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		<title>realpolitik - UnHerd</title>
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					<title>What does Sanae Takaichi want?</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2026/02/what-does-sanae-takaichi-want/?edition=us</link>
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										<unherd:main_theme>Japan</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Christopher Harding]]>
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<div><strong>Christopher Harding</strong> is a cultural historian of India and Japan, based at the University of Edinburgh. His latest book is <a href="https://www.penguin.co.uk/books/448290/a-short-history-of-japan-by-harding-christopher/9780241563199" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em>A Short History of Japan </em></a>(Pelican, 2025). He also has a Substack: <a href="https://www.chrishardingjapan.com/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Japan and the World.</a></div>
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						<unherd:twitter_handle>drchrisharding</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is a cultural historian of India and Japan, based at the University of Edinburgh. His latest book is <a href="https://www.penguin.co.uk/books/448290/a-short-history-of-japan-by-harding-christopher/9780241563199" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em>A Short History of Japan </em></a>(Pelican, 2025). He also has a Substack: <a href="https://www.chrishardingjapan.com/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Japan and the World.</a></div>
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										<pubDate>Thu, 19 Feb 2026 00:02:45 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Thu, 19 Feb 2026 00:02:45 +0000</updated>
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		<category><![CDATA[Asia-Pacific]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[realpolitik]]></category>
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								<![CDATA[China is watching the PM]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>Sanae Takaichi made history last October by becoming Japan’s first female prime minister. Just over a week ago she made it again by leading her ailing party – the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) – to a landslide victory in a <a href="http://bbc.com/news/articles/cjd9k852zdjo">snap election</a>, winning a larger proportion of seats in Japan’s powerful lower house than any other party since the end of World War II. The LDP now enjoys a “supermajority,” meaning that, if necessary, it can override the upper house in pushing policies through the Diet.</p>
<p>Commentators agree that most of the credit here is due to Takaichi herself, and to those around her, for making a wildly successful gamble on her personal popularity. “Sanamania” gripped the country during the short election campaign as people queued up to buy Takaichi’s trademark black leather handbag and her famous pink pen. While Japan’s humiliated opposition, the Centrist Reform Alliance, picks itself up off the floor, the country’s currency is riding high — suggesting at least modest market confidence in what Takaichi’s reign might bring.</p>
<p>The question now is what Takaichi may do with her mandate. The last time a comparably emphatic victory was won in a Japanese election, back in 2012, it marked the start of Shinzō Abe’s long and decisive premiership. Those hoping for strong leadership on Japan’s domestic challenges — its intertwining demographic and debt crises — and on regional tensions in the Asia-Pacific, will be looking to Takaichi to deliver. She is due in the United States in mid-March to meet Donald Trump; a few weeks later, President Trump is expected to make his highly-anticipated visit to China. A reset in East Asia is on the cards — but what does Takaichi want?</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/10/meet-japans-iron-lady/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/10/meet-japans-iron-lady/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/GettyImages-2238694829.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/10/meet-japans-iron-lady/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/10/meet-japans-iron-lady/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Meet Japan&#039;s Iron Lady</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/10/meet-japans-iron-lady/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Christopher Harding</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>The Prime Minister’s reputation is that of a China hawk. Last November, she angered China’s leadership by appearing to suggest that Japan’s Self-Defense Forces might be deployed in the event of an armed Chinese attempt on Taiwan. This violated a long-standing Japanese policy — mirroring that of the United States — of strategic ambiguity when it comes to what the country might do in the event of a “Taiwan contingency,” as the standard euphemism goes. The Chinese response was swift: a ban on Japanese seafood imports, the shutting down of Japanese films and music concerts in China and hints dropped about restricting supplies of rare-earth minerals to Japan.</p>
<p>Evidence from the campaign trail, however, suggests that Takaichi’s refusal to apologize for her remarks helped her cause with the Japanese electorate. Public opinion on China is hardening, while long-standing opposition to the Self-Defense Forces — particularly among older Japanese, committed to post-war pacifism — has softened in recent years. This will give Takaichi confidence in continuing the pivot, from defense to active deterrence, that she inherited from her predecessors.</p>
<p>Takaichi has already brought forward a target of spending 2% of Japan’s substantial GDP on defense, from 2027 to March this year. She is lavishing money on south-western Japan, near Taiwan, and on sites around the country’s coastline. Japan is also making heavy investments in aerial, surface and underwater drones, alongside long-range strike capabilities including American Tomahawk missiles. Japan’s comparatively small domestic defense industry is now being developed at pace. Mitsubishi Heavy Industries enjoyed a landmark win last year when it was awarded the contract to build Australia’s next-generation frigate.</p>
<p>For Takaichi, these moves promise a triple benefit. They signal to China that Japan is serious about its defense. They reassure an ever-transactional Donald Trump that, as requested, Japan is doing more towards its own security. And they build Japanese resilience for the day — should it ever arrive — when American interest in the Asia-Pacific region begins to recede.</p>
<p>Even if its interest fluctuates over the years to come, the US will always have to pay careful attention to what is happening across the Pacific. The downgrading of the threat from China in the latest US National Security Strategy no doubt came as a shock in Tokyo, but the basic underlying geographic and strategic realities haven’t changed. Japan remains the most important link in the “First Island Chain”, which runs from the Kuril Islands down to Borneo and constrains Chinese access to the Pacific. The US-Japanese aim remains, for now at least, the cultivation of a coalition that is capable of balancing out Chinese economic and seaborne military power in the Asia-Pacific and maintaining freedom of the seas.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;The US-Japanese aim remains, for now at least, the cultivation of a coalition that is capable of balancing out Chinese economic and seaborne military power in the Asia-Pacific and maintaining freedom of the seas.&#8221;</div>
<p>Key to these efforts are the Quad (Japan, the US, India and Australia), ASEAN (the Association of Southeast Asian Nations), and a series of bilateral relationships including Japan-Vietnam and Japan-Philippines. Japan has been remarkably successful in cultivating regional relationships in recent years, using Official Development Assistance (ODA) to fund the building of ports, railway systems and more in countries like Vietnam. Japan also has an ODA-funded agreement in place to fund the building of six patrol vessels for the Vietnam Coast Guard. In the Philippines, Japanese finance is contributing toward new roads, new bridges and the Metro Manila Subway Project.</p>
<p>A major question for what may become a historic premiership is what use Takaichi has for the past. Looming over Japan’s relationships with China, Korea and its Southeast Asian neighbors is the grim and ever-contested history of Japan’s 20th-century empire. A regular refrain in postwar Chinese critiques of Japanese defense spending, right up to the present day, has been that it risks awakening a dormant militarism. Those critiques hold less weight now that China is expanding its naval and nuclear capabilities at a rapid rate. But attempts by Japanese governments as recently as the Seventies and Eighties to woo Southeast Asian neighbors with economic assistance foundered on a perception of Japanese self-interest — even, in some quarters, neo-colonialism. Originating with postwar reparations, much of that aid and investment looked suspiciously like an attempt to find profitable outlets for Japanese export goods, helping it to rebuild its war-ravaged industries.</p>
<p>Japan has had a happier history with Southeast Asia in the decades since, but Takaichi’s personal convictions demand that she look backwards as well as forwards. She has declared her desire to revise Japan’s American-authored postwar constitution in order to clarify the role of the Self-Defense Forces. She is a member of Nippon Kaigi (Japan Conference), a powerful conservative lobby group dedicated to a traditionalist vision of Japan with the Emperor at its core. And she is now mulling a first visit as prime minister to Tokyo’s Yasukuni shrine — a lightning-rod issue in East Asia. The shrine’s original purpose was to honor Japan’s war dead from the Boshin War of 1868-9 but it also commemorates those who died in Japan’s mid-20th century wars. Any potential visit pits those in Japan who wish to honor their war dead with those in countries like China and Korea who focus on the fact that among the 2.4 million souls enshrined at Yasukuni are convicted war criminals from World War II.</p>
<p>Relitigating these controversial episodes and cultural consequences — which many in Nippon Kaigi equate with excessive Americanization following Japan&#8217;s defeat in 1945 — may well prove counterproductive. If Takaichi wants to revisit that period, she would be better off studying the intensifying perception in Japan, around a century ago, that it was becoming encircled by hostile powers: Soviets, Chinese nationalists, Europe’s Asian colonies and the United States. China may soon find itself in a similar position. It may feel it is surrounded by insufficiently friendly countries just at the point where an aging population and a slowing economy suggest that the window for reorganizing its neighborhood is beginning to close.</p>
<p>A careful reading of the past may also help Takaichi and her administration think through China’s likely long-term intentions. This is a topic on which analysts around the world are deeply divided. There are those, in the United States especially, who believe that Chinese reluctance to pronounce on the internal affairs of other countries is about current capabilities rather than political culture. Once its military is able to project power in the way that the United States can, and European nations once could, then we will begin to see a more interventionist China.</p>
<p>Another way of reading the past and present is that the benefits of territorial or maritime expansion are not what they once were. Power and prosperity in the mid-21st century rest more on economic and commercial leverage than boots on the ground. Taking direct responsibility for other countries’ affairs is both risky and costly, and Takaichi’s conclusion may be that China seeks prestige rather than empire. Rather than replace the US as global policeman, it may simply want to do away with that role, exchanging a postwar international culture of liberal cooperation under American auspices with one defined by national self-interest and multipolarity. But this may happen slowly. China will want to avoid the risk of upsetting its highly globalized economy and meanwhile allow the impression to set in that it is a natural rather than a managed transition.</p>
<p>Perhaps Japan could live with this. It could maintain credible self-defense while continuing an economic partnership with China that is currently valued at around $300 billion per year and involves deep integration of Chinese and Japanese manufacturing. It is worth remembering that for all the appearance of an unassailable position in China’s national life, the principal source of the Chinese Communist Party’s appeal is its ability to raise living standards and restore Chinese pride internationally. Takaichi’s own party dominated Japanese politics for nearly four decades on much the same basis, beginning in the mid-1950s. She knows only too well how quickly public support can drop away once people no longer see the expected returns. There is a limit to how far China and Japan’s political arrangements can usefully be compared. But the CCP’s leadership appreciates that when it comes to getting people to do what they want, even a very high-tech stick requires a little carrot alongside.</p>
<p>For now, then, it is in both Japan and China’s interests to continue their economic co-operation, even while Japan and its partners try to balance out Chinese attempts at gaining economic leverage in parts of Asia, Africa and South America via loans, investments and supply-chain dependency. Japan is already at the forefront, globally, of reducing reliance on China as a supplier of key components and raw materials including rare earths. That leadership role may expand under Takaichi.</p>
<p>There is one last way in which Takaichi might usefully look back in order to forge a path forward. It is not so much a clear-cut lesson as a question: at what point does a relationship between rival nations shift from prioritizing prosperity through economic co-operation to allowing strategic aims or fears to dictate their actions? And what, if anything, can Takaichi do to prevent that shift occurring when it comes to Taiwan? If hers ends up being a lengthy premiership, it is highly likely that the Taiwan question will be “resolved” on her watch.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;If Takaichi&#8217;s ends up being a lengthy premiership, it is highly likely that the Taiwan question will be “resolved” on her watch.&#8221;</div>
<p>For all the anger in China when Takaichi made her comments last November about the Self-Defense Forces becoming involved in a conflict over Taiwan, the chances of Japan remaining unaffected by a Chinese attempt on the island are slim. War games consistently emphasize the importance of Japan as a re-supply base for US forces responding to such an attempt and as a source of essential supplies for the Taiwanese population in the event of a Chinese maritime blockade.</p>
<p>There is a chance that China may yet engineer a peaceful takeover of Taiwan. The island’s domestic politics are divided and China is making ongoing efforts to normalize such an outcome both in Taiwan and internationally. This, however, would hardly bring tensions in the region to an end. Japan would face the very dangerous scenario of having the People’s Republic on its doorstep — visible, on a clear day, from the south-western Japanese island of Yonaguni.</p>
<p>This would be worrying enough for Japanese security. But the next question would be whether or not China’s strategic aims end there. From the Chinese point of view, taking Taiwan is a matter of bringing a renegade province to heel rather than expanding its borders. In time, however, that same logic could be used to make and perhaps enforce a claim over some or all of the Okinawan islands — of which Yonaguni is one.</p>
<p>At present, such claims appear periodically in Chinese media and academic writing, rather than in government pronouncements. Still, they are encouraged by China’s leadership at times of tension with Japan, including late last year in the wake of Takaichi’s comments about Taiwan. And for analysts who suggest paying more attention to the balance of military power than to political rhetoric — or indeed to what historians or legal scholars might argue about Okinawa — it is not beyond the bounds of possibility that soon after talk of a “Taiwan contingency” ends, talk of an “Okinawa contingency” might begin.</p>
<p>Even if China had no intention of pursuing a sovereignty claim on the Okinawan islands, the stoking of nationalist sentiment in China would be useful to the CCP while the effects on Japan could be profound: a drop in international investment and a constant sense of threat — after all, if China’s leaders proved willing to act on their Taiwan rhetoric, why wouldn’t they do so on Okinawan rhetoric too?</p>
<p>Takaichi’s political leanings mean that the past is often on her mind, as it was for her mentor Abe. As she sets about reviewing Japan’s National Security Strategy this year — while continuing to woo Donald Trump and perhaps thawing her relationship with Xi Jinping — we must hope for a creative and purposeful approach to Asia’s history. The wrongs and the suffering of the 1930s and 1940s are not to be forgotten. But the stakes are now too high for indulging in the weaponization of those wrongs and that suffering. Rather than refighting the last war, we must focus on preventing the next one.</p>
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					<title>Great power politics is an illusion</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2024/08/great-power-politics-is-an-illusion/?edition=us</link>
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						<![CDATA[Travis Aaroe]]>
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																<unherd:article_ranking>2</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[Neither Meloni nor Macron can stand up to the ECHR (LUDOVIC MARIN/AFP via Getty Images)]]>
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							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Travis Aaroe </strong>is a freelance writer</p>
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															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[is a freelance writer]]>
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										<pubDate>Tue, 20 Aug 2024 23:02:39 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Wed, 21 Aug 2024 08:14:05 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
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								<![CDATA[Liberal internationalism still rules the day]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Everyone of a certain age who passed through British secondary education will have spent a few months learning about the League of Nations, which, to my knowledge, is not a subject of academic study anywhere else. Created by the Treaty of Versailles in 1919, the League was a global quasi-government with an expansive brief to abolish war and poverty </span>worldwide<span style="font-weight: 400;">. To read about its history is to follow it from one bruising failure to the next as it sought, </span>inter alia<span style="font-weight: 400;">, to outlaw the weapons of offensive war, set international standards of safety in the workplace, and constrain Mussolini on the world stage. </span></p>
<p>Here was the essential problem: <span style="font-weight: 400;">even with the best will in the world, the League had no power to enforce any of its edicts. For this it had to rely on Britain and France, who were notorious flakes. The United States never even joined. And so it went on. The General Secretariat would pronounce, the Permanent Court of International Justice would rule, the levers would be pulled, nothing would happen. None of their high ideals were able to survive first contact with reality — that is to say, </span>state <span style="font-weight: 400;">expediency and </span>national <span style="font-weight: 400;">egoism. </span>Whenever it counted the powers would look to their own alliances, their own security. Mussolini was left to annex Abyssinia in 1936 despite the League’s protests, because Britain and France were trying to court him as an ally; Japan was allowed to overrun Manchuria for similar reasons. It all seemed to carry <span style="font-weight: 400;">a brute lesson: whatever the merits of internationalism and international law, the facts of life ran against them. </span></p>
<p>Why does English schooling fixate so much on the League, this odd sideshow? A corrective to teen idealism, maybe. These events, as told, seemed to be a mini fable in how the high ideas can’t compete against ordinary selfishness. It certainly had its appeal for teenage me: a smirker, an online troll.</p>
<p>But as a story this was over-keen and over-cynical.<span style="font-weight: 400;"> Too cynical, because it always underpriced the power of these ideas. &#8220;</span>Why can’t we all just get along&#8221;, or, latterly, &#8220;global problems require global solutions&#8221; — these are powerful notions, at least among the very powerful. <span style="font-weight: 400;">The armies that conquered Europe in the middle of the Forties were technically those of the United Nations, marching under its own banner of war: the &#8220;</span><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Nations_Honour_Flag#:~:text=The%20United%20Nations%20Honour%20Flag,their%20goal%20of%20world%20peace." target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Honour Flag</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">&#8221; — this just 10 years after the League of Nations was pronounced a dead letter. Had F.D.R. lived a little longer, something approaching a world state under the aegis of the UN would have resulted, with the planet governed as a kind of American-Soviet condominium </span>— even Wendall Wilkie, his Republican rival, called <a href="https://www.brown.edu/news/2020-03-30/willkie" target="_blank" rel="noopener">for such a course</a>. <span style="font-weight: 400;">A lunatic idea, but not one that school-of-hard-knocks international realism can really assimilate. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Too cynical then, and too cynical now. Over the past 10 years almost everyone has </span>again <span style="font-weight: 400;">been announcing the decline of </span>liberal<span style="font-weight: 400;"> international norms and the return of the nation state. Terrorism, strongmanism, populism, migration, and global diseases would force some collision with reality, the old niceties would be forgotten, and we would then revert to a harder and simpler form of rule </span>under sovereign nations. <span style="font-weight: 400;">What would this entail?</span><span style="font-weight: 400;"> Nearly every literary or political </span>weekly<span style="font-weight: 400;"> at one point carried the front piece of Thomas Hobbes’ </span><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">Leviathan </span></i><span style="font-weight: 400;">as its cover. Even the vogue for the term “geopolitics” spoke to the new mood: a politics founded in expediency and the facts of life, not liberal ideas.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">But nothing of the sort has happened. Whatever factors might be making the case for </span>the nation state<span style="font-weight: 400;"> anew,</span><span style="font-weight: 400;"> the real story of the past decade has been a huge growth in the scope and depth of international law and obligation. These are advancing over the developed world much faster than they’re receding elsewhere.</span></p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/07/rishi-sunak-defeated-millennial/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/07/rishi-sunak-defeated-millennial/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/Millennial.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/07/rishi-sunak-defeated-millennial/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/07/rishi-sunak-defeated-millennial/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Rishi Sunak is a millennial tragedy</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/07/rishi-sunak-defeated-millennial/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Travis Aaroe</a></p></div></a></div>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">For all the foam of the past 10 years, </span>it’s hard to think of any period in<span style="font-weight: 400;"> diplomatic history </span>that’s <span style="font-weight: 400;">been less defined by expediency, national egoism, or the cold accounting of interests. A classic example is the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), which, unlike the old League of Nations, doesn’t require a sponsor power. In 2015, a British exit from the ECHR was Cameronite boilerplate. Now it is deemed radical and eccentric. Giorgia Meloni heads up a party that can claim lineal descent from Italy’s National Fascists. Emmanuel Macron was billed as a statesman of Jupiterian standing, a liberal answer to the age of the strongman. </span>For all this n<span style="font-weight: 400;">either can bring themselves to face down the court in Strasbourg, or even the Dublin Convention</span>.<span style="font-weight: 400;"> France has now </span><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/newsroom/france-is-right-to-take-a-tough-line-on-immigration/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">been reduced</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> to paying the ECHR an out-of-pocket charge for each deportation. </span></p>
<p>So too with the climate. 10 years ago climate agreements like the Kyoto Protocol were a byword for the well-meaning dead letter. These have since grown teeth. Switzerland, grand doyen of the international system, was in April ruled against by the Strasbourg court for insufficient zeal on Net Zero. The Swiss government is now <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cl55ggjqvx7o" target="_blank" rel="noopener">drawing up a list</a> of climate measures which it hopes will appease the court.</p>
<p>The same is true for<span style="font-weight: 400;"> technology. All the world powers have now accepted global AI regulation, even though the first to defect from these rules </span>would surely<span style="font-weight: 400;"> reap huge commercial advantages for itself. So much for </span>the<span style="font-weight: 400;"> new egoism.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">In this sense many jumped too soon. In the 2010s, </span>a number of political<span style="font-weight: 400;"> leaders and factions bet on the revival of the Westphalian system and took the national plunge, only to end up disappointed. </span><span style="font-weight: 400;">Though China has been menacing Japan in the Spratly Islands for over a decade, this has not been enough to force a revision of Article 9 of the Constitution — which forbids Japan from waging aggressive war. Some of the more slapdash Brexiteers took it as a given that, during talks with the EU27, national interest or even the needs of European exporters would prevail, and that things like the integrity of the EEA were in fact wink-nudge negotiating positions. Wrong. The process ended up turning almost entirely on legalese such as the Good Friday Agreement — never on trade or even grand strategy. </span>They had counted<span style="font-weight: 400;"> on a new smirking Bismarckianism that never </span>actually <span style="font-weight: 400;">materialised. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Subsequent events only underline the point. Two years after this bruising course of negotiations, the United Kingdom </span>decided to <span style="font-weight: 400;">commit huge resources to defending the EU27’s eastern flank. The UK is also backing Ukraine’s accession to the EU: now a closed market to British goods. Even for a relative tearaway like Brexit Britain, the international principle is still unanswerable. Under similar circumstances, any 18th-century British cabinet would probably be concluding a</span> treaty<span style="font-weight: 400;"> with Russia. </span></p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;Even for a relative tearaway like Brexit Britain, the international principle is still unanswerable.&#8221; </div>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Liberal internationalism has been challenged only to come out stronger. That’s not to say it’s come through unchanged. In the 2020s, global institutions no longer justify themselves with anything so sensible as, say, cheap imports and just-in-time supply chains — these were all torched in the name of “global action” against Coronavirus four years ago. The only argument now </span>really<span style="font-weight: 400;"> made for these things is that any alternative to them is morally unconscionable. Britain can’t exit the ECHR to exercise ordinary border controls because that would put it in the same company as Belarus, and would be an aid and comfort to bad men everywhere. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Border control. Great power politics. National rearmament. A liberal course on AI. These are not bankrupt ideas. History will probably vindicate them. But their proponents can’t count on some inevitable global crack-up to accomplish their work for them. So far, the only successful reassertions of the nation state have come not from &#8220;wider forces&#8221;, but from small, organised conspiracies like Vote Leave and Boris-Cummings that were willing to </span>act in the face of events and<span style="font-weight: 400;"> force the issue. </span>Nationalism and internationalism are moral premises. Events cannot prove or disprove them. More than anything else, what the last 10 years have shown is that these ideas are more powerful than realism, expediency, and the so-called facts of life. Those who oppose these reigning ideas shouldn’t count on reality intruding in on them.</p>
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					<title>How do you solve a problem like the Saudis?</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2018/10/solve-problem-like-saudis/?edition=us</link>
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						<![CDATA[Giles Fraser]]>
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							<![CDATA[A protestor dressed as Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad Bin Salman, during a vigil to remember journalist Jamal Khashoggi. Credit: Chris McGrath / Getty]]>
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							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Giles Fraser</strong> is a journalist, broadcaster and Vicar of St Anne&#8217;s, Kew.</p>
]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_handle>giles_fraser</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is a journalist, broadcaster and Vicar of St Anne's, Kew.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Fri, 26 Oct 2018 12:13:56 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Tue, 07 Jan 2020 21:53:28 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Defence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[realpolitik]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Russia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Saudi Arabia]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">http://old.unherd.com/?p=17005</guid>
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								<![CDATA[Politicians operate in a ‘grey zone’ where principles and consequences are often traded off against each other]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>In 2015, when King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia died, the union flags were lowered at half-mast all across Whitehall. Even Westminster Abbey followed suit, doffing its ecclesiastical cap to a tyrannical regime that has sponsored militant Islam throughout the Arab world.</p>
<p>We need them, came the justification. They are our friends. Humbug, came the reply. <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/brookings-now/2016/04/22/watch-sen-chris-murphy-on-revisiting-u-s-saudi-relationship/" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">We have sold our soul for desert gold</a>.</p>
<p>It was an early skirmish in a moral debate that has now grown impossible to ignore.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-45988533" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">The Khasshogi case</a> has put us on the spot. A journalist was brazenly murdered in broad daylight, allegedly by the Saudis, and Western governments have to decide how they will react. On the one hand, most people will feel – to a greater or lesser extent – that such behaviour must have consequences. For our politicians to shrug their shoulders in the name of realpolitik is effectively to green light powerful nations doing what they like – much as the Russians did in Salisbury. And it is to ignore all <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/mar/08/why-saudi-arabia-in-yemen-what-does-it-mean-for-britain" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">the misery that the Saudis are creating in the Yemen</a>, as they bomb innocents with weapons supplied by this country, creating the worst humanitarian crisis in the world today.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/03/saudis-crown-prince-hardly-safe-bet-british/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/03/saudis-crown-prince-hardly-safe-bet-british/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/PA-33584841.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/03/saudis-crown-prince-hardly-safe-bet-british/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/03/saudis-crown-prince-hardly-safe-bet-british/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Saudi&#039;s Crown Prince is hardly a safe bet for the British</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/03/saudis-crown-prince-hardly-safe-bet-british/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Michael Burleigh</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>But a great many jobs here do depend upon Saudi contracts, the pragmatists reply, and if we don’t supply them on a matter of principle, the Russians gladly would. Besides, can we discount the role Saudi Arabia apparently plays in stabilising the Middle East, a counter-weight to the pernicious influence of Iran, and an important link between the Arab world and Israel.</p>
<p>How, then, can we possibly find the proper balance between principles and practical reality?</p>
<p>It’s a very old question, of course. “It is better for you that one man die for the people than that the whole nation perish,” said the High Priest in the Gospel of John, expressing bluntly the thought that the murder of an innocent man should be weighed against the consequences for the many.</p>
<p>Back in 1996, in an interview with the <em>Sunday Telegraph</em>, Tony Blair admitted a fascination with Jesus’ trial, and with how the Roman political authorities – represented by Pontius Pilate – dealt with the complexity of setting moral principles against practical reality:</p>
<blockquote><p>&#8220;[Pilate] commands our moral attention not because he is a bad man, but because he was so nearly a good man. One can imagine him agonising, seeing that Jesus had done nothing wrong, and wishing to release him. Just as easily, however, one can envisage his advisers telling him of the risks, warning him not to inflame public opinion. It is a timeless parable of political life.&#8221;</p></blockquote>
<p>Khashoggi isn’t Jesus. But the dilemma for our political authorities is not wholly dissimilar.</p>
<p>Moral philosophers have been chewing it over for many years. Broadly speaking they are divided into two camps: those who think morality is fundamentally about sticking to a clear set of moral rules or principles, and those who think morality is all about weighing up the consequences of an action. Philosophically, the debate is between deontologists like Moses and Kant who say &#8220;these are the moral rules, stick to the rules&#8221; and utilitarians who think that the right thing to do is all about what action produces the greatest happiness for the greatest number of people.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/11/test-article/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/11/test-article/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/11/test-article/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested listening</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/11/test-article/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Test article</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/11/test-article/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Giles Fraser</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Both positions are problematic. The rule based moralists can be accused of putting their own principles before the general wellbeing of the majority; that they are more committed to their own sense of virtuous conduct than to the widespread misery that can be caused by their principles. The problem with the utilitarian position is the opposite, they are so focused on a calculation of general wellbeing that they would be prepared to sanction any behaviour, however immoral, in the name of the greater good.</p>
<p>“Would you murder a child to cure cancer?” The deontologist would most probably say no, sticking hard to the moral rule that “murder is wrong”. Fair enough – but what of the millions of those who will suffer lingering and agonising deaths from the disease. The utilitarian might say yes. Weighing one child’s death on the scales against the deaths of millions might lead to the hard conclusion that, for the greater good, the sacrifice of one child’s life would be worth it.</p>
<p>Both camps, in different ways, can be accused of having blood on their hands. The deontologist is committed to doing the right thing – but at a huge cost. The utilitarian does something clearly wicked, but to the massive benefit of humankind. It’s an extreme example, of course. But nonetheless, one that focuses attention on the basic dilemma – principles or consequences? You and I might never have to face such a question, but politicians do.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/08/consumer-greed-making-suckers-us/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/08/consumer-greed-making-suckers-us/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/GettyImages-878005904.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/08/consumer-greed-making-suckers-us/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/08/consumer-greed-making-suckers-us/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Consumer greed is making suckers of us all</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/08/consumer-greed-making-suckers-us/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Giles Fraser</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>On Wednesday evening, we debated the whole Saudi situation on the BBC&#8217;s Moral Maze. And among those questioned was the political philosopher <a href="https://personalpages.manchester.ac.uk/staff/stephen.a.de-wijze/" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">Dr Stephen De Wijze</a>. His fascinating take was that neither of these positions is much help to politicians. In response to the Khashoggi case, ultilitarians are obliged to do deals with murderers. And deontologists, while avoiding that accusation, are nonetheless threatening a political and economic catastrophe.</p>
<p>In other words, there is no ‘moral innocence’ to be had, whatever one does. Doing the right thing also involves doing the wrong thing, whatever one’s course of action. Politicians operate in a ‘grey zone’, argues De Wijze, where principles and consequences are often traded off against each other. In this place, there is no hiding from the accusation of moral failure. Little wonder Tony Blair empathised with Pontius Pilate.</p>
<p>I think Dr De Wijze is correct about all of this. Politicians inevitably live with a form of what he calls “tragic remorse”, which is the emotional and existential cost of a career making these good/bad decisions. But what bothers me is that De Wijze’s position – and mine &#8211; all too easily provides an alibi to those politicians who manifestly do the morally wrong thing – like lying about WMD and invading Iraq.</p>
<p>If all decisions are good/bad ones, it is just too easy to hide, justifying all morally messy action as grey. This is so much more dangerous in a culture that has rejected a common moral framework – like Christianity – and thinks we should all just work it out for ourselves.</p>
<p>Personally, I think the answer to this fix comes in the form of an ethic of virtue in which we think of morality as located not so much in some philosophical formula for decision-making but in the character of individuals themselves. Is Pilate a “good man” or a “bad man” is the question Tony Blair asks himself. In other words, we&#8217;re not talking Kant, nor Mill, but Aristotle. This virtue ethics approach emphasises the importance of good will and strength of character; that, roughly speaking, good people –those who embody a slate of virtuous characteristics &#8211; will seek to do the right thing in messy and compromised circumstances.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/09/aristotles-answer-identity-politics/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/09/aristotles-answer-identity-politics/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/GettyImages-164110515.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/09/aristotles-answer-identity-politics/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/09/aristotles-answer-identity-politics/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Aristotle&#039;s answer to identity politics</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/09/aristotles-answer-identity-politics/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Henry Olsen</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Of course, what should go on the list of moral characteristics is debatable: Honesty? Courage? Prudence? Strength of mind? Kindness? Loyalty? Different cultures will emphasise different features of moral virtue. But what it ultimately comes down to is trust. Do we have politicians who we trust &#8211; who we trust to weigh up the principles and consequences in good faith.</p>
<p>Unfortunately, for a great many of us, that faith in politicians was spectacularly undermined by Tony Blair himself. And we are still living with the consequences. There may be no morally ‘right answer’ to the Khashoggi situation. But when we don’t trust our politicians, we won&#8217;t even assume that they will navigate the grey zone in good faith and approximate to the least bad response. Stuck on auto-Pilate, they simply wash their hands of Yemeni blood.</p>
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