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		<title>Russia-Ukraine - UnHerd</title>
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	<title>Russia-Ukraine - UnHerd</title>
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					<title>The West is losing two wars at once</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2026/09/the-west-is-losing-two-wars-at-once/?edition=us</link>
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										<unherd:main_theme>Geopolitics</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Wolfgang Munchau]]>
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							<![CDATA[Ukrainian troops training in trenches. (Diego Herrera Carcedo/Anadolu via Getty Images)]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Wolfgang Münchau</strong> is the Director of <a href="https://www.eurointelligence.com/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Eurointelligence</a> and an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist.</p>
]]>
						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>EuroBriefing</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is the Director of <a href="https://www.eurointelligence.com/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Eurointelligence</a> and an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Sun, 13 Sep 2026 23:03:57 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Sun, 13 Sep 2026 23:03:57 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[European Union]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Iran War]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Russia-Ukraine]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Russo-Ukrainian War]]></category>
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																												<description>
								<![CDATA[Overconfidence is our weakness]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>These days one reads <span style="font-weight: 400">fewer stories </span>proclaiming<span style="font-weight: 400"> the turning </span>of the <span style="font-weight: 400">tide in the Russia-Ukraine war. There are also fewer tweets from Donald Trump threatening Iran with imminent destruction.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Now that the noise has receded, it is a good time to listen. I am not hearing </span>of a successful Ukrainian counteroffensive<span style="font-weight: 400">. What I am hearing instead is the thud of Russian jackboots marching deeper into the parts of the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine that </span>Vladimir Putin<span style="font-weight: 400"> does not yet control.   </span></p>
<p>Meanwhile, <span style="font-weight: 400">in the southwest of the Arabian Peninsula, the Houthis have taken control of the strategic port city of Mokha. </span>The city<span style="font-weight: 400"> lies just to the north of the Strait of Bab el-Mandeb</span>, which<span style="font-weight: 400"> connects the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean. So far, the Houthis have not been able to interdict shipping through the Strait, as Iran did in the Strait of Hormuz. But since capturing Mokha they have also seized Perim Island, in the middle of Bab el-Mandeb, putting them in a far stronger position to threaten passing ships. If they succeed in closing the Strait, Iran and its allies would control the main maritime bottlenecks of the Middle East. </span></p>
<p>That spells economic peril for the West. <span style="font-weight: 400">Before the war, the vast majority of oil produced in the Arabian Peninsula traveled through the straits of Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb. Right now, about <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2026/09/11/business/bab-al-mandeb-strait-houthi-global-economy" target="_blank" rel="noopener">400,000</a></span><span style="font-weight: 400"> barrels of Saudi Arabian oil flow through Bab el-Mandeb </span>per day<span style="font-weight: 400">, only a small fraction of production. </span>And a<span style="font-weight: 400">fter the Houthis captured Mokha, the price of Brent crude, the international benchmark, is back to around $100 per barrel. This is not the short, sharp oil-price shock that the markets had anticipated when the Iran war started. Leon Panetta, </span>who was director of the CIA<span style="font-weight: 400"> under President Obama, now warns of a “forever war”, with no signs of it being resolved one way or the other.  </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Economists and central bankers have neatly divided the economic consequences of the war into three scenarios: baseline, adverse and severe. I would describe the situation we are in today as adverse, heading towards severe.  </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">A crude oil price of $100 translates into higher prices for petrol, diesel, heating oil, kerosene and other downstream products. </span>A severe winte<span style="font-weight: 400">r could lead to heating gas shortages in Germany, </span>for the country’s<span style="font-weight: 400"> storage tanks </span>are already at <span style="font-weight: 400">record-low levels. A $100 oil price is not one at which our </span>W<span style="font-weight: 400">estern economies function </span>smoothly<span style="font-weight: 400">.  </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">It is a price, however, at which the Russian economy functions very well. </span>And o<span style="font-weight: 400">il</span>, ominously,<span style="font-weight: 400"> is what links the two wars. The longer the war in Iran lasts, the greater the financial boost for Russia, whose main exports are oil and gas. </span>As a result, an unwelcome scenario presents itself<span style="font-weight: 400">: the US loses its war against Iran, and Ukraine loses to Russia. </span></p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/09/the-next-financial-crash-a-scenario/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/09/the-next-financial-crash-a-scenario/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/GettyImages-2292626872.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/09/the-next-financial-crash-a-scenario/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/09/the-next-financial-crash-a-scenario/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The next financial crash: a scenario</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/09/the-next-financial-crash-a-scenario/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Wolfgang Münchau</a></p></div></a></div>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Most wars do not end in outright victories or defeats. My central expectation for both is a messy draw: some dirty deal that would leave Iran charging money for passage through the Strait, with Trump and his business associates getting a cut. For Ukraine, I would define a draw as Russia keeping its presently occupied territories </span>and obtaining assurances that <span style="font-weight: 400">Ukraine</span> will stay outside<span style="font-weight: 400"> Nato. But the odds of a bad outcome, from a Western perspective, are shortening.  </span></p>
<p>For one, <span style="font-weight: 400">there is clearly a </span>risk that other European countries might be drawn into<span style="font-weight: 400"> the war — just as there </span>is <span style="font-weight: 400">an escalation risk in the Middle East. The two wars could also fuse into a broader Eurasian </span>conflict<span style="font-weight: 400"> that acts </span>as <span style="font-weight: 400">a proxy war between the US and China. </span></p>
<p>And <span style="font-weight: 400">I doubt that the aging societies of Western Europe have the stomach for a sustained fight. </span>These countries are having<span style="font-weight: 400"> to borrow money to meet their defense spending targets. </span>Nor do they have an<span style="font-weight: 400"> excess of young men eager to fight the Russians in a war that could </span>later involve the <span style="font-weight: 400">use of nuclear and chemical weapons. </span>In the event of war, <span style="font-weight: 400">our massive wealth and income redistribution systems would</span> have to be painfully cut back<span style="font-weight: 400">, with millions thrown into immediate poverty. </span></p>
<p>It is easier, then, to send money to Ukraine without committing troops. <span style="font-weight: 400">Ukraine </span>has <span style="font-weight: 400">received hundreds of billions </span>of pounds<span style="font-weight: 400"> in military and financial support from the West, but Russia </span>has <span style="font-weight: 400">still managed to outspend it. Russia hit a short recession earlier this year but is now recovering, in part due to the rise in the oil price. </span></p>
<p>At the same time, t<span style="font-weight: 400">he US, and by extension Ukraine, is suffering from a shortage of</span> <span style="font-weight: 400">interceptor missiles</span> used to take down<span style="font-weight: 400"> incoming missiles and drones. Despite its formidable military capabilities, the US is not geared up for a long war. </span>Its weak link is the supply chain<span style="font-weight: 400">. The same is happening in Europe, </span>where d<span style="font-weight: 400">ecades of running down defense spending have taken their toll.  </span></p>
<p>Britain<span style="font-weight: 400"> has an army of 75,000 troops, </span>a force so<span style="font-weight: 400"> depleted that it could only “seize a small market town on a good day”. </span>These are the<span style="font-weight: 400"> immortal words of General Sir Richard Barrons, a former military commander and co-author of the UK’s recent defense review.  </span></p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;The Russians are so confident of victory right now that they are no longer even interested in peace talks.&#8221;</div>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">So what makes us so </span>certain we can stop<span style="font-weight: 400"> Russia winning in Ukraine? The Russians, too, are brimming with confidence. They are so confident of victory right now that they are no longer even interested in peace talks. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">When Steve Witkoff, Donald Trump’s special envoy for peace missions, and Jared Kushner, Trump’s son-in-law, visited Vladimir Putin last week, it turned into a toe-curling embarrassment. Putin was happy to receive them and hear their sycophantic praise. But he did not appear in a hurry to cut a peace deal, and the commentary in the Russian media about the visit was caustic. Dmitry Drize, a political commentator at Kommersant FM, wrote: “The visit followed the standard formula — arrival, restaurant, reception in the Kremlin… One would really like to see something more.” </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">We have clearly moved beyond the period of US-Russian rapprochement marked by the Anchorage summit between Trump and Putin in August last year. </span>At the time, <span style="font-weight: 400">Russian elites fell over themselves in their praise for Trump. </span>No longer. <span style="font-weight: 400">Putin has the look of a man who thinks he can win.  </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">He has miscalculated before and may do so again. His invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 was a shambles. But the Russian army regrouped, and Russia is today in a stronger position </span>than its opponent<span style="font-weight: 400">.  </span></p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/09/putin-the-blind-autocrat/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/09/putin-the-blind-autocrat/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/GettyImages-2289643718.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/09/putin-the-blind-autocrat/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/09/putin-the-blind-autocrat/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Putin: the blind autocrat</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/09/putin-the-blind-autocrat/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Seva Gunitsky</a></p></div></a></div>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">For many in the </span>W<span style="font-weight: 400">est, </span>though, <span style="font-weight: 400">the idea of a Russian victory is </span>still <span style="font-weight: 400">too painful to contemplate. If we treat something as unthinkable, we do not think about it. </span>But u<span style="font-weight: 400">nderestimating your enemy is exactly how you lose wars. Even after four and a half years, I do not understand the strategic objective of </span>W<span style="font-weight: 400">estern support for Ukraine. I am not questioning the principle, but I fail to see what exactly the intended purpose is in concrete strategic terms. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">One of the few in Europe who pretends to have a strategy is Radosław Sikorski, the Polish foreign minister. His words do not reassure me. He once defined the strategy as one of exhausting the enemy, much as the </span>Allied Powers<span style="font-weight: 400"> defeated Germany in World War I. But the situation today is not comparable. Russia has not hit critical energy shortages as Germany did back then. The idea that we would win an endurance contest against Putin when oil prices are high seems </span>over-<span style="font-weight: 400">optimistic. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Last week, Sikorski claimed in a separate interview that the EU economy is <a href="https://x.com/radeksikorski/status/1923409003595411478" target="_blank" rel="noopener">nine to 10 times larger than</a></span> that of <span style="font-weight: 400">Russia. This is not merely a false statistic; it is a Napoleonic-scale misjudgment of the size of Russia. Measured in dollars, the EU</span><span style="font-weight: 400"> is indeed much bigger. But </span>because Russia has been cut out of <span style="font-weight: 400">the dollar markets, that’s not a smart way to look at relative size. The best way to compare ourselves with a country like Russia, China or Iran, especially for military purposes, is purchasing power — literal bang for the buck. On that metric, the EU is three times as large as Russia. And even that does not tell us what we need to know, because the EU is spending only a tiny proportion of its economic output on helping Ukraine, whereas Putin is spending a lot more.  </span></p>
<p>The military metrics tell no more flattering a story.<span style="font-weight: 400"> The EU has 1.3 </span>million<span style="font-weight: 400"> active military personnel, approximately the same as Russia. </span>But in<span style="font-weight: 400"> terms of military production, Russia beats the EU hands down. For example, Russia produces 3.4 million large howitzer shells per year, </span>substantially more than the <span style="font-weight: 400">EU’s projected annual capacity of two million. This is true for many other weapons categories as well.</span></p>
<p>Back in March, Trump said the White House expected the war to last for four or five weeks. But historians have seen that kind of delusion before. When Germany started World War I in August 1914, Kaiser Wilhelm confidently told his troops: &#8220;You will be home before the leaves have fallen from the trees.&#8221; Today’s equivalent is the assertion that Russia and Iran are easy to defeat because we are so much richer than them.</p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">The bottom line is that Trump has no strategy for the Middle East, just as Europeans have no strategy for Ukraine. We are rich and creditworthy enough to keep supporting Ukraine and battle Iran a little longer. But in either case I struggle to see a path to victory</span>, for <span style="font-weight: 400">we are not willing to put our money, and our troops, where our mouth is. </span></p>
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					<title>Trump has called Europe&#039;s bluff</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2025/11/trump-has-called-europes-bluff/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://stage.unherd.com/2025/11/trump-has-called-europes-bluff/?edition=us#comments</comments>
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										<unherd:main_theme>ukraine peace plan</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Wolfgang Munchau]]>
					</dc:creator>
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																<unherd:article_ranking>1</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[The president saw opportunities that Europe did not. Photo by John McDonnell/Getty Images]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Wolfgang Münchau</strong> is the Director of <a href="https://www.eurointelligence.com/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Eurointelligence</a> and an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist.</p>
]]>
						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>EuroBriefing</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is the Director of <a href="https://www.eurointelligence.com/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Eurointelligence</a> and an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Mon, 24 Nov 2025 00:03:04 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Mon, 24 Nov 2025 00:03:04 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Donald Trump]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[EU]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Russia-Ukraine]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Vladimir Putin]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Volodymyr Zelensky]]></category>
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								<![CDATA[The bureaucrats had no strategy]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>The 28-point plan the White House negotiated with the Kremlin is not a done deal. It’s not even close. It is a blueprint, no more, no less. In any case, Trump is an unpredictable player — he could back out at any moment. But this time, I don’t think he will.</p>
<p>The plan, first circulated on a <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/read-donald-trumps-latest-russia-ukraine-peace-plan/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Telegram channel</a>, is clearly not a great one for Ukraine. But, equally, it isn’t a “capitulation” and those who have described it as such don’t really want a deal. Ukraine will be able to improve on it. But, admittedly, not by much. &#8220;<a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/what-trump-and-zelenskyy-said-during-their-heated-argument-in-the-oval-office" target="_blank" rel="noopener">You don&#8217;t have the cards</a>,&#8221; Trump once told Zelensky. Unfortunately, after the recent corruption scandal, his hand is weaker than ever.</p>
<p>Over the past three years, US officials have repeatedly told me that Ukraine has no chance of winning the war. And after America withdrew support earlier this year, it was clear that they had a point: Europe was in no position to plug the gap. Europeans might be the self-righteous defenders of the fast-collapsing multilateral world order, but history will record that when push came to shove, they weren’t ready to put their money where their mouth was. On average, the total support for Ukraine was around <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_25_1978" target="_blank" rel="noopener">€4 billion per month</a> during the first half of the year. In July and August, it collapsed to under <a href="https://www.kielinstitut.de/publications/news/ukraine-support-tracker-military-aid-falls-sharply-despite-new-nato-initiative/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">€1 billion per month, according to the Kiel Institute</a>. No major European country has been willing to cut spending or raise taxes to fund Ukraine meaningfully. The Europeans&#8217; strategy, such as it was beyond photo-ops with Zelensky, was to keep the Russians fighting until they got tired. Unfortunately, America tired first. And Europe had no Plan B.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/11/the-rot-at-the-heart-of-europe/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/11/the-rot-at-the-heart-of-europe/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/GettyImages-2231875366.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/11/the-rot-at-the-heart-of-europe/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/11/the-rot-at-the-heart-of-europe/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The rot at the heart of Europe</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/11/the-rot-at-the-heart-of-europe/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Wolfgang Münchau</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Now Europe is out of money and out of ideas. And Trump does have a plan. He has been playing the long game. His tough talk against Vladimir Putin was merely tactical, intended to mask a long-term strategy to force an end to the war. As Phillips O’Brien has suggested, in his <a href="https://phillipspobrien.substack.com/p/the-long-con-comes-to-an-end">“Long Con” analysis</a>, even Trump’s secondary oil sanctions were part of this gambit. These were supposed to take effect on 21 November. And yet nothing happened. India and China can continue buy Russian oil with impunity. The sanctions were never serious.</p>
<p>Trump has a singular priority — to end the war, whatever it takes. And he has two major advantages in this bid. One is Ukraine and Europe&#8217;s military dependence on the US. The other is America’s unique status as the only influential Western power with direct diplomatic channels with Moscow. The Europeans committed a huge strategic blunder when they simultaneously ended their conversations with Vladimir Putin.</p>
<p>And so Trump’s 28-point plan was negotiated by Steve Witkoff with his counterpart in Russia, Kirill Dmitriev. Admittedly, it does have the feel of a work in progress: the leaked version was written in Russian and, when translated into English, is clumsy. It is detailed, but by no means a formally agreed text.</p>
<p>There are, though, some non-negotiable elements. One is the territorial agreement which would give Russia a part of Ukraine it does not yet occupy. <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-61680301" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Russia already holds almost 90%</a> of the entire Donbas region — all of Luhansk, and roughly three quarters of Donetsk. Trump&#8217;s peace plan would hand Russia the remaining territory of Donetsk, along with the 200,000 Ukrainians who are still resident in the Ukrainian-controlled parts of the oblast. Under the plan, the territory would be demilitarized and become part of a buffer zone.</p>
<p>Trump&#8217;s team accepted this because they concluded, correctly, in my view, that without it there would be no deal. Putin would have continued to fight and eventually captured more territory. Russia has been making advances: it recently managed to occupy the vital frontline town of Pokrovsk. It could take another year for Russia to capture the remainder of Donetsk, before it went for the big prize: Zaporizhzhia, a city with approximately 700,000 inhabitants, and the capital of the region that bears the same name. At that point, Ukraine’s future independence could could no longer be assured.</p>
<p>This peace deal, though, is not as one-sided as its critics say. It formally recognizes the sovereignty of Ukraine, and its right to join the EU. It also allows Ukraine to maintain an army, capped at a reasonable 600,000 troops. Nor does restrict NATO countries from providing further assistance, except for certain weapon categories like long-range missiles.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/11/the-eus-new-censorship-machine/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/11/the-eus-new-censorship-machine/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/GettyImages-2022669077.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/11/the-eus-new-censorship-machine/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/11/the-eus-new-censorship-machine/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The EU’s new censorship machine</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/11/the-eus-new-censorship-machine/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Thomas Fazi</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>But there are some real curveballs. I almost fell off my chair when I read Point 14, which suggests the investing of $100bn of Russia&#8217;s frozen assets in the reconstruction of Ukraine — with the US taking half of the profits. This is classic Trump: playing commercial games which are beyond the imagination of our European diplomats. In addition, Europe would be obliged to pay $100bn of assistance from their own pockets. There will be a US-Russian investment fund to finance joint American–Russian projects, with profits shared.</p>
<p>But most importantly, the deal forces Europe to unfreeze the $200 billion in Russian assets currently held in European accounts, mostly in Belgium. This is a bitter pill; Europe had hoped it could use the Russian money as collateral for Ukraine loans. Trump has no authority to force Europe to release the funds — Friedrich Merz already said No to this demand — but he could make life difficult if it refuses.</p>
<p>Europe’s only semi-coherent strategy regarding Ukraine had been to withhold these assets as leverage for future reparations  — a plan built on the fiction that Ukraine would win this war. But if Russia and Ukraine end up agreeing a deal, this scheme would be rendered unworkable, since would be a tool with which the Europeans could sabotage the deal.</p>
<p>Another red-line in the peace deal is the gradual lifting of sanctions. Readmitting Russia to the Group of Seven advanced industrial nations — making it the G8 again — would be painful for the Europeans. Russia was expelled in 2014, after Russia annexed Crimea. A revived G8 would effectively be ruled by Trump and Putin.</p>
<p>No surprise, then, that EU leaders at the G20 summit in South Africa this weekend issued a statement to say that they wanted to make a counterproposal, designed primarily to frustrate Trump’s plan. They insisted on a ceasefire — a non-starter. And after senior US and European officials met in Geneva on Sunday, they said they had made some progress but gave no details.</p>
<p>Ukraine, by contrast, made some positive noises about a new version of the deal. <em>The Kyiv</em> <em>Independent</em> <a href="https://kyivindependent.com/umerov-denies-approving-any-points-of-us-russia-peace-plan/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">quoted a senior US official</a> saying that the plan had been drawn up with Rustem Umerov, the secretary of the National and Security Council of Ukraine, and one of Zelensky&#8217;s closest aides. Umerov reportedly agreed to the majority of the deal, after making several modifications, which he then showed to Zelensky.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">“The loudest supporters of Ukraine in Europe are those with no understanding whatsoever of the military reality on the ground.&#8221;</div>
<p>Domestic attitudes in Ukraine are also shifting. I noted a post from Iuliia Mendel, Zelensky’s former press secretary and staunch defender of Ukraine. Over the weekend she tweeted: “My country is bleeding out. Many who reflexively oppose every peace proposal believe they are defending Ukraine. With all respect, that is the clearest proof they have no idea what is actually happening on the front lines and inside the country right now.” She is absolutely right in her observation that the loudest supporters of Ukraine in Europe are those with no understanding whatsoever of the military reality on the ground.</p>
<p>So will the Europeans encourage Zelensky to keep on fighting? I am sure they will try. But I am not sure they will succeed. Ultimately, they will back down.</p>
<p>Because if Ukraine were to reject the deal, Trump would formally disconnect his remaining military aid and intelligence support to Ukraine. The country relies on this as its early warning system for any incoming attacks as well as guiding its own strikes on Russian infrastructure.</p>
<p>Trump could go even further and renounce US responsibility for Europe&#8217;s security, on the grounds that the continent is taking unacceptable risks. The Europeans know this, of course. While outwardly, they may give an impression of defiance, their actions suggest otherwise. After Trump imposed tariffs on European imports this summer, the EU folded and agreed to a big increase in military spending. If Europe really wanted independence from the US, it would have created a defense procurement union, with a “Buy European” mandate and started to reorganize its militaries. None of this is happening. Nor will it. This is the problem with the multilateral crowd. They care too much about procedures.</p>
<p>We can expect a good deal of huffing and puffing coming from European capitals over the next few days. Leaders will insist that they are retain sovereign decision-making. Legally, this is true. The US has no rights to decide the fate of Russian assets held in Europe.</p>
<p>But this is not a legal dispute, it is a political one. Europe never had a viable strategy for the war — and now it’s becoming clear it has no strategy for peace either. The Europeans have no choice but to make a deal: they have no cards left to play either.</p>
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					<title>A Ukraine deal is still possible</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2025/08/trumps-alaska-triumph/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://stage.unherd.com/2025/08/trumps-alaska-triumph/?edition=us#comments</comments>
										<unherd:featured_image>https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/08/GettyImages-2229490882.jpg?w=547</unherd:featured_image>
										<unherd:main_theme>diplomacy</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Heather Penatzer]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/blued-lady.jpg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>1</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[The good mood suggested proximity to a deal. Credit: Getty]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Heather Penatzer</strong> is a postdoctoral fellow at Perry World House at the University of Pennsylvania and a non-resident fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.</p>
]]>
						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>hpenatzer</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is a postdoctoral fellow at Perry World House at the University of Pennsylvania and a non-resident fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Fri, 15 Aug 2025 23:10:00 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Sun, 17 Aug 2025 07:19:04 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized @us]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Alaska]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Alaska Summit]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Donald Trump]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[European Union]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Putin]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Russia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Russia-Ukraine]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[US]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Volodymyr Zelensky]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[War]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://stage.unherd.com/?p=701265</guid>
																												<description>
								<![CDATA[Now it’s up to Kiev to accept reality]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>After three hours of talks in Alaska, Presidents Trump and Vladimir Putin emerged describing their discussion as “extremely productive.” While they offered no specifics, Trump said the next steps would involve phone calls to NATO leaders and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky. The absence of a definitive peace treaty came as no surprise, but the discussion marks an important step toward ending the conflict. Putin’s apparent readiness to explore a comprehensive settlement places new pressure on Kiev to reconsider its negotiating position.</p>
<p>The timing of the summit was as important as its outcome. In recent days, Russian forces have advanced near Pokrovsk, forcing Ukrainian defenders from several fortified positions and threatening key industrial and logistical sites. While far from a decisive breakthrough, these gains have given Moscow a measure of battlefield momentum and reinforced the perception that time, for now, is on the Kremlin’s side. Against that backdrop, any willingness to discuss a settlement is notable. Putin was unlikely to agree to any form of ceasefire without reciprocal concessions from Zelensky. This will, as Trump noted, require more coordination between both Russia and Ukraine to ensure that any ceasefire is mutually agreeable and, therefore, sustainable.</p>
<p>Trump has taken a central role in the peace process, meeting with Zelensky in late February and now meeting with Putin for the first time in Trump’s second term. While consistently eager to draw down US commitments abroad, Trump’s attitude toward the Russia-Ukraine conflict has seemingly pivoted, with the American president cracking down on states avoiding the sanctions regime against Moscow and dispatching nuclear submarines to the “appropriate regions” in response to a trollish tweet from former Russian President and notable poaster Dmitry Medvedev. That said, Trump’s legacy as a peacemaker is clearly important to him, and he has consistently advocated for an end to the bloodshed in Ukraine.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/06/netanyahus-attack-on-us-diplomacy/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/06/netanyahus-attack-on-us-diplomacy/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/iranian.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/06/netanyahus-attack-on-us-diplomacy/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More From This Author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/06/netanyahus-attack-on-us-diplomacy/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Netanyahu’s attack on US diplomacy</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/06/netanyahus-attack-on-us-diplomacy/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Heather Penatzer</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>With Ukraine, Trump&#8217;s most potent tool is the ability to curtail or cut off American aid. While his recent approach has involved compelling European governments shoulder the cost of purchasing US-made weapons for Ukraine, the underlying reality is that Washington remains the indispensable supplier of advanced arms, intelligence, and logistical support. A complete withdrawal of American assistance, whether immediate or phased, would place enormous strain on Ukraine’s military capacity, especially given Europe’s limited ability to fill the gap.</p>
<p>With Russia, Trump’s leverage is different. He can offer to ease or lift US sanctions in return for concrete steps toward a settlement. For Moscow, even partial relief from restrictions on finance, technology, and energy exports could provide meaningful economic breathing room. Conversely, Trump could boost aid to Ukraine if Russia resists, turning additional Western support into a penalty for obstruction. This dual ability to reward compliance or punish defiance gives him a flexible negotiating position, though one that must be calibrated carefully to avoid alienating either party.</p>
<p>What, then, is on the table for negotiation? It is likely that at the top of Russia’s list of demands is assurance that Ukraine will not join Nato. Since the Soviet collapse, the Western Alliance’s expansion into former Soviet republics has fueled Moscow’s suspicion that Nato’s purpose extends beyond the defense of its members. Putin has repeatedly described Ukrainian accession as a red line, viewing it as a direct threat to Russian security. Trump appears to recognize the delicacy of this issue, saying before the summit that a US security guarantee for Ukraine might be possible “but not in the form of NATO.”</p>
<p>Meanwhile, Zelensky’s best chance at salvaging a diplomatic win may lie in securing Ukraine’s path to EU membership. Closer integration with Western Europe has long been at the heart of Ukraine’s foreign-policy ambitions. While Russian accounts of the conflict often trace its origins to Mikhail Gorbachev’s mishandling of the Soviet collapse or to Lenin’s creation of Ukraine’s borders after the October Revolution and collapse of the Russian Empire, Ukrainians point instead to the Kremlin’s reaction to the 2014 Euromaidan uprising as the true starting point. In Kiev’s view, Russia’s aggression in 2014 was a direct attempt to block Ukraine’s turn toward Europe. If Moscow accepts the EU expansion that Kiev sought more than a decade ago, it would mark a genuine Ukrainian achievement — one rooted in the very struggle that, in both Ukrainian and Western narratives, set this war in motion.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">“Zelensky’s best chance at salvaging a diplomatic win may lie in securing Ukraine’s path to EU membership.”</div>
<p>A settlement would give Ukraine the breathing room to focus on the internal reforms required to meet the European Union’s standards of democracy, corruption, and minority rights that all aspiring members must satisfy. Ukraine holds official “candidate” status, but former European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker has <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/jean-claude-juncker-ukraine-corruption-eu-accession/" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.politico.eu/article/jean-claude-juncker-ukraine-corruption-eu-accession/&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1755399042235000&amp;usg=AOvVaw3VR0aBZ9CJk_vWSIU0SKku">warned</a> that the country’s notorious graft problem will require “massive internal reform processes” before meeting Kiev can meet codified EU requirements. Recent <a href="https://apnews.com/article/ukraine-corruption-law-european-union-f1ab949db19e079a52291c020ec3d24e" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://apnews.com/article/ukraine-corruption-law-european-union-f1ab949db19e079a52291c020ec3d24e&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1755399042235000&amp;usg=AOvVaw3YFzCCGRdAwkZFmA_SbZAf">protests</a> over Zelensky’s suspension of certain anti-corruption measures have compounded these concerns.</p>
<p>If EU accession is indeed central to Ukraine’s future, ending the war through a negotiated settlement would allow Kiev to restore the democratic and anti-corruption institutions that were suspended as a wartime necessity and to concentrate fully on meeting the requirements for EU membership.</p>
<p>That said, more work must be done to provide a sufficient security guarantee to Ukraine to assuage concerns that Russia will invade again in the near future. Putin seems to agree, stating that the “security of Ukraine should be ensured as well.” The Kiev government often evokes the Budapest Memorandum of 1994, in which Ukraine agreed to give up its Soviet-era nuclear arsenal in return for Russian, American, and British promises to “respect the independence and sovereignty and the existing borders of Ukraine.” As Russia’s actions in the past decade have demonstrated, that agreement had little binding power. While NATO accession likely remains a red line for Putin, a more limited European or American guarantee of Ukrainian security may be necessary to get the Ukrainians on board.</p>
<p>Territorial transfers are also likely up for negotiation. Despite concerns that Trump and Putin had plans to carve up Ukrainian territory without Zelensky at the table, Trump has repeatedly stated that he has no such intentions. “I’m not here to negotiate for Ukraine,” the president stated aboard Air Force One while traveling to Alaska, adding “I’ve got to let Ukraine make that decision.” No territorial concessions were mentioned by the leaders following their discussion, but a redrawing of national borders seems inevitable, given the state of the conflict.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/08/could-defeat-radicalise-ukraine/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/08/could-defeat-radicalise-ukraine/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/08/GettyImages-487338087-e1755189723946.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/08/could-defeat-radicalise-ukraine/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested article</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/08/could-defeat-radicalise-ukraine/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Could defeat radicalise Ukraine?</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/08/could-defeat-radicalise-ukraine/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Ian Garner</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>While Zelensky has repeatedly stated that Ukrainian territory is not on the negotiating table, such statements are likely posturing as to drive a better bargain for his country. Russia has held Crimea since 2014, and is steadily consolidating control in significant portions of southeastern Ukraine. Although Putin is likely to make significant territorial demands, Zelensky may be able to meet him halfway by accepting new effective boundaries without formally recognizing Russian sovereignty over those Ukrainian regions.</p>
<p>Should the Ukrainians agree to ceding Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhia to Russian control, Moscow should likewise agree to withdrawing its forces from Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, and Sumy oblasts in central and northern Ukraine. While this is not the most desirable outcome for Zelensky, it does offer a way for him to stop the slaughter of the Ukrainian people outside of those territories which Ukraine is unlikely to reclaim by force. When all is said and done, this is a World War II-style industrial war that Ukraine is structurally incapable of winning.</p>
<p>As Trump continues to coordinate Ukraine and Western governments, the first step toward a settlement must be a ceasefire. As the president stated to the press, his main priority is to “stop thousands of people a week from being killed.” Given the high spirits of both leaders following their conversation, this step seems to be on the horizon, if Trump is able to convince the Ukrainians to give negotiations a chance. Had Trump found Putin’s demands to be unreasonable, it seems unlikely that the two men would be in such good humor shortly after speaking.</p>
<p>This bilateral US-Russia exchange, then, marks a step toward a broader negotiation. Whether it leads to a sustainable peace will depend on the willingness of all parties to turn Alaska’s cautious opening into a lasting settlement.</p>
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					<title>Europe&#8217;s techno-populist nightmare</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2024/12/europes-techno-populist-nightmare/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://stage.unherd.com/2024/12/europes-techno-populist-nightmare/?edition=us#comments</comments>
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										<unherd:main_theme>Von der Leyen</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Philip Cunliffe]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Cunliffe_400x400.jpg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>2</unherd:article_ranking>
																<unherd:image_caption>
							<![CDATA[The Queen of Brussels? Photo by Horacio Villalobos Corbis via Getty Images.]]>
						</unherd:image_caption>
						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Philip Cunliffe</strong> is Associate Professor of International Relations at the Department of Risk and Disaster Reduction, University College London. He is the author of seven books, including, most recently: <em>The National Interest: Politics after Globalization.</em></p>
]]>
						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>thephilippics</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is Associate Professor of International Relations at the Department of Risk and Disaster Reduction, University College London. He is the author of seven books, including, most recently: <em>The National Interest: Politics after Globalization.</em>]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Tue, 03 Dec 2024 00:01:26 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Tue, 03 Dec 2024 07:57:07 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Europe]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Politics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Populism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Russia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Russia-Ukraine]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Technocracy]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://stage.unherd.com/?p=641493</guid>
																												<description>
								<![CDATA[Von der Leyen is forming an unholy alliance ]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>As Ursula von der Leyen begins her second term as President of the European Commission, she does so as a colossus, enjoying sweeping authority over the European Union and its 450 million inhabitants. The Empress rules a bloc that’s undemocratic by design, and which puts immense authority in the hands of its rulers. And as seems clear, she intends to extend her technocratic revolution, transforming the EU from a collection of member-states into a single state.</p>
<p>With Macron floundering, and Scholz despised, von der Leyen’s continued tenure breaks with a <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/e8ac09ea-c300-4249-af7d-109003afb893" target="_blank" rel="noopener">global pattern</a> of incumbency failure. Unlike mere politicians, though, von der Leyen doesn’t need to worry about what the voters think. To be sure, the President of the EU Commission must secure the support of the EU Parliament, but only after having been nominated by the government of each member state. In theory, that should reflect the outcome of European elections. In practice, however, the EU Parliament is a castrated legislature, constitutionally incapable of initiating law.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/11/america-first-leaves-europe-last/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/11/america-first-leaves-europe-last/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/GettyImages-1526842066-e1731087635679.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/11/america-first-leaves-europe-last/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/11/america-first-leaves-europe-last/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>America First leaves Europe last</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/11/america-first-leaves-europe-last/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Philip Cunliffe</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Von der Leyen is less the executive of an open democracy and more the chief officer of a Soviet politburo. That’s clear, certainly, if you glance at the titles of the President’s commissars. From the executive vice president for clean, just and competition transition, to the executive vice president for cohesion and reforms, her underlings preside over departments that wouldn’t have looked out of place in Seventies Moscow. And during her first term in office, from 2019 to 2024, she relentlessly <a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/10/von-der-leyens-authoritarian-plot/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">consolidated</a> authority, slowly tilting the EU’s balance of power towards supranational institutions like the Commission — and away from the Council of Ministers representing member states.</p>
<p>This state-building project looks set to ramp up during her second term; as she makes clear in her <a href="https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/e6cd4328-673c-4e7a-8683-f63ffb2cf648_en?filename=Political%20Guidelines%202024-2029_EN.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">political guidelines</a> for the next commission, her vision is infused with existential discourse, insisting that Europe has no future unless it continues to grind its way towards unity. With von der Leyen’s determination to pursue the proxy war in Ukraine at the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/nov/27/von-der-leyen-more-eu-defence-spending-russia-european-commission-election" target="_blank" rel="noopener">expense</a> of European economic wellbeing, and her reliance on Baltic politicians such as <a href="https://commission.europa.eu/about-european-commission/commission-2024-2029_en" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Kaja Kallas</a> as High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security, she seems to be following the historic pattern of state-making through crisis.</p>
<p>Yet if Ursula is a modern Charlemagne in her vanity and ambition, the fact that her efforts are so remote from the popular will means they’ll inevitably founder. Though centralisation at the top will doubtless enhance her personal sway, that means little without bolstering the wider EU system. In fact, concentrating power in this non-sovereign model is likely to make it even more lopsided, with a top-heavy superstructure perched over a continent seething with popular discontent. No matter how many Russophobes von der Leyen stuffs into her bureaucracy, after all, the Ukraine war will ultimately be decided not in Brussels but Washington, when Donald Trump shortly re-enters the White House in January.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;If Ursula is a modern Charlemagne in her vanity and ambition, the fact that her efforts are so remote from the popular will means they’ll inevitably founder.&#8221;</div>
<p>Thus the paradox of von der Leyen’s second term is that as the power of the EU centre grows, Europe itself becomes weaker. Nothing that von der Leyen does seems likely to reverse this decline. In fact, her plan to completely end the flow of Russian gas into Europe, in favour of expensive liquified natural gas from the US, speaks to her congenital inability to act in her continent’s best interests. That, in turn, reflects the fact that the EU is not a nation-state, and by design can’t have a national self-interest. While von der Leyen has therefore been promising to <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/0ee6c8d0-975c-4009-89a1-331f66a37de8" target="_blank" rel="noopener">slash</a> the regulation that supposedly stifles European business — plenty of which were brought in under her last term — the fact is that industry from Rioja to the Ruhr will continue to suffer without cheap energy.</p>
<p>How will this historic decline be disguised? This takes us to the second of von der Leyen’s transformations: appointing Raffaele Fitto, a minister from the Brothers of Italy party, as her executive vice president for cohesion and reforms. In so doing, von der Leyen has broken the liberal <em>cordon sanitaire</em> whereby the continent’s technocratic establishment sought to contain the electoral insurgencies of EU populists. Fitto’s new job has cost von der Leyen the <a href="https://www.economist.com/europe/2024/11/28/ursula-von-der-leyen-has-a-new-doctrine-for-handling-the-hard-right" target="_blank" rel="noopener">support</a> of certain natural allies, notably the Socialists and Democrats grouping in the EU Parliament. Yet Empress Ursula is cunning enough to realise that by appearing to be responsive to public demands, and drawing in electorally successful populists, she can easily recoup any losses sustained among squabbling centrists.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/10/von-der-leyens-authoritarian-plot/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/10/von-der-leyens-authoritarian-plot/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/GettyImages-2149151258.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/10/von-der-leyens-authoritarian-plot/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/10/von-der-leyens-authoritarian-plot/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Von der Leyen&#039;s authoritarian plot</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/10/von-der-leyens-authoritarian-plot/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Thomas Fazi</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>The nominal basis for this new political friendship is, of course, a shared commitment to pursuing the proxy war in Eastern Europe. Yet the basis for the Fitto alliance runs deeper than Ukraine. Rather, the alliance indicates that the continent’s hard-Right national populists are being carefully, and willingly, drawn into the court of the imperial centre. The reason? To help re-legitimise von der Leyen’s faltering clique of technocrats.</p>
<p>Certainly, Fitto’s appointment puts paid to the idea that populists defend national sovereignty against incursions from Brussels. It also suggests that the radicals are more than happy to collaborate with the technocrats to disguise the latter’s lack of real legitimacy. In many ways, then, Fitto represents a natural alliance, proving the point that both technocrats and populists ultimately despise national representative institutions. The technocrats dislike democracy because interest groups get in the way of the unfettered rule of experts. Populists, for their part, dislike it because, by their nature, institutionalised interests gnaw away at the demagogic charisma they so rely on.</p>
<p>In this way, then, both technocrats and populists are creatures from <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/07907184.2022.2045142" target="_blank" rel="noopener">the void</a> where national democracy should be. The fact that people such as Fitto have rushed to hide von der Leyen’s nakedness suggests that the age of European decline will be dominated by techno-populism, with both camps cooperating to accommodate each other’s weakness — even as they jointly rule over a deindustrialising continent. At any rate, that leaves space for Europe’s remaining democrats: what happens when voters realise the populists have betrayed them?</p>
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					<title>Will Putin escalate in Ukraine?</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2024/11/a-settlement-is-ukraines-only-way-out/?edition=us</link>
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										<unherd:main_theme>Nuclear war</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Aris Roussinos]]>
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																<unherd:article_ranking>1</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[Mikhail Klimentyev/Sputnik/AFP/Getty Images ]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Aris Roussinos</strong> is an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist and a former war reporter.</p>
]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_handle>arisroussinos</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist and a former war reporter.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Wed, 27 Nov 2024 00:03:11 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Wed, 27 Nov 2024 11:49:17 +0000</updated>
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		<category><![CDATA[Donald Trump]]></category>
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								<![CDATA[Western fears have shaped the conflict]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>Putin’s nuclear sabre-rattling may be intended to alarm Western publics. But the course of the war has been shaped precisely by Western fear of escalation. In the frankest terms, Nato has not directly entered the war as a combatant because Ukraine’s victory is not considered worth open conflict with Russia. Yet at a more subtle level, the Biden Administration’s strategy for the war, throughout, has been to equip and train Ukrainian forces to a level where Kyiv can enter peace negotiations from a position of strength, having demonstrated to Moscow that the costs of prolonging the war are greater than the benefits of pursuing it to its bitter conclusion. This is more or less the same approach that the Obama Administration pursued with the Syrian war, where it failed. It is now over to Trump to obtain a different outcome.</p>
<p>Yet while the incoming Trump Administration has won a mandate to end the Ukraine war, whether it has the capacity to safely do so, let alone in a manner distinguishable from strategic defeat, is another question entirely. Following the costly failure of Ukraine’s 2023 counteroffensive, intended to threaten Russia’s access to Crimea and enable Kyiv to enter peace negotiations able to dictate terms, the United States has had no workable plan for satisfactorily concluding the war. Trump’s incoming National Security advisor Michael Waltz, who <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2024/11/24/trump-national-security-adviser-waltz-sullivan-00191412" target="_blank" rel="noopener">warned this weekend</a> that “we need to bring this to a responsible end. We need to restore deterrence and peace and get ahead of this escalation later rather than responding to it”, is entirely correct in his withering analysis of the Biden Administration. “‘As long as it takes’ is a slogan, not a strategy,” <a href="https://www.foxnews.com/opinion/ukraines-blank-check-congress-over" target="_blank" rel="noopener">he wrote last year</a>.</p>
<p>While the Biden Administration still gives lip service to Kyiv’s rhetoric of pursuing total victory, defined as a return to the country’s 1991 borders, in reality a humiliating Russian defeat represents a serious risk to the West, by pushing Putin towards nuclear escalation. That one of the war’s two great missed opportunities for peace talks — Ukraine’s successful Autumn 2022 Kharkiv offensive — also <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2024/10/09/woodward-book-reveals-us-scrambled-to-urge-putin-not-to-use-nuclear-weapons-in-ukraine_6728668_4.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">apparently saw</a> Pentagon officials assess the odds of a Russian nuclear strike in Ukraine as near even, highlights how finely balanced the calculations are. In the West’s current strategy, Ukraine must be strong enough to bring Moscow to the table but not so strong as to make Putin escalate the war beyond the point of no return; that would drag the United States into a direct conflict it does not want and Europe into one for which it is unprepared. Biden’s pained, years-long deliberations over weapons deliveries, each of which have so far kept Ukraine in the fight without delivering victory, are the product of this delicate calculus. So, too, is the muted European response to <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/europe-russia-hybrid-war-vladimir-putin-germany-cyberattacks-election-interference/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">the apparent escalating Russian sabotage campaign on EU soil</a>.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/11/welcome-back-to-1945/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/11/welcome-back-to-1945/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/GettyImages-1229335744-e1731090043557.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/11/welcome-back-to-1945/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/11/welcome-back-to-1945/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Welcome back to 1945</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/11/welcome-back-to-1945/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Aris Roussinos</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>This being the case, Western and Ukrainian interests are fundamentally misaligned, as the eminent American diplomat Richard N. Haass, who is <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/former-us-officials-secret-ukraine-talks-russians-war-ukraine-rcna92610" target="_blank" rel="noopener">apparently running back-channel talks</a> with Russia, <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/perfect-has-become-enemy-good-ukraine-haass" target="_blank" rel="noopener">recently observed in <em>Foreign Affairs</em></a>. For Haass, “instead of clinging to an infeasible definition of victory, Washington must grapple with the grim reality of the war and come to terms with a more plausible outcome.” To do so, the United States government — and here Haass means the outgoing Biden Administration, seen as more sympathetic to Ukrainian interests than its replacement — “must take the uncomfortable step of pushing Kyiv to negotiate with the Kremlin — and lay out a clear sense of how it should do so”. Yet the Haass plan, which revolves around an armistice on the current front lines and accepts Ukraine’s <em>de facto</em> loss of its territory currently occupied by Russia, may no longer be in America’s power to achieve.</p>
<p>Instead, the unfortunate dawning prospect may be that Ukraine will suffer both for its early success and for Biden’s earlier disinclination to push the country towards peace talks. When the 2022 invasion began, the United States worked on the planning assumption that Russia’s swift victory was more or less inevitable. The spirited Ukrainian defence, and the Russian failures of planning and capability that saw the initially fast-tempo advance bogged down and then forced to retreat from vast areas of the country, came as a surprise, forcing all parties to improvise plans for a longer and more costly war than anyone expected. Two major opportunities for a negotiated solution, at the war’s very beginning and then following the dramatic Kharkiv counteroffensive, were rejected by Kyiv, <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2022/11/14/u-s-ukraine-milley-negotiations-00066777">the latter against the Pentagon’s advice</a> and the former <a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/01/peace-in-ukraine-has-never-seemed-further-away/">in circumstances</a> which historians will debate for many decades to come. Yet the war’s initial successes, and the promises of unlimited Western support, now seem distant. In allowing the Zelensky Administration to commit itself to maximalist terms of victory, the Biden Administration’s apparent support for Ukraine may have delivered a worse outcome for the country than pressure to have accepted a negotiated solution, even involving loss of territory, years ago.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;The war’s initial successes, and the promises of unlimited Western support, now seem distant.&#8221;</div>
<p>As a Kyiv official <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-gb/news/world/how-a-trump-putin-peace-deal-is-sparking-fear-in-kyiv/ar-AA1ugPcn" target="_blank" rel="noopener">recently told the <em>I</em></a> newspaper, “If we’re going to be forced into accepting where we were around two years ago, then it may have been better to have agreed this in 2022 and we would have saved so many lives on both sides.” Yet it is surely optimistic to assume that, following years of gruelling and costly warfare, <a href="https://www.dailysabah.com/world/europe/russia-open-to-any-realistic-ukraine-peace-initiative-moscow" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Russia’s terms now will be as amenable for</a> Kyiv as those which Ukrainian negotiators once toasted with champagne. While <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/putin-ascendant-in-ukraine-eyes-contours-of-a-trump-peace-deal/ar-AA1ur0oe" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Russian officials suggest</a> the 2022 negotiations may be a workable starting point for talks, the war’s dynamics have slowly shifted against Ukraine so starkly that Putin may hold out for a more decisive conclusion.</p>
<p>Outnumbered and outgunned, Ukraine’s exhausted defenders are falling back across the eastern front, losing vital strongpoints they successfully held for years. While Russia is now advancing at the fastest pace since the war’s opening days, it is testament to the dogged Ukrainian defence that the invading troops are not moving faster still. Ukraine has so far staved off a collapse on the Donbas front, though Ukrainian commanders on the ground <a href="https://www.economist.com/europe/2024/11/24/ukraines-warriors-brace-for-a-kremlin-surge-in-the-south" target="_blank" rel="noopener">fear that the slow retreat may not be tenable for many more months</a>. But <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cn0dpdx420lo" target="_blank" rel="noopener">should the Ukrainian defensive line collapse</a> before peace negotiations begin, the war’s outcome will be far worse for Kyiv than even the most painful concessions mooted in 2022. As the RUSI analyst <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/ukraine-must-turn-tide-it-can-negotiate" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Jack Watling observes</a>, one plausible scenario for Ukraine is an analogue to the Brest-Litovsk negotiations of 1918, where the losing side’s attempt to renegotiate unwelcome concessions is met by increased military pressure from the victor to enforce compliance. Indeed, given this scenario, even the advent of peace negotiations may not bring an end to the current escalatory spiral, but instead heighten it for the duration of talks, pressuring Ukraine by threatening its Western backers. If the current phase of the war is a tense and anxious one, the road to peace may be yet more fraught.</p>
<p>Seeking to shore up its negotiating position, Ukraine has attempted to circumvent the worrying battlefield trends through bold surprise attacks, across the Dnieper at Krynky or into Russian territory near Bryansk. Yet these diversionary attacks have proved costly, and ultimately counterproductive. The Krynky operation, <a href="https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/articles/2024/11/18/7484985/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">apparently planned by British defence officials</a>, was a costly disaster, and has now been <a href="https://kyivindependent.com/with-krynky-lost-what-did-the-perilous-operation-accomplish/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">abandoned to no gain</a>. The Bryansk incursion, while significantly more successful in seizing both territory and appreciative Western headlines, has ultimately failed on its own terms, as Putin declined the temptation to withdraw troops from the war’s pivotal Donbas front. Instead, the redeployment of Ukraine’s best-equipped brigades to a sideshow weakened its own defensive capacity in the theatre in which the war’s outcome will be decided. With 40% of the seized Russian territory now lost, the primary effect of the Bryansk operation has been to accelerate the escalatory spiral for no meaningful strategic gain.</p>
<p>As a direct result of the incursion, Russia has brought in North Korean troops; while to defend Ukraine’s shrinking toehold, the long-delayed British and French permission to use long-range airborne missiles in Russian territory led directly to Putin’s demonstrative use of experimental, nuclear-capable missiles as a direct warning to the West. Fears of an immediate direct conflict with Russia are, for now, overstated. The risks of escalation run both ways, and Russia’s advance warning to the United States of its missile launch proves that de-escalatory lines of communication remain open. In any case, there is little incentive for Putin to cross the Rubicon before seeing what can be extracted from Trump. But this phase of the war is a genuinely uncomfortable one, whose passing will be met with relief in Western capitals. As it stands, continuation of the current strategy presents greater risk, in terms of escalatory potential, than it does the reward of meaningful bargaining chips in negotiations which are still yet to begin.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/06/why-ukraines-counteroffensive-failed/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/06/why-ukraines-counteroffensive-failed/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/GettyImages-2153413701-e1718116383695.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/06/why-ukraines-counteroffensive-failed/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/06/why-ukraines-counteroffensive-failed/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Ukraine is turning into a minefield</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/06/why-ukraines-counteroffensive-failed/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> David Patrikarakos</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Instead, the Trump Administration will enter the White House with the aspiration to wind the war down as quickly as possible. That the Zelensky Administration <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/c0mzgv4x901o" target="_blank" rel="noopener">now publicly welcomes the new approach</a> signifies that Ukraine has been caught in a trap partly of its own making. Being forced into peace negotiations it cannot avoid, whose painful concessions it can later blame on Western disengagement or malfeasance, instead presents an escape route of sorts for Kyiv. Certainly, the fact <a href="https://uk.news.yahoo.com/ukraine-war-polls-show-most-171758617.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">that most Ukrainians now support peace talks</a> helps Zelensky’s new dose of realism. Yet nearly three years into the war, it is difficult to see what leverage Trump holds to persuade Russia to urgently enter talks. The most realistic bargaining chip available to Ukraine remains abandoning further risky offensive gambits and making its remaining territory too costly for Russia to comfortably seize. The Biden Administration’s <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cx2d1lj3nwqo" target="_blank" rel="noopener">last-minute delivery of antipersonnel mines</a>, perhaps more militarily useful than the more-publicised ATACMS missiles, highlights the heightened, if belated, emphasis on defence. Yet all the weapons deliveries so far have only delayed rather than averted the current trajectory of the war, while Ukraine’s greatest strategic deficit, its dwindling reserves of manpower, is not in the West’s power to resolve. From what we know of the new administration’s thinking, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/09/13/us/politics/vance-trump-ukraine-russia-war.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">as expressed by J.D. Vance on the campaign trail</a>, the Trump peace plan more or less accords with that proposed by Haass. But much now depends on whether Putin, scenting victory, will be content to exit the war with what he already holds.</p>
<p>Absent a miraculous feat of Trumpian diplomacy, to favourably conclude the war now, Ukraine requires some <em>deus ex machina</em> hard to conceive; yet to achieve victory, Russia merely needs to pursue its current winning strategy to its full conclusion, costly and painful though that will be. For nearly three years, the prospect of peace negotiations with Russia was presented by Ukraine’s most strident Western backers as a defeatist concession to Putin. Now that urgent talks to end the war are American and Ukrainian policy, the risk is that it may not immediately be in Washington’s power to initiate them, let alone direct them towards Kyiv’s advantage. The United States and Ukraine now just want the war to end, while Russia retains an incentive, tempered only by Putin’s unknowable appetite for risk, to pursue a wider victory. Ukraine’s closest European allies, <a href="https://uk.news.yahoo.com/starmer-denies-uk-war-ukraine-152555294.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">including Britain</a>, find themselves <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-gb/news/world/uk-and-europe-can-t-support-ukraine-alone-when-trump-returns-defence-experts-warn/ar-AA1uAkfU" target="_blank" rel="noopener">uncomfortably caught</a> between these opposing visions. Trump’s self-image as a historic deal-maker has long been a subject of right-thinking mockery: for Ukraine’s sake, and our own, we must hope the coming months will reveal it to have a sturdy basis in fact.</p>
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					<title>How Orthodoxy can save Russia&#8217;s soul</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2024/11/can-orthodoxy-save-russias-soul/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://stage.unherd.com/2024/11/can-orthodoxy-save-russias-soul/?edition=us#comments</comments>
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										<unherd:main_theme>vladimir putin </unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Bruce Clark]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/blue-2.jpg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>3</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[Patriarch Kirill has proclaimed Putin a 'miracle of God'. Mikhail Svetlov/Getty Images]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Bruce Clark</strong> is a former International Security Editor of <em>The Economist</em>, and the author of <em>Twice A Stranger: How Mass Expulsion Forged Modern Greece and Turkey</em>.</p>
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						<unherd:twitter_handle></unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is a former International Security Editor of <em>The Economist</em>, and the author of <em>Twice A Stranger: How Mass Expulsion Forged Modern Greece and Turkey</em>.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Tue, 26 Nov 2024 00:00:48 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Tue, 26 Nov 2024 00:00:48 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Europe]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Faith]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Orthodoxy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Russia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Russia-Ukraine]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Vladimir Putin]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://stage.unherd.com/?p=639898</guid>
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								<![CDATA[It is more than just a tool of state power]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p style="font-weight: 400;">When Lucy Ash was escorted round the vast and numinous island monastery of Valaam, located in Lake Ladoga near St. Petersburg, she had an intriguing guide: a monk who introduced himself as Father Iosif but spoke fluent English in the tones of New York. He explained that his father, a Russian furniture tycoon, had sent him to an American business school in the hope of curing his adolescent interest in religion, but “as you can see, that didn’t work”.</p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;">So far, so charming. The conversation then took a tougher turn when the black-robed figure began holding forth proudly on the vast sums of money which had been spent on the monastery at the behest of Vladimir Putin — turning the island into a place where the president and his elite guests could make comfortable and high-profile visits. Ash couldn’t help asking her companion whether he considered the president a holy man. “Only God knows that,” was the artful reply. But the results of this high-level patronage were visibly impressive. As Ash notes, it has been calculated that $700,000 of taxpayers’ money has been spent on the island for every member of a brotherhood supposedly devoted to asceticism and prayer; and Russia’s federal grid has supplied the 200-strong community with enough power capacity to meet the needs of a small country.</p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;">The post-communist transformation of Valaam island — from a harsh, romantic outpost into a slick and ruthlessly administered showpiece of state largesse — is one of many arresting stories told by Ash in <a href="https://www.londonreviewbookshop.co.uk/stock/the-baton-and-the-cross-russia-s-church-from-pagans-to-putin-lucy-ash" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em>The Baton and the Cross</em></a> about the trajectory of Russian Orthodoxy since the fall of the atheist regime. Around the time of the Soviet collapse, the resurrection of Christianity felt to its participants like a valiant and counter-cultural enterprise. But with every passing year, a de facto partnership between the Patriarchate of Moscow and Russia’s earthly powers became more evident — especially after 2012 when Patriarch Kirill, having initially kept a little distance from the Kremlin, emphatically swung behind Putin and helped to ensure his re-election. In return, hundreds of millions of roubles were made available for the construction of churches and other projects that burnished the Patriarchate’s prestige and property empire.</p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;">As Ash argues, Patriarch Kirill’s strident support for the war in Ukraine — and the harsh disciplinary measures applied to priests who question this line — are only the logical culmination of an ever-tightening relationship between Church and State. Church-state interconnections in the land of the eastern Slavs have taken a bewilderingly wide variety of forms, but there is a common theme. In every era of Russia’s evolution, not excluding the Soviet one, ways have been found for earthly rulers to turn the soft power of religion to their own advantage.</p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;">Ash is not, of course, alone in making that observation. The great Russian patriot Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn  remarked that his country’s history would have been “incomparably more humane and harmonious in the last few centuries… if the church had not surrendered its independence and [had] made its voice heard among the people as it does, for example, in Poland”.</p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;">And yet, as a careful reading of her account will also make clear, Russian Orthodoxy does not — even today — begin or end with its use as a tool of state power. There is more to the story than that.</p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;">To put matters at their very broadest, any religion, passionately embraced, gives people a motive to sacrifice personal interests and even their lives; that is one reason why earthly rulers find religion’s use so attractive. But faith also gives people the courage to oppose state power, at vast personal cost, in ways that send a dazzling moral signal. As it happens, Orthodox Christianity has inspired not only the most pliant servants of Vladimir Putin but also his most doughty opponents.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;Orthodox Christianity has inspired not only the most pliant servants of Vladimir Putin but also his most doughty opponents.&#8221;</div>
<p style="font-weight: 400;">Take one well-known example: during his trial in 2021, Alexei Navalny made clear that a vital part of his own personal story was evolution from the militant atheism of his youth into a morally and politically engaged understanding of his country’s historic faith. “Blessed are those who hunger and thirst after righteousness”, was one of the Biblical maxims which inspired the awesomely brave corruption fighter who died in an Arctic prison in February 2024.</p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;">Vladimir Kara-Murza, an equally courageous challenger of the Putin order, had good reason to anticipate a similar fate when, <a href="https://meduza.io/en/feature/2023/11/01/at-the-heart-of-christianity-is-the-rejection-of-violence" target="_blank" rel="noopener">in a letter</a> from prison in November 2023, he lamented Patriarch Kirill’s moral support for the invasion of Ukraine. The dissident couched his argument in spiritual terms. “As an Orthodox Christian, this brings me only pain, grief, and deep sorrow,” he wrote. At the heart of Christianity, he added, was the rejection of murder and violence: this made it all the more deplorable that Church hierarchs “had placed the authority of Caesar over the foundations of the Christian faith&#8221;. Kara-Murza was one of 16 prisoners released to the West in a prisoner swap in August; until his liberation he was preparing himself for imminent death in jail.</p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;">Looking way back through history, it turns out there are some striking examples of tsars who thought they could turn the Church into an efficient instrument of their own power but found that the results were quite unexpected. Start with Ivan the Terrible, who held sway from 1547 to 1584 and was admired by Stalin for his savage purges and persecutions. If anyone stood up to Ivan’s murderous rampages, it was a turbulent cleric, Metropolitan Philip, who was duly imprisoned and strangled. But Philip lives on in Church history as a saint and martyr while only a lunatic fringe of religious ultra-nationalists (who do exist, unfortunately) unconditionally revere his sadistic tormentor.</p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;">Then in the 18th century, modernising emperors like Peter and Catherine imagined they could curb Orthodoxy’s mystical and monastic tradition and turn the church into a Protestant-style enforcer of morals and state loyalty. But these efforts — like the vain attempt to cure Father Iosif — were unsuccessful. Instead, there was a strange countervailing reaction. In various remote outposts of the empire there was a kind of mystical resurgence, featuring saintly ascetics and monastics with prophetic gifts — a phenomenon which inspired writers like Dostoyevsky and hence gained an unlikely place in the history of world literature.</p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;">Those three tsars — Ivan, Peter and Catherine — are worth mentioning because they are the Russian rulers Putin most admires, according to his foreign minister Sergei Lavrov, and hence took as his lodestars when invading Ukraine. Putin may imagine those monarchs as people who successfully and seamlessly harnessed Russia’s spiritual heritage — but if so, he is misinformed.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/04/the-barbarians-are-laughing-at-us/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/04/the-barbarians-are-laughing-at-us/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/GettyImages-566418469-1.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/04/the-barbarians-are-laughing-at-us/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/04/the-barbarians-are-laughing-at-us/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The barbarians are laughing at us</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/04/the-barbarians-are-laughing-at-us/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Bruce Clark</a></p></div></a></div>
<p style="font-weight: 400;">Another unexpected twist in Russian spiritual history occurred during the death-throes of the tsarist era with the maelstrom of the Revolution and civil war. This febrile climate had an extraordinary effect on Russian religious thought, generating the so-called Silver Age whose intellectual protagonists creatively synthesised their faith with socialist atheism. That movement would, in turn, make a powerful contribution to intellectual life outside Russia.</p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;">Driven westwards by the Bolsheviks, that diaspora’s brainy, quarrelsome thinkers went on to electrify the tired worlds of French Catholicism and Anglican academia. Take the philosopher and theologian Sergei Bulgakov. Bulgakov stands out among the thinkers who on the eve of the Bolshevik Revolution abandoned secular socialism and then looked for ways to link their spiritual heritage with a practical concern for human welfare. He co-founded the Anglican-Orthodox fellowship which led to a surge of overblown excitement about a possible rapprochement or even reunion between two major segments of Christendom and had a profound impact on former leader of global Anglicanism, Rowan Williams. Amidst huge controversy, Bulgakov also foreshadowed feminist theology by reflecting on “holy wisdom” as a distinctly female form of divine power, which features rather mysteriously in Orthodox iconography and liturgical poetry. And for French thinkers like Jacques Maritain, nurtured on the medieval worldview of Thomas Aquinas, the Russian sages arriving in Paris were an exciting mixture of tradition and creativity.</p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;">Of course, not all Russia’s religious philosophers managed to escape the Bolsheviks — some, like Pavel Florensky, were among the millions of souls, including tens of thousands of priests and bishops, who perished in successive waves of repression. But those victims had a posthumous moral influence on religious thought in freer places.</p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;">In the story of Bulgakov’s friend Mother Maria Skobtsova, Russian Orthodoxy can also offer an anti-Nazi morality tale. An unconventional nun, she ran a shelter and soup-kitchen for the homeless. Having experienced the civil war in southern Russia and then a series of personal tragedies, Mother Maria had an ocean of empathy for the vulnerable and suffering — and responded positively when Jews came to her Parisian shelter asking for false documents that would help them to escape Nazi round-ups. It was for these acts of compassion that she, her son and two other associates paid with their lives. She was deported to the Ravensbrück death camp where she was executed on Easter Saturday of 1945. Among her legacies was a devastatingly accurate observation of various forms of misguided piety that she observed in her compatriots — from militaristic forms of faith to excessively ascetic and other-worldly varieties.</p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;">In short, the Russian Orthodox tradition should, from its own treasure chest, be able to offer a rich and powerful critique of the compact Putin has fashioned with an apparently docile church. It is too early to tell what opposing trends might be triggered by the present cosy and calculating relationship between an ostentatiously pious war leader and his clerical cheerleaders. But history gives us plenty of reason to suggest that Patriarch Kirill’s proclamation of Vladimir Putin as “a miracle of God” will not be the last act of the current drama. If anything can heal the pathologies now afflicting Russian Orthodoxy, it might just be the spirit of Saint Philip or Mother Maria.</p>
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															<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">639898</post-id>				</item>
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					<title>Led By Donkeys have no shame</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2024/09/led-by-donkeys-have-no-shame/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://stage.unherd.com/2024/09/led-by-donkeys-have-no-shame/?edition=us#comments</comments>
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										<unherd:main_theme></unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Kathleen Stock]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Blue-37.jpg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>1</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[Led By Donkeys have no shame. (Justin Setterfield/Getty)]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<div><strong>Kathleen Stock</strong> is contributing editor at <em>UnHerd</em>.</div>
]]>
						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>kathleen_stock1</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is contributing editor at <em>UnHerd</em>.</div>]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Thu, 19 Sep 2024 23:03:27 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Fri, 20 Sep 2024 11:03:48 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Activism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[led by donkeys]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Partygate]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Politics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Russia-Ukraine]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Social media]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[UK]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ukraine war]]></category>
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								<![CDATA[<p>How do you get a hypocrite to feel shame? The activist collective Led By Donkeys think they have found the answer: organise a needling visual provocation in the hypocrite’s vicinity, put the film of it online, then watch it go viral. You might wonder whether, despite the technological trappings, this isn’t just the modern equivalent of throwing rotten tomatoes, but Ben Stewart, James Sadri, Oliver Knowles and Will Rose want you to know they have been making important art all along. The quartet have a new coffee table book out to prove it, <em>Adventures in Art, Activism and Accountability</em>, documenting the group’s campaigns from the Brexit era to the present, and accompanied by a gallery exhibition in Bristol.</p>
<p>Their initial emergence was much lower key. An earlier book from 2019, capitalising on their newfound fame as self-described “Remainer activists”, describes the period in which they first became known for pasting posters on billboards in Southeast England, gonzo style. It is written up as a kind of subpar Ealing comedy: four ordinary house husbands from Hackney accidentally get caught up in a daring and wildly popular social protest, eventually becoming national heroes feted by Tony Blair, Steve Coogan, and Saatchi &amp; Saatchi.</p>
<p>In this early telling of their origin story, there are comic capers galore, involving mishaps with wallpaper paste, run-ins with security guards, and the strategic recurrence of Ben’s fear of heights. There are also quite a few barely latent daddy issues (“What is it about David Davis that makes him such a prick?”;“there’s something about Dominic Raab that is volcanically dislikeable”; “Olly is possessed by a visceral dislike for Michael Gove”; “Firstly and lastly, fuck Rod Liddle”). And despite braggadocio at times implying that the four are hardened activists (“We’ve scaled buildings and occupied headquarters, hung banners and even been arrested and prosecuted”), equally there is much hammed up nervousness about committing illegal acts: “This is criminal damage; it’s the A10 … We don’t want to get arrested, we both have to take the kids to school and nursery in the morning”.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/08/the-sisterhood-is-a-feminist-lie/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/08/the-sisterhood-is-a-feminist-lie/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/GettyImages-2160632373.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/08/the-sisterhood-is-a-feminist-lie/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/08/the-sisterhood-is-a-feminist-lie/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The sisterhood is a feminist lie</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/08/the-sisterhood-is-a-feminist-lie/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Kathleen Stock</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>There is also enormous detail in the early book about how much things cost, giving rise to such fascinatingly banal sentences as: “We assume that ordering five 6x3m posters will set us back the best part of £1000 but in reality each poster is forty quid and delivery is free.” Gripping verbatim text exchanges from key moments in the project are included, such as “@Will, any chance of pdfs today? Or is kiddie craziness descending?” and “We should decide by tomorrow lunchtime so I can get the posters ordered to arrive his week”.</p>
<p>Things have got a lot slicker since the early days, and the virtual tomatoes are now heirloom variety (price available on request).  In the new book, our guys are no longer styled as plucky outsiders but as solemnly engaged in an “accountability project”. In the interim, crowdfunder targets have been smashed; mutually advantageous corporate relationships have blossomed; famous screenwriters and actors are now onboard; and the groups’ campaigns, both here and in the US, have become bloated with technical gimmickry, celebrity collabs, and self-importance. And now that being a Remainer is no longer fashionable, the mission has seamlessly drifted into vaguer ideological territory: towards fighting what the new book variously calls “populist politics and petty nationalism” and “ethnojingoism”.  Definitions are not supplied, but one suspects that however the authors mean “populist” and “petty”, it won’t turn out to include them.</p>
<p>In practice, their core business is still midwit vituperation by photoshop, mostly aimed at Right-wing politicians, plus some more positive interventions designed to tug at the heartstrings of the sort of person whose bicycle comes with a sidecar. So for instance: they enlisted a thousand volunteers to cover a wall of the Embankment with love hearts, thus creating “The National Covid Memorial Wall” ; covered the road outside the Russian Embassy with “non-toxic, chalk-based” blue and yellow paint; and projected “End Performative Cruelty” in giant letters onto the Bibby Stockholm barge, only months before <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nvTtr5JfoMo" target="_blank" rel="noopener">releasing</a> a remote-control banner in Liz Truss’s presence depicting her as a giant lettuce with eyes.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;The ultimate proof of the uselessness of shame as a weapon is the persistence of Led By Donkeys themselves.&#8221;</div>
<p>Also this year, they <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5IvdffjL5h0" target="_blank" rel="noopener">filmed</a> six kilometres worth of second-hand kids’ outfits arranged on a Dorset beach and set it to the sound of Bach, in order to get people to “grasp … the number of children killed in Gaza”. (An earlier idea, thankfully rejected, involved “thousands of funeral shrouds”.)  In other words: if you like your morality tales childishly uncomplicated, prefer the literal over the symbolic, and don’t mind pedestrian visuals that rely heavily on scale for impact, then this is undoubtedly the art collective you deserve.</p>
<p>I am sure that all this feels cathartic and noble for participants, but does any of it actually work? Could such clankingly heavy-handed treatments ever initiate a real moral reckoning for a corrupt politician or institution? It seems scarcely credible. In both of the Led By Donkeys books, virality alone is frequently taken as meaningful proof of impact, but this is unconvincing: <a href="https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-13864129/Nuts-moment-two-squirrels-terrorised-GWR-train-passengers-forcing-service-axed-staff-efforts-tempt-snacks-hit-buffers.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">feral squirrels</a> in train carriages also go viral, after all.</p>
<p>At other points, the authors do their best to suggest they are making a difference, but only by blurring the lines between contiguity and causation, giving us sentences such as: “A week after this intervention, Abramovich was finally subjected to UK sanctions”; “A week later, the Met opened an investigation into 12 Downing Street parties”; “and “Two weeks later, Sunak called the election”.  Coincidences? I think probably, yes; or else the real causal relation goes in the other direction, with the four cannily sensing which way the tide was already flowing before launching.</p>
<p>What does seem clear is that the group are absolutely terrible at changing political opponents’ minds, or even at persuading relatively intelligent neutrals. Confirmation bias is an exceptionally blunt instrument. In a recent <em><a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2024/sep/16/ive-never-been-so-driven-led-by-donkeys-on-mocking-liz-truss-duping-matt-hancock-and-renaming-michelle-mones-yacht" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Guardian</a></em> interview, Ben Stewart talked approvingly about the “idea of the mind bomb”, as if he had stumbled upon a secret magic spell: the idea, apparently acquired during a stint at Greenpeace, of “an intervention that, when people saw it, their minds would immediately shift. The idea was the person putting themselves between the harpoon and the whale.”</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/06/why-scotlands-witches-fought-back/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/06/why-scotlands-witches-fought-back/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/GettyImages-1337825047-2.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/06/why-scotlands-witches-fought-back/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/06/why-scotlands-witches-fought-back/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Why Scotland&#039;s &#039;witches&#039; fought back</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/06/why-scotlands-witches-fought-back/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Julie Bindel</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>What this leaves out is that, unlike real bombs, so-called mind bombs work best in wide open spaces; upon psyches where there is very limited relevant information to compete with whatever crassly emotive image is being used as explosive. In contrast, where a person already has a lot of complex and relevant factual information and/or clashing background principles and theories, a would-be mind bomb is more likely to be a damp squib, cementing the impression that the person lobbing it is a naïve buffoon.</p>
<p>In reality, I imagine that the habitual villains of Led By Donkeys’ narratives — Johnson, Farage, Tufton Street think tank svengalis, and so on — are perturbed by their treatment for an average of about 10 seconds each. It’s not just that they know that the attention spans of onlookers will be short, and that the facile messaging is unlikely to trouble their support base anyway. Nor is it that they are (perhaps) already well used to trenchant critique and defensively hardened against it; nor even that they receive the negative attention as some kind of narcissistic tribute, though this is certainly possible. It’s also that, collectively, we have gone a long way to undermining the societal conditions for a genuine experience of shame, so that it’s a little late to start talking it up as a useful social tool now.</p>
<p>To name a few contributory factors: liberalism has eroded a firm sense of shared social or moral principles, which means a grip on what would count as genuinely shameful violations of principles has also been substantially reduced. The longtime popularity of confessional genres of writing and the availability of social media to record every passing thought have made candid self-disclosure completely acceptable, decreasing one’s fear that hidden parts of the self are bound to be badly received. In many workplaces, people have become more squeamish about overt hierarchies, so that responsibility for any problems becomes more diffuse and blame can be more easily shifted. And of course, for decades, hundreds of self-help books and magazines have encouraged us to think of personal feelings of shame as something to be fought and overcome, while complete self-acceptance is to be encouraged.</p>
<p>In short — though many of us still routinely feel it — shame as a functional tool is not what it used to be. Led By Donkeys apparently know this too, at least some of the time. In an early interview, Ben Stewart noted that “the concept of shame and political leaders paying a price for lying and dissembling is in retreat … if we begin to lose shame around lying to the public, then we’re in big trouble here”. The fact is, though, that we are losing it, probably definitively; and scandals which might formerly have caused public figures to quit on the spot in mortification are little more than minor irritants now. The closest we have to a Profumo-like figure — about to commence a lifetime of charitable work and prayer in order to propitiate his critics — is Russell Brand. And he is trying to monetise his own <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=THVhDjzup-Q" target="_blank" rel="noopener">baptism</a>.</p>
<p>But perhaps the ultimate proof of the uselessness of wielding shame as a weapon is the persistence of Led By Donkeys themselves. They have now been going for five years, tend to brush off criticism all too <a href="https://x.com/ByDonkeys/status/1834520445174845712" target="_blank" rel="noopener">readily</a>, and have vowed to plough profits from sales of the new book into future activism. Right-wing leaders in continual need of a hackneyed and unlikeable enemy in order to fire up the base will no doubt be delighted by this news. The rest of us, tired of forever wars between simple-minded fanatics, should probably consider indulging in some billboard defacement of our own.</p>
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