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		<title>Syria - UnHerd</title>
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					<title>Israel doesn&#039;t need friends</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2026/07/israel-doesnt-need-friends/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://stage.unherd.com/2026/07/israel-doesnt-need-friends/?edition=us#respond</comments>
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										<unherd:main_theme>Great Power</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Edward Luttwak]]>
					</dc:creator>
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																<unherd:article_ranking>2</unherd:article_ranking>
																<unherd:image_caption>
							<![CDATA[An Israeli soldier near West Beirut, 1982. (John Downing/Getty)]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Professor Edward Luttwak</strong> is a strategist and historian known for his works on grand strategy, geoeconomics, military history, and international relations.</p>
]]>
						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>ELuttwak</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is a strategist and historian known for his works on grand strategy, geoeconomics, military history, and international relations.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Thu, 16 Jul 2026 23:01:36 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Fri, 17 Jul 2026 08:00:17 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Geopolitics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Great Power]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Iran]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Israel]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Syria]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[War]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://stage.unherd.com/?p=1067531</guid>
																												<description>
								<![CDATA[Foreign threats breed self-sufficiency]]>
							</description>
																		
																			<content:encoded>
								<![CDATA[<p>The classic definition of a Great Power is a country that can wage war without allies. Unbeknownst even to its own leaders, Israel must have been a Great Power from the very day of its birth, when it had absolutely no allies and was invaded by Egypt, Transjordan, Syria and the volunteer Arab Liberation Army. Worse still, the new Jewish statelet had to face the very active hostility of the British and US governments, which used their then-pervasive influence to close every Mediterranean port to shipments of weapons and ammunition.</p>
<p>For the roughly 650,000 Jews of the new mini-state, who sang and danced that day in May 1948, the very strict embargo was much more than an inconvenience. The British had already supplied their best fighter aircraft and tanks to the Egyptians, and armored cars with cannons to Transjordan&#8217;s Arab Legion, the best Arab army and still led by British officers. All the while, the British rulers of what remained Mandate Palestine until midnight on 14 May 1948 had done their best to stop any attempt to smuggle weapons into the future Israel with full US support — a number of Las Vegas Jews, not necessarily accountants, doctors or lawyers, went to jail for sending mere hand guns to their coreligionists. The intent, clearly, was to guarantee an Arab victory, the exact opposite of the myth of Anglo-American help for Israel which is taught as fact across the Muslim world.</p>
<p>President Truman did recognize Israel immediately, at the urging of his Great War comrade and best friend Eddie Jacobson. But the Secretary of State, the retired five-star general George Marshall who had led the US to victory against Nazi Germany, was immensely more authoritative than ex-Vice President Truman. He simply ignored Truman&#8217;s recognition, flatly refusing to receive the new state&#8217;s first envoy, who was bound to ask for weapons Marshall was determined to deny.</p>
<p>Focused on keeping the Russians from overrunning Europe, Marshall had no time for an ephemeral micro-state that would soon vanish in defeat. American interests in the Arab world were not yet that important — Saudi Arabia’s giant Ghawar oil field had just been discovered — but Arab oil mattered while the Jewish statelet could never amount to anything. That the State Department was run by antisemites was true but at that point irrelevant, because Marshall was no antisemite: his solution for the Jewish refugees still in European camps was to waive anti-immigration laws and bring them all to the US.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/05/america-has-lost-the-will-to-fight/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/05/america-has-lost-the-will-to-fight/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/GettyImages-2267672215.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/05/america-has-lost-the-will-to-fight/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/05/america-has-lost-the-will-to-fight/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>America has lost the will to fight</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/05/america-has-lost-the-will-to-fight/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Edward Luttwak</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>The determined Anglo-American attempt to strangle Israel at its birth was partly foiled by newly liberated Czechoslovakia, which had plenty of leftover machine guns and ammunition, as well as some Spitfires and other fighter planes that it was eager to sell. The Jews, for their part, had some transport aircraft and pilots, but they could not reach Israel without a refueling stop. The State Department and the Foreign Office knew all about this desperate attempt to circumvent their embargo, and they moved to deny Israel’s use of every single European airfield. Only Tito’s Yugoslavia allowed the use of a single runway in Montenegro, at the insistence of Mosa Pijade, a Sarajevo Jew and close wartime comrade of the Marshal.</p>
<p>In the end, that minuscule cargo was enough to secure Israel its independence. Yet even after the Jews defeated their Arab enemies, the State Department did not give up, strenuously and successfully opposing any US arms sales to Israel, even after the Soviet Union started sending hundreds of aircraft and thousands of tanks to Arab governments. The US only relented after Israel defeated the Arabs in June 1967, again without any US-supplied weapons and instead relying on second-hand British tanks and new French fighters sold for cold hard cash.</p>
<p>This history matters because it puts paid to the idea that Israel is entirely dependent on US largesse. There are people, including some in the Trump administration, who imagine that cutting American aid would irreparably damage the Jewish state. Israel’s population today is not 650,000, but nine million, including two million loyal Arab citizens who supply one in four of its doctors and a great many engineers.</p>
<p>And precisely because of that long history of denials and embargoes, those nine million are enough to support disproportionately large and diverse military industries. They would mitigate any would-be restrictions on US support, especially because Israel neither has nor needs the biggest items, whether aircraft carriers or the B-2 bombers that flew all the way from Missouri to bomb Iran’s vast nuclear installations at Natanz, Fordo and Isfahan.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;Those nine million Israelis are enough to support disproportionately large and diverse military industries&#8221;</div>
<p>That raises the old question of Israel’s own nuclear weapons, which have long been known to exist as bombs, as well as tactical and ballistic missile warheads. But it also raises a major mystery: why did the US have to bomb three different centrifuge installations? Just one of these, the Natanz centrifuge-enrichment plant, had an immense 2,500 square-meter hall at ground level, and two similarly sized subterranean halls with space for up to 50,000 centrifuges, far more than enough to separate the uranium needed for a number of bombs.</p>
<p>Moreover, while Natanz alone dwarfs Israel’s nuclear-weapon center on the Dimona road, fully visible to passing travelers, Iran built another large centrifuge hall under a mountain in Fordo near Qum, and then yet another, triplicate installation south of Isfahan. Adding up those sites — alongside other large workshops at Parchin — one can tell that Iran has spent many times more than Israel, without completing even a single bomb. Then there is the question of time. Israel acquired its first bomb by 1967, nine years after the project started with a small 24-megawatt French research reactor, when it was still an agricultural country of 1.8 million with no industry to speak of. By contrast, Iran bought its first centrifuge from Pakistan in 1989, to then spend increasingly vast amounts of money for 37 more years, all without acquiring a weapon.</p>
<p>In the Middle East, there is always one and the same explanation for all such mysteries: corruption, in which fanatics engage with equal enthusiasm. One glimpse suffices. On 27 November 2020, the Revolutionary Guard’s top nuclear expert was assassinated by a satellite-aimed machine-gun when returning to his villa in Absard, a swanky hill town some 45 miles from central Tehran. That luxuriously long commute, to sleep well away from Tehran’s pollution, proves nothing in itself. But its sheer largesse hints at why the centrifuge installations were triplicated, and the entire centrifuge effort duplicated by a 40-megawatt heavy-water nuclear reactor. With their priority access to Iran’s revenues, at the expense of much-needed water, gas and electricity works, the Revolutionary Guards can afford to do everything on the largest scale, including monumental headquarters in Tehran and several other cities.</p>
<p>Compare that to Professor Ernst David Bergman. Born in Karlsruhe, he headed Israel’s bomb nuclear project with Germanic discipline from start to finish, living with his family in two bedrooms and an eat-in kitchen on the premises of his laboratory, allowing him to commute on foot. That too explains how a state of nine million can research, develop and manufacture the world’s heaviest battle tank, a full range of tactical and strategic missiles, and the interceptors that inaugurated humanity’s first instance of space warfare two years ago.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/07/how-the-west-can-beat-the-rest/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/07/how-the-west-can-beat-the-rest/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/GettyImages-73737298.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/07/how-the-west-can-beat-the-rest/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/07/how-the-west-can-beat-the-rest/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>How the West can beat the rest</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/07/how-the-west-can-beat-the-rest/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Edward Luttwak</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Israel became an enthusiastic military ally of the US when it received its first-ever combat aircraft specifically built for its air force in October 1968: a large two-engine, two-seat, McDonnell Douglas F-4E Phantom. Its arrival at a remote desert base was supposed to be a state secret of the highest order, but I heard about it that very day, from a taxi driver whose base-refueller son heard a just-landed pilot exclaim, again and again, “what an aircraft! I would marry it if I could.”</p>
<p>Having survived until then on war-surplus and a few French aircraft, Israelis reacted to the start of US military aid with deep, genuine gratitude, eagerly pursuing any opportunity to reciprocate. Israel’s Mossad was inside the Soviet Union, which the CIA could only watch from afar, and offered up all it uncovered. After its October 1973 tank-warfare victories, Israel also supplied the US Army’s Fort Monroe tacticians with every bit of data for their, and Nato’s, revolutionary “fight outnumbered and win” manuals, explicitly based on the desperate Golan Heights fight in which 200 Israeli tanks destroyed four times as many Soviet-built Syrian tanks.</p>
<p>Israel’s enemies always present it as cynical about its US alliance, but in my many encounters over the years, extending to the current war, that is not what I have heard. Rather the opposite: deep concern at any sign of American weakness in facing the Chinese, Russians or anyone else, including Iran’s self-destructive fanatics. Deep satisfaction when the United States suddenly spurts ahead, as it always does, after seemingly being on the verge of being overtaken, as happened with AI and the Chinese most recently. And, of course, a great eagerness to contribute Israel’s research and development talents, whose fruits are now built into some of the most capable US weapons, most conspicuously in the F-35 fighter jet, whose innovative helmet-mounted piloting system was entirely developed in Israel.</p>
<p>Just recently, I heard White House voices claim that Netanyahu’s tenacity has become obduracy. This is a fair comment — but what is not are the suggestions by the same voices that Iran’s new leaders are very reasonable, and that Revolutionary Guard liaison officers should be received at US Central Command forward headquarters, to clear up any misunderstandings, face to face. Iranian attacks on passing tankers duly ensued, followed by more US bombing. By contrast, while it was very much also their fight, Israel’s pilots sat in their cockpits for hours to reach and bomb Iran’s distant missile launchers, which were attacking US bases and US allies, as well as Israel itself.</p>
<p>In Nato, it has long been understood that the US Navy must rely on European minesweepers and mine-hunters for its possible Persian Gulf needs, because it cannot fit such short-range vessels in its perpetual inter-oceanic transfers. But not one European Navy even tried to obtain permission to join the US Navy in the Gulf when that help was much needed. Israel, on the other hand, would never refuse any military help it could provide, as countless US officers have known for decades. That counts for much in a world where US allies give ingratitude a bad name.</p>
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					<title>The Syrian super-drug coming for Britain</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2026/03/the-syrian-super-drug-coming-for-britain/?edition=us</link>
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										<unherd:main_theme>Dispatch</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Tam Hussein]]>
					</dc:creator>
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																<unherd:article_ranking>2</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[Syria's anti-drug officers behave more like militiamen than drug-busting law enforcers, their Kalashnikovs hanging by their sides. (Bakr Alkasem/AFP/Getty)]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><b data-stringify-type="bold">Tam Hussein</b> is an award winning investigative journalist and writer. His work has been recognised by the Royal Television Society Awards.</p>
]]>
						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>tamhussein</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[<b data-stringify-type="bold">Tam Hussein</b> is an award winning investigative journalist and writer. His work has been recognised by the Royal Television Society Awards.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Mon, 30 Mar 2026 23:01:12 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Mon, 30 Mar 2026 23:01:12 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Al-Sharaa]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Captagon]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Drugs]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Middle East]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Narco-State]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Syria]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://stage.unherd.com/?p=1054351</guid>
																												<description>
								<![CDATA[Captagon is too lucrative to stop]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p dir="ltr">I was meant to be shadowing the anti-drug squad. But when I call my contact in the Syrian government, as I huddle by the stove in my Damascus flat, there’s only bad news. “We’re overwhelmed,” he says apologetically, explaining that the unit I was meant to follow is busy fighting Kurds in the north. Before that, they were busy again, working to ensure that the revolution’s anniversary wasn’t disrupted by ISIS. Syria’s drug squads, in many ways, aren’t trained counter-narcotics officers at all. They’d started out as soldiers and rebels — and only later were drawn into anti-drug work. Even now, they behave more like militiamen than drug-busting law enforcers, their Kalashnikovs hanging loosely by their sides.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Almost 18 months after Bashar al-Assad fled into exile, such frantic improvisation is unsurprising. It’s also necessary. For if, by its end, his Baathist regime had transformed the country into a virtual narco-state, whose products surfaced in ports from Rotterdam and Genoa, the Syrian drug trade is alive and kicking. Indeed, one of the civil war’s most enduring legacies is that Assad&#8217;s former country has now become a major transit and drug hub, not just in Europe but across Asia and Africa too, encompassing narcotics as varied as crystal meth and liquid cocaine.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Yet it’s Captagon that truly keeps Syria’s drug empire afloat. Offering a blend of euphoria and detachment, the stimulant is popular among young Gulf club-goers and overstretched medical students seeking an edge in their exams. Over time, it’s become one of the country’s most lucrative exports. As he visits London for the first time today, President Ahmed al-Sharaa will doubtless <a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/events/all/standard-event/ahmed-al-sharaa-president-syria-syrias-future" target="_blank" rel="noopener">parade</a> a new Syria, one primed for investment and revived Western contact. The truth, though, is that Syria has become a legal black hole, a place where drugs can disappear, before reappearing elsewhere with little law enforcement scrutiny. That matters: not only for Syria and its own fragile future, but also for the region, Europe and the wider world.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Before the revolution, drugs weren’t really part of Syria’s story. There was cannabis, of course, grown in pockets around Baalbek, Homs and Latakia, and peddled by small-time gangsters and Hezbollah. But overall, Syria wasn’t known as a drug-exporting state, while dealers themselves were dealt with harshly. I remember living in a Damascus suburb and seeing funerals for local dealers who’d been killed in shootouts with police. Then, young men would smoke cigarettes like chimneys (they still do), and might have the odd drink, but it was rare to hear of drug-taking. There was a special stigma attached to its use. Captagon, for its part, was virtually unheard of. Syria did not present itself, to its neighbours, to Europe, or to its own citizens, as a country whose most lucrative export was narcotics.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Then came the war, and it turned Bashar al-Assad into a narco boss with a country attached. Captagon’s appeal isn’t hard to grasp. Over the past decade, parts of the Middle East — particularly the Gulf — have experienced a gradual loosening of social and religious restrictions. Among a young, affluent population with disposable income, ample free time, and a growing appetite for entertainment, the inexpensive stimulant has found a ready market. Easy to manufacture, easy to package, easy to move, it requires no fields, seasons or harvests.</p>
<p dir="ltr"><div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/07/will-syrias-jihadis-go-rogue/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/07/will-syrias-jihadis-go-rogue/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/GettyImages-2188254116.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/07/will-syrias-jihadis-go-rogue/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/07/will-syrias-jihadis-go-rogue/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Will Syria’s jihadis go rogue?</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/07/will-syrias-jihadis-go-rogue/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Tam Hussein</a></p></div></a></div>
<p dir="ltr">All a would-be kingpin needs are chemical precursors —  usually a mixture of amphetamines, caffeine and various fillers — alongside machinery and protection. As Assad was crushed by sanctions and the demands of an insatiable war machine, Captagon production proved to be an invaluable financial lifeline. By this stage, the regime boasted a growing ecosystem of militias and businessmen who propped up what remained of the hollowed-out state. Only trouble was, they all needed paying, and Captagon was the answer. And since the regime was now involved, they could manufacture most of those chemicals themselves, or else import them under official cover, attracting little scrutiny about their intended use. Importers like Eyad Lahham and former MPs like Amer Tayseer Kheiti were in on the racket, as was Assad’s brother Maher, who added drug running to his list of dubious accolades. Reports suggest that the Assads legally imported chemicals from India before producing Captagon from a disused potato-chip factory in the Damascus suburb of Douma.</p>
<p dir="ltr">At first, the Assad regime denied any connection to the drug. Its appearance was instead blamed on ISIS, with the “jihadi drug” supposedly used by fighters to remain calm in battle. On 1 July 2020, Italian police seized 14 tons of Captagon in Salerno, a port south of Naples, and initially seemed inclined to believe the shipment was indeed intended to fund ISIS. The Italians also explored links between the Islamists and the Neapolitan Camorra. No Camorra-ISIS connection was ever substantiated. What is known, though, is that one of Europe’s biggest drug traffickers, with Camorra ties, was <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/nov/16/arrest-of-drug-trafficker-on-europols-most-wanted-list-shrouded-in-mystery" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/nov/16/arrest-of-drug-trafficker-on-europols-most-wanted-list-shrouded-in-mystery&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1774944769308000&amp;usg=AOvVaw1NUxZ_q4w9GjT10ya3GIgj">arrested</a> by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham — al-Sharaa’s former outfit — while attempting to cross into regime-held territory in 2022.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Assad-linked networks were, by then, the drug’s main manufacturers and exporters. Maher al-Assad is again a case in point: his notorious Fourth Armored Division got so rich of Captagon that it reportedly <a href="https://www.afp.com/en/agency/inside-afp/inside-afp/wheres-gold-how-assads-sucked-syria-dry" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.afp.com/en/agency/inside-afp/inside-afp/wheres-gold-how-assads-sucked-syria-dry&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1774944769308000&amp;usg=AOvVaw0ZrMQ_64weHKndSRUzlWRH">maintained</a> an $80 million cash reserve at a time when the average Syrian was surviving on just $2 a day. Maher and his associates meanwhile flaunted their wealth — supercars, watches, funds parked safely abroad — embodying the stark inequality that Assad&#8217;s narco-economy had created. All the while, this bonanza offered opportunities for ordinary Syrians. A young soldier might supplement his poor salary; a Bedouin school kid, instead of going to school, could smuggle Captagon and earn $1,000 a day.</p>
<p dir="ltr"><div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;A Bedouin school kid, instead of going to school, could smuggle Captagon and earn $1,000 a day.&#8221;</div>
<p dir="ltr">The profits, then, were simply too hard to ignore. But so too is the social impact it’s wrought. Some weeks ago, while visiting friends in the war-scarred city of Raqqa — the former de facto capital of ISIS — my host warned me not to leave belongings in the car. Anything left behind, he said, would likely be stolen and sold to finance an addict’s drug habit. A UN employee from the city, speaking on condition of anonymity, describes the situation as an epidemic. Things are exacerbated, he adds, by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), a group of mostly Kurdish fighters, whose personnel turn a blind eye to trafficking — and allegedly take a cut of the action.</p>
<p dir="ltr">In this, al-Sharaa is surely an improvement. His new government celebrated the end of the trade, partly for propaganda reasons but also sincerely. For Muslims in general, and Islamists in particular, drugs aren’t just criminal but impious. Mere weeks after his victory, in the grand setting of the Umayyad Mosque in Damascus no less, al-Sharaa announced the end of “the largest Captagon factory in the world” to a rapt audience.</p>
<p dir="ltr">All that was ultimately dismantled, however, was the regime-era infrastructure; a decentralized “cottage” industry of smaller players remain. Logistics is on their side. From there, consignments are moved towards Jordan using smuggling tactics that sound like folklore until you meet the men tasked with stopping them, with everything from livestock to drones used to hide the drugs. The real key, though, is to secure the networks through which you can move your goods — and those criminal networks didn’t go away when Assad fell.</p>
<p dir="ltr">The point, here, is that Syria’s narco-state didn’t disappear. Rather, it decentralized, its remnants scattering and grouping in enclaves where government control was weakest. Many former regime producers, as analyst Charles Lister has noted, fled to join the area controlled by Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri, the de facto ruler and spiritual head of the Druze community in Suwayda. From 2018, the Assad regime allowed the province, not far from the Jordanian border, a degree of self-rule and a free hand in Captagon. For Hijri, handing over power to Damascus would effectively cut off the trade that funded both his militias and the autonomy they implied. Following his split from Damascus last year, and the creation of an independent enclave closely aligned to Israel, Hijri has emerged leader of what one expert calls a “narco-statelet” — one far closer to cartel-run corners of Mexico than any imagined Druze utopia.</p>
<p dir="ltr"><div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/11/mexicos-unending-drug-wars/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/11/mexicos-unending-drug-wars/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/GettyImages-78133174-e1762108612960.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/11/mexicos-unending-drug-wars/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/11/mexicos-unending-drug-wars/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Mexico’s unending drug wars</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/11/mexicos-unending-drug-wars/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Ioan Grillo</a></p></div></a></div>
<p dir="ltr">The Damascus authorities are hardly blind to this reality. But the fact remains that anti-drug campaigns are overstretched, under-resourced and often improvisational. Yet again, this can partly be explained by the 2024 revolution. Many experienced law-enforcement officers fled after Assad’s fall. In some areas, policing has since fallen to young local men, often without much training. Responsibility for counter-narcotics rests largely with the Interior Ministry and a security apparatus still being built, all while confronting more immediate threats. The result is a nationwide game of whack-a-mole, with raids, seizures, shootouts and occasional successes — followed by the reappearance of dealers elsewhere.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Meanwhile, officials I speak to describe increasingly sophisticated smuggling methods, from hidden tunnels to the sea route via Latakia. Scarcity has driven up prices; tighter restrictions have paradoxically made Captagon more lucrative. The trade adapts because, once more, its incentives are structural. <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2025/07/07/-new-world-bank-report-highlights-syria-s-economic-challenges-and-recovery-prospects-for-2025" target="_blank" rel="noopener">According to the World Bank</a>, extreme poverty still affects one in four Syrians, and with basic services like electricity eye-wateringly expensive, drugs remain a tempting option. That’s clear enough online. In forums I follow, there’s a lively trade between punters and traders, discussing prices, routes and volumes with the casual tone of men selling spare parts. Sometimes an odd request for a gun or cocaine is thrown in with a picture, and the trader asks for the buyer to DM him. Users sometimes upload images to show they’ve picked up their stashes, their dealer responding with a jaunty thumbs-up emoji.</p>
<p dir="ltr">What becomes evident from these conversations is that Captagon’s reach extends far beyond the Levant or even Europe, and now encompasses far-off East Africa and the Ivory Coast. One network, operating laboratory facilities in Turkey, shared wholesale prices that illustrate this reach. A million pills were apparently sold for around $150,000, with smaller batches priced in neat increments.</p>
<p dir="ltr">And if the Syrian trade was made by Captagon, there are ominous signs that diversification is the order of the day. That Turkish network doesn’t only deal in Captagon, but also heroin, Tramadol, Ritalin, Modafinil, Lyrica, hashish and crystal meth. Of course, not every claim made online is necessarily true. But that matters less than what these claims reveal: traffickers now think globally, because the market itself is global.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Given all this, how can the authorities respond? Beyond ad hoc raids — officials recently seized a major shipment of liquid cocaine from the port at Latakia — one senior Syrian official I speak to is skeptical. Dismantling an industry built over a decade and a half, he suggests, would take two or three years of sustained effort. What with its global spread, even that estimate may be optimistic. To be fair, there are now signs of cross-border cooperation, like when the Jordanian airforce recently bombed Captagon supply lines in Suwayda. More than that, though, the Syrians themselves need help: both technical support and investment.</p>
<p dir="ltr">After all, places like Suwayda rely on Captagon because of political or militia power — but also because of poverty. And if Syria and the international community aren’t careful, this small pill may yet prove more destabilizing than anything the region has seen, like a modern Pied Piper, luring its youth with the promise of oblivion. Add the networks expanding across Europe and we may soon find Captagon on the streets of Britain. Whatever al-Sharaa might claim, Syria’s civil war isn&#8217;t over yet.</p>
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															<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">1054351</post-id>				</item>
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					<title>Can Syria break its sectarian cycle?</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2026/02/can-syria-break-its-sectarian-cycle/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://stage.unherd.com/2026/02/can-syria-break-its-sectarian-cycle/?edition=us#comments</comments>
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										<unherd:main_theme>ethnic conflict</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Aris Roussinos]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/aris.jpeg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>2</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA['The remorseless logic of a country, like neighbouring Lebanon and Iraq, held hostage by its own tangled demographics.' (Delil Souleiman / AFP /  Getty Imges)]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Aris Roussinos</strong> is an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist and a former war reporter.</p>
]]>
						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>arisroussinos</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist and a former war reporter.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Tue, 10 Feb 2026 00:02:23 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Tue, 10 Feb 2026 08:43:23 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ahmed al-Sharaa]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Bashar al-Assad]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Kurds]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Syria]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://stage.unherd.com/?p=1047121</guid>
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								<![CDATA[The Kurdish experiment was doomed]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>It is generally expected that, whatever the ostensible cause of a civil war, in a country divided on ethnic and religious lines the fighting will sooner or later assume an interethnic or sectarian flavor. The Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES), now having <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2026/01/28/rojava-turkey-syria-kurds-erdogan-sharaa/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">surrendered its autonomy</a> under assault from the Syrian state’s new jihadist-derived government, was, whatever else it may have been, an attempt to rebut this grim logic. Indeed, the dusty and unprepossessing plains of the Syrian Jazira — the northeastern portion of the country, east of the Euphrates — served for more than a decade as an unlikely political experiment in the management and defusion of ethnic conflict.</p>
<p>Whether noble or naive, this project now looks doomed as AANES’s great power backers turn their fickle attentions to Damascus, and the Damascus government has in turn successfully reasserted its control through military coercion. Within a matter of days, as its Sunni Arab levies turned their affections to their ethnic kin in Damascus and their guns on their former allies, Northeast Syria switched from a bold experiment in multi-ethnic governance to a desperate, rearguard battle for Kurdish cultural and political autonomy. The war, at its presumed end, reverted to the dynamics of its earliest days, when Ahmed al-Sharaa, then leader of the Syrian al-Qaeda faction Jabhat al-Nusra, had attempted, along with the Free Syrian Army (FSA) rebels and tribes of changeable loyalties, to seize control of the oil-rich, and newly Kurdish-run region, Syria’s breadbasket.</p>
<p>Simultaneously rich in resources yet neglected by its central government, and host to the country’s richest mix of ethnic and religious minorities, alternately the tools and the victims of the central state, <a href="https://www.merip.org/2023/01/the-jaziras-long-shadow-over-turkey-and-syria/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">the Syrian Jazira</a> had always run according to its own dynamics. Both colonial French and independent Syrian administrations in distant, Levantine Damascus expended significant, if sporadic, effort in absorbing this neglected region of Mesopotamia within the modern state system, privileging one ethnic group against another for reasons of statecraft, and building model towns and vast dams, as evocative in their current dilapidation of failed modernities as the ancient <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tell_(archaeology)" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em>tells</em></a> dotting the landscape, now repurposed as gun emplacements, are of earlier lost civilizations.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/11/benedict-anderson-nationalist-prophet/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/11/benedict-anderson-nationalist-prophet/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Screenshot-2025-10-31-at-17.24.54-e1761931737673.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/11/benedict-anderson-nationalist-prophet/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/11/benedict-anderson-nationalist-prophet/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Benedict Anderson: humane nationalist</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/11/benedict-anderson-nationalist-prophet/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Aris Roussinos</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Perhaps the AANES experiment can now be added to this melancholy list. Birthed from the fusion of Kurdish nationalism and Marxist-Leninist thought that initially drove the Kurdistan Workers&#8217; Party (PKK) independence movement, the AANES, a project of the PKK’s Syrian sister organization, the Democratic Union Party ‎(PYD), performed an attempted shift to anarchist political theory. The thought of the American writer Murray Bookchin, as reworked by the PKK’s occluded godhead figure Abdullah Öcalan from his Turkish jail cell, was its most notable innovation. Echoing Öcalan’s rejection of the PKK’s previous project of independence for the Kurdish nation, the AANES presented itself as an explicitly multi-ethnic, multi-sectarian state in which the greatest possible autonomy was devolved to religious and ethnic communities, beneath the benign framework of Jazira’s de facto autonomy from Damascus. In practice, the quasi-anarchist devolution of power resulted in the proliferation of bureaucratic structures. Local empowerment, similarly, meant the elevation of new elites loyal to the project, and the freezing out of dissidents, particularly rival Kurdish factions. Imperfect though it may have been, compared to the overt totalitarianism of the Baathist state, the anarchic infighting of the FSA rebels, and the gothic cruelties of ISIS, history is likely to remember it more favorably than today’s discourse would suggest.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;Perhaps the AANES experiment can now be added to this melancholy list.&#8221;</div>
<p>Barely populated until the French Mandate period, except during the annual circulation of nomadic Bedouin shepherds, the portion of Syria east of the Euphrates underwent during the early 20th century a transformative period of internal and external immigration and development analogous, in a modest way, to that of California or Australia. Ethnic Kurds fleeing the collapse of proto-nationalist rebellions in Ataturk’s Turkey, along with Syriac Christians fleeing the Seifo genocide and many uprooted Armenians streamed south across the culverts and rusting tracks of the Berlin-to-Baghdad railway line, which still marks the modern border, joining their ethnic kin residing there from the beginning of recorded history. Ethnic Assyrians from British-Mandate northern Iraq similarly sought French protection from the predation of the Iraqi state and its Kurdish, Arab and Turkmen auxiliaries, establishing a string of fiercely Christian villages along the Khabur river. Northeast Syria was shaped by the cultural memory of ethnic conflict; its past decade of governance was an attempt to evade the return of its attendant cruelties.</p>
<p>As such, the AANES project was always as much one of necessity as Leftist idealism. The Kurdish regions of northern Syria, stretching West of the Euphrates into Aleppo, were separated from each other by clusters of Arab and Turkmen towns and villages, in large part the result of the Baathist state’s <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arab_Belt_project">settlement of Arabs</a> from Syria’s desert hinterland to hinder any Kurdish attempts at secession. While the early successes of the Syrian Kurds under the PYD, following a negotiated handover of control by Assad’s overstretched government, resulted in what was essentially the occupation by its YPG military forces of Arab settlements, loyal to one or other rebel or jihadist faction, America’s decisive intervention in the war against ISIS resulted in both sudden and unexpected great power backing for Northeast Syria and an evolution of Kurdish political attitudes towards local Arabs.</p>
<p>Partly at America’s behest, in a failed attempt to assuage the Syrian rebels’ combative Western think-tank diaspora, and partly a genuine attempt to impose progressive governance among a population Kurds frequently portray as stunted by its own reactionary obscurantism and crude ethnic chauvinism, Northeast Syria’s autonomous quasi-government undertook a project of delegating political and military authority to Arab regions won back from ISIS. It was an ambitious goal which seemed, for a decade, to have won majority acquiescence, if not affection. It became the boast of the regional administration that its armed forces, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), was now predominantly composed of Arabs, a feat of enlightened governance that rapidly proved hollow, over the past two weeks, when the majority of these Arab fighters effortlessly switched sides. Having lost almost all its Arab accretions, the SDF was once again, in practice, the Kurdish YPG, an ethnic militia fighting for purely Kurdish goals. Now that, under the threat of military defeat, a shrunken version of these forces will be subsumed under the Damascus government’s control, their future role — on paper, and in reality — remains to be seen.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://jinsa.org/jinsa_report/what-the-new-agreement-means-for-kurds-in-syria-and-beyond/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">integration terms finally accepted</a>, at gunpoint, by the autonomous administration last weekend, though better than those of a fortnight ago are worse than those of the unimplemented March agreement. Consequently, much has been made in recent days of the AANES’s failures to come to terms with al-Sharaa’s shock capture of the Syrian state just over a year ago, and negotiate a settlement with the new reality. Certainly, the region’s political focus had, since the seeming cornering of the Sunni Arab rebellion into its Idlib Bantustan, centered on negotiating re-integration into Assad’s Baathist state in a manner that preserved some means of political and military autonomy. Yet Assad, over-confident of his own position as victor of the long and bloody war, refused to offer more than integration into the central state on terms that amounted to surrender. The new regime in Damascus now offers little different: what has changed is its greater power of coercion, and international backing, compared to its previous Baathist iteration.</p>
<p>Putin, once an occasional, tacit partner of the Kurds west of the Euphrates, has <a href="https://english.aawsat.com/arab-world/5234947-putin-sharaa-talks-focus-strengthening-bilateral-ties" target="_blank" rel="noopener">fully backed</a> the new Damascus government, another instance where Russia, once America’s rival in Syria, shares increasingly aligned interests with <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/1/28/trump-praises-syrian-president-al-sharaa-after-offensive-against-sdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">the Trump White House</a>. Calls for the protection of Kurdish cultural rights and social norms by European states are outweighed by their overriding political interest in <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/dec/10/countries-push-to-return-syrians-home-fall-of-assad" target="_blank" rel="noopener">the accelerated removal</a> of their more than one million mostly Sunni Arab refugees. Regionally, the success or otherwise of the Northeast’s reintegration will determine Israel’s ability to justify its military protection of <a href="https://x.com/diyarkurda/status/2017647539655151954?s=20" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Druze autonomists</a> in the southern province of Sweida. Relations with mostly Shia Iraq, which has <a href="https://www.newarab.com/analysis/why-iraq-edge-syrias-northeast-status-quo-unravels" target="_blank" rel="noopener">its own reasons</a> to look askance at Sunni jihadist governance and is currently <a href="https://x.com/RudawEnglish/status/2013135338214928834?s=20" target="_blank" rel="noopener">making a show</a> of reinforcing its border with Syria, will be fraught at best. Given the sheer improbability of fate’s wheel suddenly projecting al-Sharaa into Assad’s Damascus palace, it would be foolhardy to offer any firm predictions, rather than vague anxieties, for the country’s future.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/01/the-west-has-abandoned-the-kurds/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/01/the-west-has-abandoned-the-kurds/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/Women-take-up-arms-in-Qamishlo-in-the-face-of-the-invasion-1.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/01/the-west-has-abandoned-the-kurds/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested Reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/01/the-west-has-abandoned-the-kurds/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The West has abandoned the Kurds</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/01/the-west-has-abandoned-the-kurds/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Matt Broomfield</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>For the Kurds themselves, the experiment in enlightened multi-ethnic governance proved, at the crucial moment, a dramatic and costly Achilles heel. The result, over time, will likely be the weakening of PKK ideology in favor of some form of pan-Kurdish ethnic nationalism, whose early stirrings are apparent in <a href="https://x.com/ammarraliii/status/2016595535235309894?s=20" target="_blank" rel="noopener">the flow of volunteers</a> from northern Iraq to defend their ethnic kin, <a href="https://x.com/RojavaNetwork/status/2016295958712054084?s=20" target="_blank" rel="noopener">the sudden revival</a> of the Kurdish flag, <em>Ala Rengin</em>, in Northeast Syria, and in the readoption of the ethnic term Rojava, or West Kurdistan, in place of its previously bland geographic descriptor. When even Abdullah Öcalan’s nephew Ömer, an MP in Turkey’s parliament for the movement-aligned DEM party, feels compelled to <a href="https://x.com/omerrocalan/status/2015814031886397463?s=20" target="_blank" rel="noopener">proclaim</a> “Long live the Kurds and Kurdistan”, <a href="https://x.com/omerrocalan/status/2016548790384153080?s=20" target="_blank" rel="noopener">and</a> “the Kurdish nation will not forgive the enmity committed against it”, we sense the tectonic plates of Kurdish politics shifting away from Leftist post-national idealism towards an embryonic ethnic nationalism. The decade-long experience of Kurdish self-governance, military success and international diplomacy will shape whatever follows the likely collapse of the AANES statelet, whether what replaces it will coalesce in the mountainous redoubts of eastern Turkey, Western Iran and northern Iraq, or in <a href="https://x.com/kurdishblogger/status/2017637959512547699?s=20" target="_blank" rel="noopener">the grey cities</a> of the European diaspora. So, too, will bitter analysis of the project’s failings.</p>
<p>Yet it would be unfair for harsh self-criticism to so soon follow hindsight. For all its faults, the Kurdish project of autonomy from the Syrian central state evolved, through managing the dynamics of their multi-ethnic region, into one that ironically and idealistically attempted to make the very idea of equable Syrian co-existence a political possibility. Inversely, the current Damascus project of re-centralization has, in western Syria, been accompanied by <a href="https://www.reuters.com/investigations/syrian-forces-massacred-1500-alawites-chain-command-led-damascus-2025-06-30/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">sectarian massacres</a> and <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2025/07/syria-authorities-must-investigate-abductions-of-alawite-women-and-girls/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">other abuses</a>, which have increased the antipathy of peripheral minority populations towards the central state. Sunni Arab supporters of the al-Sharaa government, whose decade-long displeasure at having their ethnic kin ruled by minorities is accompanied by certainty of their own natural right to rule those same minorities, have made much of Kurdish intransigence while minimizing or even justifying the starkest governance failures of their own new regime. Yet the past year’s massacres of Alawites and <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2025/10/22/world/middleeast/syria-massacre-druse.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Druze</a>, punctuating the failed integration talks with the AANES, only heightened the Kurdish disinclination to disarm and dissolve its forces and place the fates of its people in the benevolence of the central state.</p>
<p>Syria’s post-independence oscillation between peripheral revolts and centralized coercion, <a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2021/07/the-west-will-never-understand-syria/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">the very cycle</a> that produced both Assad and his own overthrow, is simply the remorseless logic of a country, like neighboring Lebanon and Iraq, held hostage by its own tangled demographics. Whether or not the new Syria can <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/cmt/middle-east-north-africa/syria/opportunity-calm-north-eastern-syria" target="_blank" rel="noopener">break this cycle</a> is <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2026/01/31/opinion/syria-kurds-turkey-pkk.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">an open question</a>. It will take great feats of governance, and of <a href="https://www.wsj.com/opinion/can-syrias-president-control-his-troops-sharaa-middle-east-5d3ceb4b?" target="_blank" rel="noopener">control</a> over his own disparate armed forces, by al-Sharaa to avoid the logic of Syria’s demographic confusion weakening his own state-building project just as, suddenly and catastrophically, it did for the Kurds. Syria’s ethnic and religious complexity makes it a hard country to rule, historically veering, as a result, between instability and oppression. The Kurdish attempt to find another, progressive path ultimately failed, for the same reasons. The lessons, it ought not to need underlining, reach far beyond Syria’s borders.</p>
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															<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">1047121</post-id>				</item>
									<item>
					<title>Will civil war return to Syria?</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2025/12/will-civil-war-return-to-syria/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://stage.unherd.com/2025/12/will-civil-war-return-to-syria/?edition=us#comments</comments>
										<unherd:featured_image>https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/GettyImages-2203587929.jpg?w=525</unherd:featured_image>
										<unherd:main_theme>One year on</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Tam Hussein]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/blued-2.jpg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>3</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[A fighter in Latakia. Omar Haj Kadour/AFP/Getty Images ]]>
						</unherd:image_caption>
						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><b data-stringify-type="bold">Tam Hussein</b> is an award winning investigative journalist and writer. His work has been recognised by the Royal Television Society Awards.</p>
]]>
						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>tamhussein</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[<b data-stringify-type="bold">Tam Hussein</b> is an award winning investigative journalist and writer. His work has been recognised by the Royal Television Society Awards.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Mon, 08 Dec 2025 00:00:01 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Mon, 08 Dec 2025 00:25:33 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Civil War]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Syria]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://stage.unherd.com/?p=1040333</guid>
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								<![CDATA[Its future is in the balance]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>A few months ago in Damascus, I discovered a medieval hospital. The door had been left slightly ajar, and I wandered in with my companion Hassan Idlibi — a rebel fighter and old friend. He hadn’t been in the Old City since the fall of Syria’s capital, exactly a year ago today. “When Damascus fell,” he told me, “we were at our lowest ebb. Even the attack on Aleppo was our last gasp. We wanted to break the stalemate. And then we just pushed and pushed, and we ended up sleeping inside the Umayyad Mosque. It was a miracle.”</p>
<p>Idlibi, like many Syrians, did not interpret the taking of Damascus through geopolitics — but as divine intervention. This wasn’t because he was a mindless zealot. Far from it. He is one of the most well-read men I know<em>. </em>But, to his mind, the fall of Damascus was so sudden, so unexpected, that only the miraculous could explain it. The victory, he noted, had been achieved by those who had been motivated by Islam. Help had come from foreign fighters, <em>the mujahideen</em>, who traveled from across the globe to aid their co-religionists. And the campaign had been led by a former jihadi, Ahmed al-Sharaa, now the interim president of Syria. At the time, the old al-Qaeda operative, then known by his nom de guerre, Abu Mohammad al-Jolani, had a $10 million American bounty on his head.</p>
<p>After more than a decade of slaughter, no one had expected the capital to collapse. Assad, then president, had seemed like a stubborn wart: unpleasant but immovable. Jolani’s rebel enclave in the northern city of Idlib looked too small, too besieged, to pose a serious threat — though in fact it was performing better economically than inflation-ravaged Damascus, helped along by a reliable flow of Turkish hard currency. I myself expected the rebels to negotiate. What leverage did they have? Yet this rebel government, roughly the size of Croydon, took over the instruments of state, and since then has avoided stumbling into a new civil war.</p>
<p>The unexpected and largely peaceful victory was attributed to piety, prophecy, steadfastness. Some have even compared the final conquest of Damascus to Muhammad’s bloodless conquest of Mecca in 630. The idea of a “miracle”, here, is not mere rhetoric — it shapes political expectations. Some Syrians, at least based on my social media, think all this makes Sharaa “the one”, with my Facebook messages and WhatsApp chats awash with prophetic readings of the present. One believed Syria would now enjoy 10 years of peace before the war with Israel begins. Perhaps, he suggested, this was the prelude to the end of times. After all, so-called “Greater Syria” — encompassing much of the Levant — plays an important role in the Syrian and indeed Muslim sacral imagination. It is where prophets walked and is the place where many of the end of times narratives will play themselves out.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;Some have even compared the final conquest of Damascus to Muhammad’s bloodless conquest of Mecca in 630.&#8221;</div>
<p>Yet if the fall of Damascus seemed miraculous to many Syrians, the survival of the new administration will depend less on providence than on governance. Despite his past, Sharaa has so far demonstrated an unexpected level of political finesse. He has kept the constitution, held elections — albeit with 70 seats appointed by himself — and all the while has acted the statesman. He is savvy enough to not mind having President Trump spray his latest fragrance on him in the Oval Office, or Syrian Jewish rabbis blessing him.</p>
<p>Sharaa has made some promising early decisions. By keeping the civil service intact, he has avoided the catastrophic purge that helped destroy post-invasion Iraq. He should continue recruiting highly-educated young Syrians from the diaspora — people familiar with Western administrations and political norms. Even so, the administration still has a tendency to fear scrutiny and behaves as if under siege. It should welcome a regulated free press, which would expose blind spots, not undermine authority. The British press has reported that Jonathan Powell’s Inter Mediate is working with the new government. This should be welcomed rather than criticized — not only for reasons of conflict resolution and soft power, but for its value in statecraft and building institutional capacity.</p>
<p>Sharaa’s priorities for the coming year are clear. The country remains immensely fragile, caught in a regional tug-of-war between Israel and its neighbors, and divided along ethnic and sectarian lines. The situation could easily drift into a reprise of Lebanon’s civil war. Sharaa’s first task is therefore to mend Syria’s sectarian and ethnic fractures with a sense of equity. The trials that began this month over the coastal massacres in Latakia will be an important test of how the country intends to move forward. The Druze and Alawite communities — already bruised by conflict and mistrust — require justice delivered without the language of sectarianism.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, Kurdish anxieties must be addressed by ending the Arab-first ideology of the old regime. Syria has never been a purely Arab country: even its favorite son, Saladin, the builder of that hospital I visited and whose grave in Damascus still draws multitudes, was a Kurd. Last year’s tentative permission for Kurdish new year celebrations (Newroz) suggests that a more pluralist future is possible. Yet it remains unclear how far Kurdish cultural expression will be allowed to develop. Already this month, exchanges of fire between Syrian government forces and Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) units under Kurdish command show how fragile the situation is.</p>
<p>Perhaps the most difficult balancing act involves the foreign fighters who fought on Sharaa’s side. They carry immense symbolic weight in Syrian society — and are the cause of immense fear in the West. Many are ready to resume normal life, but others still see themselves as Islam’s warriors. Recent clashes in the Idlib countryside involving French foreign fighters reflect anxieties that any rapprochement with the West might see them handed over to their home governments. The image of Sharaa standing beside Trump, receiving a symbolic “anointing” of his new fragrance, alarms them even if such engagement is politically necessary.</p>
<p>Granting these fighters legal status, regularizing their papers, integrating some into the national army or demobilizing them with stipends and educational opportunities — not unlike the GI Bill for US veterans — could go a long way toward neutralizing one of Syria’s most volatile pressures.</p>
<p>Then there is the conundrum of Israel. On this, Sharaa has cultivated deliberate ambiguity. At the United Nations, Syria has repeatedly noted its restraint regarding Israel’s illegal strikes on Syrian territory, yet Sharaa has resisted pressure to join Trump’s flagship Abraham Accords. Signing them now would be political suicide. But ambiguity buys him room to maneuver — and time to consolidate the state. The question is how long this can last.</p>
<p>For its part, the West has worked to prevent Syria from sliding into another civil war — one that would inevitably spill over into Europe, potentially replaying the exodus of 2015. With regional partners like Saudi Arabia and Turkey, Western governments have effectively restrained Israeli escalation, aware that renewed instability would eventually reach Jerusalem’s door. It’s not impossible to imagine rebels, having overthrown a “pro-Western stooge” like Sharaa and aided by foreign fighters, actually marching toward Israel, convinced that “the infidels” will never allow them to determine their own future. As they did in Damascus, so too — in their imagination — must they do in Jerusalem.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/12/how-syria-will-shape-europes-future/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/12/how-syria-will-shape-europes-future/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/Screenshot-2024-12-16-at-11.56.41.png?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/12/how-syria-will-shape-europes-future/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/12/how-syria-will-shape-europes-future/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>How Syria will shape Europe&#039;s future</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/12/how-syria-will-shape-europes-future/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Aris Roussinos</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Thus far Sharaa has governed with surprising openness. He has welcomed Britain’s foreign secretary David Lammy, met American diplomats and General David Petraeus, played basketball with US soldiers, and cooperated in counter-terrorism operations. He has also restored relations with London, with foreign minister Asaad al-Shaibani reopening the Syrian embassy.</p>
<p>If Western governments refuse to work with him because of his Islamist roots, they will share responsibility should Syria fracture again. Sharaa’s past is not erased; he may remain an uncomfortable partner. But what is the alternative? That he be excluded from political life and drift into a Castro- or Maduro-like role on the sidelines? If the Saudi Crown Prince can be brought in from the cold after the Khashoggi murder, then almost anything is possible.</p>
<p>Here I recall a meeting with former Saudi spy chief Turki al-Faisal in his South Kensington apartment after the release of his memoir. Faisal lamented how his advice went unheeded after the Afghan-Soviet war. He had urged the international community to launch something akin to a Marshall Plan — an investment program to stabilize Afghanistan. Had that happened, the region might not have unraveled. Instead, the country collapsed into years of civil war.</p>
<p>Likewise, fully lifting sanctions on Syria and providing a major investment program, coupled with training and cultural exchange, could restrain the country’s more radical elements. Reining in Israeli escalation, de-escalating the Druze conflict, and mediating between the SDF and Damascus would all help prevent new wars. On this, the West could also spare itself a future security headache by helping Damascus regularize or demobilize foreign fighters rather than leaving them to drift. This would all help to displace messianism.</p>
<p>What, then, would such investment bring the West, beyond avoiding another gaping wound on its eastern flank? For sure, it will not turn Damascus into another Beirut, a place for foreign journalists to party, nor into a Deano-friendly Dubai. Syria will likely remain socially conservative, more like Muscat in Oman. Given time, however, it could become a commercial hub with a distinct cultural life, just as it has been for much of its epic history. This isn’t mere optimism: Sharaa turned Idlib, once a distant town, into a magnet for Damascenes seeking commercial opportunity. Investment now would bring the West a friendly partner, business prospects and political influence. The choice is stark. With support, Syria could become a kind of West Germany: rebuilt, integrated, and stable. Without it, the country risks becoming a new Jerusalem — a battleground charged with fire and prophecy.</p>
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					<title>Does Syria have a future?</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2025/11/does-syria-have-a-future/?edition=us</link>
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										<unherd:main_theme>Middle East</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[David Patrikarakos]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/David-Patrikarakos.jpg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>2</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[They have their eye on Damascus. Credit: Uygar Onder Simsek/AFP via Getty Images]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>David Patrikarakos</strong> is <em>UnHerd</em>&#8216;s foreign correspondent. His latest book is <em>War in 140 characters: how social media is reshaping conflict in the 21st century. </em>(Hachette)</p>
]]>
						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>dpatrikarakos</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is <em>UnHerd</em>'s foreign correspondent. His latest book is <em>War in 140 characters: how social media is reshaping conflict in the 21st century. </em>(Hachette)]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Tue, 11 Nov 2025 00:01:04 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Tue, 11 Nov 2025 00:58:46 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Al-Sharaa]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Damascus]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Kurds]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Middle East]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Syria]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://stage.unherd.com/?p=1036613</guid>
																												<description>
								<![CDATA[The Kurds still mistrust al-Sharaa]]>
							</description>
																		
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								<![CDATA[<p dir="ltr">Not so long ago, US presidents ordered the killing of jihadists from the White House. These days, they’re invited to Washington for a chat. Ahmed al-Sharaa’s meeting yesterday with Donald Trump represented the climax of a remarkable year for the former al-Qaeda leader: his transformation from terrorist to statesman is, it now seems, complete. And we must hope that it is a sincere metamorphosis. For after the chaos of Syria’s civil war, the Americans — and the world — need to know that Sharaa can hold his fragile country together.</p>
<p dir="ltr">So far, he has said the right things, apparently trying to govern with pragmatism. But the reality is that the future of Syria does not lie with him — and his fellow Sunnis — alone. Syria’s minorities will help decide the nation’s fate as well, and none is as large or powerful as its Kurds. They, after all, are the only real force in the country outside Damascus that can put a disciplined army in the field: the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which was built in alliance with the United States to destroy ISIS. No less important, they control about 70% of Syria’s oil and gas reserves.</p>
<p dir="ltr">That blend of military and economic neatly explains why, if Syria is to survive as a viable state, Sharaa must find a way to accommodate its Kurdish minority, which even amid the upheavals of war and displacement represent roughly a tenth of the country’s total population. Combined with a gaggle of other minorities — Christians, Alawites, Druze — Syria simply cannot be the Sunni Caliphate that Sharaa once sought.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Still, many Kurds remain wary. In the cafés of Qamishli, the main city of the Syrian Kurdish region popularly known as Rojava, people joke that Sharaa’s beard may be shorter — but his prayers are the same. They want Syria to work. They need it to. But behind the dark humor lies genuine fear: that a man defined by jihad can never build the pluralist state necessary to keep Syria together.</p>
<p dir="ltr">No one understands these tensions better than Aldar Khalil. Officially, he is a senior member of the Executive Committee of the Democratic Society Movement in Rojava — the Kurdish-run autonomous region in Syria’s northeast — and its most powerful figure. In reality, he is its de facto leader. Whether or not the Syrian state can hold together will come down, in large part, to the decisions he and a few others around him take.</p>
<p dir="ltr">To meet Khalil, I leave Qamishli and travel through pale emptiness to the town of Hasakah. At checkpoints, Kurdish fighters in faded fatigues wave me through. We enter the city and eat. Night falls and we wait for news. It’s time: follow the black car, we are told. We end up in a municipal building of some kind. Prominently displayed on a wall is a photo of Abdullah Öcalan, founder of the Kurdistan Workers&#8217; Party (PKK) who’s been in a Turkish prison since 1999, and whose picture you see everywhere in Rojava. We sit in a large room with Kurdish carpets on the wall. Coffee and bottles of water are laid out for us.</p>
<p dir="ltr"><div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/09/syrias-future-is-sectarian/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/09/syrias-future-is-sectarian/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/GettyImages-2198554735.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/09/syrias-future-is-sectarian/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested Reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/09/syrias-future-is-sectarian/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Syria’s future is sectarian</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/09/syrias-future-is-sectarian/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Tam Hussein </a></p></div></a></div>
<p dir="ltr">Khalil enters with his security detail. He wears beige trousers and a checked shirt. I notice that his left hand is missing. Later I ask why, but nobody really knows. One of my guides ventures that it might have something to do with a grenade, but that’s just speculation.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Khalil’s manner is polite, controlled, his voice almost soft. “People in Syria began the revolution hoping for a democratic system,” he says. “But after the regime collapsed, what came was in total opposition to that: a government that wants to take us back 1,400 years.” He means Sharaa. “This is someone with a very restrictive mind,” Khalil continues flatly. “You cannot expect someone like that to change. Maybe he changes his name or city, maybe he speaks differently for the media — but his beliefs stay the same.”</p>
<p dir="ltr">So can the Kurds deal with such a man? “We are Syrians,” Khalil replies. “Either we cede from Syria — and we have no plans for that — or we need to work with whoever is in Damascus, we have to deal with him. We are forced to negotiate.” What about clashes with Alawites on the coast, and with the Druze in Suweyda earlier this year, which both led to brief revivals of Syria’s sectarian slaughter? Does Khalil blame the government for those? “Of course we blame the government.”</p>
<p dir="ltr">Khalil’s own vision is simple: a decentralized Syria, each community managing itself, united by loose federal ties. Fail, he warns, and the country will slide back into civil war, not just in Rojava but “everywhere in Syria”. Not that Damascus is the only threat to Rojava’s future. It was Turkey, after all, that armed and bankrolled Sharaa’s overthrow of Assad at the end of last year, and which has considerable sway with Damascus now. This also poses a considerable problem for Rojava, whose Kurdish forces President Erdogan sees simply as the Syrian version of the PKK — which it considers to be a terror group responsible for tens of thousands of deaths in its mountainous southeast.</p>
<p dir="ltr">“Recently we have had several meetings in Damascus with the Syrian government,” Khalil tells me. “But unfortunately, after every meeting, Damascus promises to form committees to work on integration and then, immediately afterwards, Turkey steps in to impede the process. At the moment, we have two delegations waiting to see what will happen next, because Turkey keeps undermining the negotiations.”</p>
<p dir="ltr">I leave Khalil and step into the night. The traffic is heavy. Concrete minarets stand tall in the gloom. The next morning I’m back on the road again. The sun is climbing high, flattening everything into gold and white. I drive near Qamishli airport, and, to my right, the Turkish border scars the horizon. Every few kilometers, a watchtower stands looking across. To my left, a Russian flag flaps limply over an armored compound.</p>
<p dir="ltr">It’s a physical reminder of the perennial role of outsiders here. Before I arrived, a regional expert explained the situation to me by way of analogy. “Think of Syria as a condominium,” he said. “Russia owns the walls, America the roof, and Turkey has the keys. Everyone else rents the space inside.”</p>
<p dir="ltr"><div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;Think of Syria as a condominium. Russia owns the walls, America the roof, and Turkey has the keys. Everyone else rents the space inside.&#8221;</div>
<p dir="ltr">He was exaggerating for effect, but I now see what he means. Everywhere I look in Rojava, there are signs of this uneasy balance: Russian soldiers buy bread from Kurdish stalls; American engineers fix irrigation pumps; Turkish drones strike sporadically. It’s a useful reminder of how crucial this region remains: Moscow still needs Damascus to keep its port on the Mediterranean, while Iran wants a corridor to the sea once more and the United States, half-hearted and weary, stays only to contain the remnants of ISIS.</p>
<p dir="ltr">To understand what this might mean for the Kurds, I meet Fawza Yusuf, co-chair of the Autonomous Administration’s Executive Council. Composed and cheerful, she heads the delegation that meets with Damascus, which is to say she’s the woman now negotiating the fate of Syria for the Kurds. Like Khalil, meanwhile, she stresses the importance of negotiating with the new regime in Damascus. “From the start we believed the only way is peace, dialogue, and negotiation,” she explains. “We must talk to Damascus directly — there is no other path.”</p>
<p dir="ltr">It is the language of a negotiator who understands both the limits and the possibilities of her position. “We have fought enough wars,” Yusuf continues, sipping black tea. “Now we need a country where our children can live.” Yet — and again like Khalil — she’s skeptical of Sharaa’s intentions. “Their policy is anti-democratic,” she says. “They still don’t recognize others. But we continue working.”</p>
<p dir="ltr">What she means by “working” is critical, both to the Kurds and Damascus, and it includes the slow-motion integration of the SDF into the national army. You cannot run an effective state unless you have a monopoly on the use of force, which comes through having sole control of its only army. The Kurds, for their part, accept this, albeit on their own terms. “We agreed with Damascus that we will join the Syrian army — but not as individuals,” she says. “We will join as brigades: the SDF will become three brigades in the national army and remain stationed here.”</p>
<p dir="ltr">The SDF gives Rojava leverage — up to a point. The force numbers roughly perhaps 70,000 fighters, most of them veterans hardened by years of war with ISIS. They’re battle-tested, and disciplined in light-infantry and counterinsurgency tactics, but lack heavy armor, air defense, and artillery. In open battle, then, they’d be little match for Damascus’s army or Russian airpower. Yet in their own territory – the plains and towns of the northeast – they could bleed any invading force through guerrilla warfare and local support.</p>
<p dir="ltr"><div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/07/why-turkeys-kurds-are-tired-of-fighting/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/07/why-turkeys-kurds-are-tired-of-fighting/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/GettyImages-2223902775.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/07/why-turkeys-kurds-are-tired-of-fighting/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested Reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/07/why-turkeys-kurds-are-tired-of-fighting/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Why Turkey’s Kurds are tired of fighting</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/07/why-turkeys-kurds-are-tired-of-fighting/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Matt Broomfield</a></p></div></a></div>
<p dir="ltr">It is a clever sort of compromise: ostensible unity, but without surrender, even as Yusuf herself evokes a “decentralized” Syria going forward. Yet with many in Damascus seeing federalism as the short end of a secessionist wedge, optimism is perhaps harder in practice. Rhetorically, certainly, Sharaa is unequivocal about the need for a united Syria. “We must preserve national unity and civil peace as much as possible,” he said on 25 February, during the opening speech of the Syrian National Dialogue Conference in Damascus.</p>
<p dir="ltr">And if a Turkish-backed Sharaa is one worry for Yusuf, another foreign power looms large over Syria too. Israeli aircraft have long been a presence in the night skies, striking weapons depots from Damascus to Deir ez-Zor, sometimes near the oil fields the Kurds control. A weak, divided Syria suits Israel’s security. While Iran’s land bridge to Hezbollah fell with Assad, the Israelis want to ensure that Iranian militias cannot burrow their way into the nascent post-Assad state.</p>
<p dir="ltr">But Israel and the Kurds have much in common. Both perennial outsiders in a largely Sunni Arab Middle East, they have survived by living on the edge, sustained by vigilance. They have collaborated in the past, and, for many of the Kurds here, Israel is a model of the type of muscular independence they seek.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Yet the Israeli model the Kurds quietly admire – a small, embattled state that survived by building institutions, intelligence networks and deterrent power – offers both inspiration and illusion. Israel’s strength came from coherent leadership, outside backing, and a shared national narrative. The Kurds, by contrast, remain divided between rival parties and foreign patrons. Emulating Israel’s vigilance is one thing; reproducing its fortress statehood in the middle of Arab Syria is quite another.</p>
<p dir="ltr">There are other dangers in being seen as Israel’s proxy. The Druze of southern Syria learned that lesson when their perceived ties to Tel Aviv turned them into targets for both foreign jihadists and the Damascus regime. For the Kurds, then, any open alignment with Israel risks uniting Ankara, Tehran, and Damascus against them: a trinity of enemies they can hardly afford. Their survival, as ever, depends on balancing between powers without becoming the pawn of any.</p>
<p dir="ltr">And if Syria’s future depends on Rojava — secession would certainly wreck the country’s economy, and perhaps even rekindle the civil war’s ethnic butchery — the whole region hinges on it too. If Rojava unravels, after all, Lebanon’s sectarian truce could collapse; Iraq’s Kurdish-Arab balance might crack; Turkey would face renewed insurgency; Iran would push its militias deeper west. If Syria’s fate still depends on foreign powers, then, those same foreign powers are bound to Syria too — whether at the White House or closer to home.</p>
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															<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">1036613</post-id>				</item>
									<item>
					<title>Syria’s future is sectarian</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2025/09/syrias-future-is-sectarian/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://stage.unherd.com/2025/09/syrias-future-is-sectarian/?edition=us#comments</comments>
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										<unherd:main_theme>Middle East</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Tam Hussein]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/blued-2.jpg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>3</unherd:article_ranking>
																<unherd:image_caption>
							<![CDATA[Christians and Druze are tolerated — for now. Asaad Al Asaad/Middle East Images via AFP.]]>
						</unherd:image_caption>
						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><b data-stringify-type="bold">Tam Hussein</b> is an award winning investigative journalist and writer. His work has been recognised by the Royal Television Society Awards.</p>
]]>
						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>tamhussein</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[<b data-stringify-type="bold">Tam Hussein</b> is an award winning investigative journalist and writer. His work has been recognised by the Royal Television Society Awards.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Wed, 24 Sep 2025 23:01:53 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Thu, 25 Sep 2025 06:18:30 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Al-Sharaa]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Damascus]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[jihad]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[restofworld]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Sectarianism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Society]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Sunni]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Syria]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[UN]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://stage.unherd.com/?p=1029063</guid>
																												<description>
								<![CDATA[Religious minorities feel threatened]]>
							</description>
																		
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								<![CDATA[<p>From jihadi to statesman, Ahmed al-Sharaa has become renowned for smashing the Middle East’s old certainties. And yesterday, as he stepped up to the UN’s famous green dais, he upturned another: as the first Syrian leader to speak in New York for over half a century. The last time that happened was in the long-lost world of 1967, three years before the Assads took power in a military coup. But now, speaking to his fellow leaders, al-Sharaa promised a new Syria, prosperous and open to relations with the outside world.</p>
<p>Back home, however, things feel anything but open. Over recent months, this has been most clear in Sweida, a southern town rocked by anti-government protests. Sweida is home to many Syrian Druze, a syncretic faith born out of Shi’ism, and which claims the loyalty of 3% of Syrians. The protesters waved Israeli flags, and for the first time in Syria’s history demanded self-determination. They have also set up their own “national” guard, born out of the militias that enforced order during the long years of civil war.</p>
<p>No one apart from Israel — which has been lobbying Washington for a weak Syria — wants to see the Balkanization of the country. Al-Sharaa himself is now <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/middle-east/20250922-syria-s-sharaa-baulks-at-abraham-accords-with-israel-during-new-york-visit" target="_blank" rel="noopener">distancing</a> his country from the putative Abraham Accords. The Americans, certainly, are keen on stability, and have stepped in to avert a civil war. The fact al-Sharaa took time out of his busy New York schedule to meet both Secretary of State Marco Rubio and General David Petraeus, the ex-commander of US forces in Iraq, certainly hints at the hopes the White House now places in him.</p>
<p>Be that as it may, the Sweida violence suggests a country spiraling out of control, as do rumors of a resurgent Assadism on the coast. Yet in the end, such pessimism would be to misdiagnose the unrest. For the chaos is not an aberration, a disaster to be averted, but rather represents the birth pangs of a process long underway: the Sunnification of Syria. Whatever al-Sharaa<span style="font-weight: 400">’</span>s claims, as he enjoys the world’s attention in Manhattan, what we are witnessing is the emergence of a new Sunni state — and not the pluralist nation that foreign analysts might like to imagine.</p>
<p>Outsiders often read the Syrian revolution as romantically simple: the people rose up against the tyrant, and after years of brutal struggle finally secured their freedom. But that overlooks other interpretations, especially when it comes to religion. The Syrian conflict, after all, was also about the long-oppressed Sunni majority versus the Alawite minority — another heterodox offshoot of Islam to which the Assad dynasty belonged. Viewed through that lens, the fall of Damascus, and al-Sharaa’s own triumph, was merely the culmination of Sunni empowerment.</p>
<p>I witnessed these tensions first hand, in 2009, while I was teaching business English to staff at the Syrian National Bank. By then, I had lived in the country long enough to discern a student’s sectarian background through dress, mannerisms, attitudes. My classroom reflected the country: Sunnis — including Kurds — made up around 70%; Christians 10%, Druze 3%; and Alawites 13%. The students were all supposedly supportive of the stern-looking president, Bashar al-Assad, whose portrait hung in every room, paid their salaries, and claimed to run the country under the banner of Baathism, a secular pan-Arab socialist ideology which didn’t care about your sectarian affiliation.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/07/will-syrias-jihadis-go-rogue/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/07/will-syrias-jihadis-go-rogue/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/GettyImages-2188254116.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/07/will-syrias-jihadis-go-rogue/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/07/will-syrias-jihadis-go-rogue/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Will Syria’s jihadis go rogue?</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/07/will-syrias-jihadis-go-rogue/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Tam Hussein</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>That, of course, was a lie. The Assad dynasty had stayed in power for 50 years by pitting the resentments and fears of the various sects against each other. They promoted Sunni clerics to positions of influence, based Syrian family law on Islamic jurisprudence, even married into a Sunni family — as Bashar did — yet still kept Sunnis out of power. All the while, they propagated the message that only <em>they</em> could protect minorities from Sunni tyranny. It was not uncommon for pro-government rallies to come with banners declaring “no to sectarianism”, the <a href="https://www.alwasatnews.com/news/534872.html?utm_source=chatgpt.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">implication</a> being that Sunni domination would result in the marginalization of Christians and others.</p>
<p>Such sectarianism also played out in my classroom. On exam day, no matter how hard the Sunni employees studied, or how rigorously I marked the papers — the Alawite students and those connected to the government would end up top of the class, with the results bitterly accepted by the Sunnis. Of course, I didn’t have the courage to make an issue of it. All of us, whether Syrian or not, knew what happened to the unruly. The horrors of Tadmor prison lived alongside us, as did slaughters of 1982, when the Hafez al-Assad crushed a Muslim Brotherhood-led uprising in the central Syrian town of Hama.</p>
<p>In 2011, that brittle sectarian order shattered. Bashar al-Assad repeated his father’s strategy and tried to crush the Sunni-led discontent. The Sunnis, in turn, went from peaceful demonstrations during Friday prayers to violent insurrection, with al-Qaeda-affiliated Ahmed al-Sharaa being one of the rebellion&#8217;s most effective leaders. Eventually, his victory came not from the international community, but from a rebellious Sunni redoubt of Idlib, a small town in northern Syria which prided itself on having quite literally thrown a sandal at Hafez al-Assad. The Sunnis, in short, had helped themselves to power: or so they told themselves.</p>
<p>Throughout all this, Syria’s minorities were in an impossible situation. Should they side with the tyrant they knew, or with the revolutionaries, some of whom were jihadists? At the same time, they were bombarded with regime propaganda, plenty of it real. Sunni Islamists, after all, had massacred the Druze at Qalb Lozeh in 2015, and ISIS had attacked them at Sweida. Christians, for their part, had their churches desecrated, their people killed or kidnapped. The prospect of joining the revolutionaries, then, was not as clear-cut as it seemed to many Sunnis. But with victory going to al-Sharaa’s forces, even neutrality could be interpreted as complicity, especially given the terrors Assad had inflicted on Sunni civilians.</p>
<p>Out of this sectarian chaos came Ahmad al-Sharaa. He was a jihadist, aggressively Sunni, who believed that minorities like the Alawites should not only renounce their support for Assad, but also their “heretic” faiths. Yet by 2017, al-Sharaa was courting Druze and Christian leaders in his newly established “Salvation” government in Idlib. Either he had changed — or he was just a political Machiavel.</p>
<p>Whatever the case, al-Sharaa reversed a lot of the damage that his group had been responsible for. On 10 June 2022, for instance, he visited Qalb Lozeh. Many Druze in the area had been forced to convert to Islam, the better to escape the clutches of Sunni extremism. In a marked departure from his earlier rhetoric, however, al-Sharaa publicly assured Druze leaders that there is no compulsion in religion, and that they were free to practice their faith without fear. This statement sent a strong signal to his followers that his Hay<span style="font-weight: 400">’</span>at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) Islamist group was changing.</p>
<p>Indeed, according to an informative new <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/transformed-by-the-people/">book</a> on HTS, its political evolution is not unlike that of far-Right groups in Europe. To wield power, explain its authors Patrick Haenni and Jerome Drevon, al-Sharaa had to move to the center. Of course, there are still radicals on the periphery, but he increasingly relied on a broad Sunni populism over hardcore ideologues. Extremists — notably Osama Qasem, leader of Egyptian Islamic Jihad and once celebrated for his ties to al-Qaeda — were compelled to step down after being deemed a “liability”.</p>
<p>In al-Sharaa’s Salvation government was also a clue as to how the new Syria might look. His rump in Idlib was essentially a Sunni proto-state, as al-Sharaa transferred power from the warlords to a civilian government, run by a new generation of Islamist technocrats, each intimately connected to al-Sharaa himself. Certainly, Syria’s interim president has followed a similar path once he eventually took power in Damascus, filling state institutions, long hollowed out by Assad, with his own supporters, friends and family.</p>
<p>Maybe that explains why the Gulf kingdoms, which initially viewed al-Sharaa with deep suspicion due to his Islamism, eventually came round. Perhaps, they thought, he was someone who wanted to build a state not unlike their own — conservative, authoritarian, anti-Iran and pro-stability, all elements the emirs could work with. And, what was more, none of this contravened Sunni Islamic jurisprudence: which, as its long history testifies, has always taken a pragmatic approach to wielding power. Sunni Islam, as historians like Marshall Hodgson have shown, is quietist by temperament, and has happily lived alongside caliphs, sultans and presidents.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;Sunni Islam is quietist by temperament, and has happily lived alongside caliphs, sultans and presidents.&#8221;</div>
<p>At the same time, al-Sharaa’s Salvation government was not intolerant of minorities. That was clear enough in his rapprochement with the Druze and Christians, but also his ban on the notorious <em>jizya</em> payments — a tax levied on non-Muslims for protection and exemption from military service.</p>
<p>By the time Damascus fell, Haenni and Drevon write, Syria’s minorities had gone from “<em>dhimmis</em> [protected minorities] no more” to “citizens not yet”. And if that hints at the ambiguous status they enjoy in the new Syria, al-Sharaa’s country is also being shaped by forces not directly under his control. Once again, the experience of Idlib is revealing here. Under years of Islamist rule, the rural hinterland had inevitably become more conservative. Meanwhile, Druze who had initially converted out of fear found that their children had forgotten the tenets of their faith, and prayed and fasted like Sunnis.</p>
<p>Yet if the Sunnification of northern Syria had begun long before the Assads finally fled, this must once again be tempered by al-Sharaa’s apparent moderation. When I last visited Idlib, in March 2025, it was a bustling town like any other, albeit with the occasional shop selling Kalashnikovs. There was no religious police enforcing the <em>hijab</em>, and shops remained open when the call for prayer came, just as they had before the revolution. Islamic laws were adhered to because people in Idlib — devout or not — accepted them. In post-Assad Damascus, too, life continued as before. In the Christian quarter of the Old City, alcohol was available in the bars, just as it had always been, and I suspect this will remain the case.</p>
<p>That&#8217;s shadowed elsewhere too. Al-Sharaa has repeatedly emphasized that the Syrian people are one. By March, when the interim government drafted its 2025 constitutional declaration, it confirmed that Syria would remain a republic, its president would be a Muslim and the republic’s source of law was Islamic jurisprudence. All the while, minorities and their personal beliefs were protected. All this is based on the 1973 constitution, and affirmed the secular social contract first drafted by the Assads.</p>
<p>Even so, and as the constitutional primacy of Muslims implies, Sunnis will ultimately shape Syria’s future. In many ways, it didn’t matter whether they’re Islamists, devout Sunnis or liberals. Most Syrian Sunnis, after all, are small “c” conservatives, traumatized by war and shaped by the fight against Assad. This has glued them together, allowing them to stand alone if need be.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/02/can-kurds-survive-the-new-syria/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/02/can-kurds-survive-the-new-syria/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/broom.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/02/can-kurds-survive-the-new-syria/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/02/can-kurds-survive-the-new-syria/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Can Kurds survive the new Syria?</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/02/can-kurds-survive-the-new-syria/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Matt Broomfield</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>This Sunni supremacism has manifested itself in other ways too. For one thing, Friday sermons have become overtly Sunni in tone. Hezbollah — a Shia militant group — is referred to as <em>Hizb al-Shaytan</em> (“the party of the devil”). Black and white flags emblazoned with the Islamic declaration of faith, long associated with jihadists, are waved by Sunnis as they go about their business. When the bastion of traditional Sunnism Sheikh Osama al-Rifai — someone who has often disagreed with al-Sharaa in the past — returned from exile in January, he received a rockstar’s welcome. In fact, al-Sharaa appointed him the grand mufti of Syria.</p>
<p>All the while, the war’s aftershocks have continued to play out. In February, former Assadists tried to foment a counter-revolution of sorts, resulting in massacres of Alawites near the coastal city of Latakia. Sunni revanchism soon followed, and old scores were settled: former Assadists, paramilitaries and Alawite officers, who had raped and tortured Sunnis, were killed and buried in unknown graves. But so too were many innocent Alawites, simply caught up in the violence, with the sect increasingly seen as a fifth column. The Druze in Sweida have faced similar troubles. After the summer’s violence, Druze leaders accused al-Sharaa of siding with Sunni Bedouins: but then committed political suicide by calling for Israeli support and demanding self-determination. In the eyes of many Sunnis, they, like the Alawites, are edging towards treason.</p>
<p>In the end, though, Syria’s process of Sunnification will conclude only if Damascus manages to incorporate the Kurds into the new state. Most Kurds are Sunnis, and though they have spent years fighting the Arab majority, Damascus could probably bring them on board more easily than the country’s religious minorities. Mazloum Abadi — head of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and one of the de facto leaders of the Kurdish enclave in Syria<span style="font-weight: 400">’</span>s north — is a formidable political operator. But he is fast running out of political road. For one thing, the PKK, the SDF’s sister organization in Turkey, has disbanded. For another, the US have abandoned Abadi in favor of al-Sharaa, and if the former seeks support from Israel, or allies himself with the Druze, he’ll soon become discredited. The SDF, then, are outgunned both militarily and diplomatically, and the resources required to restart another civil war seem politically out of reach.</p>
<p>Either way, each of these stories — Druze unrest, Alawite reprisals, Kurdish bargaining — all point the same way: towards a Sunni majoritarian state. That doesn’t mean Syria will become an Islamist theocracy. But it does likely mean that pluralism, minority rights and perhaps even democracy itself will operate within a conservative Sunni framework. Whether that’s better or worse for the exhausted people of Syria will probably depend on where and how you pray.</p>
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									<item>
					<title>How Angela Merkel radicalized Germany</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2025/08/how-merkel-fuelled-the-afd/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://stage.unherd.com/2025/08/how-merkel-fuelled-the-afd/?edition=us#comments</comments>
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										<unherd:main_theme>10 years on</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Katja Hoyer]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/blue-copy.jpg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>2</unherd:article_ranking>
																<unherd:image_caption>
							<![CDATA[Nearly 1.1 million people applied for Asylum in Germany in 2015 alone. Photo: Sean Gallup/Getty.]]>
						</unherd:image_caption>
						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Katja Hoyer </strong>is a German-British historian and writer. Her latest book Weimar: <em>Life on the Edge of Catastrophe</em> will be released in May 2026.</p>
]]>
						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>hoyer_kat</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[is a German-British historian and writer. Her latest book Weimar: <em>Life on the Edge of Catastrophe</em> will be released in May 2026.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Wed, 20 Aug 2025 23:02:55 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Wed, 20 Aug 2025 23:02:55 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Angela Merkel]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Europe]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Germany]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Immigration]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Politics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Refugees]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Syria]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://stage.unherd.com/?p=702341</guid>
																												<description>
								<![CDATA[Her asylum policy led to the rise of the AfD]]>
							</description>
																		
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								<![CDATA[<p>“There was a before and an after,” Angela Merkel wrote on the first page of her memoirs, referring to the moment in the summer of 2015 when she decided “not to turn away the refugees.” Looking back, the former German Chancellor saw her welcoming hundreds of thousands of asylum seekers into Germany “as a caesura”. She was right: it was indeed the watershed moment that would define her legacy. More than that, though, it was a choice that defined Germany&#8217;s future.</p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Almost exactly 10 years have passed since 24 August 2015. On that day, the German government, headed by Merkel, suspended the so-called Dublin Protocol, which stipulates that asylum seekers must be processed in the EU country they first enter. It was a response to the waves of refugees coming into Europe, fueled by the Syrian civil war, and which were overwhelming bureaucratic systems across the bloc. </span>Especially in light of her country’s Nazi past, Merkel felt she had no choice but to act on what she <a href="https://www.cer.eu/in-the-press/two-years-after-opening-germanys-doors-refugees-angela-merkel-stands-tall-how-has-she" target="_blank" rel="noopener">called</a> a “humanitarian imperative”. <span style="font-weight: 400">Germany’s decision effectively made it legal for anyone to enter Germany, so long as they said they were claiming asylum.</span></p>
<p>According to the <a href="https://www.bka.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/Publikationen/JahresberichteUndLagebilder/KriminalitaetImKontextVonZuwanderung/KriminalitaetImKontextVonZuwanderung_2015.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&amp;v=4#:~:text=Zuwanderer%20stammt%20aus%20den%20Balkanstaaten,(2%20%25%20der%20Asylbegehrenden)." target="_blank" rel="noopener">German Federal Office for Migration and Refugees</a>, nearly 1.1 million people applied for asylum in Germany in 2015 alone. For context: that number was 25 times higher than in 2011. Syrians made up the single largest proportion that fateful year, at 40% of the total, but they were not the majority. Other people from the Middle East, mostly Iraqis and Afghans, but also from the Balkans and North Africa, comprised the remainder. Nearly 70% were male.</p>
<p>A year later, the center-left newspaper <a href="https://www.zeit.de/gesellschaft/2016-08/refugees-open-border-policy-september-2015-angela-merkel" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em>Die Zeit</em></a> looked back on the night of 4 and 5 September, when Merkel decided to fully open the borders and bring asylum seekers in on trains, as “the night Germany lost control”. For one thing, the liberal journalists lamented, “the government admits that not a single refugee who arrived on that weekend or in the days that followed was screened by security officials.” Germany had no idea whether it was admitting snotty-nosed children from war-torn Aleppo — or terrorists and sex offenders. Over the next decade, Germans swiftly discovered that they had opened their gates to all of these and more.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/05/will-east-germans-ever-feel-at-home/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/05/will-east-germans-ever-feel-at-home/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/GettyImages-1320890536.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/05/will-east-germans-ever-feel-at-home/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/05/will-east-germans-ever-feel-at-home/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Will East Germans ever feel at home?</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/05/will-east-germans-ever-feel-at-home/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Katja Hoyer</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>The first shock came on New Year’s Eve 2015, when <a href="https://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/uebergriffe-in-koeln-1200-frauen-wurden-opfer-von-silvester-gewalt-1.3072064" target="_blank" rel="noopener">1,200 women</a> were sexually assaulted in Cologne. “A throng of about a thousand young men was forming,” German broadcaster Deutsche Welle <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/new-years-eve-in-cologne-5-years-after-the-mass-assaults/a-56073007" target="_blank" rel="noopener">explained</a>. “Most of them were from the North African-Arabic region.” In scenes Merkel would later describe as “abominable”, the report continued, “packs of men were hunting down women, cornering many of them. There were sexual assaults, rapes.”</p>
<p>The police response was somewhere between clueless and callous. One young woman <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/a-new-dimension-of-sexual-assault-in-cologne/a-18959299" target="_blank" rel="noopener">told</a> the German media later how she was trapped in the crowds and then suddenly &#8220;someone had his hands between my legs.” When she tried to report this at a police station where “there were lots of girls, all crying uncontrollably”, she was told to go elsewhere. A public police statement said the celebrations in Cologne had been “relaxed”.</p>
<p>In the end, it was probably this staggering denial that riled people the most. In her memoirs, Merkel dedicates just one paragraph to the incident in Cologne. There is no compassion for the victims, just a cool assessment that the delayed response “gave rise to the impression that the authorities were trying to cover something up.” Merkel’s main concern, then as now, was political. As the leader of a nominally center-right party, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), she faced plenty of internal pressure for her generous refugee policy. But the public mood also tipped. The “Welcoming Culture” that dominated the news dissipated quickly. Asked in one representative <a href="https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/deutschlandtrend-469.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">poll</a> in January 2016, 73% of respondents felt dealing with “asylum” and “refugees” was the most urgent government priority.</p>
<p>The same <a href="https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/deutschlandtrend/deutschlandtrend-3456.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">poll</a>, from January 2025, showed that 68% of people wanted Germany to take in fewer asylum seekers. The problem was that while Merkel was chancellor, all the way up to 2021, there was no effective way for this majority to express their skepticism at the ballot box. The architect of the refugee policy hogged the center-right slot on the political spectrum. The other parties sat further to the Left. Even Christian Lindner, the leader of the small libertarian FDP, <a href="https://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/inland/lindner-haette-fluechtlingen-2015-auch-die-einreise-erlaubt-15844665.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">called</a> Merkel’s decision “right and justifiable”.</p>
<p>Merkel understood this dynamic. In 2015, she tried to frame the influx as a temporary crisis that the country had to overcome together. “<em>Wir schaffen das</em>!” (“We can do this!”), she famously <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/germany/angela-merkel/12049633/Angela-Merkel-bows-to-pressure-agreeing-to-limit-refugee-numbers.html">told</a> her compatriots. By December, however, she <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/germany/angela-merkel/12049633/Angela-Merkel-bows-to-pressure-agreeing-to-limit-refugee-numbers.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">admitted</a> at a party conference that “even a strong country like Germany would in the long run be unable to cope with such a large number of refugees.” In March 2016, the EU duly struck a deal with Turkey to return migrants and show domestic voters something was changing. Yet with the German political establishment reluctant to change, the intake continued. Today, there are <a href="https://mediendienst-integration.de/migration/flucht-asyl/zahl-der-fluechtlinge.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">at least 3.3 million</a> asylum seekers in Germany: some 4% of the population.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">“In 2015, she tried to frame the influx as a temporary crisis that the country had to overcome together.”</div>
<p>The majority that worried about the numbers was never going to stay silent forever. With Merkel defending what was essentially a Left-wing migration policy while leading the major center-right party, a powerful vacuum emerged for a more radical alternative. It was filled by a political newcomer: the Alternative für Deutschland or AfD.</p>
<p>In December 2015, Alexander Gauland, a leading figure in the AfD then as now, <a href="https://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/afd-alexander-gauland-sieht-fluechtlingskrise-als-geschenk-a-1067356.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">called</a> the migration crisis a “gift” and “very helpful” to his then two-year-old outfit. He was right: the AfD, which started on a libertarian platform but is now focused on immigration, first entered the German parliament in the election of 2017 with 13% of the vote. Today, it is the largest opposition party in the Bundestag. Recently, it has even topped some <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/germany-far-right-afd-lead-survey/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">polls</a>, with around a quarter of the electorate supporting it.</p>
<p>The meteoric rise of the AfD is a direct response to German immigration policy since 2015, with many here feeling their country has changed irrevocably — and without their consent. Take crime. Official police <a href="https://de.statista.com/statistik/daten/studie/2460/umfrage/anteile-nichtdeutscher-verdaechtiger-bei-straftaten-zeitreihe/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">statistics</a> say 42% of suspects are foreign nationals. Even if you discount being in the country illegally, that still leaves 35%.</p>
<p>Such statistics have come in for criticism. One <a href="https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/gesellschaft/kriminalitaet-migration-100.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">study</a>, released earlier this year, found that “migration and asylum have no systematic impact on criminality.” But many people feel and see unwelcome change in their immediate environment. This summer, sexual harassment and assault of women and girls in German lidos have triggered a heated debate. In June, one case made the headlines when girls aged 11-16 reported to have been groped by four Syrian men. According to <a href="https://www1.wdr.de/nachrichten/debatte-freibad-uebergriffe-100.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">figures</a> from the Federal Criminal Police Office, there were 423 sexual crimes reported in public swimming locations last year; nearly two thirds of suspects were non-Germans.</p>
<p>One can attack the veracity of those statistics: but what’s certain is that Germans feel less safe. In a <a href="https://www.br.de/nachrichten/deutschland-welt/ard-deutschlandtrend-weniger-menschen-fuehlen-sich-sicher,UHXmDkO" target="_blank" rel="noopener">survey</a> taken last year, only a little more than half of people said they felt safe in public spaces. Two years earlier, it had still been 75%. This is likely also connected to a number of high-profile, violent crimes and acts of terrorism committed by men who came to Germany as asylum seekers. This began with the Christmas market attack in Berlin in 2016 in which 12 people were killed by an unsuccessful asylum seeker from Tunisia who had entered Germany during the refugee crisis in 2015. From there, the grim reports have continued, from a mass stabbing at Solingen, in August 2024, to the shocking story, in Aschaffenburg, of an Afghan asylum seeker who stabbed a toddler to death earlier this year.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/11/angela-merkel-architect-of-german-decline/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/11/angela-merkel-architect-of-german-decline/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/merkel.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/11/angela-merkel-architect-of-german-decline/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested Reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/11/angela-merkel-architect-of-german-decline/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Angela Merkel: mother of German decline</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/11/angela-merkel-architect-of-german-decline/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Thomas Fazi</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>No doubt, radicalization and psychiatric issues played a role in all these cases. But that won’t make people feel any safer. The fundamental problem remains that asylum seekers weren’t checked, with the government’s focus being on their safety and not that of the German public.</p>
<p>Beyond the questions of safety, meanwhile, Merkel’s experiment has transformed German life in other ways. Politicians have constantly stressed that the vast majority of asylum seekers are law-abiding and hard-working. Nonetheless, the sheer numbers admitted since 2015 make integration difficult both for them and the rest of the country. <a href="https://www.suedkurier.de/ueberregional/wirtschaft/geld-finanzen/buergergeld-statistik-wer-bezieht-es-18-8-25;art1373668,11757767" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Nearly half</a> of benefits claimants in Germany are non-nationals. Often this is due to bureaucratic hurdles as well as language and culture barriers. Regardless of the reasons, <a href="https://www.dbb.de/artikel/70-prozent-halten-den-staat-fuer-ueberfordert-politik-muss-endlich-umsteuern.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">seven-in-10</a> Germans think the state is “overwhelmed”.</p>
<p>People see this in their everyday lives. On average, <a href="https://www.noz.de/deutschland-welt/politik/artikel/obergrenze-fuer-migranten-an-schulen-eine-gute-idee-48942747">30%</a> of school children now have what Germany calls a “migration background”; in some places, notably <span style="font-weight: normal !msorm">in certain parts of larger cities</span>, it’s 80% or more. Apart from language issues in overstretched classrooms, this has a bearing on culture too. Some schools have switched to <a href="https://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article688b27454ab4754741bf96cc/Wir-erleben-definitiv-eine-Islamisierung-sagt-der-Sprecher-der-Arche.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Halal</a>-only food in canteens. In Berlin, a gay teacher was <a href="https://www.rbb24.de/panorama/beitrag/2025/06/carl-bolle-schule-vorwuerfe-mobbing-lehrer-chronologie.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">abused</a> by children for years. At his primary school, where 95% of students come from migrant families, he was told he would “go to hell” and that “he was a disgrace to Islam”. Some kids boycotted his lessons. His complaints to school and city authorities remained ignored until he took them to the <a href="https://www.sueddeutsche.de/leben/podcast-das-thema-mobbing-schule-berlin-islam-schwul-homosexuell-lgbtq-pride-li.3270409" target="_blank" rel="noopener">media</a>.</p>
<p>This cultural shift is visible right across Germany. After the October 7th attacks, Hamas <a href="https://www.verfassungsschutz.de/SharedDocs/hintergruende/DE/auslandsbezogener-extremismus/samidoun.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">supporters</a> celebrated on the streets of Berlin, handing out sweets to passers by. For obvious historical reasons, the connection between antisemitism and immigration in Germany is a highly sensitive and contested field, but existing figures suggest that there is a link. In 2020, a <a href="https://www.mdr.de/nachrichten/deutschland/gesellschaft/muslime-antisemitismus-gruende-verschwoerungsmythen-israel-100.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">study</a> found that 40% percent of Muslims in Germany held antisemitic views; the same was true for just 5% of Protestants.</p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">To quote Merkel herself, then, “there was a before and an after.” Germany has changed forever and there is no turning back the clock. But that still leaves the future. The current German government under Friedrich Merz — a long-term inner-party rival and critic of Merkel — is attempting a two-step approach to move forward. On the one hand, it is implementing stricter immigration policies. National border controls have been reinstated, and family reunification rules have been</span> <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/germany-suspends-refugees-family-reunification/a-72565576" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400">suspended</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400"> for certain asylum seekers. Though there are a number of reasons behind this trend, Germany has seen a</span> <a href="https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2025/07/05/germany-sees-50-decline-in-asylum-application-in-first-half-of-2025" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400">50% decline</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400"> in asylum applications in the first half of 2025.</span><span style="font-weight: 400"> </span></p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">“Germany has changed forever and there is no turning back the clock.”</div>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">The second, and much more difficult, step will be the integration of recent arrivals who are likely to stay in Germany. The case of a school in</span> <a href="https://www.faz.net/aktuell/feuilleton/debatten/brennpunkt-schule-in-ludwigshafen-hier-bleibt-jeder-vierte-erstklaessler-sitzen-110547505.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400">Ludwigshafen</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400"> in western Germany has triggered a debate on how the children of immigrants can be better supported to learn the skills needed to integrate into German society. There, nearly all students are from non-German backgrounds while a quarter of them lack the required basic skills to advance to the next grade. Education Minister Karin Prien has put the idea of an</span> <a href="https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/innenpolitik/prien-vorschlag-schulklassen-migration-100.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400">imposed</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400"> “migration quota” for schools on the table to distribute children with poor language skills and those lacking other required skills, such as holding a pen, or have difficulty sitting in a chair for extended periods. But she received immense criticism for this, and the debate over integration rages on.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Policies like these are important for voters to feel that a line has been drawn under Germany’s unlimited approach to asylum. Had Merkel followed her initial instincts, when she argued that opening the gates was the only way out of a once-in-a-generation crisis, many Germans would likely have forgiven her. After all, they came out in droves to feed, house and support genuine refugees. The problem came with the abdication of control. The borders remained open, and the lines between asylum policy and general migration were blurred. Arguments around labor shortages, demographic imbalance, and cultural diversity were all introduced, as though Germany only had two choices: no immigration or uncontrolled immigration.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">What is clear, anyway, is that the current German government will have a hard time tackling the problems Merkel unleashed. Yet, as the AfD rises and cultural divisions widen, the tenth anniversary of her decision may be the last chance for the German establishment to look back, take stock, and finally change course.</span></p>
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					<title>Israel is breaking the Middle East</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2025/07/israel-is-breaking-the-middle-east/?edition=us</link>
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										<unherd:main_theme>Disorder</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Thanassis Cambanis]]>
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																<unherd:article_ranking>International</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[Israeli strikes on Damascus. Credit: SANA (Syrian Arab News Agency)]]>
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							<![CDATA[<p>Thanassis Cambanis is a senior fellow at the Century Foundation and directs its Center for International Research and Policy</p>
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						<unherd:twitter_handle>tcambanis</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[Thanassis Cambanis is a senior fellow at the Century Foundation and directs its Center for International Research and Policy]]>
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										<pubDate>Thu, 24 Jul 2025 23:07:17 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Thu, 24 Jul 2025 23:07:26 +0000</updated>
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								<![CDATA[The Arab state system must be preserved]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p><span style="font-weight: 400">For a generation, the Middle East has been a byword for state failure. A series of cataclysms buffeted Arab states in this period, weakening institutions, security, and regional governance. The turmoil began with the US invasion of Iraq on false pretenses, which plunged that country into chaos. Then came the Arab Spring, ISIS and its conquest of a swath of Mesopotamia and the Levant, the dissolution of Syria and Libya, serial dysfunction in Lebanon, and the Saudi war in Yemen, among other troubles.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Yet despite ongoing conflict and instability, the Arab state system has made a</span><a href="https://www.thecairoreview.com/essays/the-changing-middle-east-regional-order/"> <span style="font-weight: 400">hard-earned comeback</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400"> in recent years. Iraq has crafted the foundations of a functional state. In fits and starts, the monarchies in the Persian Gulf region have fashioned modern bureaucracies and a measure of mutual security cooperation. Autocrats spurned popular demands for democracy and good governance. But the same Arab regimes succeeded at rebuilding state capacity — a necessary if insufficient ingredient of regional stability.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Now, however, that glimmer of possibility has come under threat from Israel’s spiraling, maximalist regional war. With a mostly blank check from Washington, the Jewish state has challenged the viability of states across the region, threatening to undermine the Middle East’s only recently rebounding, fragile state order. The Trump administration gets the importance of stable states, but its response is limited to off-the-record or background seething. “Bibi acted like a madman,” a White House official told</span><a href="https://www.axios.com/2025/07/20/israel-syria-strikes-trump-netanyahu-divide?s=09"> <i><span style="font-weight: 400">Axios</span></i></a><span style="font-weight: 400"> this week. “He bombs everything all the time. This could undermine what Trump is trying to do.”</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">Those remarks concerned Israel’s intervention in Syria, ostensibly carried out to protect the country’s Druze minority. The U.S. government has its own concerns about whether Syria’s new leader can control their security forces or want to protect minorities — but Washington does not support Israel’s approach, of bombing government targets, occupying Syrian territory, and arming proxies, supposedly under the guise of a humanitarian aid mission.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">These gripes summon memories of Biden advisers leaking that Biden called</span><a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/investigations/biden-disparages-netanyahu-private-hasnt-changed-us-policy-israel-rcna138282"> <span style="font-weight: 400">Netanyahu an “asshole”</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400"> while doing nothing to limit the Israeli premier’s recklessness. Under Trump, however, Israel’s adventurism has grown more extreme and destabilizing, and Trump has at times directly contradicted leaders in Jerusalem and expressed irritation. On occasion Trump has even </span><a href="https://time.com/7304352/israel-netanyahu-trump-syria-strikes-gaza-catholic-church-iran-ceasefire/"><span style="font-weight: 400">reined in Israel</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400">. That’s understandable; the present-day tableau is alarming. Israel is causing famine in Gaza, igniting sectarian tensions and attacking the government in</span><a href="https://apnews.com/article/syria-us-barrack-israel-druze-ede9f5299c4e59a477736842adcd7de9"> <span style="font-weight: 400">Syria</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400"> (in direct contravention of US interests and policy in that country), and keeping up a steady patter of threats and strikes against Iran, Yemen, and Lebanon.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400">In a war without limits or clear goals, Israel has directly targeted Lebanon, Syria, Yemen, Iraq, and now Iran, while also undermining the popular credibility of those Arab monarchs in the Gulf who have quietly sided with the Jewish state. These open-ended conflicts could wreak the same kind of generational ruin that America inflicted on Iraq — the kind of unraveling that leaves a trail of hard-to-govern spaces undermined by broken states, institutions, and societies.</span></p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/06/israel-has-opened-pandoras-box/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/06/israel-has-opened-pandoras-box/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/GettyImages-526088204.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/06/israel-has-opened-pandoras-box/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/06/israel-has-opened-pandoras-box/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Israel has opened Pandora’s box</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/06/israel-has-opened-pandoras-box/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Philip Cunliffe</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Conspiracy theorists in the Middle East have long bemoaned the Israeli and American plots to weaken their governments and fragment their political communities — a Machiavellian divide-and-rule strategy to keep a strategically critical oil-rich region off balance and easier to manipulate. Often, these fevered Arab visions were just that: scaremongering used by Arab elites to fend off domestic challenges to their misrule. But these days, the notion that Western powers, especially Israel, seek chaos for its own sake is hard to dismiss as a conspiracy.</p>
<p>Historians and policymakers often treat the Arab state system as a unit of analysis, because of the shared language and grouping within the Arab League. Today, in assessing the damage to states caused by Israel’s wars since Oct. 7, it’s probably more useful to look at the entire geography of the Middle East and distinguish states by their longevity, unity, and capacity, rather than their language group.</p>
<p>A small cadre of states have operated in their current form for centuries, with political communities that have remained cohesive across multiple eras and regime types. That group includes Iran, Turkey, and Egypt. A second category includes an array of post-colonial states, most of them monarchies, that have acquired some ability to project regional power. These include Gulf Cooperation Council powers like Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar. The final group includes the rest of the Middle Eastern states, some of them republics and some monarchies, but all vulnerable to destabilizing conflict and general precarity.</p>
<p>To be sure, states in the region, especially the Arab states, have often exemplified brittle personalistic or securitized rule (what Daniel Brumberg calls the <a href="https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/the-legacy-of-the-pillared-arab-state/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">“pillared state,”</a> more concerned with regime survival than with good governance). But the answer isn’t to shatter state capacity in such places, but rather to direct that state capacity to serve the interests of the nation rather than the regime.</p>
<p>Some policymakers in the United States have belatedly come to understand that without functional states, the Middle East will never stabilize. Constant conflict, displacement, and human suffering, along with failed governance, have driven decades of perpetual emergency: wars, refugees, and failure to respond to climate change are just a few of the burning crises.</p>
<p>Over the last decade, successive US administrations have, with one hand, encouraged a necessary state revival. They helped mend the rift between the GCC states. They provided economic lifelines to Jordan and Egypt, and helped pay salaries to the Lebanese army when the state went bankrupt. They’ve made critical decisions to support Syria’s transition from Bashar Assad, recognizing the new government and lifting some sanctions. They’ve invested in the problematic, sectarian, but burgeoning Iraqi state, and they’ve negotiated with Iran over Tehran’s nuclear program.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">“There is no regional hegemon or collective order effective enough to calm the roiling waters. ”</div>
<p>The problem is the other hand, which sometimes undoes the work of the first. In his first administration, Trump pulled out of the Iran nuclear agreement and gave space to regime-change enthusiasts. Biden gave Israel a free hand to destroy Gaza and consolidate Israeli steps to annex the West Bank. And in his second term, Trump directly joined Israel’s wars in Iran and Yemen, and backed the Israeli military campaigns that threaten state survival in Syria and Lebanon (even as administration officials grumble about Bibi’s adventurism to the press).</p>
<p>Israel has clearly stated its strategic aim — to keep rival states so weak that they can’t strategically threaten Israel. Recent history makes clear what fool’s errand this approach is. Power vacuums and weak states generate far greater security threats — for<a href="https://tcf.org/content/commentary/israel-and-the-united-states-are-planting-a-harvest-of-chaos-in-iran/"> everyone involved</a>, including their own populations, Israel, the United States, and the international community. Groups like Islamic State and Al Qaeda thrive in ungoverned hinterlands.</p>
<p>But the Israelis, emboldened by what they see as an unbroken string of military triumphs after the Oct 7 Hamas terror assault, have embraced a strategy that seeks to expand the zones of chaos in the Middle East. Confident that they have coopted or irreversibly weakened their Arab neighbors, they are now cultivating enduring disorder in a wider ring: Yemen, Iraq, Syria, and, most consequentially, Iran. Some of Israel’s leaders, along with a few like-minded American officials, dream of a regime-change war against the Islamic Republic. But they’ve publicly expressed that they’d be equally satisfied to simply hobble the Iranian state, making its people suffer and its government struggle. Publicly Netanyahu has mused about regime change but emphasized that Israeli wanted to make sure Iran would lose its nuclear capacities. “They may be more comfortable with destroying the country than we are,” an American official told <em><a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/jun/17/netanyahu-israel-iran-regime-change-destruction" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Axios</a></em>, speaking about the Israelis.</p>
<p>So what can or should Washington do in response? The United States is conflicted about how much it wants to get involved in the Middle East. In some instances, American leaders appear determined to stay out of regional disputes and avoid new wars. At the same time, US troops are still deployed in numerous declared and undeclared wars, and Washington continually enables Israel’s regional bombing bonanza.</p>
<p>When the United States intervenes, as Trump did by bombing Iran’s nuclear facilities, it resolutely wants to stay at arm’s length — simultaneously in and out. There is no regional hegemon or collective order effective enough to calm the roiling waters. The most powerful states in the region are Israel, Iran, the Gulf monarchies, and Turkey. Egypt is too weak to play much of a stabilizing role. Against this backdrop, America’s paramount interest lies in ensuring stability and balance in this system.</p>
<p>A Middle East at war and chaos is good for nobody, even if leaders in Jerusalem mistakenly believe that such disorder will benefit Israeli security. Another era of regional conflict certainly harms US interests. America’s leaders increasingly tilt populist and isolationist, but as a global superpower, the US government finds time and time again that it cannot ignore global conflicts, especially in the Middle East, which has proven of enduring strategic interest. A succession of US presidents has hopefully insisted that they’re pivoting away from the Middle East, before inevitably turning the lion’s share of their policy bandwidth to the region.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/05/the-brutal-flaw-in-israels-starvation-plan/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/05/the-brutal-flaw-in-israels-starvation-plan/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/GettyImages-2215362507.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/05/the-brutal-flaw-in-israels-starvation-plan/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/05/the-brutal-flaw-in-israels-starvation-plan/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The brutal flaw in Israel’s starvation plan</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/05/the-brutal-flaw-in-israels-starvation-plan/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Alex de Waal</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Only functional states can deliver basic governance, uphold rights, and protect their populations — the minimum ingredients of stability. The Middle East needs states with basic competence: functional institutions, some authority over militias, an economic plan, and access to international support. Even bad or ambiguous states with some capabilities are better than chaos and power vacuums.</p>
<p>There are a few hopeful signs. Gulf powers have avoided new fissures, despite their considerable differences over how to deal with Israel, Yemen, and Iran. Notwithstanding internal pressures from militias and external pressure from Israel, Iran, and others, Iraq has maintained its hybrid authoritarian system, built some effective institutions, and cultivated stable relations with Middle Eastern regional powers from whom Baghdad was historically estranged. Lebanon’s new government wants to place Hezbollah’s militia under state control. The Assad dictatorship is gone, and Syria has at least a theoretical prospect of enjoying legitimate national governance.</p>
<p>All those gains are tentative, however. Without enumerating all the many caveats, major risks overshadow every small prospect for good in the region, from the ongoing proxy wars in Yemen and Libya, to the spoiler activities of Iran and its Axis of Resistance network, to the authoritarianism and sectarianism of the region’s leaders.</p>
<p>The biggest threat of all to the region right now, however, comes from Israel’s unfettered and ever-expanding war. Israel’s bombings near and far have no strategic logic beyond sowing disorder and weakening authority. Strikes on Syria might <a href="https://press.un.org/en/2025/sc16042.doc.htm" target="_blank" rel="noopener">upend the transition</a> there, but can’t possibly engender security or good governance for Syrians. The war on Iran won’t engender a peaceful democracy there, but it already has sabotaged diplomacy — which was working — and appears near certain to accelerate fragmentation and disorder. Terrorism, proxy war, and many of the Middle East’s worst ills are weapons of the weak, spawned by ideologues and accelerated in weak or failing states.</p>
<p>Israel’s gains from the gyre of war are likely to prove illusory or, at best, brief. But the campaign to erode states and the region’s state system will cause enduring harm to the Middle East — and to US interests. The most damning lesson of America’s failed interventions after 9/11 is that it’s far easier to break a state than to build one. And without functioning states, the United States faces another generation of neglecting its own prosperity and security while it manages conflict in the Middle East.</p>
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					<title>Will Syria’s jihadis go rogue?</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2025/07/will-syrias-jihadis-go-rogue/?edition=us</link>
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										<unherd:main_theme>Dispatch</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Tam Hussein]]>
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							<![CDATA[Foreign fighters are symbols of Syria's revolution. Aref Tammawi/AFP via Getty.]]>
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							<![CDATA[<p><b data-stringify-type="bold">Tam Hussein</b> is an award winning investigative journalist and writer. His work has been recognised by the Royal Television Society Awards.</p>
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						<unherd:twitter_handle>tamhussein</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[<b data-stringify-type="bold">Tam Hussein</b> is an award winning investigative journalist and writer. His work has been recognised by the Royal Television Society Awards.]]>
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										<pubDate>Tue, 08 Jul 2025 23:01:59 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Wed, 09 Jul 2025 10:51:10 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Al-Sharaa]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Assad]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Extremism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[jihadis]]></category>
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								<![CDATA[Foreign fighters could upend al-Sharaa’s revolution]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>When I arrived in Damascus, mere weeks after Assad fell, there wasn’t a single foreign fighter in sight. The country’s new ruler, Ahmed al-Sharaa, once known to the world by his jihadist <em>nom de guerre</em> Abu Mohammed al-Jolani, made sure that the capital’s checkpoints were manned by Syrian provincials. It seemed like he wanted to reassure Damascenes frightened by decades of Assad propaganda, real and imagined, about the deeds of foreign jihadists. He wanted to show the world that Assad’s downfall was a nationalist victory, not a jihadi one.</p>
<p>But the foreigners were there all right, as I found when I met a busload of Uyghur fighters visiting the horrific Sednaya Prison. They were al-Sharaa’s most disciplined fighters and crucial in his rise to power. Six months on, however, the very fighters who delivered him victory now threaten his bid for international legitimacy. For if the Trump administration has just announced that it will no longer <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2025/07/07/al-nusrah-front-terrorist-designation-00441351" target="_blank" rel="noopener">designate</a> al-Sharaa’s group as a terrorist threat, Syria’s new president may yet be unable to contain the foreign extremists who brought him to power — without plunging his country, and the wider region, back into blood-stained chaos.</p>
<p>When the Syrian uprising began, back in 2011, foreign fighters <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/video/2014/apr/15/jihad-syria-social-media-video" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Instagrammed</a> their “five-star jihad” to the world, a life filled with swanky villas and the latest gaming consoles. There were tens of thousands, then, from all over the world, from red-bearded Chechens to diminutive Maldivians. The survivors now have beards flecked with grey, and wander through the Umayyad Mosque pushing prams, as their wives snap photos in fake Gucci shades. Perhaps al-Sharaa, or just life, had tamed them.</p>
<p>But given how jihadist foreign fighters had dominated the news cycle and occupied the nightmares of Western policy makers for over a decade, beheading journalists in Raqqa and launching terror attacks on European streets — their very presence in Syria needed a response. They couldn’t be left to rural obscurity in the desert. When Donald Trump met al-Sharaa in Saudi Arabia, back in May, no wonder the Americans gave him an ultimatum: get the foreign fighters out, and crushing US sanctions will be lifted.</p>
<p>Trump’s offer was immediately celebrated in Syria. Billboards all over Damascus thanked the president for finally <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2025/06/06/world/video/damascus-syria-trump-clarissa-ward-digvid" target="_blank" rel="noopener">lifting</a> the sanctions. Fair enough: Syrians are tired of the crushing poverty sanctions have brought, with shoppers forced to carry around bundles of Syrian pounds in black plastic bags. Yet amid the jubilation, there were questions too. Whatever the benefits of taking Trump’s deal, would al-Sharaa really sell out the men who stood by him through the hardest of times? No wonder Western media speculated that the American offer might prompt yet more bloodshed, with the <em>Washington Post</em> suggesting that al-Sharaa’s foreign fighters “pose a profound challenge to his political survival”.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/09/will-a-new-generation-of-jihadis-flock-to-somalia/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/09/will-a-new-generation-of-jihadis-flock-to-somalia/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/GettyImages-1250825131-e1726243747111.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/09/will-a-new-generation-of-jihadis-flock-to-somalia/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/09/will-a-new-generation-of-jihadis-flock-to-somalia/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Will a new generation of jihadis flock to Somalia?</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/09/will-a-new-generation-of-jihadis-flock-to-somalia/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Tam Hussein</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>But as the political analyst <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/profile/jerome-drevon/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Jerome Drevon</a> points out, how does one expel the foreign fighters to their homelands when they’re clearly not wanted there? European capitals, after all, are hardly likely to take their jihadis back, given both the security threat and the populist far-Right sentiment sweeping the continent. In any case, many of these foreign fighters have no desire to return to Europe. Many face long prison sentences for terror-related offenses, and even those who don’t suffer long-term surveillance and social exclusion. Female returnees also aren’t able to access basic services for their children, thanks to the absence of legal documentation. That, in turn, means they become wholly reliant on state handouts.</p>
<p>And if these foreign fighters cannot stay in Syria or go to Europe, that could lead them to places where the state is weak: Sudan, Somalia, Afghanistan. In a worst-case scenario, in fact, they might be roused from quiet domesticity and join Ahmed al-Assir brigade, a newly formed Lebanese jihadi group that’s actively recruiting. Or, perhaps, they instead lend their support to Free Masked Youth, a new opposition group intent on bringing down the house of Saud? Or, buoyed by the fall of Damascus, they could even start agitating in Gaza and Jordan.</p>
<p>In other words, then, their departure from Syria could mean foreign jihadis scattering embers across a region already primed to burn. And, in such volatile circumstances, it will be these very same foreigners who’ll likely emerge as the victors, as they’ve become immensely adept at surviving for over a decade of savagery. Letting them go could turn them into jihadi Ronin — masterless and wholly unpredictable. And no one wants that.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;Letting them go could turn them into jihadi Ronin — masterless and wholly unpredictable.&#8221;</div>
<p>Yet the truth, as one anonymous Syrian government insider tells me, is that “everyone is really exaggerating the ‘burden’ of foreign fighters”. In many ways, after all, most of these people have already signed up to al-Sharaa’s vision. He has happily given many foreigners high-ranking roles in the new Syrian military, while others work as civil servants. No less important, those who don’t like his vision know that it’s not worth taking him on. Certainly, Donald Trump himself saw something he liked, referring to him as an “attractive, tough guy” as if he were a UFC fighter.</p>
<p>By implication, many of the foreign fighters still in Syria have accepted al-Sharaa’s more moderate politics, too. Taken together, US envoy Thomas Barrack’s recent comments — that keeping the foreign fighters within the Syrian state project rather than excluding them — surely make sense. And if that wasn’t enough, the Americans have history on their side too: from Northern Ireland to the Balkans, bringing extremists into the political fold can bring results.</p>
<p>Then there’s al-Sharaa himself. Immensely affected by the Palestinian issue and US intervention in the Middle East, he was essentially radicalized and travelled to fight the Americans in Iraq. It is even said that he fought in the brutal battle of Fallujah, when militants killed dozens of US troops in 2004.</p>
<p>According to one former associate, however, al-Sharaa “joined al-Qaeda because it was the only group that took in foreigners”. And while he received an intimate education in insurgency, his experiences also turned al-Sharaa into a skilled politician. As one insider who knows him puts it, he’s alternatively known as “Machiavellian” and “<em>muwaffaq</em>” — someone who knows just how much to push and get away with it.</p>
<p>It was these attributes that allowed him to emerge on top. In 2013, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the sometime ISIS head, tried to reassert his authority over al-Sharaa’s group. Al-Sharaa refused, and an intra-jihadi conflict duly broke out in northern Syria. With al-Sharaa’s back to the wall, he outfoxed al-Baghdadi by swearing allegiance to Ayman al-Zawahiri: Baghdadi’s boss. Al-Zawahiri backed al-Sharaa’s cause, and many foreign jihadists rallied to his standard.</p>
<p>At some point around 2015, meanwhile, al-Sharaa realized that no state in the Middle East could flourish with a transnational jihadist vision. Certainly, the downfall of the Islamic State testified to that. Of course, that didn’t mean that al-Sharaa had suddenly turned into an Arab liberal who’d happily crack open the arak. Far from it: he remains an Islamist and has not abandoned the idea of jihad. What he has done, however, is keep the bit that serves as a vehicle for national liberation and defense, while discarding the suggestion that Muslims are obliged to overthrow any government that doesn’t implement Islamic law.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/06/i-warned-the-cia-about-afghanistans-collapse-and-was-ignored/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/06/i-warned-the-cia-about-afghanistans-collapse-and-was-ignored/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/GettyImages-181827767-2.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/06/i-warned-the-cia-about-afghanistans-collapse-and-was-ignored/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/06/i-warned-the-cia-about-afghanistans-collapse-and-was-ignored/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>&#039;I warned the CIA about Afghanistan&#039;s collapse — and was ignored&#039;</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/06/i-warned-the-cia-about-afghanistans-collapse-and-was-ignored/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Tam Hussein</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>This ideological clarity was accompanied by a series of remarkable power grabs. After 2016, al-Sharaa renounced al-Qaeda and formed Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). By 2020, what al-Qaeda called “the betrayal” was complete. Al-Sharaa had crushed all his former jihadi friends, while also mobilizing his band of well-disciplined Uyghur fighters against Ahrar al-Sham, the dominant rebel faction in northern Syria. By the time he set up a civilian government in northern Syria, then, al-Qaeda’s foreign fighter networks had been neutralized.</p>
<p>Taken together, then, al-Sharaa is well placed to control the foreign fighters in his midst — or destroy any dissenters if needs be. No less important, he’s in a strong position with places like al-Hol, detention camps which hold ISIS wives and children, many of whom are from Europe. Nor does he seem particularly troubled by the ISIS fighters held by the Kurds.</p>
<p>Yet if al-Sharaa is safe from a practical perspective, more symbolic challenges remain. Foreign fighters carry immense symbolic weight in the Syrian religious imagination, with many known as Ansar. “Helpers” in Arabic, the Ansar in Islamic tradition supported the early Muslim community, and are viewed in a sanctified light. After the failure of the international community to act against Assad, it was these latter-day Ansar, and their Syrian brothers-in-arms, who stepped into the breach.</p>
<p>That fact has its own status both in Syria and across the Muslim world. The Syrian revolution, after all, is not just a national one but one replete with religious symbolism. Jihadism — albeit in its localized form — is no longer external to Syria’s revolutionary movement. Rather, it is woven into the social and political fabric of the country. Wander around the markets of Damascus and you’ll see the revolutionary banner alongside jihadi ones. Stop at a checkpoint and you’ll find long-haired and bearded Syrians, emulating the jihadi style.</p>
<p>It’s easy to see how that could cause problems for al-Sharaa, especially now that relations with the US seem so crucial to his future plans. Beyond removing HTS from the terror hit list, after all, Secretary of State Marco Rubio also <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2025/07/07/al-nusrah-front-terrorist-designation-00441351" target="_blank" rel="noopener">expects</a> Damascus to “combat terrorism in all its forms”. But doing so might alienate al-Sharaa from both his foreign supporters, and those Syrian jihadis who view them as brother-in-arms. At best, anyway, such a move could lead to civil unrest. At worst, the President risks damaging the foundational myth of the revolution. That would obviously undermine his credibility, even as the West might lose a willing and cooperative partner.</p>
<p>What al-Sharaa must therefore do, and it is by no means easy, is to strike a balance between honoring the foreign contribution to the revolution — while sidelining them or co-opting them into the state. Fail, and he risks suffering a similar fate to Bashar al-Assad.</p>
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															<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">690673</post-id>				</item>
									<item>
					<title>Trump’s Syrian gamble</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2025/05/trumps-syrian-gamble/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://stage.unherd.com/2025/05/trumps-syrian-gamble/?edition=us#comments</comments>
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										<unherd:main_theme>Art of the deal</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Lily Lynch]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/150523.jpg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>1</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[Who is behind Trump's Middle East policy? Alamy]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Lily Lynch </strong>is a writer and journalist based in Belgrade.</p>
]]>
						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle></unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[is a writer and journalist based in Belgrade.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Wed, 14 May 2025 23:03:44 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Thu, 15 May 2025 15:30:27 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Donald Trump]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Middle East]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Mohammed bin Salman]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Politics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Saudi Arabia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Syria]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[US]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://stage.unherd.com/?p=677162</guid>
																												<description>
								<![CDATA[America is looking for an exit plan]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>In a remarkable speech before a friendly audience in Riyadh on Tuesday, President Trump assailed the long history of &#8220;Western intervention&#8221; in the Middle East. He lambasted the neocons, hawks and &#8220;nation builders&#8221; who had traditionally anointed themselves arbiters of who should lead the region, all while administering democracy and human rights through occupations and shock-and-awe-style displays of spectacular violence. &#8220;The so-called nation builders,&#8221; he said, &#8220;wrecked far more nations than they built, and the interventionists were intervening in complex societies that they did not even understand themselves.&#8221; Trump also marveled at the &#8220;gleaming skyscrapers of Riyadh and Abu Dhabi&#8221; — emphasizing that the achievements of the &#8220;modern Middle East&#8221; had been entirely their own.</p>
<p>But the most significant part of Trump’s anti-interventionist speech, delivered on the first evening of a historic three-day trip to the Gulf, was not in its rhetoric but in policy. In a dramatic announcement, he stated that he would be ordering the &#8220;cessation of sanctions&#8221; against Syria. This, he said, would give the new government in Damascus &#8220;a chance at greatness&#8221;. From across the region, you could almost hear the collective sigh of relief.</p>
<p>Among the most punitive in the world, the sanctions on Syria were introduced during the long reign of the Assad family, starting in the Seventies. But the most debilitating sanctions were imposed in the last years of Bashar al-Assad’s regime, who was ousted in December by Islamist rebels led by the country’s new de facto president Ahmed al-Sharaa. Leaders with a stake in regional stability, including many assembled in Riyadh, had worried that absent sanctions relief, Syria could soon become a failed state — one that could potentially descend into full-scale sectarian civil war and even dissolution, sending more refugees towards Turkey and Europe.</p>
<p>In Syria, where some people haven’t received salaries for months, sanctions have strangled the economy, inhibited foreign investment, hampered the provision of humanitarian aid, and surely placed increased strain on existing fissures within society. As a result, the news boosted Syria’s beleaguered currency, with the pound strengthening against the dollar for the first time in years.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/03/erdogans-now-world-order/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/03/erdogans-now-world-order/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/GettyImages-1186404820.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/03/erdogans-now-world-order/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/03/erdogans-now-world-order/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Erdoğan&#039;s new world order</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/03/erdogans-now-world-order/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Lily Lynch</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Sanctions relief, coupled with Trump’s brief meeting with Sharaa yesterday — the first such meeting between a Syrian and American leader in 25 years — mean relations between the two countries have been suddenly transformed. This is due in part to Al-Sharaa’s wise choice to invest heavily in Syria’s relations with Saudi Arabia, and aggressive diplomatic outreach that began immediately after his forces seized power. Indeed, convincing the region and the West to trust him despite his history as a leader of militant Islamist groups has been central to his government’s charm offensive. During the US occupation of Iraq, the new president spent years as an inmate in an American prison infamous for nurturing jihadists. Upon his release, he returned to Syria to fight, first with ISIS and then al-Qaeda, eventually severing ties with both to form his own ostensibly more moderate outfit, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). Since his ousting of Assad, Sharaa has embraced the language of inclusivity, meeting many minority leaders and securing cautious support from many corners of the EU. Even so, spasms of sectarian violence have tempered the initial optimism that accompanied Assad’s fall.</p>
<p>In Syria, there has been widespread jubilation at the news of sanction relief. But removing US sanctions will not be as simple or as straightforward as many might wish. As Alexander Langlois, a contributing fellow at Defense Priorities, explains, Syria has &#8220;multiple sanctions regimes in place&#8221; — making their revocation complicated. Some, such as Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) sanctions and Executive Order (EO) sanctions, can be lifted unilaterally by the president or his team. More difficult to remove will be the so-called Caesar sanctions, which require Congressional approval. The president can only waive these for up to 180 days, and even that requires him certifying to various congressional committees that this is in America’s national security interest.</p>
<p>One alternative might be simply to ignore the law once those six months are up — something the administration has proven more than happy to do elsewhere. Yet as Giorgio Cafiero, the CEO of Gulf State Analytics, says, not everyone in Washington will be eager to help the new Syrian government. &#8220;There are elements in Washington that are very skeptical towards this idea that Sharaa has moved past his extremist past,&#8221; Cafiero says. They would want the sanctions to remain in place for longer.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/12/how-syria-spooked-mbs/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/12/how-syria-spooked-mbs/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/GettyImages-928555530-e1734005623498.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/12/how-syria-spooked-mbs/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/12/how-syria-spooked-mbs/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Syria has spooked MBS</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/12/how-syria-spooked-mbs/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Malise Ruthven</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Beyond the excitement that accompanied Trump’s sanctions announcement, though, there was another, quieter message that received less attention: removing sanctions on Syria would give the United States an exit strategy. Behind all his praise of the Gulf’s leadership for the region’s achievements, and denigration of failed Western nation-building projects, was an unspoken declaration of his administration’s plans for the Middle East: a policy that would swap Western dependence for regional self-reliance and a reduction if not total withdrawal of the US troops on the ground in northeast Syria.</p>
<p>The US military presence supports local forces in countering ISIS, but the specter of withdrawal has been in the air since Trump won the November election. Assad’s fall a few weeks later forced a reassessment in an altered security environment. But before this week, the Trump administration appeared to have no coherent policy on Syria. Certainly, the rest of the administration’s messaging on Sharaa has been skeptical at best. Sebastian Gorka, Director of Counterterrorism at the US National Security Council, expressed reservations in February: “He was a jihadist for a long time,” he said. “Has he reformed himself? Is he a better man now? Does he believe in a representative (democratic) government?&#8230; In my 24 years of studying jihadist movements, I have never seen a successful jihadist leader evolve into a democrat or embrace representative government.”</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;Trump’s new Syria policy seems to put him at odds with top members of his own team.&#8221;</div>
<p>What’s more, during her confirmation hearing earlier this year, Trump’s current Director of National Intelligence, Tulsi Gabbard, denounced Sharaa for “dancing in the streets on 9/11”. And while Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth has not directed such pointed criticism at the Syrian president, there were other, subtler indications that he would not support the new Islamist leadership in Damascus: in March, new photos revealed that Hegseth had the word “kafir” — meaning “infidel” or “non-believer” — tattooed on his arm in Arabic. All this made this week’s developments particularly striking. After meeting President Sharaa, Trump had nothing but praise for him, calling him a “young, attractive guy, a tough guy with a strong past”.</p>
<p>Trump’s new Syria policy, then, seems to put him at odds with top members of his own team. It also suggests that there are other powerful figures who hold considerable sway over his decision-making. Trump has credited Sharaa’s two most ardent backers in the region, Saudi leader Mohammed bin Salman and Turkey’s Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, with convincing him to lift US sanctions on Syria. That they were able to do so suggests that both Riyadh and Ankara now play a preeminent role in shaping Washington’s thinking in the Middle East. It also implies that Trump is not taking all his cues from Israel. Earlier this year, it was reported that Israel had lobbied the US to keep its sanctions on Syria. And, just a few weeks ago, the IDF bombed an area next to the presidential palace in Damascus, only one of the many attacks it has launched against Syria since Assad’s fall. Now, in a dramatic turn of events, Trump is establishing friendly relations with the new Syrian president — on a trip to the Middle East with no scheduled stop in Israel.</p>
<p>Indeed, this week’s trip has exhibited Trump’s predilection for forming alliances with erstwhile foes. Trump emphasized that he was “willing to end past conflicts and forge new partnerships for a better and more stable world, even if our differences may be profound… I have never believed in having permanent enemies.” And in Trump’s world, new relationships are best solidified through dealmaking. This week’s deals have been of a historic size: on Tuesday, Trump secured a $600-million commitment from Saudi Arabia to invest in the United States. Sharaa has proven a quick study: though Syria lacks Saudi Arabia’s enormous financial resources, he reportedly offered Trump what he could: a Trump Tower in Damascus. During his meeting with Trump yesterday, Sharaa also invited the United States to invest in Syria’s oil and gas sector.</p>
<p>But, as Cafiero says, American investors will likely remain hesitant, at least initially. Instead, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates will be Syria’s most important partners in making investments. The sanctions may soon vanish, but terrorism designations are just one reason why Western governments and companies may be reluctant to invest. With the US looking to reduce its military footprint in the region while strengthening its business partnerships, Trump’s friends in the Gulf appear poised to consolidate their influence in the new Syria.</p>
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					<title>Why Erdogan can’t crush the Kurds</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2025/05/why-erdogan-cant-crush-the-kurds-2/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://stage.unherd.com/2025/05/why-erdogan-cant-crush-the-kurds-2/?edition=us#comments</comments>
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										<unherd:main_theme>PKK</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Matt Broomfield]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/guy2.jpg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>2</unherd:article_ranking>
																<unherd:image_caption>
							<![CDATA['The group is often portrayed as an anachronistic throwback.' Mustafa Ozer / AFP via Getty Images]]>
						</unherd:image_caption>
						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Matt Broomfield </strong>is a freelance journalist, PhD researcher, co-founder of the Rojava Information Center, and author of <a href="https://www.amazon.co.uk/Hope-Without-Rojava-Revolutionary-Commitment/dp/1849355665" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.amazon.co.uk/Hope-Without-Rojava-Revolutionary-Commitment/dp/1849355665&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1747243103561000&amp;usg=AOvVaw0T9G1BlMj6GuZO-cMOmbar"><em>Hope Without Hope: Rojava and Revolutionary Commitment</em></a> (2025).</p>
<div></div>
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						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>MattBroomfield1</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[is a freelance journalist, PhD researcher, co-founder of the Rojava Information Center, and author of <a href="https://www.amazon.co.uk/Hope-Without-Rojava-Revolutionary-Commitment/dp/1849355665" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.amazon.co.uk/Hope-Without-Rojava-Revolutionary-Commitment/dp/1849355665&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1747243103561000&amp;usg=AOvVaw0T9G1BlMj6GuZO-cMOmbar"><em>Hope Without Hope: Rojava and Revolutionary Commitment</em></a> (2025).
<div></div>]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Tue, 13 May 2025 23:01:55 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Thu, 03 Jul 2025 11:57:59 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Kurds]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Politics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[restofworld]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Syria]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Turkey]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[War]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://stage.unherd.com/?p=677042</guid>
																												<description>
								<![CDATA[They have always moved with the times]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>In 1978, a handful of Kurdish political science students gathered in an obscure village in Turkey’s southeast, together founding a militant Marxist-Leninist party. A half-century on, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and its affiliates have controlled territory from Iran’s remote Zagros Mountains, through the Iraqi desert to ISIS’s erstwhile Syrian capital Raqqa. The PKK’s affiliates have won global influence and sympathy through their famed, women-led struggle against ISIS, even as the PKK itself remains a listed terror organization thanks to its ongoing conflict with Turkey — itself a key NATO ally.</p>
<p>The PKK’s senior leadership recently gathered in the cave networks where they shelter from ceaseless Turkish airstrikes, and in a somber-looking conference proposed an end to the conflict which has cost a <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/10/17/turkey-claim-syrian-kurds-terrorists-not-isis-ypg-pkk-sdf/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">reported</a> 40,000 lives. Most of the dead were Kurdish civilians killed by Turkey’s brutal counter-insurgency, a fact often missed when that grim statistic is trotted out. And, certainly, Ankara’s drone technology and growing geopolitical clout have tipped the balance against the PKK, with the group’s embattled, exiled leaders hardly negotiating from a place of strength.</p>
<p>Yet rumors of the PKK’s demise are often greatly exaggerated. The sophisticated, sprawling Kurdish revolutionary movement is a many-headed hydra, and a step back for the guerrilla forces stationed in the Iraqi mountains may well come with gains elsewhere across Kurdish-majority regions in Turkey, Syria and Iran. Whether the PKK will actually down arms remains an open question. Whatever happens next, Kurdistan remains a crucial geopolitical battleground, and the PKK’s movement will continue to play a crucial role in a conflict stretching from Gaza to Tehran and beyond.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;Rumors of the PKK’s demise are often greatly exaggerated.&#8221;</div>
<p>It’s hard to reconcile familiar images of gleaming Mediterranean holiday resorts — with their rows of equally gleaming “Turkey teeth” — to the savage guerrilla warfare at the far end of Anatolia. But the violence is very real. The West chooses to see Turkey as a flawed but basically functional parliamentary democracy. But with <a href="https://anfenglishmobile.com/rojava-syria/20-000-hdp-members-taken-into-custody-in-4-years-10-000-jailed-48896" target="_blank" rel="noopener">tens of thousands</a> of Kurdish politicians, MPs, mayors and activists detained in recent years, this definition seems like a weak excuse to avoid provoking a deeply authoritarian ally.</p>
<p>As for the PKK itself, the group is often portrayed as an anachronistic throwback to a vanished era of anti-colonial struggle, beginning its fight for an independent, socialist Kurdish state “late” in the 20th century. Yet the group has moved with the times. The Nineties were a period of deep crisis, as the party reckoned with the USSR’s collapse as a potential sponsor of Kurdish national aspirations. The broader ideological delegitimization of communism did not help either. These existential challenges were compounded by the 1999 capture of the PKK’s political and intellectual figurehead Abdullah Öcalan, who has remained detained ever since on the prison island Imrali, where his almost total isolation inspires frequent comparison with Nelson Mandela.</p>
<p>Reacting to these developments, Öcalan came to view both communist and capitalist nation states as inherently repressive — a message reiterated by banners adorning the PKK’s subterranean disarmament conference. Instead, Öcalan now advocates for a decentralized federation based on municipal governance, minority representation, women’s autonomy, and ecology. This unexpected departure from communist and nationalist orthodoxy almost tore his party apart. During a period of reformation lasting from 1999 until 2003, the PKK <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/1934120.stm" target="_blank" rel="noopener">briefly changed</a> its name, sought to reorganize into an unarmed, civil and political federation, and entered into secret negotiations with Ankara. None of these steps caused the PKK to collapse, and indeed are effectively being repeated in this latest détente.</p>
<p>Indeed, these internal upheavals helped the PKK refind its strength, diversifying its tactics and building up ever-broader support in Kurdish civil society. Parties sympathetic to Öcalan’s vision made unprecedented gains in Turkey’s parliament, alongside renewed Turkey-PKK peace talks. At the same time, the revolutionary Kurdish movement achieved global fame. ISIS were sweeping through Iraq and Syria, and only the PKK stood in their way, fending off the jihadist genocide of the Yazidis and leading thousands of the Kurdish-speaking religious minority to safety — all in <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2014/08/11/a-u-s-designated-terrorist-group-is-saving-yazidis-and-battling-the-islamic-state/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">unexpected</a> battlefield coordination with the US. The PKK’s Syrian affiliates went further still, winning the support of a US-led “Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS”, as its all-female Kurdish units spearheaded a successful, years-long campaign to eradicate the caliphate.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/03/erdogans-now-world-order/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/03/erdogans-now-world-order/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/GettyImages-1186404820.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/03/erdogans-now-world-order/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/03/erdogans-now-world-order/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Erdoğan&#039;s new world order</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/03/erdogans-now-world-order/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Lily Lynch</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Millions of people now lived under PKK-inspired rule in and around Syrian Kurdistan, guarded by the presence of US troops. Tens of thousands of women took up arms and many more joined a civil-society revolution, as Kurds celebrated unprecedented freedoms and local communities explored self-governance amid the chaos of the Syrian civil war. Öcalan must have rubbed his eyes to see his utopian vision taking hold in a growing zone of PKK influence reaching almost to the Mediterranean.</p>
<p>Almost, but not quite. As ISIS were defeated, Turkey reacted violently to the Kurdish movement’s domestic, cross-border and international gains. Peace talks foundered amid bitter and renewed civil conflict in Turkey, while cross-border military operations against Syrian Kurdish regions killed hundreds and displaced hundreds of thousands more. Syrian Kurds’ dreams of international recognition for their embattled enclave vanished. Yet as this potted history shows, the PKK’s story is one of dogged survival and organizational flexibility, adapting its tactics and even its ideology to respond to challenges of the sort which have crushed many other would-be revolutionary movements. The latest disarmament announcement is equally part of this continued, strategic evolution.</p>
<p>For Recep Tayyip Erdoğan also has problems of his own. Turkey is confronting both Israel and Iran, putting Ankara on an uncomfortable collision course with both of the Middle East’s power blocs. These tensions have reached boiling point following the unexpected December 2024 ouster of Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad by militant Islamist forces with deep and growing ties to Ankara. Iran was the big loser as Turkey expanded its influence in Syria, while Israel will not countenance the presence of Turkish military bases and former al-Qaeda affiliates near its own, growing zone of occupation in southern Syria.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, the PKK’s Syrian affiliates continue to control a third of the country’s territory, its oil wealth, and its largest single armed force in the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). The US-trained, highly effective SDF guards tens of thousands of ISIS affiliates on behalf of its Western allies, and Americans have no desire to see the slightly less radical Islamists who now rule Damascus take control of these facilities. If Turkey and Syria’s jihadist-turned-statesman Ahmed al-Sharaa want the Western powers to continue their rapid normalization of the new regime, they would be well advised to continue their present strategy and avoid picking a fight with the SDF. Rather, heavy US pressure has brought about a tentative peace deal between the SDF and Damascus, in tandem with the PKK-Ankara agreement. For now, Turkish airstrikes against Syrian Kurdish regions have abated.</p>
<p>Syrian Kurdish leaders are therefore quietly confident, issuing maximalist demands aimed at preserving their Kurdish-led, multiethnic federation and its military wing, even as they prepare for the potential evacuation of PKK-trained military commanders from Syria and fret over a future, unwanted clash with Damascus. Some degree of Syrian Kurdish autonomy will certainly be preserved, though how far this will resemble Öcalan’s radical, direct-democratic vision is another question.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/01/britains-last-chance-to-stop-islamic-state/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/01/britains-last-chance-to-stop-islamic-state/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/GettyImages-2163514212-e1736517183984.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/01/britains-last-chance-to-stop-islamic-state/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/01/britains-last-chance-to-stop-islamic-state/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Britain&#039;s last chance to stop Islamic State</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/01/britains-last-chance-to-stop-islamic-state/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Matt Broomfield</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Across the border, it is less clear what the PKK will get from its own deal with Ankara — beyond a mooted amnesty for the majority of its guerrilla fighters and transfer to a nominally safe third country for senior commanders. A close listen to the “disarmament” speech makes it clear the PKK will only down weapons if their demands are met, including Öcalan’s release as a non-negotiable first step. Ankara must therefore take the next step: a genuine, internationally monitored amnesty would be a good place to start.</p>
<p>There are many hurdles before a peaceful transition, each presenting an opportunity for both the PKK and Turkey to abandon the process once again. Ankara has over 100 <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/c985lw7lywlo" target="_blank" rel="noopener">military bases</a> deep in Iraqi Kurdish territory, waypoints for its war against the PKK. This little-known, de facto occupation is linked to Turkey’s so-called “Development Road”. A $17-billion project, it <a href="https://jacobin.com/2024/08/turkey-war-iraq-regional-power/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">will link</a> Baghdad to Europe via Iraqi Kurdistan and Turkey, offering a third way beyond both the Houthi-blockaded Red Sea and a <a href="https://www.gisreportsonline.com/r/imec/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">proposed alternative route</a> running from India to Europe through the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and Israel, but unacceptably bypassing Turkey. As Turkey seeks to align itself as a key regional partner, therefore, Ankara will be loath to give up its Iraqi beachhead in the name of a peace deal. As of today, Turkish airstrikes continue to hit PKK’s positions in Iraqi Kurdistan.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, battle-hardened PKK veterans may wonder if their sacrifices are justified by Kurdish gains in the Turkish parliament or Syria, and continue their fight under yet another name. Intriguingly, the 1999-2004 ceasefire period saw the PKK switch focus from its long-term battle against Turkey to back its Iranian Kurdish affiliates targeting the no-less repressive Iranian regime. Today, Israel’s obliteration of the Iranian-led “Axis of Resistance” raises the possibility of future destabilization in the Islamic Republic. The PKK, or its successor organizations, might well be drawn into any such future conflict. Meanwhile, Israel has been making overtures to the Syrian Kurds, at the risk of alienating their Arab allies and international supporters.</p>
<p>Kurdistan may remain formally divided between Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria, but it lies at an increasingly crucial geostrategic crossroads — not only between the Middle East’s warring power blocs, but also on routes for infrastructure, oil and even water. Those weary, gray-haired Kurdish militants never completed their political scientific degrees, but they have learned valuable lessons across 50 years of conflict. As state power declines, drone technology becomes cheaper, and resources become scarcer right across the world, canny non-state armed groups like the PKK and the Houthis can and will play an increasing role over the coming decades. The PKK may be changing strategies once again, but its long struggle is far from over.</p>
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					<title>Syria can&#039;t escape war</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2025/03/war-returns-to-syria/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://stage.unherd.com/2025/03/war-returns-to-syria/?edition=us#comments</comments>
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										<unherd:main_theme>Middle East</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Robin Yassin-Kassab]]>
					</dc:creator>
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																<unherd:article_ranking>3</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[On the way to Latakia. Photo: Delil Souleiman/Getty.]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Robin Yassin-Kassab</strong> is co-author of <em>Burning Country: Syrians in Revolution and War</em>, and the English editor of the ISIS Prisons Museum.</p>
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						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle></unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is co-author of <em>Burning Country: Syrians in Revolution and War</em>, and the English editor of the ISIS Prisons Museum.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Thu, 13 Mar 2025 00:00:53 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Thu, 13 Mar 2025 00:00:53 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ahmed al-Sharaa]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Assad]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Israel]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Syria]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[US]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[War]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://stage.unherd.com/?p=662044</guid>
																												<description>
								<![CDATA[Sectarian rage goes back decades]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>It felt like a fairytale. How else to explain the dramatic fall of the Assads, in the space of days and all without any civilian casualties? Back in December, Syrians had feared that the regime would make a last stand in Lattakia, the heartland of their support and of the Alawite sect from which its top officers emerged. Many also feared there would be a sectarian bloodbath, as traumatized members of the Sunni majority took random revenge on the communities that had birthed their torturers.</p>
<p>None of that happened then — but some has now. On 6 March, an Assadist insurgency killed hundreds in Latakia and other coastal cities. Beyond crushing the insurrection, government forces also committed sectarian atrocities, summarily executing their armed opponents and killing many Alawite civilians. This is the first sectarian massacre of the new Syria, and it casts a fearsome shadow over the future. The revolution was supposed to overcome the targeting of sects for political reasons. Now, many fear the cycle will continue.</p>
<p>The previous regime was a sectarianizing regime par excellence, both under Hafez al-Assad, who ruled from 1970, and under his son Bashar, who inherited the throne in 2000. This doesn’t mean that the Assads attempted to impose a particular set of religious beliefs: but they did divide and rule, exacerbating and weaponizing resentments between sects (as well as between ethnicities, regions, families, tribes). They carefully instrumentalized social differences for the purposes of power, making them politically salient.</p>
<p>The Assads made the Alawite community into which they were born complicit in their rule — or, at least, to appear to be so. Independent Alawite religious leaders were killed, exiled or imprisoned, swiftly replaced with loyalists. Membership in the Baath Party and a career in the army were promoted as key markers of Alawite identity. The top ranks of the military and security services were almost all Alawite.</p>
<p>In 1982, during their war against the Muslim Brotherhood, Assadists killed tens of thousands of Sunni civilians in Hama. That violence pacified the country until the Syrian Revolution erupted in 2011. The counter-revolutionary war which followed can plausibly be thought of as a genocide of Sunni Muslims. From the start, collective punishment was imposed on Sunni communities where protests broke out, in a way that didn’t happen when there were protests in Alawi, Christian or mixed areas.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/02/can-kurds-survive-the-new-syria/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/02/can-kurds-survive-the-new-syria/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/broom.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/02/can-kurds-survive-the-new-syria/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/02/can-kurds-survive-the-new-syria/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Can Kurds survive the new Syria?</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/02/can-kurds-survive-the-new-syria/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Matt Broomfield</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>The punishment involved burning property, arresting people randomly and en masse, then torturing and raping detainees. As militarization continued, the same Sunni areas were barrel-bombed, attacked with chemical weapons, and subjected to starvation sieges. Throughout the war years, the overwhelming majority of the hundreds of thousands of dead, and of the millions expelled from their homes, were Sunnis. Alawi officers and warlords were backed in this genocidal endeavor by Shia militants from Lebanon, Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan, all of them organized, funded and armed by Iran. These militias — with their sectarian flags and battle cries — were very open about their hatred of Sunnis.</p>
<p>The worst of sectarian provocations were the massacres perpetrated in a string of towns and villages in central Syria, particularly in 2012 and 2013. The regime’s modus operandi was that the army would first shell a town to make opposition militias withdraw. From there, Alawi thugs from nearby towns would move in to cut the throats of women and children. It’s important to note that these were not spontaneous outbreaks of violence between neighboring communities, but rather carefully organized assaults. They were intended to induce a Sunni backlash, frightening Alawites and other minorities into loyalty. This fitted with the regime’s primary counter-revolutionary strategy. Early on, it had released Islamist jihadis from prison while rounding up enormous numbers of non-violent, non-sectarian activists. For the same reason, it rarely fought ISIS — which in turn usually focused on taking territory from revolutionary forces.</p>
<p>Soon enough, Sunni extremist organizations provided the response the regime wanted. For example, an August 2013 jihadist offensive in the Latakia countryside killed at least 190 Alawite civilians, and abducted many more. When they saw such horrors, many members of minority groups, and some Sunnis too, felt they had no option but to fight to preserve the regime.</p>
<p>But in recent years HTS — the de facto authority since December 2024 — seemed to have abandoned the divide-and-rule strategy. The Islamist militia improved relations with non-Muslims in Idlib, while also sending positive messages to Alawites. It also offered an amnesty to all former regime fighters, except senior war criminals. It looked, finally, as if the new Syria might avoid further sectarian conflict. After all, throughout the revolution, many Sunnis had worked for the regime, and many Alawis had opposed it, at enormous cost, from the army officer Zubeida Meeki to the actor Fadwa Suleiman.</p>
<p>Nevertheless, the ingredients for an Assadist insurgency in Alawite areas were present. Men had lost their jobs in the collapsed regime army, and many feared Syria’s new rulers. Iranian funds and Hezbollah organization provided the support they needed to challenge HTS. That led to the attacks last week, with several coordinated Assadist attacks killing up to 400 members of the new security forces alongside dozens of civilians. Some of the victims were burnt alive, while hospitals and ambulances were targeted too.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;The ingredients for an Assadist insurgency in Alawite areas were present.&#8221;</div>
<p>Across Syria, there was a furious popular response. Impromptu demonstrations condemned the insurgency and chaotic convoys of militants and armed civilians headed for the coast. Government fighters and their allies largely succeeded in clearing the rebels from urban areas, but they also committed atrocities. Disarmed Assadist fighters were summarily executed. So too were Alawite civilians, including women and children.</p>
<p>According to the Syrian Network for Human Rights, the most consistently reliable monitoring organization, 211 civilians were killed by Assad loyalists, and at least 420 people by Syrian security forces. The latter includes both civilians and disarmed fighters who were killed out of hand. It is difficult to distinguish the two: most Assadist fighters wore civilian clothes. Yet at least 49 women and 39 children are among the dead.</p>
<p>The Assadist assault was never going to restore the old regime — it had totally collapsed, and is widely hated across all parts of society. The true aim of the insurgency’s backers, rather, may have been to provoke a sectarian response. That, after all, was the strategy of the previous decade. If so, the rebels got what they wanted. It seems that most atrocities were perpetrated by the notoriously ill-disciplined Syrian National Army (SNA) factions, and by foreign fighters including Chechens. The extent of official HTS involvement remains unclear. But in a way, that is already irrelevant. The crimes against innocents could now turbo-charge an insurgency, preventing Syria from stabilizing, even as it serves the vultures surrounding the country.</p>
<p>Chief among these are Iran — which lost its most important Arab ally, and its route to Lebanon, when Assad fell — and Israel. The Netanyahu government is assiduously working to partition Syria along sectarian lines, trying, without much success, to exploit fissures in Druze and Kurdish politics. For their different reasons, these enemy states share the same desire to keep Syria weak.</p>
<p>Iran and Israel, as well as a range of Western Islamophobes and “Tankies” are seeking to fan the flames with disinformation. Commentators from Elon Musk to George Galloway are helping spread claims that Syrian Christians are being massacred. There is zero evidence of this, but like some of the atrocity stories on October 7, including that Hamas beheaded dozens of Israeli babies, the narrative may become fixed in certain corners of the Western mind.</p>
<p>The next weeks and months will determine if Syria’s future will be something like civil war Iraq, or else something better. President Ahmad al-Sharaa has been doing a good job of giving the impression of stability — stressing that no one is above the law and establishing a committee to investigate the violence. It is now necessary to actually implement real change, not least given Sharaa has yet to bring the opposition militias together under a single disciplined command.</p>
<p>Beyond those crisis measures, Syria urgently requires an independent transitional justice process. After decades of violence, Syrians need to air their grievances, to establish the facts of what happened, and to see justice done. Only then can a national consensus be built on past tragedies and future direction; only then will the lure of vigilante justice be neutralized.</p>
<p>So far, several war criminals have been arrested, but none have yet been put on trial. In some cases, criminals have been released shortly after their arrest. One example is Fadi Saqr. An Assadist commander, and implicated in an infamous massacre in the Damascus suburb of Tadamon, he went walking in the neighborhood after his release, prompting protests by locals.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/02/why-baathism-was-doomed/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/02/why-baathism-was-doomed/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/GettyImages-583022582.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/02/why-baathism-was-doomed/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/02/why-baathism-was-doomed/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Why Baathism was doomed</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/02/why-baathism-was-doomed/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Robin Yassin-Kassab</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Sharaa identified transitional justice as one of the government’s priorities in a 30 January speech, yet on 27 February the authorities prevented a conference on the topic from taking place in Damascus. Organized by the Syrian Centre for Legal Studies and Research, the body is headed by Anwar al-Bunni, the human rights lawyer who contributed to the first ever trial of an Assadist war criminal. The government has yet to explain why it prevented the conference from happening.</p>
<p>There are good reasons for Sharaa to feel he can’t afford genuine transitional justice. For a start, HTS bears its own share of historical guilt. Perhaps in retrospect, one can justify its gobbling up of other opposition militias for the sake of military efficiency. It’s much harder to justify the group’s elimination of revolutionary civil society figures, with some murdered as recently as 2018.</p>
<p>Even if the HTS leadership could be exempted from scrutiny, meanwhile, Sharaa’s stabilization strategy involves bringing all military factions under one national umbrella. Putting the faction leaders on trial would contradict this effort. But the crimes committed on the coast by SNA militias show that leniency threatens social peace much more than arrests.</p>
<p>The more that Syrian communities are brought into the governance process, the less ability warlords will have to unsettle the country. In this respect, there is still grounds for optimism. On 10 March, al-Sharaa signed a deal with the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) to integrate that Kurdish-led militia into the national army, and to re-establish central control over northeast Syria. If a deal with the Druze militias follows, Israel will find it much harder to destabilize the country. To deprive Iran and the Assadist remnants of their power too, military action must be coupled with efforts to appoint anti-Assad Alawites to administrative positions, both on the coast and in Damascus. In short, then, the government must establish sufficient peace for civil society to get to work. Syrians themselves must be able to do the hard work of addressing and overcoming their trauma.</p>
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															<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">662044</post-id>				</item>
									<item>
					<title>Can Kurds survive the new Syria?</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2025/02/can-kurds-survive-the-new-syria/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://stage.unherd.com/2025/02/can-kurds-survive-the-new-syria/?edition=us#comments</comments>
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										<unherd:main_theme>Dispatch</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Matt Broomfield]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/guy2.jpg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>2</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA['When appealing to its anarchist and socialist supporters, the AANES has long drawn comparisons to the Spanish Civil War.' Photo: Delil Souleiman/Getty.]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Matt Broomfield </strong>is a freelance journalist, PhD researcher, co-founder of the Rojava Information Center, and author of <a href="https://www.amazon.co.uk/Hope-Without-Rojava-Revolutionary-Commitment/dp/1849355665" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.amazon.co.uk/Hope-Without-Rojava-Revolutionary-Commitment/dp/1849355665&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1747243103561000&amp;usg=AOvVaw0T9G1BlMj6GuZO-cMOmbar"><em>Hope Without Hope: Rojava and Revolutionary Commitment</em></a> (2025).</p>
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						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>MattBroomfield1</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[is a freelance journalist, PhD researcher, co-founder of the Rojava Information Center, and author of <a href="https://www.amazon.co.uk/Hope-Without-Rojava-Revolutionary-Commitment/dp/1849355665" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.amazon.co.uk/Hope-Without-Rojava-Revolutionary-Commitment/dp/1849355665&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1747243103561000&amp;usg=AOvVaw0T9G1BlMj6GuZO-cMOmbar"><em>Hope Without Hope: Rojava and Revolutionary Commitment</em></a> (2025).
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					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Fri, 28 Feb 2025 00:02:17 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Fri, 28 Feb 2025 10:20:30 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Assad]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Geopolitics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Kurds]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Syria]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Turkey]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[War]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://stage.unherd.com/?p=657804</guid>
																												<description>
								<![CDATA[Their fate will remake the region]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>From the moment I cross the rickety pontoon bridge from Iraq into Syrian Kurdistan, I feel a deep sense of isolation. The arrivals hall, which offers the only link to the outside world, is falling apart around me. The duty free shop is shuttered, and even its sign is crumbling — the &#8220;DUTY&#8221; has long since vanished, but you can just about make out &#8220;FREE&#8221; clinging to the wall outside. Away from the crossing, the road passes wheat fields strewn with garbage, dotted by creaking oil derricks patched together after repeated airstrikes. It&#8217;s all overlooked by a foreboding border wall, from which Turkish guards take potshots at shepherds and would-be refugees.</p>
<p>Welcome, then, to the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES), a place that sometimes feels at the very edge of world affairs. Save the Catalan Parliament, no foreign body recognizes this multi-ethnic federation of four million people, often known by its Kurdish name Rojava. And yet this rugged corner of the Middle East, between the Euphrates and the Tigris, has long been a fulcrum of regional change. The Assyrians and Seleucids and Ottomans have all come and gone, leaving locals deeply conscious of their storied history. One group of AANES-affiliated Arab women’s activists have named themselves &#8220;Zenobia&#8221; — evoking the ancient warrior queen who briefly defied Rome here back in the 3rd century.</p>
<p>These days, AANES faces threats equal to Aurelian’s legions. After the dramatic collapse of the Assad regime, Damascus is ruled by Ahmed al-Sharaa, and his al-Qaeda offshoot Hayyat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). Turkey, HTS’s key backer, lurks behind the border wall, its drones leaving vapor trails spiraling through the sky as they target AANES ambulances, civilian protesters and Kurdish commanders continuing the fight against ISIS. And then there is the Islamic State itself, no longer a physical Caliphate but still backed by tens of thousands of fanatical detainees, currently wallowing in AANES-run camps but eager for revenge.</p>
<p>With Donald Trump still prevaricating over Washington’s role in the region, the future feels bewilderingly unclear. Nor is this surprising. AANES’s existential struggles for survival have long been animated by dynamics driving the broader conflict now engulfing the Middle East — proxy conflict amid a new Cold War; Islamist insurgency and authoritarian brutality; struggles over oil and water resources between rich capitals and impoverished regions. All the while, the AANES’s vision of multi-ethnic federation governance offers a striking alternative to Islamism and autocracy, even as its fate hints at the future course of conflicts swirling through Syria, the Levant, and beyond.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/11/test-article/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/11/test-article/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/11/test-article/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/11/test-article/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Test article</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/11/test-article/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Matt Broomfield</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Throughout Syria’s decade-long civil war, these complex tensions played out in Qamishlo. The largest Syrian Kurdish city, and the AANES’s de facto capital, it was long divided between Russian-backed Assadists and US-backed Kurds. In practice, that created a complex patchwork of checkpoints and intrigue recalling Cold War Berlin. Woe betide the visitor who confused a checkpoint belonging to &#8220;Sutoro&#8221; (a pro-Kurdish Christian militia) with one guarded by &#8220;Sootoro&#8221; (their pro-Assad rivals).</p>
<p>Today, Russian troops are withdrawing from their base at Qamishlo airport, their presence untenable since Assad’s ouster. Yet the uneasy peace that endured here for over a decade hints at the strange relationship between Bashar al-Assad and his former Kurdish subjects. The Assads historically repressed Kurdish language and culture, while the AANES’s armed forces sporadically skirmished with Assadist militias. But as he focused on entrenching his doomed regime, Assad mostly left the Kurds alone.</p>
<p>Many locals fear the same cannot be said for his successors. &#8220;Assad was brutal, but you knew where you stood with him,&#8221; says Abu Adil, a guard standing by a former regime compound in downtown Qamishlo, a defaced poster of the dictator flapping nearby. &#8220;We don’t know if HTS will come and take these buildings over, if the [AANES] will move in, or if we can tear them down and build something in their place.&#8221; Abu Adil knows how volatile politics here can be. He himself was displaced in a 2019 Turkish offensive that saw hundreds killed and hundreds of thousands displaced. &#8220;Turkey’s militias stole everything,&#8221; he explains. &#8220;They didn’t leave a single washing machine behind. We don’t have any problem with HTS: but Turkey is the problem.&#8221;</p>
<p>Ankara has long been existentially opposed to the AANES, fearing the project in Kurdish-led autonomy provides ideological inspiration and material support to Kurdish militants hoping to dislodge Turkey’s own Islamist autocrat: President Erdoğan. With the Assads gone, Turkey is now aiming to finish what it started in 2019. Last December, Ankara moved to occupy all the remaining AANES-held territory west of the Euphrates, displacing 100,000 people. Over 100 civilians have been killed in ongoing Turkish airstrikes, amid reports of potential war crimes, with the offensive now concentrated around a key hydroelectric dam offering Turkey a potential bridgehead across the Euphrates.</p>
<p>Especially considering their long fight against ISIS — the battle to retake the key city of Kobane killed hundreds of Kurdish fighters — many newly displaced refugees are unsurprisingly resentful. “We were a shield protecting not only the rest of [AANES], but the whole world,” says Ahmed Sharo, a gold merchant and AANES loyalist who fled the Turks to Qamishlo. I’ve heard similar arguments during previous trips to Rojava, but the mood is now especially bitter. No wonder: after wallowing in a refugee camp for years, Sharo says he only had 30 minutes to flee advancing Turkish militias. After we spoke, two women approached and asked for money, a first in all my visits to Rojava’s proud and politicized refugee camps.</p>
<p>It’s clear, then, that many locals here are tired of life in the AANES, unrecognized by the world and exposed to the depredations of a major NATO ally. Yet if Turkey’s assault is particularly concerning to people like Sharo — the Kurds, Yazidis and Christians who’ve benefited most from Rojava’s model of minority self-determination — they’re not the only ones to worry. Just like the region’s population at large, both the civilian AANES and its military wing are now Arab-majority, working to unite religiously conservative Arab communities into their multi-ethnic project. The “administration and the military” are not Kurdish, emphasizes Hamdan al-Abd, a charismatic, mustachioed sheikh who represents Arab interests in the AANES Executive Council. “Rather, they respect and protect all communities in the region.”</p>
<p>Others would disagree. I meet al-Abd in Raqqa, the former ISIS capital and now the largest city in the AANES. Like other officials, he is careful to fly both the AANES’s livery and the new three-starred Syrian flag in office, the latter waved by pro-democracy protesters at the start of the civil war and now by the new Islamist government in Damascus. Yet when protesters in Raqqa raised this same flag following Assad’s expulsion, AANES security forces opened fire. In a gloomy hotel lobby, I hold furtive conversations with activists who say they’ve consecutively been detained by the Assads, ISIS and the AANES. “People here don’t feel free, as they now do in the rest of Syria,” says one. “We believe that the new government in Damascus has the same ideas as us, and in the future, this city will be part of their central government system.”</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/12/will-erdogan-crush-the-syrian-kurds/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/12/will-erdogan-crush-the-syrian-kurds/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/GettyImages-2187491782.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/12/will-erdogan-crush-the-syrian-kurds/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/12/will-erdogan-crush-the-syrian-kurds/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Will Erdoğan crush the Syrian Kurds?</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/12/will-erdogan-crush-the-syrian-kurds/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Matt Broomfield</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Nor are these revolutionaries-turned-NGO-employees the only ones to disdain the AANES experiment. Jihadis do too, as I discovered when I visited a Raqqa lingerie store. The owner implausibly claims her husband died of a heart attack just as US forces carpet-bombed the city, making her the likely widow of an ISIS fighter. She says the people of Raqqa are “waiting and praying” for Turkish militias to purge the city’s secular Kurdish administration. Though her prosperous business could never have existed under ISIS — the Caliphate were never big fans of latex corsets, even sold by women in full niqabs — she hopes Ankara’s close relationship with al-Sharaa in Damascus can bring an end to corruption at checkpoints and bring down import tariffs.</p>
<p>The AANES has shown some openness to local sensitivities. Though the diplomatic and military elite is still dominated by Kurds, Raqqa and other Arab areas have been able to secure exemptions in areas like secular education, military service, oil tariffs and marriage law. Public opinion in Raqqa is therefore more nuanced than either the AANES or its opponents suggest. By defending the rule of law and protecting basic services even in Arab regions — visiting for the first time in three years, I was struck by the pace of reconstruction in Raqqa’s bustling market — officials have long been able to secure tacit support from locals otherwise suspicious of its modernizing, feminist vision. “Despite all the errors AANES has made, it is nonetheless the best option in Syria,” a female Arab journalist in Raqqa tells me, sipping a fruit milkshake from a nearby store. “I personally would like to see the AANES and HTS reach a deal for a shared administration.”</p>
<p>Syria’s leaders have tried to find some common ground. Al-Sharaa has already met the top Syrian Kurdish commander, while HTS and AANES have maintained a careful ceasefire, with both sides expressing sincere desires to prevent further conflict and establish working committees and a national conference. But Turkey’s massive influence as al-Sharaa’s key foreign interlocutor is frustrating progress, while both sides have deeply contrasting visions about what Syria should look like: secular versus clerical; federal versus unitary.</p>
<p>This creates a paradoxical challenge for AANES leaders eager to devolve decision-making autonomy to Syrian communities. But like that lingerie store owner, many people in these same communities long for a more-or-less centralized Syria, a vision they trust the new strongman in Damascus to deliver. Before the war, Syria was not a particularly conservative or radicalized country. Yet 14 bloody years of conflict have catalyzed Islamist militancy and Sunni Arab chauvinism, particularly in reaction to the Alawite clique around Assad. More broadly, even moderate Arabs — and some Kurds — would be willing to tolerate a degree of Islamist authoritarianism under HTS as the price of internal stability and reentry into global markets.</p>
<p>Resolving these questions is especially urgent given the deteriorating humanitarian situation. In Kurdish, “the grass is always greener on the other side” is pessimistically rendered as “herbs grown in your own garden always taste bitter” — an apt description of mutual suspicions between Kurds and Arabs. In Raqqa, locals claim the Kurdish administration is appropriating local oil wealth to fund its own separatist ambitions, as wild rumors fly of 24-hour electricity and newly-paved roads in Kurdish areas. But when I travel north to Kobane, site of that famous 2015 victory, I find just the opposite. Turkish airstrikes have put the hydroelectric dam out of action, while their proxy militiamen regularly pepper frontline pumping stations with heavy weapons. Without electricity, hospitals are battling to maintain basic standards, and even the proverbial gardens are struggling. Without much rain this year, the environmental crisis in this desertifying region only grows.</p>
<p>With so much uncertainty, it’s no wonder some in AANES are looking further afield for security. Abu Adil, the security guard in Qamishlo, has already sent his sons to the neighboring Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) to find work. Like many Syrian Kurds, he uses the word “Kurdistan” simply to mean the rival Iraqi region, suggesting a lack of faith in the AANES’s own Kurdish project. Absent other friends, the Kurds are forced to hope US protection can keep them safe, even if that means partnering with the conservative KRI. Given Trump’s erratic foreign policy, that isn’t a sure bet, though it’s undoubtedly more plausible than hoping Israel will come to the rescue, as some desperate locals would wish: Tel Aviv has happily instrumentalized the Kurdish cause while keeping up a brisk oil trade with Ankara.</p>
<p>Assessing these panicked appeals, a Syrian Kurdish friend describes his stateless people as “children who grew up without parents, leaving them desperate for love from anyone.” Indeed, the Syrian Kurds have long sought support in unexpected places. On the one hand, the AANES has drawn support from the international Left by advancing its progressive ideology through the “anti-fascist” struggle against ISIS. On the other, the AANES’s armed wing successfully established themselves as the Pentagon’s indispensable partner in the war against Islamist terror. Even beyond emotive appeals to anti-fascist values, or else the security risk posed by over 40,000 ISIS affiliates still held in the region, yearning for a HTS takeover, there are reasons for observers of all stripes to care about what happens next.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;The Syrian Kurds have long sought support in unexpected places.&#8221;</div>
<p>When appealing to its anarchist and socialist supporters, the AANES has long drawn comparisons to the Spanish Civil War. The analogy is more than a rhetorical flourish. Just like in Spain, the Syrian bloodbath presaged a far wider conflict, one defined by proxy warfare, state collapse and mass displacement. The conflict offers a case-study for the coming disintegration of the so-called “rules-based international system” — a euphemism for US hegemony — as Islamism and other forms of political militancy both challenge and buttress central state power.</p>
<p>All this is precipitated by rising temperatures, desertification, failed harvests, and the weaponization of water resources. Israel’s degradation of Iran’s clients in Hezbollah and Hamas forms part of this broader story, paving the way for Assad’s collapse. Turkey’s expansion of drone and proxy warfare beyond Syria into Iraq, Azerbaijan and Libya does too. The mooted economic corridor linking Saudi Arabia through Israel to Europe, while evading Houthi attacks in the Red Sea, will be linked to fresh conflicts, as will Turkey’s competing, multi-billion dollar Development Road project between Baghdad and the West. Combined with worsening resource competition in the Eastern Mediterranean and Horn of Africa, little wonder that AANES representatives have long referred to this spiraling polycrisis by a simpler name: World War III.</p>
<p>The complex struggles in northern Syria therefore form part of a broader picture, suggesting ways in which state governance, resistance and reaction might evolve in decades to come. For all their differences, the AANES and HTS have responded to these historical upheavals in strikingly similar ways. &#8220;HTS have two faces,&#8221; says one opposition activist in Raqqa. &#8220;One is a religious face, which aims to export jihad worldwide; and the other is a political one, which tries to find a solution for all the peoples in Syria. We are with them for this second approach.&#8221; The AANES, which has long sought to balance radical Leftist militancy and institutionalized legitimacy, could be described in similar terms. Evolving far beyond its utopian vision of a decentralized &#8220;commune of communes&#8221;, it&#8217;s established a complex federation capable of feeding and protecting millions of people despite severe ideological differences. Indeed, while AANES officials dramatically claim that &#8220;Turkey wants to reorganize Syrian society under an Ottoman <em>vilayet</em> system&#8221;, their own project rather closely resembles that unwieldy pre-modern federation.</p>
<p>Given this mutual pragmatism, it’s possible to at least imagine a future <em>modus vivendi</em> between HTS and the AANES. While the latter have declared their readiness to recognize al-Sharaa, and integrate into his new Syrian army, any such transition is likely to be fraught and protracted. Rather, the Kurdish leadership will seek ways to survive, adapting themselves to a diminished role in the new Syria. Their chances depend on the direction taken in Damascus. Al-Sharaa himself looks set to continue down the path of technocratic crony capitalism, coupled with authoritarian repression of civil society. It’s a model he has already successfully trialed in Idlib, while the new Syrian foreign minister recently joined Tony Blair on stage at Davos to proclaim his hopes that his country would follow the Saudi Arabian path toward neoliberal integration. While this model could protect some basic rights, community self-determination in the Kurdish model is likely to remain beyond the pale.</p>
<p>Nonetheless, it’s striking to hear AANES talking points over women’s and minority rights being echoed by both al-Sharaa and the conservative Arab opposition in Raqqa. From 1789 to 1917, all true revolutions have had an impact beyond their collapse, as civil rights once seen as radical become everyday conventions. The same could yet happen in Syria. Of course, the Spanish Civil War analogy also implies the likelihood of the Rojavan revolution’s final defeat. Yet this is a corner of the world where hope can thrive even in the grimmest of circumstances, even amid the “bitter herbs” of your own garden. Just ask Raqqa’s female activists, whose namesake Zenobia died in exile, her resistance to the Romans crushed.</p>
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					<title>Why Baathism was doomed</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2025/02/why-baathism-was-doomed/?edition=us</link>
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										<unherd:main_theme>Ideology</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Robin Yassin-Kassab]]>
					</dc:creator>
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																<unherd:article_ranking>3</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[Jacques Pavlovsky/Sygma/Getty Images]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Robin Yassin-Kassab</strong> is co-author of <em>Burning Country: Syrians in Revolution and War</em>, and the English editor of the ISIS Prisons Museum.</p>
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															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is co-author of <em>Burning Country: Syrians in Revolution and War</em>, and the English editor of the ISIS Prisons Museum.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Thu, 27 Feb 2025 00:00:39 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Thu, 27 Feb 2025 00:00:39 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Arabs]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Bashar al-Assad]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Iraq]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[Saddam Hussein]]></category>
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					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://stage.unherd.com/?p=657729</guid>
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								<![CDATA[Rulers put Arabism over Arabs]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>As well as the most persistent of revolutions, Syria’s was also the most total. Over a decade and more of struggle, the Syrian people ousted not just Bashar al-Assad, but also his army and security services, his prisons and surveillance system, his allied warlords and cynical foreign sponsors. The revolution’s victory saw the end of a dictatorship which had lasted 54 years — and the final death of Baathism, an ideology that ensnared millions of Arabs for almost a century.</p>
<p>Birthed in the heady aftermath of the Second World War, the Arab Socialist Baath Party went through three major stages, each closely related to the vexed political history of the region. The first stage was one of utopian dreams. The second involved military action, power grabs and coups. The third, and worst, was of ideals betrayed, of personal dictatorships and brutal death squads. Yet, if Baathism has finally entered history, with the Syrian party officially dissolved in February, its story is far from over.</p>
<p>On the contrary, the lessons of Baathism must now urgently be absorbed by a new generation of Arab leaders. From the way it pitted the region’s Arab majority against minorities, and in how it took the ideology&#8217;s mythical sense of destiny and placed it into the hands of strongmen, there’s plenty for men like Ahmed al-Sharaa to think about, even if they emerge from very different ideological backgrounds — especially if they hope not to end their premierships either exiled or hanging from a noose.</p>
<p>Founded in Damascus in April 1947, Baathism was the most enthusiastic iteration of Arab nationalism. Whereas Gamal Abdel Nasser understood the Arab world in hard-nosed strategic terms, as a place to exert his own influence, the Baathists had an almost mystical sense of the Arabs as a nation transcending historical forces. As one of its founders put it, this was a people with a “natural right to live in a single state&#8221;.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/12/syria-is-doomed-to-instability/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/12/syria-is-doomed-to-instability/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/GettyImages-1242115912.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/12/syria-is-doomed-to-instability/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/12/syria-is-doomed-to-instability/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Syria is doomed to instability</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/12/syria-is-doomed-to-instability/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Rajan Menon</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Such high-minded ideas are unsurprising. After all, the ideology was founded by Syrians who had immersed themselves in European philosophy, from Marx to Nietzsche, while studying at the Sorbonne. Two of the three founders were members of minority communities, and it’s useful to think of Baathism as a way of constructing an alternative Arab identity to Islam. While Salah al-Din al-Bitar was a Sunni Muslim, Michel Aflaq was an Orthodox Christian. Zaki al-Arsuzi, for his part, was an Alawite who later embraced atheism.</p>
<p>What all three shared was an eagerness to blend Enlightenment modernism with Romantic nationalism. Arsuzi, for instance, believed Arabic, unlike other languages, to be “intuitive” and “natural”. Aflaq, for his part, turned the usual understanding of history on its head. He considered Islam to be a manifestation of “Arab genius” and deemed the ancient pre-Islamic civilizations of the Fertile Crescent to be Arab too. Never mind the fact that the Assyrians or the Phoenicians had never spoken Arabic.</p>
<p>Like other grand political narratives of the 20th Century, then, Baathism was an attempt to repurpose religious energies for secular ends. Even the word “Baath” means “resurrection”. Consider the party slogan, “umma arabiya wahida zat risala khalida” in Arabic. That means “one Arab nation bearing an eternal message” — which sounds strangely grandiose, even before you realize that “umma” is the word formerly used to describe the global Islamic community, and that “risala” is used for the divine message the Prophet Muhammad delivered to humanity.</p>
<p>If a secular form of messianic faith was one wing of Baathist ideology, you get a sense of the other from the party’s motto. Proclaiming “Unity, Freedom, Socialism”, it evoked a single, unified Arab state stretching from the Atlantic in the west to the Arabian Gulf in the east, and from Syria in the north to Sudan in the south. This Arab state, Baathists argued, must also be free of foreign control, and construct a socialist economic system. That makes sense: the region had long been exploited, both by the Ottomans and their European imperialist successors.</p>
<p>At first, Baathism was spread by rural doctors and itinerant intellectuals. In those early days, the leadership consisted disproportionately of schoolteachers, ruling over a membership of schoolboys. In 1953, however, the party merged with Akram Hawrani’s peasant-based Arab Socialist Party. This brought it a mass membership for the first time, and it came second in Syria’s 1954 election.</p>
<p>By then, though, democracy was becoming ever rarer. Since Colonel Husni al-Zaim’s March 1949 coup, the first in Syria and anywhere in the Arab world, politics was increasingly being determined by men in uniform. The most significant of these soldiers was Nasser, who seized power in Cairo in 1952, and promptly became a pan-Arab hero after successfully confronting Britain, France and Israel over the Suez Canal in 1956.</p>
<p>Nasser’s popularity fueled an already raging popular desire to eliminate colonial borders and, at the behest of Baathist officers in Damascus, Syria and Egypt merged into the United Arab Republic (UAR) in 1958. Yet Nasser’s conception of unity, one which the Baathists would emulate, was totalitarian. There should be only one leader, one party, one truth. Following Nasser’s orders, the Syrian Baath dissolved itself. It would never be a grassroots movement again.</p>
<p>In the meantime, Syrian officers seconded to Cairo formed a secret Baathist military committee. This marked the start of the Baath’s next stage, with the party now belonging firmly to military elites. Following the collapse of the UAR, in 1962, Baathists tasted power for the first time, seizing control of both Iraq and Syria. The Iraqi Baath had a different sectarian make-up to the Syrian. Its membership was mainly Sunni Arab, which was a minority locally but the majority across the wider Arab world. Iraq’s Shia Muslims, therefore, associated Baathism with Sunni identity and were more likely to join the communists, then Iraq’s largest party. This meant that the Iraqi Baath appealed to some — and may well have been sponsored by the CIA — as an anti-communist force. Its March 1963 coup was accompanied by a massacre of Leftists. In November, however, it was ousted by another coup.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;The ideology was founded by Syrians who had immersed themselves in European philosophy.&#8221;</div>
<p>The Syrian Baath retained power from 1963 onwards, but was riven by conflict, culminating in 1966 in an internal coup by Salah Jadid. Arsuzi was brought back from obscurity to play the role of ideological figurehead of the Syrian wing, but most of the party’s original leadership, including Aflaq, fled abroad. Bitar was assassinated in Paris in 1980.</p>
<p>The Baathists turned on each other, its Syrian and Iraqi wings becoming irreconcilable enemies. In Syria, an endless series of purges further sectarianized an already sectarian army. Competent officers were replaced by loyalists, overwhelmingly from the same Alawite community as Jadid and his ally Hafez al-Assad. The consequent weakening of the army may explain the catastrophic loss of the Golan Heights in 1967, when Assad, then defense minister, gave the order to retreat long before Israeli troops actually arrived.</p>
<p>Under Jadid’s “Leninist” leadership, the Syrian Baath practiced a top-down Leftism aimed at eliminating the old bourgeoisie. In 1970, however, the “pragmatist” Assad launched a new internal coup. Jadid was sent to prison, where he languished until his death. Assad eased off the class warfare, concentrating instead on building his own power base. The Iraqi Baath, meanwhile, had returned to power in 1968, and Saddam Hussein ascended within it until he became absolute leader in 1979.</p>
<p>This marks the third stage of the Baath, in which the party became a vehicle for one-man dictatorships. Cults of personality exalted Assad and Hussein with mass rallies and titles like “first pharmacist” or “hero of war and peace”. They were lionized as “eternal leader” and “symbol of the Arab revolution” — as if the hitherto deified nation had been reduced to a single figure.</p>
<p>Some sections of society benefited, for a while at least, from this system. Members of hitherto marginalized rural communities, including religious minorities, entered the army and security services. Some of the urban working class benefited from jobs in the rapidly expanding state sector. In Iraq, enormous oil wealth allowed rapid development of civilian infrastructure. Yet terrifying political repression and massive corruption caused a brain drain, scaring off investment from both Damascus and Baghdad.</p>
<p>Then Hussein’s regime squandered Iraq’s wealth on wars of choice. Despite bloody stalemate against Iran, and embarrassing defeat in Kuwait, Hussein hailed his victories. In this, he borrowed from the Baathist playbook: Assad had done something similar in 1973, after losing to Israel in the Yom Kippur War. The gap between rhetoric and reality was vast and growing, perhaps inevitable given Baathism’s totalizing aspirations.</p>
<p>All the while, both Assad and Hussein built fearsome security states. Far from uniting the people, repression in both countries soon took on ethnic and sectarian overtones. Hussein killed tens of thousands of Kurds — the 1988 chemical atrocity at Halabja was especially infamous — before exterminating Shia Muslims when they rose against him in 1991. Hafez al-Assad responded to the challenge of the Muslim Brotherhood by killing up to 40,000 people in Hama in 1982. Then Assad’s son Bashar, who inherited the presidency in 2000, outdid his father, responding to the 2011 revolution by killing hundreds of thousands.</p>
<p>Hussein was deposed by the Anglo-American invasion of Iraq in 2003, and soon met his end at the gallows. Many of his security officers later joined ISIS which — despite its religious rhetoric — is actually the Baath’s closest successor: both revel in mass surveillance, detention and torture.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/12/syria-will-never-be-unified/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/12/syria-will-never-be-unified/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/GettyImages-2191405696.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/12/syria-will-never-be-unified/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/12/syria-will-never-be-unified/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Syria will never be unified</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/12/syria-will-never-be-unified/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Matt Broomfield</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>So what became of “Unity, Freedom, Socialism”? Instead of unity, the Baath brought divide and rule, splintering society by ethnicity, sect, class and region. Instead of freedom from foreign powers, Iraq and Syria ended up occupied. In both countries, socialism ended in sanctions, neoliberalism and graft.</p>
<p>In Greek drama, the tragic hero is brought down by a fatal flaw in their character. The Baath party’s flaw was its identification of the Arabs with state power, and then the reduction of the state to one-man rule. An Arab nation can be said to exist, and sometimes it even transcends state borders. The Arab Spring proved this, when Arabs from Tunis to Sana’a, influencing each other, all revolted simultaneously. But the Arab countries include non-Arab peoples, and the Arabs themselves are plural and diverse, far greater and more creative than a single man or a single mystic ideology could ever be.</p>
<p>That still leaves one more question: what lessons should present and future leaders learn from the failure of Baathism? First, that strong men are brittle and easily broken, whatever their ideology. Second, that the highly centralized, hyper-authoritarian states built by such men end in military defeat and economic collapse. These dictatorships weaken and impoverish society, and provide security to no one, not even to the strong men in the end.</p>
<p>There’s a foreign policy dimension here too. The Arabs have long been assaulted by a string of foreign states: Israel, the US, Russia and Iran. The need to win freedom from the nation’s enemies — or at least to deter their aggression — is more crucial than ever. But seizing control of the state by military force is not sufficient to shift the balance. There are no shortcuts. Lasting power can only be built by liberating the people rather than smothering them: and that means human and civil rights are essential tools in constructing national power. Once the peoples of the Arab and Muslim region are able to express themselves freely and determine their affairs democratically, then their various polities will be ready to coordinate their energies. And that, more than Baathism ever did, will truly change the world.</p>
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					<title>Britain&#039;s last chance to stop Islamic State</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2025/01/britains-last-chance-to-stop-islamic-state/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://stage.unherd.com/2025/01/britains-last-chance-to-stop-islamic-state/?edition=us#comments</comments>
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										<unherd:main_theme>Terrorism</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Matt Broomfield]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/guy2.jpg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>2</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[Al-Hol camp is an ISIS stronghold. Delil Souleiman/AFP via Getty Images. ]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Matt Broomfield </strong>is a freelance journalist, PhD researcher, co-founder of the Rojava Information Center, and author of <a href="https://www.amazon.co.uk/Hope-Without-Rojava-Revolutionary-Commitment/dp/1849355665" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.amazon.co.uk/Hope-Without-Rojava-Revolutionary-Commitment/dp/1849355665&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1747243103561000&amp;usg=AOvVaw0T9G1BlMj6GuZO-cMOmbar"><em>Hope Without Hope: Rojava and Revolutionary Commitment</em></a> (2025).</p>
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						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>MattBroomfield1</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[is a freelance journalist, PhD researcher, co-founder of the Rojava Information Center, and author of <a href="https://www.amazon.co.uk/Hope-Without-Rojava-Revolutionary-Commitment/dp/1849355665" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.amazon.co.uk/Hope-Without-Rojava-Revolutionary-Commitment/dp/1849355665&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1747243103561000&amp;usg=AOvVaw0T9G1BlMj6GuZO-cMOmbar"><em>Hope Without Hope: Rojava and Revolutionary Commitment</em></a> (2025).
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					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Mon, 13 Jan 2025 00:01:35 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Mon, 13 Jan 2025 09:29:49 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Caliphate]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[ISIS]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Kurds]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Shamima Begum]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Syria]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[War]]></category>
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																												<description>
								<![CDATA[Extremists on the loose endanger us all]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>In 2019, my colleagues and I <a href="https://x.com/RojavaIC/status/1112737892051357696" target="_blank" rel="noopener">uncovered</a> a British Islamic State affiliate held in a Syrian refugee camp. <a href="https://www.vice.com/en/article/tooba-gondal-isis-matchmaker-return-uk/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Tooba Gondal</a>, the so-called &#8220;ISIS matchmaker&#8221; known for grooming and recruiting young women online, while publicly exulting in IS&#8217;s worst acts of violence, was being guarded by Syrian Kurdish forces. Yet when I returned to the camp, six months later, it was a smoking ruin. Initially captured by the Kurds during the bloody defeat of the IS, Gondal and hundreds of other <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/oct/13/kurds-say-785-isis-affiliates-have-escaped-camp-after-turkish-shelling" target="_blank" rel="noopener">foreign</a> affiliates had seized their chance to flee, exploiting the chaos of a Turkish invasion to disappear into the desert.</p>
<p>Amid fresh chaos in Syria, history risks repeating itself. Turkey has again unleashed its militias against the Kurdish enclave, and thousands more IS members could yet escape. That includes dozens of British citizens, from young children to Shamima Begum to violent male killers. No wonder Sebastian Gorka, Donald Trump’s counter-terrorism pick, is <a href="https://www.thetimes.com/world/us-world/article/uk-should-take-back-isis-members-in-syria-says-trumps-terror-chief-qsw0vh9v6" target="_blank" rel="noopener">urging</a> London to follow the American lead and repatriate its militants, hoping they can be tried and punished back home.</p>
<p>The British public and Government are dead set against any such repatriations. Yet it’s exactly this policy of abandoning both the detainees, and their Kurdish jailers, which endangers British lives — and risks blowback of terrifying proportions.</p>
<p>The end of the Assad regime has transformed Syria, including the multi-ethnic polity led by the Kurds in North and East Syria (NES). Emboldened by the collapse of Baathism, Turkey is conducting fresh military operations against the Kurds, just like those that enabled Gondal’s escape five years ago. At the same time, the change of government in Washington could bring its own challenges. Trump is currently weighing up withdrawing from the country altogether, leaving the Kurds, and their prisoners, to their fate.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/12/will-erdogan-crush-the-syrian-kurds/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/12/will-erdogan-crush-the-syrian-kurds/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/GettyImages-2187491782.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/12/will-erdogan-crush-the-syrian-kurds/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/12/will-erdogan-crush-the-syrian-kurds/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Will Erdoğan crush the Syrian Kurds?</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/12/will-erdogan-crush-the-syrian-kurds/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Matt Broomfield</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>All the while, IS remains a threat years after their physical caliphate was eradicated. Attacks in Syria <a href="https://www.syriaweekly.com/p/in-2024-isiss-resurgence-in-syria" target="_blank" rel="noopener">nearly tripled in 2024</a>, while the top Syrian Kurdish commander has <a href="https://news.sky.com/story/kurdish-us-allies-halting-anti-isis-operations-in-syria-because-of-threat-from-turkey-backed-rebels-sdf-commander-warns-13271611" target="_blank" rel="noopener">warned</a> that Turkish attacks on their territory are further strengthening the organization. The group’s ideology is still potent too. Just last week, a lone-wolf IS-linked extremist killed 15 in New Orleans, underscoring the diverse threat still posed.</p>
<p>Any breakout would strengthen the organization&#8217;s resilient transnational networks, encouraging <a href="https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/islamic-state%E2%80%99s-global-long-game-and-resurgence-syria-poses-evolved-threat-west" target="_blank" rel="noopener">further attacks</a> across Africa, the Middle East and Central Asia. Even before Assad’s fall, the head of MI5 used a <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/isis-terrorism-britain-islamic-state-general-security-service-ken-mccallum/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">rare public address</a> to warn that IS were the number one security threat facing the country, a danger that would increase exponentially if thousands of radicalized loyalists went loose.</p>
<p>Given all this, it’s unsurprising that Trump should push the UK to take back its own militants, ensuring they can’t fade into the wilderness, but finally face criminal justice at last. Nor is the incoming president alone. The Biden administration, the UK’s own terrorism tsar, and the Kurds themselves have all reiterated the same message: there are urgent security reasons for Britain to secure its IS members.</p>
<p>Yet though Khaled Issa, co-chair for foreign affairs in NES, warns that defeating the threat is “the responsibility of the international community as a whole&#8221;, David Lammy has <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/uk-david-lammy-reject-us-trump-gorka-call-repatriate-isis-bride-shamima-begum-syria/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">poured cold water</a> on any chance of a policy rethink. Rather, the UK looks set to leave its erstwhile Kurdish allies to guard prisoners alone.</p>
<p>As hardly needs restating, the establishment of anything resembling a new caliphate would be a disaster: not just for Britain, but also ordinary people throughout the Middle East. Exploiting civil war in Iraq and Syria, the Salafist organization rose to rule 10 million people back in 2014, drawing thousands of volunteers from over 80 countries. While Assad was responsible for the bulk of the deaths in his country’s bloodbath, IS&#8217;s crimes were particularly heinous. They perpetuated a genocide against the Yazidis; slaughtered Shia Muslims and Christians; burned and beheaded prisoners; paraded crucified corpses; raped gay men and threw them off buildings.</p>
<p>Amid this nightmare, the Syrian Kurds found themselves in an unexpected alliance. Kurdish fighters rapidly proved themselves the only force capable of defeating IS on the battlefield, winning global sympathy and ultimately direct support from the USA, UK and other Western powers. Turkey — which fields Nato’s second-largest army — had long fought a violent war against Kurdish guerrillas battling for autonomy. President Erdoğan, for his part, was unsurprisingly enraged as the US chose to partner with Kurdish ground forces. But Washington trusted their Kurdish partners, and ignored protests from Ankara to offer “temporary and transactional” support to a multiethnic anti-IS coalition spearheaded by Kurdish units. By 2017, this coalition had liberated Raqqa, the IS capital, capturing thousands of jihadis as they went.</p>
<p>Yet these battle-hardened volunteers didn’t simply vanish alongside their caliphate. As Issa notes, over 10,000 male combatants remain in Kurdish custody, all guarded on a minuscule budget and amid war, geopolitical isolation and economic collapse. Male militants are held dozens to a room in former schools, crudely repurposed as detention centers. These are places where disease and radicalization spread with equal ease.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;Battle-hardened ISIS volunteers didn’t simply vanish alongside their caliphate.&#8221;</div>
<p>Meanwhile, thousands of highly radicalized female members and their children are held alongside innocent, internally-displaced Syrians and Iraqis in a shabby camp-cum-detention center called al-Hol. Among the endless rows of tents, female loyalists run a <a href="https://news.sky.com/story/islamic-state-new-mini-caliphate-forms-at-syrian-al-hol-camp-11858828" target="_blank" rel="noopener">clandestine</a> “mini-caliphate” — where they intimidate other residents through beatings, arson, and murder. Some even hold Yazidi women in secret slavery to this day. More than half of the camp’s population is under 12, with female militants grooming and training young boys to continue the jihad. When I visited al-Hol, primary-aged children threw stones as we walked among the tents, raising their index fingers in salute to Allah.</p>
<p>While these conditions might seem a fitting punishment, in truth they only create the perfect conditions for the organization to regroup and rebuild: an ongoing sleeper-cell campaign outside the camps and prisons has killed hundreds of locals. At the same time, Assad’s fall has brought fresh opportunities for IS, benefiting in particular from Turkey’s manipulation of the Syrian crisis to launch fresh attacks against NES. Notwithstanding its claims to oppose IS, the Erdoğan government has happily indulged extremists elsewhere, allowing many thousands of militants to cross its territory into Syria. Today, Ankara bankrolls dozens of Islamist militias for the purposes of targeting the Kurds, including those sanctioned by the USA for <a href="https://rojavainformationcenter.org/2020/10/database-former-isis-members-now-part-of-turkish-backed-forces-in-sere-kaniye-and-tel-abyad/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">sheltering</a> members of IS, while top jihadi commanders have long hidden in Turkish-occupied territory.</p>
<p>Combined with the eagerness of IS members themselves to escape their rackety Kurdish prisons, the arguments in favor of repatriation are clear — not least when the numbers, for Britain anyway, are so manageable. With no more than 10 male British fighters left in Syria, alongside 20 women and 40 minors, it wouldn’t be hard for the UK criminal justice system to process them. As UK terrorism commissioner Jonathan Hall KC has rightly noted, a country of the UK’s stature could easily manage the repatriation of a few dozen ISIS affiliates.</p>
<p>Why, then, has Britain been so slow to take action? Part of the answer again involves Turkey, which is bitterly opposed to any form of political or diplomatic recognition of NES. Domestic opposition clearly matters too. Liberal commentators are doubtless too quick to paint British IS affiliates as mere victims rather than potential culprits who need to be brought to trial, whether in the UK or elsewhere. But at the same time, conservative voices are too hasty in demanding that IS detainees in Syria are left to rot, ignoring the reality that this places an unjustifiable security and humanitarian burden on the Kurds.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/01/the-betrayal-of-british-kurds/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/01/the-betrayal-of-british-kurds/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/GettyImages-595238680-2-e1705505455445.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/01/the-betrayal-of-british-kurds/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/01/the-betrayal-of-british-kurds/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The betrayal of British Kurds</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/01/the-betrayal-of-british-kurds/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Matt Broomfield</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>What’s missing in all this is the voice of the UK’s own Kurdish partners. As Issa puts it: “ISIS committed crimes against our people, war crimes, crimes against humanity, yet there was no international court or criminal justice procedure.” He and his colleagues have therefore been appealing for the West to repatriate its own nationals; to set up a proper international court or tribunal to process those thousands of global IS fighters; and to provide proper financial, political and diplomatic support to their beleaguered administration.</p>
<p>A senior Syrian Kurdish delegation will shortly visit the UK, where the security threat posed by IS detainees in NES will be high on the agenda. But while these officials have met with Trump and Emmanuel Macron, British authorities once again seem terrified of upsetting President Erdoğan, the new kingmaker in Syria — and a key British trade partner. And with Turkey clamoring to finish the destruction it began back in 2019, time is running out for the UK to prevent a catastrophe whose fallout will reach far beyond the windblown camps of northern Syria, with fanatics far worse than Shamima Begum free to spread terror once more.</p>
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					<title>The West still doesn&#039;t understand Iraq</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2025/01/the-west-still-doesnt-understand-iraq/?edition=us</link>
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										<unherd:main_theme>Middle East</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[David Patrikarakos]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/David-Patrikarakos.jpg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>2</unherd:article_ranking>
																<unherd:image_caption>
							<![CDATA[There are things worse than tyranny. Sean Smith/Getty Images.]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>David Patrikarakos</strong> is <em>UnHerd</em>&#8216;s foreign correspondent. His latest book is <em>War in 140 characters: how social media is reshaping conflict in the 21st century. </em>(Hachette)</p>
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						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>dpatrikarakos</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is <em>UnHerd</em>'s foreign correspondent. His latest book is <em>War in 140 characters: how social media is reshaping conflict in the 21st century. </em>(Hachette)]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Fri, 03 Jan 2025 00:02:07 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Fri, 03 Jan 2025 16:39:33 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Barack Obama]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[interventionism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Israel Hamas War]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Middle East]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Politics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Syria]]></category>
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																												<description>
								<![CDATA[2025 will be even worse]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>Last year was, on balance, a miserable one for the world. And while only a fool attempts to predict the future in geopolitics, I am firm in the conviction that 2025 will be worse.</p>
<p>If 2024 was depressing, it was also instructive, in the Middle East at any rate. There, we saw the deepening of a trend which I suspect will come to characterize 2025 even more strongly: the shattering of political and policy beliefs so long and dearly held that they have amounted to orthodoxies. For the smart politician or state, this allows for sparks of opportunity amid the gloom.</p>
<p>Towards the end of the year, I was in Erbil, the capital of Kurdistan in Northern Iraq, discussing the supposedly imminent withdrawal of coalition troops from the country. Under Operation Inherent Resolve, Washington keeps 2,500 troops in Iraq and 900 in Syria, where the UK has 1,000-1,200 and 150-200 respectively. Their job is to work alongside local partners, like the Kurdish Peshmerga and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), to prevent a resurgence of the terror group ISIS. Coalition forces also fill critical gaps in Iraqi security.</p>
<p>But Iran, which dominates Iraq through its proxy Shia militia groups, has long wanted us out. In September, the US and Iraq agreed to conclude the formal coalition mission by September 2025, though some troops will remain in advisory roles. The first phase of withdrawal has already begun. A final withdrawal means that Iraq will fall almost completely into Tehran’s grip. My interlocutor was Kurdish and, unsurprisingly, this worries him — as it does millions of Sunnis.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/12/after-assad-what-next-for-syria/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/12/after-assad-what-next-for-syria/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/GettyImages-2188259877.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/12/after-assad-what-next-for-syria/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/12/after-assad-what-next-for-syria/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>What next for Syria?</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/12/after-assad-what-next-for-syria/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> David Patrikarakos</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>There are, you see, many Iraqis who not only have no problem with Western intervention in their country, but don’t want it to end.</p>
<p>But I was surprised later when a Sunni Arab friend told me that many Iraqis love Trump because, in January 2020, he whacked Qasem Soleimani, the leader of Iran’s Quds Force and the man responsible for so much violence in their country. No matter that Trump brought in a so-called “Muslim ban”, his Western “intervention” in Iraq was more palatable to a section of its people than Iran’s far more localized — and constant — meddling.</p>
<p>This speaks to a broader, unignorable truth: the reality on the ground in the Middle East is often not just merely different to what we read, believe or are told in Oxbridge Area Studies departments, but entirely at odds with it; as is our relationship to the region, and how that is often received by the people there. I was reminded of the great historian and Middle East scholar Elie Kedourie, an Iraqi Jew who ended up a professor at the LSE in London (and who was also married to my mother&#8217;s cousin).</p>
<p>Kedourie, who passed away in 1992, was famous for many books but what stands out is his genuinely iconoclastic 1970 work <em>The Chatham House Version: and Other Middle-Eastern Studies</em>. I still remember reading it for the first time, being struck not only by its percipience and extraordinary breadth of knowledge, but its literary style; and in his third language (after Arabic and French, too). It is a forensic dismantling of the “Chatham House” — the informal name for the Royal Institute of International Affairs think tank — analysis of the Middle East. For Kedourie, Chatham House stands as shorthand for an elite British view of the Middle East (and the Arabs in particular) that he argues is based around a mix of sentimentality, guilt, and self-flagellation brought together by a guiding tendency to favor romantic illusion over prosaic reality.</p>
<p>Kedourie was most scathing about the effect of this approach in his homeland of Iraq. He watched the British scuttle out of there, and indeed the region, during the end of empire, and let chaos ensue — and he damned them for it.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;He watched the British scuttle out of there, and indeed the region, during the end of empire, and chaos ensue — and he damned them for it.&#8221;</div>
<p>According to Kedourie, “The British left behind a region whose political, social, and economic structures were inadequate to sustain the independence they had promised and which they had uncritically imposed.” Add “Americans” alongside “British” and you’ll recognize not only the timeless wisdom of his words, but also the West’s ability to make the same mistakes, timelessly.</p>
<p>The 2003 invasion of Iraq was a historic mistake. We should not have done it. But we did, and in so doing we removed a brutal and sadistic dictator, but one who nevertheless kept chaos at bay. Chaos that, lest we forget, is built into the Iraqi state, carved illogically from three Ottoman provinces, and filled with a toxic mix of Sunnis, Shias and Kurds. Iraq was constructed (by us and the French no less) as if it were designed to be a sectarian tinderbox; and once Saddam’s controlling authority was gone, that tinderbox erupted. Last year, on the 20th anniversary of the invasion, I reported for <em>UnHerd</em> from Baghdad where my fixer Ammar told me something that has lodged, ineradicably, in my mind ever since. &#8220;We had so much hope in the beginning,&#8221; he said. &#8220;Then the country turned to a path of blood, and then people started to want Saddam back to keep order. Even with all the misery he brought.&#8221;</p>
<p>And it’s not just Iraq where coalition troops are indispensable, but Syria too. There, they are concentrated mainly in the northeast and comprise a limited but strategic presence focused on counterterrorism, military partnerships with the Kurds, who control an autonomous region in parts of the north and east, and containing Russian and Iranian influence.</p>
<p>Following the fall of Assad — and was not the rapid fall of this supposedly immovable dictator yet another orthodoxy shattered — we hope that Syria is moving toward effective self-governance. But make no mistake, coalition troops are still needed there. The Turkish-backed Syrian National Army is already skirmishing with Kurdish forces, primarily the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), who are allied with Washington in the fight against Islamic State, but which Turkey views as a threat due to their links to Kurdish groups it views as terrorists. My Kurdish friends on the ground are understandably worried. Without US forces on the ground, who knows what the SNA will do. The situation is made worse through the presence of the terror group Islamic State (IS). Over the first half of 2024 IS <a href="https://x.com/CENTCOM/status/1813332001010630840" target="_blank" rel="noopener">claimed</a> responsibility for 153 attacks in Iraq and Syria (almost more than double the total number of attacks claimed in 2023). In <a href="https://x.com/CENTCOM/status/1813332001010630840" target="_blank" rel="noopener">that</a> time, US forces along with the Iraqi security forces and the SDF have conducted 196 missions, killed 44 IS operatives and detained 166. According to US CentCom, &#8220;these leaders include those responsible for planning of operations outside of Syria and Iraq, recruiting, training and weapons smuggling.&#8221;</p>
<p>The Kurds also control Al-Hol Camp, where 10,000 to 12,000 imprisoned jihadist fighters and former IS members are imprisoned (the camp houses around 50,000 to 60,000 people, including family members of IS fighters, one of whom is Shamima Begum). If the Kurds come under sustained SNA attack, they will no longer be able to effectively control the camp, and thousands of Jihadis could go free. These are not just issues of Syrian and Iraqi security, but our own too. And finally, there is the problem of Russia and Iran. Both regimes are now under huge pressure at home and abroad, and they will grasp any opportunity to claim any sort of victory — Iraq and Syria offer them a chance.</p>
<p>We have a responsibility to the people of Iraq whose country we invaded, destroyed and now want to hand over to Iran. We have a responsibility to the people of Syria too, especially the Kurds, who fought with us to defeat IS. If we flee (again), we will abandon the region to chaos: just as Kedourie shows we did over half a century ago. Both US and UK diplomats have admitted to me over recent years the shame and awkwardness they feel because of the failed invasion. They are right to feel ashamed, but it is dangerous madness to leave Iraq, above all for the Iraqis we profess to care about so much.</p>
<p>So, why have we promised that we will? For the same reasons Kedourie identified over half a century ago: loss of nerve born from a failure of confidence. We fear being called occupiers or imperialists while the Iranians and Russians are shamelessly trying to rebuild the empires they have lost. Then there is Turkish President Recep Erdoğan’s drive across Syria, which is led by several geopolitical considerations but also the more far amorphous vision of rebuilding the Ottoman Empire there.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/10/israels-plan-to-weaken-iran/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/10/israels-plan-to-weaken-iran/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/GettyImages-2179863598-1.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/10/israels-plan-to-weaken-iran/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/10/israels-plan-to-weaken-iran/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Israel&#039;s plan to weaken the Iranian regime</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/10/israels-plan-to-weaken-iran/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Edward Luttwak</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>In the name of anti-imperialism, we would hand these countries over to the worst imperialists of our day.</p>
<p>Action can indeed be disastrous, but so can inaction. We invaded Iraq in 2003, and it brought chaos and bloodshed to Iraqis. But in 2011, Barack Obama, haunted by Iraq’s legacy, refused to enforce his own red line and punish Bashar al-Assad for gassing his own people. He failed to act, and it brought chaos and bloodshed to Syrians.</p>
<p>And if we do cut and run, who suffers most in the countries we abandon? Again, we turn to Kedourie who, as a Jew, was always sensitive to the treatment of minorities (that supposedly sacred group in contemporary Western policy-making). He was just 15 when he witnessed, along with most of my maternal family, the June 1941 pogrom known as the Farhud (“Looting”) in which officers of the state murdered over 180 Jewish men, women, and children. For Kedourie, two lessons emerge, not just from the Farhud but post-imperial Iraq. The first is that living as a minority under the cosmopolitan Ottoman empire was preferable to a Sunni Iraq, increasingly gripped by notions of nationalism it had imported from the West, but which lacked the institutions and traditions to fully understand or implement. The second, was that, as the author Robert Kaplan has observed, Kedourie understood that Empire provided the kind of Hobbesian Leviathan needed to control a Middle East gripped by incessant turmoil and violence (which he exhaustively detailed in his work) and protect the weak from the strong.</p>
<p>Now I am emphatically not suggesting that the coalition remain in Iraq (nor to a far lesser extent Syria) to act as Leviathan. But when the US crowbarred itself in that role for close to two decades to suddenly abandon Iraq, not to its own people but to the far less palatable Leviathan next door, is not merely inadvisable, it is inexcusable.</p>
<p>All this is so obvious that mere loss of confidence seems inadequate to explain it. In fact, it is compounded by something else that Kedourie identified in the British foreign policy establishment: a deep strain of orientalist fascination with, and fetishization of, Arab culture (how else to explain its indulgence of that bloviating fraud T.E. Lawrence). This is then compounded by guilt: at the problems caused by their drawing of post-imperial borders and, perhaps above all, the foundation of the state of Israel. Simply put, British officials believed that the Arabs, once freed from the twin evils of Zionism and imperialism, would naturally establish peaceful, stable governments, without recognizing the challenges posed by centuries of division and conflict. Once again, add “Americans&#8221; to “British” and this book, which was written over half a century ago, could have been written this morning.</p>
<p>Kedourie understood that this was nonsense; he understood that what followed the end of empires was not a halcyon age of “authentic” liberation but often corrupt governance and mass violence; he understood, also, that it is only a “fashionable western sentimentality which holds that Great Powers are nasty and small Powers virtuous”. This phrase should be cast in bronze to hang over the desk of every FCDO and State Department official, and of every foreign news editor. Any temptation to view it as simplistic or exaggerated is swiftly disabused with consideration of the behavior of many Global South countries towards Russia&#8217;s attempted colonization of Ukraine. Being colonized a century ago may give you an insight into that particular form of suffering, but it clearly doesn’t extend to empathy for countries undergoing similar threats today, and it absolutely does not endow you with any superior ability to analyze contemporary geopolitics.</p>
<p>But most of all Kedourie understood the problem was not Zionism but, as Kaplan observes, that “the Ottoman Empire with its caliphate crumbled, leaving an Islamic civilization without a recognized religious authority. The result was various groups and factions and ideologies that competed for which one could be the most pure; that is, the most extreme. Today’s problems are old problems, going back to the decades of Ottoman decline, with the realization that the Middle East, from Algeria to Iraq, has still not found a solution to the final collapse of the Turkish sultanate in 1922.”</p>
<p>Still, though, it was Zionism, or more correctly the State of Israel, which supposedly sat and sits at the center of orthodox Middle East analysis and reporting today as a source of all instability — a font of original sin in a region that, without its cancerous presence, would surely exist as an oasis of tranquility. It is notable that directly challenging this orthodoxy has led to the greatest regional breakthrough of the last decade in the region, the 2020 Abraham Accords. That the series of normalization agreements between Israel and several Arab states were brokered by Donald Trump is extraordinary but perhaps also inescapable.</p>
<p>Only a man so divorced from the Western foreign policy establishment could go so directly against one of its guiding principles, as articulated by then-US secretary of State John Kerry in 2013. “I will tell you that peace between Israel and the Arab world is impossible without a Palestinian peace,” he said. “It’s not going to happen. You’re not going to get it.”</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;Only a man so divorced from the Western foreign policy establishment could go so directly against one of its guiding principles&#8221;</div>
<p>After Hamas committed the October 7 atrocities — which occurred just weeks after another star of the DC foreign policy establishment, National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan, declared that the Middle East is &#8220;quieter than it has been for decades” — Israel launched its war in Gaza. It then launched its war in Lebanon and took out the leaders of both Hamas and Lebanon, while also striking Iran directly for the first time. At each stage the world (most importantly the Americans) told Israel to stop. They told it to make peace. They told it that an extended war would be bad for everyone; and that it would strengthen Hamas. They said, going into Lebanon would be a bloody disaster (as would going to Rafah, where in fact the IDF managed to kill Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar); and that Iranian missiles could destroy large parts of its territory. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu ignored them on every occasion.</p>
<p>I make no moral judgment on each of these actions, merely on their efficacy, which as of now, is proven. And Netanyahu was able to accomplish everything he has for a variety of reasons (not least that he wants to put off the post-war inquiries over October 7) but above all because he understands that the Middle East that matters is not that the one that triggers undergraduate protestors, or makes the hard Left go misty-eyed, or the one that aging Foreign Office or State Department mandarins fondly imagine.</p>
<p>And in this he follows Kedourie, whose work remains priceless not just because he was intellectually brilliant, but because he understood that what matters is not ideology or politics, but the reality on the ground, viewed without sentiment or, as far as possible, bias. He understood that history is not about ideology but about facts and evidence —as are the highest forms of reporting. As 2025 dawns, we can do a lot worse than look forward by looking back over 50 years to one of the greatest works by one of the great Middle East scholars of the 20th century, and use it to help us navigate the many challenges we face today.</p>
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					<title>Syria will never be unified</title>
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										<unherd:main_theme>diplomacy</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Edward Luttwak]]>
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							<![CDATA[Damascus in ruins. (Credit: Chris McGrath/Getty)]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Professor Edward Luttwak</strong> is a strategist and historian known for his works on grand strategy, geoeconomics, military history, and international relations.</p>
]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_handle>ELuttwak</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is a strategist and historian known for his works on grand strategy, geoeconomics, military history, and international relations.]]>
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										<pubDate>Fri, 27 Dec 2024 00:03:37 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Thu, 18 Dec 2025 11:49:52 +0000</updated>
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								<![CDATA[Western busybodies should be wary]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>The foreign busybodies in the State Department, Foreign Office and the French foreign ministry, who are already now pressing for the reconstruction of a unitary Syrian state, should reflect on the country’s history. Syria was never meant to function as a unitary state. Nor under Sunni Arab majority rule, as it is likely to now.</p>
<p>The distinct national identities of its Alawite, Arab Christian-Orthodox, Druze, Kurdish, Armenian, Ismaili and Arab Shia populations were all recognised under Ottoman rule. And when France obtained the territory in 1919, it strove to accommodate plural identities by creating two separate states: an Alawite one in north-west Syria and a Druze one in the south-east.</p>
<p>But when the French gave up their attempt to control Syria in 1946, a Sunni Arab, Shukri al-Quwatli, became the country&#8217;s president. He did not discriminate against the minorities, but he did send troops with Transjordan and Egypt to invade Israel in 1948 in the name of Sunni Arab solidarity. He had high hopes of conquering the Galilee, because the Syrians had tanks and artillery left behind by the French, while the Jews only had rifles, some machine-guns, and a couple of antique 1906 howitzers.</p>
<p>The ensuing Arab defeat came as a terrible humiliation, which prompted the first of Syria&#8217;s many coups. The next president, General Husni al Zaim, only ruled for 137 days but set enduring precedents: although he had been in charge of the fighting as the Army Chief of Staff, he blamed civilian politicians for Syria&#8217;s defeat, and second, he was not an Arab but a Kurd — the first of a series of non-Sunni Arab rulers, found in no other Arab country.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/12/will-tehran-be-next/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/12/will-tehran-be-next/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/GettyImages-2188260220.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/12/will-tehran-be-next/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/12/will-tehran-be-next/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Will Tehran be next?</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/12/will-tehran-be-next/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Edward Luttwak</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>During the next 21 years, 17 presidents followed one another. And three of those years were under Egyptian rule. In 1958 Gamal Abdel Nasser, then the very embodiment of Arab nationalism, had been invited to rule Syria as well, in what became the United Arab Republic. The Syrian elite, desperate for stability, had simply given up on independence.</p>
<p>This experiment in Arab unity lasted for three years and 219 days, long enough to teach the Syrian elite both civil and military that the rule of much larger but much poorer Egypt was very costly. A military coup dissolved the United Arab Republic on 29 September 1961, and six more presidents tried to rule Syria. But stability would come in November 1970 when Hafez al-Assad took control as military dictator before naming himself the president in February 1971.</p>
<p>With Hafez al-Assad there was no more beating around the bush on the question of ethnicity, never even mentioned by all his predecessors. He was an Alawite, therefore only a very nominal Muslim (they drink wine and believe in the transmigration of souls), and he relied very largely on fellow Alawites to control the levers of power, from the command of air force squadrons and every armoured unit within reach of Damascus, to the customs service that generated revenue much more reliably than taxes, and the police which recruited informants in every part of Syrian society.</p>
<p>It was Hafez-al Assad&#8217;s father, Suleiman, who had laid the basis of subsequent Alawite power over Syria. In June 1926, along with other notable Alawites, he sent a letter to the French Prime Minister Leon Blum, to explain why his people — mostly peasant farmers in those days — could never live under Muslim rule. &#8220;The spirit of hatred and intolerance plants its roots in the heart of Muslim Arabs toward everything that is non-Muslim,” he wrote, warning of the risk to Syrian minorities if France granted independence. At the time the French were organising their colonial army for Syria, and thought it prudent to favour Alawite applicants along with Druzes, Ismailis and a few Christians, all much more likely to be loyal to France against majority Arab Sunni demands for independence.</p>
<p>The disproportionate number of Alawites in the officer corps allowed Hafez al-Assad to seize control of the armed forces in 1970. But the elevation of Alawite farmers into the ruling class would ultimately undo the 54-year long regime of Assad father and son that finally collapsed two weeks ago. The sons of farmers moved into Damascus and other Syrian cities to exploit their Alawite connections to occupy lucrative government positions or work in state-connected firms, and were less and less willing to serve as soldiers, gendarmes and spies to protect the regime from its enemies.</p>
<p>For many years this enfeeblement of the Alawites was masked by the rise of Iran&#8217;s power in Syria. Tehran’s militantly Shia rulers needed bases in Syria to build up Hezbollah in Lebanon, and to claim overall Muslim leadership against Israel. They therefore chose to accept the exceedingly heretical Alawites as both Muslim and Shia.</p>
<p>Iran’s support allowed the Assad regime to cling to power for years, even in the face of the mass “Arab Spring” protests led by the Sunni Arab majority that started in December 2010. The Revolutionary Guards trained Shia recruits from Iraq and as far as Afghanistan to repress the Sunni majority rebels all over Syria, while relying on higher grade Hezbollah units to reconquer strongly held towns and city quarters, with bombing support from Syrian aircraft and Russian fighter-bombers.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;Iran’s support allowed the Assad regime to cling to power for years.&#8221;</div>
<p>Determined to resist by all means possible including the use of chlorine and mustard gas, the regime survived for another 14 years. But it could not survive Israel&#8217;s demolition of Hezbollah, and its clear-cut aerial victory right over Tehran. The thousand or so Sunni fundamentalist rebels of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham who drove into Aleppo on 29 November, would easily have been stopped by a Hezbollah battalion in the past, but not this time. And neither could Iran&#8217;s Revolutionary Guards be flown to support the regime because the Israelis would not have allowed it. After Iran&#8217;s air force did not even try to resist Israel’s 26 October attack near Tehran, the entire edifice of Iran&#8217;s military power was exposed as a sham. Assad fled just in time to avoid certain death.</p>
<p>The Foreign Office, State Department Near East Bureau, and French Quai d&#8217;Orsay should pause to reconsider this history. The Alawites might be beaten down but not the Kurds in the north-east, nor the Druzes in the south-east.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/12/how-syria-will-shape-europes-future/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/12/how-syria-will-shape-europes-future/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/Screenshot-2024-12-16-at-11.56.41.png?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/12/how-syria-will-shape-europes-future/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/12/how-syria-will-shape-europes-future/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>How Syria will shape Europe&#039;s future</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/12/how-syria-will-shape-europes-future/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Aris Roussinos</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>There are other ways to accommodate plural identities. Switzerland, for example, once the scene of civil war, caters to the diverse preferences of its multi-ethnic, multi-lingual, and multi-religious population with 26 different cantons<em>,</em> each of which has its own government, constitution, and primary language. The last time Swiss took up arms against each other was in 1847, but the newest canton, French-speaking Jura, only acquired its independence in 1979.</p>
<p>Of course, there are glaring differences between ultra-prosperous and perfectly tranquil Switzerland and war-ravaged Syria, but the former’s accommodation of diversities at the local level is far better than any attempt at nation-wide ethnic/religious accommodations, as in India, where the original idea of helping the lowest-caste “untouchables” that started under British rule has escalated over the years into a system of privileges (including in university admissions) for whatever group is strong enough at the ballot box, including a newer “Other Backward Classes” category that embraces almost a third of the population. A unitary Syrian state without strong local governments would be disastrous, especially because each city and some larger towns has its own distinct urban culture shared by most ethnicities and religions.</p>
<p>Perhaps the Syrians are best left alone to rebuild their state as they see fit. But if benevolent Western officials do intervene, they should not automatically favour a unitary and centralised state — a preference unfortunately shared even by American officials who come from a federal state. A confederal Syria would be a much better alternative.</p>
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					<title>A fearful Christmas in Syria</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2024/12/a-fearful-christmas-in-syria/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://stage.unherd.com/2024/12/a-fearful-christmas-in-syria/?edition=us#comments</comments>
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										<unherd:main_theme>War</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Giles Fraser]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/giles.jpeg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>2</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[]]>
						</unherd:image_caption>
						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Giles Fraser</strong> is a journalist, broadcaster and Vicar of St Anne&#8217;s, Kew.</p>
]]>
						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>giles_fraser</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is a journalist, broadcaster and Vicar of St Anne's, Kew.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Wed, 25 Dec 2024 00:03:54 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Sat, 28 Dec 2024 09:56:08 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Christianity]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Christmas]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Faith]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Syria]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://stage.unherd.com/?p=645846</guid>
																												<description>
								<![CDATA[Christianity is threatened by Islamism]]>
							</description>
																		
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								<![CDATA[<p>The small city of Al-Suqaylabiyah has long been an indicator of Christian-Muslim relations in Syria. And two days ago, <a href="https://www.intellinews.com/christmas-tree-burned-in-syrian-city-by-masked-men-359610/?source=syrian-arab-republic">masked militants</a> doused the northern Syrian city’s Christmas tree in petrol and set it alight. The message is clear: Christians beware. Now, Christians all over Syria are nervously watching what happens next in Al-Suqaylabiyah; among other things, places like this are on the front line between two very different conceptions of God.</p>
<p>If you ask Sunday school children to draw a picture of God, you often get two sorts of images. The first is a cloudy scribble, generally pretty abstract and amorphous. It could be fire or a depiction of wind. This is God the unknowable. The second sort of image is of a kindly face, mostly a man with a beard. Sometimes a baby. People have killed each other over this difference, and continue to do so right up to this day. It’s a difference that gets to the theological heart of why Christians in Syria are so nervous about the return of Islamism. This is a Christmas story set against the violence of world events.</p>
<p>Idolatry is probably the number one thought crime in the Hebrew scriptures. God alone is worthy of worship, and to imbue divine status to anything less than God Almighty is a capital offence. “Show them no pity or compassion and do not shield them. But you shall surely kill them; your own hand shall be the first against them to execute them. Stone them to death” as the book Deuteronomy puts it. Judaism and Islam share a profound hostility to any kind of depiction of the divine; for them, the real God is unrepresentable. The second commandment prohibits the representation of God, and representational art is profoundly suspect. So, in many ways, Rothko is the archetypal Jewish artist. And Islam focuses a great deal of its visual aesthetic energy into calligraphy. At the extreme end of this scale are the fighters of Islamic State blowing up statues in Palmyra.</p>
<p>But Christianity works in a completely different way, and because of Christmas. For the mad idea that God is born into the world as a child, and grows up to be a man, introduces the thought that the Almighty has a face. That He has a certain look. And all of a sudden, permission seems to have been given for this look to be reproduced. As the Epistle of Colossians puts it, “Christ is the image of the invisible God”. And with that idea everything changes, especially for artists.</p>
<p>The Arab theologian St John of Damascus did the most to defend the use of images for Orthodox Christianity. St John was an Arab Christian, born in 675, and into a city that only 40 years previously had fallen to the Muslim army. It was here that he defended the use of icons, focusing his argument on the incarnation, the coming of God into the world as flesh. “And the word became flesh and dwelt among us,” he says in the familiar Christmas reading. Suddenly there is something specific you can draw. In fact the whole tradition of Western art, with its representations of the birth of Christ, and of the Cross, owes its existence to a little Syrian monk writing in the seventh century. Long before Islam, Syria was the place of St Paul’s conversion and baptism, one of the great cradles of the Church. And though Christians have been leaving Syria in droves since the beginning of the Syrian civil war in 2011, there is still a significant Christian population there.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/12/have-yourself-a-countercultural-christmas/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/12/have-yourself-a-countercultural-christmas/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/GettyImages-505842332-scaled-e1671020348219.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/12/have-yourself-a-countercultural-christmas/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/12/have-yourself-a-countercultural-christmas/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Have yourself a countercultural Christmas</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/12/have-yourself-a-countercultural-christmas/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Terry Eagleton </a></p></div></a></div>
<p>In the centre of Damascus, along Straight Street, where St Paul rested after his traumatic conversion, a number of churches cluster together for security. They are all brimming with icons and images, twinkling with gold. These are identity markers for orthodox Christians. Far more than nice decorations, icons speak of the coming of God into the world. Not unlike the Eucharist for Catholics, they are sacramental, and represent what it is to be an Orthodox Christian. But to Islam, these images are an insult. And to radical Muslims of the Islamic State kind, an absolute abomination.</p>
<p>I left Syria in May 2015, and recall being driven at a ridiculous speed through the checkpoint into Lebanon to Beirut airport by a mad Syrian monk who had to get back for a service. It is the closest I have ever felt to death. Uninterested in the police who were attempting to flag him down through various concrete chicanes, he wound down the window to reveal his priestly robes — better than a passport, apparently. The fact that the Syrian police let him through was testament to the kind of relationship the Christian community had built up with Bashar al-Assad and his family. They didn’t like Assad, though they only whispered it, frightened like everyone else. But they were terrified of Islamic State. “Better Assad than ISIS” — I heard this several times. A few weeks after I left, ISIS detonated mines around the 2,000-year-old temples in Palmyra, out in the eastern Syrian desert. Their campaign against the idolatrous culture of the ancients was uninterested in pathetic Western cries of heritage. And now that Assad has gone, the Christian community are secretly terrified that this sort of Islamism is coming for them and their precious icons.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;Now that Assad has gone, the Christian community are secretly terrified that this sort of Islamism is coming for them and their precious icons.&#8221;</div>
<p>Not every Christian image in the churches of Straight Street is a beautiful icon. The Armenian Orthodox church has a representation of the Armenian Genocide in its courtyard, one of the most gruesome and disturbing images I have ever seen. It recalls the Turkish (then Ottoman) mass murder of its Armenian Christian population during the First World War. During that period, more than one million Armenian Christians were wiped out by the Turkish authorities. Many Armenian Christians were forced to convert to Islam, others were driven into the Syrian desert to die of starvation. This is why what is now Turkey, once a wellspring of Christianity, is now pretty much Christian-free. “Who now remembers the Armenian Genocide?” Hitler once said, as he prepared to copy it in his genocide of Jews. Mostly, we don’t remember. But they do in Damascus. This is where terrified Christians fled from Ottoman bayonets. And Christians on Straight Street keep the memory of those horrors alive to this day.</p>
<p>Will Abu Mohammed al-Jolani, and his Turkish backers, bring liberation as he seems to have promised, or further misery for the Christian community in Damascus? In truth, no one yet knows. For now, a huge Christmas tree is raised in Abbasiya Square in the city centre. The lights are on in Straight Street. Joy to the world. Even the first Christmas was set against dangerous world events, with Matthew telling of Herod ordering a massacre of children. This may feel like an old story to us. It is all too horrifically real to the Christians of Damascus.</p>
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					<title>Syria is doomed to instability</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2024/12/syria-is-doomed-to-instability/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://stage.unherd.com/2024/12/syria-is-doomed-to-instability/?edition=us#comments</comments>
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										<unherd:main_theme>Postwar</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Rajan Menon]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/Blue-thumbnail-example-5-300x300-1-1.jpg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>3</unherd:article_ranking>
																<unherd:image_caption>
							<![CDATA[The new Syria may not last. Huseyin Nasir/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images.]]>
						</unherd:image_caption>
						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Rajan Menon </strong>is the Anne and Bernard Spitzer Professor Emeritus at the City College of New York and Senior Research Scholar at the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University.<span style="color: #888888;"><br />
</span></p>
]]>
						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle></unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[is the Anne and Bernard Spitzer Professor Emeritus at the City College of New York and Senior Research Scholar at the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University.<span style="color: #888888;">
</span>]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Thu, 19 Dec 2024 00:01:42 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Thu, 19 Dec 2024 00:01:42 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Geopolitics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Israel]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Jolani]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Politics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Syria]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Turkey]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://stage.unherd.com/?p=644864</guid>
																												<description>
								<![CDATA[Outside agents will stoke chaos]]>
							</description>
																		
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								<![CDATA[<p>The House of Assad endured for over half a century, but crumbled in 10 days. Ba’athism is dead and Abu Mohammed al-Jolani now finds himself the de facto leader of a government in Damascus, led by his rebel coalition Hay&#8217;at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). It’s a denouement he may have dreamed of but likely never expected. For now, Jolani can bask in the euphoria and gratitude sweeping his country. But soon, he’ll have to meet Syrians’ pent-up desire for good governance and better lives. In a land as multicultural as Syria, perhaps the most urgent task involves proving his self-proclaimed tolerance. And many Syrians remain cautious, wondering whether his political conversion is little more than a tactical makeover.</p>
<p>In order to convince them, Jolani must create political stability while distancing himself from Assad-era repression. This means ending such practices as casting offenders into dungeons, common under both Bashar al-Assad and his father. It also means the disbanding of Assad’s security services. Nor will Jolani pardon any officials, civilian and military, who have committed egregious human rights violations. Syrians will want to see such offenders brought to justice: especially senior members of the military, the Ba’ath Party, and the <em>mukhabarat</em> (secret police). They will also want the hated <em>shabiha</em> (“ghosts”) to be held accountable. These citizens groups, armed and trained by the Assad regime, have been <a href="https://cija-syria-paramilitaries.org/#investigating-assads-ghosts" target="_blank" rel="noopener">accused</a> of kidnap, torture and murder on a vast scale. To deliver justice and accountability there must be new legal codes and a new judiciary with people who are both qualified and trusted by the public.</p>
<p>Jolani’s biggest long-term challenge, though, will be reviving Syria’s battered economy. For a time, perhaps, Syrians will blame their economic hardships on the Assad regime. But, in time, they will hold their new rulers responsible, and fulfilling economic expectations will prove a formidable task. Syria’s <a href="https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/PCAGDPSYA646NWDB" target="_blank" rel="noopener">per capita GDP</a> has plummeted from $3,000 in 2011 to a pitiable $421 in 2021: that’s 86%. At the same time, the World Bank <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2024/05/24/syria-growth-contraction-deepens-and-the-welfare-of-syrian-households-deteriorates" target="_blank" rel="noopener">reports</a> that “consumer price inflation” increased by 93% in 2023, even as 69% of Syrians live in poverty.</p>
<p>It hardly helps that 13 years of civil war have killed 500,000 people, displaced more than seven million, and turned six million others into refugees, the majority in Turkey. Then there are the <a href="https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2024/11/10/the-worlds-most-unlikely-safe-haven" target="_blank" rel="noopener">half a million</a> people who’ve fled into Syria from Lebanon — escaping punishing Israeli airstrikes — and the million more <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/us/node/27191" target="_blank" rel="noopener">displaced</a> during the recent HTS offensive. With the economy in ruins, resettling returnees will be costly. Mohammad al-Bashir, the interim prime minister until elections next year, has urged Syrian refugees to return and rebuild their country. But even if only a small fraction of them heed his call, they will still need to be housed, fed, and provided with basic necessities to help them reintegrate into society.</p>
<p>Given Syria’s pervasive poverty, the new government won’t have much of a tax base to stimulate growth. In theory, income from oil sales could help: Syria produced <a href="https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=3110" target="_blank" rel="noopener">387,000 barrels</a> of oil a day in 2010 and exported about a third. But the oil fields are <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/50464561" target="_blank" rel="noopener">largely</a> in Syria’s east and northeast, the stronghold of Syria’s Kurds, now known as the Autonomous Administration for North and East Syria (AANES). Run by Farhad Abdi Shaheen (better known by the nom de guerre Mazloum Abdi), leader of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which is backed by American troops as part of Washington’s fight against the Islamic State (IS).</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;Given Syria’s pervasive poverty, the new government won’t have much of a tax base to stimulate growth.&#8221;</div>
<p>Jolani, who has <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-assad-regime-falls-what-happens-now/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">called for</a> a new Syrian settlement featuring <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-assad-regime-falls-what-happens-now/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">regional autonomy</a>, could strike a deal with Abdi to share oil revenue in return for Kurdish autonomy. Abdi, for his part, has sent <a href="https://hawarnews.com/en/mazloum-abdi-aanes-participation-crucial-to-solving-syrian-crisis" target="_blank" rel="noopener">positive signals</a> in return. He ordered that the post-independence national <a href="https://www.barrons.com/news/kurdish-administration-says-adopts-syria-s-independence-flag-371f475e" target="_blank" rel="noopener">flag</a> adopted by HTS be flown by all administrate bodies within the AANES and declared that his enclave is part of Syria and will participate in a new political settlement encompassing the entire country.</p>
<p>Yet a deal between Jolani and Abdi could run into an obstacle, one that highlights the interplay between internal governance and external relations. Tayyip Recep Erdoğan, Turkey’s leader, has now gained even greater influence in Syria, especially in its northeast, following Assad’s fall. And he could have an even freer hand if Donald Trump, who <a href="https://www.msnbc.com/opinion/msnbc-opinion/trump-syria-troops-assad-biden-rcna183781" target="_blank" rel="noopener">said recently</a> that the United States “should have nothing to do” with Syria, withdraws American troops from the AANES, something said he’d do in 2018 but did not. Erdoğan may oppose any deal between Syria’s new government and Abdi’s SDF: he considers the latter a branch of the <a href="https://www.csis.org/blogs/examining-extremism/examining-extremism-kurdistan-workers-party-pkk" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Kurdistan Workers’ Party</a> (PKK), which has been waging a secessionist war against Turkey since 1984.</p>
<p>Since the start of Syria’s civil war, Turkey has <a href="https://www.europarl.europa.eu/EPRS/EPRS-Briefing-642284-Turkeys-military-operation-Syria-FINAL.pdf">invaded</a> northern Syria repeatedly. In concert with the Syrian National Army (SNA), its local proxy, it has also occupied <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/a14241de-8dbf-4a69-b064-2991f5992503" target="_blank" rel="noopener">stretches of territory</a> west of the Euphrates River deep inside Syria. After Assad’s fall, the SNA, backed by Turkish air and drone strikes, has pushed into <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2024/12/12/syria-turkey-wants-to-extend-its-buffer-zone-by-pushing-back-kurdish-forces_6735985_4.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">several border towns</a>, forcing local residents to flee. Erdoğan had also pressed Assad for the right to patrol Kurdish-populated areas across Turkey’s border with Syria. Jolani may therefore find himself forced to stand with Abdi to oppose Turkey’s increasingly extravagant demands.</p>
<p>Jolani is also under pressure from Israel, which has “temporarily” occupied the UN patrolled <a href="https://www.972mag.com/israeli-settlers-syria-lebanon/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">demilitarised area</a> beyond the Golan Heights, created in 1974, as well as some territory beyond it. It also launched hundreds of airstrikes to destroy the Syrian army’s weapons stocks and chemical weapons sites, the latter strangely never discovered before despite Israel’s vaunted Intelligence capabilities. Israel also acted without first trying to engage HTS to see whether this zone could be preserved and an agreement reached to keep the Syrian army’s weapons out of the hands of terrorist groups and to secure and then destroy Syria’s chemical weapons stocks.</p>
<p>Jolani has called for an Israeli withdrawal from the occupied lands, but Tel Aviv has refused: and there’s no reason to expect the United States will side with Jolani. The rebel leader knows, of course, that his efforts to improve Syria’s economy could be derailed if tensions between Syria and Israel boil over into violence. While he has called Israel&#8217;s attacks and incursion unjustified — and criticised its “unwarranted escalation” — he isn’t spoiling for a fight. Syria, Jolani conceded, is just too weak, and should focus on economic reconstruction and diplomacy with Israel instead.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/10/the-failed-lessons-of-libya/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/10/the-failed-lessons-of-libya/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/GettyImages-109891750-e1697718512510.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/10/the-failed-lessons-of-libya/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/10/the-failed-lessons-of-libya/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The failed lessons of Libya</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/10/the-failed-lessons-of-libya/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Rajan Menon</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>As expected, Jolani has asked for the lifting of economic <a href="https://www.cartercenter.org/resources/pdfs/peace/conflict_resolution/syria-conflict/us-and-european-sanctions-on-syria-091620.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">sanctions</a> on Syria — imposed by the EU and far more broadly by the United States — which didn’t diminish the living standards of Assad and his cronies but did hit ordinary Syrians hard. The West, though, won’t provide sweeping sanctions relief anytime soon: it will first test HTS’s governance practices, especially its declared commitment to be inclusive and abandon terrorism. The West will also expect Jolani to battle IS, which has conducted close to <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/12/15/opinion/al-assad-syria-isis.html?searchResultPosition=1" target="_blank" rel="noopener">700 attacks</a> in Syria this year alone. The problem is that Jolani won’t have many resources at his disposal: Israel’s airstrikes destroyed as much as 80% of the country’s military power.</p>
<p>Then there are the Russians and the Iranians. Both have suffered serious setbacks but will surely seek to regain the influence they enjoyed under Assad. The Russians have apparently already <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-12-12/russia-nears-deal-with-new-syria-leaders-to-keep-military-bases" target="_blank" rel="noopener">cut a deal</a> with Syria’s new rulers to retain their airbase in Khmeimim and the naval base at Tartus. That stake may induce them to avoid stoking instability. But Iran has no comparable motivation, and has anyway suffered a much larger loss of influence following the triumph of HTS. If HTS fails the governance test, Iran may decide to back such opposition forces as emerge. As Naim Qassem, the leader of Hezbollah, Iran’s ally, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/hezbollah-chief-says-group-lost-its-supply-route-through-syria-2024-12-14/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">noted</a> recently, his group has lost its supply route from Iran — but could regain it if “a new regime” emerges in Syria.</p>
<p>Outsiders jostling for position, let alone arming local surrogates, could make the already-daunting governance challenges HTS faces even harder. Syria is too strategically important to be left alone, but meddling foreigners bent on shaping its political future should be careful. The upheavals resulting from their rivalries will affect them too, through another surge in refugee outflows or an increase in terrorism or narcotics trafficking. Sadly, based on the past, there isn’t much hope that they will act any differently.</p>
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															<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">644864</post-id>				</item>
									<item>
					<title>The Turkish Left&#8217;s love for Assad</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2024/12/the-turkish-lefts-love-for-assad/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://stage.unherd.com/2024/12/the-turkish-lefts-love-for-assad/?edition=us#comments</comments>
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										<unherd:main_theme>Immigration</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Kaya Genç]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/man2.jpg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>3</unherd:article_ranking>
																<unherd:image_caption>
							<![CDATA[The Turkish Left have engaged in a dangerous love affair with Assad. Bulent Kilic/AFP via Getty Images]]>
						</unherd:image_caption>
						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Kaya Genç </strong>is a novelist and essayist from Istanbul. He is a European Press Prize finalist and author of four books.</p>
]]>
						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle></unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[is a novelist and essayist from Istanbul. He is a European Press Prize finalist and author of four books.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Wed, 18 Dec 2024 00:00:36 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Wed, 18 Dec 2024 00:00:36 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Assad]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Erdogan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Politics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Syria]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Turkey]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://stage.unherd.com/?p=643860</guid>
																												<description>
								<![CDATA[Anti-imperialists have only empowered Erdoğan]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>Bashar al-Assad, who ruled Syria with an iron fist for 24 years before getting his comeuppance, received silent support from one of the unlikeliest places during his dictatorial rule. Numerous groups in Turkey’s splintered Left, from self-professed Maoists to Stalin apologists and various “Kemalist revolutionary” sects, have pledged alliance to the leader of the Syrian Ba’ath Party since the war started in 2011. The love affair has been costly for Turkey’s secular progressives, the very people the Leftists claim to represent. And it has empowered Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who has accused the opposition of being heartless in the face of Syria’s tragedy.</p>
<p>Erdoğan strongly supported the Free Syrian Army in its endeavours to “protect and liberate Syria and Syrians from the tyranny of the Assad regime”. In 2012, when prime minister, he expressed his desire to embrace his rebelling Islamist brothers in Damascus in service of his “neo-Ottomanist” vision, and “inshallah, to pray in front of Saladin Mausoleum and do namaz in the Umayyad Mosque”. He was clearly acting in self-interest. An adviser to Erdoğan <a href="https://yurtsever.org.tr/2018/afrinde-56-sehit-verdik-ama-ihaleleri-turk-muteahhitler-alacak-166095/">noted</a> in 2018 how, thanks to Turkey&#8217;s involvement, &#8220;Turkish contractors will get a bigger share of the pie&#8221; in Syria. But the Left, for its part, built a pro-Assad case built on anti-immigrant, anti-Arab and “anti-imperialist” sentiment.</p>
<p>The Turkish Left’s love for Assad is rooted in their respect for Ba&#8217;athism, the Arab nationalist ideology that promoted national unity through the leadership of a socialist revolutionary state. It had identified Syria&#8217;s Ba&#8217;athism as a sister movement to Ataturk’s Kemalism, the founding ideology of the nation: with a similar holy trinity of nationalism, socialism and secularism. Like its Syrian counterparts, Turkish Leftist movements since the 20th century have adopted an anti-imperialist posture, violently defended modernisation, while considering “foreigners” dangerous agents of dark outside powers. Kemalists claimed that the only way to unify the country was by imposing militant secularism through a repressive state apparatus and by banning all Islamic lodges and public expressions of religion. Anyone talking about ethnic rights and political freedoms or daring dissent was branded an imperialist stooge.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/12/how-syria-spooked-mbs/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/12/how-syria-spooked-mbs/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/GettyImages-928555530-e1734005623498.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/12/how-syria-spooked-mbs/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/12/how-syria-spooked-mbs/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Syria has spooked MBS</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/12/how-syria-spooked-mbs/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Malise Ruthven</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>For these strands of the Left, anti-regime activities in Syria were an imperialist ploy. After the rebels moved their command centre from Turkey to Damascus in 2012, <em>The Washington Post </em>and <em>The Los Angeles Times</em> claimed that the CIA and US special operations units were training Syrian rebels in Turkey and Jordan, months before Barack Obama had approved sending arms. These reports sufficed to convince the Turkish Left that the Syrian suffering was manufactured in Western capitals and disseminated by the Western press to convince the world to intervene in the civil war. Instead of sharing the pain of those who suffered unspeakable tortures at Sednaya Prison — the &#8220;Human Slaughterhouse&#8221; — they tried to invalidate and belittle their experience. Instead of showing empathy, they came up with various conspiracy theories about how Turkish secularism would take a hit if those tortured by the Syrian regime could achieve some justice in Damascus.</p>
<p>This mindset expressed itself in various ways. Take the Orhan Pamuk affair. In 2012, a year into the civil war, the French daily <em>Libération</em> published a letter addressed to Assad and signed by various international writers including Pamuk, Turkey’s Nobel Laureate in literature. They demanded Assad’s resignation, warning him that &#8220;other than resignation, there will be just one road that remains and that will be a death similar to what happened to Saddam or Gaddafi. Or life imprisonment in a cell at the Hague.&#8221;</p>
<p>This created a furore in Turkey. <em>SOL</em>, the publication of the Turkish Communist Party, depicted Pamuk wielding a shotgun on their front page. “You’re a fascist,” read the accompanying headline. Elsewhere, Ulusal Kanal, the television broadcaster of the Kemalist Patriotic Party, called the intellectuals&#8217; letter “an open threat” and described Pamuk as “an intellectual loser… After the Young Turk revolution, his new target is Syria.” According to Ulusal Kanal<strong>, </strong>Pamuk “had collaborated with the imperialists and remained under the wings of the US”.</p>
<p>Increasingly, the secular Turkish opposition to Erdoğan and his Islamist allies took the form of anti-immigration and anti-Syrian sentiment. A decade into the Civil War, Turkey was hosting 3.6 million Syrian refugees: the highest number in the world. And by 2021, anti-Syrian riots rocked Turkey, with activist groups torching Syrian houses and shops in Ankara. Then, this summer, more than 470 people were arrested for attacking shops and smashing cars in Kayseri. Ugly, racist questions became increasingly unmuted: who were those Syrians filling up our streets anyway? Weren’t they paid-up voters of the Islamist government? Weren’t they inflicting violence on Turkish women on the streets? Weren’t they the sole cause of Turkey’s recent demise?</p>
<p>And immigration played a decisive role in the general elections last year. Erdoğan seemed to be on his way out in 2023: his one-party regime had rattled millions with its ceaseless nepotism, while his unorthodox economic policies, including lowering interest rates as an antidote to inflation led the Turkish lira to a free fall. Turkey was ready to turn the page from his ilk.</p>
<p>But Erdoğan had an advantage. As an Islamist, he could claim that his loyalties were clear and accuse the opposition of flip-flopping when it came to issues like the Syrian refugees. He told his voters that while the secularists were promising to understand the pious now, it was nothing more than a calculated electioneering strategy. The Left’s hatred against immigrants was proof that they were no humanists, but opportunists. The opposition parties suffered from the same selfishness; the alternative to Islamist rule was no better, so people should elect the autocrat they already knew.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;As an Islamist, he could claim that his loyalties were clear and accuse the opposition of flip-flopping when it came to issues like the Syrian refugees.&#8221;</div>
<p>Although Turkey’s leading opposition party promised change, purporting to have become a democratic party and extending a hand to Turkish Kurds and Armenians, the Leftist CHP reverted to its ugly anti-immigrant rhetoric days before the second round. The party allied with far-Right firebrand Ümit Özdağ, and covered thousands of billboards with a pledge to deport “15 million immigrants”. Had they been elected to office, the Turkish Left would have forcefully sent back all immigrants from Turkey to Syria by May 2024.</p>
<p>Erdoğan wanted the best of both worlds: incorporating the rhetoric of “anti-imperialist” Third Worldism, demonising “foreign intervention” and “internal enemies” in the pay of foreign powers, while sustaining Turkey’s involvement in Syria and its support for Syrian dissidents. But the fall of Assad is not all good news for Turkey’s president. It removes a rhetorical device from his lexicon — no longer can he rule out domestic secular opponents by <a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/facing-defeat-erdogan-personally-intervenes-against-opposition-candidate-istanbul" target="_blank" rel="noopener">comparing them</a> to Assad and his allies such as Egypt’s Sisi. And the Left can regain popularity without drawing from Erdoğan’s playbook. Take Istanbul’s Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu. Having strayed from anti-immigrant rhetoric, İmamoğlu has shown how a social democrat politician doesn’t need far-Right ideas to retain popularity. He was reelected earlier this year, thwarting Erdoğan’s preferred candidate. He will likely run for president in 2028.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/12/will-erdogan-crush-the-syrian-kurds/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/12/will-erdogan-crush-the-syrian-kurds/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/GettyImages-2187491782.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/12/will-erdogan-crush-the-syrian-kurds/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/12/will-erdogan-crush-the-syrian-kurds/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Will Erdoğan crush the Syrian Kurds?</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/12/will-erdogan-crush-the-syrian-kurds/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Matt Broomfield</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>In the meantime, it looks as if Turkey’s Syrian immigrants will return. Last week, BBC’s Turkish service reported how “almost all Syrians say their country is safe to return now” and how Turkey’s Syrians, “women, men, young and old, say in unison: ‘It’s now time for us to go back.’” Their departure will mean a culturally poorer and ethnically more homogenous Turkey.</p>
<p>Will the self-fashioned Turkish “communists” and Kemalists, whose hateful chatter about imperialist designs and regressive Arabs is now passé, feel ashamed about the fall of the Assad regime? Will they feel guilty about the bodies of dissidents (reportedly deported from European countries and Turkey) found at Sednaya Prison? More likely, they’ll pour their resentments on other targets: the heinous liberal intelligentsia or any other group they believe they can easily scapegoat without consequences.</p>
<p>And so whenever foreign journalists and scholar friends ask me how Erdoğan remains this popular in Turkey despite his autocratic rule and the accompanying financial meltdown, I remind them of what Turkey’s public perceives as his alternative. For so long, the tragic fate of Turkey’s secular resistance was to act heartless in the face of tragedy just beyond Turkey’s borders. From now on, if they want to convince people that they act ethically and not out of self-interest, they must do better.</p>
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					<title>The politicians lying about Syria</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2024/12/the-politicians-lying-about-syria/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://stage.unherd.com/2024/12/the-politicians-lying-about-syria/?edition=us#comments</comments>
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										<unherd:main_theme>middle east</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Tom McTague]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/Tom-McTague-Website.jpg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>1</unherd:article_ranking>
																<unherd:image_caption>
							<![CDATA[Back in 2013, David Cameron, pictured with Barack Obama, couldn't be honest about his intention for Syria. (Credit: Ken Cedeno/Corbis Getty)]]>
						</unherd:image_caption>
						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Tom McTague</strong> is UnHerd&#8217;s <strong>Political Editor.</strong> He is the author of <em>Between the Waves: The Hidden History of a Very British Revolution 1945-2016,</em> due to be published in September 2025</p>
]]>
						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>TomMcTague</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is UnHerd's <strong>Political Editor.</strong> He is the author of <em>Between the Waves: The Hidden History of a Very British Revolution 1945-2016,</em> due to be published in September 2025]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Mon, 16 Dec 2024 00:03:03 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Mon, 16 Dec 2024 07:52:23 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[David Cameron]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ed Miliband]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Immigration]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Politics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Syria]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://stage.unherd.com/?p=644331</guid>
																												<description>
								<![CDATA[History is being rewritten]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>Old grievances in Western politics have been reopened by the sudden fall of Syria’s Bashar al-Assad. And they are as dispiriting in their dishonesty as they are myopic in their self-interest. On the one hand, we have the unrepentant interventionists convinced that the tyrant’s fall would have happened years earlier were it not for Ed Miliband’s recklessness in 2013, when he blocked British airstrikes. On the other, we have the unrepentant anti-interventionists, led by Miliband himself, who say the real criminals are those who recklessly pursued the Iraq war a decade earlier. To paraphrase Henry Kissinger, it’s a pity that both sides can’t lose this tedious and tendentious war of history that reveals far more about the failures of our political class than either side appears to understand.</p>
<p>To take the interventionists at face value, you would think the fall of Assad in 2024 is somehow proof of their own wisdom in supporting airstrikes on his regime 11 years earlier in response to his use of chemical weapons. Wes Streeting, the Health Secretary, said last week that “if the West had acted faster, Assad would have been gone”. By not intervening when it had the chance, the West “created a vacuum that Russia moved into and kept Assad in power for much longer”, Streeting argued. It’s a neat story with a pleasingly simple moral at its core: take action or somebody else will.</p>
<p>Streeting’s account of recent history — notably far from his health brief — is the conventional view in London, Paris and Washington; the view of what Barack Obama once described as “the blob”. It is no surprise, then, that it was echoed by George Osborne on his podcast, <em>Political Currency</em>, last week. Osborne described David Cameron’s failure to win parliamentary authorisation for military action in 2013 – inadvertently setting off a train of events culminating in Barack Obama’s decision not to impose his red line against chemical weapons — as one of his greatest regrets from government. “Forget about the suffering the Syrian people have endured for the past 10 years as a result [of non intervention], look at the massive migration flows into Germany, the pressures that put on European governments, the collapse of more moderate centrist administrations, ultimately the small boats that come across the English Channel,” Osborne explained. All could be traced back to the West’s failure to take control back in 2013 when it had the chance.</p>
<p>To support Osborne’s case, he played a clip of the British diplomat Hugh Powell reflecting on the lost parliamentary vote a decade in.</p>
<p>Powell was Cameron’s deputy national security adviser in 2013, and scion of Britain’s greatest diplomatic family. He is the son of Margaret Thatcher’s former foreign affairs adviser, Charles Powell, and nephew of Keir Starmer’s national security adviser, Jonathan. In Hugh’s view, the 2013 vote against intervention was “a massive mistake”. The key point, he said, was that the Assad regime was always fragile and could have been knocked out of power with more forceful Western intervention. “2013 was an opportunity to help crack it well before Hezbollah and Russia came to its rescue,” Powell told Osborne and his podcast partner, Ed Balls. “And with Assad gone we had a good chance of installing a power-sharing government in Damascus that might well have prevented the hidden expansion of ISIS.” It’s a neat story.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;Osborne’s attempt to claim the Syrian non-intervention led to the small-boats crisis is particularly lamentable.&#8221;</div>
<p>The thing is, though, Powell’s explanation is exactly the opposite of what David Cameron insisted was the case at the time. In 2013, Cameron told MPs that he was seeking parliamentary approval for military action for one reason alone: to deter the use of chemical weapons. “The question before the House today is how to respond to one of the most abhorrent uses of chemical weapons in a century,” Cameron began in his statement pleading for their support. “It is not about taking sides in the Syrian conflict, it is not about invading, it is not about regime change, and it is not even about working more closely with the opposition; it is about the large-scale use of chemical weapons and our response to a war crime — nothing else.”</p>
<p>So, which is it? Was it a missed opportunity for regime change, as we are now led to believe. Or was it a failure to punish the use of chemical weapons that had nothing to do with regime change, as Cameron insisted then?</p>
<p>Powell’s apparent admission that there was a wider ambition was picked up by Ed Miliband to defend his decision to vote against military action. Responding to Wes Streeting’s comments, Miliband correctly stated that the 2013 vote was — at least ostensibly — to authorise a “one-off bombing of Syria”. However, Miliband then claimed the reason he did not support this one-off bombing mission was because “there was no plan for what this British involvement would mean, where it would lead and what the consequences would be”.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/12/trumps-new-world-order/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/12/trumps-new-world-order/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/GettyImages-2035834721-e1734109249954.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/12/trumps-new-world-order/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/12/trumps-new-world-order/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Trump&#039;s new world order</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/12/trumps-new-world-order/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Tom McTague</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Miliband’s account is just as lamentably dishonest as Cameron’s. If Western intervention would have made no difference to Assad’s grip on power because it was a “one-off”, then his argument for not punishing Assad in 2013 is logically bogus. But if it were not, then he cannot at the same time claim with certainty that the air strikes would not have undermined Assad’s grip on power. They were either one-off strikes or they were not. Miliband, like Cameron and Osborne, is trying to have it all ways.</p>
<p>Just as it now seems obvious that Cameron was hiding the real motivation of his policy 2013, so too does it seem obvious that Miliband was too. Cameron couldn’t be honest about his intention because it would’ve sparked even more opposition. Miliband couldn’t be honest, because his calculation was fundamentally not about the policy but his own self-interest. Labour opposed intervention in Syria in 2013 because they believed it was necessary to win the general election in 2015.</p>
<p>The dishonesty of the two sides trying to recast their roles in recent history captures the essence of our governing class’s failure in recent years. For so many of our leading politicians and diplomats, it seems, their views are essentially unfalsifiable acts of faith. Casting my mind back across the great titans of 21st-century British policies it is hard to think of a single big beast who appears capable of genuine reflection on the inadequacies of their way of understanding the world. The world of podcasts is teeming today with former ministers or political leaders explaining why what they have always said remains entirely true.</p>
<p>It is for this reason that I find myself reflexively jumping to Miliband&#8217;s defence despite his reprehensible behaviour in 2013. For Osborne, nothing seems capable of shaking his faith in the benign power of the West and its ability to make the world better for all.</p>
<p>Osborne’s attempt to claim the Syrian non-intervention led to the small-boats crisis is particularly lamentable. Of those trying to make it to Britain illegally today, most come from Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan and Albania — none of whom are wanting for lack of Western intervention. What is more, the ability of the EU to deal with illegal migration flows across the Mediterranean have grown immeasurably worse because of the Cameron-Sarkozy decision to intervene in Libya in 2011, toppling the Gadaffi regime and creating an anarchic vacuum of power which continues to this day. Where is the real reflection from Osborne et al about this failure, let alone the ones in Iraq and Afghanistan?</p>
<p>There is a fundamental complacency to our outgoing political class today, which seems happy to wallow in what Keir Starmer might call the “tepid bath” of its simplistic analysis, unable, it seems, to wrestle with the complexities of foreign and economic policy today and to level with people about the trade-offs. It is striking that David Lammy’s “progressive realism” places ever greater emphasis on the realism of its creed rather than the progressivism, emphasising, for example, the recent push to develop ties with the Gulf. The days of Tony Blair’s Chicago speech setting out his interventionist “doctrine of the international community” seem as ancient as those of Kissinger.</p>
<p>In Hugh Powell’s account of 2013, for example. Western intervention would have led to the fall of Assad and the emergence of a unity government of some kind. In Osborne’s telling, this would have prevented the various crises which swept over Europe thereafter. Both are essentially declarations of faith.</p>
<p>Today, Powell says the only outside power able to impose order on Syria is Turkey and that President Erdogan will need to send a Turkish Richard Holbrooke figure with the skill and determination to pull Syria’s various ethnic and religious factions together in a Lebanon-style power-sharing arrangement. The references to Holbrooke and Lebanon are inadvertently telling.</p>
<p>Lebanon is a failed state with a record of catastrophic mismanagement and corruption that has destroyed a once thriving country. Living in Lebanon might have been better than living in Syria, Iraq or Afghanistan in recent years, but it was worse than almost everywhere else outside sub-Saharan Africa. Is this really the best solution?</p>
<p>Richard Holbrooke, meanwhile, might be a hero to the interventionists today, but his record carries lessons that are more uncomfortable than they imagine. A biography written by Holbrooke’s friend and admirer, George Packer, is a reminder that he rose to prominence in the Sixties as a far-sighted diplomatic realist who saw that America’s war in Vietnam was going catastrophically wrong in a way that the country’s foreign policy establishment seemed incapable of understanding.</p>
<p>In the late summer of 1966, after returning from Saigon, Holbrooke found himself at the White House with President Lyndon Johnson. “The belief that America could do whatever it wanted remained strong as iron,” Packer writes. But Holbrooke dared to question. “Mr President, I’ve just come back from Vietnam and, you know, I’m a little worried about this… there are some limitations to what the Americans can do in the civilian field in Vietnam.” Johnson then stared at Holbrooke and replied: “Well, son, your job is to get rid of those limitations.”</p>
<p>The wise men of the American establishment were wrong in 1966 and Holbrooke was right. But it was the wise men who would be summoned to the White House, as Packer writes, “to assure Johnson, on the basis of nothing except heavily slanted briefings, an unexamined attachment to the domino theory, and their own code of resoluteness, that this distant country they didn’t understand was a necessary battlefield of the Cold War, before returning to their stately offices and sterling reputations”.</p>
<p>It is an irony — though perhaps a revealing one — that Holbrooke ended his career as such a wise man convinced of his and America’s ability to overcome their limitations in another faraway country, Afghanistan. Today, in his place, we have new wise men, clinging to their unexamined theories and codes of resoluteness convinced of their own fantastical tales of recent history. <span style="font-weight: 400;">The truth is that both Ed Miliband and David Cameron are losing their battle for history — and deservedly so. The vote in 2013 and the fall of Assad 11 years later are just two crises in an epoch of Western failure that has given us the world of Donald Trump and Abu Mohammed al-Julani in which we live today. If Britain and its new Foreign Secretary really wants to learn from its recent past, they will need more young Holbrookes and fewer wise men clinging to their unexamined faiths which have long since lost credibility.</span></p>
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					<title>How Syria will shape Europe&#8217;s future</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2024/12/how-syria-will-shape-europes-future/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://stage.unherd.com/2024/12/how-syria-will-shape-europes-future/?edition=us#comments</comments>
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										<unherd:main_theme>Weekend Essay</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Aris Roussinos]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/aris.jpeg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>1</unherd:article_ranking>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Aris Roussinos</strong> is an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist and a former war reporter.</p>
]]>
						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>arisroussinos</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist and a former war reporter.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Sat, 14 Dec 2024 00:10:42 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Mon, 16 Dec 2024 11:57:26 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Immigration]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Israel]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Middle East]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[multipolar world]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Syria]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Turkey]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[War]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://stage.unherd.com/?p=644027</guid>
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								<![CDATA[We cannot afford another refugee wave]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>War is of its nature an uncertain business. Only in retrospect does Assad’s fall, so improbable last week, now look fated. It is ironic, given the opprobrium with which Arab normalisation with his regime was greeted by pro-rebel advocates, that that same normalisation may have helped spell his doom. Seeking to reintegrate himself into the Arab fold, Assad <a href="https://amwaj.media/article/inside-story-hezbollah-iran-and-the-downfall-of-assad" target="_blank" rel="noopener">allowed relations to cool</a> with the Iran-centred Resistance Axis which had ensured his survival a decade ago. Yemen’s Houthis have accused Assad of clamping down on their activities in Syria to win Israeli and Gulf Arab favour; Iran now briefs that Assad was an ungrateful and undependable ally in their conflict with Israel; Hezbollah, smarting at Assad’s standoffish response to their recent setbacks, swiftly abandoned a last-minute attempt to preserve his rule.</p>
<p>For all that the Western advocates of the Resistance Axis worldview lament the downfall of their embattled hero, it was the decisions made by the Iranian and Hezbollah leadership to abandon him to his fate that made Assad’s fall so swift and relatively bloodless. Hamas has congratulated the victorious rebels; Hezbollah has expressed its support for Syria’s territorial integrity and political transition; with Russia apparently negotiating with HTS to preserve its coastal bases in Syria, and Iran and the new regime <a href="https://x.com/IranObserver0/status/1866537036733096106" target="_blank" rel="noopener">establishing diplomatic relations</a>, when Assad finally sank, the regional waters closed over him with barely a ripple.</p>
<p>Syria now pauses at a crossroads, where both hope for a better future, and scepticism that it will be achieved, are equally warranted. The essential problem of Syrian politics has always been <a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2021/07/the-west-will-never-understand-syria/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">how to manage the country’s religious and ethnic diversity</a>. The Baathist model, essentially an alliance of minorities and the Sunni elite against the Sunni Arab mass (and east of the Euphrates, of Sunni Arab tribes against the Kurds), in the end failed. Whether or not the new Syrian regime can succeed is an open question. Yet whatever happens now, it is up to Syrians to achieve. Rebel victory was won not by Western intervention but by the West essentially walking away from the Syria question at a loss. Advocates of the Syrian rebels, who spent a decade demanding Western military intervention to place a rebel government on the throne, now possess the end-state they have fought for for so long. Now it is their responsibility to ensure that the system they demanded is an improvement upon that which it replaced. The Assad government’s fall was not the result of the West’s actions, nor will the results be the West’s responsibility.</p>
<p>Indeed, it is for the better that Assad’s fall was not the product of Western bombs. This was a Syrian-led transition, helmed by a group Western powers spurn as terrorists, whose success depended as much upon the sudden decision by Assad’s own former loyalists that the regime was no longer worth fighting for as it did the rebels’ force of arms. Kleptocratic, unwilling to translate seeming victory into necessary political reform, deliver prosperity beyond the regime leadership to its core support base, or in the end ensure their security, the Assad regime simply shredded its own legitimacy. A state is like some local deity in this respect: once enough people cease to believe in it, it suddenly ceases to exist. There is a lesson for Western, particularly British, leaders here; HTS has spent years honing its legitimacy by observing the core competences in statecraft and effective governance — policing, transport, swift and responsive reaction to sudden crises.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;It is for the better that Assad’s fall was not the product of Western bombs.&#8221;</div>
<p>Indeed, the <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/7efc20db-6da9-47d0-96e3-94b0f230134c" target="_blank" rel="noopener">extraordinary recent interviews</a> with HTS officials attempting to introduce their own stripped-down, digital governance to Syria’s bureaucratic state suggests that Jolani may be as much a 21st-century state-capacity autocrat like Bukele or the younger Gulf rulers than any narrow analogue in Islamic statecraft. Rather than a retreat to the Middle Ages, for good or ill the new Syrian state will be a 21st-century one, and not built on the old model of 20th-century regimes like its Baathist forebear.  Technocratic, results-driven governance is, by its nature, non-liberal, even if not necessarily illiberal: in the new Syria, we may indeed see glimpses of our own near future. But whether or not HTS can expand its effective governance in Idlib – the establishment of which, it should not be forgotten, involved <a href="https://snhr.org/blog/2022/11/23/four-years-have-passed-since-activist-raed-al-fares-was-killed-as-the-party-responsible-for-his-and-hamoud-jneeds-assassination-hayat-tahrir-al-sham-must-be-held-accountable/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">the eradication of some of the most prominent liberal revolutionary voices</a> – to the wider country remains to be proved. When Damascus fell, it was to the forces of the rebel Southern Operations Room, formerly Jordanian assets latterly (and we now see, ineffectively) “reconciled” to Assad’s rule by Russia. The repeated exhortations by HTS for armed rebels to leave the cities to allow security to be established by (its own) police forces highlight one potential tension: how far HTS can exert its authority over its own notional, and generally worse-disciplined allies.</p>
<p>It is one of the ironies of Syria’s rebellion, which does not map onto mainstream pro- or anti-rebel Western discourse, that Salafi jihadist groups such as HTS, through their greater discipline and adherence to stern moral codes, have generally been better at governance than the broadly secular rebel militias the West once backed to varying degrees. Indeed, the Islamic State’s original rise to power across Northern Syria came off the back of quashing predatory rebel militias to the acclaim of Syrian civilians — before then imposing its own brutal and apocalyptic vision of governance. Initial, cautious noises of optimism made on social media by some of the former regime’s most outspoken advocates have been dented in recent days by footage of atrocities carried out, seemingly, by members of the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) rebel militias, some of which were once recipients of American military support. Retaliatory rebel excesses — or the sheer banditry for which the SNA is now renowned — will rapidly lose HTS its recent and hard-won domestic and international legitimacy unless Jolani can rein these groups in.</p>
<p>Yet this may not be possible. Whatever Turkey’s role in the HTS offensive, Erdoğan has used the sudden <em>fait accompli</em> in western Syria as the moment to achieve his longstanding aims in the country’s east, of eliminating the Kurdish-led but multiethnic Autonomous Administration of Northeast Syria (AANES) statelet, the West’s chosen partner in the fight to destroy Islamic State. Backed by Turkish airstrikes, SNA militias have forced the AANES’s Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) troops from the city of Manbij, west of the river Euphrates. An apparent American diplomatic push to ensure AANES’s survival east of the river does not seem to be working, with Turkish ground and aerial bombardment of the celebrated border city of Kobani heightening fears of a wider invasion. While the AANES and SDF leadership have made clear their desire to incorporate their statelet in the new Syria, and have already begun pragmatic negotiations with HTS, Jolani may not be strong enough to rein in the SNA or confront its Turkish backer. Indeed, he may not want to: rather than fight the SDF himself, it may be easier for HTS to allow Turkey and the SNA to take the brunt of the fighting and international opprobrium, and reap the spoils at some later date.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/10/britain-has-learned-nothing-from-palestine/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/10/britain-has-learned-nothing-from-palestine/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/GettyImages-1787694781-2.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/10/britain-has-learned-nothing-from-palestine/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/10/britain-has-learned-nothing-from-palestine/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Britain has learned nothing from Palestine</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/10/britain-has-learned-nothing-from-palestine/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Aris Roussinos</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Like the opportunistic Israeli ground invasion of southern Syria, condemned by European states, the Turkish invasion of northern Syria shows two notional American client states pursuing their own expansionist foreign policy ends, while a directionless United States seems powerless to stop them. Condemning each other for identical actions, Turkey and Israel together threaten Syria’s largely peaceful transition, eroding the new state’s legitimacy while setting the stage for a resumption of major conflict, and in the case of Northeastern Syria, almost certainly provoking a new refugee crisis for Europe.</p>
<p>On the one hand, the pragmatic acceptance of Syria’s new order by regional and international powers like Russia and Iran shows what actual “multipolarity”, rather than the crude, reflexively anti-Western folk usage, could look like; the West is simply one actor among others hashing out mutually acceptable compromise deals. Yet the opportunistic aggression of both Israel and Turkey highlights that the most dangerous multipolar rivalry comes from within the American order itself. If America has any part to play in the new Syria — and the incoming Trump administration seems to disavow any future involvement in the country — it is simply to use whatever diplomatic leverage it still possesses to safeguard the country’s sovereignty from its own regional clients. Whether it is able to do so will determine the extent of America’s survival as a regional actor.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;The most dangerous multipolar rivalry comes from within the American order itself.&#8221;</div>
<p>For us Europeans, with America fading from the picture, the stability of Syria and the wider Middle East is <a href="https://ecfr.eu/article/the-fall-of-assad-europeans-have-an-opportunity-to-help-forge-a-new-syria/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">a core strategic interest.</a> Leaving the management of the Syrian conflict to America and regional rivals over the last decade destabilised European politics through the ensuing interlinked waves of mass migration and terrorism, the combined effects of which will ripple through our continent’s politics for decades to come. Europe cannot afford another Syrian refugee wave, and it is a central interest in preserving Europe’s stability that much of the previous wave must be undone, as humanely but swiftly as possible. Diplomatic engagement with HTS, indeed, sets a precedent for the same process with Afghanistan’s comparable Taliban government, for the same ends.</p>
<p>Beyond that, it is in Europe’s interests to help Syria recover from the effects of its lost decade, through lifting sanctions and supporting the country’s economic recovery. Removing terrorism designations from HTS, as the Labour government has suggested may soon follow, could well be a pragmatic step: ensuring that European volunteers from within the group’s ranks, and from within the ranks of allied, even more extreme jihadist groups do not return home is also pragmatic governance. If the overriding theme of Syria’s transition to rebel governance is one of pragmatic, multipolar bargaining for acceptable outcomes, then Europe must begin to think of itself as an independent actor, with its own interests to safeguard, rather than a charity on continental scale.</p>
<p>Rebel rule will mean a new Syria, one way or another. It must also mean a new European way of engaging with an unstable world.</p>
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					<title>Syria has spooked MBS</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2024/12/how-syria-spooked-mbs/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://stage.unherd.com/2024/12/how-syria-spooked-mbs/?edition=us#comments</comments>
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										<unherd:main_theme>Middle East</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Malise Ruthven]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/Untitled-design.jpg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>2</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[MBS's future is rosy. Leon Neal/Getty Images]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Malise Ruthven</strong> is an author and journalist. He has worked at the BBC World Service, and has taught at universities on both sides of the Atlantic. He is the general editor of <em><a href="https://www.amazon.co.uk/Carving-Up-Globe-Atlas-Diplomacy/dp/067497624X" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Carving up the Globe: An Atlas of Diplomacy</a></em>.</p>
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						<unherd:twitter_handle></unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is an author and journalist. He has worked at the BBC World Service, and has taught at universities on both sides of the Atlantic. He is the general editor of <em><a href="https://www.amazon.co.uk/Carving-Up-Globe-Atlas-Diplomacy/dp/067497624X" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Carving up the Globe: An Atlas of Diplomacy</a></em>.

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					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Fri, 13 Dec 2024 00:02:29 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Fri, 13 Dec 2024 11:54:36 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Gaza war]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[MbS]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Saudi Arabia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Syria]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[War]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://stage.unherd.com/?p=643701</guid>
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								<![CDATA[Regime change is contagious ]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>The flight of Bashar al-Assad and his family to Russia, where they have been granted asylum, indicates that however ruthless his style of governing by murder, torture and repression, he is not an ideologist. Instead of remaining defiantly in Syria after his regime collapsed, he has put his family first. He was doubtless mindful of the fate of the Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein, ignominiously hanged with insults from his executioners after several weeks in hiding in December 2006, or the Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi shot by his captors in 2011, with a video circulating afterwards showing him sodomised with a bayonet.</p>
<p>The unexpected collapse of Assad’s regime, propped up by Russia and Iran, was the result of years of meticulous planning by Hussain al-Shara’a, known as Abu Mohammed al-Jolani, leader of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) — an offshoot of al-Qaeda based in the Turkish-protected enclave of Idlib outside of Assad’s control. An astute operator who currently appears to prioritise governing Syria over messianic dreams of global jihad, Jolani timed his offensive to benefit from the US-sponsored ceasefire between Israel and Iran-backed Hezbollah, when the latter’s fighters had been withdrawn from Syria or neutralised. Meanwhile, Russia was preoccupied with Ukraine.</p>
<p>Assad’s fall is a major blow to Iran and a victory for Israel in its drawn-out contest with the Islamic Republic. But the biggest winner is probably Turkey, whose leader Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is a “soft” supporter of Islamism. The power vacuum created by the fall of the Assad’s regime, with soldiers abandoning their units, leaves the country with a number of forces outside of Jolani’s control. These include the Syrian National Army —  a militia supported by Turkey — as well as Iran-linked Iraqi militias and Kurdish forces in the north-east. The southern border has its own cluster of militias, including some manned by the Druze minority.</p>
<p>Jolani has signalled inclusiveness, ordering his fighters not to “instil fear” into people of different sects. The Shi’ite minorities, such as Alawites and Ismailis, will be feeling especially vulnerable, given the extent to which they relied on Assad’s Alawite-dominated Baathist regime for protection. Yet there is no guarantee that Jolani will succeed in asserting his authority over the mosaic of Syria’s different faith or ethnic communities, which tend to arm themselves in times of civil strife. While a majority of Syrians are Sunni, its society contains a large diversity of ethnic and religious communities including Alawis, Armenians, Assyrians, Chechens, Druzes, Catholic and Orthodox Christians, Ismailis and Turkomans. Before the civil war erupted, in 2011, polarising religious forces between Salafist-oriented groups supported by Turkey and Saudi Arabia, Syria had an impressive record of permitting pluralist religious spaces, though not political dissent.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/12/why-syria-is-back-at-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/12/why-syria-is-back-at-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/GettyImages-2187154696-e1733161682622.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/12/why-syria-is-back-at-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/12/why-syria-is-back-at-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Why Syria is back at war</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/12/why-syria-is-back-at-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Aris Roussinos</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Assad’s fall is sure to have unnerved Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS), along with other wealthy Gulf rulers. While they may relish the Iranian setback — two of Iran’s “axis of resistance” allies, Assad and Hezbollah, have effectively been sent off the field — the deeper implications of Syrian regime change must seem threatening. After years of civil war, during which some half a million people were killed and 14 million displaced, and which saw cities such as Aleppo pulverised by Russian air power and Syrian air force barrel bombs, the situation appeared to have been stabilised. The mainly Sunni rebels were safely contained in the north-western enclave of Idlib. And in May 2023, Syria was readmitted to the Arab League, a mark of “normalisation” supported by Saudi Arabia and the UAE.</p>
<p>Now, the region has fallen to chaos again. The kings and emirs of the Gulf have good reasons to fear that the recent scenes of jubilation in Damascus and other Syrian cities could become harbingers of a new Arab Spring. After all, popular feeling against repressive political structures often poses a threat to incumbent regimes, especially to dynastic rulers such as the Assads or Sauds. As the Israeli analyst Zvi Bar’el observes: “When militias take over a country, regardless of their ideology, it threatens traditional regimes that rely on authoritarian control. Such success as was seen in the Arab Spring, is contagious and encourages the revival of organisations and rebel movements.”</p>
<p>Saudi Arabia was relatively unaffected by the Arab Spring in 2011. A “Day of Rage” announced on Facebook aimed at imitating the massive street protests occurring in Cairo and other Arab capitals, but the movement fizzled out after would-be demonstrators received messages on their phones threatening fines or national expulsion. By contrast, in neighbouring Bahrain, where a Sunni dynasty presides over a restive Shi‘a majority, there were weeks of sit-ins and protests. The Saudis eventually sent troops across the causeway to assist the island’s government in restoring order.</p>
<p>The Assad regime may come to loom large in the annals of human torture and misery after a decade of civil war. But the Western-friendly Saudis, who are not currently facing the threat of internal conflict, can hardly be described as laggards in this area, with their high levels of political repression. Since MBS became the de facto ruler in 2015, <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2024/10/06/executions-saudi-arabia-record-high-crown-prince-mohammed/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">around</a> 1,400 people have been executed by the state, including minors.</p>
<p>The triumph of Jolani, and his Turkish backers, poses a dilemma for MBS. He and other Gulf rulers may be happy to see the anti-Western “axis of resistance” defanged, based as it is on a “Shi‘ite crescent” stretching from Iran to the Shi‘ite heartlands of southern Lebanon. The Saudi kingdom was founded on an alliance between the tribal power of the Al Saud family and the explicitly anti-Shi‘ite ideology of Wahhabism — and, for a long time, its strategy was to foster a disdain towards or even hatred of Shi’ism that persists to this day. When the Sunni minority in Iraq felt vulnerable after the US invasion that removed the (Sunni) Saddam Hussein, Saudi clerics spread fear of the Shi’ite danger, warning against the murder, torture and displacement of Sunni Iraqis. After the Arab Spring uprisings that lit the fuse of civil war in Syria, the Saudi government adopted a policy of “‘sectarianisation”. Madawi al-Rasheed, a historian and anthropologist, sees this as “a deliberate counter-revolutionary strategy…deployed to exaggerate religious differences and hatred and prevent the development of national non-sectarian politics”.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;Assad’s fall is sure to have unnerved Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman.&#8221;</div>
<p>More than a decade ago, the emergence in Syria of a Sunni-dominated regime of neo-fundamentalist or “salafist” colouring would have suited the Saudi agenda perfectly. Over the years, the Saudi regime has spent billions of petrodollars promoting salafism (a neo-conservative type of religiosity, with emphasis on outward observance) throughout the Islamic world. According to several estimates, the sums spent by the Saudis on <em>dawa</em> (evangelism) prior to 2016 ranges from $70 billion to $100 billion. This dynamic dates back to the oil-boom years of King Faisal (r. 1964-75), who saw the Muslim Brotherhood and other salafist movements as necessary counterweights to the secular-oriented Arab nationalism promoted by Egypt’s charismatic leader Abd al-Nasser. Muslim Brotherhood exiles, such as Muhammad Qutb, brother of the movement’s leading intellectual Sayyid Qutb, were welcomed to teach in the Saudi kingdom, where Muhammad’s students included the young Osama bin Laden.</p>
<p>The Iranian revolution of 1979 and, more strongly, the attacks on New York and Washington in 2001 (with 15 of the 19 hijackers hailing from Saudi Arabia) led to an eventual volte-face in Saudi religious orientation. The change was epitomised by a state-sanctioned sermon delivered by Shaikh Abdulrahman al-Sudais, imam of the Grand Mosque in Mecca, hailing the vision of MBS as the “young, ambitious, and divinely-inspired” crown prince, comparable to the great Umar ibn-al-Khattab, second caliph of Islam or “deputy” to the Prophet Muhammad. The sermon, broadcast live on cable networks and social media, was delivered less than three weeks after the murder and physical dismemberment of Jamal Khashoggi in the Saudi consulate in Istanbul. A former champion of the Saudi regime, Khashoggi was like Erdoğan a “soft” supporter of the Muslim Brotherhood — a movement that includes not only hardened jihadists such as Jolani, but constitutionally minded politicians such as Rachid al-Ghannouchi, leader of the Ennahda Party in Tunisia. The Brotherhood, once championed by King Faisal, is now anathematised in both the Gulf (with the exception of Qatar) and Washington as <em>the</em> primary threat to dynastic rule.</p>
<p>The Saudi volte-face was a necessary prerequisite to the Abraham Accords signed between Israel, Bahrain and the UAE in September 2020, (and later with Sudan and Morocco). It was negotiated in part by Donald Trump’s son-in-law Jared Kushner, a family friend and political supporter of Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu. In September 2023, Saudi Arabia was on the point of “normalising” relations with Israel, with Riyadh allowing journalists to write op-eds in their favour, and MBS himself telling the US Fox News that “every day we get closer” to a deal. The October 7 attack by Hamas, killing more than 1,200 Israelis and taking several hundred hostages, put paid to these prospects, as Israel’s counter-attack on Gaza produced Dresden-like scenes of urban devastation and many thousands of civilian casualties. Last November, at a gathering of Islamic leaders in Riyadh, the Crown Prince even used the “G-word”, accusing Israel of carrying out “collective genocide” against the Palestinian people in Gaza.</p>
<p>Although the Gaza war may be coming to an end, “normalisation” between the Saudi kingdom and Israel now seems a distant prospect — even if Kushner returns as his father-in-law’s Middle East adviser next year. The international outrage caused by the Gaza counter-attack, along with genocidal statements by some Israeli leaders and the evident failure of the Biden administration to restrain its Israeli ally, has put the lid on normalisation for the foreseeable future. While Saudi Arabia, unlike Qatar, lacks a free press, polls are sometimes permitted. A rare poll published in December 1993 by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy found that 90% of Saudis think that Arab countries should sever all ties with Israel “in protest against its military action in Gaza”.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/12/will-tehran-be-next/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/12/will-tehran-be-next/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/GettyImages-2188260220.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/12/will-tehran-be-next/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/12/will-tehran-be-next/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Will Tehran be next?</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/12/will-tehran-be-next/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Edward Luttwak</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Thanks largely to the Gaza war, and to the failure of the Trump administration to retaliate in support of the Saudis after an Iranian attack on the oil refinery at Abqaiq in September 2019, Saudi Arabia has pivoted away from US dependency. The Saudi-Iran rapprochement in 2023 was brokered, not by Kushner or the White House, but by President Xi Jinping of China. When the Chinese president visited Riyadh in December 2022, he was given fulsome honours. Not only was he greeted with a purple carpet, but Saudi jets escorted his plane streaming the green and white colours of the national flag. When Secretary of State Antony Blinken went to visit, MBS kept him waiting for some 12 hours before granting him an audience.</p>
<p>Saudi Arabia’s orientation away from the West and towards the global south is heralded by its upcoming membership of Brics. It will join the existing acronymic members — Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa — alongside Iran, the UAE, Argentina, Egypt and Ethiopia. Though faced with declining oil revenues, MBS may be heartened by the fact that he is now able to trade oil products in the Chinese currency, avoiding the sanctions imposed on Russia by US dollar leverage. And despite the cutbacks on his ambitious plans for Vision 2030, aimed at weaning his economy off oil, a future in a world market dominated by China and the global south could be rosy indeed. That is provided he is clever enough, or lucky enough, to avoid the fate of Saddam Hussein or Muammar Gaddafi — or, indeed, of Bashar al-Assad.</p>
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					<title>Will Syria re-open Lebanon&#8217;s wounds?</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2024/12/will-syria-re-open-lebanons-wounds/?edition=us</link>
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										<unherd:main_theme>Middle East</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Michal Kranz]]>
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																<unherd:article_ranking>3</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[Hezbollah is down but not out. (Credit: Sally Hayden/SOPA Images/LightRocket via Getty)]]>
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							<![CDATA[<div><strong>Michal Kranz</strong> is a freelance journalist reporting on politics, society and defence in Eastern Europe and the Middle East. He runs <i><a href="https://theeasternflank.substack.com/" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://theeasternflank.substack.com/&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1737473225062000&amp;usg=AOvVaw1ymYD5AVcHVPGcry_zwCIQ">The Eastern Flank</a>,</i> a Substack newsletter focused on Eastern European geopolitics.</div>
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						<unherd:twitter_handle>Michal_Kranz</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is a freelance journalist reporting on politics, society and defence in Eastern Europe and the Middle East. He runs <i><a href="https://theeasternflank.substack.com/" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://theeasternflank.substack.com/&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1737473225062000&amp;usg=AOvVaw1ymYD5AVcHVPGcry_zwCIQ">The Eastern Flank</a>,</i> a Substack newsletter focused on Eastern European geopolitics.</div>
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										<pubDate>Thu, 12 Dec 2024 00:00:46 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Thu, 12 Dec 2024 00:00:46 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Assad]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Hezbollah]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Israel]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Lebanon]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Politics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Syria]]></category>
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								<![CDATA[Assad's demise could spark chaos ]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>For most of Lebanon&#8217;s modern history, the Assads have been as immovable as its mountains. As far back as 1976, early in the Lebanese Civil War, Hafez al-Assad ordered Syrian troops over the border. And there they remained, for 29 years, until his son, Bashar, finally called them home in 2005. Yet even then, these tall men with moustaches continued to cast a shadow over Beirut, influencing Lebanese politics and linking Hezbollah to its main Iranian sponsors.</p>
<p>But now, suddenly, the Assads are gone, scuttling off to Moscow in disgrace. The Syrian Arab Army, which had occupied Lebanon in some form for decades, and which had fought viciously against Syrian rebels for 14 long years, melted like the Lebanese snow in springtime, fatally weakened by violence and <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/middle-east/20241208-why-the-assad-regime-collapsed-in-syria-and-why-so-fast" target="_blank" rel="noopener">wrecked</a> by pitiful salaries. Yet if this revolution obviously means the most to Damascus, Lebanese too could see their lives change. The end of the Assads, after all, leaves vast economic and political opportunities — if, that is, foreigners avoid meddling in Lebanon once more.</p>
<p>With Syria stumbling into a new era, Lebanese political leaders are struggling to grasp what that means for them: especially given they are already reeling from Israel’s assault on Hezbollah and the <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/ABCNews/israel-claims-hezbollah-violated-ceasefire-strikes-hezbollah-target/story?id=116583374" target="_blank" rel="noopener">not-so-final</a> ceasefire that followed. What they have done, at least, is bolster the country’s security, <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/video/20241208-lebanon-says-boosting-troops-on-syria-border-after-assad-s-fall" target="_blank" rel="noopener">deploying more troops</a> to the Syrian frontier. To <a href="https://www.thenationalnews.com/news/mena/2024/12/08/lebanons-largest-party-hails-assads-fall-as-a-great-day-for-history/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">quote</a> the office of Najib Mikati, the Lebanese prime minister, his government is working to distance “Lebanon from the repercussions of the developments in Syria”.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/11/hezbollah-has-weakened-iran/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/11/hezbollah-has-weakened-iran/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/GettyImages-2186488735.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/11/hezbollah-has-weakened-iran/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/11/hezbollah-has-weakened-iran/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Hezbollah has weakened Iran</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/11/hezbollah-has-weakened-iran/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Michal Kranz</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>In practice, of course, that’s impossible. Assad may be gone, but Lebanon remains joined at the hip to Syria, just as it always has. Certainly, that’s clear when it comes to Hezbollah. As the militia <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/lebanons-hezbollah-sees-major-dangerous-change-syria-2024-12-09/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">itself</a> has apparently conceded, Assad’s demise represents a “dangerous” new transformation both for Syria and itself. To understand this, you only need to look at a map. Though it was created as an Iranian proxy, Hassan Nasrallah’s former group always needed help from Syria, with the Assads representing a logistical bridge from Tehran to Beirut. The rebel takeover in Damascus has decisively severed this link, and though Iran may still <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2024/03/14/iran-weapons-hezbollah-israel-gaza/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">funnel</a> weapons to Hezbollah by sea, it’ll no longer be able to provide the heavy equipment that made the group so formidable.</p>
<p>Nor do the consequences for Hezbollah end there. As the Syrian economy crumbled, the Assad regime effectively became a narcostate, <a href="https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/captagon-drug-syria-assad-hezbollah-f1588132" target="_blank" rel="noopener">financing</a> both itself and Hezbollah through the captagon trade. Now though, that funding has gone, even as the ceasefire with Israel has squeezed the group north of the Litani River. Dovetailed with persistant IDF strikes against Hezbollah infrastructure, and the group is weaker than ever, especially when you recall that forces hostile to Hezbollah surround Lebanon on three sides. Even the militia itself has begun to see the light, releasing a <a href="https://x.com/BroderickM_/status/1866287087382577178" target="_blank" rel="noopener">statement</a> saying it “supported” the aspirations of the Syrian people — a ludicrous claim after helping Assad butcher civilians for years.</p>
<p>Where Hezbollah falls, meanwhile, other forces may rise to take its place. Already, there are <a href="https://x.com/MohanadHageAli/status/1866094063226617929" target="_blank" rel="noopener">signs</a> that Lebanese heavyweights outside the militia&#8217;s circle are breathing more freely. Consider Walid Jumblatt. The leader of the Druze, his father was assassinated by Syrian operatives during the Lebanese Civil War. And though Walid himself remained deferential to Assad for much of the last decade, he nonetheless welcomed the dictator’s expulsion. As he <a href="https://www.agenzianova.com/en/news/Lebanon-hopes-and-fears-after-the-historic-fall-of-Assad-in-Syria/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">wrote</a> after the regime’s collapse: “I greet the Syrian people after a long wait.” He isn’t alone. Gebran Bassil, a Lebanese Christian politician, recently <a href="https://www.newarab.com/news/hezbollah-must-focus-lebanon-not-wider-region-bassil" target="_blank" rel="noopener">stated</a> that Hezbollah should now focus on domestic affairs, and end its adventures abroad.</p>
<p>Whether this more open atmosphere translates into action will become clearer as Lebanon approaches its presidential vote on 9 January, with lawmakers hoping they can finally appoint a head of state after two years of gridlock. The Americans, for their part, see an opportunity here too: Washington is pushing the Lebanese parliament to appoint a president not aligned with Hezbollah. For the first time in years, this seems possible. One obvious candidate would be Joseph Aoun, the head of the Lebanese Armed Forces. And though his election is far from guaranteed, Aoun’s ascension to the presidency would be a major blow to Hezbollah’s influence at the top of Lebanon’s politics.</p>
<p>Beyond the parlour games in Beirut, the fall of Assad could soon have vast consequences for the Lebanese themselves. No longer running the risk of an extended stay at <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/dec/10/tuesday-briefing-what-happened-when-the-doors-of-syrias-most-notorious-prison-were-finally-opened" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Sednaya</a>, many of the million or so Syrian refugees in Lebanon will return home. Their departure will transform Lebanon’s embattled economy, creating much-needed work for locals while throwing industries like agriculture into crisis. For a large segment of the Lebanese political establishment Syrians as a group have long been a convenient political scapegoat, unfairly blamed for <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/longform/2024/4/26/the-hostility-syrian-refugees-content-with-in-lebanon" target="_blank" rel="noopener">political murders</a> and the country&#8217;s <a href="https://nowlebanon.com/what-is-fueling-hate-against-syrian-refugees-in-lebanon/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">economic crisis</a>. Their return home won’t solve Lebanon’s problems — but may remove a lightning rod social issue from Lebanese discourse, helping mitigate social tensions at a time of unprecedented uncertainty.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;Beyond the parlour games in Beirut, the fall of Assad could soon have vast consequences for the Lebanese themselves.&#8221;</div>
<p>Much could still go wrong. With Hezbollah weakened, and Assad gone, Lebanon’s sectarian politicians are now likely to compete among each other for power. That, it goes without saying, could potentially usher in more instability, or even actual bloodshed. That&#8217;s what happened back in 2008, when Hezbollah’s rivals tried to constrain the group following an earlier war with Israel. More to the point, there are plenty of factions ready to take Hezbollah’s place. One is the Amal Movement, another Shi’a organisation, others, such as Christian groups like the Lebanese Forces, could jockey for position too.</p>
<p>Nor are Lebanon’s internal dynamics the only worry here: with Israel one obvious fly in the ointment. In an ideal Middle East, Hezbollah’s growing isolation would encourage the Jewish State to sit back, allowing its old foe to founder. But given the upheaval in Syria, Israel may decide that now is the time to destroy Hezbollah once and for all.</p>
<p>Israeli behaviour certainly seems aggressive. Netanyahu’s first impulse following the rebel takeover of Damascus was to attack Syrian weapons depots, preventing them from falling into militant hands. No less striking, Netanyahu has “<a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/12/09/israel-syria-golan-heights-rebels-assad/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">temporarily</a>” moved his troops beyond the Golan Heights, illegally annexed by Israel in 1981 — and into Syria proper. The prime minister justified this move by pointing to the collapse of a border security agreement Israel had signed with the Assads back in 1974. Be that as it may, with the IDF’s capture of the Syrian side of Mount Hermon, the tallest peak for miles, Israel has gained a strategic point from which to monitor both southern Syria and Hezbollah’s stronghold in southern Lebanon. If Israel’s conflict with Hezbollah indeed restarts in the coming months, both Syrians and Lebanese may find themselves dragged into the quagmire once more.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/10/can-lebanon-survive-without-hezbollah/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/10/can-lebanon-survive-without-hezbollah/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/GettyImages-2175229460.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/10/can-lebanon-survive-without-hezbollah/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/10/can-lebanon-survive-without-hezbollah/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Can Lebanon survive without Hezbollah?</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/10/can-lebanon-survive-without-hezbollah/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Michal Kranz</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>The new Syria could also cause more direct problems for Lebanon. Abu Mohammed al-Jolani, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham’s (HTS) leader, is presenting himself and his forces as moderate Islamists interested in preserving a genuinely pluralistic Syria, but it’s unclear if he’ll stick to this agenda. Though HTS seems unwilling to launch incursions into Lebanon for now, a resurgent Hezbollah could change that. No less worrying, HTS has form here. Under its former guise of Jabhat al-Nusra, it launched several forays across the border. The Syrian war even sparked a micro-conflict in the Lebanese city of Tripoli, where Sunni militias fought their Shi’a rivals for years.</p>
<p>An Islamist regime in Damascus, then, could quickly reopen Lebanon’s own religious wounds. And that’s not the only Syria threat. Between Syrian Kurdish forces, clashing with groups backed Turkey, to the competing foreign ties of other rebel factions, renewed violence is likely. And as <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/video/20241209-at-the-border-with-lebanon-there-are-more-people-fleeing-syria-than-the-opposite" target="_blank" rel="noopener">reports</a> now emerge of pro-Assad Syrians fleeing over the border to Lebanon, there’s a risk that Beirut gets dragged back into its neighbour’s political fights — especially if the new rulers in Damascus choose to hunt down their newly exiled enemies.</p>
<p>As with so much else in the Levant right now, it&#8217;s too early to know how things will go. Yet Lebanon now faces its most significant movement of flux since the end of the civil war in 1990. With Iran and Hezbollah on the decline, the US resurgent, and the Gulf States and Turkey poised to return to Lebanese politics, there’s plenty to play for. Let’s just hope the country’s long-suffering citizens don’t yet again lose to other peoples’ games.</p>
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					<title>Will Erdoğan crush the Syrian Kurds?</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2024/12/will-erdogan-crush-the-syrian-kurds/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://stage.unherd.com/2024/12/will-erdogan-crush-the-syrian-kurds/?edition=us#comments</comments>
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										<unherd:main_theme>Middle East</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Matt Broomfield]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/guy2.jpg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>2</unherd:article_ranking>
																<unherd:image_caption>
							<![CDATA[Out of the frying pan? Delil Souleiman/AFP via Getty Images.]]>
						</unherd:image_caption>
						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Matt Broomfield </strong>is a freelance journalist, PhD researcher, co-founder of the Rojava Information Center, and author of <a href="https://www.amazon.co.uk/Hope-Without-Rojava-Revolutionary-Commitment/dp/1849355665" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.amazon.co.uk/Hope-Without-Rojava-Revolutionary-Commitment/dp/1849355665&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1747243103561000&amp;usg=AOvVaw0T9G1BlMj6GuZO-cMOmbar"><em>Hope Without Hope: Rojava and Revolutionary Commitment</em></a> (2025).</p>
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						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>MattBroomfield1</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[is a freelance journalist, PhD researcher, co-founder of the Rojava Information Center, and author of <a href="https://www.amazon.co.uk/Hope-Without-Rojava-Revolutionary-Commitment/dp/1849355665" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.amazon.co.uk/Hope-Without-Rojava-Revolutionary-Commitment/dp/1849355665&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1747243103561000&amp;usg=AOvVaw0T9G1BlMj6GuZO-cMOmbar"><em>Hope Without Hope: Rojava and Revolutionary Commitment</em></a> (2025).
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					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Wed, 11 Dec 2024 00:03:51 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Wed, 11 Dec 2024 09:48:36 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Assad]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Damascus]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Kurdistan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Middle East]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Syria]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Turkey]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[War]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://stage.unherd.com/?p=643177</guid>
																												<description>
								<![CDATA[Turkey has always feared their revolution]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>Syria’s two million Kurds have every reason to loathe Bashar al-Assad. His Baathist regime long repressed their identity, and there are many Kurdish activists among the countless people emerging, dazed and stumbling, from the dictatorship’s dungeons. But even as Kurds danced and toppled statues, the shadow of further violence cast a pall across the celebrations, especially now their bête noire Turkey is emerging as the dominant foreign power in a new Syria.</p>
<p>With Russian forces withdrawing in disarray, Washington wrong-footed, and Tehran neutered by Israel, Erdoğan appears the main winner from the extraordinary developments in Syria. Turkey’s own objectives in Syria are clear enough: liquidating the Kurdish presence on its border by establishing a 20-mile deep corridor of Turkish influence. In fact, it was reportedly Assad’s refusal to capitulate to this proposed violation of Syrian sovereignty which led Ankara to give an implicit green light to Hayat Tahrir al-Sham’s military operation. Aleppo, the first city to fall to HTS’s blitzkrieg advance, was a former jewel in the Ottoman Empire’s crown. After its capture, the Turkish flag flew from the Aleppo citadel once more.</p>
<p>Under Assad, the Kurds were written out of state politics — literally. Hundreds of thousands were denied Syrian identity papers, following a Sixties policy intended to “Arabise” the country’s north. In practice, that involved displacing the Kurds, described by an official as a “malignant tumour” in the body of the nation. Over more recent decades, Assad tolerated a militant Kurdish presence within Syria’s borders. The idea was to provoke nearby Turkey, a Nato member and key Western ally. Yet as the relationship between Damascus and Ankara warmed after the Cold War, that arrangement came to an end, and local Kurdish leaders were jailed or expelled. Many locals bear the scars of torture from those dark years, particularly after Assad’s security forces violently repressed a Kurdish uprising in 2005.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/03/is-rojava-a-socialist-utopia/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/03/is-rojava-a-socialist-utopia/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/GettyImages-1076552636-scaled-e1679934999530.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/03/is-rojava-a-socialist-utopia/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/03/is-rojava-a-socialist-utopia/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Is Rojava a socialist utopia?</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/03/is-rojava-a-socialist-utopia/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Matt Broomfield</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>The revolutionary Kurdish political movement has moved away from its Marxist-Leninist roots, instead advancing a unique model based on women’s autonomy, minority representation, and a nominally devolved system of municipal governance. That’s even as it retains a strict Leninist political culture, an ideological paradox which nonetheless allowed the Kurds to react swiftly following the 2011 outbreak of the Syrian civil war. Soon enough, they declared autonomy in Rojava, as Syrian Kurds refer to their homeland. During the brutal fight that followed, the Syrian Arab Republic spilled oceans of blood to keep Arab-majority cities in its grasp. That it quickly withdrew its forces from Kurdish areas, surrendering control to a ragtag militia, shows how little it cared about its nominally Kurdish citizens.</p>
<p>Beyond the Baath Party’s Arabist sentiments encouraging a dismissive view of Kurds, Assad likely felt able to ignore his country’s Kurds for other reasons. When compared with the Kurdish homelands in Iran, Iraq and Turkey, the arid badlands of Syrian Kurdistan were long dismissed as poor and undynamic. Yet the Kurds, bolstered by returning militants, battle-hardened during a dogged guerrilla war against Turkey, proved the only local force capable of defeating Islamic State. Along the way, they saved the Yazidis from genocide, and forged unexpected tactical partnerships with both Americans and local Arabs. As they drove Isis out of its former strongholds, including its erstwhile capital Raqqa, the Kurds helped forge a fragile multi-ethnic alliance alongside Arab Muslims, Yazidis, Christians, and other minorities. Known as the Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (DAANES), this alliance has since faced existential threats. That includes a deadly Islamic State insurgency; sporadic battles against Assad; and successive military occupations launched by Turkey — with Ankara bitterly opposed to the project in Kurdish-led autonomy on its southern border.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;The Kurds helped forge a fragile multi-ethnic alliance alongside Arab Muslims, Yazidis, Christians and other minorities.&#8221;</div>
<p>Throughout this fraught process, constructing a quasi-state while espousing a determinedly anti-statist ideology, the Kurdish movement demonstrated a protean diplomatic adaptability, finding various accommodations with Assad, Islamist and secular opposition forces, the US and Russia. With Russian and Iranian troops stationed in western Kurdish regions, and the US, UK and France to the east, the Syrian Kurds were able to exploit tensions between the two blocs, and make themselves indispensable to both. Kurdish forces even mediated when US and Russian patrols clashed while establishing their respective zones of influence in 2019-2020: a striking illustration of their ability to profit from the chaos of great-power conflict.</p>
<p>This pragmatic spirit enabled the Kurds not merely to seek reconciliation with Arab tribal federations, which had formerly thrown their weight behind Isis, but also maintain a tense if functional détente with Assad and his Russian backers. The Syrian army, for its part, was generally confined to small administrative centres and garrisons in Rojava’s cities. This tension was made tangible in the complex, interlocking geography of Qamishli, where the Assad regime controlled some streets and the Kurdish movement others. Anarchist international volunteers would regularly pass Syrian regime soldiers in the street, each studiously ignoring the other.</p>
<p>But with Assad ignominiously dispatched to Moscow, the calculus has changed. After helping the West defeat Isis, to the tune of 10,000 dead Kurdish fighters, Syrian Kurdish representatives want to pay a key part in rebuilding Syria. Their involvement in Syria’s government would benefit Western strategic interests, securing an anti-Iranian axis while creating a counterweight against Islamist rule.</p>
<p>In practice, however, the situation seems grim: and Turkey is to blame. Up to 100,000 Kurds have already been displaced in the latest round of fighting. Yet that’s not the fault of HTS, whose campaign has been marked by relative restraint toward local minorities, but rather Ankara-backed militias taking advantage of the chaos to attack internally displaced Kurds and Yazidis. “The situation remains critical,” says Mohammed Sheikho, a local council leader who weathered attacks by Turkey’s jihadist proxies to lead thousands of people to safety in regions still under DAANES control. “Many thousands of [displaced people] remain outside. Houses are not to be found. We lack blankets, ways to keep warm, heaters, bread, food. Many other people were detained [by Turkish-backed forces], and their fate is unknown until now.”</p>
<p>Even worse, Turkish proxies, united under the banner of the Syrian National Army (SNA), are now staging a fresh assault on the DAANES heartland. To paraphrase Voltaire, these militias are neither Syrian, nor national, nor an army. Rather, they’re funded and armed by Turkey; dedicated to executing Turkish aims against the Kurds; and encompass a muddled collection of mostly jihadist militias, including some sanctioned by the US for war crimes.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, Turkish air power continues to pound the US’s Kurdish partners across the north-east. A Turkish drone strike has just killed 12 civilians, including six children, in the town of Ain Issa (despite Turkey’s posturing as a friend of the anti-Assad revolution, no drone strikes targeted Assad’s forces as they capitulated to HTS).</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/01/the-betrayal-of-british-kurds/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/01/the-betrayal-of-british-kurds/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/GettyImages-595238680-2-e1705505455445.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/01/the-betrayal-of-british-kurds/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/01/the-betrayal-of-british-kurds/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The betrayal of British Kurds</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/01/the-betrayal-of-british-kurds/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Matt Broomfield</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>The situation appears grave. Yet that same spirit of pragmatic cooperation, which has ultimately enabled the Kurdish movement to survive 13 years across one of the 21st century’s deadliest conflicts, could yet pave the way for an unexpected outcome. HTS and the DAANES are reportedly engaged in negotiations, with HTS so far seeming relatively restrained. But other forces are set to profit more directly from HTS’s rise to power. As Yusuf Can of the Wilson Center explains, though the DAANES could capitalise on their “relatively established” institutions, Turkey is “cautiously jubilant” at the prospect of using HTS to gain leverage with everyone from Trump to Iran.</p>
<p>What of the future? Will Turkey follow through on its threats of a cross-border operation to crush the Syrian Kurds for good? Or, given HTS’s unexpectedly conciliatory rhetoric towards minorities, perhaps there could be space for a multi-ethnic federation. If Turkey can, finally, be encouraged to end the communal bloodletting, a negotiated settlement encompassing all of Syria’s diverse populations could yet emerge. But despite these efforts, further bloodshed seems inevitable, with Donald Trump’s return to the White House unlikely to pour oil on troubled waters.</p>
<p>At the time of writing, Turkey’s proxy militias are advancing on Kobanî, the Syrian Kurdish city where the Kurds first turned the tide against Isis in 2014, launching their partnership with the US and UK. But 10 years on, with bands of Turkish-armed Islamists once again appearing over the horizon and swearing vengeance on the Kurds, their nominal Western allies are nowhere to be seen.</p>
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															<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">643177</post-id>				</item>
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					<title>Syria has exposed Russias frailty</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2024/12/syria-has-exposed-russias-frailty/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://stage.unherd.com/2024/12/syria-has-exposed-russias-frailty/?edition=us#comments</comments>
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										<unherd:main_theme>Vassal state</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Ian Garner]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/Blue-thumb.jpg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>3</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[Syria is no longer Russia's friend. Aaref Watad/AFP/Getty Images ]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Dr. Ian Garner</strong> is assistant professor of totalitarian studies at the Pilecki Institute in Warsaw. His latest book is <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/z-generation/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em>Z Generation: Russia&#8217;s Fascist Youth</em></a> (Hurst).</p>
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						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>irgarner</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is assistant professor of totalitarian studies at the Pilecki Institute in Warsaw. His latest book is <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/z-generation/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em>Z Generation: Russia's Fascist Youth</em></a> (Hurst).]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Tue, 10 Dec 2024 00:03:24 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Fri, 13 Dec 2024 17:13:07 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Bashar al-Assad]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Russia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Syria]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Vladimir Putin]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[War]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://stage.unherd.com/?p=642928</guid>
																												<description>
								<![CDATA[Putin's multipolar world is a sham]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>Five months ago, Vladimir Putin <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/world/putin-says-multipolar-world-reality-now/3266012" target="_blank" rel="noopener">declared</a> that the so-called “multipolar world” had become a reality. He surely imagined this meant Russia would be one of only a handful of powerful nations able to dominate 21st-century global politics. But if the sudden collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s government in Syria is anything to go by, then the multipolar reality is for Russia one of chaos and enfeeblement.</p>
<p>For a quarter of a century, Putin has dreamed of ending the era of American hegemony that followed the Cold War. Just 11 days after his shock appointment as acting president in 1999, Putin <a href="https://www.bits.de/EURA/natsecconc.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">signed</a> a National Security Policy declaring that “Russia will facilitate the formation of an ideology of establishing a multipolar world”. In theory, the “multipolar world” describes the end of American unipolarity. In reality, it is a synonym for the return of Russia’s international standing. After years of humiliating decline — a national debt crisis, a military disaster on home turf in Chechnya, and Russia’s increasing marginalization in international security discussions — Putin was promising a new era of national and international strength.</p>
<p>Russians hoped their nation would once again become a great power. Back in the Seventies, the Soviet Union was a major player in Africa and the Middle East. By funnelling money, arms, and propaganda to support friendly countries, and fuel chaos and revolution in unfriendly ones, the Kremlin was, effectively, wrestling with the USA in proxy economic and physical wars. But as the Soviet empire unravelled at home and economic strife hit, Moscow’s influence waned. Formerly friendly countries looked to Washington instead. Throughout the Nineties, the government of the new Russian Federation was powerless to stop its influence collapsing.</p>
<p>Yet Syria remained one of Moscow’s most enduring friends and obedient servants, a role it has played for much of the last 80 years. After the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1944, the USSR openly advocated on behalf of Damascus. Moscow poured arms and money into Syria as the country ended French colonialism in the Forties. The following decades saw ever more tokens of friendship. A Soviet naval base opened in Tartus in 1971, and Moscow assisted Syria in the Yom Kippur War. Billions of dollars went to propping up the relationship, all eagerly received by the Syrians themselves.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;Syria remained one of Moscow’s most enduring friends and obedient servants, a role it has played for much of the last 80 years.&#8221;</div>
<p>Even as the USSR’s foreign power flagged in the Eighties, then president Hafez Assad’s government <a href="https://books.google.pl/books?id=GU6fDwAAQBAJ&amp;newbks=1&amp;newbks_redir=0&amp;lpg=PT19&amp;dq=hafez%20assad%20soviet%20afghan%20war&amp;pg=PT19#v=onepage&amp;q&amp;f=false">expressed</a> support for the disastrous Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and continued to rely on Moscow for assistance. Their enduring relationship exemplified the old, bipolar world order. Come what may, the Syrian regime relied on Moscow for military and ideological firepower. Syria, in turn, was an unusually stable country in an often fractured region, while the Soviet Union could count itself a major regional player thanks to this one-sided relationship.</p>
<p>In the Nineties, Russia’s inability to provide any real support to Syria saw the partnership wither. Under Putin’s aegis, a plan was hatched to revive it. While Moscow was hesitant at first to directly intervene in the Syrian Civil War, its airpower and ground forces proved crucial in helping Bashar al-Assad cling on to power as rebel forces gathered steam. The Russian Air Force’s <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/mar/02/russia-committed-war-crimes-in-syria-finds-un-report">brutal</a> bombing campaigns were conducted with the same disregard for humanitarian law and civilian casualties as its earlier war in Chechnya, and foreshadowed Moscow’s approach to the Ukraine conflict. In return for propping up Assad, Russia was able to keep its naval base in Tartus, which allowed it to reach further into Africa. More important, Putin sent a clear message: he was willing to use any means necessary to ensure Russia was a global power that Washington and its allies could not ignore. The “multipolar world order” — if that meant the West listening to a powerful Russia — seemed to be coming to life.</p>
<p>Assad has stuck by Moscow like few others in recent years. While other countries in the Kremlin’s economic and military orbit, including traditional partners in Central Asia and Africa, have attempted to play off Russia and an ascendant China, Assad remained the perfect vassal. Speaking at the Kremlin last year, the former Syrian leader <a href="https://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/70680">expressed</a> his fealty by parroting Russian propaganda. He offered support for Russia’s war “against neo-Nazis and their predecessors”, and went on to speak of his “devotion” to Russia and the “need to stabilize the world”. Subjugation to Russia meant stability for the dictator.</p>
<p>Today it transpires that this stability has been, along with Moscow’s military, economic, and cultural strength, another of Putin’s grand illusions. Just as the campaign against Ukraine revealed military weaknesses in hours, so Russian power in Syria has evaporated in a matter of days. Stretched to the limit by its war in Ukraine, where despite recent progress some 30,000 soldiers and billions of dollars are being <a href="https://kyivindependent.com/russia-has-spent-200-billion-on-full-scale-war-in-ukraine-suffered-700-000-casualties-austin-says/">lost</a> every month, the Kremlin has no more forces, no more men, and no more money to send to the Middle East. The best it can offer is asylum to the humiliated Assad. Today’s “multipolar world order” has turned out to be a sham, more akin to the Eighties world of ailing Soviet power than the genuine strength of the post-Second World War decades.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/12/why-syria-is-back-at-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/12/why-syria-is-back-at-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/GettyImages-2187154696-e1733161682622.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/12/why-syria-is-back-at-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/12/why-syria-is-back-at-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Why Syria is back at war</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/12/why-syria-is-back-at-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Aris Roussinos</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Putin’s power is crumbling across the old Soviet Empire and beyond. Ukraine may not take back Crimea and its eastern regions in the near future, but the country’s population has definitively turned away from Moscow. Ten years ago, for example, Ukrainians were <a href="https://books.google.pl/books?id=MmTiEAAAQBAJ&amp;newbks=1&amp;newbks_redir=0&amp;lpg=PT100&amp;dq=popova%20shevel%20nato&amp;pg=PT102#v=onepage&amp;q&amp;f=false">ambivalent</a> about NATO and EU integration. Today, they overwhelmingly embrace both. Across Central Asia, countries look to China, not Russia, for development aid. Azerbaijan behaves without regard for Moscow’s opinion, while Armenia looks to India, China, and the USA for support.</p>
<p>Even worse, Russia has been forced to accept ever more negative trade terms with stronger countries, such as India and China, thanks to the West’s firm approach to sanctions. Its few real alliances, like those with North Korea and Iran, see the smaller partners dictating terms. Today, Putin needs those countries more than they need him, and they are extracting maximum benefits in exchange for providing soldiers and military equipment to Moscow. At any moment, Putin’s whole foreign policy facade could crumble.</p>
<p>Russian diplomats might today claim that their country “does not betray its friends in difficult situations”, but their world is one of smoke and mirrors, in which Moscow’s PR men project dominance, with fake news, disinformation, and braggadocio about everything from Syria to <a href="https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2024/12/03/exclusive-kremlin-stages-oreshnik-propaganda-blitz-as-nuclear-threats-lose-their-potency-a87206">ballistic</a> missiles, to cover up their country’s comparative weakness. Russia deployed its usual range of propaganda tactics to claim Assad’s position was impregnable, but at the first sign of trouble, some of its propagandists now <a href="https://theins.press/en/news/277029">claim</a> that Syria never mattered anyway.</p>
<p>Ever since 1999, Putin’s aim has been to recreate Russian power with mastery over vassal states like Syria and Ukraine, but he has presided over chaos. Moscow is capable of breaking things, of instigating revolutions, of creating this chaos, but it does not have the strength to institute new international power structures.</p>
<p>Russia no longer has any control over Syria, which is likely to collapse into a period of turmoil as new leadership is asserted and contested. It seems unlikely that the new Syrian leadership, carried to power by soldiers with memories of being brutally attacked by Russian forces, will be as favorable to Moscow as any of its predecessors. Russia today has less power in the Middle East and across the post-Soviet space than it did a decade ago. A combination of big economic and military players — above all China — and chaotic, independent-minded groups, like in Syria, is filling that vacuum.</p>
<p>The Kremlin lacks the money, materiel, and motivation to do little more than hope that its international influence does not erode further. Short on options, and following his response to the Arab Spring, Putin will likely attempt to boost his domestic standing with attacks on Ukraine and more aggressive nationalism at home. This inward turn is not the multipolar world order Vladimir Putin was hoping for.</p>
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					<title>Trump&#8217;s new world order</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2024/12/trumps-new-world-order/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://stage.unherd.com/2024/12/trumps-new-world-order/?edition=us#comments</comments>
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										<unherd:main_theme>Second Term</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Tom McTague]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/Tom-McTague-Website.jpg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>1</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[Flying the flag. Anna Moneymaker/Getty Images.]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Tom McTague</strong> is UnHerd&#8217;s <strong>Political Editor.</strong> He is the author of <em>Between the Waves: The Hidden History of a Very British Revolution 1945-2016,</em> due to be published in September 2025</p>
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						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>TomMcTague</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is UnHerd's <strong>Political Editor.</strong> He is the author of <em>Between the Waves: The Hidden History of a Very British Revolution 1945-2016,</em> due to be published in September 2025]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Tue, 10 Dec 2024 00:03:15 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Fri, 13 Dec 2024 17:00:55 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Diplomacy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Middle East]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Politics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Syria]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Trump]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://stage.unherd.com/?p=643000</guid>
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								<![CDATA[Global leaders are reassessing their position]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>When Donald Trump first visited Paris when President in 2017, he appeared as something of a passing curiosity; the apparent manifestation of America’s inexorable decline, captured in all its spray-tanned vulgarity. Seven years later he has returned to Paris as emperor, crowned by his client kings in none other than the spiritual home of modern Christendom: Notre-Dame. “It was a coronation,” as one European diplomat put it to me, laughing with incredulity at the spectacle.</p>
<p>What is so striking about this second coming of Trump is not just that the world appears to have accepted his victory this time, but to have actively embraced him as the harbinger of a new age, no longer seeking to protect the old one that has been discredited. The visual proof of this diplomatic embrace was captured in the image of Europe’s leaders in Paris, one after the other, moving to submit themselves at the feet of the new imperator.</p>
<p>Yet it was not the symbolism of the ceremony in Notre-Dame on Saturday which came closest to capturing the revolutionary spirit of Trump’s coming presidency, but the events unfolding at the same time thousands of miles away in Syria. While in one sense the collapse of the Assad regime in Damascus has little to do with Trump, it is impossible to understand the speed and timing of the revolution without considering the impact that his impending presidency is already having on world affairs.</p>
<p>Think about the events that have already happened since Trump’s election victory in November. First, there was the collapse of the German government and the sacking of Israel’s defence secretary, Yoav Gallant, on the day of the American election. Then came Netanyahu’s ceasefire-deal with a dazed and confused Hezbollah, followed by the authorisation of the firing of long-range American missiles into Russia, the publication of Zelensky’s peace plan, the collapse in the value of the Russian rouble under fresh American sanctions and, finally, the sudden implosion of the Syrian regime. The French government also collapsed.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;In many global capitals today Trump is a clarifying presence.&#8221;</div>
<p>“Everyone has taken his mantra that all is transactional and is positioning themselves to open the way for a bargain with Trump,” explained one French official reflecting on this extraordinary cascade of events. Even before taking power, then, Trump is the catalyst for a new age.</p>
<p>In Syria, he sparked a revolution. Frustrated with a diplomatic impasse as the clock ticked down to Trump’s inauguration and the ambitions of the American-backed Kurdish rebels in Syria’s north east, Turkey’s President Erdogan appears to have authorised the advance of his own client rebels first. Erdogan, it seems, wanted to ensure the Turkish-backed militias were in the strongest possible position to deal with Trump after January 20, only to have triggered the sudden and complete collapse of the Assad regime. Russia, meanwhile, bogged down in Ukraine and already having paid a large price for little reward in Syria, was also caught off guard and now faces the loss of key military bases on the Arab-Mediterranean coast, further entrenching Erdogan’s power in the region.</p>
<p>Across the Middle East, all the major powers are jockeying for position. Already, Benjamin Netanyahu has taken advantage of the vacuum of power in Syria and in Washington to grab new territory in the Golan Heights and try to impose a new political dominance at home. Saudi Arabia, too, sees opportunities under Trump. Even Iran, the great loser in world affairs since October 7 last year, may feel it now has no choice but to sue for peace and reach a deal.</p>
<p>For Ukraine, meanwhile, it is President Biden (or his officials) who is accelerating events by rushing to do all he can before Trump’s inauguration, with new weapons transfers and sanctions that are causing Russia fresh economic pain. Yet, once again, it is Trump who stands to gain as each side plays out their cards in expectation of his attempt to impose a new order on the world once in power.</p>
<p>It is striking how open so many diplomats and officials are to Trump’s approach, telling me that they see in it a degree of brutal honesty if not morality. During his first term there was a hope that his Hobbesian outlook on life would not, in the end, last. Today, there is no such hope — or even desire. Meanwhile, the comprehensive nature of Trump’s victory coupled with European rolling political and economic crises, seems to have robbed the continent’s leaders of any last delusion of superiority. Only Emmanuel Macron’s departing Prime Minister, Michael Barnier, showed any real distaste at Trump’s presence at Notre Dame, which is itself rather telling. If there was a figure who appeared out of touch in this scene, it was not Trump; Barnier’s instinct is that of an older age, revealing his own anachronism. In today’s world, Trump no longer represents good or bad, but simply power. He has it and Europe does not.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/11/welcome-back-to-trump-land/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/11/welcome-back-to-trump-land/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/GettyImages-2182526071-e1730884947606.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/11/welcome-back-to-trump-land/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/11/welcome-back-to-trump-land/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Welcome back to Trumpland</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/11/welcome-back-to-trump-land/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Tom McTague</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>It is for this reason that in many global capitals today Trump is a clarifying presence, forcing leaders to address the fundamentals of their position. Europe is weak — economically and militarily — and made weaker by the leaders it has chosen. In Paris, Macron has destroyed his presidency in his desperate and doomed attempts to save the country from the Le Pennist fate he seems only to succeed in making more likely. In Berlin, Olaf Scholz is drifting towards defeat, a listless chancellor atop a listless Germany at the heart of a listless continent. In London, meanwhile, there is the odd spectacle of an all-powerful government that already feels adrift. Can these three powers really find it in them to step into a void left by Trump in Ukraine? And if they can, at what cost to an electorate already raging against the deteriorating state of their public services?</p>
<p>None of this means Trump’s clarifying presence will be either good, bad or in any sense successful at finding solutions to problems that have defeated his predecessors. In an important sense, in fact, Trump represents the end to all such teleological notions of progress or decline. Power is the point.</p>
<p>In Syria, the fall of Assad cannot be squeezed into any such narrative of progress or decline. It is a story of order and who has the power to impose it. Trump doesn’t want it. Iran has lost it. And Turkey may find it is no more successful in its attempts to control its foreign clients than Pakistan was in controlling the Taliban. And just like Afghanistan, in Syria a gruesome regime has evaporated after being abandoned by its foreign protectors. What comes next may be just as dangerous — and far closer to home.</p>
<p>Syria’s new warlord Abu Mohammad al-Jolani was 20 when he joined the jihad in Iraq. Perhaps he has mellowed and forgiven — but it would be a brave analyst after the past 20 years to believe that Syria has reached its nadir: modernity may yet have some new horrors for it to endure. What comes in its place may be no better or worse than what it replaced, merely a new epoch symbolised not by the beauty of Notre-Dame but the hellish anarchy of America’s Iraq.</p>
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					<title>Will Tehran be next?</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2024/12/will-tehran-be-next/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://stage.unherd.com/2024/12/will-tehran-be-next/?edition=us#comments</comments>
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										<unherd:main_theme>Syria</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Edward Luttwak]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/edward_luttwak-1.jpg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>2</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[A sign of the times. Yasin Akgul / AFP via Getty Images.]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Professor Edward Luttwak</strong> is a strategist and historian known for his works on grand strategy, geoeconomics, military history, and international relations.</p>
]]>
						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>ELuttwak</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is a strategist and historian known for his works on grand strategy, geoeconomics, military history, and international relations.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Tue, 10 Dec 2024 00:02:19 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Tue, 10 Dec 2024 09:32:58 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Assad]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Damascus]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Iran]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Middle East]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Politics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Syria]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://stage.unherd.com/?p=642915</guid>
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								<![CDATA[Iran's myth of power has been shattered ]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>Damascus has fallen — something that has as much to do with Iran as with Syria. Tehran had long kept the Assad dictatorship in power, with its Hezbollah militia in Lebanon, the largest non-state army on Earth. But starting in late September, Israel demolished Hassan Nasrallah’s organisation in a series of punishing attacks. Iran’s response was to launch ballistic missiles against Israel, which its own Arrow missiles efficiently intercepted.</p>
<p>But when Israel’s air force counterattacked on 26 October, destroying targets in more than 20 locations across Iran, not one of its aircraft was even challenged. Exposed as vulnerable in its own capital, the Ayatollah regime is weaker than ever. And now, perhaps, the revolutionary wind that engulfed the Assad dictatorship could blow all the way to Tehran, as Iranians throw off their fundamentalist masters.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/10/biden-must-unleash-israel/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/10/biden-must-unleash-israel/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/GettyImages-2177185422.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/10/biden-must-unleash-israel/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/10/biden-must-unleash-israel/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Biden must unleash Israel</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/10/biden-must-unleash-israel/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Edward Luttwak</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>The myth of Iranian power was ironically propagated by the United States itself. Right at the start of his first term, in January 2009, Barack Obama was terrified that he would be manoeuvred into fighting a war against Iran. Conscious of what had happened to Bush when he ordered the invasion of Iraq, Obama started his tenure by apologising for America’s erstwhile support for the Shah. And beyond showing contrition for the past, the then president also set a new rule, one that lasted all the way to October 2024: Iran may attack anyone, but none may attack Iran.</p>
<p>As late as this January, when an Iranian drone killed three American soldiers in Jordan, there was no US retaliation against the Islamic Republic. Israel, too, was subject to Obama’s rule. On 13 April, Iran launched 170 drones, 30 cruise missiles, and 120 ballistic missiles against the Jewish State. Jake Sullivan, the US National Security Advisor and a former Obama official, was frantic as he acted to prevent any Israeli counterattack, implicitly threatening the loss of US military aid if Israel retaliated. A bewildered Pentagon official wondered if Sullivan had close relatives living in Tehran.</p>
<p>Yet no amount of US pressure could stop Israel’s final crushing of Hezbollah. It started on 27 September, with the killing of Hassan Nasrallah, alongside his entire high command. Iran’s response, a few days later, was massive: over 190 ballistic missiles, each the size of a fuel tanker truck, which might have killed thousands were it not for Israel’s unique Arrow interception system.</p>
<p>Once again, Sullivan tried to stop Israel’s retaliation, but this time he failed. On 25 October, Israel launched air strikes that revealed the extent of Iran’s weakness. IDF planes attacked Iranian targets at will, including a key missile production unit in the top-secret Parchin base, just 19 miles from Tehran. That was enough to prove to Iran’s enemies that there was no real strength behind its façade of strategic superiority. All the country had left were the Revolutionary Guards.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;There was no real strength behind Iran&#8217;s façade of strategic superiority.&#8221;</div>
<p>It fell to Mohammed al-Jawlani, head of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, one of the several Syrian anti-regime groups, to test Iran’s residual power. He chose as his target Aleppo, historically Syria’s most important city and second in population only to the capital Damascus.</p>
<p>Al-Jawlani’s variegated fighters, in light trucks and jeeps, could have been stopped by a few hundred well-trained soldiers. But neither Hezbollah nor Iran’s own Revolutionary Guards could react. Hezbollah no longer has any large units capable of crossing the border to fight rebels in Syria, as they had done so many times before. As for the Revolutionary Guards, they were commandeering civilian airliners to fly troops into Damascus Airport to support Assad. But then Israel made clear that it would not allow Iran’s troops so close to its border, and Iran no longer had credible counter-threats.</p>
<p>That left Iran with no quick-reaction options at all: there was no other airport securely held by Assad’s collapsing forces. Nor could Iran risk trucking troops into Syria overland across Iraq. Not even its own Shi’a militias, with tens of thousands of armed men, could have secured their passage across Kurdish controlled north-east Syria.</p>
<p>Now Iran’s population is discovering that it has spent decades in poverty to pay for the massive build-up of the Revolutionary Guards and all their militias. And for what? They have elaborate bases and showy headquarters, but their expensive ballistic missiles can only be used against defenceless Arabs, not Israel with its Arrow interceptors. As for Hezbollah, clearly they cannot even defend themselves, let alone Iran’s remaining allies in the region. Perhaps, in short, the dictatorship will finally be challenged in the streets of Iran&#8217;s cities, at scale and in earnest.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/10/israels-plan-to-weaken-iran/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/10/israels-plan-to-weaken-iran/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/GettyImages-2179863598-1.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/10/israels-plan-to-weaken-iran/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/10/israels-plan-to-weaken-iran/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Israel&#039;s plan to weaken the Iranian regime</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/10/israels-plan-to-weaken-iran/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Edward Luttwak</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>If that happens, Iran’s long-forgotten regular armed forces, denied modern weapons and reduced to playing second fiddle behind the Revolutionary Guards, might also make their move. That would certainly decide the fate of the regime: if a sizeable part of their 350,000 men were to act. Nobody can know if regular Iranian officers and men are less inclined to support the dictatorship than the Revolutionary Guards, but Iran recently had elections in which the hard-line candidate was squarely defeated. Nor is there much evidence that Iran’s soldiers, sailors and airmen are enthusiasts for the regime that leaves them without any modern aircraft, land weapons or warships.</p>
<p>The fall of Iran’s dictatorship, which for so long has combined intense repression at home with aggression abroad, would not solve the Middle East’s problems overnight. But it would certainly liberate many Iranians, and finally end Iran’s support for murderous Shi’a militias from Iraq to Yemen. Syria, in short, could just be the start.</p>
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									<item>
					<title>What next for Syria?</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2024/12/after-assad-what-next-for-syria/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://stage.unherd.com/2024/12/after-assad-what-next-for-syria/?edition=us#comments</comments>
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										<unherd:main_theme>revolution</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[David Patrikarakos]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/David-Patrikarakos.jpg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>1</unherd:article_ranking>
																<unherd:image_caption>
							<![CDATA[Syrians celebrate the flight of Assad. (Credit: Muhammad Haj Kadour/AFP/Getty)]]>
						</unherd:image_caption>
						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>David Patrikarakos</strong> is <em>UnHerd</em>&#8216;s foreign correspondent. His latest book is <em>War in 140 characters: how social media is reshaping conflict in the 21st century. </em>(Hachette)</p>
]]>
						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>dpatrikarakos</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is <em>UnHerd</em>'s foreign correspondent. His latest book is <em>War in 140 characters: how social media is reshaping conflict in the 21st century. </em>(Hachette)]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Mon, 09 Dec 2024 00:05:32 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Mon, 09 Dec 2024 13:12:32 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[HTS]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Israel]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Russia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Syria]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Turkey]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[War]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://stage.unherd.com/?p=642763</guid>
																												<description>
								<![CDATA[As the regime falls, the region is in flux]]>
							</description>
																		
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								<![CDATA[<p>It was the clock tower that settled it. The images of rebels driving around the central square of Homs, its famous clocktower visible, confirmed they had taken the city. This meant they could now sever Damascus from the coastal regions, cutting the Assad regime off from the remaining pockets of support it had outside the capital. It was over.</p>
<p>Right now, the rebels are at Umayyad Square in central Damascus; they have taken control of the State TV while explosions and gunfire can be heard in some neighbourhoods of the capital. These are likely to be bouts of sporadic fighting as pro-Assad militias try to make it to the coast or the Lebanese border.</p>
<p>Escape routes, though, are becoming hard to find. Damascus International Airport is closed, with all flights cancelled. The borders with Lebanon and Jordan are closed. The Syrian government has made no official statement yet, and the location of Assad and his family is unknown (though there are rumours that a plane he was fleeing in may have come down).</p>
<p>Syria is in chaos.</p>
<p>All eyes are now on Abu Mohammad al-Jolani, the leader of Hay&#8217;at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the Islamist militant group in Syria that leads the rebel forces. Formed in 2017 through the merger of several factions, including Jabhat al-Nusra — al-Qaeda&#8217;s former Syrian affiliate — HTS is a tricky proposition. It emerged from al-Qaeda but it also later fought them. Jolani is educated, sophisticated and politically astute.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/12/why-syria-is-back-at-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/12/why-syria-is-back-at-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/GettyImages-2187154696-e1733161682622.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/12/why-syria-is-back-at-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/12/why-syria-is-back-at-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Why Syria is back at war</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/12/why-syria-is-back-at-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Aris Roussinos</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>He has by all accounts been on a journey since he was dispatched from Iraq with bags of cash to bring jihad to Syria. He seems to recognise that international terror is a busted flush and that political pragmatism and moderation — or at least the avoidance of overt brutality — are the way forward. <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/574cc17a-fa3a-411b-acb0-34fc032c7fe4?shareType=nongift" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Reports</a> indicate that when it comes to fusing religion with politics his belief is “the real world has to guide your Islam, that you cannot force your Islam on to the real world”. On parts of Arab social media, he has acquired the nickname “Jolani-Zelensky”.</p>
<p>HTS’s reputation has soared as it has advanced across Syria. Its soldiers would seem to be avoiding civilian casualties for now and are careful not to be seen as an occupying military power. Incredibly, there have — so far — been no reports of old scores being settled. Instead, there is footage of Assad troops surrendering and being set free to go home (the foot soldiers at least) and of peaceful transitions of power at airports, police stations and so on. As one Syria analyst said to me, “I’m surprised we haven’t seen more images of Assad soldiers being lined up and shot, gathered in squares for public executions, minority persecution, displacement and so on.”</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;Let&#8217;s not forget that not so long ago HTS were selling foreigners to Islamic State to behead on YouTube.&#8221;</div>
<p>Unexpectedly, Jolani has been vocal about protecting minority rights. He has sought to portray a more moderate attitude in interviews and on the ground he has personally managed the surrender of Assad troops — offering pardons, and then handing over control of the areas to local councils and civil authorities.</p>
<p>Then there are the prisons. These are a shorthand for Assad’s barbarity. Social media is now drowning in videos of startled prisoners being released; of Syrians weeping with relief and joy to discover a relative imprisoned long ago is alive. It’s powerful messaging.</p>
<p>All of which is to say that if the military campaign is a success, the strategic communications have been a stroke of genius.</p>
<p>Not least because HTS remains problematic. Let&#8217;s not forget that not so long ago that its followers were selling foreigners to Islamic State to behead on YouTube. The US has designated the group a terrorist organisation and has a $10 million reward out for Jolani’s death or capture. If he intends to run for Syrian president — and there are a lot of Syrians who would love that right now — then the US bounty is a huge problem.</p>
<p>Assad had stamped on his people so hard for so long that what we are now seeing is the eruption of a sudden and colossal vacuum of power. For the moment, the only real contenders to fill it are Jolani and HTS. We must hope that Jolani’s conversion is indeed “Damascene”; the West simply cannot afford Syria&#8217;s implosion to become a self-fulfilling prophecy.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/11/the-dangers-of-normalising-bashar-al-assad/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/11/the-dangers-of-normalising-bashar-al-assad/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/GettyImages-2176914586.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/11/the-dangers-of-normalising-bashar-al-assad/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/11/the-dangers-of-normalising-bashar-al-assad/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The dangers of normalising Bashar al-Assad</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/11/the-dangers-of-normalising-bashar-al-assad/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Alessandra Bajec</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>It would be salient, then, to remember the lessons of the fall of that other tyrant, Muammar Gaddafi. He was overthrown and everyone was euphoric. The problem was that booting him out had been the goal unifying all the armed factions — and without it, they turned on each other, with predictably disastrous consequences for Libya.</p>
<p>It didn&#8217;t help that the UN was too slow to put in place an effective political process. As a result, the government formed in Tripoli wasn’t inclusive, but made up of the Libyans who had been in exile and making friends in western capitals — just as the Iraqi businessman Ahmad Chalabi had conned so many people in Washington and London into believing that the Iraqis would welcome him as a returning leader. We never learn.</p>
<p>Ten years on, Libya is a mess. Tripoli is ruled by gangs and there has been zero development. Benghazi is run by a pro-Russian maniac. The country has become jihadi training camp and a launchpad for people smuggling to Europe.</p>
<p>Right now, the best-case scenario for Syria — and, most likely, regional security — is that Jolani is true to his word. What emerges is an inclusive political process to federalism, endorsed and supported by the international community, with funding for development and recovery. A transitional justice process is set up for perpetrators of war crimes, and there are no more Wild West jihadi training grounds fuelling untold terrorism and conflict the world over.</p>
<p>Regionally, the effects are huge. We don’t know what comes next, but it is extremely unlikely that a group that emerged from a Sunni Jihadists is going to have much time for Shia Iran and its militias. As it stands, Iran can kiss its land bridge to Hezbollah goodbye, severely weakening both parties, and strengthening Israel.</p>
<p>Jerusalem will have to watch what happens in the Golan Heights but as of now the events benefit Israel. One rebel even went on Israel&#8217;s Channel 11: “Dear neighbours from the State of Israel…” he <a href="https://x.com/dpatrikarakos/status/1865658530436469094" target="_blank" rel="noopener">said</a>, “I’m speaking on my behalf and for all the free people of Syria. The next phase will be a phase of harmony and of peace with the State of Israel.&#8221; Whether that is true is debatable, but an extraordinary statement nonetheless.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/11/hezbollah-has-weakened-iran/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/11/hezbollah-has-weakened-iran/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/GettyImages-2186488735.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/11/hezbollah-has-weakened-iran/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/11/hezbollah-has-weakened-iran/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Hezbollah has weakened Iran</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/11/hezbollah-has-weakened-iran/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Michal Kranz</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Another winner is Turkey, which has clearly been funding and training HTS. It may now move on with plans to further degrade the Kurdish PKK that runs part of Northeast Syria. At any rate, my friends in Kurdistan are nervous, and reaching out.</p>
<p>But Assad’s fall is bad news for Moscow. Syria is Putin’s southern flank, and it looks like he has lost it. Being unable to protect his client makes him look weak, and he may now also lose his naval facility at Tartus. Russian planes have been landing there all day — doubtless to extract their men.</p>
<p>Syria is once more in revolution, and the region is once more in flux. I think again of the Homs clock tower. On 18 April 2011, thousands gathered at its base for a peaceful protest. In the early hours of the following day, security forces dispersed the crowd with live ammunition, killing several of the protestors. The &#8220;Clock Tower Massacre” lives on for Syrians, who are now be hoping that some form of justice, and improvement in their lives, is coming. We must pray that these hopes are not in vain.</p>
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															<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">642763</post-id>				</item>
									<item>
					<title>Why Syria is back at war</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2024/12/why-syria-is-back-at-war/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://stage.unherd.com/2024/12/why-syria-is-back-at-war/?edition=us#comments</comments>
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										<unherd:main_theme>Middle East</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Aris Roussinos]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/aris.jpeg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>1</unherd:article_ranking>
																<unherd:image_caption>
							<![CDATA['Hayat Tahrir al Sham surprised the world — and probably itself.' Rami Alsayed/NurPhoto/Getty Images]]>
						</unherd:image_caption>
						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Aris Roussinos</strong> is an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist and a former war reporter.</p>
]]>
						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>arisroussinos</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist and a former war reporter.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Fri, 06 Dec 2024 00:06:28 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Mon, 09 Dec 2024 10:16:02 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Bashar al-Assad]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Syria]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[War]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://stage.unherd.com/?p=641557</guid>
																												<description>
								<![CDATA[Assad's days could be numbered ]]>
							</description>
																		
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								<![CDATA[<p>The Syrian jihadist group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) surprised the world and probably itself with its almost unimpeded conquest of Aleppo at the weekend, conquering in hours territory that had been bloodily fought over for many years. And like an ancient bacterium released from melting permafrost, the sudden unfreezing of Syria’s assumed frozen conflict has released noxious old strains of geopolitical discourse into a very different world. One of the things that made the Syrian war, at its height, so hard for casual observers to understand was that it was a series of rapidly-shifting, amoral and pragmatic alliances and betrayals. Yet these convoluted dynamics were filtered for external observers through a moralising internet war, aimed at mobilising foreign intervention: the results were disastrous for Syria’s people, on all sides.</p>
<p>This time around, we may still hope that things turn out differently. Rather than a reversion to the great crisis of a decade ago, the dramatic events of the weekend, and the international reactions, highlight how far the region, and the wider world, have changed since the war’s bloody height.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/11/a-settlement-is-ukraines-only-way-out/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/11/a-settlement-is-ukraines-only-way-out/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/GettyImages-872780694-1.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/11/a-settlement-is-ukraines-only-way-out/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/11/a-settlement-is-ukraines-only-way-out/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Will Putin escalate in Ukraine?</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/11/a-settlement-is-ukraines-only-way-out/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Aris Roussinos</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Now locked in dangerous rivalry over Ukraine, the United States and Russia had, over the past decade, come to a workable <em>modus vivendi </em>over Syria. The assumption was that Russian intervention had more or less won the war for Assad, with only the details of a final durable peace to be settled. Indeed, Moscow’s 2015 intervention was itself a response to just such a sudden jihadist-led offensive — led by the same actors breaking out of their Idlib confinement, with what is now HTS then the Syrian al-Qaeda franchise Jabhat al-Nusra. Rhetoric aside, the Russian intervention came as a welcome opportunity for Washington to wash its hands of the long-derailed Syrian revolution, focusing instead on the campaign to dismantle the Islamic State, the war’s most dramatic unintended consequence, using the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) as its most reliable and least problematic proxy.</p>
<p>This time around, the United States, which in 2015 was still officially committed to Assad’s overthrow, but in practice focused on arming Syrian rebels enough to force him to the negotiating table, is happy to take a back seat. The <a href="https://x.com/gbrew24/status/1863023288705835246" target="_blank" rel="noopener">State Department’s communique</a> emphasising that Washington has no hand in the matter, that HTS is still on America’s list of proscribed terrorist groups, and that the ultimate cause of the renewed fighting is Assad’s intransigent refusal to come to a durable peace settlement, is a masterpiece of the genre. The United States is, in 2024, physically present but for the most part genuinely uninvolved in a conflict in which strategic defeat at Russia’s hands had come to seem the most stable and manageable outcome. Aloofly urging all sides to respect human rights and come to a quick and lasting peace settlement, as the US statement does, is probably the optimum American attitude to the current crisis.</p>
<p>For European powers, whose ambivalent attitude to the Syrian revolution itself was rapidly overshadowed by the consequent refugee crisis, which upturned the continent’s politics, the only current strategic interest in Syria is in preventing a reprise of the same demographic tsunami. <a href="https://stage.unherd.com/newsroom/returning-syrian-refugees-could-reconcile-assad-with-europe/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">European diplomatic normalisation with Assad</a>, with the aim of returning as many Syrian refugees as possible, is, we must assume, now on hold. Pragmatic normalisation with HTS itself, with the same motivation, is not out of the question. The overriding European fear will be that any attempted Damascus campaign to reconquer its newly lost territory will mean a resumption of the devastating aerial campaign of the 2010s, backed by Russia with all the additional innovations in the art of killing learned in Ukraine. Equally, any HTS persecution of the ethnic and religious minorities now under its rule will provoke its own new refugee flow. Either scenario, should those uprooted direct themselves to Europe’s shores, would represent another body blow to Europe’s wavering liberal order. Who rules Syria, and how, is now far less of a concern for European leaders than who will rule Europe, and how.</p>
<p>Instead it is regional actors, and Russia, that will determine the outcome of the war’s sudden reflorescence. During the 2010s, the Arab states dramatically prolonged and worsened the Syrian war through their backing of rival rebel groups for their own narrow ends. Qatar and Kuwait funded jihadist groups so lavishly that more or less secular rebels adopted increasingly fundamentalist rhetoric and aesthetics to procure weapons and influence. Saudi Arabia, contrary to the perception many Western observers held, favoured various broadly secular potential strongmen among the rebel leadership, as part of its general fear of jihadist militancy at home; Jordan reluctantly backed broadly secular rebel groups to keep the war as far from its borders as possible and satisfy the geopolitical whims of its American patron.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;It is regional actors, and Russia, that will determine the outcome of the war’s sudden reflorescence.&#8221;</div>
<p>This dynamic is long gone: the Arab League, <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/cab11131-824f-41ab-a20d-87db015c6b35" target="_blank" rel="noopener">committed to normalisation with Damascus</a>, now firmly backs Assad, removing one escalatory factor from the current equation. Working towards <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/12/02/saudi-arabia-mohammed-bin-salman-pivot-iran/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">a stable relationship with Iran</a>, today the Gulf states have no desire to involve themselves in a revival of the Syrian war. Only Iraq, an Iranian ally with a justifiable fear, after its bitter experience of the Islamic State expansion from Syria a decade ago, is likely to involve itself directly. The Shia Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF), the Iraqi militias which fought Islamic State so effectively, are <a href="https://x.com/ScharoMaroof/status/1863268889490027001" target="_blank" rel="noopener">already streaming into Syria</a> to defend Assad. Yet their arrival along the overland supply route to Damascus, through which Iran supplies Hezbollah with munitions, will also likely attract the attention of the Islamic State, still a menacing presence in Syria’s eastern desert. At the same time, a closer Iraqi PMF presence will unsettle Israel, for whom any disruption to Hezbollah’s logistics comes as a welcome development. It is in the world’s interest, as well as the region’s, for the Syrian war, if it must restart, to confine itself to Syrian territory: yet the unstable dynamics of today’s Middle East, centred on Israel’s current spiral of wars, may yet work against any desired quarantine.</p>
<p>Indeed, the timing of the HTS offensive, just as Israel concludes its truce with Hezbollah, highlights both the linkages between the differing theatres of regional instability, and the group’s own careful attention to wider diplomatic nuances. Focused on its own struggle for survival, Hezbollah will not be available to rush to Assad’s aid, as it did so effectively at the war’s beginning. Perhaps HTS held off mounting its offensive while the war with Israel was ongoing: to be seen as benefiting from Israel’s campaign, or worse, coordinating with it, would seem impolitic. In stark contrast with the fearsome reputation Jabhat al-Nusra won among Syrian minorities a decade ago, this time around HTS is making every effort to assuage both domestic and international audiences that they are now a more tolerant actor <a href="https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1862481411371884724.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">committed to serious state-building</a>. As well as <a href="https://x.com/Al7khalidi/status/1863264170801496190" target="_blank" rel="noopener">diplomatic outreach to Iraq</a>, the initial, stunning capture of Aleppo was accompanied with <a href="https://x.com/azelin/status/1862629686045528382" target="_blank" rel="noopener">a press release, in Russian</a>, insisting that HTS was a mature and capable actor with which Moscow could come to a mutually profitable arrangement.</p>
<p>Had the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) collapsed over the weekend, it is not impossible that Putin, as pragmatic and cynical as any Syrian militia commander, would have been tempted. Assad’s stock as a local security provider had plummeted, and Moscow is known to be frustrated at his intransigence in negotiating a peace deal which would have secured its long-term role in the country. A successful HTS push through Hama towards Homs would have isolated Russia’s two most important strategic assets in the country, Khmeimim airbase and Tartus naval base — vital for power projection in the wider Mediterranean. But the Syrian Army’s last-minute staunching of its own headlong retreat on Saturday night, along with Russia and Iran’s reconfirmed support for Assad’s continued rule, have seemingly put paid to the HTS gambit. The SAA has held, for now, as a battle for Hama looms, and Assad remains in the game. The unfortunate result is that loyalist areas of Aleppo spared aerial bombardment at the war’s height will likely soon experience it a decade later, unless some grand regional diplomatic bargain can swiftly be produced.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/11/the-dangers-of-normalising-bashar-al-assad/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/11/the-dangers-of-normalising-bashar-al-assad/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/GettyImages-2176914586.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/11/the-dangers-of-normalising-bashar-al-assad/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/11/the-dangers-of-normalising-bashar-al-assad/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The dangers of normalising Bashar al-Assad</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/11/the-dangers-of-normalising-bashar-al-assad/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Alessandra Bajec</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>On the domestic plane, a flurry of communiques have come from HTS Leader Abu Mohammad al-Jolani, <a href="https://x.com/azelin/status/1862931085946134792" target="_blank" rel="noopener">urging his fighters</a> to respect civilian lives and the rights of minorities, with specific outreach being made to Aleppo’s large, and overwhelmingly pro-government, Christian community. Equally, while demanding that the Syrian Kurds withdraw their forces from their autonomous stronghold in northern Aleppo, they are doing so <a href="https://x.com/azelin/status/1863249451428511762" target="_blank" rel="noopener">as politely as possible,</a> declaring that civilians will be protected and that Syria’s <a href="https://x.com/vvanwilgenburg/status/1863541498425287164" target="_blank" rel="noopener">“diversity is our strength.”</a> Both Christian and Kurdish communities have every reason, though, to be wary of rule by a former al-Qaeda faction at whose hands they have suffered before. At the same time, Aleppo’s Christians, abandoned by the Syrian army, appear to have no choice but to accept jihadist rule for now, while the <a href="https://x.com/ScharoMaroof/status/1863298482817081421" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Kurdish declarations that their forces will stay put</a>, unless rescinded, will pit both HTS and the Kurdish-led SDF in Aleppo against each other in a war both factions, equivalently pragmatic actors, would rather avoid.</p>
<p>For the Kurds themselves, the greatest risk are the various rebel factions, including those once mooted by Western commentators as future rulers of Syria, who have evolved as Turkey’s anti-Kurdish proxy, the Syrian National Army (SNA). Long disinclined to fight Assad, the primary function of these militias,<a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2024/02/29/everything-power-weapon/abuses-and-impunity-turkish-occupied-northern-syria" target="_blank" rel="noopener"> prone to ethnic cleansing, rape, banditry and infighting for the spoils of Turkish occupation</a>, and now <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/world/us-to-mount-pressure-on-turkey-to-halt-syria-offensive-may-increase-sanctions-idUSKBN1WU2GL/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">scorned as “pirates”</a> by the US government, is to push autonomous Kurdish forces away from Turkey’s borders, while securing the Turkish semi-annexation of large parts of Northern Syria. When HTS launched its shock offensive against the Syrian government, the SNA launched its own offensive against the isolated surviving Kurdish pockets of northwest Syria, as the government forces whose deployment saved the local Kurds from total collapse during the 2019 Turkish invasion melted away.</p>
<p>Allied with the United States east of the Euphrates, as part of the anti-Islamic State campaign, the Kurds also rely on Russian patronage in northwest Syria, west of the river, for preservation from Turkish invasion. And they manage the support of the two rival sponsors as delicately as can be imagined. Until this new phase of the war, both the US and Russia were broadly aligned on the Kurdish question, both encouraging the SDF’s reabsorption into the SAA with some degree of autonomy for their northeastern region. Yet the unknown stance of the incoming Trump administration, whose last iteration was <a href="https://www.vice.com/en/article/trumps-betrayal-of-the-kurds-is-as-incoherent-as-it-is-dangerous/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">nearly fatal</a> for Syria’s Kurds, is a complicating factor: he may still wish to pull American forces out entirely; yet, equally, the recent heightened focus on Israel’s security may make an American military presence in eastern Syria more desirable. Qamishli airport, an island of government-held territory in a Kurdish-held zone, directly abutting Turkey’s border, was until now a curious backwater in the Syrian war: with Aleppo airbases lost, and Russia and Iran preparing for a new campaign of reconquest and aerial bombardment, it may now assume new importance on the Syrian chessboard.</p>
<p>So far, the Russian air force has bombed SNA troop concentrations preparing to assault Kurdish positions, and Turkey has yet to actively join the fray: doing so would likely push Russia and the SDF closer together, as each seeks to preserve their gains with each other’s support. For the Kurds, who have reiterated their desire to stay out of the current fighting, the only option is to defend their areas as best possible and hedge against a total dependence on either the United States or Russia by maintaining relationships with both. It is an unenviable military-diplomatic position that may yet prove usefully flexible in negotiating Syria’s rapidly shifting tectonic plates.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;It is an unenviable military-diplomatic position that may yet prove usefully flexible in negotiating Syria’s rapidly shifting tectonic plates.&#8221;</div>
<p>Over the course of a weekend, HTS, long-penned into a corner of the country abandoned by world opinion as a doomed jihadist reservation, managed to wreck the narrative of the Syrian war, not only placing Assad’s eventual victory in doubt, but threatening even his short-term survival. Such a dramatic upturning of the chessboard is not necessarily a terrible result for Syria or the region: the Astana peace process between Russia, Turkey and Iran over the country’s future had become a dead end, primarily due to Assad’s <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/b62e834d-e8fe-45a7-be18-3221b3d05515" target="_blank" rel="noopener">disinclination to compromise.</a> With his seat on the throne threatened, an alternative future for Syria, whereby the regional powers negotiate a sustainable settlement between themselves, with heightened urgency and without Western involvement, could plausibly deliver meaningful results. This offensive could, perhaps, have been the jolt necessary to finally bring the Syrian war to a decisive end.</p>
<p>The ongoing <a href="https://x.com/clashreport/status/1863524803845423145" target="_blank" rel="noopener">flurry of diplomacy</a> between <a href="https://x.com/clashreport/status/1863517161676763614" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Russia, Iran and Turkey</a> holds out the slender possibility of a hopeful outcome: neither Russia <a href="https://amwaj.media/media-monitor/iran-weighs-intervention-as-syrian-civil-war-returns-to-spotlight" target="_blank" rel="noopener">nor Iran</a>, busy with other fronts, needs the Syrian war to spring back into full, bloody bloom. Equally, both Arab and Western states, tacitly or openly resigned to Assad’s survival, just want the whole thing to end. It would be pleasing to hope, now that so many of the external actors whose involvement in the war’s high period have removed themselves from the table, that the catastrophic errors of the previous decade could this time be sidestepped. But Syria has proved itself the graveyard of optimism many times before. For all HTS’s attempts at diplomatic outreach, Russia and Iran, locked in confrontation with the broader West, have no real incentive to tread gently in securing their greatest strategic victory of the last decade. Syria spent the 2010s as the harbinger and proving ground of today’s wider international crisis — and once again, the Syrian people, on all sides, look doomed to pay the price of the shifting world order.</p>
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