoption of Schengen’s internal “open borders” without first securing Europe’s external ones; Mrs. Merkel’s invitation to Syrian refugees to Europe, supported as it was by the European Commission, without first establishing efficient procedures for either vetting or deporting them; the stealthy moves towards independent European defense structures separate from NATO; and overall the gradual encroaching of European institutions on the national democratic prerogatives of the EU’s member-states.</p>
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	<div class="quote"><div class="inner">Populists of Right and Left proposed, opposed, debated, and amended legislation. They became part of ‘the System’ and they expanded it. They just don’t seem very threatening any more.
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<p>Each one of these over-ambitious initiatives produced its own crisis from the (now perennial) Greek crisis to the migrant one. Taken together, however, they also fostered an overall crisis of legitimacy in European democracy as voters found that they couldn’t change policies they disliked by voting in national elections, since even politicians who had campaigned for change would explain afterwards that these issues were determined ‘at the European level.’ Policies at that level were determined on the inevitabalist basis of “ever closer union.” And unfortunately there didn’t seem to be any way of throwing the European rascals out.</p>
<p>When insurgent parties then arose demanding that more be done about controlling immigration, or imposing anti-terrorist border controls, or changing endless ‘austerity’ policies required by the Bundesbank, the European Central Bank, and Mrs. Merkel, the early response of both political and media elites was to denounce them as “populists,” or “nationalists” or simply “extremists” who were threatening, democracy, international order and even world peace. That argument worked well enough at Davos or Aspen but lacked electoral magic. Electorates began voting for extremists in such significant numbers that it seemed silly to dismiss them as outside the mainstream. And at the same time, the ‘mainstream’ Left visibly collapsed in half of Europe.</p>
<p>As the crises became sharper after 2014 – with the Brits voting for Brexit and the Italians electing a majority populist government – the voters were increasingly joined by intellectuals dissenting from the elite consensus. Dutch left-wing political scientist, Cas Mudde, has pointed out that populism was a democratic response by the voters to the fact that elites had removed entire issues – like the Euro or migration policy – from political debate. In effect they had silently imposed their own priorities.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/08/welcome-populist-decade/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/08/welcome-populist-decade/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/GettyImages-632197932.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/08/welcome-populist-decade/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/08/welcome-populist-decade/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Welcome to the populist decade</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/08/welcome-populist-decade/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Henry Olsen</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>British social critic, David Goodhart, pointed out that most government policies reflected the interests and values of the mobile, highly educated 25% of people he called “Anywheres” over the rooted 50% he dubbed “Somewheres.” Brexit was <em>inter alia</em> a protest against that. Pierre Manent was one of several distinguished French intellectuals to see European politics as developing into a competition between an unrespectable national-populism and an arrogant cosmopolitan centrism – or, in his words, between populist demagogy and the fanaticism of the Centre. For him, the fanaticism of the Centre was the greater threat.</p>
<p>The bare bones of this evolution were evident in the European parliament where the mainstream parties of Left and Right had formed a coalition against the ‘extremes’ (that is, all the other parties.) Also evident was the determination of the Brussels Eurocrats to prevent the Brits leaving the EU—which they succeeded in postponing several years beyond the original departure date.</p>
<p>All the ingredients for serious political conflicts within and between European nations were present and combustible as 2019 came into view. One observer, Iain Kearns, entitled his dystopian analysis of Europe&#8217;s future: <em>Collapse.</em> What was needed was a strategy to draw the populists into conventional politics and government responsibility before they broke into them by electoral force.</p>
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	<div class="quote"><div class="inner">In this new economic environment Europe was no longer moving in a centralising direction: integration would be achieved on lines that were both more national and more liberal
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<p>It was the voters who ensured that no catastrophe occurred. They did so in the first instance by giving the mainstream centrist parties of Left and Right a smaller combined share of the total vote in May 2019 than in any previous European election. They barely cleared the 50% mark between them, and the ranks of the centre-right European People’s Party included a large delegation from Viktor Orban’s Fidesz party, which dissented from the centrist ideology of ever-closer union and centralising power in Brussels, while being firmly committed to Hungary’s EU membership. There would be no more pressing for further European integration or, in the jargon, &#8216;More Europe&#8217;.</p>
<p>The second instance was the German election of Fall 2019 when the voters similarly reduced their support for the Social Democrats and Christian Democrats and gave a larger share of their votes to the populist AFD, the Bavarian CSU, and especially the once-centrist Free Democrats (who had adopted a more populist tone in the campaign), in a parliament that shifted overall to the Right. Chancellor Merkel was unable to form a new coalition with her past allies, the Social Democrats and Greens, and resigned.</p>
<p>Her successor, Wolfgang Schauble, gave up the Bundestag speakership to become CDU leader and Chancellor. He presented himself as a “caretaker Chancellor” but proved to be a very active one indeed. He set out to divide the AFD, tempting ambitious individual MPs to leave their “untouchable” party and become respectable by joining <em>any</em> of the parties in his new coalition, which was comprised of the CDU, the CSU, the FDP, and a faction of the Greens. In this way he brought moderate populists into government and constructed a durable conservative majority rooted in compromise between social traditionalists, free market (or corporate) business interests, moderate environmentalists, and a patriotic citizenry.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/08/europe-2025-beginning-end/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/08/europe-2025-beginning-end/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/GettyImages-5046654370.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/08/europe-2025-beginning-end/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/08/europe-2025-beginning-end/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Europe 2025: the beginning of the end</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/08/europe-2025-beginning-end/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> James Bloodworth</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Schauble, a long-standing supporter of Euro-integration, was expected to re-affirm Germany’s attachment to the Euro. For a while he seemed to do so. Then, to people’s surprise, Schauble announced on a Sunday evening in February 2020 that at midnight Germany would revert to the D-Mark at a fixed exchange rate for one week, after which it would be allowed to float. Outside Germany only the head of the European Central Bank and the French president were informed in advance.</p>
<p>This was unexpected, but in retrospect seemed inevitable. Economists on all sides had long agreed that the Euro was the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shirt_of_Nessus">Shirt of Nessus</a>: it was painful to keep it on and painful to take it off. But it eventually dawned on them that the pain of staying in was indefinite, that of leaving was transitional.</p>
<p>Realising this in 2014, Schauble <a href="https://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/schaeuble-pushed-for-a-grexit-and-backed-merkel-into-a-corner-a-1044259.html">had proposed</a> helping Greece to leave the single currency with a parting gift of billions to get the Greeks over the transition. Merkel had vetoed this. Now Schauble followed his own judgment and saw an independent D-Mark establish itself at a higher exchange rate while the smaller Euro fell and made the countries of southern Europe much more competitive. Schauble called a conference with Eurozone members a week later which agreed on additional changes: some northern EU-members later joined the D-Mark bloc, while Macron’s France sensibly decided to choose the Euro and prosperity over the D-Mark and <em>gloire</em>.</p>
<p>After brief market turbulence, Europe settled down into being a two-currency trading bloc with more balanced overall economic relations. German industry lost the super-advantage of an undervalued exchange rate, but this was compensated for by the gradual recoveries of markets in Greece, Spain, and Italy.</p>
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	<div class="quote"><div class="inner">&#8216;More Europe&#8217; was replaced by &#8216;Europe a la carte&#8217; as a general principle of Euro-governance
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<p>In this new economic environment Europe was no longer moving in a centralising direction: integration would be achieved on lines that were both more national and more liberal. That left President Macron of France, who was reliant on German generosity for his program of reviving the European project, without a policy to his name. He pursued one of domestic economic reform, but that lost as many votes as it won. He is now an unemployed Man of Destiny short of a great cause.</p>
<p>This presented an opportunity for the Gaullist wing of the conservatives, however, which had lacked influence in recent governments. Not only did it allow them to revive the General’s concept of Europe des Patries in favourable circumstances, but it also opened up the possibility of winning votes from the populist Rassemblement National (formerly the National Front.) Under their new leader, Laurent Wauquiez, The Republicans set about enticing the populist Right’s more attractive celebrities – notably, Marine Le Pen’s telegenic niece, Marion Marechal-Le Pen – over to their side for a campaign of respectable nationalism in the 2022 election. They won hands down. By 2022 the continental EU had populist or semi-populist governments in its three largest member-states.</p>
<p>Together with the new environment of economic optimism, this upsurge of qualified populism had a wider impact. Some countries like Italy decided to imitate EU member-states like Sweden, Hungary and Denmark that had opted to retain their own currencies. Stricter border controls had already been restored in response to rising threats of terrorism and illegal migration. EU Commission proposals for tax harmonisation were placed on the back burner, and harmonisation of regulation was increasingly rejected in favour of the principle of “mutual recognition” of national rules (ironically, a rock on which the Brexit negotiations had foundered earlier). Europe’s courts were increasingly inclined to respect national laws that reflected strong popular sentiment, and powers taken earlier by Brussels were returned to national parliaments. &#8216;More Europe&#8217; was replaced by &#8216;Europe a la carte&#8217; as a general principle of Euro-governance.</p>
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	<div class="quote"><div class="inner">Until the mid-teens of this century, it was politically risky and socially dangerous for people to say that they liked their country as it was, together with its customs and traditions
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<p>Contrary to much pessimism in the establishment, these transfers of legal and economic power did not result in a less dynamic European economy. Instead, over time they transformed the EU from a cartel of governments into a market of governments (as Margaret Thatcher had called for in a 1991 speech in the Hague.) In order to attract and keep businesses and talented people in their jurisdictions, individual EU governments had to craft tax-and-regulation packages at least as good as their competitive neighbours. Forcing governments to compete in this way proved to produce better economic results than dictating a level playing field from a single city in Belgium.</p>
<p>Still more unexpectedly, these power transfers also promoted both more vigorous and inclusive democratic politics, and a more heightened sense of national identity and community throughout Europe. Populists of Right and Left, some in coalition, some in majority parties, some in opposition, proposed, opposed, debated, and amended legislation. They became part of ‘the System’ and they expanded it. They just don’t seem very threatening any more.</p>
<p>Nations, regions, and localities have the freedom to bring in laws and regulations that reflect a national or local consensus, rather than a European elite orthodoxy. Neither Swedish urban secularists nor rural Croatian conservatives get exactly the moral and religious laws—for instance on abortion—that they want across Europe. But there is no persecution, residual but shrinking discrimination, real debate on contested issues, and a pan-European spirit of ‘live and let live’ that tolerates local option on many questions while gradually changing minds in both directions.</p>
<p>It turns out that what alienated people in our societies wanted was less to impose their own opinions than to have them treated with respect as part of legitimate debate. They took the ‘free’ in ‘free society’ literally and seriously.</p>
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	<div class="quote"><div class="inner">As 2025 approaches, Orban is the moral leader of the dominant conservative populist wing of European politics
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<p>One change in particular has been crucial: a powerful social taboo has been removed. Until the mid-teens of this century, it was politically risky and socially dangerous for people to say that they liked their country as it was, together with its customs and traditions, and that they would oppose policies, such as mass migration and multiculturalism, likely to change its character markedly. This had long been the opinion of most ordinary citizens, yet, as Ed West in <em>The Diversity Illusion</em> and Douglas Murray in <em>The Strange Death of Europe</em> had pointed out, they were routinely stigmatised as “racist” by parts of the media and cultural leaders.</p>
<p>The surprisingly deep elite prejudice against nationalism and the nation-state changed in part because of the intellectual challenges mounted by writers like Manent, Goodhart, Mudde, West, and Murray, and in part because the establishment&#8217;s anti-nationalism so overreached, arguing national borders were incompatible with human rights, that it discredited itself with most people.</p>
<p>More visibly, however, it was halted in politics by the fact that Hungary’s Prime Minister, Viktor Orban, won electoral landslides while declaring that Hungary was a nation with a Christian tradition and a specifically Hungarian culture. Like other nations, it should be treasured and protected from abrupt cultural, demographic, and national transformation—especially one imposed from outside. Other parties, not only in Central Europe, followed his example. He was accordingly credited with the rise of a new conservative cultural politics (usually called ‘illiberalism’ by him and his critics, misleadingly in my view) that led to the victories of populist parties in elections across Europe.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/08/far-rights-plans-capture-europe/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/08/far-rights-plans-capture-europe/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/GettyImages-942688020-e1610970150613.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/08/far-rights-plans-capture-europe/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/08/far-rights-plans-capture-europe/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The far right&#039;s plans to capture Europe</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/08/far-rights-plans-capture-europe/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Ian Birrell</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>As 2025 approaches, Orban is the moral leader of the dominant conservative populist wing of European politics, but his practical influence is limited by the fact that he is the prime minister of a small country. There is talk of his helping to create a new Carpathian Federation that would increase the influence of Central Europe within the EU.</p>
<p>What were the Brits doing while these events were unfolding? After the 2017 election Prime Minister Theresa May had been persuaded by Remainer Cabinet Ministers and officials to adopt policies for Brexit that brought her into conflict with the large majority of her own party. That produced a weak paralysed government, divided against itself, several failed initiatives starting with the so called Chequers Fiasco, and a policy stalemate that might have lasted indefinitely if a military scandal had not erupted to change public opinion on the Brexit debate.</p>
<p>Anxious to make Brexit as ‘soft’ as possible and thus more acceptable to the EU, officials in the Cabinet Office and the Ministry of Defence had committed the UK to far deeper participation in the EU’s independent defence structures than the Cabinet or Tory MPs knew or would have approved. Ominously the new EU defence establishment felt they needed a success – especially since Russia had been making threatening noises towards Montenegro and Macedonia. Accordingly, Brussels decided to handle the Russian threats outside of NATO. British troops were actually in the air to join an EU deterrent force on the Greek-Macedonian border when the scandal broke. The government fell.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/07/liberal-smugness-will-destroy-left/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/07/liberal-smugness-will-destroy-left/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/GettyImages-681436332.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/07/liberal-smugness-will-destroy-left/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/07/liberal-smugness-will-destroy-left/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Liberal smugness will destroy the Left</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/07/liberal-smugness-will-destroy-left/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Giles Fraser</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>A new government with a distinctively Brexiteer cast of mind and characters was appointed in an atmosphere of acute Euro-skepticism and public anger. Looking around desperately for policy options, ministers discovered a free trade and migration deal with Australia, Canada, and New Zealand that had apparently fallen behind a filing cabinet in the Treasury. Polls had always shown this so-called CANZUK Option was popular with the voters in all four countries.</p>
<p>Ministers also realised that it could be a clever preliminary and/or roundabout way of striking a trade deal with the US, without looking like Britain becoming the 51<sup>st</sup> state option. Both trade deals were acted on fairly quickly, and after a period of serious but temporary disruption (which the public in its new mood accepted without too much complaint), they began to stabilise the UK economy on different lines. More important, the new government moved the UK into the first lane of economic and technological development by gradually moving its supply-lines from the relatively quiescent ones in Europe to the far more dynamic ones in the wider US and Anglospheric worlds.</p>
<p>And what happened to the EU? Well, it didn’t collapse. Indeed it prospered. But the EU Commission did less well. As Marshall Foch once said of the graduates of the St. Cyr military academy, it could be said of the Brussels mandarins: “They know everything. Unfortunately, they don’t know anything else.” So as the Commission and other centralised EU institutions saw their power diminish in the new Europe des Patries, its leading figures gradually resigned or retired to become professors of European politics at Ivy League universities and centre-Left think tanks in the US.</p>
<p>From there they tell us how to arrange the world rather than merely Europe. The world rolls on. It is an arrangement that seems to suit everyone.</p>
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															<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">15927</post-id>				</item>
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					<title>Europe 2025: the beginning of the end</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2018/08/europe-2025-beginning-end/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://stage.unherd.com/2018/08/europe-2025-beginning-end/?edition=us#respond</comments>
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					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[James Bloodworth]]>
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					<unherd:creator_img>https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/bloodworth.jpg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
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							<![CDATA[Credit: Johannes Simon/Getty Images]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>James Bloodworth</strong> is a journalist and author of <em>Hired: Six Months Undercover in Low-Wage Britain</em>, which was longlisted for the Orwell Prize 2019.</p>
]]>
						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>J_Bloodworth</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is a journalist and author of <em>Hired: Six Months Undercover in Low-Wage Britain</em>, which was longlisted for the Orwell Prize 2019.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Wed, 22 Aug 2018 08:04:20 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Wed, 22 Aug 2018 17:35:10 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[European Union]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[France]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Germany]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Italy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Populism 2025]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Refugees]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Syria]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">http://old.unherd.com/?p=15917</guid>
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								<![CDATA[<p><em>This article is part of a series in which we have asked our contributors to imagine that populist movements continue to gain influence in the coming years – what do western democracies look like in 2025?</em></p>
<p>–––</p>
<p>The year is 2025. The death toll in Syria has exceeded one million. We have come a long way since March 2011, when 15 boys were detained and tortured by Syrian authorities for writing graffiti in support of the Arab Spring. The hopes of the western policy establishment that Syrian dictator Bashar al Assad would return the country to ‘stability’ – flatteringly known as the ‘realist’ position – have proven illusory. Aside from the horrific death toll, nearly 10 million Syrian refugees have fled the country as rebellions against the dictatorship have continued to flare.</p>
<p>It is a grim irony that the impetus for inaction in Syria on the part of the international community was based on the forlorn hope of containing the conflict. Yet a willingness to let Assad remain in power – at an exorbitant human cost – has created a refugee crisis the scale of which European nations have been forced to confront. To paraphrase Leon Trotsky, European electorates may not be interested in war, but war is interested in them. The globalisation of refugees is a reality whether or not the isolationists of Left and Right care to acknowledge it.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/08/welcome-populist-decade/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/08/welcome-populist-decade/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/GettyImages-632197932.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/08/welcome-populist-decade/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/08/welcome-populist-decade/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Welcome to the populist decade</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/08/welcome-populist-decade/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Henry Olsen</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>If the European project teeters on the brink of collapse it is due in part to this willingness to acquiesce in Assad’s slaughter. As millions of desperate people have sought refuge outside of Syria’s borders, many hundreds of thousands have ended up in Europe. Sections of the European media have been running a steady stream of articles over the past decade blaming the new arrivals for all of society’s maladies. Indeed, populism’s appeal on European soil stems in large part from its single-mindedness in running against the spectre of the newcomer.</p>
<p>The eurozone has also been dragged down by the increasing unwillingness of some of its member states to adhere to the bloc’s fiscal rules. While the worst fears of many pundits have not been borne out – predictions of the impending collapse of the European bloc have been receiving ample airtime since 2008 – in recent years nearly everything that could go wrong has gone wrong.</p>
<p>Ground zero of the latest crisis is not in one country but spans three: Italy, Germany and France. In Italy, the right-wing Lega (led for more than a decade by Matteo Salvini) has ridden to power on the back of frustration with the compromises of its larger coalition partner, the Five-Star Movement (M5S). First elected in 2018 after a meteoric rise, the M5S movement has progressed from ramshackle upstart to another spoke in the wheel of the status quo. Much of this rests on little more than the fact that the M5S – like all governing parties – has been forced to compromise with political and fiscal reality.</p>
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<p>For all of its pretence at partnership, the Lega sought to undermine its senior partner at every turn, pushing for a much stronger line on immigration (echoed vociferously by much of the press) while blaming Italy’s economic problems on the vacillations of M5S. Record numbers of refugees arriving on Italian shores – mainly from Syria – have driven an even more virulent wave of anti-immigration sentiment, which the Lega has done little to quell, instead fanning resentment at newcomers and adopting the Putinist line that all opposition to Syrian dictator Assad is Jihadist in nature.</p>
<p>Somewhat paradoxically, the Lega has toned down its anti-European rhetoric just as it finds itself on a collision course with Brussels. Along with several continental parties of the hard-Right, the Lega has never been as anti-European as common parlance suggests. Indeed, in the mid-90s the party sought to join the Euro, a position that would be unthinkable for hard-line Eurosceptic parties such as the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP).</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/07/populists-united-italy/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/07/populists-united-italy/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/GettyImages-965311466.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/07/populists-united-italy/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/07/populists-united-italy/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>How the populists have united Italy</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/07/populists-united-italy/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Beatrice Faleri</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>However, it is the Lega’s approach to the economy that has facilitated the gravest concerns in Brussels. In the past seven years Italy’s budget deficit has ballooned to 8% of the country’s GDP. Much of the deficit was accumulated during the Lega’s period in coalition with M5S, when the two parties sought to mollify two radically different constituencies with an anomalous and at times incongruous set of policies. Tax cuts, the scrapping of pension reforms and the introduction of the universal minimum income scheme have all precipitated the crisis at the Italian treasury.</p>
<p>As a consequence, Italy has broken the EU’s Stability and Growth Pact, sending risk premiums on bond markets soaring. As the Lega’s war of words with Brussels has grown increasingly vituperative, financial markets have begun to soberly contemplate Italy dropping out of the Euro altogether. This would arguably facilitate a severe economic crisis in Italy – and so the Italian government has opted instead to flagrantly break the eurozone’s fiscal rules.</p>
<p>Elsewhere, particularly in Germany and France, migration has had the greatest impact on the political weather. Emmanuel Macron narrowly lost the French Presidency to National Front leader Marine Le Pen at the 2022 elections, sending shockwaves reverberating around European capitals. Macron had led in most opinion polls leading up to the vote, though the two candidates switched places after a terrorist attack rocked Paris a fortnight before France went to the polls. Le Pen responded predictably with a fiery speech denouncing ‘non-European barbarians’, charging them with ‘polluting’ Europe, an accusation which seems to have captured the revengeful zeitgeist of a country living in fear of the next attack.</p>
<div class="inner-body-quote" data-type="quote">
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	<div class="quote"><div class="inner">Emmanuel Macron narrowly lost the French Presidency to National Front leader Marine Le Pen at the 2022 elections, sending shockwaves reverberating around European capitals
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<p>Yet only a fool would claim that the crisis in France has nothing to do with economics. Public sentiment in France has undoubtedly been made more susceptible to anti-refugee rhetoric by a bourgeoning economic crisis, driven in part by instability across the eurozone. As incomes in France have stagnated – and as the country has been gripped by industrial strife stoked by Macron’s attempts to push through pro-market reforms – a sense of chaos has prevailed. The French have sought someone to blame, and someone to follow. Moderation and managerialism have been eclipsed by the familiar search for scapegoats. The trite buzzwords of the centre – ‘forward not back’, ‘progress’, ‘on the move’ – have been replaced by an increasingly apocalyptic rhetoric which brings to mind splashes of petrol sprayed on a bonfire.</p>
<p>Since coming to power three years ago, Le Pen has threatened – albeit sporadically – to withdraw from the European single currency (though few take the threats seriously). Perhaps more ominously, the French President has set in motion plans for a 2026 referendum on France’s membership of the European Union.</p>
<p>Some 65% of the French public now have an unfavourable opinion of the EU, the highest recorded figure since 2016. France’s exit from the EU would precipitate the end of the European project in theory if not in practice. The 26 other members states will still be signed up to a host of European treaties, but the ideal – of a supranational foundation anchored in Germany and France – would lie in tatters.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/08/rural-france-fertile-ground-le-pen/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/08/rural-france-fertile-ground-le-pen/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/GettyImages-143627541.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/08/rural-france-fertile-ground-le-pen/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/08/rural-france-fertile-ground-le-pen/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Why rural France is fertile ground for Le Pen</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/08/rural-france-fertile-ground-le-pen/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> John Lichfield</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Germany no longer remains at the epicentre of European moderation either. Angela Merkel finally stepped down as German Chancellor in 2021 after nearly two decades in power. Her successor – both as leader of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and as German Chancellor – is 44-year-old Jens Spahn, the former Federal Minister of Health.</p>
<p>Spahn’s main challenge seems to be to fend off the hard-Right Alternative for Germany (AFD), now the second largest party by vote share. Spahn has achieved a modicum of success in this regard by stealing the AFD’s policies: Spahn has banned the niqab and rejected <em>in toto</em> the pro-refugee policies of his predecessor in the Bundestag.</p>
<p>But it is Spahn’s economic worldview that has potentially greater repercussions for Europe. Beyond his obsession with law and order, Spahn is an uncompromising free-marketeer who has little sympathy for southern Europe’s inability or unwillingness to pay its way. Germany still desires to be the European project’s hegemon, but not at any price. Eurozone GDP is shrinking while Germany powers ahead. And while Germany can prosper without Europe, the inverse is by no means guaranteed.</p>
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<p>It is true that Germany remains the euro zone’s largest creditor, meaning it has much to lose if the euro collapses. Yet with Spahn in office, pragmatic attempts to shore-up the Euro at any costs are undermined by the prevailing view in the Reichstag that southern Europeans are feckless and lazy. It is ultimately a battle of ideology versus common sense, and it is ideology that is on the march.</p>
<p>Since the financial crisis of 2008, many pundits have been making apocalyptic pronunciations forecasting the end of the eurozone. Every commentator wishes at some level to be an actor in an epoch-defining era (see the characterisation of former American President Donald Trump as a fascistic return to the 1930s), yet very few are. Institutions rarely walk headlong into disaster. Catastrophe, when it occurs, is usually the result of a steady accumulation of blunders that build up over decades.</p>
<p>As far as the European project is concerned, we have likely progressed beyond the end of the beginning and are approaching the beginning of the end. There will be no big bang, no Sarajevo moment in which Europe collapses cataclysmically into poverty and strife. Instead, Europe as we know it will probably expire quietly in the offices of the continent’s parliaments and chancelleries, as weary bureaucrats rush back and forth clutching reams of glistening white paper. Given the awful historical precedents, it is what happens next that should concern us.</p>
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					<title>Welcome to the populist decade</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2018/08/welcome-populist-decade/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://stage.unherd.com/2018/08/welcome-populist-decade/?edition=us#respond</comments>
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					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Henry Olsen]]>
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					<unherd:creator_img>https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/UnHerd-Henry-Olsen.jpg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
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							<![CDATA[Credit: Spencer Platt/Getty Images]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p>Henry Olsen is a Senior Fellow at the Ethics and Public Policy Center in Washington, DC. He is the author of <em>The Working Class Republican: Ronald Reagan and the Return of Blue-Collar Conservatism</em>.</p>
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						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>henryolsenEPPC</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[Henry Olsen is a Senior Fellow at the Ethics and Public Policy Center in Washington, DC. He is the author of <em>The Working Class Republican: Ronald Reagan and the Return of Blue-Collar Conservatism</em>.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Mon, 20 Aug 2018 05:55:41 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Mon, 20 Aug 2018 16:13:56 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Europe]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Populism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Populism 2025]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Trump]]></category>
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								<![CDATA[<p>We are now in the third year of our populist era. Brexit, Trump, and the continuing political appeal of political parties and figures who barely would have registered two decades ago have convinced most observers that <em>something</em> is going on across the Western world. Yet, despite that recognition, most observers remain rooted in their pre-populist political paradigms. They rarely expect populists to win, and when they do they rarely expect serious change to result.</p>
<p>It is time for the West to wake up. The something that is going on is not transient, nor will it be silenced by avoiding or ignoring the challenges these populists represent. Their concerns – slow and unequal economic growth, radical social change, and widespread institutional corruption – won’t go away without a concerted effort. And if the establishment’s leaders find they cannot, or will not, successfully address them, then people will embrace radical figures who say they can – as the victories of Donald Trump, Matteo Salvini, and Andrej Babis demonstrate.</p>
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<p>Of course, while all populist parties agree that change is necessary, they differ on exactly what that means, and how it should be achieved. Can that change be realised without fundamentally changing the West’s liberal democratic capitalist order? Or are some populist strains seeking a new settlement which is incompatible with liberalism, capitalism, or democracy.</p>
<p>The fall of the Berlin Wall and the opening of China, India, and much of the developing world to Western ideas and investment raises serious challenges. The rapid decline in Christianity and the concomitant revolution in social and sexual behaviour across the West poses a separate – and in the minds of many, equally dramatic – challenge. The rise of non-Western nations poses a third, related challenge. Populist parties and figures interact with each of these issues differently.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/02/centre-left-will-never-defeat-european-populism-fails-first-understand/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/02/centre-left-will-never-defeat-european-populism-fails-first-understand/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/PA-31279981.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/02/centre-left-will-never-defeat-european-populism-fails-first-understand/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Further reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/02/centre-left-will-never-defeat-european-populism-fails-first-understand/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The centre-left will never defeat European populism if it fails to first understand it</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/02/centre-left-will-never-defeat-european-populism-fails-first-understand/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Henry Olsen</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Regardless of those differences, it&#8217;s not unreasonable to think, given the failure by mainstream parties to grasp the strength of feeling among their electorates, that the populist wave will continue. What, then, would a heavily populist influenced, even dominated, next decade bring? That is the question UnHerd is exploring this week. Our contributors are imagining a world in which populist figures, mainly of the blue-collar right-wing variety, have increased their influence in Europe and America. Has the West been strengthened? Or is it headed downhill fast?</p>
<p>We don’t aim to present a comprehensive analysis of every conceivable outcome. Rather, we seek to spark discussion by doing what remains virtually unthinkable in most precincts: taking populism seriously.</p>
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	<div class="quote"><div class="inner">In many ways, the opening of this century resembles the opening of the last, with economic, social, and geopolitical changes creating pressures that fundamentally change the world
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<p>What will America look like if Donald Trump wins a second term? Chris Buskirk, editor of the pro-Trump American opinion website <em>American Greatness</em>, argues that Trump has indeed made America great again. Michael Warren, a writer at the Trump-skeptical magazine <em>The Weekly Standard</em>, disagrees. What happens to Europe if the populist sweep continues? John O’Sullivan, former speechwriter to Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and head of the Budapest-based Danube Institute, can see positives. James Bloodworth, in contrast, sees disaster. And what of the geopolitical structures and relationships? Peter Franklin considers the likely outcomes.</p>
<p>In many ways, the opening of this century resembles the opening of the last, with economic, social, and geopolitical changes creating pressures that fundamentally change the world. But unlike the failures of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century, today’s pressures need not lead to death, destruction, and desolation – I will be exploring this in an essay to conclude the series.</p>
<p>“He who rejects change is the architect of decay. The only human institution which rejects progress is the cemetery.” Harold Wilson’s aphorism is no less true today than it was when he uttered it in 1967. Populism is a call for change. How the West answers that call will determine how it changes and whether it retains its unique character after it does.</p>
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