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		<title>Syrian civil war - UnHerd</title>
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					<title>Anarchy is coming</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2021/03/anarchy-is-coming/?edition=us</link>
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						<![CDATA[Aris Roussinos]]>
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							<![CDATA[Wars in the Middle East are now increasingly fought by proxies. Photo: John Moore/Getty Images]]>
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							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Aris Roussinos</strong> is an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist and a former war reporter.</p>
]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_handle>arisroussinos</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist and a former war reporter.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Tue, 23 Mar 2021 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Tue, 23 Mar 2021 10:47:47 +0000</updated>
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								<![CDATA[The liberal world order has failed to usher in global peace]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">When the Biden administration undertook </span><a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/feb/25/us-airstrike-syria-iran-militia"><span style="font-weight: 400;">its first known act of war</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> a few weeks ago, it provided an illuminating snapshot of conflict in the 21</span><span style="font-weight: 400;">st</span><span style="font-weight: 400;"> century. The aerial strike on Iranian-backed Iraqi Shia militias in eastern Syria, facing territory held by American-backed Syrian proxy forces, in response to the shelling of American positions in Iraq by Iranian-backed Iraqi militias which led to the death of an American private contractor, encapsulates the central role of surrogate warfare in modern conflict. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Like the </span><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/thepost/armenia-another-country-abandoned-to-its-fate/"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Karabakh conflict</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> last year, when </span><a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/stories-55238803"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Turkish-backed Syrian rebel militias</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> fought Armenian conscripts as disposable cannon fodder, as they had previously done in Libya, while Turkish drones </span><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/thepost/tanks-for-the-memory/"><span style="font-weight: 400;">cleared the way</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> for Azerbaijani forces to advance, we were presented with a sobering image of the new face of war. Like the Spanish Civil War before it, </span><a href="https://tcf.org/content/commentary/politics-memory-ten-years-war-syria/"><span style="font-weight: 400;">the decade-long Syrian Civil War</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">, a conflict perpetually about to conclude which yet may never fully end, has revealed itself as a harbinger of dangerous new trends the full implications of which we are yet to fully understand. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">It is only natural, for example, that </span><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2021/03/britains-plan-for-survival/"><span style="font-weight: 400;">last week’s Integrated Review</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> notes that Britain’s state competitors are likely to use proxy forces to challenge the international order, while the forthcoming defence review will mandate </span><a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2021/03/19/british-army-turn-infantry-soldiers-elite-fighters-tackle-high/"><span style="font-weight: 400;">the creation of a new elite “Rangers” regiment</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> formed precisely to advise and fight alongside proxies of our own.</span></p>
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<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">A recent new book, </span><a href="https://www.amazon.co.uk/Surrogate-Warfare-Transformation-Twenty-First-Century/dp/1626166781"><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">Surrogate Warfare</span></i></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">, by the professors of Security Studies Andreas Krieg and Jean-Marc Rickli, does much to synthesise recent academic work on the deteriorating global situation brought about by both technological advance and globalisation. Echoing research on neo-medievalisation within International Relations — the dawning realisation, </span><a href="https://www.amazon.co.uk/Anarchical-Society-Study-Order-Politics/dp/0333985869"><span style="font-weight: 400;">first voiced by the theorist Hedley Bull in 1977</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> that late modernity was heading inexorably to the weakening power of the Westphalian state system and its replacement by an overlapping web of transnational and sub-national actors — its authors present a stark vision of a world of growing anarchy brought about by the intersection of new technologies and the unintended consequences of globalisation.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">As they warn, “the world arguably looks more anarchical in the early twenty-first century than it has ever been in modern times,” as ”with its 9/11 attacks and the spread of global jihadism, massive transnational migration streams, the financial crisis of 2008, and the wide-spread collapse of state authority across Africa and the Middle East — the idealist, classical conceptualizations of conflict in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries appear as historical anomalies.”</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The liberal world order, and the unhindered global movement of information, goods and people it accelerated, was intended to usher in an age of global peace and harmony. Yet instead, it has undermined the basic foundations of the global order, and “</span><span style="font-weight: 400;">state-centrism, the idea that individuals can escape the state of nature only through a covenant binding them to an authority modeled on the Westphalian nation-state, has become archaic in a world of porous borders and growing migrant populations”.</span><span style="font-weight: 400;"> Instead of promoting good governance across the globe, postmodernity has eroded the authority of the state at home and the stability of the international system itself, returning us to a situation analogous to that of the Middle Ages, where sovereignty was widely dispersed, contested and partial.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">By dismantling physical and informational barriers across the globe, the basic capacity of states to provide security for their citizens has become weakened, perhaps fatally. By eroding the lines between home and abroad, postmodernity has globalised conflicts, and eroded even the very distinction between war and peace. Instead of perpetual peace, it has ushered in an age of perpetual anarchy that states are finding themselves powerless to contain. As Krieg &amp; Rickli note, “the globalised conflict is transnational in nature and disregards the state-centric norms, conventions, and laws put in place in the nineteenth century to limit war.” We have entered an era of “everywhere conflicts” where “the authority of the state in the twenty-first century is the weakest it has been since the Peace of Westphalia in 1648.” </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Which cheerleader of globalisation a generation ago would have foreseen that children in Manchester would be blown apart by a British Libyan suicide bomber as a downstream consequence of wars in Syria and Iraq? That social media would inspire young British citizens to journey to the Middle East to keep captured minorities as slaves and slaughter their compatriots on hi-definition video for the horror and delight of their online audiences at home? Such atrocities, and the state’s desperate attempts to provide security to an increasingly unsettled public, are not anomalies, but the natural outcome of the waning of the Westphalian state and the rise of challengers to its authority from both above and below: “insecurity, not security, has become the norm in postmodern society.” </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">As a result, both liberal Western states and their illiberal competitors are driven to intervene in complex and tangled wars with strong ethnic and sectarian dimensions by an unstable and often contradictory mix of humanitarian concerns, security fears and realpolitik. Yet at the same time, both are conscious that their domestic publics are increasingly averse to casualties, particularly in wars not of obvious strategic necessity, with the result that the burden of fighting is shifted to expendable local proxies, while the brunt of casualties is borne by civilians on the ground at the mercy of stand-off weapons. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Eager to avoid unpopular casualties in these “wars of choice,” states are subcontracting the bloody business of fighting on the ground  to local proxies, whose goals may differ from those of their sponsors, and whose behaviour is not subject to any meaningful legal oversight. As Krieg &amp; Rickli note, “the need to remove military action from society’s checks and balances is the single most important driver and aspect of postmodern surrogate warfare in liberal and illiberal states,” driving the push towards stand-off weapons like drones and local proxies on the ground, almost entirely to the detriment of the civilians who live there. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The catastrophic civil war in Syria, the parallel conflict in Yemen and the widening destabilisation of Iraq, Lebanon and Libya exemplify these trends, where external actors like the United States, Russia, Turkey, Iran and the Gulf kingdoms manipulate their local proxy militias like chess pieces while their drones, ballistic missiles and jets lay waste to the ground on which they fight. Instead of democratising the  Middle East as pundits first hoped, the unintended intersection of the Arab Spring, globalisation and new technologies have seen the entire region spiralling into a giant arena of experimentation in 21st century warfare, almost wholly disastrous to its people, as a result of global trends they had no part in making.</span></p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2021/03/twilight-of-the-american-empire/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2021/03/twilight-of-the-american-empire/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/GettyImages-131440013.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2021/03/twilight-of-the-american-empire/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2021/03/twilight-of-the-american-empire/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Twilight of the American empire</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2021/03/twilight-of-the-american-empire/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Aris Roussinos</a></p></div></a></div>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">It is precisely the internationalisation of the wars in Syria, Libya and Yemen that has made them so deadly. Insulated from taking casualties of their own, intervening states have little or no inclination to moderate their activity. Drones and proxy militias are cheap, compared to the mass mobilisation of armies in the 19</span><span style="font-weight: 400;">th</span><span style="font-weight: 400;"> and 20</span><span style="font-weight: 400;">th</span><span style="font-weight: 400;"> centuries: proxy-centred conflicts  are affordable for even mid-ranking powers, lowering the barrier for entrance into conflict and limiting the need to end them quickly. Claims that Russia, or Iran, or Turkey would soon find themselves bogged down in wars they cannot afford have been repeated for years now, without this moment ever being reached. It is for these reasons, and not solely the inherent instabilities of the nations suffering them, that the conflicts of the Arab Spring have continued for so long. Like the Congo war, a parallel case of intervention by regional powers worsening a local conflict, there is no particular reason why they should not smoulder on for decades.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Yet one innovation marks out the Syrian War from its neighbouring conflicts: the centrality of social media in its prosecution. Beginning in 2011, the Syrian conflict’s early stages tracked the transition from Facebook to Twitter in the global information economy, as the site became the chosen platform of journalists, activists and policymakers. The result was not good for journalism, nor for Syria. As Krieg &amp; Rickli note, “the emergence of social media has not just changed patterns of communication across communities but has become a major means of warfare in itself,” where, “in conjunction with kinetic operations on the physical battlefield, the clash over narratives in the cyber sphere sets the parameters for strategic victory.” </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Social media is not just a novel add-on to the modern way of war: it is a weapon that actively shapes the war itself, turning those sharing it into participants themselves. The inherently toxic dynamics of Twitter’s discourse, which inexorably blurs the distinction between journalists, analysts, activists and trolls, reflected the growing divisions on the ground in what became a shifting multipolar conflict between Assad’s loyalist forces, rebels, al-Qaeda and then Islamic State jihadists and Kurds. It also, arguably, exacerbated them. As the Syrian journalist and revolutionary activist Zaina Erhaim </span><a href="https://english.alaraby.co.uk/english/Comment/2021/3/13/Polarisation-gnaws-at-Syrias-hopes-for-reconciliation"><span style="font-weight: 400;">remarks</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">, “international experts and media have also played a role in over-simplifying our complex conflict into two dimensions &#8212; ‘good vs bad,’” hardening and exacerbating the divisions lived by the Syrian people themselves.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">In that the perceptions of intervening actors, whether governments, foreign fighters or NGOs, were partly moulded by this hyper-combative Twitter environment, it can be argued that Twitter helped shape the choices made by external actors which prolonged the conflict. Certainly, Twitter was the dominant means by which Western recruits were entranced by the war’s drama and bloodshed to actively take part: simply by acting as the recruiting sergeant for the Islamic State, Twitter demonstrably worsened the war’s outcome for both the Syrian people and those of neighbouring Iraq. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The Syrian War blurred the distinction between fighter and content creator, armed group and social media account. Militias proliferated on YouTube videos designed to  be shared on social media to attract funding from external sponsors. ISIS cynically gamed journalism, producing lurid and exciting content expressly designed to be shared on social media, and relying on journalists — including me — to spread their propaganda for them. Indeed, ISIS had a symbiotic relationship with both legacy journalism, itself struggling to navigate the new world of social media and declining budgets for original reporting, and on the new hybrid role of online analyst midwifed by Twitter. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">As Krieg &amp; Rickli note, journalists and analysts are </span><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">themselves</span></i><span style="font-weight: 400;"> surrogate actors in the new conflicts, active participants in a new and only partly-understood form of warfare.  “ISIS’s strategy as a global terrorist organisation relies on social media influencers to target the sociopsychology of Western publics,” they write: “Superinfluencers, such as journalists, analysts, and commentators, become unwilling, somewhat coincidental surrogates for the Islamic State as they spread the images and messages of terror.” </span></p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2020/12/the-british-centrists-deluded-worship-of-germany/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2020/12/the-british-centrists-deluded-worship-of-germany/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/GettyImages-1163071416-1.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2020/12/the-british-centrists-deluded-worship-of-germany/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2020/12/the-british-centrists-deluded-worship-of-germany/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>British centrists&#039; deluded worship of Germany</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2020/12/the-british-centrists-deluded-worship-of-germany/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Aris Roussinos</a></p></div></a></div>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Perhaps no state actors have understood these new dynamics as well as Erdogan’s Turkey and  Putin’s Russia. While both use their respective television news networks, staffed by ambitious Western journalists, as traditional forms of propaganda, they are also both sophisticated and competent manipulators of the online battlefield. In Libya and the Karabakh war, Turkey exploited the Syria-derived fashion for online “OSINT” analysis in its favour by </span><a href="https://twitter.com/clashreport"><span style="font-weight: 400;">opening social media accounts in their image</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">, utilising the high-quality cameras on their armed drones to provide exciting war imagery that online journalists would eagerly share on its behalf, just as Russia produces thrilling </span><a href="https://www.youtube.com/c/WarGonzo/videos"><span style="font-weight: 400;">gonzo war footage</span></a> <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6gHbFZeT830"><span style="font-weight: 400;">from Syria for its social media fans</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">. Drone, camera and social media sharer thus become a single, integrated weapon system, a hybrid semi-autonomous proxy as useful and as cheap to operate as the expendable proxies fighting on the ground. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">With the barriers between home and abroad, war and peace eroded by postmodernity, it is not difficult to interpret our own interminable culture wars as part of the globalised everywhere war, with the social media platforms celebrated a decade ago for upturning the sclerotic states of the Arab world now vilified for doing the same at home. Now that our own systems are the focus of popular discontent, we are lectured on the evils of social media, and treated to long and convoluted conspiracy theories of foreign bots and disinformation campaigns precisely mirroring those used by Arab regimes to explain away their peoples’ anger. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">America’s generation-long war on terror has come home, as a new Green Zone sprouts up in the heart of the imperial capital and terror experts refocus their gaze on the internal enemy. Journalists are no longer chroniclers of political conflict but active participants, proxies in a sprawling, decentralised war of narratives. Instead of the claimed depoliticisation of liberal technocracy, every aspect of life now functions as a source of conflict. There is no objective truth or reality, just warring narratives dismantling the political contract between people and their governments, “unable to contain the multiplicity of opinions, narratives, and messages being exchanged in an unconstrained cyber sphere.” </span></p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2019/09/have-we-forgotten-syria/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2019/09/have-we-forgotten-syria/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/1557912769575_0620x0435_1557912845830.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2019/09/have-we-forgotten-syria/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2019/09/have-we-forgotten-syria/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Have we forgotten Syria?</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2019/09/have-we-forgotten-syria/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Ian Birrell</a></p></div></a></div>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Like </span><a href="https://www.amazon.co.uk/Imagined-Communities-Reflections-Origin-Nationalism/dp/1844670864"><span style="font-weight: 400;">the new print media which drove the rise of nationalism</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">, we can interpret the global internet as the mother of new political identities, of micro-nationalisms and never-before-seen ideologies, imagined communities birthed by the online world’s partisan dynamics. Yet perhaps the death of the Westphalian state has been pronounced too early: we are already witnessing </span><a href="https://voxeu.org/article/pandemic-adds-momentum-deglobalisation-trend"><span style="font-weight: 400;">the first stirrings of deglobalisation</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> as the nation-state, desperately fighting for its own survival, seeks to regain control of its own destiny. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The increasing regulation of social media, like the re-erection of barriers between the free flow of capital and people, perhaps marks a resurgence of the Westphalian system. States that have come to rely on proxies to do their fighting for them may yet be forced to return to wars of citizen soldiers to preserve their place in a newly fractured global system. To win a conflict between peer competitors, wars of necessity and not choice, states will be forced to reassert their control  of both physical and virtual space in a way we have not seen in decades. Krieg &amp; Rickli’s book is a valuable study of a neo-medieval order that may already be receding: if the high water mark of globalisation has already been reached, then its ebbing tide may yet reveal the Westphalian system born anew. </span></p>
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					<title>Will Libya tear Nato apart?</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2020/06/will-libya-tear-nato-apart/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://stage.unherd.com/2020/06/will-libya-tear-nato-apart/?edition=us#comments</comments>
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					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Aris Roussinos]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/aris.jpeg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking></unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[2020 is just great isn't it. Photo by Amru Salahuddien/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Aris Roussinos</strong> is an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist and a former war reporter.</p>
]]>
						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>arisroussinos</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist and a former war reporter.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Mon, 22 Jun 2020 08:45:58 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Mon, 22 Jun 2020 10:51:44 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Emmanuel Macron]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[Syrian civil war]]></category>
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								<![CDATA[The North African state is a disaster zone slowly sucking in the region's belligerents ]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">It seems Libya’s unhappy fate is to always be the arena of conflict between great powers, and a testing ground for new forms of war. In 1911, the Italian pilot Lieutenant Giulio Gavotti, serving in the Italian expeditionary force fighting to capture what was then called Tripolitania from its Ottoman Turkish rulers and incorporate it in Italy’s new Mediterranean empire, wrote home to his father: &#8220;Today I have decided to try to throw bombs from the aeroplane. It is the first time that we will try this and if I succeed, I will be really pleased to be the first person to do it.” </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The experiment succeeded beyond Gavotti’s wildest dreams: the concept proven, aerial bombing would dominate the warfare of the ensuing century, levelling Europe’s cities in the following decades, and later the historic trading cities of the Levant in the Arab Spring wars. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Exactly one hundred years after Gavotti’s fateful flight, protestors in the eastern city of Benghazi rose up against the dictator Muammar al-Gadhafi and the current Libyan war began. Nato intervened, winning UN approval for a humanitarian intervention to protect Benghazi and its lightly armed rebels from Gadhafi’s vengeful army, whose tanks were just entering the city’s outskirts when they were incinerated from the sky by the high-tech descendants of Gavotti’s experiment. It is safe to say, at this point, that the results of the Nato intervention were not as intended. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The dreams of an Arab world breaking off the shackles of authoritarianism and joining Europe and America in liberal democratic harmony were shattered by the chaos that followed. Russia’s displeasure at the humanitarian intervention it had reluctantly acceded to escalating into regime change led directly to </span><a href="https://www.una.org.uk/did-libyan-intervention-give-r2p-bad-name"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Putin’s refusal </span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">to countenance Western airstrikes against the Syrian government</span><span style="font-weight: 400;">, and to Russia’s own, </span><span style="font-weight: 400;">brutal and — so far — </span><a href="https://syrianarchive.org/en/collections/russian-airstrikes/"><span style="font-weight: 400;">successful aerial intervention</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> to prop up Assad’s rule. Even Benghazi’s Italianate architecture, its unique glory, has been destroyed, not by Gadhafi’s tanks but by the </span><a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-libya-security/where-libyas-revolution-began-many-now-yearn-for-a-strong-hand-idUSKCN1QA0QR"><span style="font-weight: 400;">bitter fighting which ravaged the city</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> in the decade since the Western alliance declared victory.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The Nato intervention promised at the time to herald a new wave of military campaigns for humanitarian ends, and to give the Atlantic alliance a cause to justify its continued existence long after the end of the Cold War. Instead, allies are now locked in a naval standoff off Libya’s coast which threatens to break the alliance apart, and to drag European militaries into the ever-widening chaos of the Arab Spring wars. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The current Libyan conflict derives from longstanding</span> <a href="https://www.ecfr.eu/mena/mapping_libya_conflict"><span style="font-weight: 400;">regional rivalries</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> within the country, but has become subject to the antagonisms destabilising the region as a whole, sucked into the Middle East Cold War now playing out from the Red Sea to Italy’s shores. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The Turkish government of Recep Tayyip Erdogan, along with its financial backer Qatar saw the Arab Spring as an opportunity to promote revolutionary Muslim Brotherhood governance projects across the Arab world. It also supports the Tripoli administration of Fayez al-Sarraj, which nominally leads </span><a href="https://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR_Mapping_of_Libyas_factions.pdf"><span style="font-weight: 400;">an unstable coalition</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> of Islamist groups, regional autonomists from the coastal city of Misrata and from the western Amazigh Berber minority, and urban militias </span><a href="https://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/T-Briefing-Papers/SAS-SANA-BP-Tripoli-armed-groups.pdf"><span style="font-weight: 400;">indistinguishable from organised crime cartels</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">. </span></p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2020/06/the-case-for-tory-anarchism/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2020/06/the-case-for-tory-anarchism/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/GettyImages-1219247691.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2020/06/the-case-for-tory-anarchism/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2020/06/the-case-for-tory-anarchism/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The case for Tory anarchism</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2020/06/the-case-for-tory-anarchism/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Aris Roussinos</a></p></div></a></div>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">On the opposing side, the counterrevolutionary Gulf kingdoms of </span><a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-06-17/uae-hints-at-frustrations-with-beleaguered-libyan-ally-haftar"><span style="font-weight: 400;">the UAE</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> and </span><a href="https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2020/02/saudi-arabia-role-liyba-gna-hifter.html"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Saudi Arabia</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">, along with their local client Egypt, back the would-be strongman Khalifa Haftar and Libya’s rival government in the eastern city of Tobruk. The Libyan National Army forces there are composed of </span><a href="https://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/81917"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Cyrenaican tribesmen</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> and <a href="https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2018/0117/Libya-crisis-as-opportunity-Who-are-the-Madkhalis" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">quietist Salafist militias</a>, along with mercenaries from Sudan and Chad.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Having taken control of almost all the country, Haftar’s LNA forces, heavily-armed and lavishly equipped through the largesse of the UAE, launched a push to seize the capital last April. It precipitated an intensified Turkish intervention to prop up the Tripoli government. Erdogan flooded the battle space with Bayraktar drones, armoured vehicles, Turkish military advisors and thousands of Syrian mercenaries from Turkey’s proxy militias, still notionally referred to as Syrian rebels. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The Turkish intervention changed the course of the war, with Haftar’s forces</span><a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/independentpremium/world/libya-tripoli-airport-haftar-serraj-erdogan-attack-army-a9549536.html"><span style="font-weight: 400;"> retreating from Tripoli</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> in disarray, harried by drone strikes from the air and artillery on the ground. Last week, Turkey’s foreign minister </span><span style="font-weight: 400;">Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu</span><span style="font-weight: 400;"> and spy chief Hakan Fidan </span><a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/libya-welcomed-turkish-delegation-s-visit-cavusoglu/1880980"><span style="font-weight: 400;">visited Tripoli in triumph</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">, promising a new era of strategic and economic cooperation between Erdogan’s government and its Libyan client.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">It is the </span><a href="https://asiatimes.com/2020/06/turkeys-blue-homeland-doctrine-takes-shape-in-libya/"><span style="font-weight: 400;">expansionist nature</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> of this cooperation that most alarms European officials. Earlier this year, shortly before intervening in force in Libya, the Turkish government signed a </span><a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-libya-idUSKBN1Y213I"><span style="font-weight: 400;">memorandum of understanding</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> with Sarraj’s besieged Tripoli administration, dividing up much of the Eastern Mediterranean, and its plentiful undersea deposits of oil and gas, between them. This MoU, which saw Turkey claim for itself Greek waters up to the coast of Crete, immediately drew condemnation from the European Union and the United States. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The discovery of petroleum deposits beneath the Eastern Mediterranean had already drawn the region into a </span><a href="https://www.ecfr.eu/specials/eastern_med"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Cold War</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> of sorts, with Greece and Cyprus assembling a regional defence and </span><a href="https://www.financialmirror.com/2020/01/27/athens-agreement-bolsters-east-med-alliance/"><span style="font-weight: 400;">energy coalition</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> including Israel and Egypt to box Turkey in and divide the potential oil wealth between them. The United States backs the alliance, seeing a future Eastern Mediterranean oil pipeline as a rival to Russia’s petroleum exports to the EU, diminishing the diplomatic leverage Putin’s market dominance holds over Germany and central Europe.</span></p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2020/06/the-case-for-national-hobbitism/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2020/06/the-case-for-national-hobbitism/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/GettyImages-871865922-e1605807105712.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2020/06/the-case-for-national-hobbitism/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2020/06/the-case-for-national-hobbitism/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Britain should stay out of Cold War II</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2020/06/the-case-for-national-hobbitism/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Aris Roussinos</a></p></div></a></div>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Turkish threats to send drill ships into Greek and Cypriot waters, along with Erdogan’s alternating requests for Greece to </span><a href="https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20200127-greece-rejects-turkey-call-to-demilitarise-aegean-islands/"><span style="font-weight: 400;">demilitarise its eastern islands</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> and </span><a href="https://www.keeptalkinggreece.com/2019/09/18/turkey-claims-aegean-mykonos-paros-naxos/"><span style="font-weight: 400;">threats to invade them</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">, already risk an </span><a href="https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/7x5x3q/greece-and-turkey-are-playing-dangerous-war-games-on-the-aegean-sea"><span style="font-weight: 400;">incident in the Eastern Mediterranean</span></a> <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/12/greece-turkey-closer-armed-conflict-experts-191205214345751.html"><span style="font-weight: 400;">escalating into a war </span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">between the two notional Nato allies. France, increasingly hostile to Turkey and a major strategic player in the Eastern Mediterranean for the first time since the mid-19</span><span style="font-weight: 400;">th</span><span style="font-weight: 400;"> century, has stepped in as Greece’s military patron, conducting joint naval and aerial drills, and deploying frigates and </span><a href="https://www.ekathimerini.com/249188/article/ekathimerini/news/french-aircraft-carrier-in-cyprus-block-8"><span style="font-weight: 400;">an aircraft carrier</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> to ward off Turkish encroachment in Greek and Cypriot water. The defence partnership has been derided by the Turkish foriegn ministry as the “</span><a href="https://www.mfa.gov.tr/sc_-33_-gkry-ortak-bildiri-hk-sc.en.mfa"><span style="font-weight: 400;">axis of malice</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">”. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Indeed, Emmanuel Macron has now emerged as Erdogan’s fiercest critic within the Nato, accusing the Turkish government of </span><a href="https://news.yahoo.com/squabbles-overshadow-nato-70th-anniversary-summit-013415153.html"><span style="font-weight: 400;">supporting ISIS in Syria</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">, of destabilising the region by launching wars against America’s Syrian Kurdish allies, and of accelerating the “brain death” of the Western alliance. </span><a href="https://www.rusi.org/commentary/Libya-France-A-Revival-of-Napoleonism"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Quietly backing Haftar</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">, France now finds itself working alongside<a href="https://rusi.org/commentary/russias-strategy-libya"> Russia in Libya</a>, with the wartorn country emerging as the testing ground for Macron’s rapprochement with Nato’s eastern rival. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Russian mercenaries from the Wagner Group, perhaps paid for by the UAE, are now deployed against the Tripoli government and its Turkish and Syrian mercenary allies on the battlefields of Libya. <a href="https://www.military.com/daily-news/2020/06/18/russian-fighter-jet-activity-libya-part-of-larger-influence-campaign-general-says.html">Advanced Russian fighter jets</a>, perhaps also piloted by mercenaries, have been flown to Libya to counteract Turkey’s aerial superiority in the conflict, as each escalation leads to counter-escalation on the part of the rival factions’ external patrons. As Haftar’s forces pull back towards the east of the country, neighbouring Egypt, another American client state at odds with Turkey since its military ruler Abdel Fattah el-Sisi overthrew his predecessor Mohammed Morsi’s Muslim Brotherhood government in 2014, has threatened to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-libya-security-egypt/egypt-has-a-legitimate-right-to-intervene-in-libya-sisi-says-idUSKBN23R0W1">intervene directly</a>. With the possibility of outright victory </span><a href="https://www.cfr.org/blog/prospects-peace-libya-are-bleak"><span style="font-weight: 400;">likely to elude each side</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">, a division of the country into two warring entities, each a</span><a href="https://www.ecfr.eu/publications/summary/libyas_global_civil_war1"><span style="font-weight: 400;"> proxy of rival regional powers</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">, is emerging on Europe’s southern doorstep.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">For the European Union, Libya’s growing chaos is a strategic disaster. With the country both a training hub for terrorism and the central launching ground for the migrant boats upending the continent’s politics, EU officials had hoped that Libya would become the trial run for the continental bloc’s new policy of </span><a href="https://carnegieeurope.eu/2020/06/11/eu-security-and-defense-challenges-toward-european-defense-winter-pub-82032"><span style="font-weight: 400;">strategic autonomy</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">. After all, a Turkish government that so vigorously </span><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2020/03/get-ready-for-fortress-europe/"><span style="font-weight: 400;">uses migrants as a diplomatic weapon</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> against the EU’s eastern borders will surely not be a reliable partner controlling migration from the south. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Similarly, Turkey’s </span><a href="https://www.nordicmonitor.com/2019/10/former-us-envoy-claims-40000-isis-fighters-came-via-turkey/"><span style="font-weight: 400;">indulgent attitude </span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">to </span><a href="https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2020/02/turkey-syria-russia-is-ankara-changing-strategy-in-dlib-hts.html"><span style="font-weight: 400;">jihadist fighters in Syria</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> does not bode well for its role in Libya, or in the wider Sahel where French and European forces are already struggling to control a growing jihadist insurgency. “It’s a danger to ourselves,” French defence minister Yves Le Drian told </span><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">Le Figaro</span></i><span style="font-weight: 400;"> last week, “an unacceptable strategic risk, because it’s 200 km from the Italian coast.”</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Yet the </span><a href="https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_make_believe_in_the_med_europes_new_libya_mission"><span style="font-weight: 400;">EU’s </span><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">Irini</span></i><span style="font-weight: 400;"> naval operation</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">, which sees French and Greek warships join German reconnaissance aircraft in a mission to enforce the UN arms embargo on the warring factions, was slow to begin and controversial from the start. By focusing on shipments by sea, </span><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">Irini</span></i><span style="font-weight: 400;"> has no mandate to monitor or intercept weapons shipments to Haftar’s LNA forces from the UAE and Egypt, validating Turkish claims that the mission is biased against its own intervention. Yet by fusing the separate disputes over the Eastern Mediterranean’s oilfields, the Syrian war and the battle for control of Libya into one </span><a href="https://www.ecfr.eu/specials/eastern_med"><span style="font-weight: 400;">interwoven and escalating conflict</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">, Erdogan’s Turkey has created an intractable mess almost impossible to de-escalate, with the risk of open warfare between Nato members growing every day. </span></p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2020/06/high-stakes-india-and-chinas-border-brawl/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2020/06/high-stakes-india-and-chinas-border-brawl/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/GettyImages-82077247.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2020/06/high-stakes-india-and-chinas-border-brawl/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2020/06/high-stakes-india-and-chinas-border-brawl/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Can India keep China at bay?</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2020/06/high-stakes-india-and-chinas-border-brawl/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Tim Marshall</a></p></div></a></div>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Only last week, </span><a href="https://www.lefigaro.fr/international/le-courbet-navire-francais-au-large-de-la-libye-vise-par-une-manoeuvre-turque-extremement-agressive-20200617"><span style="font-weight: 400;">France accused </span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">Turkish warships of locking their missile-launching radar onto the French frigate </span><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">Courbet, </span></i><span style="font-weight: 400;">an “aggressive act” designed to deter the French navy from intercepting arms shipments to Tripoli. &#8220;The Turks are behaving in an unacceptable manner and are exploiting NATO,” a French official told the press, “France cannot just stand by.” Turkey’s foreign ministry responded with a statement claiming that “the support France has provided to the putschist and pirate Haftar &#8230; has exacerbated the crisis in Libya.  </span><span style="font-weight: 400;">What should actually be a cause for concern are France’s dark ties. It is unacceptable for a NATO ally to behave this way.” </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Similarly, Greece’s defence minister Nikos Panagiotopoulos warned this month that Greece is ready for war with Turkey, telling journalists that “we are preparing for any scenarios. Among these possibilities is also military intervention. We do not want to go there, but we want to make it clear that we will do whatever it takes to defend our sovereign rights to the fullest extent possible.” </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The Nato intervention in Libya almost a decade ago was surely the high water mark of </span><span style="font-weight: 400;">American hegemony and its post-Cold War justifying ideology of liberal interventionism.</span><span style="font-weight: 400;"> America and its European allies were able to overthrow a brutal dictator, but soon found themselves entirely powerless to influence what replaced him. Now the United States finds itself a backseat spectator to the region’s spiralling chaos, the security of its European allies threatened by the jostling for position America’s growing weakness has unleashed, and the future of the Nato alliance itself threatened by the fruits of its own poorly-conceived campaign. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The EU, equally, had long hoped to be a new kind of superpower, where soft power and the assumed appeal of the European way of life would obviate the need to sully itself with the rough business of force. Yet as the escalating crisis in the Mediterranean shows, Europe’s inability to project hard power leaves the continent’s security at the mercy of smaller but more forceful actors. European states who had hoped to export democracy to Libya instead find themselves importing terrorism from the country, as shown by Saturday’s lethal attack in Reading. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">In a reversal of Gavotti’s historic experiment, it is Turkey and other Middle Eastern states who are now the expansionist military innovators in Libya and the wider region and European governments who are passive spectators to history, defensive and fearful of what is coming next.</span></p>
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					<title>The case for Tory anarchism</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2020/06/the-case-for-tory-anarchism/?edition=us</link>
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						<![CDATA[Aris Roussinos]]>
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							<![CDATA[What could go wrong? (Photo by David Ryder/Getty Images)]]>
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							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Aris Roussinos</strong> is an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist and a former war reporter.</p>
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						<unherd:twitter_handle>arisroussinos</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist and a former war reporter.]]>
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										<pubDate>Sun, 14 Jun 2020 23:08:23 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Mon, 15 Jun 2020 08:16:51 +0000</updated>
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		<category><![CDATA[Capitol Hill Autonomous Zone]]></category>
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								<![CDATA[The emergence of the CHAZ in Seattle provides lessons about self-governance at local level]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>America’s ongoing disorder has thrown up a moment of levity — as well as genuine political experimentation — in the birth of the Capitol Hill Autonomous Zone, a quasi-anarchist statelet carved out of six blocks of a gentrified district of Seattle.</p>
<p>Rarely has the process of state formation been observable to such a wide audience in real time. But will the CHAZ vindicate Rousseau’s utopian and cooperative vision of human nature, or that of Hobbes, who traces the origin of the state in the acquiescence of the mass to authority, for its own protection from anarchy and extortion?</p>
<p>The reality, as always, contains elements of both. But perhaps the most fascinating element in Seattle’s ongoing experiment is the adoption of many of the trappings of the Autonomous Administration of Northeast Syria, formerly known as Rojava. This is another quasi-anarchist statelet which has been carved out from the chaos and bloodshed of the nearly decade-long civil war, becoming the country’s most competent and harmonious system of governance.</p>
<p>Governing between a third and half the country at its height, managing Syria’s most ethnically and religiously diverse region, and controlling its most productive wheat and oilfields, the AANES project has achieved a cult status among many young Western leftists. They view the region as a viable and appealing alternative to both liberal capitalism and state communism and have flocked to take part in the project.</p>
<p>They are <a href="https://makerojavagreenagain.org" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">reforesting the region’s arid plains</a> and fighting as part of the local YPG militia to preserve the statelet’s autonomy. <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/mar/19/briton-kurds-anna-campbell-dies-fighting-turkey-syria-afrin" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">Indeed, many of these young activists</a> who abhor the very notion of borders in their own countries have died to defend the borders of the Autonomous Administration from both ISIS and Turkish attacks.</p>
<p>Back in Seattle, one groupuscule, “Demand Utopia Seattle”, has renamed itself as the <em>Democratic Confederalists of the Puget Sound </em>in homage to the AANES experiment, and <a href="https://blacksocialists.us/our-strategy" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">further afield the “Black Socialists of America”</a> movement <a href="https://twitter.com/BlackSocialists/status/1267075053532962816?s=20" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">explicitly cites</a> the Rojava administration’s model of policing by community militias as a model for the US to emulate.</p>
<p>Indeed, much of the Left-wing American discourse around police abolition derives directly from an idealised misapprehension of the nature of policing in northeastern Syria. While it is true that the region’s HPC militia functions as an armed neighbourhood watch— some 40,000 HPC militiamen and women are currently deployed guarding the growing wheat harvest from ISIS sabotage— they are not central to maintaining social order.</p>
<p>Over the seven years that I have been visiting northeastern Syria as a journalist, policing has become increasingly professionalised. There are separate and well-armed militias for the purposes of general crime prevention, traffic police, highly-trained and well-equipped special forces teams for counterterrorism operations and military police to find and detain draft-dodgers and return them to their units. It is not a slight on the region’s genuine achievements to observe that, for all its ideological basis in anarchist thought, it is a highly bureaucratic security state, and far from the policing abolitionist demands of American protestors.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2020/06/covid-has-exposed-america-as-a-failed-state/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2020/06/covid-has-exposed-america-as-a-failed-state/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/GettyImages-1235424618.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2020/06/covid-has-exposed-america-as-a-failed-state/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2020/06/covid-has-exposed-america-as-a-failed-state/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Covid has exposed America as a failed state</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2020/06/covid-has-exposed-america-as-a-failed-state/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Aris Roussinos</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Indeed, one of the most interesting aspects of the AANES experiment is that it is a testing ground for anarchist thought, where ideology is adapted to the demands of real-world governance. Where the theory fails, it is abandoned. Those aspects of the traditional Westphalian state found to be useful or necessary are adopted, forming a hybrid system of governance, part-anarchist, part-statist, part autonomous statelet, part traditional state.</p>
<p>As for the theory itself, much of AANES’s system of governance derives from the work of the little-known American political theorist <a href="https://www.nybooks.com/daily/2018/06/15/how-my-fathers-ideas-helped-the-kurds-create-a-new-democracy/" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">Murray Bookchin</a>, whose post-anarchist thought, filtered through the idiosyncratic readings of the jailed PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan, have become the region’s governing philosophy.</p>
<p>On the Left then, as much as on the illiberal Islamist Right, the Syrian war has filtered back to the politics of the West. Rojava’s success, and the romantic drama of a multi-ethnic and gender-equal libertarian socialist statelet fighting and beating ISIS in the middle of the most brutal civil conflict for a generation has led to a revival of Bookchin’s ideas in western discourse.</p>
<p>Bookchin’s political philosophy, centred on “a network of administrative councils whose members or delegates are elected from popular face-to-face democratic assemblies, in the various villages, towns, <a href="https://libcom.org/files/Murray%20Bookchin-The%20Next%20Revolution.%20Popular%20Assemblies%20and%20the%20Promise%20of%20Direct%20Democracy-Verso%20(2015).pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">and even neighbourhoods of large cities”</a>, are attractive as an alternative to the crisis of liberalism. Versions have been adopted, in one form or another, by European administrations from <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/news/our-columnists/barcelonas-experiment-in-radical-democracy" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">Barcelona’s city council</a> to, on a more parochial level, Frome’s experiment in<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2015/may/22/flatpack-democracy-peoples-republic-of-frome" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer"> governance by popular assembly.</a></p>
<p>It is with good reason that one of Rojava’s most prominent advocates in the UK is Blue Labour’s<a href="https://www.newstatesman.com/world/middle-east/2019/10/no-friends-mountains" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer"> Lord Glasman, a frequent visitor to northeastern Syria,</a> who has discerned in the region’s fledgling political order a potential model for post-liberals here at home.</p>
<p>To cite a provincial region of war-torn Syria as a model example of good governance generally, I can confidently attest, provokes mirth and disbelief from British post-liberals. Yet the ability of its systems of local councils and radical direct democracy to maintain social harmony and functioning political order in the most ethnically- and religiously-mixed region of a country torn apart by civil war suggests it may have lessons to offer our own country, currently struggling with far less brutal but growing political divisions.</p>
<p>Glasman’s idea of the self-governing church and village hall-centred ’parish commune’, derived from the Rojava experiment, is an attempt to reshape anarchist-inflected thought for a socially conservative but politically radical British context. Indeed it has shared philosophical roots in Britain’s Red Tory and Blue Labour traditions of radical working class politics and robust and ecologically-minded localism, all rooted in a pre-capitalist social order.</p>
<p>This is not a case of convergent evolution but rather of common philosophical descent. The intellectual basis of anarchism, which must be understood as a serious political tradition distinct from the black-clad, window-smashing stormtroopers of liberalism derisively dismissed by Bookchin as “lifestyle anarchists”, originates in the same romantic appreciation of the pre-liberal order as the medievalising tendency in British conservative socialism. It is not by accident that the major anarchist theorists Peter Kropotkin and Errico Malatesta descend from decayed aristocratic families whose pre-modern utopia was shattered by base and vulgar bourgeois capitalism.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2020/06/the-case-for-national-hobbitism/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2020/06/the-case-for-national-hobbitism/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/GettyImages-871865922-e1605807105712.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2020/06/the-case-for-national-hobbitism/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2020/06/the-case-for-national-hobbitism/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Britain should stay out of Cold War II</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2020/06/the-case-for-national-hobbitism/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Aris Roussinos</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>For Kropotkin, <a href="https://libcom.org/library/mutual-aid-5" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">the medieval guild presented a vision of the anarchist future</a>, where each “had its own self-jurisdiction, its own military force, its own general assemblies, its own traditions of struggles, glory, and independence, its own relations with other guilds of the same trade in other cities: it had, in a word, a full organic life which could only result from the integrality of the vital functions.”</p>
<p>For Malatesta, similarly, anarchism in practice would sound more like Burke’s famous “little platoons” than the oppressive structures of state communism he regarded as a certain route to totalitarianism, centred around the “organisation of social life by means of free association and federations of producers and consumers”.</p>
<p>The medievalising tendency in radical politics has its basis in the premodern system of widespread local autonomy through guilds, wards, moots and parish self-governance, a system eroded when the Early Modern state began its long process of centralisation. As noted by historians like Peter H. Wilson<a href="https://www.amazon.co.uk/Holy-Roman-Empire-Thousand-Europes/dp/1846143187" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer"> in his sprawling chronicle of the Holy Roman Empire,</a> medieval politics can be understood as a series of brakes on the power of the central state, where kings found it difficult to assert their power and local autonomy was stubbornly defended by the people.</p>
<p>Evolved versions of medieval direct democracy are seen in the political systems of <a href="https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/07/switzerland-direct-democracy-explained/" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">Switzerland</a> and <a href="https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/iceland-direct-democracy-in-action/" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">Iceland</a>, yet while only <a href="https://www.laxtonnotts.org.uk/Laxton%20manorial_system.htm" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">a few relics of this lost system</a> of self-governance <a href="https://www.nationalreview.com/corner/island-of-sark-feudalism/" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">still exist in Britain,</a> the romantic appeal of this lost social order has influenced thinkers of Left and Right for centuries.</p>
<p>Perhaps its time has come again.<a href="https://sso.id.kent.ac.uk/idp/module.php/core/loginuserpass.php?AuthState=_0331347b3ab733cf9578fb1167e10595be3c3caa30%3Ahttps%3A%2F%2Fsso.id.kent.ac.uk%2Fidp%2Fsaml2%2Fidp%2FSSOService.php%3Fspentityid%3Dhttps%253A%252F%252Fsso.id.kent.ac.uk%252Fchain%26RelayState%3Dhttps%253A%252F%252Fsso.id.kent.ac.uk%252Fchain%252Fezproxy.php%253Furl%253Dhttps%253A%252F%252Fjournals.sagepub.com%252Fdoi%252Fpdf%252F10.1177%252F1755088217713765%26cookieTime%3D1592208884" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer"> A current trend in academic political theory</a> observes that globalisation, by weakening the power of the nation state in favour of transnational and sub-national entities from global corporations to NGOs and international terrorist groups, has plunged us into a “neo-medieval” world of overlapping authority, where ties of loyalty and power reside beyond and beneath the borders of the modern state.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09592318.2015.1129168" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">According to this framework,</a> “the political and social order following the Treaty of Westphalia of 1648 – resulting ultimately in the nation-state system as we have come to know it in the modern world – is an anomaly, and… the world is reverting back to conditions of fluid borders (now including those found in cyberspace), complex and overlapping sovereignty, a return of religion to the political sphere, and the blurring of peace and war which pre-dated it in the medieval period.” The centralised, statist world of modernity is perhaps already past, then, whether we wish it or not, and what seemed a long-forgotten past has become our future.<em> </em></p>
<p>Given this neo-medieval drift within postmodernity, is a High Tory anarchism of autonomous town and village councils, a radical localism of “every field and hedgerow,” a viable political system? No less a reactionary than Tolkien believed so. In a 1943 letter to his son Christopher, <a href="https://www.firstthings.com/web-exclusives/2010/11/anarcho-monarchism" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">the romantic visionary of Deep England</a> remarked that: “My political opinions lean more and more to Anarchy (philosophically understood, meaning the abolition of control not whiskered men with bombs)—or to ‘unconstitutional’ Monarchy. I would arrest anybody who uses the word State (in any sense other than the inanimate real of England and its inhabitants, a thing that has neither power, rights nor mind); and after a chance of recantation, execute them if they remained obstinate!”</p>
<p>Similarly George Orwell, another idiosyncratic political visionary of a type only England can produce, stated his politics were those of the “Tory anarchist,” a political category defined by the <a href="https://www.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1467-9248.2012.00950.x" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">political theorist Peter Wilkin</a> as “a form of cultural dissident, out of step with and in opposition to many features of the modern world” displaying “respect for privacy and the liberty of individuals, a fear of the state and its expanding power over social life; a nostalgic and melancholy temper that laments the passing of an ‘Old England’; criticism of social conformism; and a pervasive sense of pessimism about the fate of the modern world.”</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2020/06/the-great-artist-of-deep-england/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2020/06/the-great-artist-of-deep-england/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/GettyImages-148276184.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2020/06/the-great-artist-of-deep-england/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2020/06/the-great-artist-of-deep-england/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The great artist of Deep England</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2020/06/the-great-artist-of-deep-england/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Niall Gooch</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Many British conservatives will recognise themselves in this description. The sad truth is that the Westminster system, despised by the majority of voters, has done little to defend the common good and much to accelerate the economic and social harms that have fractured British society. It is an unfortunate political reality for British conservatives that the space for Burkean little platoons has been filled not by organic local guilds and associations but by a state-funded quangocracy of NGOs and deliberative bodies, <a href="https://www.conservativehome.com/platform/2020/01/sam-packer-the-government-is-still-packing-quangos-with-left-wing-activists.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">almost exclusively staffed by liberals</a>, which stifle any opportunity for meaningful political change and accelerate the total political victory of liberalism even where <a href="https://www.spectator.co.uk/article/the-quango-state-how-the-left-still-runs-britain" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">conservatives win elections</a>. The total capture of the civil sphere by liberal ideologues of Left and Right has left British conservatism with a hollowed-out intellectual tradition and a beaten-down sense of failure and loss. How can you be a conservative when there&#8217;s nothing left to conserve?</p>
<p>Perhaps the only solution is a radical conservatism, following the meditative dictum of the Prince of Salinas in Lampedusa’s Italian novel <em>The Leopard</em> that, “for things to stay as they are, everything must change.” There are two possible paths for conservatism, now that the centre ground has been destroyed by fundamentalist liberalism: the first is the conversion of conservatives to vengeful reactionaries, seeking to dramatically overturn unwanted change rather than slow it; the second is to reset the arena of political conflict entirely, abandoning a battlefield so heavily stacked against conservative victory, and creating a new one where democratic victories can be fairly implemented by the very people who themselves demand them.</p>
<p>The anti-modernist roots England’s unique and idiosyncratic utopian High Tory tradition shares, counterintuitively, with anarchism hint that British conservatism could, like northeast Syria, adapt the few aspects of radical left thought that actually work to its own cultural and political context.</p>
<p>With one stroke, the dead hand of the managerial para-state would be severed, freeing conservative politics from the stultifying grasp of quangos, lobby hacks and politicised civil servants. The pitfalls of populist anger directed at a distant and dysfunctional Westminster could be avoided by removing Westminster from the equation almost entirely, continuing the unfinished business of devolution and its unresolved English Question, and reintegrating the long-neglected regions into a functioning political whole.</p>
<p>Though he would no doubt recoil from the term anarchism, the Conservative MP Matt Warman suggested just such a scheme for radical localism in a little-noticed <a href="https://www.cps.org.uk/files/reports/original/180720173103-WhoGovernsBritain.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">2017 policy paper</a> urging the “relentless devolution of powers and responsibilities down the democratic food chain to the lowest possible level,” emphasising “that’s not about shifting power from Whitehall to county councils and unitary authorities; it’s about asking what can parishes take from districts, and making clear to devolved administrations that devolution doesn’t end when power moves from Whitehall or Brussels to Holyrood.”</p>
<p>A radical reordering of British politics along these lines might work as follows: only the great issues of state like defence, foreign policy and finance would be overseen by Whitehall, with responsibility for health care, taxation, education, policing devolved to genuinely popular assemblies at county, town, district and parish level. This might do much to assuage the growing and dangerous disconnect British voters feel between their needs and the state’s response. In northeastern Syria, a far more divided society than the UK, a fragile political harmony has been achieved by the proliferation of local assemblies with genuine capabilities for self-governance, winning popular support by incorporating hitherto marginal communities in the business of politics.</p>
<p>Similarly, Covid-19 has shown that smaller political units, from the German <em>länder</em> to American states and tiny Baltic and central European countries, have consistently performed better dealing with the crisis than flailing central governments in the UK and US. “Small is beautiful,” as the economist E.F. Schumaker noted in his call for a return to the local scale, and as the fragility of the global system shown by Covid-19 as well as the sudden resurgence of local food and mutual aid networks as a result both demonstrate, perhaps a more robust and sustainable future politics can be found in the radical localism of our past.</p>
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					<title>How daughters turn fathers into feminists</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2020/02/how-daughters-turn-fathers-into-feminists/?edition=us</link>
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						<![CDATA[Tom Chivers]]>
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							<![CDATA[Did John Wayne become a feminist as-a-father-of-daughters? Credit: Getty/Images]]>
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							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Tom Chivers</strong> is a science writer. His second book, <em>How to Read Numbers</em>, is out now.</p>
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						<unherd:twitter_handle>TomChivers</unherd:twitter_handle>
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						<![CDATA[ is a science writer. His second book, <em>How to Read Numbers</em>, is out now.]]>
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										<pubDate>Tue, 11 Feb 2020 00:25:20 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Tue, 11 Feb 2020 11:54:53 +0000</updated>
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								<![CDATA[Sometimes it does take fatherhood to turn on men's empathy-valve]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Four years and four months ago, I became the father of a daughter, Ada, our second child. As is traditional, I am a pushover with her where I was stern with our son; she gets forgiven things that Billy would have been naughty-stepped for 20 times over. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Sometimes I try to interrogate my own reasons for it, in that guilty way that parents do with every decision we make, everything that we could have done differently. I wonder if it’s second-child syndrome, that everything she does is old hat to us so we’re relaxed, whereas everything the eldest one does is new ground broken and new fears faced. Or if it’s just differences in personality, that she tends to misbehave with a cheeky grin that makes it harder to be angry. Or, of course, if it’s simple sexism: I forgive the girl-child things I wouldn’t the boy, because gender roles. I don’t know what the truth is.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Another cliché is that fathers of daughters are suddenly supposed to have </span><a href="https://medium.com/@chrisdeerin/ms-sturgeon-tear-down-this-wall-196d3389acf9"><span style="font-weight: 400;">a wave of newfound feminist feeling</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">. “As a father of daughters, I now realise that, in fact, women should have the vote,” we are meant to say; or, “As a father of daughters, I now realise that perhaps we should pay women nearly as much money as men.” </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">It’s such a trope that I know of at least two articles spoofing it. Both of them are good and funny and hit home. “As a man with no daughters, I am completely incapable of feeling any empathy towards any woman whatsoever,” says </span><a href="https://www.newstatesman.com/politics/feminism/2017/10/man-no-daughters-here-are-my-views-feminism"><span style="font-weight: 400;">one</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">. “How merrily I used to drive down country lanes in my old Ford, periodically dodging off-road to mow down female pedestrians (you must remember I had no daughters then),” recalls </span><a href="https://the-toast.net/2016/04/18/father-daughters-think-treat-women-like-daughters/"><span style="font-weight: 400;">the other</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">. Other pieces are more </span><a href="https://www.bustle.com/p/these-tweets-about-men-who-say-as-a-father-of-daughters-in-regard-to-sexual-assault-are-savage-2891558"><span style="font-weight: 400;">straightforwardly </span></a><a href="https://www.vulture.com/2017/10/damon-affleck-father-of-daughters-excuse-harvey-weinstein.html"><span style="font-weight: 400;">angry</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">I haven’t greatly noticed such a change in myself, I think probably because I’m already as perfectly egalitarian and pro-women as it’s possible to be; DM me if you want lessons in feminism, ladies! But there’s an implicit accusation in the trope, and I want to defend my fellow fathers-of-daughters from it.</span></p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2019/12/so-did-the-voters-just-get-it-wrong/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2019/12/so-did-the-voters-just-get-it-wrong/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/GettyImages-1183617887-5.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2019/12/so-did-the-voters-just-get-it-wrong/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2019/12/so-did-the-voters-just-get-it-wrong/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>So did &#039;idiot voters&#039; get it wrong?</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2019/12/so-did-the-voters-just-get-it-wrong/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Tom Chivers</a></p></div></a></div>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The accusation, I think, goes something like this. The father-of-daughters didn’t care about women beforehand; he was unable to even process the idea of them as fully human. Now that he has daughters, he wishes to protect them from bad things, and to do that — he belatedly realises — he needs to protect all women. But it shouldn’t take the production of a new woman from your genetic material to realise that women deserve equal pay, a life without fear of assault and all those other things. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">There’s also a suggestion that fathers in these situations </span><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">still</span></i><span style="font-weight: 400;"> don’t see women as fully human: they wish to protect their daughters because they see themselves as the owners of those daughters, and wish to protect their property; or because their daughters are extensions of themselves, and they wish to protect themselves.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Most especially, I think the argument is: it should be </span><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">obvious</span></i><span style="font-weight: 400;"> that women deserve all the things that men deserve, and if a man needs to procreate to realise it, then something is wrong with that man.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">To argue that that is not necessarily the case, I want to go back to a beach in Turkey in 2015. </span><span style="font-weight: 400;">That autumn, a little boy called Alan Kurdi died with his brother and mother, trying to cross the sea to Europe having escaped the Syrian civil war. You’ll remember the awful photo; it was everywhere, the little boy on the beach. A year or so later, another awful photo went viral, of another young boy, Omran Dagneesh, covered in dust and blood after an air strike.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">That second time, </span><a href="https://www.buzzfeed.com/tomchivers/being-a-father-makes-me-empathetic-but-does-it-make-me-right"><span style="font-weight: 400;">I wrote about it</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">. I was a relatively new parent at the time: when Alan died, Billy was about 18 months old, and Ada was as yet unborn. When Omran was caught in the air strike, Billy was two and a half or so, Ada just short of her first birthday.</span></p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2020/01/why-do-we-spend-millions-on-bs-tests/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2020/01/why-do-we-spend-millions-on-bs-tests/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/GettyImages-91393625.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2020/01/why-do-we-spend-millions-on-bs-tests/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2020/01/why-do-we-spend-millions-on-bs-tests/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>How racist are you?</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2020/01/why-do-we-spend-millions-on-bs-tests/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Tom Chivers</a></p></div></a></div>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The images provoked an extraordinary reaction in me. With the photo of Alan, in particular, I was close to tears; I swore online at a journalist who shared it (“STOP TWEETING IT. STOP TWEETING THAT FUCKING PICTURE. It is a <em>little boy</em>. A dead little boy. Let him have some dignity”). With the photo of Omran, to quote my own words from the time, “I stood staring at my phone for over a minute, with the picture, again, switching between Omran’s face and Billy’s in my mind, like those optical illusions that could be a duck or a rabbit depending on how you look at it.”</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">I return to that piece every so often, because it still evokes an echo of the same reaction each time I read it: the yawning, panicking horror; seeing myself, as in a dream, simultaneously the parent of the child and the child himself. In my imagination, the child’s inability to comprehend the horrible things that are happening is the worst part; he would not understand why it was happening or why I had been unable to protect him. My chest still tightens when I think about it. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Three years earlier, I would have had an entirely different response. Of course images of dead and suffering children would have been awful and heartbreaking to look at, but they wouldn’t have evoked the asphyxiating shock that they did when I was a father myself. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Why was that? After all, it should have been obvious that children being injured or dying in war is awful, that Alan and Omran would have been unimaginably scared, that their families would have been devastated in ways that the word “devastated” cannot do justice to because it is worn away by overuse. I shouldn’t have needed to have kids of my own to realise that. And yet I did. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">And I don’t think I’m alone. A lot of people, both men and women, messaged me to say that since becoming parents, they have become hugely more vulnerable to images or stories of children. Parenthood opened a sort of empathy-valve: suddenly we were all drinking from a firehose of empathy; we couldn’t </span><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">not </span></i><span style="font-weight: 400;">put ourselves in the place of the scared child, whether we wanted to or not.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">That is, I think, what is going on in the minds of the authors of those fathers-of-daughters pieces. You can be a man, making your way through the world, and being perfectly aware — on an intellectual, conscious level — that the women in your life have concerns which are different from yours. Most, if you asked them, would probably agree that women deserve equal pay for equal work, that medical research should gather as much data from women as from men, that pathways to STEM careers should be as straightforward for women as for men. They might even have said that it was obvious.</span></p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2019/10/how-motherhood-put-an-end-to-my-liberalism/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2019/10/how-motherhood-put-an-end-to-my-liberalism/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/GettyImages-842399018.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2019/10/how-motherhood-put-an-end-to-my-liberalism/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2019/10/how-motherhood-put-an-end-to-my-liberalism/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>How motherhood put an end to my liberalism</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2019/10/how-motherhood-put-an-end-to-my-liberalism/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Mary Harrington</a></p></div></a></div>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">But if the father-of-daughters experience is anything like my experience with the images of children, then perhaps – one day – that empathy-valve was opened. They couldn’t </span><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">not</span></i><span style="font-weight: 400;"> feel themselves in the place of their daughters walking down a dark alley at night, or being told girls don’t do physics. And suddenly, instead of it being a thing of which they were intellectually aware, it was a great burning heart-squeezing pressure, and they couldn’t stop themselves from taking whatever platform was available to them and shouting from it to anyone who would listen.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Maybe that will happen to me, some day; maybe it happens when one’s daughter reaches her tweens or teens, when society starts to impose more strictures on what she should and shouldn’t do (at the moment she is far more concerned about whether she is Elsa or Anna in her playground games of make-believe). Maybe at the moment I’m in the calm “it is obvious” intellectual stage and it’ll all change for me.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">If it does, it doesn’t necessarily mean I’ll suddenly realise the Right Thing to Do, any more than it meant that Andrea Leadsom <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-36752865" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">would have been a better PM than Theresa May because she was a mother</a>. The empathy firehose gives you insight but costs you detachment, I think, and sometimes detachment is important; empathy won’t tell me the correct maternity leave policies for a given trade-off between economic growth and female participation in the workforce, for instance. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">“Parents don’t necessarily make better decisions,” I wrote in 2016. “They just make different mistakes.” There is, for any policy goal, a correct policy decision, and I’m not sure being a father of daughters reveals it to you. But it probably makes you want to shout about the problem a lot more.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">I haven’t felt the father-of-daughters impulse, as I say; I’ve just felt myself become wrapped around our daughter’s little finger, even when she shrieks “I HATE DADDY. POO POO DADDY” and refuses to let me put her to bed, which she does fairly often. But I understand the awful rush of empathy behind it. </span></p>
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