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		<title>The Wagner Group - UnHerd</title>
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					<title>The Prigozhin copycats are coming for Putin</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2023/07/the-prigozhin-copycats-are-coming-for-putin/?edition=us</link>
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					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Michal Kranz]]>
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							<![CDATA[The threat from within the Kremlin remains (Gavriil Grigorov / Sputnik / AFP)]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<div><strong>Michal Kranz</strong> is a freelance journalist reporting on politics, society and defence in Eastern Europe and the Middle East. He runs <i><a href="https://theeasternflank.substack.com/" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://theeasternflank.substack.com/&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1737473225062000&amp;usg=AOvVaw1ymYD5AVcHVPGcry_zwCIQ">The Eastern Flank</a>,</i> a Substack newsletter focused on Eastern European geopolitics.</div>
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						<unherd:twitter_handle>Michal_Kranz</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is a freelance journalist reporting on politics, society and defence in Eastern Europe and the Middle East. He runs <i><a href="https://theeasternflank.substack.com/" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://theeasternflank.substack.com/&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1737473225062000&amp;usg=AOvVaw1ymYD5AVcHVPGcry_zwCIQ">The Eastern Flank</a>,</i> a Substack newsletter focused on Eastern European geopolitics.</div>
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										<pubDate>Wed, 12 Jul 2023 23:00:58 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Thu, 13 Jul 2023 09:28:22 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Putin]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Putinism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Russia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[The Wagner Group]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[Ukraine war]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Yevgeny Prigozhin]]></category>
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																												<description>
								<![CDATA[The Wagner rebellion isn't over]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>Kremlinology is like reading tea leaves or astrology. It is closer to an art than a science — little is as it seems, and what information does trickle out has often only been released to service further palace intrigue. Nearly three weeks after Yevgeny Prigozhin’s Wagner rebellion, the Kremlin is doing everything in its power to project a façade of resilience and normality. But nothing could be further from the truth. And despite the opacity of Moscow politics, some fundamental threats to Putin (of which Prigozhin is only a particularly grisly manifestation) are beginning to emerge.</p>
<p>Putin is now engaged in a power struggle on three fronts: against the still-lingering forces of Prigozhin and Wagner; against discontents within his own military hierarchy; and against the Russian public itself which, spurred on by nationalist influencers, have proven themselves far from loyal to the regime. Putin knows that Prigozhin’s rebellion could open a Pandora’s Box of pretenders and uprisings for the rest of his reign. But at a deeper level, the nationalist Right, for whom Prigozhin has become the favoured avatar, now offers an alternative to Putin’s monopoly on political thought in Russia. And this is a far more fundamental threat to Putinism — the emergence of an ideological movement to challenge the stranglehold he has maintained on Russia’s political culture for a generation.</p>
<p>Far from defeated, Prigozhin now stands as a symbol of future defiance. Though his coup failed to topple the Russian Defence Ministry, for now his Wagner Group continues to operate outside of the military establishment. And though the Russian authorities have already begun to dismantle his <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/07/01/prigozhin-wagner-businesses-kremlin-russa/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">personal commercial empire</a>, Prigozhin is far from penniless: Belarus’s Alexander Lukashenko <a href="https://apnews.com/article/russia-wagner-mutiny-belarus-d7134f34ccea592e52e1dcb39f4aeb94" target="_blank" rel="noopener">confirmed</a> that he had <a href="https://twitter.com/TheStudyofWar/status/1676428666190852101" target="_blank" rel="noopener">arrived in St Petersburg</a> to claim billions in cash assets and personal weapons that had been seized, while authorities <a href="https://twitter.com/TheStudyofWar/status/1676428666190852101" target="_blank" rel="noopener">cleared him</a> of financial responsibility for the rebellion. The balance of power between him and his President is therefore unclear, with Putin clearly unable to clear or quash him. This week, the Kremlin confirmed that Prigozhin met with Putin after the uprising “<a href="https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-war-school-crime-6e6e5eee6e9166fb755eafea64246222" target="_blank" rel="noopener">and pledged loyalty to the Government</a>” — messaging that <a href="https://twitter.com/JuliaDavisNews/status/1678624020197982209" target="_blank" rel="noopener">contrasts sharply with the continuing demonisation</a> of the Wagner leader in the Russian media.</p>
<p>The contradictory narratives around Prigozhin&#8217;s future continue to pile up. But for now, he remains active and substantially autonomous. In a recent broadcast, he <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/prigozhin-wagner-fighters-ukraine-russia-support-putin-rcna92495" target="_blank" rel="noopener">stated</a> that Wagner fighters would be back on the frontlines in Ukraine soon, in direct contravention of his deal with Putin, which stipulated that Wagner would relocate to Belarus. The group reportedly continued to recruit new fighters in Russia for some time after the rebellion, before finally <a href="https://meduza.io/en/news/2023/07/02/wagner-group-to-stop-recruiting-for-a-month-due-to-temporary-non-participation-in-russia-ukraine-war-and-move-to-belarus" target="_blank" rel="noopener">announcing</a> it would pause as it withdrew from the country — which <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-66118007" target="_blank" rel="noopener">reportedly</a> has yet to materialise. All of this amounts to a highly frustrating set of circumstances for Putin. He has been reduced to chipping away at Prigozhin’s power instead of confronting him. And this demonstrates his continuing dependence on Wagner: he understands the role the group has played in Ukraine, and would rather <a href="https://twitter.com/KenRoth/status/1674090789540974593" target="_blank" rel="noopener">reorganise than disband it</a> so as to maintain its influence in Africa, the Middle East, and elsewhere.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/07/russias-toxic-military-politics/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/07/russias-toxic-military-politics/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/GettyImages-1259023079-1.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/07/russias-toxic-military-politics/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading </span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/07/russias-toxic-military-politics/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Russia&#039;s toxic military politics</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/07/russias-toxic-military-politics/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Alex de Waal </a></p></div></a></div>
<p>So Wagner remain a dormant but present threat. But more proximate are the copycat-rebels Prigozhin may inspire from elsewhere in Putin’s administration. It was evident from the moment that Wagner captured Rostov-on-Don without any resistance and embarked on its march toward Moscow nearly unopposed that Prigozhin may have had help on the inside — a notion that is more terrifying for Putin than the rebellion itself. There are claims that General Sergei Surovikin, one of the most senior members of Putin’s military brass, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/06/27/us/politics/russian-general-prigozhin-rebellion.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">knew of Prigozhin’s plans in advance</a>. And since the revolt, <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/06/30/europe/russian-general-sergey-surovikin-wagner-vip-intl-hnk/index.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">documents have emerged</a> showing that he and 30 other high-ranking military and intelligence officials had been secret “VIP members” of Wagner since 2018. Surovikin has not been seen in public since he released a video during the rebellion, leading US intelligence reports <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/06/29/world/europe/sergey-surovikin-detained-russia.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">to suggest</a> he may have been detained or arrested. Other military leaders, such as Deputy Defence Minister Yunus-bek Yevkurov, who <a href="https://meduza.io/en/feature/2023/06/24/we-re-saving-russia" target="_blank" rel="noopener">was filmed negotiating with Prigozhin</a> in Rostov (potentially under duress), were also conspicuously absent from recent broadcasts by the Ministry’s leadership this week.</p>
<p>At <a href="https://twitter.com/DefenceHQ/status/1676468871069417473" target="_blank" rel="noopener">the very least</a>, the rebellion has exacerbated divisions within the Russian security state, while the influential Russian military blog <em>Rybar</em>, founded by <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20230512-russian-offensive-inspires-golden-age-of-military-bloggers" target="_blank" rel="noopener">a former Defence Ministry press officer</a>, claims that Putin is in fact executing a “<a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/where-are-russias-top-generals-rumours-swirl-after-mercenary-mutiny-2023-06-28/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">purge</a>”. The scale will remain obscure until Putin is finished, but given the circumstances, a significant reorganisation must be taking place in which personal loyalty to Putin will become the chief currency. Putin has always privileged fealty over competence — Surovikin, a well-regarded military commander who once headed Russia’s operations in Ukraine, was later replaced by Gerasimov, who, despite being widely seen as incompetent by many Kremlin critics including Prigozhin, has served as a faithful foot soldier for his President. For what Putin truly fears is lack of control over his circle of strongmen, the so-called <em>siloviki</em>.</p>
<p>But, rare for an aspiring autocrat, the last front on which Putin has been forced to defend himself is in the theatre of public opinion. In a recent <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/news/q-and-a/what-prigozhins-half-baked-coup-could-mean-for-putins-rule" target="_blank" rel="noopener">interview</a> with <em>The New Yorker</em>, analyst Tatiana Stanovaya correctly pointed out that Putin has never derived his authority from the Russian people. Nonetheless, public perception still matters, because any form of dissent undermines the central narrative of Putinism: that the only way to secure Russia’s historically justified status as first among nations is through allegiance to Putin and his circle.</p>
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<p>Not only did Prigozhin publicly speak out against Putin’s establishment from the outside, but in his broadcasts he often spoke directly to the Russian public. In doing so, he violated another pillar in Putin’s power — the idea the Russian people should remain depoliticised and allow the authorities manage the country as they see fit. The sight of civilians in Rostov greeting Wagner with open arms and shaking Prigozhin’s hand is a spectacular affront to this. And, <a href="https://www.levada.ru/2023/06/29/padenie-avtoriteta-evgeniya-prigozhina-i-otnoshenie-k-ispolzovaniyu-nayomnikov-i-zaklyuchyonnyh-v-voennyh-dejstviyah/?utm_source=mailpoet&amp;utm_medium=email&amp;utm_campaign=newsletter-post-title_81" target="_blank" rel="noopener">according to the Levada Center</a>, one of the largest independent polling organisations left in Russia, support for Wagner sat at 58% in the days leading up to its rebellion, including the day when Prigozhin laid out why he believed the Ukraine war had been started for corrupt reasons. Although this support dropped on the day of the rebellion, it continued to hover around 30% for days afterward, despite near-universal denunciations of Prigozhin on mainstream Russian media.</p>
<p>In tandem with these media attacks, Putin has also apparently felt compelled to demonstrate that he can also command the allegiance from ordinary Russians. In a somewhat uncharacteristic move after his long years of isolation during the pandemic, Putin <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aJgZMvHvjKE&amp;ab_channel=GuardianNews" target="_blank" rel="noopener">appeared</a> in front of a doting crowd in Derbent in the Republic of Dagestan, on the southern fringes of the Russian Federation. The Wagner rebellion has changed the rules of the game, and Putin has been forced to adapt. But it’s not the disorganised masses of far-flung Derbent that Putin is most concerned about.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/06/polands-phoney-war-on-russian-saboteurs/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/06/polands-phoney-war-on-russian-saboteurs/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/2GettyImages-1258429044-1-e1686153245214.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/06/polands-phoney-war-on-russian-saboteurs/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author </span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/06/polands-phoney-war-on-russian-saboteurs/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Poland&#039;s phoney war on &#039;Russian saboteurs&#039;</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/06/polands-phoney-war-on-russian-saboteurs/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Michal Kranz </a></p></div></a></div>
<p>After quashing the last vestiges of Russia’s liberal opposition, and successfully entrenching his historically-informed vision of traditionalist Russian nationalism, Putin positioned himself as the ideological north star of modern Russia. But as the war in Ukraine exposed his inabilities to deliver on that vision, this hegemony began to crack, and the same nationalists Putin had inspired soon took note. Prigozhin gave voice to many of these concerns about the management of the war, including from sub-regime agitators such as <em>Rybar</em>. Now, <em>Rybar</em> and other influencers <a href="https://eu.usatoday.com/story/news/world/ukraine/2023/07/02/ukraine-russia-war-live-updates/70377081007/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">are bristling</a> at the Kremlin’s campaign to discredit Wagner’s achievements in Ukraine, and are <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/russias-military-now-fighting-war-bloggers-after-wagner-group-mutiny-2023-7?IR=T" target="_blank" rel="noopener">picking fights</a> with a Russian Ministry of Defence that is increasingly frustrated with its inability to get these milbloggers to fall in line with the official narrative. Offline, too, support for Wagner continues to fester, as students <a href="https://twitter.com/polidemitolog/status/1675786559050711042" target="_blank" rel="noopener">brandishing the group’s flags</a> in Moscow earlier this month demonstrated.</p>
<p>For Putin, the Wagner rebellion destabilised the ground beneath him as much as it did the walls around him. Though his public responses have appeared restrained so far, the better to project an image of calm, his command is no longer absolute. Even if he is able to neutralise Prigozhin and bring Wagner under his own control, the threat from within the Kremlin and from the nationalist grassroots will remain. And far from an aberration, Prigozhin’s coup may be looked back upon as a turning point, the first link in a concatenation of coups, counter-coups and civil wars, all-too bloodily familiar to Russia and its people.</p>
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									<item>
					<title>How Putin enabled the Wagner revolt</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2023/06/how-putin-enabled-the-wagner-revolt/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://stage.unherd.com/2023/06/how-putin-enabled-the-wagner-revolt/?edition=us#comments</comments>
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					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Edward Luttwak]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/edward_luttwak-1.jpg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
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							<![CDATA[Wagner mercenaries in Rostov-on-Don (Stringer/AFP via Getty Images)]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Professor Edward Luttwak</strong> is a strategist and historian known for his works on grand strategy, geoeconomics, military history, and international relations.</p>
]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_handle>ELuttwak</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is a strategist and historian known for his works on grand strategy, geoeconomics, military history, and international relations.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Sun, 25 Jun 2023 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Mon, 26 Jun 2023 07:41:11 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[Yevgeny Prigozhin]]></category>
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								<![CDATA[Prigozhin was right about Russia's military failures]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>Why do Russia’s wars always start with disaster? The answer is straightforward: because the autocrats who rule Russia — be they Tsars (with the exception of Napoleon&#8217;s nemesis Alexander I), Joseph Stalin or Vladimir Putin — appoint obedient toadies sadly lacking in military talent to command their forces.</p>
<p>And none is more out-of-his-depth than Sergei Shoigu, Putin&#8217;s minister of defence. Shoigu studied engineering and skipped military service altogether. Nonetheless, he was rapidly promoted all the way to full general and then minister of defence by Putin because of his uncritical loyalty, which was further guaranteed by his obscure Tuvan origins that gave him no Muscovite power base to threaten the Kremlin (his birthplace is much closer to Beijing than to Moscow).</p>
<p>As for Putin&#8217;s chief of staff, Valery Gerasimov, his incompetence is of a very modern sort, indeed postmodern. Just like some telegenic US generals with PhDs but no actual hands-on combat experience, Gerasimov preached &#8220;post-kinetic&#8221; warfare, in which cyber war, &#8220;information war&#8221; or &#8220;hybrid war&#8221; replaced old-fashioned infantry, armour and artillery combat .</p>
<p>It was Gerasimov who cooked up the brilliant plan that so convinced Putin — as well as the CIA, the US director of national intelligence and their fashionably post-kinetic military advisors — that the air-landed seizure of the Antonov field on the first night of the war would open the door to Kyiv. Absent post-kinetic delusions, the overhead photography alone should have sufficed to tell US intelligence that the Russians would fail: they were invading Europe&#8217;s largest country with an army of less than 140,000 troops, as opposed to the 800,000 who invaded Czechoslovakia in 1968, a country one-fifth the size of Ukraine and with one-quarter of the population. And, of course, as perfect yes-men, Shoigu and Gerasimov never told Putin that, if he wanted to invade Ukraine, he first had to declare war and mobilise the Russian army.</p>
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<p>Even so, what happened next came as a great surprise. The failure of Gerasimov&#8217;s dazzling plan and the ignominious retreat from the edges of Kyiv and Kharkiv should have been followed by the usual Russian remedy but nothing happened. In 1941, when the German army easily defeated the Red Army to swiftly conquer Ukraine and start its march to Moscow, Stalin&#8217;s favourite toady Marshal Grigory Kulik was dismissed and eventually shot. Others were shot right away, and were replaced by officers previously set aside because they were not yes-men. Some were rescued from prison to take up command at the front. (Konstantin Rokossovsky, who had been arrested, badly tortured and locked up as a traitor, was patched up and given an entire army to lead; he would finish the war a victorious marshal.)</p>
<p>This is what Yevgeny Prigozhin expected from Putin: the swift dismissal of Shoigu and Gerasimov and their replacement by officers old-fashioned enough to have &#8220;kinetic&#8221; skills, and who would focus on building up effective infantry, armour and artillery units to capture Kyiv and conquer Ukraine. Instead, with Gerasimov and Shoigu inexplicably still in charge, the Russians continued to rely on &#8220;information warfare&#8221; to demoralise the Ukrainians into surrender, with non-stop propaganda and terror air attacks against random buildings in Kyiv and most other cities.</p>
<p>Not only did this &#8220;non-precision&#8221; bombing fail to hurt morale — it never does — but it was also hugely wasteful. As Russia’s rockets and ground-to-ground missiles started to run out, they turned to expensive air-to-ground missiles meant for high-value targets, such as air-base installations or at least battle tanks. But their warheads were too small to make much of an impression in built-up cities.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/06/putin-declares-war-on-prigozhin/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/06/putin-declares-war-on-prigozhin/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/GettyImages-1258997962-1-scaled-e1687602160104.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/06/putin-declares-war-on-prigozhin/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/06/putin-declares-war-on-prigozhin/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Putin declares war on Prigozhin</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/06/putin-declares-war-on-prigozhin/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> David Patrikarakos</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>This is when Prigozhin, with his mercenaries, started his own land-combat campaign, contracted as always by the Russian government, this time to fight in Ukraine rather than in Libya or Mali or ex-French Congo. But, a few months later, he very soon found himself competing for manpower with contract units that were raised by the Russian army itself. These official units offered good pay to ex-servicemen and therefore competed with Wagner — but without its cadre of experienced mercenaries, they achieved very little.</p>
<p>All of which was frustrating for Prigozhin, who started to voice his complaints increasingly loudly, eventually asking why Shoigu and Gerasimov were still in-command when they should have been shot for incompetence, or at least kicked out of their jobs. Inexplicably — not only to him — Putin failed to take advantage of his dictatorial power to get rid of the pair of failures.</p>
<p>It was then that Shoigu and Gerasimov hit back by denying artillery shells and small-arms ammunition to Wagner, even when it was Wagner that was doing all the fighting in Bakhmut. Ultimately, it was a struggle between a very talented maverick — Prigozhin had started as a caterer — and the dull bureaucrat Shoigu and too-clever-by-half Gerasimov.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/06/how-putin-and-xi-resurrected-america/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/06/how-putin-and-xi-resurrected-america/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/GettyImages-145312023-scaled-e1686137764962.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/06/how-putin-and-xi-resurrected-america/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/06/how-putin-and-xi-resurrected-america/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>How Putin and Xi resurrected America</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/06/how-putin-and-xi-resurrected-america/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> David Patrikarakos</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Stalin greatly valued such competition; even at the very end in 1945, he made Marshals Georgy Zhukov and Ivan Konev race one another to reach the centre of Berlin with their separate armies. But Putin is no Stalin. He is still, after everything, the bureaucrat he has always been. He would never have dreamed of promoting the talented Prigozhin to run his war, in the way that Lincoln promoted the <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/about-the-white-house/presidents/ulysses-s-grant/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">hard-drinking Grant</a>.</p>
<p>In the coming days, Prigozhin will be captured or killed. Any trial would compound Putin&#8217;s colossal embarrassment. The reason he must fail is that, in Russia, he falls into a specific category: like Yemelyan Pugachev, who rebelled against Catherine the Great in 1773, Prigozhin has no power base in Moscow, let alone in the military and security establishment he has so savagely ridiculed.</p>
<p>Yet there is also a lesson in this for Putin: if he does not fire Shoigu and Gerasimov and start anew with leaders plucked from the smart younger officers who have emerged in recent fighting, he will have to abandon the war that has become Russia&#8217;s misfortune.</p>
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					<title>The Wagner Files</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2023/04/the-wagner-files/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://stage.unherd.com/2023/04/the-wagner-files/?edition=us#comments</comments>
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					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[David Patrikarakos]]>
					</dc:creator>
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							<![CDATA[<p><strong>David Patrikarakos</strong> is <em>UnHerd</em>&#8216;s foreign correspondent. His latest book is <em>War in 140 characters: how social media is reshaping conflict in the 21st century. </em>(Hachette)</p>
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						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>dpatrikarakos</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is <em>UnHerd</em>'s foreign correspondent. His latest book is <em>War in 140 characters: how social media is reshaping conflict in the 21st century. </em>(Hachette)]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Sat, 29 Apr 2023 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Sat, 29 Apr 2023 00:00:00 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[Europe]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[The Wagner Group]]></category>
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								<![CDATA[Internal documents reveal how the mercenary group operates]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>The Wagner Group might be a gang of hired murderers, but it is also a well-oiled machine: peel back its layers of barbarity and you’ll find a slick private military company with plans to expand its influence throughout the world. Experts, including <a href="https://www.congress.gov/116/meeting/house/110854/witnesses/HHRG-116-FA14-Wstate-MartenK-20200707.pdf">US Congress,</a> have long argued that Wagner is controlled by the Russian special services, specifically the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defence, commonly known as the GRU.</p>
<p>But this is wrong. I have been investigating Wagner for six months, and both sources in Ukraine and documents shown to me by the Dossier Center, an investigative project set up by Russian dissident Mikhail Khodorkovsky, tell a very different story. The company has never been under the GRU; nor does it report to the Ministry of Defence, with which it now has an increasingly fractious relationship, or any law enforcement or government agencies. In fact, unlike other Russian private or quasi-private military companies, such as <a href="https://www.opensanctions.org/entities/NK-9iEp7sqxGYKEzvhd2qyeWC/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Redut</a>, it is funded and run by a single individual: Yevgeny Prigozhin, who in turn answers only to one man: Vladimir Putin.</p>
<p>Wagner, then, is vital to understanding the Kremlin’s emerging global strategy. Its mercenaries are not only butchering in Ukraine, but are also being deployed across Africa as the Kremlin seeks to hoover up the continent&#8217;s resources. As violence strafes Sudan, <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/04/20/africa/wagner-sudan-russia-libya-intl/index.html">reports</a>, backed up by my contacts on the ground, claim that Wagner supplied Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces with surface-to-air missiles in its battle for control of the state against Sudanese leader General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan. The group is also helping to prop up the regime in Syria and is busy meddling in Baltic states as well.</p>
<p>Late last year, as the war in Ukraine intensified, Prigozhin, who holds no official position, was considered by many to be more powerful than most federal ministers. Some argued he even held more sway in the Kremlin than Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu and Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov. But even if Prigozhin wouldn’t take orders from the Ministry of Defence, Russian sources tell me he would work with it when it suited his needs.</p>
<p>At the direct request of Putin or his office, the Ministry was forced to provide support — including weapons, tanks, fighter jets and military bases — to Wagner. In return, Prigozhin’s units would sometimes find themselves under the operational control of the Ministry of Defence or the Russian special services: this has been the case in Syria since February 2022. For the most part, however, Wagner remains an independent entity, which suits Prigozhin perfectly. If the invasion goes wrong in Ukraine, he won’t be the person responsible; if it goes well, he can point to his role in any success.</p>
<p>For the first time, documents handed to me by the Dossier Center reveal how Prigozhin finances Wagner, as well as many of his other projects. It is a web of dark money that spreads through dozens of countries. Prigozhin is linked to several hundred companies registered in Russia that received government contracts for various state functions, such as building military camps, organising rubbish collections, and supplying food for the military, hospitals and schools. From 2011 to 2018, these companies received more than 5,000 Russian state contracts worth 209 billion rubles (£2 billion), with some of these profits going to projects involving Wagner and so-called “political technologists” — those whom the Kremlin puts in charge of influencing political systems — abroad.</p>
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<p>Contracts are generally awarded on a non-competitive basis, but none of Prigozhin&#8217;s companies have ever been severely penalised for this behaviour. Due to the legal simplicity of registering new companies in Russia, his firms can dodge sanctions easily. Once a company has been sanctioned, its cash is simply moved to the balance of another of Prigozhin’s companies (as yet unknown to the authorities) — and the trading can begin again. Prigozhin’s internal documents on his many African and Syrian projects illustrate this cash flow, freely paying the necessary expenses for projects in countries of interest to him, including in cash.</p>
<p>In Africa, as the crisis in Sudan shows, Wagner is fast making the region’s many problems worse. Sources in the Central African Republic have confirmed that Prigozhin recently paid bribes to political influencers and local military leaders, while further <a href="https://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/17242571)%20.">reports</a> suggest the group is planning to increase its level of activity in Libya (possibly, due to elections that are scheduled for summer 2023). When I was in the region last year, a contact who had recently been inside Burkina Faso (which had just experienced a coup) showed me photos of streets filled with Slavic-looking tough guys.</p>
<p>This all benefits Prigozhin, who is also growing fat off oil and mining concessions in Syria and Africa. In 2019, the Syrian parliament signed contracts for the development of three blocks of gas and oil fields with two Russian companies, Velada and Mercury, both of which are affiliated with Prigozhin. The monthly share of Prigozhin&#8217;s structures from the extraction of natural resources is likely to be about $20 million.</p>
<p>One former Wagner commander who fought in Syria recently told me how Prigozhin&#8217;s office in the country is in a room rented from the Russian Foreign Ministry in the centre of Damascus, where large amounts of cash are kept for necessary expenses (salaries, recruitment of locals and so on). He explained how the battalion commander once took out about $200,000 for expenses. The cash itself is transported in and out of Syria on private jets used either by Prigozhin or by his many underlings.</p>
<p>Prigozhin knows the value of hiring fighters who have served in some of the toughest places on earth and earned a reputation for viciousness. He pays them well — often more than what is stated in their contract — via both bank transfers and bundles of cash from one of his offices. According to contracts signed by the fighters, relatives or other preselected individuals could collect cash from the offices on their behalf. However, in 2020, security measures were tightened, and Wagner employees are now required to present a badge with an identification number to receive their pay in cash.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/04/the-football-hooligans-fighting-for-ukraine/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/04/the-football-hooligans-fighting-for-ukraine/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/GettyImages-524217254-1.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/04/the-football-hooligans-fighting-for-ukraine/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/04/the-football-hooligans-fighting-for-ukraine/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The football hooligans fighting for Ukraine</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/04/the-football-hooligans-fighting-for-ukraine/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> David Patrikarakos</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Of course, nothing is ever simple, or pleasant, with Prigozhin. As a compulsive micro-manager, he is known to punish employees with large fines for petty disobediences and offences: excessive use of alcohol, drug use, improper use of social media and so on. He is also known to be violent with those who work for him.</p>
<p>Sources in Ukraine tell me that Prigozhin would regularly liaise with high-ranking generals from the Ministry of Defence, including General Sergei Surovikin, the man in charge of Russia’s “special Military Operation” in Ukraine from October to January 2023. Things have not gone well for Russia in Ukraine, which is why Surovikin was replaced, and Prigozhin has repeatedly publicly <a href="https://meduza.io/feature/2022/10/04/kadyrov-i-prigozhin-regulyarno-i-podozritelno-sinhronno-kritikuyut-rossiyskuyu-armiyu-chego-oni-dobivayutsya">criticised</a> the Ministry of Defence for its performance — he ridiculed the regular army, claiming his own Wagner units were far superior.</p>
<p>Relations between Wagner and the defence ministry worsened throughout early 2023, especially over the battle for the eastern city of Bakhmut, where both the Russian military and Wagner is battling to claim credit for the city’s eventual fall, as I discovered when I <a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/02/the-madness-behind-the-battle-for-bakhmut/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">reported</a> from there earlier this year. According to an April 2023 British intelligence <a href="https://www.scotsman.com/news/world/ukraine-conflict-russia-looking-to-develop-replacement-for-wagner-group-in-ukraine-to-ensure-more-control-mod-4091379">report</a>, relations between the two have become so factious that “Russia’s military leadership likely wants a replacement PMC that it has more control over”. But it was also at pains to point out the difficulties. “No other known Russian PMC currently approaches Wagner’s size or combat power,” it concluded.</p>
<p>If this seems like a chaos of internal conflict, it’s one that may well have approval from the very top. Putin has praised Josef Stalin on several occasions — and Stalin, perhaps more than anything, relied on internal rivalries to maintain control. In this context, Prigozhin’s repeated criticisms of the Ministry of Defence are beneficial to Putin, not only for pointing out mistakes that might be corrected, but for pushing it to perform better (while ensuring that neither side becomes too powerful). It is, in effect, win-win for Putin.</p>
<p>But for the rest of the world it is not. Wagner and Prigozhin now face allegations of terrorism, political assassinations and the use of rape as a weapon of war. Last November, UK law firm McCue Jury and Partners announced it was suing Wagner on behalf of Ukrainian victims who have fled to the UK. Jason McCue, a senior partner, told me that the decision to pursue the claim was an easy one. “They have committed war crimes in Bucha&#8230; They are the ones who identified civilian targets so the Russian military could strike them. And then there are the numerous documented acts of torture they have committed against both soldiers and civilians.”</p>
<p>And this catalogue of allegations seems destined to swell. Since last year, the number of mercenaries has at least tripled. These recruits not only increased their military capability in general, but also gained vital experience of participating in larger scale operations, such as in Bakhmut. Their equipment has also been diversified, with greater numbers of high-tech heavy weapons flowing in. Wagner is now no longer merely a private military company, but an army.</p>
<p>Behind them stands Prigozhin, a man whose political ambitions, and presence in the Russian public consciousness, has never been greater. Russian aggression is growing globally, and as the Wagner Files reveal, a globally connected, well-funded private army is now at its forefront.</p>
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					<title>How Wagner plundered Sudan&#8217;s gold</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2023/04/how-wagner-plundered-sudans-gold/?edition=us</link>
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					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Martin Plaut]]>
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							<![CDATA[Al-Burhan in Khartoum in 2021 (Mahmoud Hjaj/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images)]]>
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							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Martin Plaut</strong> is former Africa Editor of the BBC World Service and a Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of Commonwealth Studies. He has advised both the British and American governments.</p>
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						<unherd:twitter_handle>martinplaut</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is former Africa Editor of the BBC World Service and a Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of Commonwealth Studies. He has advised both the British and American governments.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Sat, 22 Apr 2023 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Sat, 22 Apr 2023 00:00:00 +0000</updated>
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								<![CDATA[A new Cold War is playing out in Africa]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>Aircraft are bombing Sudan’s capital Khartoum; soldiers are occupying civilian houses; most of the country’s hospitals have run out of basic supplies. On the surface, this might appear in the West to be just another African war — the culmination of a struggle between two rival army officers vying for control. And, in some ways, it is.</p>
<p>Since a coup in 2021, Sudan has been run by a council of generals, led by the two men at the centre of this dispute: army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and his deputy-turned-enemy Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (known as Hemedti), the head of the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF).</p>
<p>Al-Burhan and Hemedti represent a long-standing divide in Sudanese society, between the people living along the Nile and those on the marginalised periphery. Al-Burhan is a traditional army recruit who rose up the ranks. Raised in a small town in Northern Sudan, he looks to and is allied with Egypt.</p>
<p>Hemedti is very different. He comes from the western region of Darfur and his family extends into Chad. He belongs to the Rizeigat, a nomadic Arab tribe, and made his name with the Janjaweed militia (literally “devils on horseback”) by attacking settled Darfuris. In 2013, he transformed the Janjaweed into the RSF and has extended his power ever since. Today, he is one of the richest men in Sudan: a smooth operator, with vast holdings in mining and property.</p>
<p>This conflict, however, is much bigger than the two personalities at its heart. Indeed, there is a third character in this violent tragedy, a man who prefers to watch from afar.</p>
<p>Vladimir Putin already exercises influence across much of the arid Sahel through the Wagner Group. Although best known for its current activity in Ukraine, Wagner is also <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2022/02/08/russias-wagner-group-in-africa-influence-commercial-concessions-rights-violations-and-counterinsurgency-failure/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">active</a> in a number of African states, including Burkina Faso, Mali, Chad and Libya. In this conflict, Hemedti is the man who could add Sudan to that list.</p>
<p>During the Cold War, Africa was transformed into a superpower battleground, with the USSR and the USA slugging it out from Egypt and Ethiopia to Angola and Mozambique. Since then, Putin has continued to regard Africa’s conflicts as a cheap route into the continent. Using every trick in the book, from troops on the ground to digital propaganda, the Wagner Group has become one of the most powerful forces on the continent, allying with embattled political leaders and militia in exchange for cash or <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/31/world/africa/wagner-group-africa.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">lucrative mining concessions</a>.</p>
<p>Wagner’s chance to make inroads into Sudan came in November 2017, when then Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir <a href="https://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/56163">visited</a> Putin’s residence in Sochi. Publicly, the agreement reached by the two leaders was focused on their joint opposition “to US interference in the domestic affairs of Arab countries”; less publicly, it paved the way for the extension of the Wagner Group into Sudan.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/04/private-armies-have-infiltrated-the-west/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/04/private-armies-have-infiltrated-the-west/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/GettyImages-1388612148-1-1.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/04/private-armies-have-infiltrated-the-west/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/04/private-armies-have-infiltrated-the-west/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Private armies are making a killing</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/04/private-armies-have-infiltrated-the-west/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Thomas Fazi</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>What form this took only became clear last July, after an <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2022/07/29/africa/sudan-russia-gold-investigation-cmd-intl/index.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">investigation by <em>CNN</em></a> revealed that Russian aircraft had been flying Sudanese gold out of the country to the Syrian port city of Latakia, where Russia has a major airbase. The purported aim was simple: Russia was desperate to fortify its reserves against increasingly punitive Western sanctions. In total, <em>CNN</em> estimated that up to $13.4 billion worth of gold was missing, though <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-04-30/how-a-sanctioned-russian-company-gained-access-to-sudan-s-gold?leadSource=uverify%20wall" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em>Bloomberg</em></a> later put the figure at $4 billion. Either way, the sums of money are enormous.</p>
<p>These transactions were being organised by Meroe Gold — a subsidiary of M-Invest, owned by Yevgeny Prigozhin, the leader of the Wagner Group. In return, Prigozhin provided training and arms for the Sudanese military and, increasingly, to Hemedti. As <em>CNN</em> pointed out, in early 2022, a day after Russia launched its invasion of Ukraine, Hemedti flew to Moscow, “ushering in a new phase in the RSF’s relationship with the Wagner Group”.</p>
<p>These reports were corroborated a few months later, when journalists from <em>Le Monde</em> and the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP) were sent a trove of documents relating to Wagner’s activities in Sudan. Their <a href="https://www.occrp.org/en/investigations/documents-reveal-wagners-golden-ties-to-sudanese-military-companies" target="_blank" rel="noopener">publication</a> revealed just how deep this relationship had become. M-Invest was shown to have paid millions of dollars to a company operated by Sudanese military intelligence. And the dividends for Prigozhin were huge. In return, Wagner was granted permission to land on a military base in Khartoum and to use “the signal code of the air force for the purpose of operating internally and externally”. It was, in effect, a licence to fly weapons into the country and gold out of it — without being officially declared or detected.</p>
<p>For a short while, they managed to get away with this — until July 2020, when the US sanctioned Meroe for its links to Prigozhin. Last month, the Council of the European Union followed suit, claiming that: “These companies, together with Lobaye Invest Sarlu and Diamville in the CAR (Central African Republic), are sanctioned in view of their role in illegally trading gold and diamonds looted by force from local traders.”</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/01/did-the-west-impose-austerity-on-africa/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/01/did-the-west-impose-austerity-on-africa/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/GettyImages-1208243257-1-1-copy.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/01/did-the-west-impose-austerity-on-africa/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/01/did-the-west-impose-austerity-on-africa/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Did the West impose austerity on Africa?</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/01/did-the-west-impose-austerity-on-africa/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Toby Green</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Yet the measures appear to have had little impact on the activities of any of the parties concerned: there is simply too much at stake. This is also partly why, in 2020, as scrutiny of Wagner’s foreign companies intensified, Meroe <a href="https://www.occrp.org/en/investigations/documents-reveal-wagners-golden-ties-to-sudanese-military-companies" target="_blank" rel="noopener">handed its interests</a> to a new company called Al Sawlaj for Mining Ltd, which has no assets and lists just one employee — a former Meroe Gold manager.</p>
<p>While few at the time noticed this shift, on 13 April, just three days before the latest fighting erupted, <em><a href="https://www.mining.com/web/sudan-charges-russian-national-in-gold-smuggling-probe-that-showed-power-feud/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Bloomberg</a> </em>carried an intriguing story. The Sudanese authorities, it emerged, had charged a Russian national working for Al Sawlaj with gold smuggling. This signalled, claimed the report, “an escalation in a simmering power struggle between Sudan’s military and a rival militia whose leader has forged close ties with Russia”.</p>
<p>One can probably assume that “the rival militia leader” with close ties to the Kremlin was Hemedti. By the time his confrontation with al-Burhan erupted, he was <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/heavy-gunfire-heard-south-sudanese-capital-khartoum-witnesses-2023-04-15/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">estimated</a> to have had as many as 100,000 troops at his disposal. Hemedti had become, in other words, a serious political rival with a military force to boot. And from Moscow’s point of view he was more compliant than al-Burhan, who was happy to <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20230209-russia-s-lavrov-meets-sudan-s-military-leaders-in-final-stop-of-africa-tour">receive</a> Putin’s foreign minister, but was nowhere near as close to Russia.</p>
<p>In Sudan, then, it appears we have yet another conflict sparked by a struggle for a nation&#8217;s wealth and weapons. But if that were the spark, the Wagner Group was the match. A new Cold War is playing out in Africa — and Africa seems unlikely to win.</p>
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					<title>Private armies are making a killing</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2023/04/private-armies-have-infiltrated-the-west/?edition=us</link>
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						<![CDATA[Thomas Fazi]]>
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							<![CDATA[A private security contractor in Afghanistan (Matt Moyer/Getty Images)]]>
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							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Thomas Fazi</strong> is an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist and translator. His latest book is <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/the-covid-consensus/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">The Covid Consensus</a>, co-authored with Toby Green.</p>
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						<unherd:twitter_handle>battleforeurope</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist and translator. His latest book is <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/the-covid-consensus/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">The Covid Consensus</a>, co-authored with Toby Green.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Wed, 12 Apr 2023 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Fri, 14 Apr 2023 10:24:11 +0000</updated>
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								<![CDATA[Mercenaries thrive while democracy dies]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>Last week, Russia <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/04/03/world/europe/bakhmut-ukraine-wagner-russia.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">claimed</a> to have seized control of the city of Bakhmut after an eight-month battle with Ukrainian forces — the longest and bloodiest fight of the war so far. The assault, however, wasn’t led by the Russian Armed Forces, but by a private army that has been fighting alongside regular Russian troops since the invasion: the infamous Wagner Group.</p>
<p>The Wagner Group has always been cloaked in mystery. In the first days of the war, reports emphasised the secretive nature of its military operations, including a plot to assassinate Zelenskyy and his cabinet. Until recently, it was <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/07/06/what-is-wagner-group-russia-mercenaries-military-contractor/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">unclear</a> whether a company registered under the name “Wagner” even existed.</p>
<p>That all changed in September 2022, when Yevgeny Prigozhin, a close ally of Putin, published a <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/yevgeny-prigozhin-admits-that-he-created-the-wagner-group/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">statement</a> claiming that he founded the group in 2014 to “protect the Russians” when “the genocide of the Russian population of Donbas began”. Then, in January this year, he decided to make it official, registering Wagner as a business and opening its “PMC Wagner Center” <a href="https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2023/01/17/wagner-group-becomes-legal-entity-in-russia-bbc-a79967">headquarters</a> in St Petersburg. He didn’t make any secret of its activities: as the company’s name, which also appears on the group’s logo, makes clear, the Wagner Group is a PMC: a private military company, also known as a mercenary group. The Russian government was forced to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/kremlin-denies-conflict-between-wagner-defence-ministry-2023-01-16/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">acknowledge</a> its existence. The Wagner Group’s clandestine status was officially discarded.</p>
<p>In many ways, Wagner’s emergence from the shadows symbolises the changing nature of modern warfare, in which the traditional Clausewitzian paradigm — based on a <a href="https://users.sussex.ac.uk/~hafa3/kaldor.htm" target="_blank" rel="noopener">clear distinction</a> between public and private, friend and enemy, civil and military, combatant and non-combatant — has given way to a much messier reality, in which state armies now regularly fight alongside private and/or corporate paramilitary and mercenary groups. Today’s conflicts, even when violent in nature, often occur in a “<a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/todays-wars-are-fought-in-the-gray-zone-heres-everything-you-need-to-know-about-it/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">grey zone</a>” below the threshold of conventional military action; adversarial states increasingly confront each other through proxies or surrogates — including private armies — rather than through their own armed forces. And this is not just a Russian issue: the increasingly central role of private military and security companies (PMSCs) in modern warfare is a global phenomenon.</p>
<p>Private armies have existed for centuries. In recent decades, the use of mercenaries was particularly widespread during the Cold War, especially in Africa, in the context of decolonisation and the ensuing civil wars. In particular, they were widely used between the Sixties and early Eighties by the West to prevent colonies attaining independence or to destabilise or overthrow newly independent governments, such as in the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/44147734" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Democratic Republic of Congo</a>, the <a href="https://warisboring.com/in-1977-80-mercenaries-nearly-took-over-benin/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Republic of Benin</a> and the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1981_Seychelles_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat_attempt#:~:text=The%201981%20Seychelles%20coup%20d,%2C%20James%20Mancham%2C%20to%20power." target="_blank" rel="noopener">Republic of Seychelles</a>.</p>
<p>At the time, there was virtually no international legal framework regarding mercenarism. It was only in 1977 that the Geneva Conventions incorporated an <a href="https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/api-1977/article-47?activeTab=undefined">international legal definition</a> of it. A mercenary, it held, is any person who is recruited to fight in an armed conflict, who actively takes a direct part in the hostilities, and who is neither a national of a party to the conflict nor a resident of territory controlled by one. It was a very narrow definition — but one which, at the behest of the newly independent nations, was <a href="https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA440071.pdf">specifically tailored</a> to address the use of mercenaries by the West against the post-colonial governments.</p>
<p>This led to the appointment, in 1987, of a Special Rapporteur on the use of mercenaries; and then, in 1989, to the International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries, which entered into force in 2001 and added language specifying that mercenaries were people undermining legitimate governments — another clause that implicitly reflected the concerns of post-colonial countries. To this day, the Convention — which essentially copies the wording of the 1977 definition — represents the international legal definition of mercenarism.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/03/the-battle-to-control-americas-mind/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/03/the-battle-to-control-americas-mind/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/GettyImages-1229447690-1-copy.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/03/the-battle-to-control-americas-mind/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading </span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/03/the-battle-to-control-americas-mind/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The battle to control America&#039;s mind</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/03/the-battle-to-control-americas-mind/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> David Samuels</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>As a result, during the Nineties, there was a significant rise in the number of private military and security companies, who sought to distance their activities from the legal definition of mercenarism by presenting themselves as official business entities offering “legitimate” security and defence services allegedly distinguished from that of rogue mercenary groups. And, by and large, they did so successfully. In that decade alone, PMSCs <a href="https://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/18294" target="_blank" rel="noopener">reportedly</a> trained the militaries of 42 nations and took part in more than 700 conflicts.</p>
<p>There was a broader backdrop to this growth, too. The growing influence of the neoliberal logic of economic rationalisation and deregulation during the Nineties also pushed states to privatise and outsource many government functions and services — including warfare. Security came to be perceived as a commodity, a service like any other that could be sold and bought in the marketplace. This was also part of a broader push towards the transfer of national prerogatives to suprastate or, as in this case, non-state actors as a way to shift the decision-making process away from democratic institutions. This trend was compounded by the global <a href="https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2325&amp;context=nwc-review" target="_blank" rel="noopener">downsizing</a> of national military forces, which also expanded the recruiting pool for PMSCs.</p>
<p>Even though PMSCs started out by mainly selling their services to developing countries and so-called failed states facing political crises, by the mid-Nineties Western governments, particularly the US, started to use them as well. By contracting them to support, train and equip the military and security forces of friendly governments — most notably in former Yugoslavia — Western powers were able to promote their interests and <a href="https://www.chaire-eppp.org/files_chaire/10_14_2009_TCE_paper.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">foreign policy agendas</a>, while avoiding becoming embroiled in unpopular conflicts, and even circumventing national or international constraints on troop deployment. By the end of the decade, NGOs (such as Oxfam) and even the United Nations had also come to rely heavily on PMSCs for their own security and even for <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/248954186_Private_military_companies_A_second_best_peacekeeping_option#pf4" target="_blank" rel="noopener">peacekeeping missions</a>.</p>
<p>In this sense, PMSCs did not replace the role of states as much as integrate into them. In some cases, they even bolstered state military power, by allowing governments to engage in forms of warfare that they might otherwise have been prevented from undertaking for fear of provoking a conventional military response by more powerful states, while also escaping public scrutiny. The Wagner Group’s activities in several African and the Middle Eastern countries — such as Syria, Libya, the Central African Republic and Mali — are a good illustration, insofar as they granted Moscow a degree of plausible deniability concerning its foreign interventions and the alleged <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2023/01/mali-un-experts-call-independent-investigation-possible-international-crimes" target="_blank" rel="noopener">human rights abuses</a> committed by Wagner.</p>
<p>Over the years, various efforts have been made to regulate this new phenomenon at the international level, eventually leading to the establishment of a <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/special-procedures/wg-mercenaries" target="_blank" rel="noopener">UN Working Group</a> on the use of mercenaries in 2005. But these bodies have, by and large, failed. Today, the sector remains largely unregulated and operates in a <em>de facto</em> legal vacuum. PMSCs can’t be considered soldiers or supporting militias under international humanitarian law, since they are not part of the army or in the chain of command — but nor can they usually be considered to be mercenaries under the narrow legal definition adopted by the UN. In the current conflict in Ukraine, for instance, the Wagner Group can’t be considered a mercenary group by legal standards for the simple fact that its members are nationals of one of the parties to the conflict.</p>
<p>These private military companies remain largely unaccountable, characterised by a “fundamental lack of transparency around, and oversight over [their operations]”, as the UN Working Group <a href="https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3883092?ln=en" target="_blank" rel="noopener">noted</a> in 2021. Indeed, it suggested that this is sometimes “done precisely with the ominous objective of providing ‘plausible deniability’ of direct involvement in a conflict”. Greater regulation would be welcome, of course, but it wouldn’t change the fact that corporate armies intrinsically <a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9780429296161-3/unaccountable-current-state-private-military-security-companies-marcus-hedahl" target="_blank" rel="noopener">undermine democratic accountability</a> — arguably one of the reasons that makes them attractive to states in the first place.</p>
<p>More fundamentally, what we are dealing with here is the legalisation and normalisation of mercenarism. The only real difference between traditional guns-for-hire and PMSCs is that the latter are often legally constituted businesses with corporate organisational structures. This lends them legitimacy and, theoretically, makes the monitoring of their actions and prosecution easier. But ultimately they remain, to all intents and purposes, “new modalities of mercenaries”, as even the UN General Assembly <a href="https://www.policycenter.ma/sites/default/files/2022-02/PB_08-22_Mquirmi.pdf">argued</a> some years back.</p>
<p>Crucially, the UN report acknowledges that the private security and military industry is a global and growing phenomenon. While today’s focus is on Wagner, the real mercenary boom occurred during the US-led military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq. In both cases, the US relied heavily on PMSCs such as DynCorp and Blackwater (now known as Constellis). Indeed, at points, the number of contractors on the ground actually <a href="https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&amp;did=825564" target="_blank" rel="noopener">outnumbered</a> American troops. By 2006, there were estimated to be at least 100,000 PMSC employees in Iraq working directly for the US Department of Defense.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/03/how-russia-and-china-overtook-the-west/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/03/how-russia-and-china-overtook-the-west/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/GettyImages-492383529-1-e1679081068457-2.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/03/how-russia-and-china-overtook-the-west/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading </span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/03/how-russia-and-china-overtook-the-west/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>How Russia and China overtook the West</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/03/how-russia-and-china-overtook-the-west/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Thomas Fazi</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>And like Wagner today, these were involved in several human rights abuses in the country. <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Blackwater-Powerful-Mercenary-Revised-Updated/dp/156858394X" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Blackwater</a>, for example, the most high-profile PMSC in Iraq, was involved in the massacre of 17 Iraqi civilians in 2007 (which led to the conviction of four Blackwater employees), while other PMSCs <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/20034280" target="_blank" rel="noopener">were involved</a> in the Iraq Abu Ghraib prison scandal (though none faced prosecution) and <a href="https://www.aclu.org/news/national-security/international-accountability-cias-torture-flights" target="_blank" rel="noopener">were alleged</a> to have participated in the CIA’s “extraordinary rendition” programme — the kidnapping and forced removal of individuals to places known to torture. Despite these obvious failures, by the summer of 2020, the US had more than 20,000 contractor personnel in Afghanistan — roughly twice the number of American troops. Before that, in 2017, Erik Prince, founder of Blackwater, had proposed to <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/military/officials-worry-trump-may-back-erik-prince-plan-privatize-war-n901401">fully privatise</a> the war effort there.</p>
<p>What could possibly inspire such chutzpah? Well, although the Iraqi and Afghan conflicts are generally considered to have been a strategic blunder for the US, not to mention a humanitarian tragedy, they were a boon for the PMSC sector: up until 2016, the US State Department <a href="https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R44116/11" target="_blank" rel="noopener">spent</a> $196 billion on PMSC contracts for the Iraq war, and $108 billion for the Afghan war. And business hasn’t slowed: in 2022, the PMSC sector — whose <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/figure/Mapping-the-ten-largest-known-PMSCs-by-services-offered_tbl2_297918918" target="_blank" rel="noopener">largest businesses</a> are now American or British — <a href="https://www.vantagemarketresearch.com/industry-report/private-military-security-services-market-1578" target="_blank" rel="noopener">was valued</a> at $260 billion and is projected to reach a value of around $450 billion by 2030. The largest PMSC in the world, UK-based G4S, alone employs more than 500,000 people and <a href="https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/private-military-and-security-companies-views-uk-and-russia-regulation-and-accountability" target="_blank" rel="noopener">is present</a> in more than 90 countries.</p>
<p>Should we be surprised? Ultimately, the growth of the PMSC sector is just another example of how economic transformations in recent decades have blurred the boundary between the public and private-corporate sphere to the point of making it indistinguishable. The result has been the rise of a state-corporate Leviathan which has gobbled up every sector of the economy — healthcare, banks, energy, tech — and has now taken over the field of warfare as well, at the expense of democratic control and oversight. This applies to Russia just as much as it applies to Western countries. If the conflict in Ukraine has taught us anything, it’s that war today is a bigger business than it’s ever been. No wonder peace — in Ukraine or elsewhere — seems constantly out of reach.</p>
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					<title>Could Russian mercenaries conquer the world?</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2022/03/will-russian-mercenaries-conquer-the-world/?edition=us</link>
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						<![CDATA[John Lewis-Stempel]]>
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							<![CDATA[A still from 'Le monde en face'. Credit: YouTube]]>
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							<![CDATA[<p><strong>John Lewis-Stempel</strong> is a farmer and writer on nature and history. His most recent books are <a href="https://www.penguin.co.uk/books/441214/the-sheeps-tale-by-lewis-stempel-john/9781804991145" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em>The Sheep&#8217;s Tale</em></a> and <a href="https://www.penguin.co.uk/books/451867/nightwalking-by-lewis-stempel-john/9780857529114" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em>Nightwalking</em></a>.</p>
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						<unherd:twitter_handle>JLewisStempel</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is a farmer and writer on nature and history. His most recent books are <a href="https://www.penguin.co.uk/books/441214/the-sheeps-tale-by-lewis-stempel-john/9781804991145" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em>The Sheep's Tale</em></a> and <a href="https://www.penguin.co.uk/books/451867/nightwalking-by-lewis-stempel-john/9780857529114" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em>Nightwalking</em></a>.]]>
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										<pubDate>Thu, 03 Mar 2022 00:02:46 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Thu, 03 Mar 2022 11:41:14 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Bellingcat]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Chechnya]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Emmanuel Macron]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Kremlin]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Russia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[The Wagner Group]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ukraine]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ukraine at war]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Vladimir Putin]]></category>
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								<![CDATA[The Wagner Group's tentacles stretch beyond Ukraine]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>Four days before the invasion of Ukraine, an eerily prescient documentary aired on France 5. <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=61Xq_aBM85E" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em>Le monde en face:</em><em>Wagner, l&#8217;armée de l&#8217;ombre de Poutine</em></a> assiduously tracks the activities of the Russian President’s “shadow army”: the Wagner Group, which arranges military “solutions” for the Kremlin. Since the film was broadcast, members of the 6,000-strong mercenary organisation have been deployed to Ukraine. Their orders: to kill President Zelenskyy and dismember his government.</p>
<p>This isn’t the first time the Wagner Group has taken part in a war; it’s just the first time it’s caught the attention of UK newspapers. In France, though, it has been on the radar for years. And with good reason. The Putin regime has long had bases in the south of France (Putin himself was actually holidaying in Biarritz when Yeltsin called him with the order to take over the Kremlin). But more pressingly, in the last decade Wagner have increasingly interfered in French zones of influence in the Middle East and Africa: Syria, Libya, the Central African Republic and, in January this year, Mali, the focus of France&#8217;s Operation Barkhane against Sahel jihadists.</p>
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<p>As Alexandra Jousset and Ksenia Bolchakova’s TV documentary made plain, the key problem in understanding the Wagner Group is this: it does not officially exist. No company of that name is registered in Russia. Instead, Wagner is a grey network of Russian businesses and mercenary activity. But what is clear in the murk are two key figures.</p>
<p>Wagner’s founder and leader is former Russian special forces officer Dmitry Utkin, a veteran of the Chechen wars. Reputedly, Lieutenant-colonel Utkin&#8217;s military call sign was “Wagner”, after Hitler’s favourite composer (Utkin is obsessed with Nazi Germany, suggesting Putin&#8217;s “de-nazification” programme could start closer to home than the Ukraine). But the power behind the Wagnerian throne is oligarch Yevgeny Prigozhin, who is serially sanctioned by the United States, including for his financing of the troll-factory Internet Research Agency, which interfered in American elections in 2016 and 2018.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2020/07/frances-african-forever-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2020/07/frances-african-forever-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/GettyImages-1184517941.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2020/07/frances-african-forever-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2020/07/frances-african-forever-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>France&#039;s African forever war</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2020/07/frances-african-forever-war/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> John Lewis-Stempel</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>In 2020, investigative news site Bellingcat <a href="https://www.bellingcat.com/news/uk-and-europe/2020/08/14/pmc-structure-exposed/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">published telephone records</a> revealing that Prigozhin had made 99 calls to Vladimir Putin&#8217;s chief of staff in eight months. So cosy is Prigozhin with the Russian president that he is dubbed &#8220;Putin&#8217;s chef&#8221;, metaphorically serving up what the Kremlin requires in foreign policy. The Kremlin itself maintains that Prigozhin is quite literally Putin&#8217;s caterer — he is, after all, a skilled restauranteer. Beginning as a hot-dog seller in Leningrad, Prigozhin went onto oversee a chain of classy restaurants <a href="https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/putins-secret-army-the-wagner-group-and-the-chef-he-chose-to-run-it-btm00fmqx" target="_blank" rel="noopener">good enough even for the epicurean French president</a> Jacques Chirac, and has coordinated many banquets for Putin.</p>
<p>Still, the Kremlin continuously and strenuously denies it has any influence over Wagner. French foreign minister Jean-Yves Le Drian recently blasted the group for &#8221;supporting&#8221; Mali’s ruling junta, and accused Russia of lying about Wagner&#8217;s existence. &#8220;When we asked our Russian colleagues about Wagner, they said they don’t know anything,” Le Drian told France 24. He added: “When it comes to mercenaries who are Russian veterans, who have Russian weapons, who are transported by Russian planes, it would be surprising if the Russian authorities did not know about it.”</p>
<p>In truth, Wagner and Russian security departments overlap. Putin has been photographed at a Kremlin banquet with Wagner troops (including Dmitry Utkin), whose training facility at Molkino in southern Russia is next door to that of Russian special forces, the <em>spetsnaz</em>.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2021/02/what-is-the-point-of-bellingcat/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2021/02/what-is-the-point-of-bellingcat/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/GettyImages-1031488498.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2021/02/what-is-the-point-of-bellingcat/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2021/02/what-is-the-point-of-bellingcat/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>What is the point of Bellingcat?</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2021/02/what-is-the-point-of-bellingcat/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Eliot Higgins</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>The Wagner Group was birthed in Ukraine in 2014, when Russian military intelligence backed unmarked troops led by Utkin in the annexation of Crimea. Since then, the group’s web of influence has spread to the Middle East, Latin America, and principally Africa. Shocking revelations about the conduct of Wagner fighters followed. In 2017, four Wagner operatives — the group’s distinctive skull logo clearly visible on their uniforms — mutilated and eventually beheaded a Syrian army deserter, Mohammed Taha Ismail al-Abdullah, with a spade. (Tracking down, interrogating and murdering rebels and deserters is very much the Wagner Group&#8217;s <em>modus operandi</em>; in Ukraine it is most likely to be at work in areas already seized by the Russian Army.) A fifth Wagnerian acted as the cameraman for the movie. A lawsuit brought by al-Abdullah’s brother got unsurprisingly <a href="https://www.fidh.org/en/region/europe-central-asia/russia/wagner-in-syria-moscow-court-upholds-decision-in-murder-case" target="_blank" rel="noopener">short shrift</a> from the Moscow City Court.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, in the Central African Republic, both the UN and France claim that Wagner have been responsible for raping and robbing unarmed civilians in the country&#8217;s rural areas. An exclusive document obtained by France 5 details the execution of a man on the side of a road in the north of the country by a Wagner unit. In Libya, the BBC obtained a Samsung tablet owned by a Wagner fighter, which revealed he had been placing unmarked personnel mines in a civilian area — an unalloyed war crime, enough to get any real army in the dock at Den Haag.</p>
<p>Which explains, perhaps, why Putin uses the Wagner Group. In the words of Kevin Limonier, <em>Professeur en Géopolitique et Études Slaves</em> at the University of Paris, subcontracting operations to Wagner allows the Kremlin the “denial of causality”. Cost is also a factor: Wagner creatively self-finances (Bashar al-Assad&#8217;s regime allowed the Group 25% of the profits from oil and gas fields seized), thus lifting pressure on Moscow&#8217;s coffers.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/03/vladimir-putins-secret-weapon/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/03/vladimir-putins-secret-weapon/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/GettyImages-1238766650-1.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/03/vladimir-putins-secret-weapon/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/03/vladimir-putins-secret-weapon/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>How Vladimir Putin weaponises refugees</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/03/vladimir-putins-secret-weapon/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Ayaan Hirsi Ali</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>But the group’s usefulness goes beyond that. Using Wagner as a proxy avoids home scrutiny of combat losses. As many as 600 hundred Wagnerians died fighting in Syria alone. In early 2018 Wagner fighters — who, paid about £2,000 a month, are mostly former Russian regulars — attacked an outpost manned by US special forces and their allies at a Conoco gas plant in Syria&#8217;s Deir Ezzor Province: embarrassingly, the Wagner company <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/07/08/putin-s-not-so-secret-mercenaries-patronage-geopolitics-and-wagner-group-pub-79442" target="_blank" rel="noopener">suffered 200 casualties</a>. Yevgeny &#8220;The Chef&#8221; Prigozhin is unlikely to inform potential clients that his crack force is not all it&#8217;s cracked up to be.</p>
<p>It is flexible, though. An examination of the Central African Republic’s recent history shows how Moscow has shifted Wagner from combat roles to propping up fragile regimes by providing troop-training, defence of installations, and the protection of top officials. France 5 <a href="https://www.francetelevisions.fr/et-vous/notre-tele/a-ne-pas-manquer/une-enquete-rare-qui-eclaire-wagner-larmee-de-lombre-de-poutine-10273">also discovered</a> that Wagner is behind troll factories in Mali and neighbouring countries pumping out anti-French propaganda.</p>
<p>Indeed, no regime seems more prone to Wagner&#8217;s influence than Mali, where the group&#8217;s appearance at Camp 101, north of Bamako airport, in January was one of the reasons given by French president Emmanuel Macron for his recent decision to pull out 2,400 troops from the country. Macron told French media that the Mali military junta considered Wagner &#8220;the best partners they can find to protect their power, not to fight against terrorism&#8221;. France was not interested in junta-propping. Macron also claimed the Wagner group was “arriving with predatory intentions, but why?”</p>
<p>To build Russian influence, Monsieur Macron. Wagner is the Kremlin&#8217;s new favoured tool for establishing a political presence in receptive regimes. Macron&#8217;s retreat from the Sahel, where the French army has fought an insufficiently applauded and under-supported war against Islamic extremism, leaves a vacuum, and politics hates a vacuum. Enter: Putin, Prigozhin, and 1,000 Wagner troops.</p>
<p>Ukraine. Mali. Syria. As far as the Wagner Group is concerned it is all one simultaneous war. As Vassily, an active Wagner mercenary, told France 5, “At present, the Russian Federation is not yet an empire, but it intends to become one again… Wagner is one of the instruments to achieve this goal.” The danger is that while all eyes are on Ukraine, Putin is wielding the Wagner Group to achieve victories for Russian power politics in parts of the world British newspapers pay less attention to. And that would be a real <em>Götterdämmerung</em> for the West.</p>
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