<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss version="2.0"
	xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"
	xmlns:wfw="http://wellformedweb.org/CommentAPI/"
	xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"
	xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"
	xmlns:sy="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/syndication/"
	xmlns:slash="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/slash/"
	xmlns:unherd="https://www.unherd.com"
	>

	<channel>
		<title>Russian Imperialism - UnHerd</title>
		<atom:link href="https://stage.unherd.com/tag/russian-imperialism/feed/" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" />
		<link></link>
		<description>think again</description>
		<lastBuildDate>Mon, 01 Sep 2025 19:56:20 +0000</lastBuildDate>
		<language>en-US</language>
		<sy:updatePeriod>hourly</sy:updatePeriod>
		<sy:updateFrequency>12</sy:updateFrequency>
		<generator>https://wordpress.org/?v=7.1.4</generator>

 
<site xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">241382538</site>				<item>
					<title>Is Putin opening a second front in Europe?</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2024/03/is-putin-opening-a-second-front-in-europe/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://stage.unherd.com/2024/03/is-putin-opening-a-second-front-in-europe/?edition=us#comments</comments>
										<unherd:featured_image>https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/GettyImages-1235528700.jpg?w=526</unherd:featured_image>
										<unherd:main_theme>Russian Empire</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[David Patrikarakos]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/David-Patrikarakos.jpg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>2</unherd:article_ranking>
																<unherd:image_caption>
							<![CDATA[Flying close to the wind. (SERGEI GAPON/AFP via Getty Images)]]>
						</unherd:image_caption>
						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>David Patrikarakos</strong> is <em>UnHerd</em>&#8216;s foreign correspondent. His latest book is <em>War in 140 characters: how social media is reshaping conflict in the 21st century. </em>(Hachette)</p>
]]>
						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>dpatrikarakos</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is <em>UnHerd</em>'s foreign correspondent. His latest book is <em>War in 140 characters: how social media is reshaping conflict in the 21st century. </em>(Hachette)]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Wed, 06 Mar 2024 00:01:04 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Mon, 01 Sep 2025 19:56:20 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Europe]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Moldova]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Russian Imperialism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Transnistria]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Vladimir Putin]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[War]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://old.unherd.com/?p=492260</guid>
																												<description>
								<![CDATA[The chaos in Transnistria is ripe for exploitation]]>
							</description>
																		
																			<content:encoded>
								<![CDATA[<p>Could another war be beginning in Europe? The past few weeks in Transnistria are worrying, not least because they are so familiar. The separatist government there is agitating against Moldova, <a href="https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/warning-transnistria-may-organize-referendum-annexation-russia-support-russian-hybrid">accusing</a> it of destroying the economy, and violating Transnistrian human rights and freedoms. If this is not a new war, it certainly suggests a widening of the existing one.</p>
<p>It all kicked off last week, when Transnistria adopted a resolution condemning Moldova for the “economic and political blockade&#8221; of the region. It then called on Russia, the UN, the OSCE and the EU to intervene and protect the rights of its people — around 460,000 Russians and Ukrainians and a sizable ethnic Moldovan minority.</p>
<p>Transnistria, the narrow strip of land running between Moldova’s eastern border with Ukraine, illegally broke away from Moldova in 1990 and is unrecognised as independent by almost all the world, including the UN. But not Russia, of course, which maintains two motorised rifle battalions there. And as Russia performatively heeds the breakaway republic’s “call”, memories of eastern Ukraine in 2014 are inescapable.</p>
<p>I was there after the EuroMaidan revolution in which Ukrainians overthrew their Kremlin-backed President, the corrupt, convicted criminal Viktor Yanukovych. Over the following weeks I travelled across the country talking to so-called Ukrainian “separatists” (backed by Russia, we now know) who were saying exactly the same thing as the Transnistrian government is now. They were, they told me, calling on Russia to come and “rescue” them. They wanted their indigenous rights protected from the government of the country they were legally a part of. It was nonsense then just as it is now in Moldova.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/03/moldovas-war-on-russias-saboteurs/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/03/moldovas-war-on-russias-saboteurs/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/GettyImages-1248090167-scaled-e1678805769122-2.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/03/moldovas-war-on-russias-saboteurs/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/03/moldovas-war-on-russias-saboteurs/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Moldova&#039;s war on Russian saboteurs</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/03/moldovas-war-on-russias-saboteurs/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Michal Kranz</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>The catalyst for the Maidan Revolution in 2014 was Yanukovych’s last-minute refusal to sign the EU Accession Agreement in favour of Moscow’s Eurasian Customs Union. This year, on 7 February, Ilan Shor (a former Moldovan MP who is now sanctioned by US) <a href="https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/warning-transnistria-may-organize-referendum-annexation-russia-support-russian-hybrid" target="_blank" rel="noopener">went </a>to Russia where he had a meeting with Leonid Kalashnikov who assured him that Moldova’s only chance of betterment was to join Eurasian Economic Union.</p>
<p>Gennady Chorba, a Transnistrian politician said his “government” will submit a request to the Kremlin to this effect during a special congress that last met in 2006. “This will be voiced to Russia on behalf of citizens living on the left bank of the Dniester River.” His statement came a few days after Sergei Lavrov, Russia’s foreign minister, said the rights of pro-Russian separatists in Transnistria must be respected.  On 17 February, Russia <a href="https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/warning-transnistria-may-organize-referendum-annexation-russia-support-russian-hybrid" target="_blank" rel="noopener">relaxed</a> its requirements for “compatriots” living abroad so that they do not now need to prove their Russian proficiency to resettle into Russia, so long as the individual was born in the <em>former</em> USSR.</p>
<p>Once again, the similarities with the situation in Ukraine are depressingly similar. In November 2023, Putin gave a <a href="https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/warning-transnistria-may-organize-referendum-annexation-russia-support-russian-hybrid" target="_blank" rel="noopener">speech</a> referring to the concept of the “Russian world (<em>Russkiy Mir</em>)”: loosely speaking, people living in the former USSR, people who feel a “spiritual connection” to the motherland, people who consider themselves native Russian speakers, and people who are carriers of Russian history and culture – regardless of national affiliation. In reality, this means anyone the Kremlin would ideally like to annex, not least Ukrainians.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">This is the price of the West’s weakness: the war in Ukraine is not just about Russia and Ukraine</div>
<p>In 2014, before Russia sent in the tanks, they flooded eastern Ukraine with disinformation. I remember the memes and the tweets and posts on the contiguity of Russia and Ukraine, the perniciousness of the West (especially the EU and NATO) and the historical and cultural affinities and glories of <em>Russkiy Mir. </em>In this sense, even beyond Transnistria, Moldova is right in the Kremlin&#8217;s sights. And just like Crimea and the Donbas were never about just those regions, but the whole of Ukraine, this is also an operation directed against Moldova. It is the type of state that is in many ways guaranteed to give Putin a conniption: a former Soviet state that is also now a candidate for EU accession.</p>
<p>Moldova was granted status as candidate nation in June 2022 with the view to being a member nation by 2030. For the Kremlin, the prospect of Moldova joining the EU is almost as geopolitically and ideologically unacceptable as it was and is for Ukraine. What is happening now is merely the fruition of years (if not decades) of information and political subversion there (as across eastern Europe).</p>
<p>A few years ago, I traipsed across large parts of eastern Europe to assess the threat level of Russian information operations in the region — I wanted to know how the Russians were targeting the hearts and minds of the people there. As I sat in various dilapidated offices in Moldova listening to people delivering the various Russian narratives, it was clear that the Kremlin&#8217;s playbook was pretty rigid. It centred on a mythologising of Moldova’s soviet past: pointing to the supposedly elevated standards of living that both shared along with a glorious history. The inescapable fact, though, was Moldova’s weakness meant it couldn’t operate as a state without Russian help. Once more I could have been in Ukraine.</p>
<p>More narrowly, Russian disinformation narratives argued that the Moldovan government is a puppet of the EU and Nato and US. Europe is of course totally corrupt and a bastion of perversion in which corrupt officials are hankering to replace family values with LGBT rights. “What this means,” a fierce Moldovan journalist said to me, “is that they say if we join the EU our kids will be forced to become gay and it won’t be possible to beat your wife anymore.” I replied that this was surely couched in a more sophisticated language. “Barely,” she replied.</p>
<p>Like pretty much all former Soviet states, Moldova suffers from the twin curses of corruption and Kremlin influence. Politically, Moldovan politics remains vulnerable to its propaganda. In March 2022, just weeks after Russia’s all-out invasion, Ukraine banned its pro-Russia Regions Party, but in Moldova the pro-Russia Party of Socialists remains prominent in public life and has about a 20% share of the vote.</p>
<p>To make matters worse, the country has scant separation between politics and media. Former Democratic Party of Moldova leader and President Vladimir Plahotniuc, for example, have had significant media holdings, former President Igor Dodon has enjoyed close links with media oligarchs.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/02/egypt-is-gazas-most-fickle-friend/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/02/egypt-is-gazas-most-fickle-friend/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/GettyImages-1989148835.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/02/egypt-is-gazas-most-fickle-friend/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author </span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/02/egypt-is-gazas-most-fickle-friend/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Egypt is Gaza&#039;s most fickle friend</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/02/egypt-is-gazas-most-fickle-friend/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> David Patrikarakos </a></p></div></a></div>
<p>All the problems of Russian influence in Moldova can be cubed in Transnistria. For a start, its media space is separate. Broadcasts from the right bank of the Dniester are jammed, and the frequencies of Moldova TV broadcasters have been redistributed to rebroadcast Russian content. There are few purely Russian-language media in Moldova: <em>Komsomolskaya pravda </em>and<em> Argumenty i Fakty </em>(long-standing newspapers originating from Russian with licences in other post-soviet countries). Most are in two languages, Moldovan (Romanian) and Russian, or Moldovan (Romanian). It is a space into which Russia can broadcast more or less unopposed.</p>
<p>The Transnistrians are calling for Mother Russia. It will heed their call. This is how it begins. This is how it began in Ukraine. Moscow already has troops in the region, and sources tell me that the Russians have been sneaking what they call “saboteurs” into the region on flights.</p>
<p>But in the end, Transnistria as a region is of little importance to Russia beyond its ability to act as a garrison station on Ukraine’s southern border. But preventing Moldova from ever joining the EU and bringing it back into a new enlarged Russia are what most counts.</p>
<p>It is no coincidence that Putin is trying this when things on the battlefields seem to be turning in his favour, largely due to the delay in weapons from Kyiv’s allies.</p>
<p>This is the price of the West’s weakness: the war in Ukraine was never just about Russia and Ukraine, but wider Europe. We did not understand this when Putin invaded. But our failure to give Ukraine the means to fight most effectively has emboldened Putin. Now he has turned his eyes to Moldova — and we have only ourselves to blame.</p>
<style>
				a.appcomments {
					background: #FFF;
					border: 1px solid #446c76 !important;
					font-family: benton-sans,sans-serif;
					font-weight: 600;
					font-style: normal;
					font-size: 12px;
					color: #446c76 !important;
					padding: 12px 50px;
					text-transform: uppercase;
					letter-spacing: 1.5px;
					text-decoration: none;
					width: 100%;
					display: block;
					text-align: center !important;
				 }
			</style>
			<a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/03/is-putin-opening-a-second-front-in-europe/?edition=us?appcomments" class="appcomments">view comments</a>]]>
							</content:encoded>
																<unherd:comments_embed_url>https://stage.unherd.com/2024/03/is-putin-opening-a-second-front-in-europe/?edition=us?appcommentsnew</unherd:comments_embed_url>
											<wfw:commentRss>https://stage.unherd.com/2024/03/is-putin-opening-a-second-front-in-europe/?edition=us/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
															<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">492260</post-id>				</item>
									<item>
					<title>What we get wrong about Solzhenitsyn</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2022/03/what-we-get-wrong-about-solzhenitsyn/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://stage.unherd.com/2022/03/what-we-get-wrong-about-solzhenitsyn/?edition=us#comments</comments>
										<unherd:featured_image>https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/GettyImages-1233499794-scaled.jpg?w=528</unherd:featured_image>
										<unherd:main_theme></unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Blake Smith]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/image-28.jpg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking></unherd:article_ranking>
																<unherd:image_caption>
							<![CDATA[This ain't Jordan Peterson's Solzhenitsyn. (Photo by MICHAEL EVSTAFIEV/AFP via Getty Images)]]>
						</unherd:image_caption>
						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Blake Smith </strong>is a Harper-Schmidt Fellow at the University of Chicago. A historian of modern France, he is also a translator of contemporary francophone fiction and a regular contributor to <em>Tablet</em>.</p>
]]>
						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>blejksmith</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[is a Harper-Schmidt Fellow at the University of Chicago. A historian of modern France, he is also a translator of contemporary francophone fiction and a regular contributor to <em>Tablet</em>.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Tue, 15 Mar 2022 00:00:04 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Tue, 15 Mar 2022 12:52:11 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Andrei Sakharov]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Communism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Culture Wars]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Gulag]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Jordan Peterson]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Michel Foucault]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Russian Imperialism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Russian Nationalism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[The Gulag Archipelago]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[USSR]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://old.unherd.com/?p=387120</guid>
																												<description>
								<![CDATA[The West has forgotten his extreme nationalism]]>
							</description>
																		
																			<content:encoded>
								<![CDATA[<p>In the West Alexander Solzhenitsyn is accorded the status of a secular saint. In 1970 the Nobel committee lauded the “ethical force” of his writings as they awarded him literature’s greatest prize. Soon after, the publication of a French edition of <em>The Gulag Archipelago</em> was heralded by Michel Foucault, who used it to support his increasingly open attacks on orthodox Marxism (and borrowed its metaphor of the “archipelago” for his work on prisons in the West). More recently Jordan Peterson, who often decries Foucault’s intellectual influence, described writing a forward to a new edition of Solzhenitsyn’s opus as “the greatest honour of my life.” Across the political spectrum, Western thinkers have turned to Solzhenitsyn, finding in him a wintry, experience-honed critic of communism, a witness to one of a century’s greatest horrors, and a model of courageously free speech.</p>
<p>First imprisoned, then internally exiled from 1945 to 1956, and finally expelled from the Soviet Union in 1974, Solzhenitsyn seemed a living testament to the injustices he exposed. But while Western intellectuals and politicians acclaimed this aspect of his message, they largely ignored another side of it. Solzhenitsyn warned that a Russia free of Communism would not become Western. Russia would continue to oppose liberalism, and pursue geopolitical ambitions that would bring it into conflict with other powers.</p>
<p>In his famous 1978 <a href="https://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/alexandersolzhenitsynharvard.htm">commencement address at Harvard</a>, Solzhenitsyn warned that Westerners, with a combination of naïveté and arrogance, assumed that the world was moving towards a standard set by its capitalist liberal democracies. They could not understand that Russia, although currently “in Communist captivity”, was the heir to an “autonomous world” that would never be assimilated to the West. Indeed, the problem with Communism was that it, too, was a cosmopolitan ideology with ambitions for remaking the world, destroying Russia’s autonomous cultural traditions in the process.</p>
<div class="ad-insert"></div>
<p>Solzhenitsyn’s speech is <a href="https://thefederalist.com/2018/06/08/40-years-later-alexander-solzhenitsyns-harvard-speech-blazes-beacon-renewal/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">fondly</a> <a href="https://quillette.com/2020/10/24/reflections-on-solzhenitsyns-harvard-address/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">remembered</a> by <a href="https://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/40-years-ago-today-when-solzhenitsyn-schooled-harvard/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">conservatives</a> in the West as a stinging critique of cultural liberalism. With his call for a return to traditional values, he appeals to the contemporary Western Right as a useful figure in our own culture wars. But his conjoining of liberalism and Communism as two aspects of a common assault on traditional non-Western cultures goes much further than a repudiation of ‘political correctness’. Asserting that the world is divided into distinct cultural zones, and opposing any ideology that on whatever premises puts our common humanity before their preservation, Solzhenitsyn implied that liberals would have little to look forward to from a post-Communist Russia.</p>
<p>Most Western observers at the time were too taken with Solzhenitsyn’s critique of the Soviet system to pay adequate attention to his views on the Russian past and warnings about the Russian future. However, some of his fellow dissidents and Western critics observed saw that Solzhenitsyn — and the Russian nationalism that he represented — represented a dark cloud on the horizon.</p>
<p>In 1974 the dissident Russian scientist <a href="https://www.nybooks.com/articles/1974/06/13/in-answer-to-solzhenitsyn/">Andrei Sakharov</a> noted that Solzhenitsyn argued against Communism less out of a desire for freedom at home and peace with the West. He believed that the author wanted more than to promote supposedly traditional values; Solzhenitsyn wanted to focus Russian energies on the military threat (which he took to be existential) posed by China, entering a new Cold War with its neighbour. The future Russian regime, for Solzhenitsyn, could not be a liberal democratic one imported from the West, but one shaped by an understanding of Russia’s dangerous geopolitical situation and particular history. The latter, Sakharov bitterly summarised, seemed to have taught Solzhenitsyn that “when accompanied by respect for law and by Orthodoxy the authoritarian system was not all that bad.”</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/02/rene-girards-apocalypse-is-now/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/02/rene-girards-apocalypse-is-now/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/15827-girardobit_teaser.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/02/rene-girards-apocalypse-is-now/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/02/rene-girards-apocalypse-is-now/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>René Girard&#039;s apocalypse is now</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/02/rene-girards-apocalypse-is-now/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Blake Smith</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>It was on this heading that, in a 1980 issue of <em>Foreign Affairs</em>, a group of <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/20040662?searchText=solzhenitsyn+france&amp;searchUri=%2Faction%2FdoBasicSearch%3FQuery%3Dsolzhenitsyn%2Bfrance%26so%3Drel&amp;ab_segments=0%2Fbasic_search_gsv2%2Fcontrol&amp;refreqid=fastly-default%3A22206e112c75924bc7d9738c25e529cb&amp;seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents" target="_blank" rel="noopener">American scholars</a> criticised Solzhenitsyn for his rosy image of pre-revolutionary Russia — a vision that elided, or falsified, many historical facts. Where he had argued that the Tsars tolerated dissident intellectuals and religious minorities (including Jews), historians observed that this was a fantasy.</p>
<p>The Russian empire under the Tsars organised massive surveillance programmes, and routinely imprisoned and executed suspects without trial. Far from tolerating minorities, it subjected Jews to humiliating restrictions and implicitly sanctioned pogroms. In the year 1905 alone, there were 690 documented pogroms (with over 3,000 reported murders) during the two weeks following the declaration of the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/October-Manifesto" target="_blank" rel="noopener">October Manifesto</a>. Nicholas II, according to one historian, regarded this violence as a form of “justified revenge” against subjects he considered to be politically suspect. The Russian revolution, although intended to overturn the old regime, perpetuated many of its signature domestic policies, from secret policing to anti-Semitism.</p>
<p>Solzhenitsyn was also criticised for exaggerating the differences between Tsarist and Soviet foreign policy. <a href="https://www.encyclopedia.com/religion/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/loebl-eugen" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Eugen Loebl </a>argued that he downplayed the continuities between the imperialist policy of the Tsars and that of the Soviet leadership, which both sought, under the pretext of Christianity or Communism, to extend Russian power over subject nations. Loebl had a personal stake in this critique. He had been a member of Czechoslovak Communist government in the Sixties, an era of liberalising reform — cut short when the Soviets invaded the country to restore Communist orthodoxy and obedience to Moscow. From Loebl’s perspective, this invasion was continuous with Russia’s nineteenth-century expansion into Eastern Europe and violent suppression of nationalist and democratic movements throughout the region. The Tsars and Communists justified their policies in terms of apparently opposite ideologies, but their common aim was Russian power.</p>
<p>Countering Loebl, Solzhenitsyn argued that Communism was an “international or even metaphysical entity”. To understand it as something akin to Nazism — an ideology of national self-aggrandisement — would lead to disaster. In the West, opponents of Communism, especially on the centre and Right, often linked the Soviet regime and the Third Reich as examples of ‘totalitarianism’, a concept popularised by Hannah Arendt. Solzhenitsyn, however, stressed that there were important differences between the Nazis and the Communists.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/03/the-russia-we-have-lost/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/03/the-russia-we-have-lost/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/GettyImages-1238727310-1.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/03/the-russia-we-have-lost/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested article</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/03/the-russia-we-have-lost/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The Russia we have lost</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/03/the-russia-we-have-lost/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Ben Judah </a></p></div></a></div>
<p>After the Nazi invasion of the USSR in 1941, many in the Soviet Union had believed German rule might be preferable to Communism — particularly to the murderous purges, famines, and population transfers that characterised Stalin’s reign in the Thirties. Soldiers deserted the Red Army in huge numbers during the first weeks of Operation Barbarossa. It was not only oppressed peoples, such as Balts and Ukrainians, who did so, but Russians as well.</p>
<p>In spite of sympathy from Russians and non-Russians alike, Nazi <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Generalplan_Ost" target="_blank" rel="noopener">policy</a> towards the region was openly genocidal, founded on a project of eliminating local populations to make room for future German colonisation. Hitler, Solzhenitsyn argued, “had declared war on the Russian people as such, leaving them no way out”. Russians thus rallied to the Soviet regime not out of any loyalty to Communism, or sense that it represented their ‘national’ interests, but because they had no other choice.</p>
<p>There was an important lesson for the West in Germany’s defeat, Solzhenitsyn argued. The Nazis had conflated Russia and the Soviet Union, and thus forced Russians who would have accepted German rule to rally around Stalin. Advised by figures such as Loebl, the West risked making the same mistake of seeing “the threat now looming over the world as Russian rather than as Communist”. This would have a “devastating outcome”. While Russians despised their Communist government and yearned for liberation, they would oppose any power that threatened their existence as a people.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/03/populists-are-losing-this-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/03/populists-are-losing-this-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/GettyImages-872780694-scaled.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/03/populists-are-losing-this-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested article</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/03/populists-are-losing-this-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Populists are losing this war</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/03/populists-are-losing-this-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Eric Kaufmann </a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Solzhenitsyn was warning the West that if it hoped for friendly relations with a future, post-Communist Russia, it would have to accept Russian nationalism — and attendant demands for ‘security,’ often understood in expansionist terms by successive Russian governments. Loebl, meanwhile, warned that Russian nationalism, whether it disguised itself as Communist or anti-Communist, would inevitably mean Russian imperialism in Eastern Europe. Both warnings, perhaps, were true.</p>
<p>Already in 1980 Western leaders reading the exchange between Solzhenitsyn and Loebl might have foreseen that there was a dangerous tension at the heart of their hopes for the collapse of the Eastern Bloc. If Russian anti-Communists like Solzhenitsyn sympathised with their ideological opposition to the Soviet regime, they did not agree with Eastern European dissidents such as Loebl that Russian power was an inherent danger to peace. A common hostility to Communism, however, could conceal for a time fundamentally different geopolitical visions — which have been brought into terrible clarity in recent weeks, as Russia began its assault on Ukraine.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/03/the-dark-heart-of-russia/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/03/the-dark-heart-of-russia/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/GettyImages-94984802-e1648463685245.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/03/the-dark-heart-of-russia/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested article</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/03/the-dark-heart-of-russia/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Why Russian leaders kill</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/03/the-dark-heart-of-russia/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Costică Brădățan </a></p></div></a></div>
<p>The West’s enthusiasm for Solzhenitsyn, celebrating his anti-Communist resistance while ignoring his rehabilitation of Tsarist illiberalism and imperialism, is of a piece with two signal failures of our collective political understanding during the last decades of the twentieth century. First, the United States supported Islamic terror networks to oppose the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in the Eighties, only to find itself their target after the collapse of the USSR. Still more to its detriment, the West pursued in those years, and since, a strategy of economic engagement with China, in the hope that integration in the global capitalist economy would <a href="https://www.iatp.org/sites/default/files/Full_Text_of_Clintons_Speech_on_China_Trade_Bi.htm" target="_blank" rel="noopener">lead to political reform</a> in Beijing.</p>
<p>As with Solzhenitsyn, Western leaders failed to perceive that sharing temporary tactical goals with non-Western intellectuals, militants, and regimes was only a short-lived suspension of the always-present possibility of renewed enmity, based on enduring, and perhaps irreconcilable, visions of the world. Liberal democracy, based as it is on a cosmopolitan understanding of human rights, often misperceives a world which does not share its assumptions about those rights. For the duration of the present crisis in Ukraine, at least, such misperceptions will be impossible to sustain — and their resumption will make a disastrous situation even worse.</p>
<style>
				a.appcomments {
					background: #FFF;
					border: 1px solid #446c76 !important;
					font-family: benton-sans,sans-serif;
					font-weight: 600;
					font-style: normal;
					font-size: 12px;
					color: #446c76 !important;
					padding: 12px 50px;
					text-transform: uppercase;
					letter-spacing: 1.5px;
					text-decoration: none;
					width: 100%;
					display: block;
					text-align: center !important;
				 }
			</style>
			<a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/03/what-we-get-wrong-about-solzhenitsyn/?edition=us?appcomments" class="appcomments">view comments</a>]]>
							</content:encoded>
																<unherd:comments_embed_url>https://stage.unherd.com/2022/03/what-we-get-wrong-about-solzhenitsyn/?edition=us?appcommentsnew</unherd:comments_embed_url>
											<wfw:commentRss>https://stage.unherd.com/2022/03/what-we-get-wrong-about-solzhenitsyn/?edition=us/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
															<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">387120</post-id>				</item>
						</channel>
</rss>
