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					<title>Nato is weakening America</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2023/09/what-nato-sceptics-get-wrong-about-ukraine/?edition=us</link>
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						<![CDATA[Aris Roussinos]]>
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							<![CDATA[Get behind the defensive umbrella. (Artur Widak/NurPhoto via Getty Images)]]>
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							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Aris Roussinos</strong> is an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist and a former war reporter.</p>
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						<unherd:twitter_handle>arisroussinos</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist and a former war reporter.]]>
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										<pubDate>Sat, 30 Sep 2023 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Sat, 30 Sep 2023 00:00:00 +0000</updated>
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								<![CDATA[Europe, not America, is calling the shots]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>Nearly three quarters of a century after Nato’s founding, Britain has slid down its league table of political and military power: from a near-peer ally of the United States to more or less open vassalage. To witness the conquered mindset of the British establishment, one need only read a <a href="https://www.spectator.co.uk/article/britains-shrinking-army-faces-an-uncertain-future/?utm_medium=Social&amp;utm_source=Twitter#Echobox=1694242325-1" target="_blank" rel="noopener">recent article</a> deliberating on what is to be done with the British Army, plummeting in numbers, capability and international esteem. It proposes to reshape our land forces as a collection of Special Forces units at America’s disposal: “we are likely to fight as part of a coalition in future, so why not be the sharpened tip of the American spear?”</p>
<p>On the one hand, the very idea of formalising Britain’s role as Washington’s most loyal and reckless auxiliary, without even the hint that Britain may have vital strategic interests of its own, strikes the reader as a shameful metric of national decline. Yet on the other, it is merely a frank acceptance of Britain’s true role in the world.</p>
<p>Just as the Five Eyes alliance, promoted as a valuable forum to share secret intelligence, can be more accurately viewed as a means to ensure the Anglophone intelligence establishment orientate themselves towards serving US foreign policy goals, the Nato alliance is as much a Cold War means of organising satellite states to serve imperial interests as was the Warsaw Pact. The distinction between Moscow’s loyal network of European generals, securocrats and pet politicians and those of present-day Washington is barely perceptible. Yet, in recent years, the value of the Nato alliance has declined markedly, both to Washington insiders increasingly disgruntled that the United States finds itself subsidising the defence of rich but feckless European states, and to some European leaders such as Macron, who famously termed the Cold War relic “brain dead”. The alliance’s most recent adventures, in Afghanistan and Libya, were disasters both to the countries fated to host its intervention, and to the European states who suddenly found themselves hosting the unwanted human floods that followed.</p>
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<p>Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, then, came as a godsend to the faltering alliance. Once again, Nato could focus on its core purpose: the American-led defence of Europe from an aggressive Moscow. Summarising an emergent  strand of thought on both the Left and Right of European politics, Wolfgang Streeck, writing in <a href="https://www.versobooks.com/en-gb/products/3093-natopolitanism" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em>Natopolitanism</em></a>, Verso’s collection of essays from the <em>New Left Review</em>, remarks that by “restoring the West, the war neutralised the various fault lines where the EU was crumbling… while catapulting the United States into a position of renewed hegemony over Western Europe, including its regional organisation, the European Union”. This precise critique, that a war-revived <a href="https://niccolo.substack.com/p/turbo-america" target="_blank" rel="noopener">“Turbo-America”</a> has consolidated its wavering hold on our home continent, grasping us ever more suffocatingly to the imperial bosom, is now commonplace in discussions of geopolitics following the Ukraine war: but is it true?</p>
<p>The authors in <em>Natopolitanism</em> robustly make the case that, as the writer Thomas Meaney observes, “in practice, Nato is above all a political arrangement that guarantees US primacy in determining answers to European questions“ and “administers US power in Eurasia, as a regional satrapy and launchpad for excursions elsewhere”. In essays spanning decades, which aim to “stand in contrast to the pieties and propaganda that saturate the Natopolitan scene”, the writers outline Washington’s strategy of “convincing potential competitors” such as Europe “that they need not aspire to a greater role”, while accounting “sufficiently for the interests of the advanced industrial nations to discourage them from challenging our leadership”. As Europe’s leadership shows, this plan was entirely successful, so that “what was once presumed to be an artefact of the Cold War order sits so comfortably at the heart of the Western system that it is frequently mistaken for a natural feature in the geopolitical landscape”.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/05/boomer-europe-is-dying/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/05/boomer-europe-is-dying/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/2GettyImages-917363126-1-1-scaled-e1684493128527.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/05/boomer-europe-is-dying/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author </span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/05/boomer-europe-is-dying/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Boomer Europe is dying</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/05/boomer-europe-is-dying/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Aris Roussinos </a></p></div></a></div>
<p>The book reminds us of the fearful warnings of US defence establishment giants such as <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/wikileaks-russia-cable-2014-5" target="_blank" rel="noopener">William J. Burns</a> that the decision to expand Nato eastwards, enfolding the Baltic and Central European states while leaving Ukraine and Georgia in their current, fateful ante-room to membership, was an act of monumental hubris which. It would, he wrote, “cross the brightest of Russia’s red lines” by “indulging the Ukrainians and Georgians in hopes of Nato membership on which we were unlikely to deliver, while reinforcing Putin’s sense that we were determined to pursue a course he saw as an existential threat”.</p>
<p>Indeed, <em>Natopolitanism</em>’s essential thrust — and the limitations of its analysis — can be summarised by the title of Realist theorist John Mearsheimer’s contribution: “Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault: The Liberal Delusions That Provoked Putin.” It captures a strain of thinking common to European strategic autonomists who regret that the alliance has kept the continent subordinate to Washington, Left-wing anti-imperialists keen to highlight the hypocrisy of the alliance’s newfound commitment to the inviolability of national borders, and to the American anti-interventionists whose stance is, at least in liberal interventionist eyes, now indistinguishable from “IR Realism” Outlining viewpoints mocked by American neoconservative broadsheet columnists and boisterous cartoon dogs on Twitter alike, the collection is perhaps the most sustained and articulate critique so far of Washington’s hubristic attitudes towards Russia.</p>
<p>And yet, much of its argument can be refuted by observation of the Ukraine war’s progress until now. The purported “last chance for peace” lamented by contributors, Russia’s eve-of-invasion request to rule out the alliance’s further eastward expansion, also included a demand to withdraw Nato infrastructure from the Central European and Baltic countries welcomed into the alliance a generation ago: a politically absurd demand made in the full knowledge it was impossible to grant. Far from the United States forcing European states into a stance of radical and self-defeating hostility to Russia, it is European states that have consistently pushed a reluctant Biden administration into delivering ever-more deadly and sophisticated weapons systems to Kyiv. The pattern of hawkish European states browbeating their cautious and reluctant overlord into greater escalation echoes the dynamic of the Libya intervention, where the bright-eyed and idealistic Cameron and Sarkozy pairing cajoled Obama’s intervention in what he later termed the Libyan “shitshow” against his better judgment. If anything, Nato displays the European tail wagging the American dog: instead of keeping Europe subordinate, weak but ambitious European states use the Nato alliance to advance their own foreign policy ends — that these ends would, in Libya, prove disastrous is a European failing rather than an American one.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/09/the-russian-invasion-was-a-rational-act/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/09/the-russian-invasion-was-a-rational-act/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/GettyImages-1246326347-e1694625194805.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/09/the-russian-invasion-was-a-rational-act/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading </span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/09/the-russian-invasion-was-a-rational-act/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The Russian invasion was a rational act</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/09/the-russian-invasion-was-a-rational-act/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> John Mearsheimer and Sebastian Rosato</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>No wonder that American defence thinkers, such as the Realist strategist <a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/11/how-america-can-save-taiwan/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Elbridge Colby</a>, dispassionately debate the idea of cutting the Baltic countries loose as a strategic burden a declining US can no longer afford. Yet the sceptical attitude to the alliance displayed by <a href="https://www.theamericanconservative.com/the-eu-should-have-an-army/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">the American Right</a>, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/14/us/politics/nato-president-trump.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">and particularly Trump</a>, points to another potential outcome from the war. While Streeck asserts that “the war also seems to have dealt a death blow to the French dream of turning the liberal empire of the European Union into a strategically sovereign global force, credibly rivalling both a rising China and a declining United States”, dwindling American political support for a war in which the EU has fully committed itself leaves Europe forced to assume a position of power, almost against its own will.</p>
<p>Ultimately, Europe’s future defence strategy will be written in the straits and islets of the Western Pacific: either the US will be forced to concentrate on the threat from China, forcing Europe to finally take up the burden of its own defence, or Washington will abandon its role as global hegemon, taking Europe tighter into its embrace as a rich and easily assimilable core empire. Either outcome is possible, and the decision will only come at the time of China’s choosing. But if the first eventuality comes to pass, with a giant and hostile neighbour to its east, and an imperial sponsor distracted from by its own great challenge on the other side of the world, Europe will be forced to extract itself from the position of helpless dependence its role in the Nato alliance has fostered.</p>
<p>For Left-wing writers such as Meaney, such an autonomous Europe is hardly a more appealing outcome than subordinate membership in the American alliance: “considering what the European Union is today, if it ever did succeed in taking a more militarised form, this would hardly be a rosy prospect,” he writes. “A competent EU army patrolling the Mediterranean littoral for migrants, enforcing an elaborate repatriation system, and forcing regimes in Africa and Asia to serve in perpetuity as extraction points for its resources and receptacles of its trash would only clinch the status of ‘Fortress Europe’.” European conservatives, accustomed by habit if not self-interest to look longingly for Washington’s approval, may yet come to welcome this new dispensation.</p>
<p>Certainly, the most recent iteration of Nato as a heavily armed liberal NGO would not survive this shift. As noted in <em>Natopolitanism</em>, Poland’s hawkish attitude to the Ukraine war has led Washington to forget its until-recently-held doubts about the strength of the country’s democratic institutions, just as concerns over Meloni’s purported fascism evaporated once she committed herself to the war. So, Streeck warns, controversies over the “‘rule of law’ will become increasingly obsolete as cultural conflicts between “liberal” and “illiberal” democracy will be eclipsed by the geostrategic objectives of Nato and the United States,” while “a shift in political power inside the EU may be imminent in favour of the Union’s eastern front states”. Poland’s massive programme of rearmament, plus the planned incorporation within the EU of whatever iteration of the Ukrainian state follows the war, already promises a shift in Europe’s gravity from the post-national liberalism of the continent’s northwest to the resurgent, militarised nationalisms of the eastern frontier. As long as the new Europe’s defence posture alleviates the burden on the United States, Washington voices which once promoted Nato as an engine for liberal idealism will no more protest Europe’s Rightward political experimentation than their equivalents of past decades did the pliant authoritarian regimes of member states Portugal, Greece and Turkey.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/07/britain-is-europes-liberal-outcast/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/07/britain-is-europes-liberal-outcast/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/GettyImages-455584006.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/07/britain-is-europes-liberal-outcast/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author </span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/07/britain-is-europes-liberal-outcast/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Britain is Europe&#039;s liberal outcast</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/07/britain-is-europes-liberal-outcast/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Aris Roussinos </a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Far from ensuring Europe’s political and economic subordination, America’s retrenchment towards simultaneously managing both a great struggle with China and its own internal political conflict is very likely to leave Europe functionally autonomous. American voters and politicians may <a href="https://news.yahoo.com/zelenskyy-returns-washington-face-growing-040353960.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">already be tiring</a> of what will be a long and bloody war: Ukraine has, it seems, already reached the high-watermark of Pentagon support. Yet committed as Europe now is, with expanding Russian armies on its doorstep, disengagement is a luxury European leaders cannot afford. Perhaps things might have been otherwise, if different decisions had been made at the zenith of American power: but there is no rewriting history, no going back, and we are forced to make the best we can of the cards our masters dealt us.</p>
<p>In all this, the Sixth Form Third Worldist anti-imperialism of <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2022/apr/20/jeremy-corbyn-would-like-to-see-nato-ultimately-disband" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Nato sceptics such as Corbyn</a> has been superseded by events. The idea that Corbyn could ever have extracted Britain from Nato was fanciful. As Meaney observes of Central Europe, “were any political leadership in Poland, Romania, Hungary, or any other Eastern European state to become intolerable for Washington, it would have an open, exploitable channel to that country’s military, greased by years of mutual exchanges, including stints at Nato headquarters, bevies of Nato conferences, retreats, and ceremonies, as well as wars fought together in the Middle East”. Precisely the same is true, with the inclusion of securocrats and wonks as loyal devotees, for us Western European countries. As the desperate wheedling for an American pat on their head from Britain’s defence establishment makes clear, the idea of Britain pursuing strategic ends distinct from those of its imperial master is literally incomprehensible to our governing class. Updating this strategic calculus is more likely to result from <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/02/27/opinion/a-war-with-china-would-reach-deep-into-american-society.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">a sudden external shock</a> than dispassionate consideration of Britain’s interests.</p>
<p>Yet Macron’s sudden pivot from Nato-scepticism towards <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/france-emmanuel-macron-ukraine-war-russia-uturn-vladimir-putin/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">a full-throated commitment</a> to the alliance’s eastward expansion reminds us that other outcomes are possible. In our current turbulent period of interregnum between American supremacy and retreat from global hegemony, the Nato alliance may provide the framework within which a future, sovereign Europe can establish itself, through the creation of a notionally subordinate European defence pillar ready to take up the burden of the continent’s security from its faltering sponsor. There is no political utility in railing against Nato, given the unshakeable attachment of European elites to their sinecures as loyal auxiliaries. Yet by working within Nato structures, to establish Europe as an equal partner within the alliance rather than a collection of weak and disunited supplicants, our home continent may still quietly prepare itself for <a href="https://thehill.com/policy/international/3900921-former-nato-chief-trump-nomination-would-be-geopolitical-catastrophe/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">the withdrawal of America’s protective shield</a>, and the contested multipolar order already bloodily dawning on its borders. Just as Rome’s successor states, once the legions left, still proudly wore imperial titles, Nato’s ghostly form may yet outlast the empire itself.</p>
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					<title>The emptiness of Macron&#8217;s grand strategy</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2023/09/the-emptiness-of-macrons-grand-strategy/?edition=us</link>
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						<![CDATA[Krzysztof Tyszka-Drozdowski]]>
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							<![CDATA[Can he play the Great Game? (LUDOVIC MARIN/POOL/AFP via Getty Images)]]>
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							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Krzysztof Tyszka-Drozdowski</strong> is a Polish writer based in Barcelona.</p>
]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_handle>ktdrozdowski</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is a Polish writer based in Barcelona.]]>
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										<pubDate>Thu, 07 Sep 2023 23:00:57 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Thu, 07 Sep 2023 23:00:57 +0000</updated>
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								<![CDATA['Strategic autonomy' is little more than a slogan]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>In the latest battle for strategic autonomy, Emmanuel Macron has notched up a small victory. Last month, under French pressure, American Fiona Scott Morton resigned from her post as chief economist of the EU’s Directorate-General for Competition. Starting from this month, Morton was to become head of the body that manages the functioning of the European market, despite many believing she is compromised by her previous roles advising companies in Silicon Valley.</p>
<p>Jean-Luc Mélenchon, leader of the far-Left, declared flatly that giving Morton the post amounted to <a href="https://twitter.com/JLMelenchon/status/1679392755716333569" target="_blank" rel="noopener">annexation of Europe by the US</a>. Marine Le Pen <a href="https://twitter.com/MLP_officiel/status/1679438014982881283" target="_blank" rel="noopener">echoed him</a>, indignant at an EU “that does not work on behalf of the interests of the European peoples”. Geoffroy Didier from the centre-right Les Républicains, <a href="https://www.france24.com/fr/info-en-continu/20230713-une-am%C3%A9ricaine-%C3%A0-un-poste-cl%C3%A9-de-l-ue-paris-demande-%C3%A0-bruxelles-de-revoir-son-choix" target="_blank" rel="noopener">expressed astonishment</a> that, at a time when the EU should be curbing the power of US monopolies in Europe, such an important position was being granted to their lobbyist. The Macron government was equally united in its opposition.</p>
<p>Addressing <em>l’affaire Morton</em>, Macron once again insisted that Europe needs strategic autonomy, as well as “intellectual autonomy”, <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2023/07/18/nomination-de-l-ex-lobbyiste-americaine-fiona-scott-morton-a-bruxelles-macron-se-dit-dubitatif_6182530_3210.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">arguing that</a> the appointment of an American with ties to Big Tech “does not necessarily represent the most coherent decision”. The largest groups in the European Parliament also rallied around France and sent <a href="https://www.lexpress.fr/monde/europe/affaire-fiona-scott-morton-a-bruxelles-la-commission-europeenne-tente-deteindre-lincendie-NZUSUEMFQFGZBERGRZBBWHZ6PM/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">a joint letter to the European Commission</a> demanding the withdrawal of Morton’s nomination and stressing that strategic posts in the EU should be reserved for Europeans. Objections to the American candidate were also voiced from within the EU itself, where five commissioners — including Josep Borrell and Thierry Breton — wrote a letter to President von der Leyen.</p>
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<p>How did Morton unite a continent so fractious and diverse? Symbolically, because she represents a challenge to Europe’s attempt to establish civilisational parity between itself and America — Macron’s fabled “autonomy”. But specifically because she was seen as a champion of the American tech oligopoly. As Matt Stoller, author of <em>Goliath: The Hundred Year War Between Monopoly Power and Democracy</em>, has noted, “competition or consumers are secondary in Morton’s thinking. This is why the Obama antitrust authorities facilitated the dominance of big business when she was in the administration there.” He<a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/en/economy/article/2023/07/17/fiona-scott-morton-is-a-trojan-horse-for-big-tech-at-the-european-commission_6056267_19.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener"> points out that</a> it was during the Obama administration that Big Tech consolidation occurred and “Scott Morton played a role facilitating [it]”. This is also the reason, according to Stoller, why she did not find a position in the Biden administration, as she was viewed as not being assertive enough towards Silicon Valley.</p>
<p>Yet the affair can also be seen as a settling of scores between France and Margrethe Vestager, the Danish Commissioner for Competition who defended Morton as simply the best person for the job. <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/how-france-took-on-vestager-and-won/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">According to <em>Politico</em></a>, Morton&#8217;s resignation has severely eroded Vestager’s political capital. And Paris already harboured resentment towards Vestager for opposing a proposed merger between France’s rolling stock giant Alstom and Germany’s Siemens Mobility in 2019. Following her decision, Minister of Economy Bruno Le Maire had expressed outrage that the European Commission would deliberately obstruct the emergence of <a href="https://www.lefigaro.fr/conjoncture/2019/02/06/20002-20190206ARTFIG00199-bruno-le-maire-au-lieu-de-defendre-l-interet-de-l-europe-la-commission-sert-celui-de-la-chine.php" target="_blank" rel="noopener">“European champions”</a>. Instead of defending Europe, he added, the Commission &#8220;serves the interest of China”.</p>
<p>Serious concerns remain that the next candidate for chief economist, an Austrian with American citizenship, Florian Ederer, will clash with Paris as well. He has admitted <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/not-another-american-meet-the-new-favorite-for-eu-competition-economist/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">his own scepticism</a> about loosening the rules around industrial policy and said &#8220;the guiding principle should be protecting competition and not protecting competitors”, even if it disadvantages European companies. This is the new division between Paris and Brussels: a division between the market-brain that still predominates at levels of the EU and the strategic <em>realpolitik </em>emanating from the Palais de l&#8217;Élysée.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/11/macrons-grand-european-delusion/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/11/macrons-grand-european-delusion/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/GettyImages-1241279067-scaled-e1669045908914.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/11/macrons-grand-european-delusion/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author </span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/11/macrons-grand-european-delusion/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Macron&#039;s grand European delusion</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/11/macrons-grand-european-delusion/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Krzysztof Tyszka-Drozdowski</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>For Macron, meanwhile, the fact that he was able to mobilise opposition against the American candidate is the first real success of his vision of Europe. But in doing so, he has extended the fear of loss of sovereignty to the rest of Europe’s leaders — who already live surrounded by headlines auguring continental decline. According <a href="https://www.wsj.com/amp/articles/europeans-poorer-inflation-economy-255eb629" target="_blank" rel="noopener">to the IMF</a>, the eurozone economy grew about 6% in the last 15 years, compared with 82% in the US. And crucially, not only is the Old Continent becoming poorer relative to the New, but the essential basis of sovereignty and strength in the 21st century, technology, is its Achilles’ heel: among the 20 largest technology companies, only two hail from Europe.</p>
<p>Does the EU have the means and will to resolve this? Or is its margin for manoeuvre limited only to symbolic victories, such as the rejection of Morton? The big, ambitious projects that were supposed to form the core of the EU’s technological sovereignty have largely failed. Like its unsuccessful <a href="https://www.phenomenalworld.org/analysis/the-eurochip/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Eurochip</a> project and delayed and overpriced Project Galileo scheme, the GAIA-X project, supposed to provide Europe with its own online cloud, also <a href="https://www.telecomtv.com/content/digital-platforms-services/gaia-x-hits-the-trough-of-disillusionment-45611/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">seems doomed to failure</a>.</p>
<p>The story will likely be the same with the upcoming AI Act, which is being suffocated by Brussels&#8217; bureaucracy. The EU sees itself as a regulatory superpower and wants to shape the future of AI not by fostering innovation, but by imposing its regulatory standards on the entire world. There are many indications suggesting that, unlike in the area of internet privacy, the so-called “Brussels effect”, projecting European standards across the world, will <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-eu-ai-act-will-have-global-impact-but-a-limited-brussels-effect/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">not prevail</a>. Instead, rigid regulations are hurting European companies, which are losing the chance to compete with their competitors from the US, China or even the UK. Last year, in one report, <a href="https://coadec.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/05072022-AI-Report-For-Publication.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">more than three-quarters</a> of British start-up companies claimed that, if they were subject to the restrictions, the impact would either be negative or prevent them from doing business altogether.</p>
<p>So, while Macron can claim a symbolic victory over Morton’s resignation, it hides a deeper problem for the proponents of strategic autonomy, namely the lack of vision on how to accomplish it. Devoid of one, it risks remaining a mere slogan, little more than a manifestation of sterile anti-Americanism. In the early Eighties, Georges Suffert addressed the French in his book <em>Les Nouveaux Cowboys</em>, which stemmed from his observations of Silicon Valley. “I am going to tell you why you don&#8217;t like Americans: they play, they putter about assembling a world, and before long you will no longer know how to play in it.” The big question for Macron&#8217;s grand strategy after <em>l’affaire Morton</em> is: can Europe rule, let alone play in, this new world?</p>
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					<title>Macron&#8217;s grand European delusion</title>
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						<![CDATA[Krzysztof Tyszka-Drozdowski]]>
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							<![CDATA[Nothing but une comédie (LUDOVIC MARIN/POOL/AFP via Getty Images)]]>
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							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Krzysztof Tyszka-Drozdowski</strong> is a Polish writer based in Barcelona.</p>
]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_handle>ktdrozdowski</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is a Polish writer based in Barcelona.]]>
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										<pubDate>Tue, 22 Nov 2022 00:02:01 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Tue, 22 Nov 2022 00:02:01 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Angela Merkel]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Emmanuel Macron]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[France]]></category>
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								<![CDATA[His dreams of a French-German partnership are dying]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>“The impression of narrow-mindedness&#8230; prompted a great part of public opinion to turn to a spectre. This spectre was born in Geneva, and against the sterility of the French political landscape, it bore resemblance to hope. Its name was Europe.” So wrote French thinker Jean-Pierre Maxence before the Second World War. Today, it is enough to replace “Geneva” with “Brussels” for his diagnosis to neatly match the mindset of contemporary French elites, and the ideological malaise which has captured them.</p>
<p>Europe, Maxence argued, was a myth “that was worshipped all the more strongly the more distant it seemed”. At that time, it was associated with Aristide Briand, who led five French governments after the First World War. A “United States of Europe”, according to this “Briandist” vision, represented an imminent future that would relegate conflict between nations to the past. Today, this vision is the political alibi most eagerly used by Emmanuel Macron.</p>
<p>Macron&#8217;s neo-Briandism is based, above all, on the belief in “<em>couple franco-allemand</em>”. But lately, relations between France and Germany have fallen into a crisis. The annual government consultations between the two countries, scheduled for the end of October, <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/france-may-delay-joint-cabinet-meeting-with-germany-over-energy-defense/">have been postponed</a> until January next year. Yesterday, Germany foreign minister Annalena Baerbock travelled to Paris to try and recover the situation, holding meetings with her French counterpart and, unusually, Macron himself. But whatever their outcome, she will be unable to rescue a relationship which has always been defined by French foreign policy delusions.</p>
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<p>Central to their discussions was defence co-operation — a key part of the neo-Briandist dream of “strategic autonomy” — on which a rift has opened between France and Germany. In March, under the auspices of the French presidency, EU heads of state <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/03/11/the-versailles-declaration-10-11-03-2022/?utm_source=dsms-auto&amp;utm_medium=email&amp;utm_campaign=The%20Versailles%20declaration%2C%2010%20and%2011%20March%202022#:~:text=On%2010%20and%2011%20March,a%20more%20robust%20economic%20base." target="_blank" rel="noopener">signed a declaration in Versailles</a> pledging increased investment in European defence. A stark rebuttal of this French vision came with Germany’s decision to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/germany-decides-principle-buy-f-35-fighter-jet-government-source-2022-03-14/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">buy F-35 fighter jets from the US</a>, though there <a href="https://www.reuters.com/business/autos-transportation/france-germany-spain-agree-next-phase-fighter-jet-development-source-2022-11-18/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">are signs of cooperation</a> over the development of the new FCAS fighter jet system. Meanwhile, the project <a href="https://www.lefigaro.fr/international/l-allemagne-multiplie-les-affronts-envers-la-france-sur-les-projets-d-armement-20221023" target="_blank" rel="noopener">of a European anti-missile shield</a>, put forward by Scholz, also disregarded the work of the French aerospace company Thales and its Italian partners on the existing Mamba anti-missile system. But perhaps the greatest injury was caused by <a href="https://www.latribune.fr/opinions/le-piege-allemand-se-referme-sur-l-exportation-francaise-d-armement-937664.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">the German proposal</a> for “harmonisation of arms exports within the EU”, which would have meant a ban on sales to non-EU and non-Nato countries, depriving the French of important customers.</p>
<p>China is the other issue fracturing the Franco-German couple, symbolised by Scholz’s visit to Beijing earlier this month. He went <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/germany-olaf-scholz-criticism-embarks-china-trip-visit-xi-jinping/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">in defiance of Paris</a>, which not only intended it to be a joint trip, but also wanted it to take place later so as not to grant legitimacy to Xi right after his propagandising Party Congress. Scholz&#8217;s actions here should not come as a surprise. He embraces the vision of German businessmen, <a href="https://europe.autonews.com/automakers/vw-ceo-diess-says-german-economy-needs-china" target="_blank" rel="noopener">who believe that Germany needs China</a>, rather than strategic autonomy. In the very first phone conversation between Scholz and Xi, they agreed that economic relations between the two countries <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/olaf-scholz-xi-jinping-deepen-economic-ties-germany-china-human-rights/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">must deepen</a>. This direction in Berlin&#8217;s policy was further confirmed by the recent sale of shares in the port of Hamburg <a href="https://www.euronews.com/2022/10/26/germany-agrees-to-controversial-sale-of-hamburg-port-terminal" target="_blank" rel="noopener">to the Chinese</a>.</p>
<p>But perhaps nothing has undermined the myth of the “Franco-German couple” more than Scholz&#8217;s rescue plan for German industry. Its scale — <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/economy-jobs/news/draghi-criticises-germanys-e200-billion-energy-rescue-shield/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">€200 billion</a> — has frightened the French and other European leaders, who fear it will further compound Germany&#8217;s industrial advantage. Paris&#8217;s anxiety stems from the fact that it does not have the resources to respond to Germany&#8217;s neo-mercantilist challenge. A source close to Macron stated bluntly: <a href="https://www.lefigaro.fr/conjoncture/bertille-bayart-le-couple-franco-allemand-cul-par-dessus-tete-20221012" target="_blank" rel="noopener">&#8220;they want to crush us&#8221;</a>. Liberal philosopher Pierre Manent noted immediately after Macron&#8217;s election in 2017 that the French “want to marry the Germans”, and called this desire “strange”. If this behaviour continues, <a href="https://www.lefigaro.fr/vox/monde/2017/10/13/31002-20171013ARTFIG00256-pierre-manent-sortons-de-cet-etat-de-transe-amoureuse-envers-l-allemagne.php" target="_blank" rel="noopener">he presciently warned</a>, France would risk complete economic, political and intellectual vassalisation. But the French subordination to Germany did not begin with Macron — it is one of the prevailing narratives of modern French history.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/05/the-failure-of-may-1968/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/05/the-failure-of-may-1968/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/GettyImages-120446131-scaled-e1653328017886.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/05/the-failure-of-may-1968/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/05/the-failure-of-may-1968/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The failure of May 1968</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/05/the-failure-of-may-1968/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Krzysztof Tyszka-Drozdowski</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>A key step towards this vassalisation was the adoption of the euro. The terms France agreed to amounted to a gift to Germany, so determined was François Mitterand to draw Germany into an integrated Europe, whatever the cost. Oskar Lafontaine, one of the SPD&#8217;s leaders, <a href="https://www.marianne.net/monde/europe/oskar-lafontaine-lamitie-franco-allemande-ne-peut-pas-fonctionner-comme-cela" target="_blank" rel="noopener">admitted years later</a> that the euro was a system that favoured his country’s economic power, as German-exported goods would have been much more expensive without the common currency. French elites believed that the monetary union would provide a magical incentive for structural reforms and saw the euro just as the Italians did: a <em>vincolo esterno</em>, an external constraint forcing them to adapt. They did not anticipate that the only thing they would have to adapt to would be Berlin&#8217;s demands.</p>
<p>France&#8217;s position <em>vis-à-vis</em> Germany worsened further in 1997, when Paris introduced a 35-hour working week. The then-Chancellor Gerhard Schröder <a href="https://www.fondation-res-publica.org/Les-strategies-qui-ont-fait-de-l-Allemagne-l-hegemon-de-l-Europe_a1507.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">described it as</a> “excellent news for German industry” and, beginning with the Schröder era, German unilateralism and neo-mercantilism became explicit. A period of <em>fait accomplis</em> was <a href="https://atlantico.fr/article/decryptage/mais-qui-osera-stopper-l-allemagne-dans-son-egoisme-forcene-bruno-alomar-roland-hureaux" target="_blank" rel="noopener">inaugurated by the Hartz reforms</a>, which Schröder did not discuss with European partners. Imposed soon after the introduction of the single currency, they tipped the scales of the eurozone <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2012/04/16/mercantilism-is-a-state-of-mind/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">permanently in favour of Berlin</a> (although <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/germany/2017-09-11/germany-after-hartz-reforms" target="_blank" rel="noopener">some do question their importance</a>).</p>
<p>Again, in 2011, Merkel did not talk to her counterparts when she decided to abandon nuclear power, which “<a href="https://atlantico.fr/article/decryptage/cavalier-seul---la-strategie-de-l-allemagne-est-une-veritable-menace-pour-le-nucleaire-en-europe-energie-centrales-investissement-avenir-strategie-choix-volonte-politique-grunen-allemands-verts-bernard-accoyer-chantal-didier" target="_blank" rel="noopener">destabilised the French nuclear industry”,</a> as pro-nuclear campaigners have put it. But the most striking example of Berlin&#8217;s unilateralism came in 2015, when Merkel single-handedly decided that Europe should open its borders to an unprecedented influx of migrants. Despite this, Macron remained a firm believer in the myth of the “<em>couple franco-allemand</em>”. During his first campaign, he promised reforms to restore trust with Germany, and travelled to Berlin on his first visit after assuming office. In 2018, during his speeches at the Sorbonne and in Athens, he went so far as to propose that the “<em>couple</em>” transform the EU into a tighter federation. Merkel, however, showed no enthusiasm for these ideas, never substantially addressing them.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.economist.com/europe/2019/11/07/emmanuel-macron-warns-europe-nato-is-becoming-brain-dead" target="_blank" rel="noopener">In an interview</a> with <em>The Economist</em> in the autumn of 2019, the French president restated his position, arguing that Nato was in a state of “brain death” and that the EU&#8217;s task should be to regain “strategic autonomy”. And more recently speaking to <em>Les Échos</em>, Macron <a href="https://www.lesechos.fr/politique-societe/emmanuel-macron-president/exclusif-emmanuel-macron-il-faut-une-politique-massive-pour-reindustrialiser-leurope-1870009" target="_blank" rel="noopener">repeated his credo</a>: “I believe in the strength of the <em>couple</em> <em>franco-allemand</em> and in our ability to implement an ambitious strategy.”</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/10/is-revolution-brewing-in-france/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/10/is-revolution-brewing-in-france/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/GettyImages-1244015001-scaled-e1666353179623.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/10/is-revolution-brewing-in-france/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading </span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/10/is-revolution-brewing-in-france/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Is revolution brewing in France?</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/10/is-revolution-brewing-in-france/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> John Lichfield </a></p></div></a></div>
<p>But Macron&#8217;s true attitude toward sovereignty is historically ambiguous, and undermines any of the grand gestures he makes. In 2010, when he sat on the Commission for the Liberation of French Growth set up by then-President Sarkozy, he proposed getting rid of France&#8217;s nuclear deterrent. “It serves no purpose. Germany doesn&#8217;t have it,” said Macron according to Marc Endeweld’s book, <em>L’Emprise</em>. And while today Macron considers reindustrialisation as inherent to strategic autonomy, over the years he has been an important actor in the deindustrialisation of France.</p>
<p>He is not the only culprit here, and this process began long before him, during the economic shocks of the Seventies. But it accelerated from 1995 to 2015, driven both by neoliberal politics and the myth of Europe. A case in point is Pechiney, world leader in the transformation of bauxite into aluminium. In 2000, as Nicolas Dufourcq explains in <em>La Désindustrialisation de la France</em>, it was strong enough to wrest control of its market through consolidations. However, the European Commission blocked these attempts and thereafter Pechiney went into decline.</p>
<p>A lack of assertiveness to protect Pechiney was accompanied by a particular intellectual climate among French elites. They had allowed themselves to be captivated by the ideology of “fabless”, whose main propagator in France was Serge Tchuruk, then CEO of Alstom. He argued that the days of industrial manufacturing were over, and claimed that a new age of post-industrial economy and society without factories was beginning, with companies only involved in design and production outsourced. Dufourcq, himself an entrepreneur and currently the director of the Banque Publique d&#8217;Investissement, argues that this had a deplorable effect: by the Noughties, Parisian elites were clueless about real industrial strategy.</p>
<p>This is Macron’s intellectual background. And he has followed its example: when he held the office of finance minister, Alstom was sold, the phone company Alcatel was bought by Nokia, Technip (an engineering and construction company in the energy sector) ended up in the hands of the American FMC, and Lafarge, specialising in building materials, became the property of the Swiss Holcim.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/04/america-has-captured-france/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/04/america-has-captured-france/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/GettyImages-1079144800-scaled.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/04/america-has-captured-france/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/04/america-has-captured-france/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>America has captured France</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/04/america-has-captured-france/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Krzysztof Tyszka-Drozdowski</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>The fate of Alstom is emblematic. It was one of the most important French conglomerates, the main contributor to France&#8217;s post-war reconstruction, whose extensive operations — from railroads to nuclear — can only be compared with Germany&#8217;s Siemens or the South Korean chaebols. Even before Macron was appointed finance minister, he piloted the Alstom case from his position as secretary to President Hollande. Back then, he commissioned an analysis from the US consulting firm AT Kearney, whose recommendation was to sell Alstom to General Electric. When minister Arnaud Montebourg tried to voice his opposition and proposed a partial nationalisation of strategic assets, <a href="https://twitter.com/france2tv/status/1452672048069808139?lang=en-GB" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Macron reportedly countered</a>: “We are not in Venezuela!”</p>
<p>In 2021, in an act of contrition, he announced the repurchase of a portion of Alstom. The price the French will come to pay will be higher than what they sold it for. And this brings to mind Jean-Pierre Maxence&#8217;s other remark about Briand. He was praised, the French writer notes, for being capable, “but his ability consisted primarily in feigning victory whenever he suffered defeat”.</p>
<p>Macron’s neo-Briandist delusions obscure his underlying powerlessness. In 2018, <a href="https://www.ifop.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/115896-Rapport.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">IFOP conducted</a> a multiple-choice survey asking who holds power in France. Remarkably, 54% of respondents pointed to the “financial markets”, while 49% chose “multinational corporations” and “the president” equally. The French public senses that the office of the president, despite the immense prerogatives with which the institutional framework of the Fifth Republic endows him, no longer commands the destiny of the country.</p>
<p>Contrarian sociologist Emmanuel Todd argues in his <em>Les Luttes des classes en France au XXIe siècle</em> that France has entered “a fascinating and fictional era&#8221;, which he calls “<em>La Grande Comédie</em>”. It has as much to do with real politics as The Phoney War had to do with real war. The main task of the French political system has become to organise fictions concealing the fact that the President has lost his influence over the course of national affairs. Judging by Macron&#8217;s recent statements about the Franco-German couple and Europe, the great comedy will only continue.</p>
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