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		<title>Protectionism - UnHerd</title>
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		<description>think again</description>
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	<title>Protectionism - UnHerd</title>
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					<title>Why Trump will win the tariff war</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2026/02/why-trump-will-win-the-tariff-war/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://stage.unherd.com/2026/02/why-trump-will-win-the-tariff-war/?edition=us#comments</comments>
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										<unherd:main_theme>Supreme Court</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Wolfgang Munchau]]>
					</dc:creator>
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																<unherd:article_ranking>1</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA['Trump may no longer have his tariff gun, but an economic bazooka remains'. (Nathan Howard/Getty)]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Wolfgang Münchau</strong> is the Director of <a href="https://www.eurointelligence.com/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Eurointelligence</a> and an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist.</p>
]]>
						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>EuroBriefing</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is the Director of <a href="https://www.eurointelligence.com/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Eurointelligence</a> and an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Mon, 23 Feb 2026 00:03:12 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Mon, 23 Feb 2026 09:36:25 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Donald Trump]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Economics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Protectionism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Tariffs]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[USA]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://stage.unherd.com/?p=1049670</guid>
																												<description>
								<![CDATA[Lawfare has never stopped him]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p dir="ltr">Before we all start celebrating, it is worth reflecting for a moment on what the Supreme Court’s tariff ruling did — and what it didn’t. The only positive I can see is that it takes us outside the realm of threat. Donald Trump will no longer be able to point a tariff gun at the rest of us. The era of the tariff tweet, too, will end. Yet amid the bluster and the late-night posts, nothing of substance will change.</p>
<p dir="ltr">After all, virtually all the tariffs will survive unaltered. In the short-run, the President is covered. On Friday night, immediately after the Supreme Court ruling, he invoked Section 122 of the 1974 Trade Act, signing an executive order to impose an immediate 10% tariff on the rest of the world. On Saturday, he raised that figure to 15%, the maximum allowed under the Act. The tariffs will kick in tomorrow — but despite what some journalists have claimed, none of this is “defying” the judges. On the contrary, Trump is merely implementing their ruling.</p>
<p dir="ltr">The catch is that Section 122 has a time cap of 150 days. That takes us until late July. At that point, Trump could get Congress to extend the period further. It may be possible, and legally more risky, for him to reset the clock. Or he could let the tariffs lapse before applying a new 150-day batch. Whether or not this holds up in court, it will buy him time to get ready for his real tariff fightback.</p>
<p dir="ltr">The point, here, is that all the Supreme Court did on Friday was tell the President that he should have picked a different legal basis for his tariffs. This is still a big deal — but not quite as big as you might imagine.</p>
<p dir="ltr">To understand exactly what happened requires a deep-dive into US trade law. When, on 2 April last year, Trump stepped into the White House Rose Garden to declare “Liberation Day”, he used a law dating from the Jimmy Carter era. The 1977 International Emergency Economic Powers Act, or IEEPA, was a response to the two oil crises of that decade. IEEPA gave the president unprecedented rights to act in response to a crisis, from freezing foreign assets to confiscating foreign property.</p>
<p dir="ltr"><div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/01/why-trump-will-get-greenland/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/01/why-trump-will-get-greenland/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/GettyImages-2255969993.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/01/why-trump-will-get-greenland/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/01/why-trump-will-get-greenland/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Why Trump will get Greenland</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/01/why-trump-will-get-greenland/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Wolfgang Munchau</a></p></div></a></div>
<p dir="ltr">Importantly, though, IEEPA says nothing about tariffs. Yet Trump picked it as the legal basis for his Liberation Day tariffs — and this is what the Supreme Court objected to. In essence, the Court ruled that the US faces no immediate emergency, unlike in the Seventies. In any case, tariffs fall under a different set of laws. The Court decided against the US administration with a majority of six to three, with Brett Kavanaugh one of the dissenting justices, and the legal disagreement essentially about who decides what constitutes an emergency.</p>
<p dir="ltr">In his minority opinion, Kavanaugh made one point that is not contested: that the ruling would have little effect in real life. As he puts it “numerous other federal statutes” allow Trump to impose tariffs legally — “albeit perhaps with a few additional procedural steps”.</p>
<p dir="ltr">What are those procedural steps? Quite simply the two big trade acts through which presidents normally levy tariffs on other countries. They’re hardly arcane: Joe Biden used them too. The first is the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, specifically Section 232 on national security. It allows the president to levy tariffs on products he deems to be a potential threat to national security. The Trump administration already levied tariffs on several products under this act — cars and trucks, steel and aluminum. There is also copper, furniture, lumber, and timber. The Supreme Court ruling has no effect whatsoever on these Section 232 tariffs, and indeed the Trump administration may yet use it to stick tariffs on foreign airline parts and pharmaceuticals. If this happened, the Canadians and the Europeans would suffer most.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Section 232 tariffs only concern goods for which a national security argument can be made: notably critical raw materials. Dolls imported from China, or French luxury handbags, clearly do not fall into that category. The heavy lifting that yielded most of America’s tariff revenue before Trump’s Liberation Day announcement came from Section 301 of the 1974 Trade Act. That’s also where most of the action on future tariffs will come from, now that the Court has blocked the IEEPA route. Section 301 is about unfair trading practices, like violations of trade agreements, or any policies that are deemed to discriminate against US businesses. Trump will have little difficulty here, with Section 301 playing into his rhetoric that foreign trading partners are out to cheat America.</p>
<p dir="ltr"><div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/11/trump-has-called-europes-bluff/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/11/trump-has-called-europes-bluff/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/GettyImages-2247393568.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/11/trump-has-called-europes-bluff/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/11/trump-has-called-europes-bluff/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Trump has called Europe&#039;s bluff</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/11/trump-has-called-europes-bluff/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Wolfgang Munchau</a></p></div></a></div>
<p dir="ltr">That, of course, still leaves one question: why did Trump go down the IEEPA route to start with, when he had these other laws at his disposal? The answer involves understanding the President himself. Trump is a man of transactions, not procedures — and both the 1962 and 1974 acts are heavy on procedure, typically taking about a year to enact. In the case of Section 232, the Department of Commerce must first investigate the effects of the relevant imports on national security. There are maximum, but no minimum, time limits. There are no formal appeal procedures, but there are legal safeguards in place to prevent the process from being cynically short-circuited. The investigation takes at most 270 days, after which the president has 90 days to decide whether to act. In practice, the process is a little faster, but not much. Back in 2017, Trump’s tariffs on steel and aluminum took almost a year to enact.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Section 301, too, requires a formal procedure, in this case by the US Trade Representative. A typical 301 investigation takes 6-12 months from start to finish. Those investigations come with depositions and hearings, and end with a long report. After four years, the tariffs must be reviewed.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Bureaucracy, in short, intrudes. This explains why Trump first chose IEEPA as the legal basis for its tariffs: for its speed and what we might therefore call its “threat factor”. Not for nothing did Scott Bessent, the US treasury secretary, once refer to tariffs as the gun on the table.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Yet if the 1962 and 1975 acts are big on paperwork, Kavanaugh is again right that Trump will ultimately be able to get his way — and Congress will be unable to stop him. Another advantage of both laws, after all, is that they are firmly in the president’s gift to enact.</p>
<p dir="ltr"><div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;Trump will ultimately be able to get his way — and Congress will be unable to stop him.&#8221;</div>
<p dir="ltr">Here, then, is the timeline: the temporary 15% tariffs will kick in this week, buying Trump the space to impose the bureaucratic procedures that make them permanent. He could even end up raising the total level of tariffs if he so wished; I myself foresee a scenario where tariffs on cars from the EU and the UK go up by a tenth. That is even as he uses the law to bolster his broader argument about America’s economic position. “They rip us off,” he said of the EU a year ago. Well, that is precisely what Section 301 is about.</p>
<p dir="ltr">So if you hate Trump, you may well celebrate the Supreme Court ruling as a symbolic defeat. If, however, you hate the tariffs, you have no reason to cheer: the powers of the President to impose tariffs unilaterally are not affected at all.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Why, then, are people celebrating? I’m reminded here of the lawfare against Trump ahead of the 2024 election. I remember the BBC in particular expressing gleefully confidence that the New York criminal case against Trump would deprive him of the means of launching an effective campaign. In that particular case, the US Supreme Court came to Trump’s rescue. What has always helped Trump is a tendency by his opponents to overestimate the effect of legal games.</p>
<p dir="ltr">A deluded German commentator described the ruling as an “embarrassment of historic proportions”. There is an awful lot of “peak Trump” commentary about. Statements such as these may be designed to make us Europeans feel better, but they just don’t hold up to scrutiny. The tariffs were Trump’s most important economic policy decision — and they will stay, even as he has almost three more years of his four-year term.</p>
<p dir="ltr">The real problem with Trump is not that he is a buffoon, but that he learned how to game the political system. Not all of the mud he throws will stick. But a lot will. The President may no longer hold his tariff gun, but an economic bazooka remains, and it is pointing at the rest of us.</p>
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									<item>
					<title>Claudia Sheinbaum: Trump whisperer</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2025/12/claudia-sheinbaum-trump-whisperer/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://stage.unherd.com/2025/12/claudia-sheinbaum-trump-whisperer/?edition=us#comments</comments>
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										<unherd:main_theme>Trade war</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Edwin Ackerman]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/Blue-1.jpg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>3</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[Has Donald met his match? Alfredo Estrella/AFP via Getty.]]>
						</unherd:image_caption>
						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Edwin Ackerman </strong>is an associate professor of sociology at Syracuse University and the author of <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/origins-of-the-mass-party-9780197576502" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em>Origins of the</em> <cite>Mass Party: Dispossession and the Party- Form in Mexico and Bolivia in Comparative Perspective</cite></a>.</p>
]]>
						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>edwinackerman</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[is an associate professor of sociology at Syracuse University and the author of <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/origins-of-the-mass-party-9780197576502" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em>Origins of the</em> <cite>Mass Party: Dispossession and the Party- Form in Mexico and Bolivia in Comparative Perspective</cite></a>.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Thu, 11 Dec 2025 00:00:03 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Thu, 11 Dec 2025 11:54:14 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[America]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Claudia Sheinbaum]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Donald Trump]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Mexico]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Protectionism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Tariffs]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[The left]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://stage.unherd.com/?p=1040750</guid>
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								<![CDATA[Mexico’s Leftist leader has surprised critics]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>“I have great respect for the president, a woman that I think is a tremendous woman,” Donald Trump said of Mexico’s president Claudia Sheinbaum in October. A year earlier, he announced he would hit Mexico with a 30% tariff on goods. Yet while other world leaders facing similarly high rates floundered, Sheinbaum has received praise for negotiating the threat of tariffs without substantial concessions. Even so, what has puzzled some is that a Leftist president has been able to establish the semblance of a working relationship with a neighboring hostile administration.</p>
<p>To understand Claudia Sheinbaum’s place in Mexican politics, one must first situate her government, party, and movement within the broader landscape of the Mexican Left. Sheinbaum’s party Morena represents the electoral Left and the broader phenomenon of “Obradorismo”, named after Mexico’s former president, Andrés Manuel López Obrador. “Obradorismo” is a political movement motivated by state developmentalism and committed to pursuing the interests of the working classes and the poor through democratic means. While a certain sense of class interest animates the project, this does not entail outright confrontation with capital, but a conviction that class interests must be harmonized, and that the state must be re-legitimized as the central social actor capable of carrying out its aims. In essence, Morena represents an effort to construct a post-neoliberal social pact, one predicated on returning class politics to the mainstream political arena, and re-invigorating the state.</p>
<p>But what about other factions of the Mexican Left? One crucial distinction is between the electoral Left and what might be termed the autonomist Left, which operates as an informal social movement rather than organizing under a formal party structure. More fundamentally, it rejects state power outright. The most celebrated example of the autonomist Left is the Zapatista movement in the state of Chiapas, which has pursued autonomous communal power — a form of local self-government that explicitly refuses incorporation into any broader national project. But the Zapatistas are not the only ones. Similar orientations can be found in movements such as the self-defense units in Cherán in the western state of Michoacán, where residents have for years taken up arms to protect their communities from drug cartels while simultaneously rejecting the state’s role in security provision, seeing it as complicit with organized crime. These communities have famously expelled all political parties from their territory.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/10/what-the-left-can-learn-from-argentina/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/10/what-the-left-can-learn-from-argentina/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/GettyImages-2239653245.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/10/what-the-left-can-learn-from-argentina/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested Reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/10/what-the-left-can-learn-from-argentina/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>What the Left can learn from Argentina</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/10/what-the-left-can-learn-from-argentina/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Thomas Peermohamed Lambert</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>The autonomist Left also has an urban branch, though the term “branch” might overstate the degree of coordination between rural and urban variants. What unites them is a negative view of the state. What separates them is their social composition and the structural basis of their politics. The rural autonomist Left&#8217;s skepticism toward the state is materially grounded. They have historically experienced the state as an external intervention. The term “community” in this context carries real meaning: it refers to specific forms of collective land tenure and self-governance, often institutionalized through the legal category of <em>usos y costumbres</em> (“customs and traditions”), which grants certain communities the right to govern according to traditional practices, such as decision-making governing assemblies instead of elected delegates. Even where communities fall outside this formal category, the historical lineage of communal organization provides a material foundation for their political orientation. This structural position explains, for instance, the opposition of certain communities to developmentalist projects <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-67638183" target="_blank" rel="noopener">like the Tren Maya</a>, where questions arose about who constitutes the relevant political unit for consultation. Individual residents as in a liberal democratic model? Or communal representatives as in a corporatist one?</p>
<p>The urban autonomist Left, by contrast, lacks this structural grounding. Cosmopolitan progressives with small social bases adopt the language of social movements and civil society while remaining numerically marginal and primarily active in intellectual circles. At its best, it draws on anarchist ideals and sophisticated critiques of the bourgeois state as the node organizing capital. More commonly, however, it is characterized by its “Brahmin Left” dispositions: highly educated, credentialed, invested in cultural capital, oriented toward, for lack of a better term, identity politics.</p>
<p>Morena and the electoral Left emerge from an entirely different historical trajectory. The party can be credibly traced to a split from the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) in the Eighties. The PRI had governed Mexico for over 70 years, institutionalizing the Mexican Revolution and carrying out Keynesian welfare-state projects from the Thirties through to the Seventies. While the party contained a broad ideological spectrum, it was sometimes a contradictory mix of Mexican Cold War anti-communist and national state developmentalism. This began to change in the Seventies and accelerated in the Eighties, as a neoliberal wing became dominant within the party. In reaction, the nationalist wing broke away in the mid-Eighties, forming the party that would contest the 1988 elections and eventually consolidate into the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD).</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/02/how-the-west-fetishised-the-zapatistas/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/02/how-the-west-fetishised-the-zapatistas/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/GettyImages-1891989024.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/02/how-the-west-fetishised-the-zapatistas/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested Reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/02/how-the-west-fetishised-the-zapatistas/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>How the Left fetishised the Zapatistas</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/02/how-the-west-fetishised-the-zapatistas/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Brad Evans</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>The political career of Sheinbaum’s predecessor and political mentor, President Andrés Manuel López Obrador, otherwise known as AMLO, traverses this history. He began in the PRI in Tabasco, joined the Eighties splinter-faction, and became a founding member of the PRD, with which he won the mayoralty of Mexico City in 2000. What makes AMLO difficult to categorize for both domestic and international observers is precisely this trajectory: he does not come from the socialist or social democratic Left as his European counterparts might; he does not emerge from militant union leadership like Lula in Brazil or Evo Morales in Bolivia; he was not formed in the rural or urban guerrilla movements of the Seventies like Mujica in Uruguay, Dilma Rousseff in Brazil, or Petro in Colombia. Instead, he comes from the nationalist, developmentalist wing of the PRI — a Left that operated within the paradigm of the Keynesian welfare state and never let go.</p>
<p>Sheinbaum’s own trajectory intersects with this lineage while adding distinctive elements. An academic by training, with a career in energy engineering and climate studies, her first entry into high-level politics came when AMLO appointed her Minister of Environment during his tenure as Mexico City mayor. Earlier, she had been involved in student movements focused on resisting the privatization of higher education — movements with significant ties to the emerging PRD. Sheinbaum thus shares certain affinities with the urban progressive Left in her background, yet she was politically formed within “Obradorismo”. This duality has proven advantageous in her first year in office, allowing her to retain AMLO’s base while recapturing sectors of the professional classes that had drifted from the Left coalition.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;Sheinbaum shares certain affinities with the urban progressive Left in her background, yet she was politically formed within Obradorismo.&#8221;</div>
<p>Situating Morena within the broader Latin American context requires attention to Mexico’s peculiar timing. The Pink Tide of progressive governments that swept Latin America beginning in the late Nineties never reached Mexico during its height. The conventional explanation for the Pink Tide emphasizes the conjuncture of democratization — the famous third wave — with the growing inequality and lackluster growth produced by neoliberalism. Mexico possessed these same conditions: democratization following PRI rule, poverty and inequality caused by neoliberalism. Yet the electoral Left repeatedly failed, with three consecutive center-right governments taking power after 2000.</p>
<p>This anomaly can be explained, ironically, by the PRI’s own legacy. The electoral Left in Mexico developed without a social base of its own because the PRI had already organized and neutralized what would theoretically constitute the Left’s natural constituency. Through patronage, clientelism, and a combination of carrots and sticks, the PRI had captured the working classes within its own corporatist structures. The PRD therefore faced the more difficult task of contesting an already-organized social base against an established hegemon, rather than simply mobilizing an available constituency. Only as neoliberalism eroded the material basis for the PRI’s clientelist networks did these social blocs become available for rearticulation.</p>
<p>There are also important structural differences between Morena and the earlier Pink Tide governments. The first wave governed during a period of extraordinary economic growth, particularly tied to the commodity boom in Brazil, Bolivia, and Venezuela. Sheinbaum, by contrast, comes to power after years of lackluster growth that estimates indicate is likely to continue. This means that the basis of legitimacy of the project must rest on a continued redistributive management of the existing “pie”. It is therefore all the more remarkable that despite these disarticulated working classes, a dilapidated state, the Covid pandemic, and subsequent inflationary pressures, the Obrador administration managed to increase real wages by 30%, lower poverty by 13%, and shift the balance between labor and capital’s share of income by 8% in favor of workers.</p>
<p>Moreover, Mexico’s integration into the global economy differs fundamentally: 20-plus years of NAFTA have restructured the economy entirely, dilapidating the countryside and national industry, and converting the country into a cheap foreign manufacturing center and import economy. Between 40 and 60% of Mexicans work in the informal sector, primarily in services and retail rather than production. The government’s relationship with NAFTA has been ambivalent — defending and legitimizing it while using it as leverage to advance pro-worker positions, as when the 2018 renegotiation was used to secure major labor reforms that previous Mexican delegations had rejected.</p>
<p>Sheinbaum’s handling of the Trump administration’s tariff threats reveals both the continuities and distinctive elements of her approach. Her negotiation tactics have been simultaneously overrated and underrated. They are overrated insofar as her approach largely follows AMLO’s playbook, yet the international press has treated her more favorably, perhaps because her technocratic background makes her more legible to the journalist class. They are underrated because, unlike many world leaders who responded to Trump’s protectionism by doubling down on free trade orthodoxy, Sheinbaum has used the moment — without knee-jerk anti-Trump posturing — to advance a post-neoliberal economic order, including tariffs against Asian imports accompanied by actual industrial policy, in the form of a return to a mild import substitution industrialization. In this sense, Sheinbaum represents both the inheritance of Mexico’s national developmentalist tradition and its adaptation to contemporary conditions. A year into her administration, Sheinbaum’s project is still finding its footing, and while the prospects of economic growth remain low, the strategy of strengthening its autonomy in its interactions with global markets will prove invaluable.</p>
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					<title>How Trump remade conservatism</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2025/11/how-trump-remade-conservatism/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://stage.unherd.com/2025/11/how-trump-remade-conservatism/?edition=us#comments</comments>
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										<unherd:main_theme>The Right</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Michael Lind]]>
					</dc:creator>
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																<unherd:article_ranking>2</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[The two sides see him differently. Credit: Getty.]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p>Michael Lind is a columnist at <em>UnHerd</em>.</p>
]]>
						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle></unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[Michael Lind is a columnist at <em>UnHerd</em>.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Thu, 13 Nov 2025 00:22:04 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Thu, 13 Nov 2025 19:32:23 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Donald Trump]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[George H W Bush]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[George W Bush]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Populism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Protectionism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Republicans]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[ross perot]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Unions]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[William F. Buckley]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://stage.unherd.com/?p=1037026</guid>
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								<![CDATA[No, he’s not George Bush 2.0]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Is Donald Trump a Trumpist? Or is he really an unacknowledged heir from Queens of the Bush dynasty? Is the 45th and 47th president of the United States a Russian matryoshka doll, whose well-coiffed head can be lifted off to reveal a figurine of Bush 43, which in turn contains Bush 41?</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Americans on the Right have reasons to wonder.</span> <span style="font-weight: 400;">Recently a number of self-styled spokespersons for MAGA have claimed that the president has betrayed his populist base on issues ranging from foreign policy (with his bombing of</span><a href="https://www.cnn.com/2025/06/22/politics/maga-movement-divided-trump-iran"> <span style="font-weight: 400;">Iran</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> and threats of</span><a href="https://www.cnn.com/2025/06/22/politics/maga-movement-divided-trump-iran"> <span style="font-weight: 400;">war</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> against Venezuela), to higher education (with his insistence on admitting Chinese</span><a href="https://www.foxnews.com/politics/trump-doubles-down-plan-600000-chinese-student-visas-despite-maga-backlash"> <span style="font-weight: 400;">students</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> to US universities to maintain university enrollments and budgets). At the same time, old-fashioned conservatives complain that Trump has</span><a href="https://www.msnbc.com/opinion/msnbc-opinion/trump-tariffs-republican-party-conservatism-rcna202794"> <span style="font-weight: 400;">betrayed</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> the legacy of</span><a href="https://reason.com/2025/04/20/reagan-is-back-in-style-but-not-in-spirit/"> <span style="font-weight: 400;">Ronald Reagan</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> and the two Bushes with his stances on trade and immigration. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Both sides are half-right — and thus half-wrong. Just as he demolished the East Wing of the White House to add a new ballroom, while leaving the rest of the structure intact, so Trump, instead of completely replacing the older version of conservatism, has added a new populist wing based on trade and labor protectionism.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Pre-Trump “fusionist conservatism,” forged by the likes of William F. Buckley and Frank Meyer in the last century, is often compared to a stool with three legs: a hawkish foreign policy, free-market libertarianism in economics, and social conservatism. Trump himself never fit that model. During his 2016 campaign, he described the Iraq War as a “disaster” and vowed not to cut Social Security or Medicare. And while George W. Bush is a born-again Christian, Trump is a thrice-married playboy who told evangelicals at Liberty University that his favorite book in the Bible is “Two Corinthians.”</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">In contrast to their leader, the priorities of most congressional Republicans in Trump’s second term, as in his first, have been Bush-like: to expand the deficit with tax cuts for the rich, or to attempt to cut or destroy ObamaCare without offering any replacement other than a few half-baked ideas. Little seems to have changed with the GOP caucus since the days when</span><a href="https://thehill.com/homenews/campaign/4650934-paul-ryan-donald-trump-2024-election-voting/"> <span style="font-weight: 400;">Paul Ryan</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> was House speaker (Ryan himself, feeling betrayed as a “true” conservative, refused to vote for Trump in 2024 and said: “I’m going to write in a Republican”). </span></p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/10/forget-the-world-wars/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/10/forget-the-world-wars/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/GettyImages-2155600568.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/10/forget-the-world-wars/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/10/forget-the-world-wars/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Don&#039;t mention the old World Wars</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/10/forget-the-world-wars/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Michael Lind</a></p></div></a></div>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Yet the betrayal charges — from MAGA populists and doctrinaire Reaganites alike — misunderstand something fundamental about Trump. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Far from breaking completely with Republican anti-statism, he began his second term by assigning Elon Musk, a libertarian tycoon, and Russell Vought, a veteran of pre-Trump conservatism, with the task of firing as many civil servants as possible and wrecking as many agencies as they could, often in blatant violation of statutory law and the Constitution. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">In foreign policy,</span> <span style="font-weight: 400;">it’s true that Trump in his first term was cautious compared to his predecessors. He didn’t start any new wars, unlike George W. Bush, who launched an unnecessary “forever war” in Iraq alongside the one in Afghanistan; and Barack Obama, who presided over a needless war of choice against the Qaddafi regime in Libya and who fueled an insurgency in Syria that empowered an Al Qaeda warlord, now donning ill-fitting suits.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">In the first year of his second term, however, Trump has called for the annexation of Greenland and renamed the Gulf of Mexico to the “Gulf of America.” He has bombed Iran, something the two Bushes refused to do. In recent days, he has threatened to invade Nigeria in response to the Islamist persecution of Nigerian Christians, and appears to be making preparations for war with the Maduro dictatorship in Caracas.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Venezuela happens to be No. 1 among the countries in proven </span><a href="https://ceoworld.biz/2019/03/27/these-are-the-countries-with-the-largest-crude-oil-reserves/"><span style="font-weight: 400;">crude oil reserves</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">, surpassing Saudi Arabia, and No. 8 in </span><a href="https://ceoworld.biz/2025/07/11/these-are-the-countries-with-the-largest-proven-natural-gas-reserves-2025/"><span style="font-weight: 400;">gas reserves</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">. Iran is No. 4 in crude oil reserves and No. 2 in gas reserves. Nigeria is No. 10 in oil reserves and No. 9 in gas reserves. Wars or threats of wars of regime change against an axis of oil-rich countries bring to mind those two Texan oil men, George W. Bush and the late Dick Cheney, and appealing to evangelical voters (as the Nigeria initiative does) in the service of </span><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">Petropolitik</span></i><span style="font-weight: 400;"> is very Bushian.</span></p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">“American political parties are Frankenstein’s monsters.” </div>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Trump, then, hasn’t broken with the legacy Reagan-Bush consensus on all issues. But on two issues — trade protectionism and labor market protectionism through immigration enforcement and restriction — he has departed radically from the older conservative agenda. Trump has won the presidency twice because he has added to the inherited GOP base a bloc of non-college-educated working-class voters — mostly, but not exclusively, white — who were alienated by the support for free trade and mass immigration of the Bush Republicans in the 1990s and aughts. In other words: He has united Reagan-Bush voters with the kind of voters who in the 1990s voted for H. Ross Perot.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Despite his successes in foreign policy, including the prosecution of the Gulf War and negotiations to end the Cold War, George H. W. Bush, who promoted economic austerity and free trade, repelled many white working-class voters who had been “Nixon Democrats” and later “Reagan Democrats.”</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Many of these voters were drawn to the folksy Texan billionaire Ross Perot and his personal presidential vehicle, the Reform Party. Perot garnered 19% of ballots when he ran as an Independent in the 1992 election, more than any third-party candidate since Theodore Roosevelt ran as the nominee of the Progressive Party against his Republican successor, William Howard Taft, and the Democrat Woodrow Wilson in 1912. Perot’s </span><a href="https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1992-06-16-mn-526-story.html"><span style="font-weight: 400;">strongest supporters</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> included many high-school-educated white men and women and union members in the industrial states — the kind who later put Trump in the White House twice. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Of Perot’s two main issues, economic nationalism and the budget deficit, the former was critical to his </span><a href="https://ielp.worldtradelaw.net/2024/12/is-nafta-a-good-explanation-for-workers-leaving-the-democratic-party-case-of-ohio/"><span style="font-weight: 400;">working-class support</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">. NAFTA was negotiated under George H. W. Bush and later pushed through Congress by President Bill Clinton in 1993 with only Republican votes. In the House, most Democrats voted against NAFTA, 156 to 102, while Republican support was overwhelming, 132 to 43. GOP senators voted for NAFTA 34 to 10, while Democrats opposed the treaty by 28 to 27.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Perot was ridiculed when he claimed that the passage of NAFTA would result in a “giant sucking sound” of factories and jobs offshored to Mexico. But he was right. Thanks to offshoring by US companies and investment by European and Asian auto makers exploiting low Mexican wages and access to the American market, </span><a href="https://mexico-now.com/mexico-ranks-3rd-among-the-worlds-largest-automotive-exporters/#:~:text=These%20amounts%20include%20foreign%20sales,impact%20on%20the%20Mexican%20economy"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Mexico</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> today is the third-largest automotive exporter</span><span style="font-weight: 400;"> in the world, above the United States and Japan and below only China and the European Union, while Detroit, the former “Motor City,” is a </span><a href="https://www.economyleague.org/resources/detroit-past-and-future-shrinking-city"><span style="font-weight: 400;">desolate wasteland</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">.  </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">With the transfer of production to Mexico and the anti-union American South, the wages of formerly well-paid auto workers, adjusted for inflation, </span><a href="https://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2019/article/earnings-of-production-workers-in-manufacturing-1990-2018.htm"><span style="font-weight: 400;">declined by more than 17% from 1990 to December 2018</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">, falling below the private-sector average in general.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">In his two terms, George W. Bush compounded the damage done by NAFTA to America’s working class by complacently presiding over the offshoring of much of American manufacturing to Communist China as well as to Mexico and other low-wage nations.  Meanwhile, his administration, on behalf of cheap-labor employers, turned a blind eye to massive illegal immigration from Mexico and elsewhere. “Protectionist” became an epithet in the Bush-era GOP.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">In 1999, after Perot indicated he wouldn’t run a third time, Trump ran for the presidential nomination of Perot’s Reform Party but dropped out. The nomination went instead to the paleoconservative firebrand Patrick Buchanan, whom Trump denounced as an “anti-Semite” and “Hitler lover.” In 2015, Trump chose to run for the presidential nomination of one of the two major parties, instead of a third party, and unlike Perot, he became president — twice. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">While most of the pre-Trump Republican coalition of hawks, social conservatives, and free-market libertarians remains, Trump has won back many of the working-class voters of the kind who were drawn to Nixon and Reagan but driven away by the two Bushes. Trump doesn’t owe his success to the “culture war,” which was a specialty of the Bushes, as they tried to divert attention from their country-club economic agenda by waving the flag and thumping the Bible.  Trump won because, like Perot, he made protection central to his agenda — the protection of American industries from foreign competition, and the protection of American workers from immigrant competition. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">In his first term, he rewarded these voters with the US-Mexico-Canada Agreement, which replaced NAFTA, and in his second term, he has cracked down against illegal immigration, including not only criminal migrants, but also unauthorized workers used as pawns by scofflaw employers to lower wages and evade workplace laws.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">But in domestic policy, Republicans remain mostly hostile to organized labor and regulation of any kind, and Trump has gone along with the old anti-government Right in backing Vought and Musk and DOGE. The result under Trump is a hybrid — a synthesis of economic nationalism in trade and immigration policy with old-fashioned anti-government conservatism inside America’s borders.</span></p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/10/the-post-trump-gop-will-be-even-crazier/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/10/the-post-trump-gop-will-be-even-crazier/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/GettyImages-2239376288.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/10/the-post-trump-gop-will-be-even-crazier/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/10/the-post-trump-gop-will-be-even-crazier/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The post-Trump GOP will be even crazier</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/10/the-post-trump-gop-will-be-even-crazier/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Richard Hanania</a></p></div></a></div>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Is tariff-fenced free-market conservatism in one country a stable policy? It worked for the Republicans for more than half a century between the Civil War and the Great Depression, when most of the GOP combined support for protective tariffs with opposition to organized labor and costly government. In his second Inaugural Address, Trump declared that President William McKinley, known in his time as “the Napoleon of Protection,” “made our country very rich through tariffs.”</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">He also echoed President </span><a href="https://www.coolidgereview.com/articles/grand-old-protectionists"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Calvin Coolidge</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">, who on Labor Day in 1924, told a group of union leaders that </span><a href="https://coolidgefoundation.org/resources/the-high-place-of-labor/"><span style="font-weight: 400;">high wages</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> for American workers</span><span style="font-weight: 400;"> depended upon immigration restriction and protectionism in trade policy. A “tremendous influx” of immigrants would be followed by “an almost certain reduction of wages.” He continued: “</span><span style="font-weight: 400;">Under free trade, the only way we could meet European competition would be by approaching the European standard of wages. I want to see the American standard of living maintained. We shall not be misled by any appeal for cheap goods, if we remember that this was completely answered by President McKinley when he stated that cheap goods make cheap men. By restrictive immigration, by adequate protection, I want to prevent America from producing cheap men.”</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Such hybridity is a feature of American party politics. Party realignments in the United States never involve the complete replacement of an old party with a new party that differs on every issue. American political parties are Frankenstein’s monsters that are altered with the amputation of some limbs and the addition of pieces of  dismembered parties.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Abraham Lincoln’s Republican Party stitched former Jacksonian Democrats opposed to secession and slavery, and single-issue abolitionists to the remnants of the moribund Whig Party.  Franklin D. Roosevelt sewed formerly Republican progressives, black voters, and white-ethnic urban immigrant groups that had been divided among the parties onto the Southern core of the older Democrats. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">In 1968, the American Party candidacy of George Wallace, the segregationist Democratic governor of Georgia, split the Democratic coalition, allowing Richard Nixon to defeat Lyndon Johnson’s vice president, Hubert Humphrey, the Democratic nominee. Four years later, Nixon managed to weld many former Wallace populist voters to the Republican Party, creating a presidential majority coalition that Reagan inherited.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Like Lincoln, FDR, and Reagan, Trump has brought about a genuine realignment, recruiting formerly disaffected voters by adding </span><span style="font-weight: 400;">a fourth leg to the conservative tripod, providing two economic legs, as it were — protectionism and immigration restriction in external economic affairs and free-market libertarianism at home. But his voters, again like Perot’s, are swing voters, not part of the Republican base. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">As Trump himself has pointed out, other Republican office-seekers do best in election years when he is on the ticket. And like their predecessors, they can be driven away from the GOP by too much militarism on the part of the hawks, too much anti-government fervor on part of the free-marketeers, and the kind of religious rhetoric that appeals to the dwindling number of evangelicals in America but repels most other voters.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">For all his flaws, Trump saved the GOP from dwindling into a permanent minority party of bellicose hawks, evangelicals, and libertarian opponents of the New Deal. Whether the Trump coalition survives Trump’s departure from office may depend on whether the GOP swaps out the old three-legged stool for Trump’s four-legged stool.</span></p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
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					<title>Trump stole tariffs from the Democrats</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2024/11/trump-stole-tariffs-from-the-democrats/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://stage.unherd.com/2024/11/trump-stole-tariffs-from-the-democrats/?edition=us#comments</comments>
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										<unherd:main_theme>protectionism </unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Justin H. Vassallo]]>
					</dc:creator>
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																<unherd:article_ranking>2</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[Seattle WTO protests called for Left-protectionism. Daniel Sheehan/Liaison Agency/Newsmakers]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><b>Justin</b> <b>H.</b> <b>Vassallo</b> is a writer and researcher specialising in American political development, political economy, party systems, and ideology.</p>
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						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>jhv85</unherd:twitter_handle>
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						<![CDATA[<b>Justin</b> <b>H.</b> <b>Vassallo</b> is a writer and researcher specialising in American political development, political economy, party systems, and ideology.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Sat, 30 Nov 2024 00:01:14 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Sat, 30 Nov 2024 00:01:14 +0000</updated>
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		<category><![CDATA[Donald Trump]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Economic history]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[New Deal]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[Protectionism]]></category>
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								<![CDATA[The Left needs to reclaim protectionism ]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>Recent speculation that Donald Trump’s <a href="https://www.usnews.com/news/national-news/articles/2024-11-25/how-many-billionaires-are-in-trumps-administration-and-what-is-their-worth" target="_blank" rel="noopener">billionaire cabinet</a> would lead to a more orthodox consensus on global trade came to halt earlier this week, when Trump <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/11/25/business/economy/trump-tariffs-canada-mexico-china.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">promised</a> new tariffs on Canada, Mexico and China. Though eager to be in Trump’s good graces, many Republicans such as incoming Senate Majority leader John Thune still view tariffs as a step toward restricting the “free market” and <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-11-13/thune-elected-to-be-senate-republican-leader-fox-news-says" target="_blank" rel="noopener">warn about</a> retaliation against America’s export interests. Another Republican Senator <a href="https://www.politico.com/live-updates/2024/11/14/congress/tariff-tension-00189566" target="_blank" rel="noopener">recently told</a> <em>Politico</em> that tariffs amounted to a “sin tax”, unwittingly echoing Kamala Harris, who <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/2024-election/harris-calls-trumps-tariff-proposals-sales-tax-american-people-rcna172627" target="_blank" rel="noopener">likened</a> them to a punitive national “sales tax”.</p>
<p>As that similarity reveals, tariffs and other trade restrictions are divisive across the political spectrum. High-profile, California-based donors had hoped a Harris administration would snuff out Joe Biden’s policy experiments which challenged globalisation. But some union-aligned Democrats still believe that a more effective leader could salvage Biden’s vision of a domestic manufacturing renaissance. The evolving politics of protectionism is bound to scramble traditional partisan alignments in this volatile era of geopolitics.</p>
<p>The great irony of the tariff debate is that Trump’s signature issue was largely stolen from Rust Belt Democrats. Although Trump’s nativist rhetoric and broadsides against “cheating”, not just by China but close allies, has alarmed the liberal foreign policy establishment over the years, his fundamental <a href="https://www.npr.org/2016/06/28/483883321/fact-check-trumps-speech-on-the-economy-annotated" target="_blank" rel="noopener">critique</a> of free trade is not so different from the stance adopted by earlier Democrats.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/11/can-the-tariff-king-fix-america/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/11/can-the-tariff-king-fix-america/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/gettyimages-870252162-594x594-1.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/11/can-the-tariff-king-fix-america/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/11/can-the-tariff-king-fix-america/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Can Donald Trump&#039;s tariffs fix America?</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/11/can-the-tariff-king-fix-america/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Yanis Varoufakis</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Between the late Sixties and early Eighties, a number of New Deal-style liberals dropped the Democratic Party’s historical support for trade liberalisation and <a href="https://www.compactmag.com/article/when-liberals-fought-free-trade/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">turned toward</a> full-bore protectionism. On top of advocating aggressive trade controls, these liberals focused on <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1983/10/17/gunning-for-reaganomics-democrats-falter-on-industrial-policy/199fcbd6-d418-401a-ae46-16501df8637e/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">reindustrialising</a> the Northeast and Midwest. The argument was essentially twofold: postwar trade agreements were destabilising wages and employment in once-flourishing manufacturing sectors while doing little to improve the welfare of exploited “sweat shop” workers abroad. This system of trade integration — engineered by import lobbies, US-based multinationals, and their bipartisan allies in Washington — represented what progressives like Bernie Sanders and Elizabeth Warren later <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TT0xLJfxvSY" target="_blank" rel="noopener">dubbed</a> a “race to the bottom”.</p>
<p>The final iteration of this Left-protectionist vision, considerably <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1982/09/26/business/designing-a-new-economics-for-the-atari-democrats.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">watered down</a> by the rise of tech-obsessed “<a href="https://jacobin.com/2016/02/geismer-democratic-party-atari-tech-silicon-valley-mondale" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Atari Democrats</a>” and policy advisors like the young Robert Reich, received two fatal blows. First, Ronald Reagan’s 1984 landslide re-election, and then Bill Clinton’s support for NAFTA and Permanent Normal Trade Relations with China. But Rust Belt Democrats persevered for a time. As the China Shock unfolded, rising Democratic stars like Ohio’s Sherrod Brown, a “progressive” economic nationalist, <a href="https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2006/11/the-lou-dobbs-democrats-who-won-the-election.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">proved critical</a> to the Democratic Party retaking Congress in 2006 and staying competitive in the industrial heartland.</p>
<p>There was hope among economic progressives that Barack Obama would use his formidable 2008 victory to pursue fair trade. Yet momentum behind reforms to globalisation stalled abruptly under his presidency. After the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/business/auto-bailout-saved-15-million-us-jobs-study-idUSL1N0JO0XU/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">2009 auto bailout</a>, his administration mostly resumed the path charted by Reagan, Clinton, and George W. Bush. And by 2015, the Trans-Pacific-Partnership, another technocratic free-trade agreement, was on the horizon. The opening was Trump’s to seize.</p>
<p>Of course, Trump’s haphazard efforts to reorder global trade occurred in a different economy than the one which had vexed old-school liberals. The new politics of protectionism also took place in a country much more polarised by region — and one in which the parties had largely swapped their geographical orientations, if not quite their policy commitments. That had a strange effect on how the parties responded to the tariffs introduced by Trump’s trade ambassador, Robert Lighthizer. Republicans who supported the old Washington Consensus on globalisation drew their strength from the Midwest and the South, regions that were now suffering the most from trade shocks. Meanwhile, the Democrats, once a vehicle for both the South’s development and industrial workers, handily dominated the Northeastern and Pacific coasts — affluent hubs that had long since turned the corner on industrial decline.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/11/the-left-has-forgotten-its-philosophy/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/11/the-left-has-forgotten-its-philosophy/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/GettyImages-1030008580.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/11/the-left-has-forgotten-its-philosophy/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/11/the-left-has-forgotten-its-philosophy/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The Left has forgotten its philosophy</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/11/the-left-has-forgotten-its-philosophy/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Justin H. Vassallo</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>The basis for a coherent industrial strategy was stymied by this evolution in the party system. Trump’s unique coalition of ex-Democrats and populist independents did not fit easily in either party’s tent. Although Democrats retained some loyalty in ailing manufacturing districts, they increasingly represented highly educated metro areas that had benefitted most from the tech boom and globalisation. <a href="https://thehill.com/homenews/senate/4897112-mcconnell-tariffs-trump-trade/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Mitch McConnell</a> and Paul Ryan’s Republicans, for their part, were reluctant to drop their faith in free-trade, even though the party’s new working-class base opposed it and even though the GOP historically had been the party of industrial protectionism. Despite working-class voters’ longstanding support for a new approach to trade, the dominant wings of both parties treated tariffs and similar measures as anathema to America’s global leadership.</p>
<p>These dynamics further constrained the rise of a protectionist bloc in Congress during Trump’s first term. While House Democrats <a href="https://www.politico.com/story/2019/07/18/robert-lighthizer-democrat-favorite-1597043" target="_blank" rel="noopener">worked closely</a> with Lighthizer on the USMCA, NAFTA’s replacement, mainstream liberal discourse routinely mocked Trump’s declaration that he was a “Tariff Man”. Besides the political risks of “agreeing” with Trump on trade during the high tide of the “Resistance”, national Democrats were hesitant over whether to try to win back white industrial workers or harness identity politics to mobilise the so-called “rising American electorate”. Under Biden, the pendulum swung toward the former strategy. This vindicated Rust Belt Democrats like Senator Brown who had pleaded with the party establishment to revise trade policy and decisively counter China’s export model. By then, however, the architects of Bidenism were conjuring a New Deal electorate whose remnants no longer trusted Democrats to deliver on trade. Inflation, meanwhile, had irreversibly soured many voters on the economy, sapping the positive impact of policies decades in the making. Brown and a handful of other red- and purple-state Democrats were among the casualties on election night.</p>
<p>The odds of deeper collaboration between protectionist Democrats and the incoming administration are hazy at best. The ranks of the former are now diminished, while the Wall Street types jockeying for influence are plainly allergic to a populist, pro-manufacturing agenda. As signalled by his pick of hedge fund manager <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/11/23/us/politics/scott-bessent-treasury-profile.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Scott Bessent</a> to lead the Treasury Department, Trump may simply resort to using the <em>threat</em> of new tariffs as a bargaining tool, rather than building on Biden’s more interventionist approach to long-term investment.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;The odds of deeper collaboration between protectionist Democrats and the incoming administration are hazy at best.&#8221;</div>
<p>If Trump flounders, Democrats may once more have a window to argue they have the vision and the policies to rebuild an egalitarian economy. A nascent group of younger House Democrats who managed to fend off the GOP in parts of the Rust Belt are <a href="https://x.com/econliberties/status/1859617172491850223" target="_blank" rel="noopener">turning up the dial</a> on economic populism, arguing for both more corporate oversight and more support for manufacturing. Along with Minnesota’s <a href="https://thehill.com/homenews/campaign/5006122-dnc-vice-chair-says-election-was-indictment-on-dems/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Ken Martin</a>, a populist contender to chair the Democratic National Committee, these Democrats have not disowned Biden’s economic agenda. But they have reproached the party’s liberal elite and media allies, whose blithe view of the economy’s true health betrayed a maddening condescension toward <a href="https://prospect.org/politics/2024-11-19-donald-trump-champion-working-class-discontent/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">discontent workers</a>.</p>
<p>Blue-city progressives, meanwhile, are at a crossroads: with the purported rise of the “<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2024/nov/17/trump-aoc-voters" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Trump-AOC voter</a>”, they must come to terms with a multiracial electorate that defies easy categorisation on cultural issues and economics. But it is doubtful they can simply shed their close association with doctrinaire identity politics, much as they might find it advantageous to ally with the Rust Belt populists and emphasise workers’ top concerns. For now, both factions are a minority in a party whose internal disagreements on trade and industrial policy cut across its Left and centrist flanks.</p>
<p>Ultimately, any potential reconfiguration of the Democratic Party toward Left-protectionism won’t be possible without an overhaul of its national political strategy. Yet, under its present, ageing leadership, the party’s geographical woes seem insurmountable. Establishment coastal liberals tend to recoil from tariffs, and their potential heirs, in marked contrast to both the populists and the progressives, are <a href="https://www.economist.com/united-states/2024/11/21/democrats-are-still-processing-their-defeat" target="_blank" rel="noopener">mounting a new defence</a> of globalisation. Until a new crop of Democrats forcefully champion left-behind America, the party will remain embattled — and estranged from the liberalism which once gave it purpose.</p>
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					<title>The folly of America First</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2024/09/the-folly-of-america-first/?edition=us</link>
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						<![CDATA[Jonathan Kirshner]]>
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							<![CDATA[Swagger won't solve the China problem. Thomas Peter-Pool/Getty Images]]>
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							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Jonathan Kirshner</strong> is Professor of Political Science and International Studies at Boston College. His most recent book is <a href="https://press.princeton.edu/books/hardcover/9780691166773/an-unwritten-future?srsltid=AfmBOooFYxjJJE3P7vdP7s_nx650zKO7eNT1_oW7zTXsS-3gBmZQQlUX" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em>An Unwritten Future: Realism and Uncertainty in World Politics</em></a>.</p>
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															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is Professor of Political Science and International Studies at Boston College. His most recent book is <a href="https://press.princeton.edu/books/hardcover/9780691166773/an-unwritten-future?srsltid=AfmBOooFYxjJJE3P7vdP7s_nx650zKO7eNT1_oW7zTXsS-3gBmZQQlUX" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em>An Unwritten Future: Realism and Uncertainty in World Politics</em></a>.]]>
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										<pubDate>Sun, 22 Sep 2024 23:03:33 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Sun, 22 Sep 2024 23:03:33 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[America First]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[China]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Donald Trump]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Foreign Policy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[isolationism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Middle East]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Politics]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[Tariffs]]></category>
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								<![CDATA[<p>In his 2017 inauguration speech, Donald Trump made a vow to the American people: “A new vision will govern our land, from this day forward, it’s going to be only America first.” Every decision on trade, taxes and foreign affairs, he continued, will “be made to benefit American workers and American families”. Today, Trump is campaigning on that same premise: if he wins the election in November, he promises to embrace a foreign policy posture described as “America First”.</p>
<p>The trouble is that “America First” might be an appealing sales pitch, but Trump does not have a coherent foreign policy vision. Instead, the former president has consistent (and concerning) foreign policy dispositions: wariness of allies, admiration for authoritarians, and deep-seated protectionist instincts. Moreover, he is untutored in (and incurious about) most foreign policy questions, is often impulsive, and easily swayed by flattery — attributes that matter because, in contrast to the first Trump Administration which was largely staffed by experienced professionals, the second would likely be populated by sycophants and yes-men.</p>
<p>The fact is, America First is disingenuous, tissue-thin rhetoric. No administration in modern US history did not think it was prioritising the American national interest. Certainly, different presidents had distinct visions regarding how those interests might best be advanced, but none of them — none — however profoundly misguided their actions might appear in retrospect, ever pursued a foreign policy course that they did not think would be the best choice for the country.</p>
<p>What is distinct about America First is its tactics and vision. It is short-sighted and transactional, viewing every interaction with other countries, friends and foes alike, as a zero-sum confrontation in which the objective is to extract the largest possible share of the perceived visible gains. This is to be achieved by uninhibited, sharp-elbowed diplomacy, with little regard for historical legacies or long-run implications. In this vision, alliances are viewed with scepticism, representing an albatross of unnecessary obligations, which, like a protection racket or a mercenary force, only makes sense if they turn a monetary profit.</p>
<p>Some advocates of America First will call this Realism. It is not. The realist approach to international relations emphasises the consequences of anarchy: that international relations are commonly characterised by clashes of interest, and in that context actors in world politics may resort to the use of force to get what they want — and there are no guarantees the behaviour of those others will not descend into horrifying barbarism. Thus states must be prepared to defend themselves and look out for their own interests.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/08/trumps-red-scare-will-backfire/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/08/trumps-red-scare-will-backfire/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/Untitled-1-e1724928333181.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/08/trumps-red-scare-will-backfire/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/08/trumps-red-scare-will-backfire/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Trump&#039;s Red Scare will backfire</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/08/trumps-red-scare-will-backfire/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Heather Penatzer</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>This is admittedly a gloomy perspective, but there is nothing in Realism that implies what America First suggests. If anything, the opposite is true: it is a rare realist indeed who imagines that the path to geopolitical paradise is paved by short-sighted, nakedly selfish measures. Indeed the US tried this approach once before, after the First World War, and it was a catastrophic failure. After victory, an America First disposition led the US to pursue obtusely myopic demands for repayment of the debts incurred by its wartime allies, whose exhausted economies lay in ruins. A young John Foster Dulles urged the US to forgive those obligations, not because he placed priority on the interests of others, but because it was in America’s own best interest to do so. As he argued cogently, pursuing the apparent immediate interest — which the US had every right to do — was foolish, unrealistic, and would undermine “the big objective” of global “political and financial stability”.</p>
<p>Similarly, as the economic going got tough, the US also turned to an America First trade strategy, most famously with the Smoot-Hawley Tariff of 1930. More than 1,000 economists urged President Hoover to veto that tariff bill, again, not because they were looking out for the interests of other countries, but because they thought it would be bad for America. They were right. Imports to America fell dramatically — but America’s exports fell even more, as the legislation engendered retaliation and contributed to the collapse of world trade and the deepening of the global Great Depression.</p>
<p>And, of course, there was the signature foreign policy of America First, isolationism. It is possible that by withdrawing from Europe and acting timidly in Asia, the US naively thought that the world’s problems would somehow not encroach upon its shores. However, as Jacob Heilbrunn details in <em>America Last: The Right’s Century-Long Romance with Foreign Dictators</em>, many of the prominent proponents of isolationism were also, at best, authoritarian curious, and, at worst, rooting for the wrong team. “America First” now, in both its politics and its economics, is a direct descendant of America First then.</p>
<p>Neither incarnation is well described as Realism. Indeed, after the Second World War, the US learned the lessons of its previous, self-mutilating policy choices and chose instead to embrace a more far-sighted foreign policy vision. In pursuit of what classical realist Arnold Wolfers would describe as “milieu goals”, it sought, often at some cost, to shape the international political environment in ways that would be conducive to the long-run American national interest. With the generosity of the Marshall Plan and the cultivation of alliances , America’s postwar grand strategy, measured, as Raymond Aron would insist, against the only metric that matters — what otherwise might have been — could not have been more successful.</p>
<p>Of course, all things must pass, and America now is not America then. Its foreign policy disposition should, and must, adjust to present realities. It is not just wise, but essential, to take stock of the National Interest and assess how best it might be advanced. A survey of contemporary world politics suggests that America First, take two, will be as disastrous for the US as it was the last time around.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;America First, take two, will be as disastrous for the US as it was the last time around.&#8221;</div>
<p>Nowhere is the folly of American First redux more plainly visible than with regard to the Russia-Ukraine war. Reputable scholars can debate the long-run underlying causes of Russia’s invasion; also up for legitimate discussion is how deeply the US ought to be (indirectly) engaged in that conflict, and whether some of its policies might invite unintended and dangerous risks. There is no doubt, however, that the murderous authoritarian Vladimir Putin initiated this war of conquest, and that it is in the strong interest of the West for the lesson of the war to be that “wars of conquest by Russia do not pay”. Yet team Trump is eager to see this conflict end on exactly Russia’s terms, likely due not to reasoned geostrategic analysis, but the former president’s personal pique at Ukraine’s leadership, and his bizarre admiration for ruthless dictators.</p>
<p>More generally, it is hard to imagine US membership in Nato surviving a second Trump term. Once again, the former president’s analysis is curious, imagining the alliance as a dues-paying organisation in which the Europeans are not adequately kicking back to their American protectors. In his mind, the US would save money by pulling out. The first argument is fatuous, the second somewhat far-fetched, as the US is almost certain to increase rather than decrease its defence spending, regardless of its Nato membership.</p>
<p>Here at least the argument against Nato can be expressed in a more sophisticated way: should the US leave the alliance, some smart scholars argue, its European members would (finally) increase their own defence spending. That is a deductively sound argument, although not necessarily an experiment that most realists, whose watchwords are politics and prudence, would want to run. A post-Nato Europe might emerge as a more coherent and capable force, or the withdrawal of American participation might expose and invite political rifts across the continent; in either event it would surely reduce US political influence there. Given that Europe is one of the world’s political and economic epicentres, those are not risks to be embraced casually.</p>
<p>In marked contrast, the one region of the world where the isolationist instincts and alliance wariness of America First make the most sense is the Middle East. US security commitments in the Persian Gulf might have had an underlying logic to them in the Seventies, but they are plainly anachronistic today, given basic changes to world energy markets, the nature of security threats to the region, and limits of American power. In addition, if Israel explicitly renounces any commitment to a two-state solution, or devolves into its own version of a radical theocracy, it becomes increasingly hard to understand how that special relationship would continue to reflect the American national interest.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/07/why-nato-fears-for-its-future/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/07/why-nato-fears-for-its-future/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/GettyImages-2160977809.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/07/why-nato-fears-for-its-future/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/07/why-nato-fears-for-its-future/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Why Nato fears for its future</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/07/why-nato-fears-for-its-future/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Lily Lynch</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Here the experiment of withdrawing American power and risking what might follow makes much more sense. Unfortunately, and uncharacteristically in US history, Trump’s foreign policy instincts are more similar to those of a personalist authoritarian than the temporary steward of democratic state. Thus for reasons of family business (Saudi Arabia has a multi-billion-dollar investment in his son-in-law, for example) and domestic politics (for the crucial conservative Christian base of his support, an unconditional US commitment to Israel is an inviolable act of faith, not the cool calculation of strategic interest), even under Trump the US might remain deeply enmeshed in the region, preventing the often-strained logic of America First from prevailing in the one part of the world where it might actually well apply.</p>
<p>Setting aside the prospect that a second-term President Trump — now unrestrained by anything remotely resembling “adults in the room” — might do something impetuous and outlandish (such as bombing Mexico), a proper reckoning of the consequences of America First must look to Asia. Here again the prospects are less than heartening. Trump talks forcefully about confronting China, and on this one issue, there does seem to be a general bipartisan consensus in the US. The barriers to success of an America First approach in this new epicentre of the world’s geopolitical chessboard, however, are formidable. Rhetoric, swagger, and more militarised confrontations are ill-suited to the challenge at hand. As American diplomat George F. Kennan emphasised during the Cold War, the problem — and the prize — are political. The danger is not that China will serially invade its neighbours, in a foolish and self-defeating bid for regional hegemony; the danger is that China might come to dominate the Asia-Pacific politically.</p>
<p>But America First is not very good at politics. A sound China policy will require close political partnerships with key countries throughout the region. And here is where Trump’s hatred of allies (or freeloaders, as he imagines them) might prove most catastrophic. The former president previously made noises about abandoning Korea, and his foreign policy instincts cannot but raise concerns in Japan. Moreover, if the US indeed undermines Nato, actors in Asia might further question whether the US would stay committed to the region. Whereas China is going to stay in the region, indefinitely, for obvious reasons of geography. Thus the risk is that US heavy-handedness with allies, alongside assessments of its reduced reliability more generally, might lead some states to “bandwagon” with China — that is, reach some political accommodation with Beijing that cedes to its preferences on major international issues. Such an outcome would not be in the US national interest, no matter how narrowly defined.</p>
<p>Compounding all of this, enormously, will be the Trump Tariffs, a centrepiece (indeed obsession) of both his domestic and foreign policy vision. There are precious few consistencies across Trump’s political thinking over the decades, but he has always been a passionate protectionist. And, as noted, if Trump is re-elected, it would be shocking if we did not witness what will surely be celebrated as Huge Tariffs. Again, one can responsibly debate the fine grained tactics of trade policy. The protectionism-as-panacea fantasy, however, will swiftly prove to be a nightmare. It will be both very bad for the US economy, and very bad for the world economy — miseries likely to be compounded by retaliatory tariffs imposed by others, which will likely not bring out the best in an administration that prides itself on “toughness”.</p>
<p>Worst of all, perhaps, is that the enormous economic distress caused by Trump Tariffs, among otherwise friendly states in Europe and Asia, will further undermine the broader goals of US foreign policy, and likely spark a growth inhibiting trade war that will contribute to a panoply of geopolitical stressors globally. In sum, America First will likely lead to America Alone, getting less of what it wants, in a more dangerous world, populated by players increasingly disposed to find distance from the madness of its king.</p>
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					<title>Ohio is the battleground for America&#8217;s future</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2024/07/ohio-is-the-battleground-for-americas-future/?edition=us</link>
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										<unherd:main_theme>Swing state</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Tom McTague]]>
					</dc:creator>
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																<unherd:article_ranking>2</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[Poverty still pervades the Rust Belt. (Spencer Platt/Getty Images)]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Tom McTague</strong> is UnHerd&#8217;s <strong>Political Editor.</strong> He is the author of <em>Between the Waves: The Hidden History of a Very British Revolution 1945-2016,</em> due to be published in September 2025</p>
]]>
						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>TomMcTague</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is UnHerd's <strong>Political Editor.</strong> He is the author of <em>Between the Waves: The Hidden History of a Very British Revolution 1945-2016,</em> due to be published in September 2025]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Sun, 28 Jul 2024 23:03:40 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Mon, 29 Jul 2024 10:22:45 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Free Silver]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[J. D. Vance]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ohio]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Politics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Populism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Protectionism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Rust Belt]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Trump]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[US]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[William Jennings Bryan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[William McKinley]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://stage.unherd.com/?p=612491</guid>
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								<![CDATA[The nation needs a new economic consensus]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>Ohio is a startling place for an Englishman. There are flashes of familiarity, of course: the low grey skies, unfashionable cities and place names: London and Portsmouth, Oxford and even Mansfield. Yet the longer you are there, the more you feel its Americana: the scale of suburban wealth and segregation, the presidential monuments and out of town shopping malls.</p>
<p>Ohio <em>is </em>America in many respects: a land of race and religion, LeBron James and the Tafts. And it is the epicentre of the new democratic world we are about to enter: the home of J.D. Vance and the Rust Belt rebellion. Ohio is the state that voted for Barack Obama, twice, and then for Donald Trump, twice. It’s a place that was once a swing state and could be again — but isn’t.</p>
<p>To understand America, you must understand Ohio; and so, four years ago, I travelled from the Ohio River in the south to Cincinnati, Columbus and Canton — before finally landing in Youngstown, the old steel town made famous by Bruce Springsteen. “Here in Youngstown; Here in Youngstown; My sweet Jenny I&#8217;m sinking down,” he wailed in 1995, foreshadowing the political upheaval to come.</p>
<p>By now, such laments have almost become passé, the story of modern America we all know: the hillbilly elegy that explains Trump. “Youngstown was steel, nothing but steel,” my old colleague George Packer wrote in <a href="https://www.penguin.co.uk/books/437773/the-unwinding-by-george-packer/9781529111583" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em>The Unwinding</em></a>. “Everyone here owed their life to the molten pour of iron… Without it, there was no life.” And yet, the steel disappeared in 1977 and it wasn’t until 2016 that it voted for Trump.</p>
<p>Before my trip, I’d ploughed through Phillip Meyer’s <em>American Rust</em>, set just across the border from Youngstown in the hills of western Pennsylvania. It’s a book that captures that sense of decline that has wormed its way into the bones of both northern England and the American Midwest. “You wanted to believe in America,” says one of Meyer’s characters, “but anyone could tell you that the Germans and Japs made the same amount of steel America did these days.” Here was the reflex that lies at the heart of the new post-liberal conservatism: “If you don&#8217;t have steel, you don&#8217;t have a country,” as President Trump declared in 2018.</p>
<p>This is the message that Vance brings to his ticket — a statement of economic intent. “The effects of globalisation have hollowed out America’s industrial core,” Vance <a href="https://eu.beaconjournal.com/story/opinion/columns/2021/09/09/senate-candidate-jd-vance-says-government-must-repair-trade-policies/5770574001/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">wrote</a> recently in a joint op-ed with Robert Lighthizer, Trump’s former Trade Representative and potential future Treasury Secretary, who also happens to hail from Ohio. “When the manufacturing jobs moved out, a host of social problems moved in: family divorce and breakdown, child abuse and neglect and opioid addiction.” A similar message could have been delivered by any Labour or SNP politician since the Thatcherite industrial collapse of the Eighties. Yet it is now a message more likely to be heard on the Conservative backbenches.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/07/how-starmer-slaughtered-the-tories/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/07/how-starmer-slaughtered-the-tories/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/ksnobloodnohandsred.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/07/how-starmer-slaughtered-the-tories/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/07/how-starmer-slaughtered-the-tories/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>How Starmer slaughtered the Tories</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/07/how-starmer-slaughtered-the-tories/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Tom McTague</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>In his maiden speech last week, Nick Timothy, the new Tory MP and former Downing Street chief of staff under Theresa May, pronounced the death of the old economic consensus. “We don’t make, do or sell enough of what the world needs,” he claimed. “From low pay to regional inequality, poor productivity to funding public services, all the things we worry about are symptoms of this wider problem.” In Timothy’s view, Britain needs a new economic consensus. “We need to challenge Treasury orthodoxy and think beyond the intellectual limits of ideological liberalism,” he said.</p>
<p>Occasionally, you hear an odd centrist <a href="https://x.com/alexhoneker/status/1813788686632587535" target="_blank" rel="noopener">chastise</a> this kind of message. Yet, it would be wrong to consider this new strain of conservatism as some kind of ideological aberration for either the Republicans or Conservatives. Both parties, in fact, have their roots in protectionism: the Tories in Disraeli’s support for the Corn Laws and the Republicans in Civil War tariffs. To understand why, come to Ohio.</p>
<p>Canton was once the home of William McKinley, the last Republican president to be assassinated, and a descendent from what the Americans like to call the “Scotch Irish”, much like Vance today. These Protestant Irish settlers are the original “hillbillies” — the “Billy Boys” from Ulster whose hero was and remains King Billy, or William of Orange. There is deep historic irony, then, in Vance’s conversion to Catholicism, which seems to have been largely missed.</p>
<p>McKinley today remains a largely obscure figure, lost in the sunken years between the Civil War and the Great War of 1914-18. Even the memorial to him in Canton has an air of forgotten grandeur to it. Yet, McKinley’s presidential victory in 1896 remains a pivotal moment in American history, ending decades of political deadlock and ushering in a period of Republican domination which only came to an end with Roosevelt’s victory in 1932. At the heart of McKinley’s election victory were the twin issues of protectionism and the dollar — two issues which have once again been thrust under the spotlight.</p>
<p>In 1896, it’s worth recalling that it was the Republican Party that was the party of protectionism and sound money — backed by the white middle-class protestants of the north and African Americans of the south (and beyond). The Democrats, by contrast, were the party of segregation, free-trade and “free silver” — a policy designed to help inflate away the debts of the many small farmers who formed the backbone of the party, along with the new Irish and Italian immigrants in the north (a policy with faint echoes of J.D. Vance’s ideas today). To the Republicans, they were the party of “rum, Romanism, and rebellion”.</p>
<p>That year, it was the <em>Democratic</em> candidate for the presidency who was the fiery populist: William Jennings Bryan, a pin-up of the forgotten man raging against East Coast elites, international speculators and the gold standard — the “cross of gold” upon which the American farmer was being crucified, as he put it. Here, then, was the caricature of an American populist: Trump before Trump, though one whose populism was rooted in a furious <em>opposition</em> to protectionism. To defeat him, the Republicans chose McKinley, a unity candidate for change who could appeal beyond the old Republican base.</p>
<p>For Karl Rove, a one-time Republican election guru who has written a history of the 1896 election, McKinley’s victory was pivotal — not only because it won the argument that year, but because it created a new coalition for the Republicans that would keep the party in power for much of the next 36 years.</p>
<p>With Trump and Vance playing the role of insurgent populists today, questioning the core principles of American industrial and monetary policy, the stakes of this election feel eerily similar. Yet, Harris does not appear to be a McKinley figure — and Trump, unlike Bryan, has already shown he can win. The question today, I think, is which party will be able to follow McKinley in reaching out beyond its current electoral base to create a new wider coalition that can break the deadlock in America.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;Harris does not appear to be a McKinley figure — and Trump, unlike Bryan, has already shown he can win.&#8221;</div>
<p>In Rove’s <a href="https://www.simonandschuster.com/books/The-Triumph-of-William-McKinley/Karl-Rove/9781442396418" target="_blank" rel="noopener">account of the 1896 election</a><em>,</em> he offers a number of key lessons for the Republican Party’s triumph — many of which are applicable today. First, McKinley did not skirt the big issues but addressed them directly, including the one considered to be his opponent’s core strength: Bryan’s advocacy of Free Silver. Today, it seems that Trump’s core strength is his “America First” economics — his opposition to free trade. The choice for the Democrats today, then, is whether to accept this in an attempt to neutralise it, or to take it on as McKinley did of Bryan in 1896. Do the Americans want to risk a return to inflation?</p>
<p>Second, McKinley also offered himself as “a different type of Republican” who realised he needed to broaden the party’s appeal to a whole series of states once considered safely Democrat. Once again, today’s Democratic Party seems unwilling or unable to adopt this strategy, focused instead on securing just enough electoral college votes to win. Harris does not seem like the kind of candidate capable of winning over crucial swing-states such as Michigan, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin or, of course, Ohio. Those I spoke to in Ohio said there was no reason why it could not be a swing state again, rather than a solid Republican bastion. It just required the Democrats to listen and compromise more than they currently seemed willing.</p>
<p>Finally, McKinley defined himself as a unity candidate facing off against an increasingly divisive Bryan campaign that “attacks… anyone who disagreed with him”, as Rove put it. Biden was able to play this role against Trump in 2020. Obama adopted the same message in 2008 and 2012. Hillary Clinton, meanwhile, didn’t see the need — and abjectly failed. For both parties, the lesson here isn’t hard to glean.</p>
<p>From Canton I went to Youngstown, where it was hard not to be shocked by the scale of the city’s degradation: the abandoned plots, the ruined roads, the general sense of abandonment. I couldn’t help but think of Jeffrey Eugenides’s <em>Middlesex</em>, set in Detroit in the Seventies<em>. </em>“All that was left of the old neighbourhood was empty land,” one of his characters complains as he crashes over a bridge to his death. “It seemed that most of the city was gone.”</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/07/how-jd-vance-will-reshape-the-american-order/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/07/how-jd-vance-will-reshape-the-american-order/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/GettyImages-2162163597.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/07/how-jd-vance-will-reshape-the-american-order/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/07/how-jd-vance-will-reshape-the-american-order/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Searching for Britain&#039;s JD Vance</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/07/how-jd-vance-will-reshape-the-american-order/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Aris Roussinos</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Yet this was only one part of the city. The story less often told about Youngstown is that of the suburbs and surrounding towns, which are far from abandoned and dying but very much still alive. Here I found a region filled with small factories and office blocks, neither poverty-stricken nor a land of plenty. Here the golf clubs were filled with old auto workers and union men who were once Democrat but no more, living in neat bungalows with nice cars on the drive, with their children nearby, no longer working the furnace but as teachers or office workers. According to my guide Tom Maraffa, a retired professor at Youngstown State University, this was where Trump had flipped things.</p>
<p>A little further out, one town sticks in the memory, a place so American it could be nowhere else. Not London or Oxford, but Colombiana. If the modest suburbs were the places Trump had flipped, Colombiana was always his — not filled with angry MAGA supporters, either, but driving ranges and country clubs, small businesses and nice cafes. The Republicans here might have preferred a candidate a little less brash, but considered the Democratic Party so wildly out of touch they would never consider switching sides.</p>
<p>Earlier this week, when I spoke with Tom again, he lamented the state of American politics and its coverage in the US media. I was intrigued how things had changed since my last visit. The state, he felt, remained in an odd holding pattern. The old union men now voting for Trump were still not entirely sold on the Republican Party, but the Democrats were not offering them much either. “Fundamentally, Trump speaks to people who are tied to their places and want them restored,” Tom told me. In contrast, he felt, “the Democratic Party has become the party of the educated ‘placeless’”.</p>
<p>It’s a mood that was captured by Springsteen in Youngstown. “From the Monongahela valley to the Mesabi iron range; To the coal mines of Appalachia, the story&#8217;s always the same,” he sang. Almost 30 years later, both parties face the same challenge: are they bold enough to rewrite Springsteen’s “story”? If so, Ohio is the place to start.</p>
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					<title>Is this the Tories’ real manifesto?</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2019/12/is-this-the-tories-real-manifesto/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://stage.unherd.com/2019/12/is-this-the-tories-real-manifesto/?edition=us#comments</comments>
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					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Peter Franklin]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/Peter-F.jpg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
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							<![CDATA[How would Dominic Cummings revive the regions? Oli Scarf/AFP/Getty]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Peter Franklin</strong> is Associate Editor of <em>UnHerd</em>. He was previously a policy advisor and speechwriter on environmental and social issues.</p>
]]>
						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>peterfranklin_</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is Associate Editor of <em>UnHerd</em>. He was previously a policy advisor and speechwriter on environmental and social issues.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Mon, 02 Dec 2019 00:05:09 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Mon, 02 Dec 2019 11:57:15 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[2019 election]]></category>
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																												<description>
								<![CDATA[Dominic Cummings has hinted at a bold new direction for the Government]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>In 2017, the Conservative manifesto was&#8230; interesting. That didn&#8217;t work out for them, so this time round they went for boring instead.</p>
<p>With the polls narrowing there&#8217;s a question as to whether this approach will work any better. But if the current government is returned next week, might we see a more radical agenda emerge into the light?</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2019/08/the-10-brains-behind-dominic-cummings/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2019/08/the-10-brains-behind-dominic-cummings/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/Cummings.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2019/08/the-10-brains-behind-dominic-cummings/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2019/08/the-10-brains-behind-dominic-cummings/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The 10 brains behind Dominic Cummings</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2019/08/the-10-brains-behind-dominic-cummings/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Peter Franklin</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>If anyone in this administration has big ideas it&#8217;s Dominic Cummings. That much is clear from his <a href="https://dominiccummings.com">blog</a>, an in-depth guide to <a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2019/08/the-10-brains-behind-dominic-cummings/">his thinking and influences</a>. He stopped blogging when he followed Boris Johnson into Downing Street.</p>
<p>But last week there was a <a href="https://dominiccummings.com/2019/11/27/on-the-referendum-34-batsignal-dont-let-corbyn-sturgeon-cheat-a-second-referendum-with-millions-of-foreign-votes/">new post</a>. This was mostly about Brexit and the election campaign, but there was an intriguing post-script:</p>
<blockquote><p>&#8220;If you’re interested in ideas about how the new government could really change our economy for the better, making it more productive and fairer, you’ll find this paper interesting. It has many ideas about long-term productivity, science, technology, how to help regions outside the south-east and so on, by a professor of physics in Sheffield: A Resurgence of the Regions: rebuilding innovation capacity across the whole UK.&#8221;</p></blockquote>
<p>The media love to portray Cummings as some kind of Bond villain, so is this professor — one Richard Jones — his mad scientist?</p>
<p>In a word, no. The media, finding no hint of insanity in Jones&#8217; work, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2019/nov/28/academic-praised-by-cummings-is-remain-voting-critic-of-tory-plans">tried to make something</a> of his political differences with Cummings instead. That&#8217;s a shame, because the real story is whether the <a href="https://www.softmachines.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/ResurgenceRegionsRALJv22_5_19.pdf">paper</a>, having been endorsed by Boris Johnson&#8217;s licenced thinker, represents the Conservatives&#8217; real manifesto.</p>
<p>I&#8217;ve read it and agree with the following assessment by <a href="https://twitter.com/stianwestlake/status/1200166751729848321?s=21">Stian Westlake</a>, a Whitehall advisor on innovation policy:</p>
<blockquote><p>&#8220;The mini-storm over Dom Cummings citing @RichardALJones&#8217;s recent paper on innovation policy prompted me to re-read it, and *boy* is it good. I agree with more or less everything, and as a bonus it is delightfully written&#8230;</p>
<p>&#8220;On a couple of occasions I&#8217;ve been asked by a new science minister &#8216;what should I read on innovation?&#8217;, and it was always quite a hard question to answer. But now, I&#8217;d just say &#8216;read that&#8217;.&#8221;</p></blockquote>
<p>*</p>
<p>It begins with an unsparing look at the weaknesses of the British economy. Basically, the UK is two economies: there&#8217;s our thriving capital, surrounded by a prosperous hinterland; and then there&#8217;s ‘Outer Britain’ (as officialdom once called it), which is stuck in what Jones calls a &#8220;low innovation, low skills, low wage equilibrium&#8221;.</p>
<p>Outside the orbit of London, neither business nor the state puts enough investment into skills, innovation and infrastructure. That&#8217;s because there&#8217;s not enough demand for these things. At the same time, the high-productivity enterprises that might supply the necessary demand don&#8217;t set up shop here because the necessary skills etc can&#8217;t be supplied. It&#8217;s a chicken-and-egg situation.</p>
<p>Britain beyond the South East is working hard and creating jobs, but people and communities don&#8217;t just need work, but prospects too — a chance to get on, not just get by. For that to happen a &#8216;jobs miracle&#8217; is not enough, we also need a productivity revolution — a shift to a high innovation, high skills, high wage equilibrium.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2019/11/is-the-great-british-jobs-miracle-fake-news/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2019/11/is-the-great-british-jobs-miracle-fake-news/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/GettyImages-137263997.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2019/11/is-the-great-british-jobs-miracle-fake-news/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2019/11/is-the-great-british-jobs-miracle-fake-news/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Is the British jobs miracle fake news?</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2019/11/is-the-great-british-jobs-miracle-fake-news/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Peter Franklin</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>The state can&#8217;t achieve this alone, it ultimately depends on private enterprise. However, government can provide the catalyst.</p>
<p>Jones observes that &#8220;the industrial strategy of the Conservative administrations between 1979 and 1997 was not to have an industrial strategy&#8221;. This continued until the dog-end of the New Labour years. This was deliberate; industrial policy was associated with failures of post-war planning and the strife-torn industrial relations of the Sixties and Seventies.</p>
<p>And yet, it became abundantly clear that the industrial non-strategy of the Eighties and onward was broken too. Not only has the UK&#8217;s established economic model not worked for most of the country, it was also implicated in the devastating crash of 2008.</p>
<p>In the course of our current decade, there&#8217;s been a big shift in Conservative thought. In 2016, a new Department of Business, Energy and Industrial strategy was created — its name signalling the end of an old taboo. And even though &#8216;regionalism&#8217; has remained a forbidden term, concepts such as the Northern Powerhouse have been actively promoted as part of a decentralising agenda.</p>
<p>Then there&#8217;s the U-turn on research spending. After a long period of decline, the Government wants more public and private sector investment in science and innovation. Its manifesto commits to a &#8220;target of 2.4 per cent of GDP being spent on R&amp;D across the economy&#8221;.</p>
<p>Furthermore, there&#8217;s a new consensus that investment in science and technology can&#8217;t just be limited to academic research in Britain&#8217;s universities. Our higher education sector is one of strongest in the world, but we are weak in what the paper describes as &#8220;translational research&#8221; — i.e. turning knowledge into innovation, and innovation into enterprise.</p>
<p>Countries such as Germany have strong translational research institutions, a key component in the ecosystem of universities, leading-edge companies, supply chains, providers of technical education and the networks through which individuals, businesses and organisations cooperate and compete to build local economies. Jones calls this the &#8220;industrial commons&#8221; — which is intact and flourishing in some parts of the country, but hollowed-out in others by decades of de-industrialisation, political centralisation and under-investment.</p>
<p>*</p>
<p>In this decade, there are signs that Whitehall and Westminster have woken up to this reality. We&#8217;ve seen significant decentralisation of power and resources; industrial policy, as mentioned, is firmly back on the agenda; and support for innovation includes funding for a growing network of <a href="https://catapult.org.uk/">Catapult</a> centres — institutions which specialise in translational research and the regeneration of our industrial commons.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/01/lateral-thinking-can-save-us-economic-stagnation/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/01/lateral-thinking-can-save-us-economic-stagnation/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/3FB8BE68-ADD9-4969-89BA-E7A89AFE9DC4.jpeg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/01/lateral-thinking-can-save-us-economic-stagnation/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/01/lateral-thinking-can-save-us-economic-stagnation/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Only lateral thinking can save us from economic stagnation</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/01/lateral-thinking-can-save-us-economic-stagnation/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Peter Franklin</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>So, does that mean that Richard Jones&#8217; programme for regional revival is being implemented?</p>
<p>Yes and no. Some of the elements are definitely in place — but we&#8217;ve yet to see a full and conscious commitment to the most revolutionary aspects of his argument.</p>
<p>For instance, he&#8217;s not just calling for more funding for research (including translational research) but a sea-change in how it&#8217;s allocated. The established approach is &#8220;place blind&#8221;. This principle is that instead of ensuring a particular geographical spread of resources, the money should go to where the decision-makers think it will be most productively used. That&#8217;s sounds fair, but in practice it tends to pile further advantages on those areas that already have the edge on everywhere else. When it comes to R&amp;D that means the so-called &#8216;golden triangle&#8217; of London, Oxford and Cambridge.</p>
<p>Jones sees this is an example of the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Matthew_effect" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">Matthew Effect</a> — named after a verse in Saint Matthew&#8217;s Gospel:</p>
<blockquote><p>&#8220;For to every one who has will more be given, and he will have abundance; but from him who has not, even what he has will be taken away.&#8221;</p></blockquote>
<p>When it comes to individual funding decisions, choosing a location with top universities, leading-edge companies and a highly skilled workforce maybe entirely rational, but it ignores the bigger picture which is the need to build capacity in more than just one part of the country.</p>
<p>To make that change, geographical neutrality must be abandoned — along with the investment decision models that embed the Matthew Effect in their underlying assumptions. This needs to apply to the funding of skills and infrastructure as well as research. Furthermore all these forms of investment need to be coordinated with one another on the basis of direct knowledge of local economic needs. Thus further decentralisation of decision-making power over these resources is a key test of just how seriously Government takes this agenda. If power-hoarding departments like the Treasury aren&#8217;t howling in rage, then we&#8217;ll know the reformers aren&#8217;t pushing hard enough.</p>
<p>*</p>
<p>Increasing the supply of productivity boosting inputs is only half the battle. Professor Jones emphasises the other half which is all about stimulating demand. As well as the usual ways in which government encourages companies to move to priority areas there is something that it can do directly, which is use its vast power as a policy maker, regulator and purchaser to make markets in leading edge products and services.</p>
<p>That&#8217;s exactly what happened with success stories such as offshore wind power. As well as investing in relevant skills, infrastructure and technology development, the government has mandated the purchase of renewable energy at a guaranteed price — thus enabling private-sector investment. With the industry established, competitive auctions for the right to build new wind farms then put pressure on developers and manufacturers to cut their costs. Today, the industry is close to being subsidy free.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/11/test-article/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/11/test-article/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/11/test-article/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/11/test-article/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Test article</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/11/test-article/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Peter Franklin</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>The public sector spends vast sums of money with external suppliers every year — Jones quotes a figure of £255 billion. Government also influences procurement in regulated industries such as energy. Last week, Boris Johnson said that<a href="https://www.ft.com/content/e46f977e-12b5-11ea-a7e6-62bf4f9e548a" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer"> public procurement should be used to support British industry</a>. But it&#8217;s important that this isn&#8217;t a matter of mere &#8216;propping-up&#8217; — both central and local government must use its economic clout strategically to nurture clusters of innovation throughout the country.</p>
<p>*</p>
<p>But isn&#8217;t this all a tad protectionist? In fact, isn’t it downright statist?</p>
<p>Well, yes, it is protectionist up to a point, but no more so than what our competitors, the Americans, Germans and Chinese, have been doing for decades. The UK, having suffered persistently high trade deficits and multiple currency devaluations, needs to worry less about free trade purity and more about how we&#8217;re going to earn our living as a country.</p>
<p>As for the charge of statism, the fact is that the state is, and always will be, the biggest customer in the economy. Big private companies don&#8217;t just purchase goods and services on short-term cost calculations alone, they use their clout to influence and develop supply chains that meet their long-term strategic needs. So why on Earth wouldn&#8217;t HMG want to do the same?</p>
<p>That&#8217;s especially true given the enormous challenges facing us as a nation. Professor Jones mentions the challenge of decarbonising the economy without bankrupting it and also the urgent need for productivity breakthroughs in health and social care. I&#8217;d add three further challenges to the list: the controversial goal of building millions of new homes over the next twenty years; the public transport solutions desperately needed to rescue our traffic-choked towns and cities; and the ecological revolution required to restore life to our degraded landscapes and seascapes.<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span></p>
<p>The idea that the state shouldn&#8217;t use its purchasing power to encourage the innovation upon which all this depends is frankly insane.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2019/04/to-revive-our-cities-we-must-set-them-free/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2019/04/to-revive-our-cities-we-must-set-them-free/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/GettyImages-158465474.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2019/04/to-revive-our-cities-we-must-set-them-free/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2019/04/to-revive-our-cities-we-must-set-them-free/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>To revive our cities we must set them free</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2019/04/to-revive-our-cities-we-must-set-them-free/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Peter Franklin</a></p></div></a></div>
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					<title>Can lessons from the past guide us through the present?</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2018/05/can-lessons-past-guide-us-present/?edition=us</link>
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					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Victoria Schofield]]>
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							<![CDATA[Guardsmen on parade.  Credit: Getty]]>
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							<![CDATA[<p>Victoria is an expert on India and its neighbours, worked as an independent broadcaster for the BBC World Service in London and New York in the 1980s and 1990s, and is author of – among many books – Afghan Frontier: At the Crossroads of Conflict (2010).</p>
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						<unherd:twitter_handle>rvschofield</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is Editor of <em>History Today. </em>]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Wed, 16 May 2018 04:00:17 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Tue, 17 Jul 2018 16:16:28 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Donald Trump]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Economics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[History]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Military]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Protectionism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Warfare]]></category>
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								<![CDATA[<p><strong><i>Earlier this week, the </i></strong><strong><i>History Jury </i><i>turned their minds to <a href="https://stage.unherd.com/?p=14021&amp;preview_id=14021&amp;preview_nonce=42b72c56f6&amp;_thumbnail_id=-1&amp;preview=true">dangerous misperceptions of the past</a>.</i></strong></p>
<p><strong><i>Today, the question is: what lessons from history are we ignoring? </i></strong></p>
<p><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="size-large wp-image-10978" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/Unherd-History-Jury-3-1024x450.jpg" alt="" width="1024" height="450" /></p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><b>Victoria Schofield: Protectionist</b><em> </em><strong>policies can lead to hardship rather than prosperity.</strong></p>
<p>The lesson in history is the <a href="https://www.economist.com/node/12798595">Smoot-Hawley Tariff</a> enacted by the US administration of Herbert Hoover in 1930 and which intensified nationalism in the years leading up to the outbreak of the Second World War. Initially framed to protect American farmers, its enactment – against the advice of over 1,000 economists &#8211; had the reverse effect. Although not directly responsible either for the Great Depression or the outbreak of war, its passage contributed to a substantial decline in global trade which provided those who were willing to attempt to alter the politico-economic status quo ante, notably Germany and Japan, with a reason for doing so.</p>
<p>We may like to think that we have learnt from the consequences of Smoot-Hawley with the introduction of the World Trade Organisation and a general commitment to open trade. But with <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/rising-nationalism-and-the-eus-split-with-the-east/a-42073959">nationalism on the rise</a> and the slogan of <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/01/trump-america-first/514037/">America First</a> emanating out of the United States, the mood can again change; President Trump&#8217;s <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-43512098">new protectionist initiatives</a> have already sounded an alarm bell, as witnessed by the over 1,000 economists who have now written to him. For us in Britain, as politicians argue about the exact nature of our trade and investment policy as a  &#8216;third country&#8217; outside the EU, we should remember that tariffs and quotas aimed to appease some political interests serve to make the world poorer.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="size-large wp-image-10980" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/Unherd-History-Jury-2-1024x450.jpg" alt="" width="1024" height="450" /></p>
<p><b>Paul Lay: Military investment goes hand-in-hand with technological innovation</b></p>
<p>Peace dividends are superficially attractive. Which government would not wish to lavish greater sums of money rewarding its supporters and bribing its opponents?</p>
<p>When the Cold War came to an end – along with, as some suggested, history itself  – and before the eye-opening atrocities of 9/11, when Monica Lewinsky was the biggest thing in the news cycle, humanity appeared to be on course for verdant, postbellum uplands. But, as <a href="https://www.kcl.ac.uk/artshums/depts/history/people/staff/Academic/edgertond/edgertond.aspx">the historian David Edgerton</a> suggested in his 2005 study <a href="https://www.historytoday.com/pat-thane/warfare-state"><i>Warfare State: Britain 1920-1970</i></a> and reiterates in his latest magisterial work, <a href="https://www.penguin.co.uk/books/192782/the-rise-and-fall-of-the-british-nation/"><i>The Rise and Fall of the British Nation</i></a>, technological innovation and a well-funded fiscal-military state go hand in hand.</p>
<p>Part of the return, in addition to enhanced security, is prosperity. It is no surprise that the two most technologically innovative and advanced countries on Earth – the US and Israel – should also be ones who spend serious money on the military, the source of such transformational technologies as the internet. And China is advancing on that front, too, aided by an expanding, scientifically literate workforce. The parlous state of British investment in its armed forces and the apparatus that surrounds it is a far greater challenge to our future prosperity and security than Brexit.</p>
<p>Britain has been a major military and intelligence player for centuries. It should not stop being one when, all around us, we see growing uncertainty, fragmentation and instability. The era of the fiscal-military state is not over yet.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="size-large wp-image-10975" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/Unherd-History-Jury-4-1024x450.jpg" alt="" width="1024" height="450" /></p>
<p><b>Allan Mallinson: There are limits to military force.</b></p>
<p>Tacitus’s famous “And where they make a desert, they call it peace” was not a bad warning that the sword has its limits. Insurgencies can be mitigated by strong military force, but force does no more than buy time, during which statesmen may employ other means to deal with the root causes of the trouble. Everyone seems to agree with this in theory, and yet, in practice, military force is too often the first recourse, and then politicians, bereft of ideas or will, come to believe that the military alone will achieve a result.</p>
<p>The problem of first resort to force is further exacerbated where that force is “stand-off” – that is (usually) airpower. The problem with airpower is that while it can be extraordinarily precise, the targeting of its air-delivered bombs and missiles – the product of intelligence gathering – is reliant on people on the ground. And people on the ground, unless they are your own, are ultimately not very reliable.</p>
<p>The other problem is that airpower <i>looks</i> impressive, a substantial contribution to the battle; aircraft are inherently awe-inspiring, as are explosions on the ground, whether monitored from the air or witnessed on the ground. The danger is that it can quickly seem sufficient.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="size-large wp-image-10977" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/Unherd-History-Jury-1-1024x450.jpg" alt="" width="1024" height="450" /></p>
<p><b>Eliot Cohen: History teaches us nothing.</b></p>
<p>History has no lessons.<span class="Apple-converted-space">  </span>Context, yes, and indeed, if read widely and well, a kind of wisdom and insight into people, places, and events, but nothing directive. As Sir Hew Strachan once said to me, politicians want answers, and they some times hope that historians can provide them. But what historians can really provide is good questions. That should suffice.</p>
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