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		<title>Ukraine war - UnHerd</title>
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					<title>Inside Britain’s failing Foreign Office</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2026/09/inside-britains-failing-foreign-secretary/?edition=us</link>
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										<unherd:main_theme>Exposé</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Ian Proud]]>
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							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Ian Proud</strong> was a member of His Majesty’s Diplomatic Service from 1999 to 2023. He was a senior officer at the British Embassy in Moscow from 2014 to 2019.</p>
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															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ was a member of His Majesty’s Diplomatic Service from 1999 to 2023. He was a senior officer at the British Embassy in Moscow from 2014 to 2019.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Wed, 16 Sep 2026 23:04:04 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Mon, 28 Sep 2026 09:02:37 +0000</updated>
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					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://stage.unherd.com/?p=1074863</guid>
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								<![CDATA[Why have ministers lost control?]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>There is a peculiar double standard that journalists apply to Britain’s elected leaders. While highlighting public discontent with the domestic policies of successive governments, they continue to portray our politicians as titans on the world stage, talking about Britain’s pivotal role in the “Coalition of the Willing”, or insisting that Boris Johnson — though a terrible prime minister — was somehow the second Churchill, whatever his close shave with a Russian missile this week.</p>
<p>Officials, meanwhile, look on them all with scorn. In the Foreign Office, politicians are considered movable — and discardable — pieces of furniture. In a memorable scene from <em>Yes Minister</em>, Sir Humphrey and the Cabinet Secretary discuss reshuffles, complacently agreeing that “power goes with permanence. Impermanence is impotence. And rotation is castration.”</p>
<p>Since the start of the Ukraine crisis, Britain has churned through seven prime ministers, nine defense secretaries, and 11 foreign secretaries. Our elected leaders are rotated so often that no one has the balls left to introduce new ideas. The result? Britain has a monomaniacal, single-issue foreign policy: backing Ukraine in its war against Russia, something it pursues at the expense of practically everything else.</p>
<p>In his first speech as prime minister, Andy Burnham described how he was “acutely conscious” of being Britain’s seventh PM in a decade. To correct that record, he said, “requires my generation of politicians to raise our game”. But here, he faces a considerable challenge. The bureaucrats will have already assumed that he will be replaced in the next three years, and their respective ministers probably sooner.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/05/britains-diplomats-are-monolingual/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/05/britains-diplomats-are-monolingual/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/Diplomacy-012-1.jpeg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/05/britains-diplomats-are-monolingual/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/05/britains-diplomats-are-monolingual/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Britain’s diplomats are monolingual</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/05/britains-diplomats-are-monolingual/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Ian Proud</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Meanwhile, even when they’re in office, our elected leaders appear to have little influence over the direction of policy, canceled out by civil servants who spend most of their time gossiping about them. There is always a creative tension between the inertia of the permanent staff and the energy of elected officials. But the merry-go-round over the past decade has shifted the balance of power decisively towards the gray suits.</p>
<p>In his first statement as Foreign Secretary, Ed Miliband spoke of the need to end the war in Iran, bring peace to Israel and Palestine, and stand shoulder to shoulder with Ukraine. This is exactly what his predecessors would have been told to say by their officials — just keep on fighting to the last Ukrainian in a country which has seen its population halve since the collapse of the Soviet Union.</p>
<p>Ministers used to arrive loaded with their own ideas. I worked in the Foreign Office for 24 years, and William Hague is the last foreign secretary I recall capable of bending the bureaucratic machine to his will during his four-year tenure. He did this by having a clear vision for what he wanted to achieve, but also by retaining a studied (if aloof) courtesy when working with permanent staff and by deploying well-liked junior ministers like Alastair Burt to help him deliver. I organized the London Conference on Libya for him at five-days notice in 2011, and his showpiece Preventing Sexual Violence in Conflict Initiative in 2012, just 12 days ahead of time.</p>
<p>Hague also opened 50 new diplomatic missions around the world and boosted the Foreign Office budget by grabbing £140 million of  overseas development funding, recruiting the help of Andrew Mitchell, minister at the now-dissolved Department for International Development. Hague re-opened a foreign language school closed under New Labour, and launched a Diplomatic Academy. Altogether, then, he seized back some control over Foreign Policy from No. 10, following its capture by Tony Blair and Alastair Campbell in the aftermath of 9/11.</p>
<p>During those years, the Foreign Office had a renewed sense of purpose; Hague was secure enough in his job to whip the bureaucracy into action, despite efforts by Sir Simon Fraser, then the permanent secretary, to water down his efforts and do things on the cheap. The Foreign Office multi-year budget settlement doesn’t assume the arrival of new ideas; Fraser thought the Prevention of Sexual Violence Initiative was a wasteful diversion of effort. Having forked out for a gleaming new language center, he set up the Diplomatic Academy on a shoestring. I had to beg and borrow money from other government departments to pay £70 million on the 2013 G8 Summit.</p>
<p>Unfortunately, even Hague was castrated in the end, with Foreign Office officials ensuring that Britain was shut out of the French-led Normandy peace process for Ukraine in June 2014. Britain had played a leading role in imposing sanctions on Russia after the annexation of Crimea but while David Cameron hoped that sanctions against Russia would be a temporary measure, officials saw them as the main effort. Now, Cameron had become obsessed with the obviously pointless task of blocking Jean-Claude Juncker from becoming European Commission President, sucking up most of Britain’s diplomatic bandwidth in this failed endeavor.</p>
<p>The French President Hollande had managed to get Presidents Putin and Poroshenko around the table with Chancellor Merkel in order to hammer out a process to resolve the conflict in the Donbas, but the Foreign Office dismissed its importance. Its Russia experts said: “Well, the Americans aren’t touching Hollande’s peace initiative so why should we?”</p>
<p>Britain has shut itself out of efforts at peace in Ukraine ever since. Phillip Hammond simply refused to engage with the Russians directly in diplomacy and the habit of not talking to the Russians stuck, while the Ukraine crisis slowly got worse. with officials coolly in control. During his tenure at King Charles Street, Boris Johnson was quickly dismissed as “not up to the job”, while his successors as foreign secretary have been rated by the extent to which they followed the policy scripts drafted by their officials.</p>
<p>As for Britain’s latest prime minister, a senior Labour insider told me recently that Andy Burnham is “absolutely not a warmonger”. Still, he <em>has</em> since handed over blueprints for British-made components for long-range missiles to Kyiv, even though Zelensky is in deep trouble domestically following a spate of corruption scandals among his inner circle, alongside growing internal repression. Burnham has also backed further deep strikes by Kyiv into Russian territory, even as Ukraine faces the prospects of having its energy infrastructure obliterated over another cold winter, with insufficient air defense to prevent the inevitable. All the while, Burnham has offered to support Ukraine “for as long as it takes” at a cost of £4.5 billion per year to British taxpayers.</p>
<p>To his credit, Miliband has now shifted UK foreign policy to take a tougher position towards Israel, starting with his recent sanctioning of trade with West Bank settlers. But I have seen no evidence of any change of tack on the war in Ukraine which, by conservative estimates, has killed or injured over two million people on both sides since 2022.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">“Whitehall’s vast Russia blob appears unable to come up with new ideas beyond continuing to back Ukraine — then crossing its fingers and hoping for some miraculous breakthrough.”</div>
<p>It is clear to me, then, that Burnham and his government have been given the usual script by his officials — and decided it’s too difficult to change.  To understand why you must understand how the Foreign Office works. That begins with Whitehall’s vast Russia blob. A large cross-Whitehall Russia Unit sits in the Foreign Office in King Charles Street yet, remarkably, it appears unable to come up with new ideas beyond continuing to back Ukraine — then crossing its fingers and hoping for some miraculous breakthrough against Putin.</p>
<p>There are several reasons for this. The main one is that, since 2015, leadership of the Russia Unit has been shared by the Foreign Office and the intelligence community. This followed the creation of a £1.5 billion Joint Security Fund to increase coordination across departmental lines. Of course, our spies conduct vitally important work for this country — but they should be a tool of foreign policy, not its author. Putting them in charge of Britain’s Russia policy has inevitably indulged their self-serving instincts. No enemy means no budget. It’s no coincidence that the 2018 post-Salisbury reflection retreat was held with great hospitality at MI6’s training center at Fort Monckton.</p>
<p>Second, a vast increase in staffing quantity doesn’t equate to quality. When I visited GCHQ in 2017, some of the new staff I met didn’t obviously appear to have any background knowledge or experience on Russia, instead just representing seats to be filled. The same is true in the Foreign Office. New people are shipped in, listen with great admiration to the old sweats in the Eastern Research Group, then quickly toe the party line. There is no critical challenge function.</p>
<p>Added to that, the British press, which is stock full of ex-military and intelligence types, snuffs out any suggestion of engagement with Russia to end the war, which is shouted down as “appeasement”. People who express an alternative view are called out as Kremlin stooges.</p>
<p>Yet, diplomacy isn’t about friendship but rather talking to those with whom you most disagree — ideally before shots are fired but especially when the missile are flying.</p>
<p>Of course, diplomacy is only one arm of foreign policy, alongside warfare and espionage. Yet while the UK has pumped billions into the spying, it has disinvested in diplomats. Hague&#8217;s dream of driving up country-specific expertise has long withered on the vine, and there is now a dearth of officers with Russia knowledge. The Foreign Office continues to have a woeful track record in foreign language attainment, including Russian. Speaking foreign languages is increasingly seen as an optional extra, especially at a time when British universities are shutting down foreign-language degree programs. As with country-specific knowledge, so too with diplomatic skills. When I left King Charles Street in 2023, there was still no systematic program of diplomatic skills training.</p>
<p>As I quickly learned from my own time in Moscow, you simply cannot operate effectively out of the British embassy there unless you speak Russian and have some basic skills in talking to people who violently disagree with you. When the Russians  do agree to meetings, their officials will only talk in their native language, even if they are fluent in English. I recall one chap who would batter me with machine-gun Russian, then turn up at residence receptions speaking better English than me. Having kicked out so many of our embassy staff, the Russian state knows full well that any new folk who turn up from London are, more often than not, ill-equipped to do their jobs.</p>
<p>Diplomats also need to get out of their grand embassy building, meet ordinary people, and have tough conversations at the ministries. I often had slanging matches with Russian contacts over vodka yet ended on good terms. Many Brits get disgruntled with disagreement; Russians get disgruntled at dissembling — and suspect you are up to something behind their backs.</p>
<p>There’s a broader point here too. The Russians don’t care if we don’t talk to them or not. Yet out of a sense of self-righteous indignation, and a vastly over-inflated sense of our place in the world, we remain snootily aloof, even as we reduce ourselves to a diplomatic nonentity. I can’t remember a time when Britain has appeared so irrelevant.</p>
<p>The policy of talking about Russia and not to Russia has now been been set in stone since July 2014, an aversion to dialog that has now infected all the major states in Europe, such that no one can see the value in pursuing an end to a war in Ukraine, which is costing us billions and making us less safe. But amid all this, the basic facts remain the same. Heavily indebted and de-industrialized, Britain’s army is at its smallest for 200 years. Burnham can’t even commit to increasing defense spending because the country is skint. More than that, Ukraine cannot win a war against Russia. The state is bankrupt and operates on the basis of payday loans from its European sponsors. Little wonder Zelensky has just asked for another $27 billion from Europe: his ministry of defense has already spent money earmarked for the second half of this year.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, despite the seizure of $300 billion of its foreign exchange reserves in February 2022, Russia has rode high oil prices and now has an additional $420 billion at its disposal, most of that in gold. Its debt is 20% of GDP. Certainly, Russia has suffered petrol shortages following Ukrainian deep strikes, yet it continues to export vast amounts of unrefined crude oil around the world at a time of constrained supply. Ukraine and Europe are both energy dependent, leaving them at the mercy of high prices, shuttering factories from the Midlands to the Ruhr.</p>
<p>At the same time, Russia has built up a formidable industrial base, one that consistently outperforms the US, Britain and Europe combined in munitions production. Britain, of course, has spent decades outsourcing defense production to fat-cat contractors who fleece us and consistently deliver kit that arrives late and often doesn’t work. Graft in Ukraine hardly helps either. Western allies have tipped $350 billion into Ukraine in the hopes of beating Russia, some of which has been stolen by Zelensky’s cronies.</p>
<p>I visited Kyiv several times while stationed at the British Embassy in Moscow and corruption was the issue that ordinary people wanted most to be tackled. Western “support” has not helped Ukraine discover the peace and independence its rapidly shrinking pool of citizens deserve. Two thirds now wanting the war to end, a reversal from demands for the total defeat of Russia four years ago.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/09/the-west-is-losing-two-wars-at-once/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/09/the-west-is-losing-two-wars-at-once/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/GettyImages-2252937217.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/09/the-west-is-losing-two-wars-at-once/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/09/the-west-is-losing-two-wars-at-once/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The West is losing two wars at once</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/09/the-west-is-losing-two-wars-at-once/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Wolfgang Munchau</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Since we don&#8217;t want peace — but are too weak to actually fight Russia directly — economic sanctions have become our principal lever to affect Putin’s thinking. But here, again, British policy simply hasn’t worked. Before anyone accuses me of being a cheese-eating surrender monkey, I’d point out that I personally authorized around half of the UK sanctions against Russia after the war broke out in 2022. At the time, their stated purpose was to encourage “Russia to cease actions destabilizing Ukraine or undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty or independence of Ukraine”. That manifestly hasn’t happened.</p>
<p>To be sure, sanctions have changed the structure of Russia’s economy since 2014. But the moment of peak pressure was between 2014 and 2016, when Russia was hit by the double whammy of sanctions and low energy prices. Since then, Russia has completely reoriented its monetary and industrial policy to embrace a weak ruble as an article of faith, managing inflation while piling up its reserves and prioritizing its state-owned energy and defense monopolies.</p>
<p>Russia’s fortress economy — a mix of monetary austerity and military Keynesianism — means that it can keep on fighting with little risk of running out of money. Its large population also means that Ukraine will run out of men before it does, even as both countries have already suffered hundreds of thousands of deaths and injuries. Engaging with Putin to broker peace in Ukraine therefore isn’t weakness: but necessity. Diplomacy isn’t about friendship, it’s about conflict resolution.</p>
<p>The Foreign Office has produced no new ideas to resolve the Ukraine conflict since 2014. If Andy Burnham really wants to pass the “Makerfield test” — ensuring that every government policy helps working people — he might come up with his own ideas on foreign policy: rather than reading the standard script he is given by the Foreign Office mandarins. It’s time for Burnham to grow some foreign policy balls or, even better, ask Ed Miliband to do so.</p>
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					<title>The case for de-escalation with Russia</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2026/08/the-case-for-de-escalation-with-russia/?edition=us</link>
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										<unherd:main_theme>Ukraine war</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Wolfgang Munchau]]>
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																<unherd:article_ranking>1</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA['The reason why a war with Russia is so dangerous is the presence of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons.' (Alexander Kazakov/Pool /AFP/Getty)]]>
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							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Wolfgang Münchau</strong> is the Director of <a href="https://www.eurointelligence.com/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Eurointelligence</a> and an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist.</p>
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						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>EuroBriefing</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is the Director of <a href="https://www.eurointelligence.com/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Eurointelligence</a> and an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Sun, 30 Aug 2026 23:04:25 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Tue, 01 Sep 2026 08:21:41 +0000</updated>
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		<category><![CDATA[America]]></category>
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								<![CDATA[America is leading the way]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>John Ratcliffe, the CIA director, surely did not <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cx2z8l8xdg2o" target="_blank" rel="noopener">secretly fly</a> all the way to Moscow last week merely to warn the Russians not to attack a Nato country. There is clearly more to it than has been reported. It has always been the official policy of Nato to defend itself when attacked, and so this alone wouldn’t justify Ratcliffe’s visit. I can only assume that the circumstances behind this meeting are darker, more serious and more complex than we can possibly know.</p>
<p>Based on the information we have, the most plausible explanation for the visit is that Ratcliffe and his Russian counterparts were discussing de-escalation. If Russia’s war against Ukraine were to turn into a broader European war, it would pose a vast security risk to the entire world.</p>
<p>What the US and Russia have in common is that they are both already fighting wars. Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump clearly do not wish to go to war with each other. There are reports that Putin may be planning a large autumn offensive in Ukraine. Russian troops are currently making slow but steady progress towards the Donbas cities of Kramatorsk and Sloviansk. It is quite plausible that Putin could step up this war — but for this he would need to recruit more troops and intensify his attacks on Ukrainian infrastructure. Some Western security officials are convinced that once Putin is done with Ukraine, he will try to test Nato’s cohesion.</p>
<p>I struggle to see what purpose this could possibly serve. If he really wanted to test Nato’s resolve, by far the best way would be to escalate the hybrid warfare that is already going on. One of the more serious recent incidents was a military drone flying into the wing of a parked Ukrainian cargo aircraft at Leipzig airport in early August. Attached to the drone was 600g of Semtex explosives, which did not detonate because of a malfunction. At the time there were several drone sightings in Germany. However, military leaders tend to underestimate hybrid warfare, even though it can easily morph into a conventional war.</p>
<p>Another escalation scenario is disagreement on what constitutes legitimate European support for Ukraine. International diplomacy has its rules on this that everybody including the Russians pretend to accept: if you support a party in a war financially, or with defensive weapons, you are not deemed to be participating in the war. If you take part in maneuvers, you are considered a party of the war. The supply of offensive weapons falls into a gray zone. Nato has gone to great lengths to steer clear of that zone. The Western European countries that support Ukraine also made it clear that they did not wish to participate in the war.</p>
<p>But beware of the gray zones. The issue is not who is right and who is wrong. Wars are not settled by fact-checkers in broadcasting companies. The issue is disagreement itself.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/08/germanys-nord-stream-grudge/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/08/germanys-nord-stream-grudge/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/GettyImages-2271270817-e1787511637363.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/08/germanys-nord-stream-grudge/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/08/germanys-nord-stream-grudge/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Germany’s Nord Stream grudge</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/08/germanys-nord-stream-grudge/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Wolfgang Munchau</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Another gray-zone matter is the raids by Western countries of Russian ships or vessels that transport goods from Russia. The same goes for the supply of British drones for Ukrainian attacks inside Russia. Russia has responded with outrage to Prime Minister Andy Burnham’s decision to provide Ukraine with technical blueprints that would enable Ukraine to manufacture the Franco-British Storm Shadow cruise missiles. This prompted Putin’s spokesman to declare Britain to be a participant in the war. This is how escalation starts.</p>
<p>There is an awful lot of stuff going on that could blow up in our faces. The US economist Branko Milanović <a href="https://branko2f7.substack.com/p/on-european-hypocrisy-and-warmongering" target="_blank" rel="noopener">wrote an essay</a> last week in which he described a very plausible escalation scenario. He writes the thirst for war is palpable in the Nordic and Baltic countries and is also growing in the UK and Germany. “The role of small countries—that through their geopolitical irresponsibility can wreck great damage to the world—tends to pass under the radar,&#8221; he writes. &#8220;The Nordic-Baltic coalition is essentially calling for a war with Russia, citing its own fears and traumas of Russian/Soviet control and occupation.”</p>
<p>I agree with his assessment. If I listen to assorted Finnish and Baltic politicians, it feels to me like 1914, the year when Germany started the First World War in a mood of euphoria. The person who sets the tone in European foreign policy right now is Kaja Kallas, a former Estonian prime minister who is now the EU’s high representative for foreign and security policy. I see her as the European warmonger-in-chief.<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span></p>
<p>The job of diplomacy is to find solutions to problems. This is a tough job. You keep your diplomatic back channels open and talk to the enemy. But the EU has cut off all diplomatic channels with Russia. EU countries have their ambassadors in Moscow, and they all reiterate the official lines they are given.</p>
<p>The US, meanwhile, has maintained diplomatic relationships with Russia. The Ratcliffe-Russia meeting makes it clear that these exist at several levels, including that of intelligence chiefs. The officials in charge of nuclear policy also talk to each other. Henry Kissinger maintained a strong diplomatic back channel with the Soviet ambassador to the US during the Nixon administration.</p>
<p>The reason why a war with Russia is so dangerous is the presence of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. Russia has an estimated total inventory of over 5,400 nuclear warheads. France has 290 and Britain has 225. Given the vast size of Russia, the French nuclear arsenal could make 0.1% of the Russian territory uninhabitable. The Russian nuclear arsenal could completely destroy all of Western Europe, and still have a lot of missiles left. This is not a war Europe can win.</p>
<p>If Putin were to launch an unprovoked attack on a Nato country, the picture would be different. This would draw in the Americans. I assume that Ratcliffe would have taken the opportunity to clarify the US position and possibly contradict statements from some administration officials that Europe is now in charge of its own security and that the US would not directly intervene in case of a war.</p>
<p>The big European countries, meanwhile, are following the lead of the war-mongering minions because they have no plan B. If the war in Ukraine were to end, they would have to provide security guarantees. They would have to integrate Ukraine into the EU at an enormous cost. Only last week, Germany and five other EU countries announced that they would cut the EU budget by several hundred billion euros. This is Germany not putting its money where its mouth is.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;This is not a war Europe can win.&#8221;</div>
<p>Rhetorical escalation often precedes physical escalation, often triggered by a particular event — like the assassination of Franz Ferdinand in 1914. One such foreseeable event would be the seizure of Russian assets held in Europe, which amount to around €200 billion. People have gone to war over much less.</p>
<p>The Europeans already tried to seize the money at an EU summit last December. They failed. Most of the money lies at Euroclear, a large bank depository and clearing house in Brussels. If the EU had seized it, Belgium would have been legally liable in the case of litigation in foreign courts. Belgium is a very small country with a very large bank — a bad combination. Back in December, Bart De Wever, Belgium’s prime minister, demanded robust risk-sharing guarantees by the other EU members. They refused because they did not want to put themselves at risk of another financial crisis.</p>
<p>But if the EU is good at one thing, it is coming up with technical solutions to complex problems. They could attempt to develop a hideously complex financial instrument, similar to the subprime loans that gave rise to the global financial crisis 20 years ago. There is only ever one purpose behind such financial instruments — to hide risk, and lure naive investors into making unwise decisions. The same logic applies here. National parliaments would have to sign up to any risk-sharing deal, but they might be fooled into thinking that the risk is well controlled.</p>
<p>I have no idea how likely such a scenario is. All I am saying is that the sequestration of Russian assets is once again under discussion. If it were to happen, I would attach a high probability that it would trigger a dramatic Russian response.</p>
<p>It is, of course, entirely possible that Ratcliffe and his Russian counterparts spoke about something entirely different: Iran. But Russian support for Iran is not the critical factor in the Gulf War right now. Trump has clearly found himself in a predicament in Iran. He cannot afford another conflict. Therefore, an attempt to de-escalate tensions with Moscow seems like the most plausible explanation of the Ratcliffe-Russia meeting. A war is in nobody’s interest, least of all Europe’s. European countries are simply not prepared; de-escalation is the only rational strategy.</p>
<p>The problem is that escalation is not by definition a rational thing. The fact that something is in nobody’s interest does not mean that it is not going to happen. History is littered with examples of irrational wars and, lest we forget, the biggest ones were mostly Europeans.</p>
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					<title>Germany’s Nord Stream grudge</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2026/08/germanys-nord-stream-grudge/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://stage.unherd.com/2026/08/germanys-nord-stream-grudge/?edition=us#respond</comments>
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										<unherd:main_theme>Ukraine war</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Wolfgang Munchau]]>
					</dc:creator>
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																<unherd:article_ranking>1</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA['Why support a country that bombs our infrastructure? It is a hard question to answer.' (Nadja Wohlleben/Getty)]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Wolfgang Münchau</strong> is the Director of <a href="https://www.eurointelligence.com/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Eurointelligence</a> and an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist.</p>
]]>
						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>EuroBriefing</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is the Director of <a href="https://www.eurointelligence.com/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Eurointelligence</a> and an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Sun, 23 Aug 2026 23:03:16 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Mon, 24 Aug 2026 08:19:59 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Germany]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Nord Stream]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Russia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ukraine]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ukraine war]]></category>
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								<![CDATA[The looming trial could undermine support for Ukraine]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>The Germans have just caught another alleged member of the group that bombed the Nord Stream gas pipelines in September 2022. Volodymyr Zhuravlev, a deep-sea diver, was detained last week in the Croatian coastal city of Pula. In a fantastical turn of events, he had <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/business/2026/aug/20/man-arrested-nord-stream-volodymyr-zhuravlev-consultant-film-sean-penn-snake-island" target="_blank" rel="noopener">reportedly</a> been acting as <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2026/08/20/nord-stream-sabotage-suspect-arrested-film-set/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">a consultant</a> on the set of director Doug Liman’s next movie, <i>Snake Island</i>, about the team of Ukrainian divers that allegedly carried out the Nord Stream operation.</p>
<p>The bombing of the Nord Stream pipelines — which had up until then supplied Germany with cheap Russian gas — revealed an aspect of Ukraine’s military defense strategy that had previously been hidden. It became clear that the Ukrainians were seeking to break up the Russian-German relationship, which they saw as a direct threat to their own security.</p>
<p>The first of the Nord Stream criminal trials will start on 26 October in Hamburg. It will expose many unsavory details. The prosecutors might ask questions such as: who ordered the attacks? What did President Volodymyr Zelensky know? When did he know it? The attack left Germany in a perma-energy crisis. And while I don’t think the trial will affect Germany’s support for Ukraine in the short run, it could — depending on what is revealed — make Germany more reluctant to support Ukraine’s membership of the EU and Nato in the future.</p>
<p>The pipeline explosions have a long pre-history. Germany’s energy relationship with Russia dates back to the Seventies. Gerhard Schröder, a former German chancellor and personal friend of Vladimir Putin, supercharged this relationship when he proposed the Baltic Sea pipeline projects in the early 2000s. The project later became known as Nord Stream. The first pipeline, which became operational in 2011, ran from near St Petersburg in Russia to Mecklenburg-Vorpommern in eastern Germany. Before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Nord Stream 1 provided Germany with 55% of its gas supplies. Nord Stream 2, which was only completed in 2021, had the capacity to increase the gas flows substantially.</p>
<p>The Germans treated their business dealings with Russia as separate from geopolitics. The standard answer you got from German officials before the war was that the best way to foster democracy in Russia was through trade. They called it <i>Wandel durch Handel</i> — change through trade. If it rhymes, it must be true.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;Who ordered the attacks? What did President Zelensky know? When did he know it?&#8221;</div>
<p>Eastern European countries, notably Poland, treated the Nord Stream pipelines as a security threat. If Germany made itself dependent on Russia for its gas, Poland would once again be surrounded by a hostile alliance. Later, France joined the group of critics. More importantly, the US Congress passed successive acts, supported by both Democrats and Republicans, to impose sanctions on Germans involved in the pipeline project. They did not go after Schröder personally. He was the supervisory board chairman of the project. But they went after Matthias Warnig, the Nord Stream CEO. Warnig was a former East German Stasi officer and another close friend of Putin. The pipeline diplomacy became particularly heated in the two years leading up to Russia’s invasion in February 2022. I myself criticized the pipelines on the grounds that they made Germany dependent on Russian gas and undermined European solidarity. At that time, virtually nobody in Germany thought about energy in geopolitical terms — but everybody else did.</p>
<p>A few days before Putin invaded Ukraine, the German government agreed to suspend the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, which by then had been constructed but not yet used. It still needed certification. When Putin invaded, the project died. But Nord Stream 1, the older pipeline, was still operational. Even the Green Party, the only big German party that opposed the construction of Nord Stream 2, favored the continued operation of Nord Stream 1. By that time, the Greens were responsible for energy policy in the German government. As Germany was phasing out nuclear energy and coal, the country had no alternative to gas. Even when most of their energy was coming from renewable sources, they still needed gas to cover periods when there would be no wind and no sun.</p>
<p>There were alternative gas suppliers back then. The US and Qatar, for instance, sold gas in liquefied form (LNG) — but during this period, Germany did not have the infrastructure in place to process it. Russia’s gas, meanwhile, was pumped directly into the gas grid.</p>
<p>Each of the pipelines, the old Nord Stream 1 and the new Nord Stream 2, consisted of two big tubes. On 26 September 2022, three of the four tubes exploded near the Danish island of Bornholm, including the two that made up Nord Stream 1. Initially, everybody suspected the Russians. Then the US journalist Seymour Hersh wrote an article claiming that the explosion came at the behest of the CIA.</p>
<p>The German prosecutor eventually established that the attack was launched from a sailing yacht chartered in Germany by a group of Ukrainian citizens, with links to the Ukrainian army and secret service. Initially, the Ukrainian government tried to deflect attention from this evidence, arguing that the plot was funded by a wealthy private individual. But that story has since been debunked.</p>
<p>The operatives were highly trained explosives experts and deep-sea divers. The pipelines were located 80 meters below sea level. Diving that deep is not something you learn at your local scuba-diving club. The German prosecutor established that this was a military operation through and through. The estimated physical weight of the C4 explosives used to detonate the pipelines was in the order of 50-100 kilograms. Only governments have explosives on this scale.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/08/the-sexless-lives-of-millennial-feminists/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/08/the-sexless-lives-of-millennial-feminists/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/Untitled-design-68.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/08/the-sexless-lives-of-millennial-feminists/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/08/the-sexless-lives-of-millennial-feminists/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The sexless lives of millennial feminists</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/08/the-sexless-lives-of-millennial-feminists/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Poppy Sowerby </a></p></div></a></div>
<p>The German prosecutor issued a European Arrest Warrant for the operatives. The first successful arrest came in August last year, when Italian police detained Serhiy Kuznetsov, the suspected ringleader of the operation, who carelessly went on holiday to Italy. He was extradited to Germany and placed in a high-security prison. His trial is due to start this autumn.</p>
<p>What confuses me is why Kuznetsov thought it safe to go on holiday in the EU. Even more astonishing is the fact that the second suspect, Volodymyr Zhuravlev, whom the Polish authorities previously refused to extradite, also thought it safe to go on holiday abroad. Last week, the Croatian police arrested him. He is now awaiting extradition to Germany. This is one aspect of the story that I find puzzling. These are highly trained operatives with fake passports. Why would they go on holiday in unsafe locations?</p>
<p>So far, this all makes for a gripping spy story. But it may soon become a political one. Details will matter. The <i>Wall Street Journal</i> journalist Bojan Pancevski claims in his book, <i>The Nord Stream Conspiracy</i>, that the attack was orchestrated by the Ukrainian military and intelligence network, and that Valerii Zaluzhnyi, then commander-in-chief of the Ukrainian armed forces and now Ukrainian ambassador to the UK, was the most senior officer involved. We don’t know whether Zelensky gave the order or was informed. I don’t think it really matters. As president, he is responsible for the actions of his military and his intelligence service. What matters is that a Ukrainian commando sabotaged the critical energy infrastructure of a friendly country.</p>
<p>The media covered the pipeline explosions and the immediate aftermath half-heartedly. I suspect editors did not want to be accused of disseminating anti-Ukraine propaganda. The media supported Ukraine — and the pipeline story did not sit well with the hero worship of Zelensky. The German government also did not comment on the prosecutor’s action. But it’s worth remembering that both Olaf Scholz and Friedrich Merz could have stopped the investigation if they had wanted to. The Poles are outraged that they did not. Last week, Donald Tusk, the Polish prime minister, said that the bigger crime was the construction of the pipelines, not their destruction. I recall a tweet by the current Polish foreign minister, Radoslaw Sikorski, who was an MEP in Brussels at the time of the explosions. “Thank you, USA,” he wrote.</p>
<p>So, was it really a conspiracy? Over the course of my journalistic life, I’ve come to the conclusion that there are many fewer real conspiracies than most people think. What looks like a conspiracy is usually just a series of blunders. I think this was the case here too. A giant miscalculation by the Ukrainians. Back in the summer of 2022, they had pushed back the Russians. The war was going their way. Everybody wanted a photo with Zelensky. The Ukrainians thought it within their power to ensure that the Germans would not revert to their previously cozy relationship with the Russians. But after the Trump administration ended financial and most military support for Ukraine, Germany became Ukraine’s biggest supporter. What were the Ukrainians thinking?</p>
<p>However this story ends, I don’t expect Germany to revert to its old, naive pro-Russian reflexes. Germany will not make itself dependent on Russian gas once again. But I cannot exclude the possibility that Germany may, after the war has ended, reopen at least one of the pipelines. Germany has become reliant on natural gas — and Russia could become one of its several suppliers. We are one cold winter away from an energy crisis in Germany. And when that happens, we’ll remember who bombed the pipelines. Even without a winter crisis, I suspect that Germany’s future support for Ukraine will be less enthusiastic than it might otherwise have been.</p>
<p>The upcoming trial is going to release a lot of juicy information into the public domain. The media will cover it. The Alternative for Germany, the party of the far-Right, is already making a big deal out of the Nord Stream explosions. They are asking: why support a country that bombs our infrastructure? It is a hard question to answer. The German government, for sure, has not answered it.</p>
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					<title>The Russian Church&#039;s war on Europe</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2026/08/the-russian-churchs-war-on-europe/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://stage.unherd.com/2026/08/the-russian-churchs-war-on-europe/?edition=us#respond</comments>
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										<unherd:main_theme>Faith</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Lucy Ash]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/blue-french-4.jpg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>2</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[Vladimir Putin meets Patriarch Kirill. (Vyacheslav Prokofyev/Pool/AFP/Getty) ]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><span lang="EN-AU"><strong>Lucy Ash</strong> is an acclaimed presenter of radio and TV documentaries on foreign affairs. Based in Moscow for the BBC in the early Nineties, she has reported regularly from Russia and Ukraine in the intervening decades. <a href="https://www.amazon.co.uk/Baton-Cross-Russias-Church-Pagans/dp/1837731837" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><i>The Baton and The Cross</i></a> (Icon Books 2024), </span><span lang="EN-US">a finalist for both the Orwell and British Academy Book Prizes,</span><span lang="EN-AU"> is her first book.</span></p>
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						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle></unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is an acclaimed presenter of radio and TV documentaries on foreign affairs. Based in Moscow for the BBC in the early Nineties, she has reported regularly from Russia and Ukraine in the intervening decades. <a href="https://www.amazon.co.uk/Baton-Cross-Russias-Church-Pagans/dp/1837731837" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><i>The Baton and The Cross</i></a> (Icon Books 2024), </span><span lang="EN-US">a finalist for both the Orwell and British Academy Book Prizes,</span><span lang="EN-AU"> is her first book.</span>]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Sun, 16 Aug 2026 23:01:30 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Sun, 16 Aug 2026 23:01:30 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Europe]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Orthodox church]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Putin]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Religion]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Russia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ukraine war]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://stage.unherd.com/?p=1071162</guid>
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								<![CDATA[Putin is armed with missiles and incense]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p dir="ltr">Women in white headscarves selling festive decorations, floral teacups, Orthodox icons and matryoshka dolls were once a familiar sight at Christmas markets across Europe. But ever since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the Belarusian nuns behind these stalls have been a source of controversy rather than holiday cheer. In 2022, they were barred from selling their handicrafts at Winchester Cathedral once it emerged that they supported Vladimir Putin’s invasion. They took their lead from the head of the Russian Orthodox Church, Patriarch Kirill, who declared that Russian soldiers who fall on the battlefield will be washed of their sins. He<a href="https://meduza.io/en/news/2026/07/29/russian-orthodox-patriarch-kirill-writes-book-on-redemptive-meaning-of-war" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://meduza.io/en/news/2026/07/29/russian-orthodox-patriarch-kirill-writes-book-on-redemptive-meaning-of-war&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1786961470999000&amp;usg=AOvVaw109ABsXJuo2MJk4gXfIb-b"> has silence published a book</a> on the “redemptive meaning” of what he has called a “Holy War”.</p>
<p dir="ltr">As the fighting grinds on, the backlash against the pro-war nuns has continued. At a Christmas fair in the Polish city of Szczecin, Belarusian pro-democracy activists protested in front of the nuns’ stall, accusing shoppers of “supporting torture in Belarusian prisons and Russian aggression against Ukraine&#8221;. Ukrainians in Belfast warned of the nuns’ ties to the Kremlin and urged the city council not to host them again. Last Christmas, in the parish of Täby, a suburb of Stockholm, the rector allowed the nuns to flog their wares in the church corridor. But the Church of Sweden later warned that the nuns “use their income to support Russian nationalism” and “have close ties with GRU”, referring to Russia’s military intelligence service. It advised its believers “against supporting their activities in any way”.</p>
<p dir="ltr">The Saint Elisabeth Convent in Minsk refutes such claims. On its website, it says money from the sales helps orphans and funds &#8220;humanitarian aid&#8221; for residents of Russian occupied Donbas. Yet Archpriest Andrey Lemeshonok, the convent’s spiritual father, has made no secret of his backing of the invasion. He once boasted that his nuns were part of “a combat unit”, fighting for Russia’s future.<a href="https://theins.ru/news/288553" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://theins.ru/news/288553&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1786961470999000&amp;usg=AOvVaw2vot8jkiy-uUOsLWJyf1e4"> Saint Elisabeth nuns, with flak jackets over their habits</a>, have been photographed in occupied Ukraine and posing with Russian flags decorated with the pro-war Z symbol.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Four and a half years ago, when Russia launched its full-scale invasion, Kirill did not call for peace. Instead he called Russia’s opponents in Ukraine “evil forces”, casting the war as a metaphysical battle against what he labeled the corrupting values of the West. Since then, his rhetoric has only hardened, sanctifying the bloodshed in Ukraine. But his hawkishness is nothing new: a poisonous co-dependency between church and state has existed for centuries. Many of the patriarch’s predecessors were under the Kremlin’s thumb and in hock to the secret police. In Soviet times, not a single bishop was appointed without the blessing of the KGB. But today, more than ever before, the church acts as an instrument of Moscow’s geopolitical power projecting influence, and posing a growing threat, across Europe.</p>
<p dir="ltr"><div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/12/the-mystery-of-britains-orthobros/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/12/the-mystery-of-britains-orthobros/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/GettyImages-2192498747.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/12/the-mystery-of-britains-orthobros/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/12/the-mystery-of-britains-orthobros/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The Mystery of Britain’s Orthobros</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/12/the-mystery-of-britains-orthobros/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Cosmo Adair</a></p></div></a></div>
<p dir="ltr">European security agencies increasingly view Russian church networks with suspicion. An<a href="https://www.molfar.institute/en/rpc-shpygue-u-evropi-doslidzhennya-molfar-chastyna-persha/" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.molfar.institute/en/rpc-shpygue-u-evropi-doslidzhennya-molfar-chastyna-persha/&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1786961470999000&amp;usg=AOvVaw2UBGDLbmgAxiDYaNDvQtrp"> open-source investigation</a> by the Kyiv-based Molfar Intelligence Institute in late 2024 concluded that the ROC “constructs churches near strategic facilities, government institutions, and military bases across various European countries” in a systematic effort to use religious outposts for espionage. In Bulgaria, Czechia, North Macedonia and elsewhere, “spies in cassocks” have been used as an alternative to diplomatic cover after the expulsion of Russian embassy staff following the invasion of Ukraine. In 2024, a priest from a Russian church in the Czech resort town of Karlovy Vary was expelled over suspicions of hostile activities. “We would be particularly foolish,”<a href="https://ekonomickydenik.cz/rusti-duchovni-jako-spioni-politici-volaji-po-vyhosteni/" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://ekonomickydenik.cz/rusti-duchovni-jako-spioni-politici-volaji-po-vyhosteni/&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1786961470999000&amp;usg=AOvVaw26U8MY4Lz3P9r5sdTHt_db"> said one Czech MEP,</a>  “if we did not recognize that Russia is undeniably using the Orthodox Church to carry out its hybrid warfare.”</p>
<p dir="ltr">Russia’s church has even tried to sway elections. Ahead of Moldova&#8217;s 2024 presidential poll and EU integration referendum, Russian state officials funded <a href="https://www.reuters.com/investigations/holy-war-how-russia-recruited-orthodox-priests-sway-moldovas-voters-2025-09-26/" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.reuters.com/investigations/holy-war-how-russia-recruited-orthodox-priests-sway-moldovas-voters-2025-09-26/&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1786961470999000&amp;usg=AOvVaw0wruBb6ATh9kzKfZCrTvOO">all-expenses-paid &#8220;pilgrimages&#8221;</a> to Moscow for dozens of Moldovan Orthodox priests and gave them debit cards loaded with hundreds of dollars as going-home presents. In exchange, the clerics were instructed to create channels on the Telegram messaging app warning against joining the EU.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Moscow has also been quietly hoovering up strategic real estate. In Vardø, a remote Arctic town close to Norway&#8217;s GLOBUS radar station, the Moscow Patriarchate <a href="https://www.thebarentsobserver.com/news/apparently-god-himself-commanded-the-russian-orthodox-bishop-to-build-a-chapel-right-under-nato-radars/440070" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.thebarentsobserver.com/news/apparently-god-himself-commanded-the-russian-orthodox-bishop-to-build-a-chapel-right-under-nato-radars/440070&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1786961470999000&amp;usg=AOvVaw3bivxCdNAImTV5ydmplYk4">secured</a> local approval, and even Norwegian state funding, to build a chapel. Clergy from the nearby Russian diocese of Plesetsk and Kargopol, including its bishop, made frequent visits to Vardø to unveil monuments to Norwegian partisans and consecrate Orthodox crosses. They said the chapel would serve Orthodox sailors and be a reminder of the cultural ties between Russia and Norway. But when the proposal was eventually submitted, the chapel had grown to 17 meters in height and, according to Vardø&#8217;s current mayor, the Russian bishop insisted the exact location under Nato radars had been &#8220;dictated&#8221; to him &#8220;by God himself&#8221;. Following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine and growing scrutiny of Moscow-linked institutions, the plans were shelved.</p>
<p dir="ltr">But many Russian churches have been built in sensitive spots, including in neighboring Sweden. The Church of the Holy Mother of God of Kazan in the town of Västerås, west of Stockholm, <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/europe/20250704-the-church-by-the-airport-inside-russia-s-suspected-spy-activities-in-sweden" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.france24.com/en/europe/20250704-the-church-by-the-airport-inside-russia-s-suspected-spy-activities-in-sweden&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1786961470999000&amp;usg=AOvVaw1_oDY9R-UIilam5Wt0Tbzr">built and consecrated in 2024</a>, is near a major airport, a water treatment works and a network of energy companies. Markus Göransson, a researcher at the Swedish Defense University, felt it was too close for comfort. “When Sweden’s defense forces undertake exercises on or near the airport… they do so under possible surveillance from the church,” he complained. Moreover, locals discovered that the plot of land for the church had been bought by Rosatom, Russia’s state-owned nuclear corporation which also, through an intermediary, funded the construction. Last August, the agency overseeing non-state religion funding in Sweden cut off state subsidies to the Västerås parish citing security concerns.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Finland, meanwhile, knows Russian pressure only too well. It shares an 833-mile border with its eastern neighbor, the longest in the EU. Decades of conflict and more recent hybrid tactics have fueled deep distrust. After the invasion, officials in the Finnish city of Turku moved quickly to close a Moscow-linked Orthodox church near a naval base, the port, government offices and Russia’s consulate. Governments in other countries have also wised up. Following the open-source intelligence findings of the Molfar report, governments across Europe are responding with sanctions, security investigations and pressure on Moscow-linked churches to cut ties with the Kremlin.</p>
<p dir="ltr">The issue is especially acute in the three Baltic states, where the Orthodox Church has become a flashpoint between a Soviet past and a European future. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are firmly anchored in the West through Nato and the EU, but all have sizable Russian-speaking populations, many descended from the Soviet era. Few attend church regularly, yet for many, Orthodoxy remains closely tied to Russian identity. In Estonia, where more than a quarter of the 1.4 million population are native Russian speakers, that makes the issue particularly sensitive. Parliament has now ordered Orthodox churches to sever ties with Moscow or face closure by the end of the year.</p>
<p dir="ltr">The sharpest confrontation to date in Estonia has been with <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2025/06/21/russia-using-nuns-as-spies-to-spread-propaganda/" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2025/06/21/russia-using-nuns-as-spies-to-spread-propaganda/&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1786961470999000&amp;usg=AOvVaw1BjNEqZGnNNay1ETqV4JtR">the Pühtitsa Convent</a>, which is a stavropegic monastery, meaning it comes under the direct authority of Patriarch Kirill rather than the local diocese. Pühtitsa’s abbess, Filareta Kalatšova, argues that the convent cannot unilaterally drop its subordination to the Moscow Patriarchate without breaking Church law. In an open letter to Parliament, she accused Estonian MPs of forcing her to commit a canonical crime. Though Martin Tulit, the Estonian official in charge of religious affairs, pointed out that the 134-year-old convent has changed its canonical affiliation before — including during the nation’s period of independence between the two world wars.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Outside Russia and occupied Ukraine, some Orthodox clerics who refused to follow Moscow orders eventually found they had other options. In January 2023,  in Vilnius, Lithuania’s capital, I met five unemployed priests who had been serving in a diocese linked to the Moscow Patriarchate but were defrocked for opposing the war. One had become a taxi driver to feed his family. The clerics were in limbo until the following year when Patriarch Bartholomew of Constantinople agreed to reinstate them under his jurisdiction. Not all the parishioners reacted well to the swap. Father Vladimiras Seliavko said many cold shouldered him and even relatives viewed him as a traitor but he “could not remain with a patriarch who blessed war criminals”. Although the Orthodox have no Pope, the Constantinople Patriarch, based in today’s Istanbul, is the closest equivalent. He is also known as the Ecumenical Patriarch and — much to Moscow’s annoyance — is seen as <em>primus inter pares</em>: first among equals and senior among all Orthodox bishops. Some Russian priests defrocked and forced into exile for refusing to read Kirill’s mandatory Victory Prayer have also been transferred to Bartholomew’s jurisdiction.</p>
<p dir="ltr"><div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/07/will-the-queue-bring-down-putin/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/07/will-the-queue-bring-down-putin/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/GettyImages-2160566948-1.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/07/will-the-queue-bring-down-putin/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/07/will-the-queue-bring-down-putin/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Will the queue bring down Putin?</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/07/will-the-queue-bring-down-putin/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Seva Gunitsky</a></p></div></a></div>
<p dir="ltr">In northern Europe, Poland and the Baltics, where Catholicism and Protestantism dominate, Russia’s church is widely seen as an arm of the Kremlin rather than a religious institution. The picture is very different in Orthodox eastern Europe, particularly in Serbia, Bulgaria and Georgia, where Moscow retains far deeper religious and cultural ties. Indeed, one of the challenges in countering the Russian Orthodox Church’s political influence is the hold it still has over its believers and its propensity to treat any criticism as tantamount to religious persecution. Last month, Bulgaria successfully blocked the European Union’s attempt to sanction Kirill. “The era of the Crusades is over,” said the country’s prime minister, Rumen Radev. He said he was wary of alienating millions of Eastern Orthodox believers. The Bulgarian Orthodox Church is administratively self-governing but its patriarch, Daniel, has aligned himself with Kirill&#8217;s position on the war. He warned his clergy against &#8220;inciting hatred&#8221; by labeling Russia as the &#8220;sole and unprovoked aggressor”.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Then there is the fraught question of the church in Ukraine. The establishment of the self-governing Orthodox Church of Ukraine in 2018, with the blessing of Bartholomew, was a slap in the face to Putin and his vision of the Russian World. But it was also a humiliation for Kirill. His Church, the biggest and the richest in the Orthodox world, stood to lose at least a fifth of its 150 million members, thousands of parishes and several hundred churches and monasteries. Nato encroachment aside, Ukraine’s desire to cut ties with the mother church in Moscow, to which it has been linked for three centuries, became a <em>casus belli</em>.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Disagreements over which Orthodox church in Ukraine is the most legitimate have not gone away. Even today, as bombs rain down on Ukrainian cities, many parishioners are reluctant to change jurisdictions to the autonomous Orthodox Church of Ukraine. They believe that it is uncanonical and that joining it means that they will be deprived of divine grace. This agenda is relentlessly pushed by the Kremlin. Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, hardly an authority on matters ecclesiastical, routinely invokes &#8220;canon law&#8221; to condemn Ukrainian and Western action against the branch of the church historically linked to Moscow.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Such talk leaves parishioners particularly open to manipulation. “The church is very convenient for dictatorships”, says Father Vladimiras, one of the five Lithuanian priests defrocked by Moscow, “because any propaganda can be spread through its channels. Believers are accustomed to trusting their clergy and rarely doubt the statements of their patriarch, bishops or priests.” <a href="https://news.liga.net/society/news/smotryashtie-i-vymanivanie-kontaktov-kak-rpts-verbuet-ukrainskih-bezhentsev-v-evrope" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://news.liga.net/society/news/smotryashtie-i-vymanivanie-kontaktov-kak-rpts-verbuet-ukrainskih-bezhentsev-v-evrope&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1786961470999000&amp;usg=AOvVaw0rT-tIACkhKnJpfWFw45LY">Recent reports </a>in the Ukrainian media suggest Orthodox parishes in Western Europe are being used to recruit Ukrainian refugees. It is not clear how these refugees would be deployed, but it’s not unimaginable they could become Russian intelligence assets.</p>
<p dir="ltr"><div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">“The Russian Church is key to Putin’s plan to destroy European liberal democracy and the institutions underpinning it.”</div>
<p dir="ltr">Throughout the Cold War, Soviet propaganda relentlessly targeted Uncle Sam. Now, Europe has morphed into Russia’s main enemy. And the Russian Church is key to Putin’s plan to destroy European liberal democracy and the institutions underpinning it. According to Kirill, the continent is mired in moral decay thanks to its acceptance of LGBTQ+ rights; Orthodox politicians and talk show hosts often use the pejorative term &#8220;<em>Gayropa</em>&#8221; instead of Evropa.</p>
<p dir="ltr">The war has given the Patriarch a chance to reassert his authority in a post-Soviet world as he championed the twin causes of Orthodox unity and Russian imperialism. Since the Western world “has fallen into Satanism”, in Kirill’s view, Russia functions as the <em>Katechon</em> — the biblical force that restrains the Antichrist. In a recent sermon he praised Russia&#8217;s atomic bomb for thwarting its enemies plans to “to destroy and enslave the Motherland”. In other words, massive military destruction is justified as an act of cosmic purification.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Europe may now have to confront this increasingly aggressive alliance of “the missile and the incense burner”, as one French theologian put it, with little help from across the Atlantic. If previous US administrations made equality for sexual minorities a pillar of American diplomacy, Donald Trump’s National Security Strategy, published last November, puts “traditional values” at its heart instead. <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/sounds/play/p0n1s5d4" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.bbc.co.uk/sounds/play/p0n1s5d4&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1786961470999000&amp;usg=AOvVaw1uLRjtktKw5Bjil22qZ6xr">On a trip to Texas last year for the BBC</a>, I was struck by how some ultra-conservative Americans now see Russia as a Christian bulwark — even a model to emulate. The strategy contains little criticism of Moscow despite the mounting death toll, while voicing support for “patriotic parties”, several of which enjoy the Kremlin’s favor and, in some cases, the backing of its pliant church. For a continent already facing a resurgent Russia, Europe’s isolation on this issue is an uncomfortable prospect and one it can no longer afford to ignore.</p>
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					<title>Why Ukrainian liberals love conscription</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2026/07/why-ukrainian-liberals-love-conscription/?edition=us</link>
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										<unherd:main_theme>War</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Marta Havryshko]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Screenshot-2026-07-19-at-08.59.30.jpg?w=80</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>2</unherd:article_ranking>
																<unherd:image_caption>
							<![CDATA['No amount of “intellectual mobilisation” will be enough to contain public fury.' (Scott Peterson/Getty)]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<div><strong>Marta Havryshko</strong> is a US-based author and researcher focused on Ukrainian nationalism, the far Right, and the Russia-Ukraine war. She holds a PhD in history from the Ivan Franko National University of Lviv in Ukraine.</div>
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															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is a US-based author and researcher focused on Ukrainian nationalism, the far Right, and the Russia-Ukraine war. She holds a PhD in history from the Ivan Franko National University of Lviv in Ukraine.</div>
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										<pubDate>Sun, 19 Jul 2026 23:01:45 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Sun, 19 Jul 2026 23:33:39 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Conscription]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Peace]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Putin]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Russia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ukraine war]]></category>
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								<![CDATA[Hypocritical propagandists aren’t forced to fight]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>&#8220;No!&#8221; the woman cries. “May you be damned!&#8221; You can hear the despair in her voice, as masked men grab her husband, then bundle him into a waiting van. Within seconds, she’s alone, weeping in the middle of the street. This is Odesa, but scenes like it, captured on phones and posted online, hammer Ukrainian cities as relentlessly as Russian missiles. Since Putin&#8217;s full-scale invasion began, over a million Ukrainians have been conscripted to defend their homeland. And, as voluntary recruits have dried up, the army has begun resorting to the same methods faced by that couple in Odesa. People even have a term for it: “busification”.</p>
<p>The process is brutally simple. Draft officers, often accompanied by police, snatch military-age men off the streets, before delivering them to recruitment centers. There, many are pressured through threats, intimidation, and physical abuse to pass military medical examinations and sign draft papers. Men with serious conditions — including HIV, tuberculosis and even cancer — are routinely declared fit for service. Whether they like it or not, the recruitment officers must meet quotas; the only question is who fills them. Yet with Ukraine’s wealthy elite reluctant to heed the call, Kyiv’s recruitment crisis is becoming a class crisis too, one that could cause chaos long after the guns fall silent.</p>
<p>Ukraine currently mobilizes around 30,000 men each month — yet many never make it to the front. Some flee training centers at the first opportunity, while others are later discharged as medically unfit. By autumn 2025, according to official figures, roughly 300,000 servicemen had gone AWOL or deserted. The numbers have become so politically sensitive that the authorities now keep the data secret. But the direction of travel is clear: Ukraine’s pool of willing fighters is shrinking. As a result, coercion has moved from the margins to the very center of national life.</p>
<p>Straightforward coercion, however, is only part of the story, as mobilization becomes a social scourge too. Today&#8217;s Ukrainian army is, increasingly, an army of the poor. Members of the upper-middle class — and especially the political and economic establishment — possess the resources, connections, and influence necessary to shield themselves from military service. Through a combination of legal work-arounds and bribes, they can avoid donning uniforms for a range of reasons, from illness, to having several children, to caring for disabled relatives. Others are exempt because they’re university students or academics, or work at strategic companies, particularly those linked to the defense sector.</p>
<p>A significant portion of Ukraine&#8217;s cultural and academic intelligentsia belongs to this privileged group. Many have received exemptions from military service while continuing their professional activities uninterrupted. In return, the state expects ideological loyalty and intellectual labor in support of the war effort. This includes promoting &#8220;decolonization&#8221; narratives that often amount to anti-Russian ethnonationalism. It also means deliberately ignoring the deep penetration of far-Right groups into the military, and remaining silent about the normalization of Nazi symbols within parts of the armed forces. But, most importantly, it means justifying coercive mobilization as a necessary instrument of national survival in what is routinely described as an &#8220;existential war”.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/04/why-i-went-to-moscow/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/04/why-i-went-to-moscow/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/GettyImages-2268768339-1.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/04/why-i-went-to-moscow/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/04/why-i-went-to-moscow/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Why I went to Moscow</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/04/why-i-went-to-moscow/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Yanis Varoufakis </a></p></div></a></div>
<p>A substantial number of Ukrainian intellectuals have willingly embraced this arrangement, placing themselves in the service of state interests while convincing themselves that they’re fighting on the &#8220;information front&#8221; in a war for independence from Russia. Others are motivated by more pragmatic considerations: preserving the privileges that come with exemption from military service. Still others remain loyal out of fear.</p>
<p>Fear, after all, is not an abstract concern. The costs of dissent have become increasingly visible. A recent example is the Ukrainian-Canadian political scientist Ivan Katchanovski, who became the target of a public campaign of denunciation by Ukrainian and Western scholars over his interpretation of the war. Katchanovski has argued for a more nuanced explanation of the conflict — one that looks beyond Russian imperialism and Putin&#8217;s ambitions to include the role of the Ukrainian far-Right, Nato, and a post-Cold War security architecture that excluded Moscow. Rather than confronting these arguments on their scholarly merits, many of his critics simply accused the scholar of spreading <a href="https://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2026/04/28/8032087/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">“Kremlin propaganda”</a>. Whatever one thinks of Katchanovski’s views, the episode sent a clear message: questioning dominant wartime narratives can carry serious professional and reputational consequences.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, justifying mobilization, regardless of how coercive, violent, or degrading it may be, has become a central task of Ukraine’s liberal intelligentsia. In May 2026, for instance, the prominent historian and public intellectual <a href="https://expert.in.ua/suspilstvo/istoryk-zayavyv-shho-mobilizatsiya-potrebuye-strahu-j-osudu-shho-vin-zaproponuvav/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Yaroslav Hrytsak</a> argued that patriotic appeals and financial incentives alone are insufficient to sustain effective mobilization in the country. In his view, society must also rely on fear and moral condemnation. As an example, Hrytsak invoked Britain’s experience during the First World War, when women handed white feathers to men who didn&#8217;t enlist, publicly shaming them as cowards.</p>
<p>What is striking is that Hrytsak offered no criticism of this practice, despite its deeply controversial legacy. The white-feather campaign stigmatized not only those unwilling to fight, but also veterans, disabled men, the seriously ill, and countless others who were unfit for military service. Yet in contemporary Ukraine, this history is increasingly presented not as a cautionary tale but as a model worthy of emulation.</p>
<p>In reality, of course, the public shaming of men who avoid military service is already deeply embedded in Ukrainian public discourse. For example, the popular singer <a href="https://www.obozrevatel.com/ukr/shou-oboz/ya-zahischala-sebe-alyona-alyona-potrapila-v-skandal-cherez-komentar-pro-ttsk-i-poyasnila-svoyu-pozitsiyu.htm" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Alyona Alyona</a>, who represented the country at the 2024 Eurovision, mockingly referred to such men as “Mama’s little boys” and publicly defended the harsh measures employed against draft evaders. <a href="https://tsn.ua/ukrayina/parad-licemirstva-nardepka-ustinova-rozkritikuvala-uhilyantiv-ale-ye-nyuans-2655345.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Oleksandra Ustinova</a>, an MP, has similarly attacked men who leave Ukraine to avoid service, arguing that the current civil penalties should be replaced by criminal prosecutions. Yet there’s an irony here. Ustinova’s own draft-age husband left Ukraine for the US after Russia’s invasion in March 2022, bought a house and a car there, and has shown little intention of returning.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;The public shaming of men who avoid military service is already deeply embedded in Ukrainian public discourse.&#8221;</div>
<p>There are other ironies too. In September 2024, Yaroslava Kravchenko, a celebrity TV host, published a report on male artists who had left Ukraine under the telling title <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YJJnD-kZ5lw&amp;t=1s" target="_blank" rel="noopener">&#8220;Those Who Escaped from Ukraine&#8221;</a>. Like many women who publicly denounce supposed draft dodgers, Kravchenko herself enjoys unrestricted international travel for both work and leisure. Many other female celebrities are in the same boat. Women, after all, remain exempt from the travel restrictions imposed under martial law — restrictions that prevent millions of Ukrainian men from leaving the country regardless of their personal circumstances, political views, or willingness to fight.</p>
<p>This asymmetry lies at the heart of growing social tensions. Those who champion moral condemnation often do so from positions of relative safety and freedom. They can cross borders, pursue careers abroad, and retain control over their own lives. The men they shame cannot. From the very first days of the war, Ukraine has cultivated the image of the ideal man: self-sacrificing, strong, courageous, and unfailingly committed to defending his family, his home, his nation. He is prepared, if necessary, to give his life for this cause.</p>
<p>His opposite is the <em>ukhyliant</em> — the draft evader. In the dominant narrative, he is portrayed as a coward who’ll resort to any means necessary to evade what is presented as his “natural” masculine duty. Public shaming of such men has become normalized, routine, and Ukrainian media has played a significant role in this process. Flippant headlines like “Draft Dodger Stopped by a Bear at the Romanian Border” or “Grandma Draft Dodger: Odesa Man Dressed as an Elderly Woman to Cross the Border” have now become commonplace. And though Article 35 of Ukraine&#8217;s constitution theoretically guarantees the right to alternative service for conscientious objectors, that right has effectively ceased to exist. A recent <a href="https://babel.ua/texts/127938-shturmoviy-polk-skelya-maye-boyovi-zaslugi-i-dobre-zabezpechennya-a-shche-kazhut-ochevidci-tam-katuyut-i-zabivayut-lyudey-na-smert-rozsliduvannya-babelya?utm_source=chatgpt.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">investigation</a> into the &#8220;Skala&#8221; regiment alleged that some men who refused to serve were beaten into compliance.</p>
<p>All the while, some Ukrainian feminists have directed their criticism at draft evaders while largely overlooking a wartime system that casts men as protectors and women as those in need of protection — precisely the gender hierarchy feminism claims to oppose. This flirtation with militaristic nationalism has left many feminists blind to the women whose lives are shattered by busification. Behind every man dragged into a recruitment van, then tortured or beaten to death by draft officers, let alone killed at the front, stands a mother, a daughter, a wife, bearing the fear, grief, and trauma that follow. But because their suffering complicates the dominant wartime narrative, this reality is largely met with silence.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/07/the-ukraine-wars-big-lie/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/07/the-ukraine-wars-big-lie/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/GettyImages-1468579963.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/07/the-ukraine-wars-big-lie/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/07/the-ukraine-wars-big-lie/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The Ukraine war&#039;s big lie</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/07/the-ukraine-wars-big-lie/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Thomas Fazi </a></p></div></a></div>
<p>A similar silence greets another group of inconvenient women — those who have become active in the grassroots struggle against forced mobilization. <em>Gender in Detail,</em> Ukraine&#8217;s leading gender website, has had remarkably little to say about the women standing in the way of busification. These women are threatened, attacked, prosecuted, and publicly shamed for defending relatives — or complete strangers — from recruitment vans. The courage of these women, from teenage girls to pensioners, can be seen in countless videos confronting recruitment officers and the police. Their courage is visible, their suffering documented. Yet their invisibility, in the end, is political.</p>
<p>That, of course, raises a broader question. With the frontlines mostly stagnant, and with the meatgrinder war <a href="https://www.europeandatajournalism.eu/cp_data_news/depopulation-and-war-threaten-ukraines-demographics/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">annihilating</a> Ukraine&#8217;s demographics, why is the government so intent on continuing with busification at all costs? Ukraine no longer appears to have the final say over its own future. That decision is increasingly shared with — or subordinated to — its Western sponsors, who view Ukrainian men less as citizens than as expendable military assets. The EU&#8217;s plan to refuse protection to Ukrainian men of draft age exposes this logic. By denying them refuge, Europe is effectively forcing them back to the front. Their bodies have become instruments in a larger geopolitical project: bleeding Russia. That’s further suggests that the war has become a Western proxy war against Putin. In return, Ukraine&#8217;s venal political elite, led by Volodymyr Zelensky, enjoys Western political protection — whatever the moral and legal problems with busification.</p>
<p>There’s another question here too. If Ukraine is being bled dry for Brussels, why not end militarization altogether? Unfortunately, those who suggest this path, advocating diplomacy or negotiations, are marginalized. When Yuliia Mendel, Zelensky&#8217;s former press secretary, told Tucker Carlson that the Ukrainian president had sabotaged peace talks with Russia, much of Ukraine&#8217;s mainstream media and a number of prominent liberal commentators responded not with debate but with a coordinated effort to discredit her, branding her a purveyor of &#8220;Russian narratives”.</p>
<p>Liberal intellectuals share responsibility for silencing these unwanted voices. Yet neither the state nor its intellectual allies can suppress these realities forever. Beneath the surface, they are fueling growing resentment and social anger. Every attempt to silence grievances only deepens the sense of injustice, and if the pressure continues to build, it may eventually spark a political and social explosion.</p>
<p>There are signs of this already. In the village of <a href="https://sud.ua/uk/news/ukraine/355297-vybili-steklo-travmirovali-voennykh-na-volyni-7-mashin-zablokirovali-avto-ttsk-chtoby-osvobodit-muzhchinu" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Ozero</a>, for instance, locals blocked a military recruitment vehicle, smashed its windows, and freed a mobilized man. Elsewhere, confrontations between recruitment officers and civilians have involved dozens of people, often escalating into verbal abuse and physical violence. Attacks on recruitment officers with knives, shovels, and clubs have become increasingly common too. As the military&#8217;s manpower crisis deepens, mobilization grows more coercive — and public resistance more intense. The way things are going, no amount of “intellectual mobilization” will be enough to contain public fury.</p>
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					<title>The Ukraine war&#039;s big lie</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2026/07/the-ukraine-wars-big-lie/?edition=us</link>
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										<unherd:main_theme>Stalemate</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Thomas Fazi]]>
					</dc:creator>
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																<unherd:article_ranking>1</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA['When Russians feel pinned against the wall, they harden'. (Sean Gallup/Getty)]]>
						</unherd:image_caption>
						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Thomas Fazi</strong> is an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist and translator. His latest book is <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/the-covid-consensus/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">The Covid Consensus</a>, co-authored with Toby Green.</p>
]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_handle>battleforeurope</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist and translator. His latest book is <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/the-covid-consensus/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">The Covid Consensus</a>, co-authored with Toby Green.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Wed, 08 Jul 2026 23:03:55 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Thu, 09 Jul 2026 17:13:32 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Europe]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Nato]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Putin]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Russia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ukraine]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ukraine war]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Zelensky]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://stage.unherd.com/?p=1066406</guid>
																												<description>
								<![CDATA[Can Kyiv ever win?]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p dir="ltr">It has become something of a seasonal ritual. Every summer, Brussels launches a fresh propaganda offensive on Ukraine — and this year is no different. “The tide is turning”, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen declared on social media a few weeks ago, claiming that Ukraine, with European and Nato help, has seized the initiative, while Russia has been forced onto the defensive. The same phrase has since been <a href="https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/ukraine-attacks-on-moscow-show-weakness-of-russia-position-by-sergei-guriev-2026-06?utm_source=Project+Syndicate+Newsletter&amp;utm_campaign=6601cb2eb2-Politics_Newsletter_2026_07_01&amp;utm_medium=email&amp;utm_term=0_-2e8ee61f44-93818541" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/ukraine-attacks-on-moscow-show-weakness-of-russia-position-by-sergei-guriev-2026-06?utm_source%3DProject%2BSyndicate%2BNewsletter%26utm_campaign%3D6601cb2eb2-Politics_Newsletter_2026_07_01%26utm_medium%3Demail%26utm_term%3D0_-2e8ee61f44-93818541&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1783597892718000&amp;usg=AOvVaw3A5B9VrHkMJismDa2K3TLb">echoed verbatim</a> by politicians and commentators across the transatlantic ecosystem, in what is clearly a coordinated narrative push. Meanwhile, we are told that the Russian economy is — once again — on the brink of collapse, and that even Putin’s downfall may be imminent.</p>
<p dir="ltr">We have been here before. At regular intervals since Putin’s invasion, the Western political-media complex has worked to convince the public that victory for Ukraine was just around the corner, and that Russia itself was on the verge of collapse. In 2023, for instance, Western journalists and agenda-setters spent months hyping Ukraine’s counteroffensive, which was going to “turn the tide” in Kyiv’s favor. The campaign was a catastrophic failure, producing mass casualties and negligible territorial gains.</p>
<p dir="ltr">The latest alleged game-changer is Ukraine’s drone-strike campaign inside Russia — reaching as far as Saint Petersburg and Moscow — targeting logistics, fuel depots, refineries and supply lines. Several civilian targets have also been hit, causing numerous casualties. On Monday, Moscow suffered the largest drone attack so far. President Zelensky has now announced a 40-day operation against Russian targets to “influence the aggressor state in order to press for an end to the war”, which is likely to mean many more such attacks. These measures coincide with the EU’s disbursement of the first €3.2 billion installment of its €90 billion loan to Ukraine.</p>
<p dir="ltr">The timing is not coincidental. On Tuesday, a crucial Nato summit began in Ankara, where the pro-war lobby — both in Europe and in Washington — is desperate to make the case that Ukraine is winning. It’s a narrative that Trump himself appears happy to indulge, probably to compensate for the Iran fiasco: he even signed the G7 leaders’ recent statement committing to “increase the delivery of air defense capacities, additional systems and interceptors, and long-range capabilities”; to consider extending production licenses to Ukraine; and to “strengthen our sanctions, including those on the oil and gas sectors”.</p>
<p dir="ltr">It is also, in all likelihood, a response to mounting war fatigue in the West, confirmed by the refusal of the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary to finance the aforementioned loan — an opt-out that Hungary’s new pro-EU government has strikingly not reversed so far — followed by the new Bulgarian government&#8217;s decision to prohibit arms supplies to Ukraine.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Kyiv’s drone campaign is certainly having an impact. Russian oil production has been affected; there have been serious fuel shortages across the country, as even Putin has admitted. Ukraine has also disrupted Russian supply routes north of the Sea of Azov, causing power outages in Crimea and in the Russian-held part of Ukraine’s Kherson region nearby. But these attacks are unlikely to change the course of the war. The Russian economy is faltering, yet it remains in a better position than much of the EU. Indeed, citing higher oil prices, largely a consequence of the Iran war, the International Monetary Fund in April raised its forecast for Russia’s 2026 GDP growth by 0.3 points, to 1.1%. Meanwhile, it revised the forecast downward for the EU’s top three economies — Germany, France and Italy — to 0.8%, 0.9% and 0.2% respectively.</p>
<p dir="ltr">More crucially, though, the Russian army continues to advance on the battlefield. It is steadily closing in on its goal of conquering the entire Donbass. Just the other day, Moscow announced the capture of Kostiantynivka — a town in Donetsk and the largest settlement it’s taken since Mariupol. The city was one of the last strongholds on the road to important Ukrainian-controlled cities, Kramatorsk and Sloviansk, whose capture is the Kremlin’s ultimate objective in the Donbass. Russian troops are also advancing around Chasiv Yar and Toretsk, making gains in urban fighting and on elevated positions, and continue to advance around Lyman and Rai-Oleksandrivka. All this flatly contradicts the prevailing “Ukraine has turned the tide” narrative.</p>
<p dir="ltr"><div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/05/nato-is-a-dangerous-grift/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/05/nato-is-a-dangerous-grift/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/GettyImages-2061692449-e1778520510445.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/05/nato-is-a-dangerous-grift/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author </span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/05/nato-is-a-dangerous-grift/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Nato is a dangerous grift</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/05/nato-is-a-dangerous-grift/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Thomas Fazi </a></p></div></a></div>
<p dir="ltr">If further proof were needed that things are going badly for Ukraine, one need only look at the increasingly widespread “busification” policy — the kidnapping of conscription-age men off the streets to be sent to the front, which is fueling growing domestic opposition to the war — or at the EU’s proposal to exclude military-age Ukrainian men, in practice all men aged 23 to 60, from the bloc’s temporary protection scheme.</p>
<p dir="ltr">In this light, the drone campaign looks less like a game-changer than a sign of desperation: given Ukraine’s inability to turn the tide on the battlefield, Kyiv and Nato have decided to “bring the war to Russia”. Yet there is no evidence that Ukraine’s drone campaign will turn the war around — much less force Putin to capitulate. Indeed, over the past few days, Russian forces launched some of the largest drone and missile strikes on Kyiv so far, killing dozens of people.</p>
<p dir="ltr">How much Ukraine’s campaign is affecting public support for Putin is hard to say. It is true that it is having an effect on Russian morale, but as Leonid Ragozin has <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2026/7/1/is-ukraines-campaign-of-targeting-russian-refineries-working" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2026/7/1/is-ukraines-campaign-of-targeting-russian-refineries-working&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1783597892718000&amp;usg=AOvVaw0_gIh22UyOm_aYMWZVWgBh">written</a>, the situation in the country remains relatively stable: for all the dramatic visuals of burning refineries and queues at petrol stations, most Russians have seen worse in their lifetimes, and the vast majority still enjoy a standard of living comparable to that of the poorer EU countries — a far cry from what they endured throughout the bad old days in the Nineties.</p>
<p dir="ltr">The most reliable “poll” will come on 20 September, when Russia holds elections to the State Duma; some analysts <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qy5RCnEOIA8" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.youtube.com/watch?v%3Dqy5RCnEOIA8&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1783597892718000&amp;usg=AOvVaw3oIVR_Xr8Js3vm_UC8gG8O">predict</a> that the ruling United Russia Party will suffer a humiliating result at the hands of the Communists to its Left and the (confusingly named) Liberal Democratic Party to its Right. But anyone hoping this might pressure Putin into ending the war will be disappointed: both parties have taken an even more hardline stance on the conflict than Putin’s United Russia party. The Ukrainian attacks are, if anything, emboldening the more hawkish voices in the Kremlin, who accuse Putin of mismanaging the conflict and are demanding a far more forceful response. After all, history suggests that when Russians feel pinned against the wall, they do not capitulate; they harden. Thus, the greater the pressure on Russia becomes, the more likely it is that Putin will find himself compelled to escalate the war.</p>
<p dir="ltr"><div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;The Ukrainian attacks are, if anything, emboldening the more hawkish voices in the Kremlin.&#8221;</div>
<p dir="ltr">Regardless of the short-term effects, Ukraine’s drone campaign is a textbook example of how drones are rewriting the rules of warfare in real time. Strategic deep strikes — the ability to reach the enemy’s cities, industries and leadership far behind the front — were until recently the privilege of countries with powerful air forces and missile arsenals. But low-cost, mass-produced drones have democratized it. A country losing the attritional contest on the ground — as Ukraine, on paper vastly inferior to Russia in material and manpower terms, plainly is — can now inflict vast damage deep inside the stronger power’s territory. And once the weaker side exercises that option, whatever incentive the stronger side may have had to exercise restraint collapses.</p>
<p dir="ltr">It is, after all, a matter of historical record that so far Russia has refrained from inflicting mass destruction on Kyiv and other major cities far from the front line, and throughout most of the war has conspicuously spared government decision-making centers — despite having the means to do so. For the first eight months of the conflict, Moscow also left Ukraine’s energy grid untouched; strikes began only after the Kerch Bridge attack of October 2022. In this sense, drone warfare does level the playing field, but it also invites escalation, by stripping the weaker side of the indirect protection that asymmetry itself — its inability to inflict mass damage on the enemy — once afforded it.</p>
<p dir="ltr">This is what makes the current moment so dangerous. A nuclear superpower is being subjected to a sustained campaign of strikes against its principal cities, its strategic infrastructure and, by extension, its leadership — supported by Western intelligence, executed with Western weapons and now backed by an explicit G7 commitment to “accelerate” the delivery of long-range capabilities.</p>
<p dir="ltr">As Matthew Blackburn of the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs recently has <a href="https://responsiblestatecraft.org/russia-europe-war/" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://responsiblestatecraft.org/russia-europe-war/&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1783597892718000&amp;usg=AOvVaw34OkZFCitsSq_rEjVMzv7i">warned</a>, if Moscow decides its restraint within Ukraine is being exploited to impose humiliating damage on the Russian heartland, it may abandon strikes on Ukrainian infrastructure in favor of the European supply hubs and manufacturing sites that make Kyiv’s deep-strike campaign possible in the first place, thereby correcting the asymmetry and restoring deterrence on its own terms. Indeed, Moscow has repeatedly signaled that its patience is not unlimited; voices within the Russian establishment increasingly speak of restoring deterrence by striking targets in Europe itself. The reason Russia has so far refused to do so is obvious: such an attack could easily spiral into an all-out war that Russia has no interest in fighting — as even General Alexus Grynkewich, Nato’s Supreme Allied Commander Europe and the alliance’s top military commander, <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/751d4555-9e8c-42a0-a37b-80893727776c?syn-25a6b1a6=1" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.ft.com/content/751d4555-9e8c-42a0-a37b-80893727776c?syn-25a6b1a6%3D1&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1783597892718000&amp;usg=AOvVaw2nbEuZFMHsoTOaa0XZEUlL">recently</a> noted. Simply put, the cost of retaliation has thus far exceeded the cost of tolerance. But if the latter keeps increasing, Russia’s calculus could very well change.</p>
<p dir="ltr"><div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/05/why-europe-keeps-losing/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/05/why-europe-keeps-losing/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/GettyImages-2262945841-e1779745278977.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/05/why-europe-keeps-losing/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading </span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/05/why-europe-keeps-losing/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Why Europe keeps losing</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/05/why-europe-keeps-losing/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Wolfgang Munchau </a></p></div></a></div>
<p dir="ltr">The essential fact is that nobody in the West knows where Russia’s red lines lie — and indeed Western policy seems to proceed on the assumption that they do not exist at all. Meanwhile, the Europeans keep arguing that there is no alternative to continuing to support Ukraine indefinitely because “Russia refuses to negotiate”. But as Anatol Lieven of the Quincy Institute recently <a href="https://mondediplo.com/2026/07/04russia" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://mondediplo.com/2026/07/04russia&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1783597892718000&amp;usg=AOvVaw3fD9dZglbBCJ0nVjTyx8aG">wrote</a>, it is the EU — not Russia — that has so far refused to negotiate. While Moscow has spent the past year in sustained talks with Washington and progressively abandoned several of its core demands, the Europeans have made negotiations conditional on an unconditional ceasefire that Russia cannot accept without surrendering its only leverage, and have wrapped this precondition in “principles” that amount to a demand for Russian capitulation.</p>
<p dir="ltr">The main victim of this posture has been Ukraine itself, condemned to a grinding war of attrition it cannot win militarily. Should exhaustion eventually produce a ceasefire without a settlement, meanwhile, it could lead to a Kashmir-style condition of permanent insecurity. It is in Ukraine’s interest — and in Europe’s interest as a whole — to negotiate a comprehensive peace settlement instead. We know in broad terms what any realistic settlement would entail: territorial concessions from Ukraine in exchange for security guarantees (short of Nato membership and Western troop deployments). Whether such an offer would suffice for Putin to claim his measure of victory and end the war, nobody can yet know. But what we do know is the cost of the status quo.</p>
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					<title>Russia’s veterans are bringing violence home</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2025/11/russias-veterans-are-bringing-violence-home/?edition=us</link>
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										<unherd:main_theme>Ukraine war</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Ian Garner]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/Blue-thumb.jpg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>2</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[Russian soldiers are promised the world. Kirill Kudryavtsev/AFP]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Dr. Ian Garner</strong> is assistant professor of totalitarian studies at the Pilecki Institute in Warsaw. His latest book is <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/z-generation/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em>Z Generation: Russia&#8217;s Fascist Youth</em></a> (Hurst).</p>
]]>
						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>irgarner</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is assistant professor of totalitarian studies at the Pilecki Institute in Warsaw. His latest book is <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/z-generation/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em>Z Generation: Russia's Fascist Youth</em></a> (Hurst).]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Wed, 19 Nov 2025 00:02:01 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Mon, 22 Dec 2025 12:23:10 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Russia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ukraine war]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Veterans]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Vladimir Putin]]></category>
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								<![CDATA[The state keeps them in battle mode]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>This summer, Russian soldier Sergei Moskalenko absconded from his unit at the frontline in Ukraine. Slipping past the military authorities, Moskalenko made it home to Chelyabinsk, a dilapidated industrial city in the remote Urals, where his wife and two children were waiting for him. Within days, he had violently<a href="https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2025/08/08/chelyabinsk-police-locate-war-veteran-suspected-of-killing-his-wife-a90140" target="_blank" rel="noopener"> murdered</a> his wife at home.</p>
<p>The road from contract soldier to violent criminal has become all too familiar in Russia in recent years. At least 500 civilians have been<a href="https://globalinitiative.net/analysis/russia-demobilization-challenge-galeotti-organized-crime-conflict/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"> killed</a> or seriously injured by returning veterans since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, and the tide of violence shows no signs of slowing.</p>
<p>Tune into the state’s propaganda channels, however, and a different picture emerges. On 31 December 2024, a handful of “Special Military Operation” veterans in immaculately pressed uniforms were feted as heroes at <em>Goluboi Ogonek</em>, Russia’s glitzy televised New Year’s light festival, alongside the usual cavalcade of pop stars and celebrities. They sang the praises of their government, their country’s war, and their comrades-in-arms.</p>
<p>Similarly glittering visions of soldiers, hymned as the saints of the Kremlin’s cult of war, are plastered over Russian state-owned media. The image of ordinary soldiers returning from the front, flush with cash, to acclaim and accolades is everywhere in popular culture. Billboards with the faces of the “Heroes of Russia” sprawl across highway bridges and loom over city streets throughout the land. The Russian Orthodox patriarch sings the praises of veterans from the pulpit,<a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-patriarch-kirill-dying-ukraine-sins/32052380.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener"> claiming</a> that to die in Ukraine “washes away all sins”.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/08/how-russia-fell-out-of-love-with-trump/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/08/how-russia-fell-out-of-love-with-trump/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/bromance.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/08/how-russia-fell-out-of-love-with-trump/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/08/how-russia-fell-out-of-love-with-trump/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>How Russia fell out of love with Trump</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/08/how-russia-fell-out-of-love-with-trump/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Ian Garner</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>On top of this choreographed public zeal is a deluge of advertising that promises up to $60,000 (USD) to those who enlist and survive a year as a <em>kontraktnik</em>, a contract soldier. The adverts promise Russian men that they can be rich and successful — which, stuck in the underdeveloped, stagnant regions outside wealthy cities, most ordinary Russians cannot otherwise hope to be. And it’s not just talk: as much as 1.5% of Russia’s GDP is being spent on these bonuses. The mostly uneducated men who seize the chance and survive their year in the “meat grinder”, which has left hundreds of thousands of Russian men dead in Ukraine,<a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2025/04/03/trump-putin-russia-ukraine-ceasefire-peace-negotiations-economy/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"> brag</a> on social media about the cash lining their pockets. Yet there is nothing to brag about during their time at the front, where they are initiated into Russia’s particularly brutal way of warfare which embraces violence, torture, rape, and the murder of combatants and civilians alike.</p>
<p>Russian soldiers are promised the very best treatment on their return from war. The Kremlin has created a special &#8220;Defenders of the Fatherland&#8221; foundation, led by<a href="https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D0%9F%D1%83%D1%82%D0%B8%D0%BD,_%D0%92%D0%BB%D0%B0%D0%B4%D0%B8%D0%BC%D0%B8%D1%80_%D0%92%D0%BB%D0%B0%D0%B4%D0%B8%D0%BC%D0%B8%D1%80%D0%BE%D0%B2%D0%B8%D1%87" target="_blank" rel="noopener"> Vladimir Putin&#8217;s</a> cousin Anna Tsivileva, to advocate for veterans. State-run groups on VK and Telegram — two of the country’s most popular social media platforms — run Q&amp;A<a href="https://vk.com/wall-37475973_52283?ysclid=mh8wgq5kf0133289040" target="_blank" rel="noopener"> sessions</a> for those seeking to maximize the new benefits the Kremlin is supposedly offering, which include access to family and child support, employment opportunities, and healthcare. The media<a href="https://news.mail.ru/society/66152484/?ysclid=mh8wdt5212458811158" target="_blank" rel="noopener"> explains</a> how soldiers and their families can access free trips to luxurious recuperation sanatoria; meanwhile, the wounded are supposedly cared for at hyper-modern rehabilitation clinics. In reality, such benefits are available only for the lucky few who can navigate their way through Russia’s arcane veterans bureaucracy.</p>
<p>Behind the Kremlin-orchestrated spectacle, however, lurks an angry, violent group of veterans. The state deliberately leaves its demobbed troops in a perpetual battle mode, firing them up with social and mainstream media campaigns that promise that, since Russia is surrounded by enemies at home and abroad, the battle is never over. Men who have killed for the state are told that they may have to fight again to defend their meager gains. Those who return home are thus often left unrecognizable. As one wife<a href="https://meduza.io/en/feature/2024/05/31/mitigating-factors" target="_blank" rel="noopener"> commented</a> on social media: “My husband returned home from the war. But this isn’t my husband, he’s not the man I knew before. Sometimes it feels like he was killed. His body came back, but not his soul. He’s become irritable. Everything angers him. Me, the kids, and everyone around him.” All over the country, Russia’s ex-soldiers seem incapable of interacting within a peaceful civilian milieu.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;Russia’s ex-soldiers seem incapable of interacting within a peaceful civilian milieu.&#8221;</div>
<p>Meanwhile, murder after murder hit the headlines. A veteran<a href="https://novayagazeta.eu/articles/2024/10/17/russian-veteran-who-allegedly-killed-friend-with-chair-before-going-to-bed-is-taken-into-custody-en-news" target="_blank" rel="noopener"> beats</a> his friend to death with a chair; another<a href="https://novayagazeta.eu/articles/2024/10/11/russian-veteran-and-former-convict-stabs-ex-girlfriend-to-death-in-front-of-daughter-en-news" target="_blank" rel="noopener"> stabs</a> his ex-girlfriend to death while her daughter watches; a Chechen man<a href="https://united24media.com/latest-news/russian-war-veteran-stabs-chechen-man-to-death-at-bus-stop-in-nizhny-novgorod-region-5698" target="_blank" rel="noopener"> is butchered</a> at a bus stop. These stories don’t receive much coverage in the Russian media, even as the violence conducted by ex-soldiers let loose on civilian society spreads. Serious crimes are punished with heavy jail terms, but the spiraling cases of domestic violence result in fines as small as $55 — pocket change for men who have made thousands of dollars by fighting in Ukraine. There is little real justice, and the state barely pretends to care.</p>
<p>When soldiers are demobbed from modern Western armed forces, they are offered psychological and reintegration support to help them leave their identity as soldiers — as killers — behind. But in Russia, no widespread programs exist for the hundreds of thousands of men Putin has sent to fight in Ukraine. The few rehabilitation centers that do exist are overwhelmed and poorly equipped to treat deep psychological trauma. And for those who develop post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) — a diagnosis barely even acknowledged in official media — help is scarce and stigmatized. After all, the state has no intention of transitioning these soldiers away from the violence of war — and that violence continues to offer plenty of rewards.</p>
<p>Problems are glossed over in the stilted bureaucratic language of the administrative state: “We have faced a shortage of rehabilitation institutions with highly qualified personnel,”<a href="https://www.business-gazeta.ru/article/675351?ysclid=mh8wllfw2v629108058" target="_blank" rel="noopener"> explained</a> one official this summer — but now the problem is “solved”. Wives are expected to<a href="https://vk.com/search?q=%D0%BF%D0%BE%D0%BC%D0%BE%D1%89%D1%8C%20%D0%BF%D0%BE%D1%81%D0%BB%D0%B5%20%D1%81%D0%B2%D0%BE&amp;z=video-13984605_456260695%20" target="_blank" rel="noopener"> support</a> their husbands instead of psychiatrists, reinforcing the state’s strict gender rules about women’s roles as supporters of male violence. Yet even the Kremlin does not pay more than lip service to the idea of instructing women on how to stem the rising tide of violence. One Moscow psychologist running a private practice told me they have treated a handful of former soldiers, but have been contacted by many more distraught wives — terrified of and for the men who came back from the front.</p>
<p>To those familiar with Russia’s history, this might seem par for the course. Over the past century, Russia has embroiled itself in vast wars that have left millions of men and women engulfed in post-traumatic nightmares when the guns have gone quiet. At times, this has tipped the country into outright chaos: would the Civil War have seen a wave of unfathomable brutality sweep across the country, resulting in at least eight million casualties, had the Eastern Front of the First World War not been so violent? Would post-Soviet Russia have been so dominated by criminal thuggery had a generation of young men not been sent to fight in Afghanistan, then welcomed home with a shrug as the USSR collapsed? Would the nihilism of the late Nineties, before Putin swept to power on promises of masculine and national renewal, have been so acute if Boris Yeltsin hadn’t sent a generation of conscripts into a conflict in Chechnya?</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/10/how-nord-stream-2-has-blown-up-europe/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/10/how-nord-stream-2-has-blown-up-europe/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/GettyImages-2213966859.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/10/how-nord-stream-2-has-blown-up-europe/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/10/how-nord-stream-2-has-blown-up-europe/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>How Nord Stream 2 has blown up Europe</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/10/how-nord-stream-2-has-blown-up-europe/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Wolfgang Münchau</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Each time Moscow sends its young to kill and be killed, it promises personal and collective triumph but delivers disillusionment. As one veteran of the Afghan war explained in Nobel prizewinner Svetlana Alexievich’s seminal study of those who had returned from that conflict, <em>Zinky Boys</em>: “I wanted to be in a war, but not like this one. Heroic World War 2, that’s what I wanted.” Successive regimes have seemed determined to treat the mass of their soldiers as<a href="https://www.wiley.com/en-us/Internal+Colonization:+Russia's+Imperial+Experience-p-9780745651293" target="_blank" rel="noopener"> human capital</a> more than as heroes. These angry bands of ex-soldiers have plagued the Kremlin’s incumbents with criminality, opposition and uprisings.</p>
<p>It might, therefore, appear that Putin is repeating the mistakes of the Eighties and Nineties as he foments another generation of angry soldiers who behave as brutally at home as they did at the front. But the state has done little to stymie what is an obvious problem. Instead, it almost seems to encourage it as a means to keep the entire population on edge, ready to engage in what the Kremlin <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/393526798_Russia_and_Modern_Fascism" target="_blank" rel="noopener">claims</a> is an endless war against enemies that are out to destroy Russia.</p>
<p>Putin has chosen to pursue a particularly bloody form of warfare in which soldiers are rewarded for committing violent atrocities. When they return home, the Kremlin’s soldiers are in turn offered opportunities to act as its agents of violence by enrolling in the domestic security services, taking up positions of power in the war economy, and advocating for further conflict. This is the approach Putin took in the 2000s, when he offered the disillusioned and criminal veterans of Afghanistan and Chechnya paths into the hierarchy of power as municipal police, security agents, mayors, governors, and even Duma deputies as a means to placate them. Now he is repeating the trick at a far larger scale.</p>
<p>These violent men do not represent a threat to Putin’s regime; in fact, they are key to upholding it. The Kremlin has<a href="https://cup.columbia.edu/book/russia-and-modern-fascism/9783838220154/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"> put</a> the country on a constant war footing, ensuring it is always ready to fight the next battle, which leaves it with little incentive to aid veterans. It thus pretends to help ex-soldiers while counting on those embittered and psychologically broken men to keep Russian society enveloped in a cycle of conflict and repression that Vladimir Putin’s allies claim is essential to the nation’s survival (and, of course, to their own hold on power). The soldier who lives by violence may prove necessary to an increasingly draconian regime that is struggling with a faltering economy, spiraling inflation, and a lackluster war effort. After all, history <a href="https://books.google.pl/books?id=pCeQDwAAQBAJ&amp;newbks=1&amp;newbks_redir=0&amp;lpg=PA308&amp;dq=freikorps%20trauma&amp;pg=PA308#v=onepage&amp;q&amp;f=false" target="_blank" rel="noopener">tells</a> us that oppression at home and conflicts abroad will be far more easily waged by bands of men who are psychologically traumatized by war and convinced that violence is simply part and parcel of political life.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, back in Chelyabinsk, Sergei Moskalenko is awaiting trial for the murder of his wife. Should he be convicted, he may not languish long in jail. Almost 200,000 Russian prisoners have already enlisted to, as the Red Army’s propagandists in the Second World War<a href="https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D0%98%D1%81%D0%BA%D1%83%D0%BF%D0%BB%D0%B5%D0%BD%D0%B8%D0%B5_%D0%BA%D1%80%D0%BE%D0%B2%D1%8C%D1%8E" target="_blank" rel="noopener"> christened</a> it, “atone for their crimes by blood”: to fight in return for their freedom. Moskalenko, in this case, may be back at the front within months — free to abscond, free to serve out his time, and free to return home, just as full of violence as when he left.</p>
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					<title>Will Putin win the Alaska talks?</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2025/08/will-putin-win-the-alaska-talks/?edition=us</link>
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										<unherd:main_theme>Ukraine war</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Bethany Elliott]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/lady-1.jpg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>1</unherd:article_ranking>
																<unherd:image_caption>
							<![CDATA['This is Putin’s dream scenario.' Natalia Kolesnikova/POOL/AFP/Getty Images]]>
						</unherd:image_caption>
						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Bethany Elliott</strong> is a writer specialising in Russia and Eastern Europe.</p>
]]>
						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>BethanyAElliott</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is a writer specialising in Russia and Eastern Europe.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Sun, 10 Aug 2025 23:03:46 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Sun, 10 Aug 2025 23:03:46 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Alaska]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Donald Trump]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Europe]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Putin]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ukraine war]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[War]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Zelensky]]></category>
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								<![CDATA[The peace terms will be monstrous]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p style="font-weight: 400">In 1867, Russia’s Tsar Alexander II sold Alaska to America for several million dollars, fearing that his precarious imperial outpost could no longer be adequately defended. This week, Alaska finds itself once again at the center of a debate concerning Russia’s borders and territorial ambitions, with President Donald Trump and President Vladimir Putin heading to the Last Frontier on Friday for peace talks. This time, however, Russia appears intent on gaining rather than conceding ground.</p>
<p>Moscow can feel encouraged by the beginning of discussions. By agreeing to a summit with Trump, Putin has avoided punishing new energy sanctions. Meanwhile, the Russian leader’s exact offer has been shrouded in confusion. US Special Envoy Steve Witkoff has reportedly been the source of <a href="https://gbr01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.bild.de%2Fpolitik%2Fausland-und-internationales%2Ffriedlicher-rueckzug-hat-trumps-mann-putin-falsch-verstanden-6895de301174f91cb081eb54&amp;data=05%7C02%7C%7Cda1f0f45a4d6496720e808ddd7e7ad29%7C84df9e7fe9f640afb435aaaaaaaaaaaa%7C1%7C0%7C638904112216134230%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJFbXB0eU1hcGkiOnRydWUsIlYiOiIwLjAuMDAwMCIsIlAiOiJXaW4zMiIsIkFOIjoiTWFpbCIsIldUIjoyfQ%3D%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&amp;sdata=%2BmVfnwFHlVEpWEMu2ibtNp4IeVCXBoi4CZpXP4mV1i8%3D&amp;reserved=0" target="_blank" rel="noopener">misunderstandings</a>, while European officials have <a href="https://gbr01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.wsj.com%2Fworld%2Fputin-russia-ukraine-ceasefire-proposal-0021453b%3Fmsockid%3D237223e8e1f76fb40ccc3618e04c6efe&amp;data=05%7C02%7C%7Cda1f0f45a4d6496720e808ddd7e7ad29%7C84df9e7fe9f640afb435aaaaaaaaaaaa%7C1%7C0%7C638904112216148525%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJFbXB0eU1hcGkiOnRydWUsIlYiOiIwLjAuMDAwMCIsIlAiOiJXaW4zMiIsIkFOIjoiTWFpbCIsIldUIjoyfQ%3D%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&amp;sdata=7Q2ZyF5wrZ4QuFxCZZdxmNdNogVwqLkNS5Iv95QD050%3D&amp;reserved=0" target="_blank" rel="noopener">requested</a> multiple calls with the American side in a bid to understand the exact nature of Putin’s offer. Still, one aspect is clear: on Friday, Trump <a href="https://gbr01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.bbc.com%2Fnews%2Farticles%2Fc1dxed639n7o&amp;data=05%7C02%7C%7Cda1f0f45a4d6496720e808ddd7e7ad29%7C84df9e7fe9f640afb435aaaaaaaaaaaa%7C1%7C0%7C638904112216162310%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJFbXB0eU1hcGkiOnRydWUsIlYiOiIwLjAuMDAwMCIsIlAiOiJXaW4zMiIsIkFOIjoiTWFpbCIsIldUIjoyfQ%3D%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&amp;sdata=nOwEJMyjWCkX7anUFCIJ6MjypY%2F0ImutVxReqiV6d%2FU%3D&amp;reserved=0" target="_blank" rel="noopener">announced</a> that “we’re going to get some back, we’re going to get some switched. There’ll be some swapping of territories to the betterment of both.”</p>
<p>It seems highly unlikely that this will be to the betterment of the Ukrainian side. While Russia had previously demanded full control along the entire frontline, Putin reportedly told Witkoff that he would offer a complete ceasefire if Ukraine agreed to withdraw forces from the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, along with Crimea, leaving them to Moscow. European officials received mixed signals from <a href="https://gbr01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.wsj.com%2Fworld%2Fputin-russia-ukraine-ceasefire-proposal-0021453b%3Fmsockid%3D237223e8e1f76fb40ccc3618e04c6efe&amp;data=05%7C02%7C%7Cda1f0f45a4d6496720e808ddd7e7ad29%7C84df9e7fe9f640afb435aaaaaaaaaaaa%7C1%7C0%7C638904112216175603%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJFbXB0eU1hcGkiOnRydWUsIlYiOiIwLjAuMDAwMCIsIlAiOiJXaW4zMiIsIkFOIjoiTWFpbCIsIldUIjoyfQ%3D%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&amp;sdata=mZc8OSljQtqhyggbg9BnCowOD0wiN%2FRAqJO7QuXgS%2BE%3D&amp;reserved=0" target="_blank" rel="noopener">US counterparts</a> as to whether Putin would pull out of the other contested regions of Zaporizhzhia and Kherson, or merely freeze the frontlines. One US official indicated that Russian forces would remain at the current lines, negotiating land swaps with Ukraine until Moscow possessed all of Zaporizhzhia and Kherson. The prospect of a land swap is puzzling: since Ukraine no longer holds any Russian territory, it would mean offering Kyiv-controlled land in return for the territory that Moscow currently occupies. Trump clearly finds the land swap proposal reasonable, while Zelensky has understandably rejected it, <a href="https://gbr01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fx.com%2FZelenskyyUa%2Fstatus%2F1954063605453795361&amp;data=05%7C02%7C%7Cda1f0f45a4d6496720e808ddd7e7ad29%7C84df9e7fe9f640afb435aaaaaaaaaaaa%7C1%7C0%7C638904112216231460%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJFbXB0eU1hcGkiOnRydWUsIlYiOiIwLjAuMDAwMCIsIlAiOiJXaW4zMiIsIkFOIjoiTWFpbCIsIldUIjoyfQ%3D%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&amp;sdata=18%2B%2BqHlDD6Ovu1TzMdB8SwSPps7nX3QOVNQ0inWAUiQ%3D&amp;reserved=0" target="_blank" rel="noopener">saying</a> that “Ukrainians will not gift their land to the occupier”.</p>
<p>This is the scenario that Kyiv has long dreaded: that the mercurial US President, even after months of painstaking, behind-the-scenes diplomacy to repair relations between Washington and Kyiv, would strike a deal with Putin over the Ukrainian leader’s head before trying to foist it on Kyiv. What motivates Trump in all this is obvious — after successfully calming conflicts between India and Pakistan, and Armenia and Azerbaijan, he sees Ukraine as the ultimate entry on his Nobel Peace Prize nomination form. Besides, the Russians are still <a href="https://gbr01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Ftass.com%2Fpolitics%2F1998459&amp;data=05%7C02%7C%7Cda1f0f45a4d6496720e808ddd7e7ad29%7C84df9e7fe9f640afb435aaaaaaaaaaaa%7C1%7C0%7C638904112216188877%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJFbXB0eU1hcGkiOnRydWUsIlYiOiIwLjAuMDAwMCIsIlAiOiJXaW4zMiIsIkFOIjoiTWFpbCIsIldUIjoyfQ%3D%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&amp;sdata=MYpNEox52C3JA8RttTfpxT9oq5ZVDBEhZtOlznFut9Q%3D&amp;reserved=0">dangling</a> a broader reset of relations between the US and Russia, which Trump sees as an opportunity to make highly lucrative economic deals.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;This is the scenario that Kyiv has long dreaded.&#8221;</div>
<p>As things stand, Alaska looks set to go down in history as another Yalta, as the two superpowers sit in a room and divide up Eastern Europe as though the Cold War never ended. Or, more precisely, two men. The risks of Trump and Putin meeting privately are stark: beneath the recent bluster, the US President still harbors a deep admiration for the Russian leader’s authoritarian grip on power. Putin, a former KGB officer, brings a spy’s talent for deception and manipulation, not to mention an instinct for flattering Trump and echoing even his most <a href="https://novayagazeta.eu/articles/2025/01/24/putin-says-ukraine-war-might-not-have-happened-if-trumps-2020-victory-hadnt-been-stolen-en-news" target="_blank" rel="noopener">outlandish</a> convictions. This is Putin’s dream scenario.</p>
<p>There is, of course, the possibility that this is all merely a ploy on Putin’s part. He may have felt some pressure from the US secondary sanctions being placed on Russian trade partners, including India, and decided this was the moment to blindside Trump with an offer — with little intention of following through with it. Kremlin messaging has been especially maximalist of late, with the Russian leader claiming back in June that “all of Ukraine” belongs to Russia. And indeed, Putin’s plan to <a href="https://gbr01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.newsweek.com%2Frussia-will-mass-produce-oreshnik-ballistic-missiles-putin-2002038%23%3A~%3Atext%3DRussian%2520president%2520Vladimir%2520Putin%2520announced%2520that%2520Moscow%2520will%2Cboard%2520meeting%2520yesterday%252C%2520according%2520to%2520the%2520Kyiv%2520Independent.&amp;data=05%7C02%7C%7Cda1f0f45a4d6496720e808ddd7e7ad29%7C84df9e7fe9f640afb435aaaaaaaaaaaa%7C1%7C0%7C638904112216244347%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJFbXB0eU1hcGkiOnRydWUsIlYiOiIwLjAuMDAwMCIsIlAiOiJXaW4zMiIsIkFOIjoiTWFpbCIsIldUIjoyfQ%3D%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&amp;sdata=jozYWveYt5sT%2FIzi%2FMQzHFCZPYpUxGgSKHrjFPxYEOk%3D&amp;reserved=0" target="_blank" rel="noopener">mass-produce</a> Oreshnik missiles and place them on Belarusian <a href="https://gbr01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=http%3A%2F%2Fen.kremlin.ru%2Fevents%2Fpresident%2Fnews%2F77637&amp;data=05%7C02%7C%7Cda1f0f45a4d6496720e808ddd7e7ad29%7C84df9e7fe9f640afb435aaaaaaaaaaaa%7C1%7C0%7C638904112216257564%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJFbXB0eU1hcGkiOnRydWUsIlYiOiIwLjAuMDAwMCIsIlAiOiJXaW4zMiIsIkFOIjoiTWFpbCIsIldUIjoyfQ%3D%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&amp;sdata=gol6BkkxsEr0jkuumUgcxkiVqxPP3VChETLk5WGOEJ4%3D&amp;reserved=0" target="_blank" rel="noopener">territory</a> does not suggest a man eager for peace. A source told <a href="https://gbr01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.reuters.com%2Fworld%2Feurope%2Fputin-doubts-potency-trumps-ultimatum-end-war-sources-say-2025-08-05%2F&amp;data=05%7C02%7C%7Cda1f0f45a4d6496720e808ddd7e7ad29%7C84df9e7fe9f640afb435aaaaaaaaaaaa%7C1%7C0%7C638904112216270322%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJFbXB0eU1hcGkiOnRydWUsIlYiOiIwLjAuMDAwMCIsIlAiOiJXaW4zMiIsIkFOIjoiTWFpbCIsIldUIjoyfQ%3D%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&amp;sdata=jUg8wOsZKzcBOIG9rkkSTbijgl41ha3%2FOsImUCx%2F5q8%3D&amp;reserved=0" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em>Reuters</em></a> that the Russian General Staff believes the Ukrainian front will “crumble” within two or three months. The Russian military often provides excessively optimistic projections to the leadership, but these are also the views being whispered in the corridors of the Kremlin. From Putin’s perspective, therefore, there is no military impetus for him to make a deal other than the fact that Ukrainian forces withdrawing would be easier for him than fighting further battles.</p>
<p>If Russia’s offer is legitimate, where does Ukraine stand? There is talk of Trump hosting a trilateral meeting with Putin and Zelensky, but Putin would never agree to it. He has spent years casting doubt on Zelensky’s legitimacy as a leader and falsely claiming that the Ukrainian government is a “Nazi” regime. To meet Zelensky as an equal would be to confer upon Ukraine a sovereign status that Putin does not want to accord it.</p>
<p>In terms of timing, European officials have <a href="https://gbr01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.understandingwar.org%2Fbackgrounder%2Frussian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-8-2025&amp;data=05%7C02%7C%7Cda1f0f45a4d6496720e808ddd7e7ad29%7C84df9e7fe9f640afb435aaaaaaaaaaaa%7C1%7C0%7C638904112216282978%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJFbXB0eU1hcGkiOnRydWUsIlYiOiIwLjAuMDAwMCIsIlAiOiJXaW4zMiIsIkFOIjoiTWFpbCIsIldUIjoyfQ%3D%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&amp;sdata=kOXv0QNvSFkE7%2BOZ2HbT44qgk%2F%2FgJ5DgERG1i1hN%2FOY%3D&amp;reserved=0" target="_blank" rel="noopener">indicated</a> that Trump and Putin’s proposal would have two phases — first, Ukraine would withdraw from Donetsk and the frontline would be frozen; second, Trump and Putin would agree on a peace plan to negotiate with Zelensky. Yet this plan is clearly flawed, setting Kyiv up for a scenario whereby Trump would be persuaded by Putin to back a deal that is disadvantageous to Ukraine, and then try to bully Zelensky into it. To lay the foundations for any lasting peace, the timings must be altered. If Trump is serious about earning his Nobel Peace Prize, he and his team should be going to and fro between Zelensky and Putin. After his meeting with Putin, Trump should announce a summit with Zelensky as soon as possible to make clear that the desires of Ukraine, as the injured party, are foremost in any discussions.</p>
<p>In the meantime, Zelensky has been wise to turn to Europe to shore up support and develop a counterproposal, one that stresses the need for a ceasefire before any other steps taken, for territory to be exchanged in a reciprocal matter, and ironclad security guarantees for Ukraine. Those security guarantees need to be robust — which means far stronger than anything the “coalition of the willing” can currently provide. Yet given the risk of Trump cutting off aid and intelligence to Ukraine if Zelensky rejects these unfair terms, Europe needs to intensively prepare for a scenario whereby it alone tries to supply Ukraine with weaponry.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/08/how-russia-fell-out-of-love-with-trump/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/08/how-russia-fell-out-of-love-with-trump/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/bromance.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/08/how-russia-fell-out-of-love-with-trump/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/08/how-russia-fell-out-of-love-with-trump/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>How Russia fell out of love with Trump</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/08/how-russia-fell-out-of-love-with-trump/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Ian Garner</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Zelensky is also right to reject a lopsided deal that would involve his forces backing away from fortified defensive lines and which does not mention Russia withdrawing from the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant or from positions in Kharkiv, Sumy, Dnipropetrovsk and Mykolaiv oblasts. For Ukraine to withdraw from the contested oblasts would merely put Russia in a stronger position to attack and make further gains at a later date.</p>
<p>However, many in Ukraine are horrified not merely by the grossly unequal terms of this offer but at the prospect of Ukraine surrendering any land at all — a conversation that frankly had to happen sooner or later. Zelensky has <a href="https://gbr01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.nytimes.com%2F2025%2F08%2F09%2Fworld%2Feurope%2Fzelensky-trump-ukraine-russia.html&amp;data=05%7C02%7C%7Cda1f0f45a4d6496720e808ddd7e7ad29%7C84df9e7fe9f640afb435aaaaaaaaaaaa%7C1%7C0%7C638904112216295623%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJFbXB0eU1hcGkiOnRydWUsIlYiOiIwLjAuMDAwMCIsIlAiOiJXaW4zMiIsIkFOIjoiTWFpbCIsIldUIjoyfQ%3D%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&amp;sdata=4OCUmOSqXmDeleZJfMPOJGhc1g1r2S5q5XWmQaVaP7c%3D&amp;reserved=0" target="_blank" rel="noopener">pointed</a> out that the Ukrainian constitution prevents him from doing any such thing, while various Ukrainian MPs have <a href="https://gbr01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.ft.com%2Fcontent%2F69ab6ad3-826e-4bda-a512-250992d09cae&amp;data=05%7C02%7C%7Cda1f0f45a4d6496720e808ddd7e7ad29%7C84df9e7fe9f640afb435aaaaaaaaaaaa%7C1%7C0%7C638904112216308258%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJFbXB0eU1hcGkiOnRydWUsIlYiOiIwLjAuMDAwMCIsIlAiOiJXaW4zMiIsIkFOIjoiTWFpbCIsIldUIjoyfQ%3D%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&amp;sdata=%2B%2BvfMDxiyxYN3PAI8cm6KeOP2hqZo1WMG%2B91nQUgiA4%3D&amp;reserved=0" target="_blank" rel="noopener">indicated</a> that they would not vote to ratify a deal that would see parts of the country left to Russia to secure an end to the conflict.</p>
<p>It’s clear why Zelensky has maintained the maximalist, patriotic position that he cannot cede any territory to Russia. It is difficult to accept that land acquired through hostilities and atrocities should ever belong to the aggressor. It is similarly difficult to accept that Ukrainian citizens will be lost to Russian occupation. They would be subjected to ruthless suppression of Ukrainian identity and an atmosphere of constant fear and suspicion. They are also likely to <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/human-rights-plummet-in-ukraine-russian-occupied-territories/7921152.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">face</a> egregious human rights abuses and civilian executions. One wonders how long local resistance fighters can cling to hope once they realize their life under brutal occupation has been quietly accepted by their own government.</p>
<p>But even Zelensky has <a href="https://gbr01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.independent.co.uk%2Fnews%2Fworld%2Feurope%2Fzelensky-ukraine-russia-war-putin-crimea-b2666967.html&amp;data=05%7C02%7C%7Cda1f0f45a4d6496720e808ddd7e7ad29%7C84df9e7fe9f640afb435aaaaaaaaaaaa%7C1%7C0%7C638904112216333825%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJFbXB0eU1hcGkiOnRydWUsIlYiOiIwLjAuMDAwMCIsIlAiOiJXaW4zMiIsIkFOIjoiTWFpbCIsIldUIjoyfQ%3D%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&amp;sdata=zj%2F1m1Uau6J40loiHMmsnpjNPlHJqNw2PqADpJeSGCw%3D&amp;reserved=0" target="_blank" rel="noopener">admitted</a> that Ukraine will struggle to get the occupied territories back by military means. In his New Year address, he called for a “just peace” and <a href="https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/novorichne-privitannya-prezidenta-ukrayini-volodimira-zelens-95297" target="_blank" rel="noopener">reassured</a> those in Moscow’s grip that “one day, Ukraine will return to be together”. Unless Kyiv is able to turn the tide of this war, then any peace deal will likely involve Russia holding on to some of its gains, with Ukraine and the West refusing to legally acknowledge the new borders, and Kyiv planning to take them back through diplomatic means later. As problems with <a href="https://menafn.com/1109881500/Ukrainian-MP-Nearly-400000-Soldiers-Abandon-Posts" target="_blank" rel="noopener">desertion</a> and <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/2bb20587-9680-40f0-ac2d-5e7312486c75">exhaustion</a> persist, even Ukrainian citizens are now reluctantly <a href="https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2025/06/10/7516457/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">coming around</a> to the idea of accepting — de facto, if not officially — Moscow’s occupation of the captured lands, provided that entails receiving security guarantees. However, we should expect stringent Russian demands for Kyiv to surrender further Ukrainian territory — and that will be harder to sell to the public.</p>
<p>There has to be greater public acknowledgment in Ukraine that Russian-occupied land will need to be abandoned, if only for now, for Moscow to agree to any peace. That prospect is not merely unjust — it is monstrous. But it is reality. It is the nature of war. And unless Kyiv can reverse the course of the war and reclaim its occupied territories, we must now finally confront what peace truly looks like.</p>
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					<title>Ukraine is testing America’s limits</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2025/07/ukraine-is-testing-americas-limits/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://stage.unherd.com/2025/07/ukraine-is-testing-americas-limits/?edition=us#comments</comments>
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										<unherd:main_theme>weapons</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Michael Brendan Dougherty]]>
					</dc:creator>
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																<unherd:article_ranking>International</unherd:article_ranking>
																<unherd:image_caption>
							<![CDATA[An American soldier's funeral in Ukraine. Credit: Paula Bronstein / Getty Images]]>
						</unherd:image_caption>
						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Michael Brendan Dougherty</strong> is a senior writer at <em>National Review</em> and the William F Buckley senior scholar at the Intercollegiate Studies Institute.</p>
]]>
						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>michaelbd</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is a senior writer at <em>National Review</em> and the William F Buckley senior scholar at the Intercollegiate Studies Institute.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Wed, 09 Jul 2025 23:04:29 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Thu, 10 Jul 2025 09:08:32 +0000</updated>
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		<category><![CDATA[US]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[War]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[weapons]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://stage.unherd.com/?p=691085</guid>
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								<![CDATA[There’s not enough weapons to go around]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>President Joe Biden once promised Ukraine “whatever it takes” in American support “for as long as it takes”. While this rhetoric was meant to be inspiring, it was a flippant and unrealistic promise from the outset. And now it rings hollow. Although Donald Trump has promised to send more weapons to Ukraine, the administration is reportedly <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2025/jul/08/us-pentagon-military-plans-patriot-missile-interceptor" target="_blank" rel="noopener">scrambling</a> to source the desired Patriot missile platform and highly-in-demand interceptors from allies. The administration’s initial instinct to husband resources was sound; the President is increasingly forced to choose between Ukraine’s present needs, and America’s own present readiness.</p>
<p>The fact is American foreign policy no longer adds up, the commitments made by previous administrations exceed the American ability to meet them. American promises have been outrunning American supply lines. And worse, policymakers have been trying for decades to come up with a model for achieving their foreign policy aims extra-democratically. The use of air power, covert ops, drone warfare and promiscuous outsourcing to local proxies is their admission that the American people cannot be brought to support these foreign policy goals vigorously, taking on real risks and costs. Taken together it’s a recipe for launching idealistic policy and then leaving it marooned.</p>
<p>Consider when the Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth promised an “unrelenting” campaign against the Houthis, who were harassing global shipping from Yemen. “The minute the Houthis say, ‘We’ll stop shooting at your ships, we’ll stop shooting at your drones,’ this campaign will end,” he promised. Despite <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/national-security/trump-operation-houthis-cost-1-billion-rcna205333" target="_blank" rel="noopener">expending</a> hundreds of millions of dollars in munitions — dropping hundreds of 2,000-pound bombs, 75 Tomahawks, and perhaps more than 20 AGM cruise missiles — the Houthis have not relented, using their much cheaper weapons at hand. The mounting cost led to the US working out an agreement with the Iranian-backed group.</p>
<p>Far from being a novelty imposed by the Trump administration, the United States has been triaging its resources among existing conflicts for years. In late 2023, the US redirected tens of thousands of 155-millimeter artillery shells allocated for Ukraine to Israel. In early June 20,000 anti-drone missiles (APKWS) were diverted to the Middle East to protect US troops from potential Iranian retaliation.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2021/01/the-day-qanon-captured-america/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2021/01/the-day-qanon-captured-america/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/GettyImages-1294949487.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2021/01/the-day-qanon-captured-america/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2021/01/the-day-qanon-captured-america/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The day QAnon captured America</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2021/01/the-day-qanon-captured-america/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Michael Brendan Dougherty</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Speaking of Iran, we used a significant portion of our famous “bunker busters”, or GBU-57A/B MOPs, in the raid on Iran’s nuclear facility. The Chief Pentagon Spokesman Sean Parnell said the bombing raids had set back Iran’s nuclear program by one or two years. If that estimate is true, it means Iran may have its nuclear program back to where it was long before we have replenished the bombs used to set them back. The Air Force’s “Next Generation Penetrator,” the expected successor to the MOP, is due for initial prototypes within 18 to 24 months.</p>
<p>The American military-industrial base is simply not producing fast enough, and the consequences for American policy — and American allies — are serious. After aiding Ukraine, it will take years to replenish the country&#8217;s own supply of Stingers, a weapon Taiwan is also seeking. The AUKUS naval agreement, where the UK and USA stepped in front of France to provide Australia with naval ships, is also currently under review. The deal was already expected to delay the first ships from reaching Australia from the early 2030s to the early 2040s. But beyond that, the US is already experiencing multi-year delays and massive cost overruns in production of Virginia-class submarines, which are essential for the first phase of AUKUS.</p>
<p>Hawks in both parties have argued that the only way to prevent China from making an attempt at Taiwan, and from breaking US supremacy in the Pacific, is to back Ukraine and Israel to the hilt. Their theory is that we can deter Xi Jinping by demonstrating sheer will. (It is a theory of deterrence that obviously appeals to moralizing columnists whose stances risk them nothing.)</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left"> “American credibility is built on matching our promises to our resources”</div>
<p>But surely, Xi Jinping is doing just what the Pentagon is now: seriously considering what the depletion of US weapons stockpiles means for him. His Foreign Minister, Wang Yi, made <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2025/07/04/europe/china-ukraine-eu-war-intl" target="_blank" rel="noopener">remarks</a> just this week to European diplomats, implying that China sees strategic benefit in a prolonged conflict in Ukraine, because it keeps the US, its allies, and their resources tied up in Europe. Our grandiose promises — these supposed demonstrations of will — do not intimidate China. Not when they are followed up with delayed deliveries and decaying credibility.</p>
<p>Hawkish foreign policy advisors are correct that American will and willfulness matters. American credibility is built on matching our promises to our resources, and our people’s willingness to back them up. But US foreign policy-making is increasingly reserved to an insulated coterie around the White House court around the White House, which is disconnected from the people whose blood and treasure is ultimately on the line.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/06/the-kings-of-the-drone-age/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/06/the-kings-of-the-drone-age/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/democratised.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/06/the-kings-of-the-drone-age/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/06/the-kings-of-the-drone-age/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The kings of the drone age</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/06/the-kings-of-the-drone-age/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> David Patrikarakos </a></p></div></a></div>
<p>And that is why Biden’s Ukraine policy has fallen into a ditch. Large majorities of Americans, going back to 2022, said they supported Ukraine in its defensive war. This reflects their morally sensible belief that Russia was an unjust aggressor. But even then, at the start of the war, more granular polling showed that the American people’s appetite for involvement in the conflict was severely limited. Early surveys showed that only <a href="https://www.norc.org/content/dam/norc-org/pdfs/UChicago%20Harris%20NORC%20poll%20on%20Russia.pdf">26% of Americans</a> thought the US should play “a major role” in the conflict. A <a href="https://freebeacon.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/PA-2022-GOP-Primary-Survey-Topline-F12.pdf">Target Point survey</a> in February 2022 asked Republican voters in Pennsylvania what their preferred response to Putin’s invasion of Ukraine was. Only 23% chose “Arm and support the Ukraine resistance so they can kill as many Russians as possible” — the preferred policy of the then-president and the foreign policy court. 45% said, “Impose the strongest possible sanctions on Russia and seek a diplomatic deal.”</p>
<p>The Biden White House built its Ukraine policy in the gap between America’s view of the war’s justice and the resources it was willing to contribute. That presented a huge moral hazard for Ukraine’s leaders, whose war calculus has been distorted by the fantasy of endless superpower backing.</p>
<p>Trump’s preference for a negotiated end to the Ukraine war matches his desire to refocus on China. It also takes more seriously the limits imposed by our current supply constraints, and the willingness of the American people to involve their honor, their weapons, and their treasure in foreign wars. Trump used to put his name on casinos where some men tried to save themselves by throwing good money after bad. But there are no blank checks in foreign policy. Trying to make good on promises for “whatever it takes” will lead to strategic exhaustion and moral collapse.</p>
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															<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">691085</post-id>				</item>
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					<title>Donald Trump is no Chamberlain</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2025/03/donald-trump-is-no-chamberlain/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://stage.unherd.com/2025/03/donald-trump-is-no-chamberlain/?edition=us#comments</comments>
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										<unherd:main_theme>Weekend Analysis</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[David Rundell]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/Blue-1000x1000-9.png?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>1</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[Trump still values Britain. Brandon Bell/Getty Images]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>David Rundell</strong> served as an American diplomat in the Middle East for 30 years. He is a former Chief of Mission at the American Embassy in Saudi Arabia and the author of <em>Vision or Mirage, Saudi Arabia at the Crossroads.</em></p>
]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_handle></unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ served as an American diplomat in the Middle East for 30 years. He is a former Chief of Mission at the American Embassy in Saudi Arabia and the author of <em>Vision or Mirage, Saudi Arabia at the Crossroads.</em>]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Sat, 08 Mar 2025 00:15:08 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Sat, 08 Mar 2025 00:15:08 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Britain]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Diplomacy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Donald Trump]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Munich]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[transatlantic alliance]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[UK]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ukraine war]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[War]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://stage.unherd.com/?p=661327</guid>
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								<![CDATA[America hasn't abandoned Britain]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>“The lamps are going out all over Europe,” remarked British Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey on the eve of the First World War. Judging by the commentary of the British press recently, one would think this was about to happen again. We are told that Donald Trump’s negotiations to end the war in Ukraine are tantamount to Neville Chamberlain’s appeasement of Hitler at Munich, and that the transatlantic relationship is dead. The <span style="font-style: normal !msorm"><em>Financial Times</em></span> columnist Martin Wolf <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/b46e2e24-ca71-4269-a7ca-3344e6215ae3" target="_blank" rel="noopener">went so far as to write</a>: “The US is now the enemy of the West.” But none of this is true. The analogy is flawed, the analysis is ill-informed, and above all the prediction is dangerous hyperbole.</p>
<p>How often have the Fleet Street sophists cried out that every adversary is the new Hitler and every compromise another Munich? Yet do they really understand what happened there? Chamberlain went to Munich with two objectives, the first necessary and the second noble. He sought to buy time for Britain to rearm and in this he was highly successful: the acceleration of aircraft production in 1938 and 1939 proved crucial to winning the Battle of Britain. At the same time, he gambled to give peace a chance and avoid repeating the carnage of the First World War. He lost that bet, but at the time no one could have been completely certain of Germany’s intentions. Had Hitler proven trustworthy, we would perhaps never have heard of Winston Churchill.</p>
<p>Unlike Chamberlain at Munich, Donald Trump is not trying to rearm for a looming conflict with Russia. He is trying to normalize relations with a nuclear-armed power. While Ukraine is important, so is Russia’s cooperation on many other issues, such as containing Iran’s nuclear program, stabilizing Syria, and shaping global energy markets. Above all, Trump is seeking to reverse the strategic own goal of driving Russia into the arms of China with ceaseless NATO expansion.</p>
<p>Nor is Trump trying to avoid a new war. He is trying to end one by stating obvious facts: Ukraine cannot win back lost territory without massive American assistance; the US is not going to go to war with Russia so that Ukraine can join NATO; and the longer the war goes on, the more territory Ukraine will lose. The terms of a negotiated settlement have been equally obvious for years. These are: a neutral Ukraine, a plebiscite to determine if Russian-speaking regions wish to remain part of Ukraine, and international assistance to rebuild the country. These terms will be easier to accept once Europe recognizes that while Russia started the war, it was provoked by NATO expansion. Just as the US could not tolerate Russian missiles in Cuba or Chinese control of the Panama Canal, Russia could not accept its only warm water naval base at Sevastopol being handed over to NATO and the US navy.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;The analogy is flawed, the analysis is ill-informed, and above all the prediction is dangerous hyperbole.&#8221;</div>
<p>The “stench of appeasement” has not returned to Munich, as former defense minister Ben Wallace claimed in <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/opinion/2025/02/13/ukraines-betrayal-we-have-entered-an-age-of-appeasement/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em>The Telegraph</em></a>. The situation is better understood as a replay of the 1945 Yalta Conference, where Churchill, Joseph Stalin and Franklin D. Roosevelt determined the political future of Europe and Ukraine’s current borders. In 1919, the victorious allies had transferred the Austrian city of Lemberg to Poland; at Yalta, Churchill and Roosevelt agreed to transfer the renamed Polish city of Lvov to the Soviet Union, where it became the Ukrainian city of Lviv. On neither occasion were protests from the Austrians or Poles heeded, because in the real world, one can seldom win back at the conference table what has already been lost on the battlefield. If you wish to draw analogies, at least get them right: the war in Ukraine is probably going to end with Ukrainian borders being redrawn, just as they were at Yalta.</p>
<p>Nor are we watching the death of the transatlantic alliance. Europe is unlikely to choose a world order led by China. And the US is unlikely to abandon the most successful alliance in history. That is why Prime Minister Keir Starmer has called American security cooperation indispensable. And it’s why President Trump wants to quickly reach an Anglo-American trade deal. That does not sound like a dying relationship.</p>
<p>The transatlantic relationship does, however, need to change. The unipolar moment upon which the rules-based order rested is over. The US now faces serious rivals and can no longer play the benevolent global hegemon. In 1945, the US produced 28% of the world’s GDP. Today, it is still the single most powerful nation on earth, but its share of global GDP has fallen to 13%. The world has returned to a situation where several great powers have spheres of influence and compete with each other. Any student of history will acknowledge that this is simply a return to normalcy.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/02/the-fantasy-of-british-defence/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/02/the-fantasy-of-british-defence/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/GettyImages-71556606.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/02/the-fantasy-of-british-defence/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/02/the-fantasy-of-british-defence/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The fantasy of British defence</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/02/the-fantasy-of-british-defence/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Aris Roussinos</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>In this changing world, the most significant threat to the US comes from China, not Russia. This requires America to pivot towards Asia. It means reducing America’s presence in Europe in order to increase deterrence in Asia, and it means building naval rather than land-based forces. America’s Asian allies, including Australia, Japan, and South Korea, understand this and have increased defense cooperation considerably. They appreciate that, far from encouraging China to attack Taiwan, America’s pivot towards Asia makes defending Taiwan more credible.</p>
<p>This shift in relative power will require changes in Europe. For too long the American horse has pulled the European security cart while smiling politicians rode along tossing coins to their voters. Now, they need to get down and start pushing. Russia is essentially a European problem. And given the EU has 10 times Russia’s GDP, there is no reason Europe cannot defend itself in any but a nuclear confrontation.</p>
<p>In this evolving landscape, Britain must choose whether to be a spectator or a participant. Americans recognize that Britain has contributed far more to collective security than other European nations. Vice President JD Vance’s comment about “random” countries that have not fought a war in 30 years was directed very accurately at other nations of the so-called “coalition of the willing”, not at Britain. Nevertheless, the entire British Army could not fill Wembley stadium. The Royal Navy, once the most formidable in the world, now has more admirals than war ships. While recent efforts to increase Britain’s defense budget are a good start, there is a long way to go. A flag and a national anthem will no longer guarantee any nation a place at the negotiating table.</p>
<p>In 1914, the lights went out in Britain in part due to a jingoistic press, which stoked widespread anti-German sentiment and demonized Kaiser William II. It would be a shame to repeat that mistake today, and Keir Starmer is trying not to. While many European leaders are acting like jilted lovers, Starmer grasps that America remains indispensable to European security. He is preparing his nation for greater effort — and in that sense he does resemble Churchill.</p>
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															<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">661327</post-id>				</item>
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					<title>The end of the transatlantic alliance</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2025/02/the-end-of-the-transatlantic-alliance/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://stage.unherd.com/2025/02/the-end-of-the-transatlantic-alliance/?edition=us#comments</comments>
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										<unherd:main_theme>Munich Conference</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Wolfgang Munchau]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/Blue-thumbnail-example-1.jpg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>1</unherd:article_ranking>
																<unherd:image_caption>
							<![CDATA[Europeans underestimate J.D. Vance. Tobias Schwarz/AFP/Getty  ]]>
						</unherd:image_caption>
						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Wolfgang Münchau</strong> is the Director of <a href="https://www.eurointelligence.com/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Eurointelligence</a> and an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist.</p>
]]>
						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>EuroBriefing</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is the Director of <a href="https://www.eurointelligence.com/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Eurointelligence</a> and an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Mon, 17 Feb 2025 00:03:17 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Mon, 17 Feb 2025 11:04:03 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Donald Trump]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Europe]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[JD Vance]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Munich Security Conference]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Politics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ukraine war]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[US]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://stage.unherd.com/?p=656691</guid>
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								<![CDATA[Europe has lost its way]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p style="font-weight: 400">There is no longer any doubt that Europe and America are parting ways. The death of the transatlantic relationship was foretold many times, but at the Munich Security Conference this weekend, it finally ended.</p>
<p style="font-weight: 400">The great American-European divorce has played out in three areas — Ukraine, free speech, and trade. Last week, Donald Trump blindsided the Europeans with his announcement of peace talks with Vladimir Putin. (He said he would do this during his election campaign, but Europe’s leaders were clearly not paying attention.) Keith Kellogg, Trump’s special envoy for Ukraine, told the Europeans on Saturday that they will not be included in high-level peace negotiations.</p>
<p style="font-weight: 400">Europe’s leaders are aghast. Some of them, including Keir Starmer, were still peddling the idea of future NATO membership for Ukraine when Trump announced that Ukraine will not become a NATO member. Trump said that, from a Russian perspective, it was the prospect of Ukraine’s NATO membership that triggered the war — a version of events the Europeans profoundly disagree with. He has also concluded that Ukraine cannot possibly win the war (a point on which I agree).</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/01/how-europe-crashed-its-cars/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/01/how-europe-crashed-its-cars/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/cars.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/01/how-europe-crashed-its-cars/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading </span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/01/how-europe-crashed-its-cars/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>How Europe crashed its car industry</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/01/how-europe-crashed-its-cars/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Helen Thompson</a></p></div></a></div>
<p style="font-weight: 400">The outlines of a peace deal are emerging: no NATO membership for Ukraine; a frontier that respects the current military situation; a demilitarized zone around the new frontier; and, I presume, a return of Russia’s frozen assets, and a gradual lifting of the sanctions. Trump even wants Russia back in the G7.</p>
<p style="font-weight: 400">This has left the Europeans furious. The European media, and numerous academics, keep up the increasingly implausible narrative that Ukraine can win the war only if the West maintains its support. But this is how people talk with no skin in the game. <a href="https://www.thomasfazi.com/p/slava-ukraini-how-the-british-media?utm_source=post-email-title&amp;publication_id=560592&amp;post_id=156986709&amp;utm_campaign=email-post-title&amp;isFreemail=true&amp;r=1z9de&amp;triedRedirect=true&amp;utm_medium=email" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Robert Skidelsky</a>, the British economic historian, recently pointed out the uniformity of pro-war views in the British media. Ukraine’s unconditional supporters within the British media, European think tanks, and US university history departments have all failed to heed an important lesson from the German military historian Carl von Clausewitz: do not go to war unless you know how to end it. For the Europeans, war is a spectator sport. Their support for Ukraine was all about principles and promises; there was no strategic planning, no endgame, no agreement on second-best outcomes, no concrete planning for post-war scenarios.</p>
<p style="font-weight: 400">The Ukraine war must end because Ukraine has lost. It’s as simple as that. Russia has shifted to a war economy, and outproduces the West in military gear and ammunition by a large margin. There’s no way it can lose now. A Ukrainian victory would have required the US and Europe to have taken different policy decisions early on: a complete oil and gas embargo on day one, a total cut-off of all Russian banks from international financial networks, an immediate increase in defense industrial investments, and a readiness to make sacrifices. Ukraine needed brave supporters. It got cheerleaders instead.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;Ukraine needed brave supporters. It got cheerleaders instead.&#8221;</div>
<p style="font-weight: 400">Having been relegated to the kids&#8217; table of international diplomacy, the Europeans hoped for some soothing words from the Americans at the Munich Security Conference. Instead, they got a scolding from <a href="https://www.realclearpolitics.com/video/2025/02/14/full_speech_vice_president_jd_vance_addresses_munich_security_conference.html">J</a><a href="https://www.realclearpolitics.com/video/2025/02/14/full_speech_vice_president_jd_vance_addresses_munich_security_conference.html">.</a><a href="https://www.realclearpolitics.com/video/2025/02/14/full_speech_vice_president_jd_vance_addresses_munich_security_conference.html">D</a><a href="https://www.realclearpolitics.com/video/2025/02/14/full_speech_vice_president_jd_vance_addresses_munich_security_conference.html">.</a><a href="https://www.realclearpolitics.com/video/2025/02/14/full_speech_vice_president_jd_vance_addresses_munich_security_conference.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener"> Vance</a>, the US Vice President. He told them that the biggest threat to the West is not Russia or China, but the suppression of free speech in Europe. You might think this is an odd issue to raise at a conference about security, but for Vance the two issues are linked.</p>
<p style="font-weight: 400">The Vice President cited a number of outrageous cases of state censorship, the most extreme of which was the cancellation of Romania’s presidential election last year, after the wrong candidate won. The decision was widely applauded in the EU, which I also see as an alarming sign of how censorship has been normalized in modern Europe. The argument for cancellation was Russian interference. Someone, apparently, had lied on TikTok.</p>
<p style="font-weight: 400">Vance then repeated a threat he’d first made shortly after the American election — that any attempt to censor US-owned social media companies by the EU would lead to US disengagement from NATO. “I believe deeply that there is no security if you are afraid of the voices, the opinions, and the conscience that guide your very own people,” <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/us-vice-president-jd-vance-attack-europe-migration-free-speech/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">he said</a>. “Europe faces many challenges, but the crisis this continent faces right now&#8230; is one of our own making. If you are running in fear of your own voters, there is nothing America can do for you.”</p>
<p style="font-weight: 400">Europe was at a loss to respond. Its centrist governments are running out of ideas in the fight against the Right. They fear that uncontrolled free speech could turn into an existential threat to European integration. After all, the EU was never a bottom-up democratic project, and support for the euro was feeble from the outset. There was, for example, no majority in Germany in favor of the euro. This lack of popular support is what paralyzed the EU during the sovereign debt crisis.</p>
<p style="font-weight: 400">What sustains the EU is not a democratic mandate, but the mainstream media, academia, and think tanks — a blob of organizations that together exert indirect control over what gets discussed and published. You will not find editorials in German newspapers in support of the Alternative for Germany (AfD), despite the fact that this party now accounts for approximately 20% of popular support. The new Right-wing parties communicate through social media instead. This is why the EU is so focused on content moderation for social media, and it’s why we have seen a recent explosion of fact-checking units in broadcasting companies and media organizations.</p>
<p style="font-weight: 400">But the Left is rarely subjected to such fact-checking. Quite a few members of the blob have abandoned X for the alternative Bluesky, which resembles the old Twitter. There, on a much smaller scale, the old echo chamber still works. There, users describe the Trump presidency as a <em>coup d&#8217;état</em>, and still think that Ukraine is winning the war. No one interrupts them — or checks any facts.</p>
<p style="font-weight: 400">The Germans believe they are champions of free speech, but in reality they are among the worst offenders. The only censorship I myself have ever experienced was from a well-known German news magazine.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/02/is-this-the-end-of-american-hegemony/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/02/is-this-the-end-of-american-hegemony/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/GettyImages-1159007452.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/02/is-this-the-end-of-american-hegemony/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/02/is-this-the-end-of-american-hegemony/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Is this the end of American hegemony?</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/02/is-this-the-end-of-american-hegemony/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Wolfgang Munchau</a></p></div></a></div>
<p style="font-weight: 400">When Vance threatened in November to link censorship of US social media to America’s continued support for NATO, hardly anyone in Europe took him seriously. Vance is the kind of American character Europeans habitually underestimate. This is why his speech came as a shock. The Germans were particularly outraged, because Vance called on them to drop the political firewall against the AfD. He made a point of snubbing Olaf Scholz, the German chancellor, but met with the AfD leader Alice Weidel at Munich.</p>
<p style="font-weight: 400">The BBC described Vance’s speech “extraordinarily poorly judged”. And yet the intelligent way for the Brits and Europeans to respond to America’s new regime would be to stop hyperventilating and take matters into their own hands. The EU and the UK are now responsible for the security of the European continent — the question is whether they can rise to the occasion. They will need to find more money for defense, and to coordinate and pool their defense procurement more intelligently — EU countries, for example, have 12 types of battle tank, while the US only has one.</p>
<p style="font-weight: 400">The trouble is that in Europe, every nation has its red lines. The Germans don’t want to send any troops anywhere. Emmanuel Macron is already calling for defense to be funded by European debt. The Poles reject a European army, while the Brits don’t want to take orders from the EU. If they are to get through this, they will all need to be pragmatic and fast. The brutal reality is that Europe’s governments have starved their militaries for decades, shifting their resources into social programs, which they will now struggle to reverse.</p>
<p style="font-weight: 400">There’s no denying that Trump is throwing Europe under the bus. Angela Merkel predicted this in 2018, when she gave an agitated speech in a Bavarian beer tent shortly after meeting with Trump. She said then that Europe needed to become less dependent on the US. But then she did nothing, as did everyone else. And so here we are, with EU leaders meeting to sit around yet another table. They are the Norma Desmonds of geopolitics — convinced that they are still the stars.</p>
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					<title>How Trump could liberate Europe</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2024/11/how-trump-could-liberate-europe/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://stage.unherd.com/2024/11/how-trump-could-liberate-europe/?edition=us#comments</comments>
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										<unherd:main_theme>US election </unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Thomas Fazi]]>
					</dc:creator>
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																<unherd:article_ranking>1</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[What will Trump do for Europe? Chip Somodevilla/Getty Images]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Thomas Fazi</strong> is an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist and translator. His latest book is <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/the-covid-consensus/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">The Covid Consensus</a>, co-authored with Toby Green.</p>
]]>
						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>battleforeurope</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist and translator. His latest book is <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/the-covid-consensus/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">The Covid Consensus</a>, co-authored with Toby Green.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Thu, 07 Nov 2024 00:03:45 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Thu, 07 Nov 2024 07:41:00 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Donald Trump]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Europe]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Politics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ukraine war]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[US]]></category>
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								<![CDATA[His isolationism is an opportunity]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>The EU’s worst nightmare has come true: Donald Trump is returning to the White House. It’s not hard to imagine the panic that many leaders must feeling as they gather this morning in Budapest for the European Political Community summit. Most of them, after all, have spent the past four years undermining the EU’s strategic interests by submissively aligning themselves with the Biden Administration’s <a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/09/kamala-harris-is-a-neocon-in-disguise/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">reckless foreign policy</a> everywhere from China to Gaza. The result? Europe today is more politically, economically and militarily <a href="https://www.compactmag.com/article/how-america-controls-europe/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">vassalised</a> to America than at any point since 1945.</p>
<p>More to the point, European elites have allowed themselves to be dragged by Washington into a disastrous proxy war against Russia in Ukraine, condemning their citizens to collapsing industry and rising prices. That’s even as the conflict in Eastern Europe exposes the continent to unprecedented military risks, including the genuine possibility of nuclear war. Yet despite all these sacrifices, all that eagerness to do the Pentagon’s bidding, Trump’s isolationist bent means it could ultimately all be for nothing.</p>
<p>For the past few years, the EU’s leaders have framed their entire foreign policy in American terms. Nato expansionism; economically decoupling from Russia; supporting Ukraine’s victory-at-all-costs strategy — each has been justified in the name of preserving the transatlantic alliance, even at the expense of Europe’s actual interests. Under Biden, that meant embracing a hawkish agenda grounded in aggressively countering any challenges to US hegemony, all supposedly part of an existential struggle between democracy and tyranny.</p>
<p>But with Trump back in charge, and his administration likely to pursue an isolationist bent, all these sacrifices risk being pointless. Though the president-elect is unlikely to withdraw from Nato altogether, he has expressed scepticism towards the alliance during his campaign. Among other things, that has involved criticising European countries for failing to meet defence spending targets, even suggesting that the US might not protect Nato members if they don’t pull their weight.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/11/welcome-back-to-trump-land/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/11/welcome-back-to-trump-land/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/GettyImages-2182526071-e1730884947606.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/11/welcome-back-to-trump-land/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/11/welcome-back-to-trump-land/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Welcome back to Trumpland</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/11/welcome-back-to-trump-land/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Tom McTague</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>It’s easy to see why this prospect alarms the EU establishment. For years, they have <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2023/01/10/eu-nato-joint-declaration-10-january-2023/?ref=compactmag.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">backed</a> the “mutually reinforcing roles” of Nato and the European Union, both as a bulwark against Russia and to ensure Western dominance globally. A weakened US commitment to Nato therefore threatens the very foundations of the EU’s newfound ideological identity: an extension of the American umbrella. No less important, the potential withdrawal of American arms and cash from Kyiv would seriously hamper the EU’s ability to continue the proxy war in Ukraine alone, especially given the tight finances and sluggish military-industrial complex of many member states. Trump himself has hinted in just this direction, notably <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/trump-blames-ukraines-zelenskiy-starting-war-with-russia-2024-10-17/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">criticising</a> Volodymyr Zelenskyy for allegedly starting the war with Putin.</p>
<p>Trump has even suggested he might unilaterally impose a ceasefire and peace agreement between Russia and Ukraine. This is unlikely to happen: Russia, which is winning on the battlefield, will push for such a hard bargain that even Trump may struggle to accept. A more likely outcome, then, is that the incoming Republican administration will continue to deliver weapons to Kyiv but ask Europe to foot the bill — a situation that would allow the conflict to smoulder on, even as Europe gets poorer. That’s despite the fact that even Western media outlets are now <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cr5m6d6l7e2o" target="_blank" rel="noopener">conceding</a> that the war in Ukraine is <a href="https://www.economist.com/europe/2024/10/29/ukraine-is-now-struggling-to-cling-on-not-to-win" target="_blank" rel="noopener">lost</a>.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;A more likely outcome is that the incoming Republican administration will continue to deliver weapons to Kyiv but ask Europe to foot the bill.&#8221;</div>
<p>This outcome could, perhaps, be avoided: if European leaders understood that putting an end to the war in Ukraine, and normalising relations with Russia, are in the continent’s ultimate economic and security interests. If they were clever, they might even seize upon Trump’s instinctive isolationism and push for a settlement themselves.</p>
<p>But given this would oblige Europe’s elite to totally reverse their policy on Ukraine — thereby admitting their own failure — that is an unlikely outcome. This is doubly true when you consider that such a volte-face would oblige the Europeans to finally take Russian security concerns seriously, a shift that would instantly undermine the anti-Moscow narrative they’ve been honing for years. Given, moreover, the vast economic pain the EU’s pro-Kyiv stance has caused regular Europeans, the resulting political backlash would obviously be devastating for ruling parties.</p>
<p>Beyond these short-term concerns, though, there are deeper geopolitical considerations. For one thing, making peace with Russia would force European leaders to finally acknowledge the multipolar order that now exists right across the globe, a reality whereby a free and independent Europe could act as a bridge between the West and the emerging Eurasian powers of the young century. For another, it would force them to realise that their future lies in breaking free from Washington’s grip, rejecting the latter’s desperate attempts to preserve its authority.</p>
<p>Yet if Trump’s burgeoning isolationism should be seen as an opportunity, not a threat, such a dramatic realignment isn’t going to happen: at least not for a while. Most EU leaders are just too wedded to transatlanticism — ideologically, psychologically and materially — to fully escape, regardless of who occupies the Oval Office. That’s why I don’t share the optimism of those who claim that Trump’s focus on “America First” policies will push the EU to pursue greater strategic autonomy. In any case, for as long as people like Ursula von der Leyen control the levers of power in Brussels, a “European Nato” would probably be even more aggressive towards Russia than the Biden Administration.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/11/anarcho-tyranny-has-come-for-america/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/11/anarcho-tyranny-has-come-for-america/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/GettyImages-2181433152.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/11/anarcho-tyranny-has-come-for-america/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/11/anarcho-tyranny-has-come-for-america/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Trumpism won&#039;t save Middle America</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/11/anarcho-tyranny-has-come-for-america/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Mary Harrington</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>At the same time, and notwithstanding his isolationist noises, it’s ultimately naïve to assume that Trump would happily “let go” of Europe. Put it like this: that Trump wants Europe to pay for its own defence doesn’t mean he supports a more geopolitically assertive continent. Just consider the efforts his administration put into <a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/10/did-america-cause-europes-energy-war/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">stopping</a> the construction of the Nord Stream pipeline. Any move towards greater European strategic autonomy would, therefore, inevitably mean managing an American backlash. It goes without saying that such a programme would require backbone, strategic vision and intellectual finesse — none of which is exactly plentiful among Europe’s political class.</p>
<p>In the short term, then, the most likely outcome is that EU leaders will attempt to adjust to a Trump presidency and avoid awkward clashes. The tone may be different, but expect the Europeans to continue tolerating subordination to US interests.</p>
<p>The longer-term impact of Trump’s victory on the European political landscape is harder to predict. His victory will surely embolden Right-populist leaders across the continent, from Viktor Orbán in Hungary to Giorgia Meloni in Italy. That, in turn, has the potential to further weaken mainstream parties, and ultimately accelerate the continent’s hurdling realignment. To be clear: this won’t have an immediate political impact, especially given European populists differ in their policies towards Ukraine and other foreign policy issues.</p>
<p>Over the longer term, though, the strengthening of national conservatism in the West could have serious geopolitical implications. To start with, Russia’s rejection of the excesses of liberalism make it something of a “natural” ally of Western conservatives, particularly in a world where ideologies are increasingly <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14782804.2019.1705770" target="_blank" rel="noopener">framed</a> as “national-patriotism” versus “cosmopolitan-globalism”. Moreover, to the extent that conservatives reject progressive universalism at home, embracing the cultural distinctiveness in their own countries, they should also be opposed to the same ideas internationally. It would surely be wise, then, to support the attempts of China, Russia and other Brics to foment respect for the civilisational specificity and traditional values of all nations, along the way dumping the EU and the liberal-universalist claims it stands for. In this sense, Trump may yet prove to be a crucial if unwitting ally in the Brics’ attempt to build a more “conservative” world order. That, in the end, is probably what the EU’s techno-globalist establishment should fear more than anything.</p>
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					<title>Led By Donkeys have no shame</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2024/09/led-by-donkeys-have-no-shame/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://stage.unherd.com/2024/09/led-by-donkeys-have-no-shame/?edition=us#comments</comments>
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										<unherd:main_theme></unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Kathleen Stock]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Blue-37.jpg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>1</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[Led By Donkeys have no shame. (Justin Setterfield/Getty)]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<div><strong>Kathleen Stock</strong> is contributing editor at <em>UnHerd</em>.</div>
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						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>kathleen_stock1</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is contributing editor at <em>UnHerd</em>.</div>]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Thu, 19 Sep 2024 23:03:27 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Fri, 20 Sep 2024 11:03:48 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Activism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[led by donkeys]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Partygate]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Politics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Russia-Ukraine]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[UK]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ukraine war]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://stage.unherd.com/?p=623783</guid>
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								<![CDATA[<p>How do you get a hypocrite to feel shame? The activist collective Led By Donkeys think they have found the answer: organise a needling visual provocation in the hypocrite’s vicinity, put the film of it online, then watch it go viral. You might wonder whether, despite the technological trappings, this isn’t just the modern equivalent of throwing rotten tomatoes, but Ben Stewart, James Sadri, Oliver Knowles and Will Rose want you to know they have been making important art all along. The quartet have a new coffee table book out to prove it, <em>Adventures in Art, Activism and Accountability</em>, documenting the group’s campaigns from the Brexit era to the present, and accompanied by a gallery exhibition in Bristol.</p>
<p>Their initial emergence was much lower key. An earlier book from 2019, capitalising on their newfound fame as self-described “Remainer activists”, describes the period in which they first became known for pasting posters on billboards in Southeast England, gonzo style. It is written up as a kind of subpar Ealing comedy: four ordinary house husbands from Hackney accidentally get caught up in a daring and wildly popular social protest, eventually becoming national heroes feted by Tony Blair, Steve Coogan, and Saatchi &amp; Saatchi.</p>
<p>In this early telling of their origin story, there are comic capers galore, involving mishaps with wallpaper paste, run-ins with security guards, and the strategic recurrence of Ben’s fear of heights. There are also quite a few barely latent daddy issues (“What is it about David Davis that makes him such a prick?”;“there’s something about Dominic Raab that is volcanically dislikeable”; “Olly is possessed by a visceral dislike for Michael Gove”; “Firstly and lastly, fuck Rod Liddle”). And despite braggadocio at times implying that the four are hardened activists (“We’ve scaled buildings and occupied headquarters, hung banners and even been arrested and prosecuted”), equally there is much hammed up nervousness about committing illegal acts: “This is criminal damage; it’s the A10 … We don’t want to get arrested, we both have to take the kids to school and nursery in the morning”.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/08/the-sisterhood-is-a-feminist-lie/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/08/the-sisterhood-is-a-feminist-lie/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/GettyImages-2160632373.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/08/the-sisterhood-is-a-feminist-lie/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/08/the-sisterhood-is-a-feminist-lie/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The sisterhood is a feminist lie</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/08/the-sisterhood-is-a-feminist-lie/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Kathleen Stock</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>There is also enormous detail in the early book about how much things cost, giving rise to such fascinatingly banal sentences as: “We assume that ordering five 6x3m posters will set us back the best part of £1000 but in reality each poster is forty quid and delivery is free.” Gripping verbatim text exchanges from key moments in the project are included, such as “@Will, any chance of pdfs today? Or is kiddie craziness descending?” and “We should decide by tomorrow lunchtime so I can get the posters ordered to arrive his week”.</p>
<p>Things have got a lot slicker since the early days, and the virtual tomatoes are now heirloom variety (price available on request).  In the new book, our guys are no longer styled as plucky outsiders but as solemnly engaged in an “accountability project”. In the interim, crowdfunder targets have been smashed; mutually advantageous corporate relationships have blossomed; famous screenwriters and actors are now onboard; and the groups’ campaigns, both here and in the US, have become bloated with technical gimmickry, celebrity collabs, and self-importance. And now that being a Remainer is no longer fashionable, the mission has seamlessly drifted into vaguer ideological territory: towards fighting what the new book variously calls “populist politics and petty nationalism” and “ethnojingoism”.  Definitions are not supplied, but one suspects that however the authors mean “populist” and “petty”, it won’t turn out to include them.</p>
<p>In practice, their core business is still midwit vituperation by photoshop, mostly aimed at Right-wing politicians, plus some more positive interventions designed to tug at the heartstrings of the sort of person whose bicycle comes with a sidecar. So for instance: they enlisted a thousand volunteers to cover a wall of the Embankment with love hearts, thus creating “The National Covid Memorial Wall” ; covered the road outside the Russian Embassy with “non-toxic, chalk-based” blue and yellow paint; and projected “End Performative Cruelty” in giant letters onto the Bibby Stockholm barge, only months before <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nvTtr5JfoMo" target="_blank" rel="noopener">releasing</a> a remote-control banner in Liz Truss’s presence depicting her as a giant lettuce with eyes.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;The ultimate proof of the uselessness of shame as a weapon is the persistence of Led By Donkeys themselves.&#8221;</div>
<p>Also this year, they <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5IvdffjL5h0" target="_blank" rel="noopener">filmed</a> six kilometres worth of second-hand kids’ outfits arranged on a Dorset beach and set it to the sound of Bach, in order to get people to “grasp … the number of children killed in Gaza”. (An earlier idea, thankfully rejected, involved “thousands of funeral shrouds”.)  In other words: if you like your morality tales childishly uncomplicated, prefer the literal over the symbolic, and don’t mind pedestrian visuals that rely heavily on scale for impact, then this is undoubtedly the art collective you deserve.</p>
<p>I am sure that all this feels cathartic and noble for participants, but does any of it actually work? Could such clankingly heavy-handed treatments ever initiate a real moral reckoning for a corrupt politician or institution? It seems scarcely credible. In both of the Led By Donkeys books, virality alone is frequently taken as meaningful proof of impact, but this is unconvincing: <a href="https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-13864129/Nuts-moment-two-squirrels-terrorised-GWR-train-passengers-forcing-service-axed-staff-efforts-tempt-snacks-hit-buffers.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">feral squirrels</a> in train carriages also go viral, after all.</p>
<p>At other points, the authors do their best to suggest they are making a difference, but only by blurring the lines between contiguity and causation, giving us sentences such as: “A week after this intervention, Abramovich was finally subjected to UK sanctions”; “A week later, the Met opened an investigation into 12 Downing Street parties”; “and “Two weeks later, Sunak called the election”.  Coincidences? I think probably, yes; or else the real causal relation goes in the other direction, with the four cannily sensing which way the tide was already flowing before launching.</p>
<p>What does seem clear is that the group are absolutely terrible at changing political opponents’ minds, or even at persuading relatively intelligent neutrals. Confirmation bias is an exceptionally blunt instrument. In a recent <em><a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2024/sep/16/ive-never-been-so-driven-led-by-donkeys-on-mocking-liz-truss-duping-matt-hancock-and-renaming-michelle-mones-yacht" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Guardian</a></em> interview, Ben Stewart talked approvingly about the “idea of the mind bomb”, as if he had stumbled upon a secret magic spell: the idea, apparently acquired during a stint at Greenpeace, of “an intervention that, when people saw it, their minds would immediately shift. The idea was the person putting themselves between the harpoon and the whale.”</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/06/why-scotlands-witches-fought-back/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/06/why-scotlands-witches-fought-back/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/GettyImages-1337825047-2.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/06/why-scotlands-witches-fought-back/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/06/why-scotlands-witches-fought-back/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Why Scotland&#039;s &#039;witches&#039; fought back</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/06/why-scotlands-witches-fought-back/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Julie Bindel</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>What this leaves out is that, unlike real bombs, so-called mind bombs work best in wide open spaces; upon psyches where there is very limited relevant information to compete with whatever crassly emotive image is being used as explosive. In contrast, where a person already has a lot of complex and relevant factual information and/or clashing background principles and theories, a would-be mind bomb is more likely to be a damp squib, cementing the impression that the person lobbing it is a naïve buffoon.</p>
<p>In reality, I imagine that the habitual villains of Led By Donkeys’ narratives — Johnson, Farage, Tufton Street think tank svengalis, and so on — are perturbed by their treatment for an average of about 10 seconds each. It’s not just that they know that the attention spans of onlookers will be short, and that the facile messaging is unlikely to trouble their support base anyway. Nor is it that they are (perhaps) already well used to trenchant critique and defensively hardened against it; nor even that they receive the negative attention as some kind of narcissistic tribute, though this is certainly possible. It’s also that, collectively, we have gone a long way to undermining the societal conditions for a genuine experience of shame, so that it’s a little late to start talking it up as a useful social tool now.</p>
<p>To name a few contributory factors: liberalism has eroded a firm sense of shared social or moral principles, which means a grip on what would count as genuinely shameful violations of principles has also been substantially reduced. The longtime popularity of confessional genres of writing and the availability of social media to record every passing thought have made candid self-disclosure completely acceptable, decreasing one’s fear that hidden parts of the self are bound to be badly received. In many workplaces, people have become more squeamish about overt hierarchies, so that responsibility for any problems becomes more diffuse and blame can be more easily shifted. And of course, for decades, hundreds of self-help books and magazines have encouraged us to think of personal feelings of shame as something to be fought and overcome, while complete self-acceptance is to be encouraged.</p>
<p>In short — though many of us still routinely feel it — shame as a functional tool is not what it used to be. Led By Donkeys apparently know this too, at least some of the time. In an early interview, Ben Stewart noted that “the concept of shame and political leaders paying a price for lying and dissembling is in retreat … if we begin to lose shame around lying to the public, then we’re in big trouble here”. The fact is, though, that we are losing it, probably definitively; and scandals which might formerly have caused public figures to quit on the spot in mortification are little more than minor irritants now. The closest we have to a Profumo-like figure — about to commence a lifetime of charitable work and prayer in order to propitiate his critics — is Russell Brand. And he is trying to monetise his own <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=THVhDjzup-Q" target="_blank" rel="noopener">baptism</a>.</p>
<p>But perhaps the ultimate proof of the uselessness of wielding shame as a weapon is the persistence of Led By Donkeys themselves. They have now been going for five years, tend to brush off criticism all too <a href="https://x.com/ByDonkeys/status/1834520445174845712" target="_blank" rel="noopener">readily</a>, and have vowed to plough profits from sales of the new book into future activism. Right-wing leaders in continual need of a hackneyed and unlikeable enemy in order to fire up the base will no doubt be delighted by this news. The rest of us, tired of forever wars between simple-minded fanatics, should probably consider indulging in some billboard defacement of our own.</p>
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					<title>Vladimir Putin&#8217;s immigrant army</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2024/07/vladimir-putins-immigrant-army/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://stage.unherd.com/2024/07/vladimir-putins-immigrant-army/?edition=us#comments</comments>
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										<unherd:main_theme>Ukraine war</unherd:main_theme>
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						<![CDATA[Ian Garner]]>
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																<unherd:article_ranking>3</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[Migrant workers aren't safe on Russian soil. Getty Images]]>
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							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Dr. Ian Garner</strong> is assistant professor of totalitarian studies at the Pilecki Institute in Warsaw. His latest book is <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/z-generation/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em>Z Generation: Russia&#8217;s Fascist Youth</em></a> (Hurst).</p>
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						<unherd:twitter_handle>irgarner</unherd:twitter_handle>
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						<![CDATA[ is assistant professor of totalitarian studies at the Pilecki Institute in Warsaw. His latest book is <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/z-generation/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em>Z Generation: Russia's Fascist Youth</em></a> (Hurst).]]>
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										<pubDate>Sun, 21 Jul 2024 23:00:14 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Sun, 21 Jul 2024 23:00:14 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Central Asia]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[Russia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ukraine war]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[War]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://stage.unherd.com/?p=610211</guid>
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								<![CDATA[Ethnic minorities are being forced onto the battlefield ]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>Two and a half years of full-scale war in Ukraine have devastated Moscow’s invading forces. As many as 500,000 soldiers — 2% of Russian men between the ages of 20 and 50 — may have been <a href="https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2024/07/05/how-many-russian-soldiers-have-been-killed-in-ukraine?itm_source=parsely-api" target="_blank" rel="noopener">killed</a> or seriously wounded. Russian social media networks are alight with stories of terrible conditions at the front, where troops with cursory training and substandard equipment are tossed into battle. Comparisons are drawn with the life expectancy during the Second World War, when at some times the average soldier <a href="https://www.britannica.com/facts/Battle-of-Stalingrad" target="_blank" rel="noopener">survived</a> mere days. Receiving the dreaded <em>povestka </em>— the Russian army’s enlistment paper — is all but a death sentence.</p>
<p>Despite all this, Moscow by means fair and foul continues to find soldiers to cover its losses. The Russian state’s biggest challenge remains not replacing men but equipment, and its army <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/russia-exploiting-ukraine-manpower-shortage-thin-line-breakthrough-war-expert-2024-5" target="_blank" rel="noopener">continues</a> to hold a significant manpower advantage over its Ukrainian opposition. But the Kremlin’s recruitment strategy is not limited to forcing its own citizens into uniform. It has found a way to marry an imperial Soviet tradition and 21st-century global capitalism to make joining the Russian army an appealing choice for many foreigners. Soldiers from Somalia, Syria and other friendly nations are an <a href="https://kyivindependent.com/foreign-pows-on-being-lured-to-fight-for-russia-in-ukraine/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">occasional</a> sight at the front, but the largest contingent of foreign fighters hail from the Central Asian nations of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan.</p>
<p>Russia has long been a draw for Central Asian immigrants. As many as five million Central Asians may <a href="https://www.migrationdataportal.org/regional-data-overview/central-asia#:~:text=Of%20the%207.8%20million%20international,(UN%20DESA%2C%202020)" target="_blank" rel="noopener">currently</a> be residing in Russia compared to 1.3 million in the next most popular destination, Germany. The <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=QMyNAgAAQBAJ" target="_blank" rel="noopener">history</a> of Russia-Central Asian military enlistment, moreover, is a long one. Prior to the collapse of the USSR, when Moscow ruled the entirety of Central Asia, millions of soldiers from the region served in conflicts on behalf of their Soviet masters. From the Second World War to Afghanistan, Soviet Russia used its Central Asian population as a source of disposable military material. And Central Asian soldiers tended to die more often than their Russian peers: Kazakhs were one and a half times more likely than Russians to be <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_War_II_casualties_of_the_Soviet_Union" target="_blank" rel="noopener">killed</a> in the Second World War, a fact never mentioned in today’s jingoistic Putinist war propaganda.</p>
<p>After independence in 1991, post-Soviet Russia’s wars in Chechnya and Georgia had to be fought without troops from its neighbours. But since February 2022, Moscow has been seeking to bolster its ranks with Central Asian immigrants. Terrified migrants received <em>povestki </em>on the first day of the full-scale invasion, and many <a href="https://jamestown.org/program/russia-uses-all-means-to-recruit-central-asians-for-war-in-ukraine/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">sought</a> help from all but powerless local lawyers and NGOs. Media reports — and heavily publicised scandals back home in Central Asia — have drawn attention to the Russian army’s brutal press ganging of new arrivals and to numerous cases of workers <a href="https://jamestown.org/program/russia-uses-all-means-to-recruit-central-asians-for-war-in-ukraine/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">tricked</a> into enlisting.</p>
<p>And yet, foreign soldiers tend to cause less trouble politically. While the Kremlin’s mass mobilisation of its citizens in September 2022 was successful in terms of recruitment numbers, it sparked disquiet among privileged and hitherto “safe” residents of Moscow and St. Petersburg. Since then, efforts to recruit Central Asians have become more frequent and more violent. Any migrant who sets foot on Russian soil risks being hastily rounded up and packed off to the front in Ukraine, ready to join the ranks of the fallen in an early grave.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;Any migrant who sets foot on Russian soil risks being packed off to the front in Ukraine, ready to join the ranks of the fallen in an early grave.&#8221;</div>
<p>The irony is that Russia’s war is portrayed in propaganda as an <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/16/world/europe/putin-war-ukraine-recolonization.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">ethnonationalist</a> crusade to reunite Muscovites with their Ukrainian “brothers”. It is, according to the rhetoric, a war fought to save white Russians from the “<a href="https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/article-a-missile-destroyed-a-childrens-hospital-in-ukraine-and-moscows/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">epidemic</a>” of Westernism — with all its connotations of queerness, blackness, and other “non-traditional” values — emanating from Ukraine. The heroes of the war feted on television and at official ceremonies are, almost to a man, white Russians. Meanwhile, ethnic minorities — Muslims recruited at home and abroad — <a href="https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2024/02/24/2-years-into-ukraine-war-russias-ethnic-minorities-disproportionately-killed-in-battle-a84170" target="_blank" rel="noopener">bear the brunt</a> of the worst fighting. Yet despite it all, Central Asian migrants keep coming to Russia. And, more bizarrely still, they keep choosing to enlist in the Russian army.</p>
<p>What might be driving one of the most downtrodden ethnic groups in the region to voluntarily risk their lives in Moscow’s war? The chance of earning a life-changing sum of money is the obvious motivation. Moscow promises volunteers more than $2,000 a month in wages. When the <a href="https://www.ceicdata.com/en/indicator/kyrgyzstan/monthly-earnings" target="_blank" rel="noopener">average</a> salary in Kyrgyzstan is less than $400 a month, that offer might give any young Kyrgyz pause for thought — even if their country’s authorities officially <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/kyrgyz-man-prison-term-joining-russian-troops-invading-ukraine/33006815.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">forbid</a> them to take up the offer and Moscow does not always pay out.</p>
<p>But, more than a short-term pay-out, Moscow promises to make good on the old immigrant dream. Over the past two years, the route to Russian citizenship — and long-term socioeconomic security, assuming the fighting in Ukraine can be navigated safely — has become easier and easier for volunteers. In its desperate hunt for bodies, the Kremlin has binned more and more rules <a href="https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2024-02-20/putins-foreign-legion-foreigners-fighting-war-ukraine" target="_blank" rel="noopener">preventing</a> Central Asians from becoming citizens. Today, a volunteer has a path to a passport after just a few months spent in the Russian army: a simple quid pro quo that suits both parties, even if the power imbalance is self-evident. Moscow, the old imperial centre, is still a land of unrivalled economic opportunity in the region.</p>
<p>It&#8217;s impossible to say how effective these tactics have been in terms of raw numbers, as Moscow does not release official statistics about the size and composition of its army. However, the evidence suggests that plenty of Central Asians are, by force or choice, landing in the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/russian/articles/c0kyzvlxz5no" target="_blank" rel="noopener">ranks</a> of Putin’s army in Ukraine. Hundreds are dying, but still their compatriots keep coming, with 1.3 <a href="https://www.caspianpolicy.org/research/economy/central-asian-labor-migration-exploring-new-destinations-amid-geopolitical-tensions" target="_blank" rel="noopener">million</a> arriving in the first quarter of 2023 and similar numbers since.</p>
<p>In this way, Moscow has established a new type of capitalist imperialism. In some ways, its hold over its regions resembles the old Soviet system, when citizen-comrades dreamed of coming to the imperial metropolis of Moscow to realise dreams of upward mobility in a rigid social hierarchy. But this old-fashioned relationship between the empire and its peripheries is married to a 21st century globalism. In the Soviet era, movement between and within nations was tightly controlled. Today, though, sovereignty is no boundary to a greater power siphoning off the human resources of a neighbour. This is taken to a new, brutal extent by Moscow’s military recruitment tactics, which turn Central Asians into mercenaries-cum-economic migrants. In Europe, such free movement is an opportunity for richer Western nations to draw on their Eastern neighbours for cheap labour; in Russia, it provides the manpower for a 20th century “meatgrinder”.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/05/putins-ruthless-new-plan-to-win/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/05/putins-ruthless-new-plan-to-win/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/GettyImages-2151577663.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/05/putins-ruthless-new-plan-to-win/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/05/putins-ruthless-new-plan-to-win/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Putin&#039;s ruthless new plan to win</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/05/putins-ruthless-new-plan-to-win/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Ian Garner</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Ironically, Central Asia itself has become the recipient of an outflow of Russian migrants. Educated and wealthy young Russian <a href="https://www.economist.com/asia/2024/06/13/russian-exiles-are-making-a-mark-in-the-caucasus-and-central-asia" target="_blank" rel="noopener">exiles</a> are setting up cafes, IT firms and other businesses in what were once the imperial peripheries of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, where visas are easily available and Russian is still widely spoken. The Kremlin is getting a raw deal: in return for a flood of bodies to be sacrificed in war today, the best of its young generation are leaving and taking tomorrow’s economy with them.</p>
<p>However, a growing number of Central Asians are increasingly <a href="https://ecfr.eu/publication/steppe-change-how-russias-war-on-ukraine-is-reshaping-kazakhstan/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">disgruntled</a> with this untenable situation. As their governments vacillate over relations with the Kremlin, sections of society are buoyed by <a href="https://www.asianews.it/news-en/The-'de-colonisation'-of-young-Kazakhs-58453.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">anti-Russian</a> and national pride movements. Indeed, it’s likely that many of the young immigrants in Russia itself are only there for the money and would much rather be at home. In the years ahead, perhaps, the youngest Central Asian generation will follow in the footsteps of their Ukrainian peers and thoroughly reject not just Russian influence at home but the lure of the imperial metropolis as an immigration destination. Moscow cannot count on Central Asia as its recruit reservoir forever.</p>
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															<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">610211</post-id>				</item>
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					<title>The Right&#8217;s new parties won&#8217;t save Britain</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2024/05/the-rights-new-parties-wont-save-britain/?edition=us</link>
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										<unherd:main_theme>Radical reform</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Aris Roussinos]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/aris.jpeg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>1</unherd:article_ranking>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Aris Roussinos</strong> is an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist and a former war reporter.</p>
]]>
						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>arisroussinos</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist and a former war reporter.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Wed, 15 May 2024 23:03:54 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Thu, 16 May 2024 08:48:08 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Dominic Cummings]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Matthew Goodwin]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[New political parties]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[New world order]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Politics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[UK]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ukraine war]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://old.unherd.com/?p=498703</guid>
																												<description>
								<![CDATA[Luxury beliefs will perish in a poor, angry world]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p class="p1">In January 1942, retreating British troops blew up the causeway linking Singapore to Malaya. As the Raffles College schoolboy Lee Kuan Yew, the father of modern Singapore, heard the detonation boom across the Straits, he turned to his friend, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GkfNfgsqWLE" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="s1">he later recalled</span></a>: “I said that’s the end of the British Empire. I think it was… The world as we knew it had disappeared.”</p>
<p class="p1">This is the situation we are rapidly approaching. In the Nineties, their heads spun by the unexpected Soviet collapse and the unipolar empire America won by default, the architects of our current order sincerely believed that a golden age of peace and prosperity could be won by the free movement of goods, wealth and people across national borders. Millions of words were devoted to lauding this new transnational order, as politicians busied themselves with the dismantling of hard-won state capacity, whose sacrifice would bring about the earthly paradise. To stand against this was to stand against progress; the protests of those who doubted the wisdom of the new order were merely the death-rattle of history’s losers.</p>
<p class="p1">Yet it is this order that is already dead, and the old world of hard power and industrial capacity is writing the outlines of the coming century. The ideological fantasies of the Nineties have placed the collective West at a great structural disadvantage even before the true confrontation begins. <span class="s2">Rightly, in his recent Sorbonne speech, Macron <a href="https://www.elysee.fr/en/emmanuel-macron/2024/04/24/europe-speech" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="s1">observed that</span></a> “the era when Europe bought its energy and fertilisers from Russia, had its goods manufactured in China, and delegated its security to the United States of America, is over”. </span></p>
<p class="p1">So, when Rishi Sunak professed to feel, <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pm-speech-on-security-13-may-2024" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="s1">as he did this week</span></a>, “a profound sense of urgency, because more will change in the next five years than in the last 30”, and declared “the next few years will be some of the most dangerous yet the most transformational our country has ever known”, he was entirely correct. Where he is mistaken is in his belief that “the United Kingdom is uniquely placed to benefit”. Instead, Britain is almost uniquely exposed to the dangers of this harsh new world, through the compounded errors of those who ruled us during our brief holiday from history — and whose worldview, barely altered, rules us still. The world order crumbling around us is, unfortunately for us, the one around which our entire economic and political systems still revolve.</p>
<p>Britain is on a war footing, <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2024/04/26/rishi-sunak-is-right-to-put-britain-on-a-war-footing/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">we are now told</a>, as Sunak announces a return to the 2.5% of GDP defence expenditure <a href="https://news.sky.com/story/uk-to-spend-2-5-of-gdp-on-defence-by-2030-boris-johnson-announces-12643124" target="_blank" rel="noopener">previously announced</a> by Boris Johnson just two years earlier: our fleet may be shrinking, our Army <a href="https://www.forces.net/services/army/uk-would-run-out-bullets-weeks-war-against-russia" target="_blank" rel="noopener">cannot withstand two weeks of war</a>, and <a href="https://www.standard.co.uk/news/uk/tata-labour-port-talbot-welsh-south-wales-b1153925.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">we still sell off</a> what remains of our industrial capacity, but we are preparing for conflict nevertheless. In all the many examples of the gulf between Westminster’s bombastic rhetoric and concrete action, there is little that could instil a greater sense of dread. No one sane would wish to be led into war by the current Conservative Party, but then Starmer’s front bench hardly inspires confidence either: it is hard, observing the international situation and then glancing towards Westminster, to avoid feeling like a passenger sitting in the backseat of a vehicle revving up at the edge of a cliff.</p>
<p class="p1">Yet there is at least one modest victory we can console ourselves with before we crash the barriers: the destruction of the Conservative Party, at whose door half the blame for our current state of crisis can be laid. The <a href="https://www.newstatesman.com/culture/books/book-of-the-day/2024/05/strange-death-of-conservatism" target="_blank" rel="noopener">possible extinction</a> of the world’s oldest political party would, in less tumultuous times, seem a historic event: right now, it is the barest minimum we can hope for. Though a Starmer government may well be more competent than the revolving carousel of dysfunction the Conservatives have given us over the past decade, this is a very low hurdle to clear. Labour’s timid, vacillatory leader gives little sense of understanding the scale of effort necessary for national survival, and that the grand rebalancing of British strategy, <a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/04/the-fatal-flaw-in-david-lammys-progressive-realism/"><span class="s1">announced by David Lammy</span></a>, offers only a continuation of a worldview already splintering into wreckage, gives us little confidence in a dawning era of national renewal.</p>
<p class="p1">The entire system requires change — as Dominic Cummings says, “every aspect is rotten and this exerts a collective paralysis” — yet it is manifestly incapable of reforming itself. Indeed, it is a sombre augury of Westminster’s future stability that both Labour’s path to power and the corresponding Tory decline rely not on a sudden wave of enthusiasm for Starmer, but instead on disengagement from the political process entirely. Cynical and disenchanted, the voters are “quiet quitting” from British democracy, even as the Westminster system’s cascading errors make them poorer and angrier.</p>
<p class="p1"><div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/05/westminster-is-devolving-itself-out-of-existence/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/05/westminster-is-devolving-itself-out-of-existence/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/GettyImages-2151325648-e1715256094296-1.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/05/westminster-is-devolving-itself-out-of-existence/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/05/westminster-is-devolving-itself-out-of-existence/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Westminster is devolving itself out of existence</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/05/westminster-is-devolving-itself-out-of-existence/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Travis Aaroe</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>It is to arrest this volatile course of events that two new contenders are seemingly emerging to wrest control of the British Right from the Conservative Party’s skeletal grasp — Reform UK, <a href="https://conservativehome.com/2024/05/06/smaller-parties-normally-perform-better-in-by-elections-but-reform-uk-might-be-different/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="s1">already struggling</span></a> for a populist party, can for now be written off. Both Cummings, whose “New Party” is apparently focus-grouping itself into being, and the academic analyst of populism-turned-aspiring-populist Matthew Goodwin, <a href="https://www.mattgoodwin.org/p/my-plan-for-the-future" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="s1">teasing the launch</span></a><span class="s1"> of a new Right-wing movement</span> if enough people subscribe to his Substack, are seemingly readying themselves to “plough the old Tory Party into the earth with salt”, as Cummings puts it, and birth new political movements. Though both have, to differing degrees, won the ire of the defenders of the current order, jealous to maintain control of the ship of state as they steer it towards the coming iceberg, their emerging platforms diverge in tactics even as they agree on the fundamentals.</p>
<p class="p1">First, the parallels: correctly, both see the crisis of British politics as systemic. For Goodwin: “<span class="s3">We have two big parties… that were born to provide answers to questions from a different era and which are ill-equipped to address the questions that face us today.” For Cummings: </span>“The old parties have failed for decades, they’re programmed to fail, they’ll carry on failing.” Both see Labour’s turn in office as a brief, doomed interlude. In Goodwin’s analysis, Labour “will likely become very unpopular, very quickly”, as “while the Tories are simply too strongly rooted in an old politics, in an old world, to be able to truly adapt to the new world that’s emerging around us today&#8230; So too are Labour.” For Cummings, equally, as outlined <a href="https://inews.co.uk/opinion/editor/cummings-first-newspaper-interview-since-leaving-no-10-3049355" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="s1">in an excellent recent interview</span></a>: <span class="s4">“</span>Labour’s just a carbon copy of the Tories… the MP ranks are filled with obviously useless people who can’t do anything. And the party itself is dead. It’s intellectually dead, organisationally dead, same as the Tories.” The result, he predicts, is that <span class="s4">“</span>everything will keep failing and everyone will be even more miserable by 2026 than they are now”.</p>
<p class="p1">The opportunity, or in Cummings’s phrasing, “market share” for an insurgent reformist party therefore looks excellent: yet the British political system, with its Early Modern parliament clustered round by whispering courtiers, is almost expressly designed to prevent such a possibility (indeed, to imagine a different, functional political system <a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/03/the-gravediggers-of-british-conservatism/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="s1">may now even face legal sanction</span></a>). Where the two differ is in their approach to this problem. For Goodwin, the new movement — it need not necessarily be a party — may find its greatest chance of success outside Parliament. After all, Brexit was, he notes, “perhaps the single most important thing achieved over the last decade and it had nothing to do with winning seats in Westminster… Indirect political pressure, from outside the system, can often be as consequential as direct pressure from the inside.” For Goodwin, the guiding principle behind the new movement, its overriding goal, is “popular sovereignty” as “the only way to hand power back to the people, where it belongs”, though the means to achieve this outcome is so far left unsketched.</p>
<p class="p1"><div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/04/will-the-english-ever-revolt/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/04/will-the-english-ever-revolt/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/GettyImages-2149305375.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/04/will-the-english-ever-revolt/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/04/will-the-english-ever-revolt/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Will the English ever revolt?</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/04/will-the-english-ever-revolt/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Aris Roussinos</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Where Goodwin is then a genuine populist, Cummings, by contrast, leans towards elitism: the effective models he cites as examples are California tech CEOs, “the subset of elites who are a) most competent at building but also b) almost entirely disconnected from mainstream politics”, particularly Marc Andreessen and other Silicon Valley would-be philosopher kings. The Cummings solution is built around “the elite Insider network”, who “are overwhelmingly in hedge funds, banks, VCs, PE, tech startups, research labs, academia and so on — keeping their heads down and building walled gardens between themselves and political madness”. Yet even here, the Cummings model is more democratic, in practice, than our current sclerotic system.</p>
<p class="p1">As he told <em>The i</em>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p class="p1">“I don’t think it’s a coincidence that when Britain was the most powerful country in the world its domestic politics was extremely decentralised and now that so much is broken we are more centralised than we have ever been in terms of where there’s power and money. If you’d said to people in 1800 or 1900 that all sorts of decisions about what happens in Bolton or what happens in Birmingham and ‘Do we build this or not build that?’ will be decided by some 27-year-old PPE idiot in the Treasury they’d have just thought this is complete madness.”</p>
</blockquote>
<p class="p1">Yet ironically, the two radical opponents of Westminster dysfunction depend, to a certain extent, on the <i>ancién regime</i>’s survival: but the greatest shock we face, with Starmer likely at the helm, is yet to come.</p>
<p class="p1">Like other European nations, only perhaps more so, Britain has committed itself to the war in Ukraine and the corresponding confrontation with Russia. Unfortunately, due to a combination of Western deindustrialisation and political dysfunction, and Ukrainian errors of military planning and organisation, that war is <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/05/14/us/politics/russia-momentum-ukraine-war.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">not going well</a>. For all that Cummings’s dismissal of the Ukrainian state is too vicious for his analysis to gain much currency in Westminster, his assessment that Britain has found itself “getting into a war of attrition with Russia who we pushed into an alliance with the world’s biggest manufacturing power” is unfortunately correct. With even <a href="https://www.economist.com/europe/2024/05/02/a-fresh-russian-push-will-test-ukraine-severely-says-a-senior-general" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="s1">Ukraine’s leading commanders</span></a> cautioning that military victory is unattainable and the best outcome is a negotiated peace settlement — a sentiment until recently taboo in Britain — the mismatch between Britain’s stated strategy in Ukraine and the war’s likely outcome is increasingly stark. A cynic would suggest that Europe’s actual strategy in Ukraine is to buy time, at Ukraine’s expense, for our continent’s own rearmament, while Biden’s aim is merely to palm final defeat onto Trump.</p>
<p class="p1"><div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;Where Goodwin is then a genuine populist, Cummings, by contrast, leans towards elitism&#8221;</div>
<p>Yet with the war in Ukraine concluded, will an angry, more powerful Russia attack Nato itself? The answer is: we do not know, but fear the worst. Would a Trump administration go to war with Russia to defend the territorial integrity of Lithuania or Estonia? Again, we do not know, but the anxiety of Nato officials on this question is not reassuring. The United States, on whose military power our political settlement ultimately depends, has found itself on the back foot in Ukraine, humiliated in the Red Sea, and rushing to prepare itself for a war in the Pacific in which geography and industrial capacity weigh steeply against it. Living standards in Britain have been battered by the war in Ukraine, but the economic shock of America’s looming confrontation with China will vastly outweigh anything we have ever known. When, as seems likely, America withdraws its attention from Europe’s security to wrestle with its existential rival, our necessary expenditure on rearmament and perhaps mobilisation — even if we avoid open war with Russia — will vastly reduce available spending on the social welfare we have come to expect.</p>
<p class="p1">Indeed, the emphasis by both Cummings and Goodwin on “woke elites” and culture wars already seems outdated: it is hard to see such luxury beliefs long surviving a world where British voters, already poor and angry, will be poorer and angrier than we have known in many decades. Yet of the two aspiring reformers, it is Cummings who seems most alive to the possibilities as well as threats posed by the great storm forming on the horizon. As he observes, overhauling a political system is “seemingly hard, but history shows it’s doable but it happens in response to huge system changes. Historically, wars and pandemics are things that reshape states, and financial clashes. So now we’ve got all of those things.”</p>
<p class="p3"><span class="s5">But even the most radical reformer would find it hard to derive much optimism from the present international situation: </span><span class="s6">Britain’s political system only survived the 20th century through American military intervention, kept on life support by the unmatchable industrial base of the rising superpower. Without this <i>deus ex machina</i>, and in a world where China fills America’s Forties role — only this time, on our opponent’s side — it would take unreasonable optimism to imagine that </span><span class="s5">either Sunak or Starmer will muddle Britain&#8217;s ramshackle state through to victory. </span></p>
<p class="p3"><span class="s6">We are in a situation where everything around us is rapidly changing, to our detriment, and yet our leaders act as if at the end of it, everything will somehow stay the same. </span><span class="s5">Macron’s <a href="https://www.economist.com/europe/2024/05/02/how-to-rescue-europe" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span class="s1">recent warning</span></a>, that “a</span><span class="s6"> civilisation can die” in a “brutal” way in which “things can happen much more quickly than we think” seems closer to the mark. </span><span class="s5">If the crisis is pregnant with political opportunity, as it proved to be for Lee Kuan Yew, it is increasingly likely to come in the wake of defeat.</span></p>
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					<title>Poland&#8217;s honeymoon with Ukraine is over</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2024/05/polands-honeymoon-with-ukraine-is-over/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://stage.unherd.com/2024/05/polands-honeymoon-with-ukraine-is-over/?edition=us#comments</comments>
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										<unherd:main_theme>Eastern Europe</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Michal Kranz]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/author30aug.jpg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>3</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[(Attila Husejnow/SOPA Images/LightRocket via Getty Images)]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<div><strong>Michal Kranz</strong> is a freelance journalist reporting on politics, society and defence in Eastern Europe and the Middle East. He runs <i><a href="https://theeasternflank.substack.com/" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://theeasternflank.substack.com/&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1737473225062000&amp;usg=AOvVaw1ymYD5AVcHVPGcry_zwCIQ">The Eastern Flank</a>,</i> a Substack newsletter focused on Eastern European geopolitics.</div>
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						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>Michal_Kranz</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is a freelance journalist reporting on politics, society and defence in Eastern Europe and the Middle East. He runs <i><a href="https://theeasternflank.substack.com/" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://theeasternflank.substack.com/&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1737473225062000&amp;usg=AOvVaw1ymYD5AVcHVPGcry_zwCIQ">The Eastern Flank</a>,</i> a Substack newsletter focused on Eastern European geopolitics.</div>
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					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Wed, 01 May 2024 23:00:19 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Wed, 01 May 2024 23:00:19 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Eastern Europe]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Europe]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Poland]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ukraine]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ukraine war]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[War]]></category>
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								<![CDATA[The euphoric support of 2022 is a distant memory ]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>“Enough hospitality, you ungrateful sons of bitches.” So read <a href="https://twitter.com/BDStanley/status/1762419847214792857" target="_blank" rel="noopener">a banner</a> flown by protesting Polish farmers in Warsaw in late February, which also showed a stick figure kicking another character draped in the colours of the Ukrainian flag out of Poland.</p>
<p>For the best part of a year, farmers and truckers in Poland have been staging roadblocks, marches, and blockades along the Polish-Ukrainian border in protest at various Polish and EU measures which enabled an influx of Ukrainian grain into the country, undercutting the domestic supply. Although the protests were concerned with the economic impact on farmers’ livelihoods, a nativist note could often be detected — and Ukrainians certainly read them that way. On one occasion, in <a href="https://twitter.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1704197485483151717" target="_blank" rel="noopener">a post on X</a>, Zelensky suggested that Poles were playing into Russia’s hands by effectively weakening Ukraine on the grain issue, prompting a <a href="https://www.wprost.pl/swiat/11399014/ostre-aluzje-zelenskiego-wobec-polski-pomagaja-przygotowac-scene-dla-aktora-z-moskwy.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">harsh rebuke</a> from Polish President Andrzej Duda.</p>
<p>Since the start of this year, the Polish state, the mainstream Polish media, and farmers’ unions themselves <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/poland-probes-pro-putin-banner-at-farmers-protest/a-68331291" target="_blank" rel="noopener">have strenuously condemned</a> anti-Ukrainian protest messages like those in Warsaw. But the mere presence of such slogans has marked a sharp departure for a country whose entire society had once come together to welcome Ukrainian refugees with open arms. And beyond angry farmers, something has changed here at the diplomatic level too, a turn away from the effusive solidarity of 2022, back towards a relationship defined by <em>realpolitik</em> and coloured by some of the darkest horrors of the 20th century.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/04/its-time-to-send-nato-troops-to-ukraine/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/04/its-time-to-send-nato-troops-to-ukraine/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/GettyImages-1258215253.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/04/its-time-to-send-nato-troops-to-ukraine/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/04/its-time-to-send-nato-troops-to-ukraine/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>It&#039;s time to send Nato troops to Ukraine</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/04/its-time-to-send-nato-troops-to-ukraine/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Edward Luttwak</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>On Monday, after months of negotiations and a sizeable subsidy from the Polish government for the agricultural sector, farmers finally <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/polish-protesters-lift-months-long-blockade-ukraine-border-2024-04-29/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">suspended</a> their blockade of the border. But the damage has already been done. <a href="https://razumkov.org.ua/en/announcement/assessment-of-the-foreign-policy-factors-impact-on-ukraine-attitude-to-foreign-countries-and-certain-initiatives-of-their-leaders-assessment-of-putin-s-legitimacy-by-citizens-of-ukraine-march-2024" target="_blank" rel="noopener">A new survey</a> released in late April showed that positive views of Poland among Ukrainians had fallen from a high of 94% in early 2023 to only 58% last month. Poles’ views of Ukrainian refugees have also grown <a href="https://visitukraine.today/blog/3296/how-poles-attitudes-toward-ukrainian-refugees-have-changed-a-new-poll" target="_blank" rel="noopener">somewhat more negative</a> — although more recent figures are difficult to come by, in 2023, support among Poles for accepting Ukrainian refugees fell by 10% overall to 73%, and among some demographics such as young Polish women, to a <a href="https://www.cbos.pl/PL/publikacje/public_opinion/2023/04_2023.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">mere 47%</a>. And according to <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-what-young-poles-think-about-their-nations-role-heres-what-our-survey-shows-209927" target="_blank" rel="noopener">one 2023 survey</a>, the percentage of Poles who wished to generally support Ukraine in its war effort dropped from 83% in early 2022 to 65% in 2023.</p>
<p>This growing fatigue was entirely predictable. Though few realised it at the time, that point in early 2022, when everyday Poles across the country quite literally opened their homes to families fleeing the invasion, was probably a once-in-a-lifetime moment of cross-border solidarity. For a brief period, the difficult minutiae of politics and history that had previously defined relations between Poland and Ukraine gave way to a national embrace, not just between two states, but between two peoples. Over two years since the start of the Russian invasion, and much to Vladimir Putin’s chagrin, Poland and Ukraine have remained allies. But the unbridled love affair between them and their people has ended, and the realism that had characterised their relations before 2022 has made a decisive return.</p>
<p>This is most clearly reflected in the two-pronged approach of Donald Tusk&#8217;s government, which seeks to maintain close ties with Ukraine on the security front while pursuing a more assertive, protectionist policy in the trade and agricultural spheres. Last week, in <a href="https://www.rp.pl/polityka/art40242041-expose-radoslawa-sikorskiego-w-sejmie-szef-msz-znaki-na-niebie-i-ziemi-zwiastuja-nadzwyczajne-wydarzenia" target="_blank" rel="noopener">a policy speech</a> to Parliament, Tusk’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Radosław Sikorski, reiterated Poland’s interest in defending Ukraine from Russia. But he consciously framed this commitment in terms that differed markedly from the <a href="https://www.pap.pl/en/news/news%2C1525391%2Cpolish-president-believes-ukraine-will-defeat-russia.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">overtures of brotherhood</a> President Duda had used during the first year of Russia’s invasion. “It is in Poland&#8217;s obvious interest to keep the aggressor away from our borders, which is why sovereign Ukraine must win this war,” Sikorski said. “Thanks to the sacrifice of Ukrainians, we can move the borders of the free world hundreds of kilometres to the east.”</p>
<p>Though the support remains, self-preservation has now edged out altruistic solidarity. And the latest drama playing out  demonstrates this new reality perfectly: last week, Defence Minister Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz <a href="https://notesfrompoland.com/2024/04/25/poland-offers-to-help-ukraine-bring-back-draft-age-men-to-serve-in-war/">stated</a> that Poland is ready to help return fighting-age Ukrainian men return to their home country for potential military conscription. Ukraine announced the same day that it would stop issuing passports to men of conscription age living outside of their territory, prompting a <a href="https://balkaninsight.com/2024/04/25/like-north-korea-ukrainian-men-in-poland-express-anger-at-consular-service-suspension/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">surge of anger</a> among Ukrainians at their consulates in Poland.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">“Self-preservation has now edged out altruistic solidarity.”</div>
<p>This anger may soon come to be levelled at the Polish state itself since politicians are <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/apr/25/poland-and-lithuania-pledge-to-help-kyiv-repatriate-ukrainians-subject-to-military-draft" target="_blank" rel="noopener">reviewing</a> new rules this week that may cut social benefits for Ukrainians who cannot produce valid passports. Not only that, but Kosiniak-Kamysz has also <a href="https://notesfrompoland.com/2024/04/25/poland-offers-to-help-ukraine-bring-back-draft-age-men-to-serve-in-war/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">refused to rule out</a> deporting the men back to Ukraine at Kyiv’s request — a move which would sour relations even further. Helping Ukraine beef up its military manpower along the frontlines is clearly in Poland’s national interest — but gone are the days when Poland would agree to host any and all Ukrainians, no questions asked. If keeping the Russian enemy at arm’s length now requires some coercion of refugees, Poland appears ready to play ball.</p>
<p>In the long relationship between Poland and Ukraine, this is nothing new. In 1919, the founding father of the modern Polish state, Józef Piłsudski, <a href="https://notesfrompoland.com/2022/08/26/new-biography-explores-complex-legacy-of-polands-founding-father-pilsudski/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">coined an adage</a>: “Without an independent Ukraine, there cannot be an independent Poland.” This has since remained the cornerstone of Polish policy toward Ukraine — but this didn’t always mean Poland was friendly toward Ukrainians if it didn’t suit its interests. In 1920, for instance, Piłsudski signed an alliance with Ukrainian independence leader Symon Petliura, and helped him to militarily re-establish control over Kyiv from Russian Bolshevik forces for a brief period. But just a few years before, during the last days of the First World War, Polish forces had waged a bitter ethnic war in western Ukraine, with Piłsudski himself capturing lands Ukrainians claimed as their own.</p>
<p>Ukraine’s leaders have approached the relationship in an equally transactional manner when it suited them, with exceptionally bloody consequences. During the Second World War, when an opportunity arose for the radical Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) to finally carve out a Ukrainian state on Polish territory, they did so with the utmost brutality. Between 1943 and 1945, the UPA carried out <a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/07/can-poland-ever-forgive-ukraine/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">massacres of up to 100,000 Poles</a> in today’s western Ukraine, what is known in Poland as the Volhynia Slaughter. Partially in response, the post-war Polish government carried out the resettlement programme known as Operation Vistula in 1947, deporting almost 150,000 Ukrainians from Poland’s south-east to new territories in the west.</p>
<p>At the conclusion of the Cold War, when both countries regained full independence from Soviet domination, Poland and Ukraine renounced all territorial claims against each other, and committed to living alongside each other as “<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Poland%E2%80%93Ukraine_relations#:~:text=This%20document%2C%20in%20particular%2C%20states,as%20develop%20cooperation%20in%20everything.%22" target="_blank" rel="noopener">equal and close peoples</a>”. Comparatively cordial relations have existed between them ever since — during Russia’s shadow war in the Donbas after 2014, Poland supported Ukraine diplomatically, denouncing Russia’s annexation of Crimea. But the legacy of their shared history <a href="https://mieroszewski.pl/en/programmes/public-opinion-research/poland-and-poles-as-seen-by-ukrainians-2023" target="_blank" rel="noopener">continued to loom</a>, and, since 2015, disagreements over the exhumations of Polish victims of these wartime massacres and Ukraine’s memorialisation of radical groups like UPA threatened to reopen old wounds.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/02/how-polish-farmers-ignited-a-european-revolution/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/02/how-polish-farmers-ignited-a-european-revolution/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/GettyImages-1229045209-1-e1707214461850.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/02/how-polish-farmers-ignited-a-european-revolution/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/02/how-polish-farmers-ignited-a-european-revolution/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>How Polish farmers ignited a European revolution</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/02/how-polish-farmers-ignited-a-european-revolution/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Michal Kranz </a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Since 2022, when the hard reality of Russian aggression united Poles and Ukrainians once again, Moscow has tried to exploit this to pit Poland and Ukraine against each other, but without much success. Instead, it is economic issues that have threatened to drive a wedge between the two countries — and the grain dispute is just the start. Ukraine and Poland’s economies are joined at the hip, and Ukrainian immigrants have formed a crucial part of Poland’s labour market for years. In this sense, both countries are co-dependent, and the influx of Ukrainians since 2022 has ultimately been beneficial for Poland, despite fears among Poles about the strain Ukrainian refugees are having on their social service systems.</p>
<p>However, trade issues, of which grain and food imports are only a small part, may become a much bigger problem. Although Poland has so far <a href="https://www.polskieradio.pl/395/9766/Artykul/3313670,polish-ukrainian-presidents-discuss-eu-support-for-ukraine-nato-summit" target="_blank" rel="noopener">been supportive</a> of Ukraine’s entry into the EU, the lower cost of Ukrainian agricultural and consumer goods means that their incorporation into the single market could have a dramatic impact on Poland’s economy. In addition, Ukraine, rather than Poland and other current eastern EU states, would become <a href="https://ip-quarterly.com/en/eu-enlargement-and-reform-ii-troubled-polish-ukrainian-partnership-view-warsaw" target="_blank" rel="noopener">the primary recipient of funds</a> from Brussels as the bloc’s poorest member, stymying Poland’s growth trajectory. Paradoxically, overcoming these very contemporary material problems may be more difficult for the two countries than coming to terms with the ghosts of their past.</p>
<p>But these material problems are a consequence of the same reality: geopolitical proximity and the cold logic of survival. These two forces have brought Poles and Ukrainians together in anger and in friendship through the centuries, the latter usually whenever the resurgent Russian bear starts breathing down both of their necks. As long as that threat remains, Poland and Ukraine will have many reasons to co-operate. As for any long-time neighbours in Europe, the past is full of messy indignities. And even though the most idyllic honeymoon must eventually come to an end, there is no reason why an unvarnished, imperfect, yet honest and fruitful marriage can’t replace it.</p>
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					<title>It&#8217;s time to send Nato troops to Ukraine</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2024/04/its-time-to-send-nato-troops-to-ukraine/?edition=us</link>
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										<unherd:main_theme>Nato at 75</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Edward Luttwak]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/edward_luttwak-1.jpg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>2</unherd:article_ranking>
																<unherd:image_caption>
							<![CDATA['Regardless of quality... the Russian army already outnumbers the Ukrainian, and the gap is becoming wider every day.' (Jaap Arriens/NurPhoto via Getty Images)]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Professor Edward Luttwak</strong> is a strategist and historian known for his works on grand strategy, geoeconomics, military history, and international relations.</p>
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						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>ELuttwak</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is a strategist and historian known for his works on grand strategy, geoeconomics, military history, and international relations.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Wed, 03 Apr 2024 23:02:07 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Mon, 29 Apr 2024 15:52:49 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Defence Sector]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Nato]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Nuclear bombs]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Nuclear War]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[row]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ukraine]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ukraine war]]></category>
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								<![CDATA[After 75 years, the alliance is locked in the nuclear age ]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>In 1944, Leslie Groves, the US army general who managed the Manhattan Project, asked its chief scientist, J. Robert Oppenheimer, just how powerful their new bomb might be. Would it be 10 times as powerful as the largest bomb of the time, the RAF’s Tallboy “earthquake bomb”? Or 50 times, or even 100 times? Oppenheimer replied that he could not be sure — at the time, there were even fears that the explosive chain reaction might <em>never</em> stop — but he expected a bomb much more powerful than 100 Tallboys. Groves immediately replied that such a powerful weapon would not be of much use to anyone, because the “politicians” would never dare to use it.</p>
<p>In the short run, Groves was wrong, while Oppenheimer’s guess was correct. The Hiroshima uranium bomb was in fact more powerful than 1,000 Tallboys, with the Nagasaki plutonium bomb exceeding even that. But only five years later, Groves’s prediction came to pass. First the United States, and then the Soviet Union, and then each successive nuclear power came to the realisation that their nuclear weapons were too powerful to be used in combat. This has remained true in the decades since — all the way up to the invasion of Ukraine. For, despite Putin’s atomic sabre-rattling, he too is subject to the logic of Groves’s prediction. Decades after his conversation with Oppenheimer, a brief historical summary of nuclear war has much to teach us about the situation in Ukraine — and how victory might only be attainable there through much more conventional means.</p>
<p>The first test of the nuclear age came with the Korean War. In December 1950, hundreds of thousands of Chinese soldiers crossed the River Yalu to support their North Korean allies against the US. With America in immediate danger of losing tens of thousands of men, General Douglas MacArthur decided that he had to use nuclear weapons to stop the Chinese. By far the most respected US military leader of the time — he had led American forces in the Pacific from humiliating defeat to total victory, and then acted as Japan’s de facto Emperor in reforming the country — MacArthur expected Truman to assent to his superior military judgment. Instead, the answer was a flat no. MacArthur insisted, and he was dismissed.</p>
<p>Truman recognised that the nature of warfare had fundamentally changed since Hiroshima and Nagasaki. When he authorised those strikes, neither he nor anyone else knew that the explosions would also cause radiation fallout, which would sicken and even kill thousands of people miles from the site of the detonation. Moreover, in 1945, Truman was facing the prospect of losing many more American troops in the conquest of Japan than in the entirety of the Second World War up to that point. The Japanese really did fight to the last man, and still had 2 million troops to expend. Truman would have been thrown out of the White House if he had allowed the deaths of hundreds of thousands of Americans by refusing to use the bomb.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/03/israels-victory-will-be-netanyahus-downfall/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/03/israels-victory-will-be-netanyahus-downfall/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/GettyImages-2084796134-e1710783795724.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/03/israels-victory-will-be-netanyahus-downfall/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/03/israels-victory-will-be-netanyahus-downfall/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Israel&#039;s victory will be Netanyahu&#039;s downfall</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/03/israels-victory-will-be-netanyahus-downfall/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Edward Luttwak </a></p></div></a></div>
<p>But five years later, the situation was very different. Facing catastrophe in Korea, Truman had the alternative of evacuating US troops to Japan if all else failed — and therefore never even considered using atomic weapons. Under the next president, his fission bombs evolved into thermonuclear fusion bombs at least 100,000 times more powerful than Tallboy. But that only made Truman’s “No” of 1950 even more definitive. Nuclear abstinence became the only possible choice for Americans and Russians alike, as the Cuban Missile Crisis precariously but definitively showed.</p>
<p>However, it would take much longer for this logic to develop into a definitive doctrine. Following the establishment of Nato 75 years ago today, and especially in the Sixties and Seventies, exhaustive efforts were made to extract some additional advantage from nuclear weapons and somehow gain the upper hand for the new Western alliance. So-called “tactical” nuclear weapons were made not more, but much <em>less</em> powerful, supposedly to enable their use on the battlefield. Their advocates claimed that they could provide firepower very cheaply, with small nuclear warheads replicating the effect of hundreds of howitzers. Both the US and Soviet armed forces duly acquired thousands of nuclear weapons: not only “small” bombs for fighter-bombers, but also bombardment rockets (some small enough to be carried in a jeep), anti-aircraft missiles, torpedoes, and even portable demolition charges.</p>
<p>But this illusion could not be sustained. Military planners came to understand that if US commanders tried to defend Nato territory by attacking invading Soviet forces with small “tactical” nuclear weapons, the Russians would use their own arsenal to destroy the defending Western forces. The same would apply for any attempt to replace conventional military force with nuclear weaponry. And so it was understood that, while nuclear weapons are a useful deterrent, they can only be used to strike back against a prior nuclear attack — and never to achieve any kind of victory. Thus in the Seventies, when the United States and the Soviet Union were engaged in the elaborate and highly publicised “Strategic Arms Limitation” negotiations, officials on both sides quickly agreed to quietly stop developing, manufacturing and fielding new “tactical” nuclear weapons, before equally quietly disassembling tens of thousands of these weapons.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/02/how-europe-can-lead-ukraine-to-victory/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/02/how-europe-can-lead-ukraine-to-victory/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/GettyImages-2003732157.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/02/how-europe-can-lead-ukraine-to-victory/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/02/how-europe-can-lead-ukraine-to-victory/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Why Russia isn&#039;t winning in Ukraine</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/02/how-europe-can-lead-ukraine-to-victory/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Rajan Menon</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>But in the end, it was the newest nuclear powers, India and Pakistan, that conclusively demonstrated the redundancy of their own nuclear weapons for anything beyond reciprocal deterrence. In the Kargil War of 1999, which involved multiple full-scale battles and thousands of casualties, neither side attempted even a <em>sotto voce</em> threat of a nuclear strike. And this is still true today. When Putin‘s loudest attack dog, Dmitry Medvedev, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russias-medvedev-wed-have-use-nuclear-weapon-if-ukrainian-offensive-was-success-2023-07-30/#:~:text=Medvedev%2C%20who%20has%20cast%20himself,existence%20of%20the%20Russian%20state." target="_blank" rel="noopener">started barking</a> about the use of “tactical” nuclear weapons after the failure of the initial Russian invasion in 2022, it was only the least competent journalists and those obedient to Moscow who echoed his warnings. Eventually, after several months of this foolishness, Putin came out <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/putin-says-russia-ready-nuclear-war-not-everything-rushing-it-2024-03-13/#:~:text=Putin%20reiterated%20the%20use%20of,against%20Russia%20%22when%20the%20very" target="_blank" rel="noopener">and said it</a>: Russia would only use nuclear weapons only “when the very existence of the state is put under threat” — meaning by a corresponding nuclear threat.</p>
<p>The situation in Ukraine has turned again, but the same logic holds. Instead of frustrated Russians bogged down in their trenches, now it is the Ukrainian position that looks precarious. Kyiv presents this as a question of materiel, and continually asks for more and better weapons from the West. Yet while more guns and missiles could be sent, it is clear that what is forcing Kyiv to retreat step by step is not a lack of firepower, but a lack of soldiers.</p>
<p>Until this week, conscription in Ukraine only started at the age of 27, as opposed to the global norm of 18. Zelensky has now <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2024/04/02/ukraine-lowers-conscription-age-acute-soldier-shortage/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">reduced this to 25</a>; but with many Ukrainians exempted from service, his total armed forces amount to less than 800,000 active personnel. Ukraine is hampered by the age distribution of its population, with children and older people over-represented when compared to young men in the 19-35 age bracket. But its troop total is still too low for a population that exceeds 30 million by most estimates, considering that Israel can rapidly field an army of around 600,000 from a population of around 8 million. This means that, unless Putin decides to end the war, Ukraine’s troops will be pushed back again and again, losing soldiers in the process who cannot be replaced. Russia doesn’t even have to send its finest troops to achieve this — merely volunteer contract soldiers attracted by good pay, or Russian prisoners serving ordinary criminal sentences, recruited straight from their prison cells. Regardless of quality, though, the Russian army already outnumbers the Ukrainian, and the gap is becoming wider every day.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">“Nato countries will soon have to send soldiers to Ukraine, or else accept catastrophic defeat.”</div>
<p>This arithmetic of this is inescapable: Nato countries will soon have to send soldiers to Ukraine, or else accept catastrophic defeat. The British and French, along with the Nordic countries, are already quietly preparing to send troops — both small elite units and logistics and support personnel — who can remain far from the front. The latter could play an essential role by releasing their Ukrainians counterparts for retraining in combat roles. Nato units could also relieve Ukrainians currently tied up in the recovery and repair of damaged equipment, and could take over the technical parts of existing training programmes for new recruits. These Nato soldiers might never see combat — but they don’t have to in order to help Ukraine make the most of its own scarce manpower.</p>
<p>Crucially, with China coming ever closer to an attack on Taiwan, the US cannot provide more troops than the roughly 40,000 who are already in Europe. Thus a momentous decision is in the post for the other Nato members, especially the most populous: Germany, France, Italy and Spain. If Europe cannot provide enough troops, Russia will prevail on the battlefield, and even if diplomacy successfully intervenes to avoid a complete debacle, Russian military power will have victoriously returned to Central Europe. At that point, Western European powers will have to rebuild their armed forces, whether they like it or not, starting with the return of compulsory military service. Perhaps in those circumstances, we might even witness an outbreak of nuclear nostalgia, foolishly harking back to the illusion that apocalyptic weaponry might be enough to keep the peace.</p>
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					<title>The crisis of Soviet Ukraine</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2024/02/the-repression-of-soviet-ukraine/?edition=us</link>
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										<unherd:main_theme>Ukraine: Two years on</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Volodymyr Ishchenko]]>
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																<unherd:article_ranking>1</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[Protestors in Kyiv in 2014 (Brendan Hoffman/Getty Images)]]>
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							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Volodymyr Ishchenko </strong>taught sociology at Kyiv universities, and is now a researcher at the Freie Universität in Berlin. His first book, <a href="https://www.versobooks.com/en-gb/blogs/authors/ishchenko-volodymyr" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em>Towards the Abyss: Ukraine from Maidan to War</em></a>, is out now from Verso.</p>
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						<![CDATA[taught sociology at Kyiv universities, and is now a researcher at the Freie Universität in Berlin. His first book, <a href="https://www.versobooks.com/en-gb/blogs/authors/ishchenko-volodymyr" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em>Towards the Abyss: Ukraine from Maidan to War</em></a>, is out now from Verso.]]>
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										<pubDate>Sat, 24 Feb 2024 00:10:02 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Sat, 24 Feb 2024 09:59:03 +0000</updated>
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		<category><![CDATA[Nationalism]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[Soviet Union]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[Ukraine war]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[War]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://old.unherd.com/?p=491077</guid>
																												<description>
								<![CDATA[The Maidan Revolution didn’t free my people]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-size: 12pt;"><em>&#8220;Whichever way this war ends,” thought Volodymyr Ishchenko on 24 February 2022, “I will no longer have a homeland.” In the preface to his new book, </em>Towards The Abyss<em>, the iconoclastic sociologist outlines his Soviet-Ukrainian identity as distinct from Ukraine&#8217;s Russian-speakers or the population of its south-eastern regions. Instead of ethnicity, these people were shaped by the forces of social revolution, class and modernisation. </em><em>Looking back at the post-Soviet decades, Ishchenko argues that the political fragmentation of Soviet Ukrainians and the fragility of the “Eastern” (misleadingly called “pro-Russian”) camp in Ukrainian politics, as opposed to the politically stronger “Western” (“pro-European”) camp, is an underestimated cause of the ongoing war. </em></span></p>
<p style="text-align: left;"><em><span style="font-size: 12pt;">Below, we republish the second half of the preface, a blend of family memoir and national history:</span></em></p>
<p style="text-align: center;"><strong>***</strong></p>
<p>For over 30 years, the Ukrainian nationalist intelligentsia advanced a very specific project of Ukrainian modernity. Its two main components were a rejection of Soviet modernisation and an anti-Russian articulation of Ukrainian national identity. These intellectuals sought to draw an equivalence between everything Ukrainian (in their specific articulation) and everything modern, while on the other hand they hoped to associate everything backward with everything Soviet and Russian.</p>
<p>In effect, they sought to reverse the symbolic hierarchy that identified Ukrainian with backwardness, which they feared existed behind the screen of the Soviet internationalist project. “Ukrainian” was to be seen as young, metropolitan, cosmopolitan, fluent in English, stylish, mobile, liberal, well-educated, successful. The “Soviet” and “Russian”, on the other hand, had to become old, conservative, provincial, rigid, clinging to dying industries, poorly or inadequately educated, in bad taste, losers.</p>
<p>This polarisation did not require complete homogeneity. After all, modernity is also about free rational debate. The fulfilment of Ukrainian modernity required “Ukrainian feminists”, “Ukrainian liberals”, “Ukrainian Leftists” — as well as Ukrainian Rightists. Of course there should be discussion of the nationalist crimes of the Second World War (with the obligatory disclaimer that the Soviets were worse). Of course there should be concern about Right-wing violence today (with obligatory disclaimers that it benefited Putin). And so on and so on. But at the critical moments when these discussions could really matter politically, and not just appease the “enlightened” conscience, all the red lines were strictly enforced, and you had to get back in line. Or get in trouble.</p>
<p>I was so much like these people. We had so much in common in our biographies. We went through the same universities, the same scholarships, the same programmes, the same civil-society institutions, the same conferences. We spoke the same languages. But I had not begun to think like them. My peer group often reacted to this with hatred. In one trashing of me by nationalist intellectuals, I was portrayed as a danger to the dear cause of the “Ukrainian nation-building project”. It was not because of what I wrote: they typically did not engage in any substantive discussion. And regardless of what I could possibly write, there were so much stronger forces in the media and politics that any imaginable “threat” I posed was negligible. No, it was certainly not what I <em>did</em> that threatened the nationalist cause, but, I think, simply the <em>existence</em> of people like me. We could challenge the national-liberals as social equals in forums. We were an unwanted nuisance to their monopoly. Not really traitors to an imagined community, but traitors to a real existing social group. Class traitors, not national traitors.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/01/oleksiy-arestovych-zelenskyys-challenger/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/01/oleksiy-arestovych-zelenskyys-challenger/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/GettyImages-1239752871.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/01/oleksiy-arestovych-zelenskyys-challenger/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/01/oleksiy-arestovych-zelenskyys-challenger/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Oleksiy Arestovych: Zelenskyy&#039;s challenger</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/01/oleksiy-arestovych-zelenskyys-challenger/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Freddie Sayers </a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Here was the real hatred. We were Ukrainian and modern, but not like them. Soviet Ukrainians who could have become comprador intellectuals in a peripheralising country, but refused this role. We resisted their collective gaslighting. That is why there was no rational engagement, only denial, silence, rejection, cancellation. One could write thousands of words against Russian imperialism and yet still be called a “troubadour of the empire”. One could literally say “I hate Putin” and still be accused of spreading Russian propaganda. Our intellectuals were not rated as intellectuals. Our scholarship was not scholarship but “political activism”. The political repression against us was not political repression, because threats and violence allegedly never occurred. We were simply not allowed to exist, because, if we did exist, the specific articulation of modernity and backwardness in Ukraine would no longer work. Whatever we did, we could not simply <em>be</em>.</p>
<p>We were potential embryos of an alternative Ukrainian modernity, one that could build an “organic” representation for Soviet Ukrainians — for what they were, not for what they were “supposed” to become in the view of nationalist intellectuals; that is, to become like them or to disappear altogether (at least from Ukraine’s public sphere). We could offer an alternative for Ukraine that could also be more appealing globally and in line with future trends, or at least with what more and more young people around the world would prefer as their future.</p>
<p>Why didn’t it work out this way? Many have compared the post-Soviet conflicts with the collapse of empires of the past: new contested borders were drawn; ethnonational groups that were part of the imperial majority became minorities in the new states; groups that were formerly oppressed minorities were given opportunities for revenge. These comparisons are typically blind to social class and revolutionary dynamics, which provide a very different perspective.</p>
<p>For example, the political crises and conflicts that followed the collapse of the great European empires after the First World War were fundamentally different to those that followed the demise of the multinational Soviet Union. The post-Soviet crisis was the terminal crisis of a social revolution, not an <em>ancien régime</em>. The new nationalisms of a century ago blossomed in the context of modernisation, not de-modernisation. The Twenties and Thirties were a period of intense politicisation, when organised revolutionary workers fought against no less committed and organised fascist counter-revolutionaries. The post-Soviet years, by contrast, were a period of atomisation, of general apathy, disturbed only by short-term <em>maidan</em> mobilisations. In sum, the post-WW1 crisis was a stalemate of strengthening social forces, while the post-Soviet crisis was a stalemate of mutual weakness.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/11/putin-has-enabled-ukrainian-nationhood/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/11/putin-has-enabled-ukrainian-nationhood/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/GettyImages-95452475-1.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/11/putin-has-enabled-ukrainian-nationhood/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/11/putin-has-enabled-ukrainian-nationhood/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Putin has enabled Ukrainian nationhood</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/11/putin-has-enabled-ukrainian-nationhood/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Helen Thompson </a></p></div></a></div>
<p>As noted above, the pro-Western intellectual and civic elites in post-Soviet Ukraine could offer nothing comparable to Soviet modernisation. The majority of Ukrainians did not buy their dubious promises that they too could join the global middle class. But the Russian elite’s offer was even less attractive. They typically compensated for their weakness in soft power with hard power. But even when they resorted to escalating coercion, they exposed their profound weaknesses.</p>
<p>There were three critical moments when the Ukrainian majority broke away from Russia, ending up further removed from its orbit on each occasion. Each of these was related to the failure or mid-course correction of military coercion initiated by the Russian elite. Ukrainians responded to the failed coup in Moscow in August 1991 by voting for independence, only eight months after having voted to preserve the Soviet Union. In response to Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the start of the war in Donbas in 2014, support for Russia-led reintegration projects became limited to a small minority in Ukraine, whereas they had previously been able to claim a majority or at least a plurality. The full-scale invasion in 2022 provoked the strongest anti-Russian consolidation in Ukraine ’s history.</p>
<p>These massive reactions to Russian coercion were purely negative in nature — rejections of what Russia was doing, rather than support for the West or for Ukrainian ethnonationalism. However, it was the “Western” camp that was able to seize the opportunity of these negative shocks to advance the positive substance of its agenda. This happened because of the profound class and political asymmetries between the “Western” and “Eastern” camps. The political capitalists of the “Eastern” camp did not develop their own civil society and Soviet Ukrainians remained too atomised to build their organic representation from below. Their plebeian “anti-maidans” were never a match for the <em>maidan</em> protests they were responding to. If Volodymyr Zelensky’s landslide victory over Petro Poroshenko in 2019 — after the incumbent ran on an aggressive nationalist programme — offered a last hope, this was dashed by the 2022 invasion.</p>
<p>As a result of the failure to develop and defend a pluralist nation-building project that would “organically” grow from the Soviet Ukraine, a large group of Ukrainians is now becoming the object of assimilation policies, squeezed between the “Western” nation-building projects of Ukrainian bourgeois civil society and Putin’s nostrum of “one and the same people”. In his notorious 2021 essay “On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians”, Putin articulated the Ukrainian-Russian distinction as a difference of regional-cultural variety within the same “people” as a political unit. However, there is in fact less of a <em>cultural</em> difference between the population of the urbanised and mostly Russian-speaking south-eastern Ukraine and the Russians, and more of a <em>political</em> difference.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/11/israel-could-collapse-the-american-empire/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/11/israel-could-collapse-the-american-empire/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/GettyImages-84148827-1.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/11/israel-could-collapse-the-american-empire/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/11/israel-could-collapse-the-american-empire/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The post-America war has begun</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/11/israel-could-collapse-the-american-empire/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Aris Roussinos </a></p></div></a></div>
<p>The urban culture of the late Soviet period, with its largely homogeneous cuisine throughout the USSR, typical references and jokes from literature and cinema, rituals and holidays, is far more relevant to them than the pre-modern ethnic traditions of Ukrainian and Russian villages. If some of the previously Russian-speaking Ukrainians switched to Ukrainian as a reaction to the invasion, it was clearly a political choice for them, not determined by their ethnic identity. The people feel more connected to the national imagined community of Ukraine, and less to Putin’s, even if they have a different vision of the nation than the speakers of the “Western” camp. In 2016, only 26% of Ukrainians agreed with the statement that Ukrainians and Russians are “one and the same people”, although 51% agreed that Ukrainians and Russians are different but “brotherly people”.[1. “Konsolidatsiia ukrainskoho suspilstva: shliakhy, vyklyky, perspektyvy” (Consolidation of Ukrainian society: Paths, challenges, prospects), Razumkov Centre, 2016, p. 71.] Both figures are likely to have fallen dramatically after 2022.</p>
<p>For the “Western” camp, the weak <em>cultural</em> difference of some Ukrainians from Russians has always been a <em>political</em> threat. It was seen not only as legitimising Russian expansionism, but also as a threat to their elitist ersatz-modernisation project. Quite early after the Russian missiles hit Ukrainian soil and Russian troops crossed the border, the national-liberal intellectuals understood that this was not only a threat, but also an opportunity for “knife solutions” — a radical, uncompromising transformation of the whole country in their image and likeness on a scale that was impossible before: the war helps to silence the voices of discontent.[2. S. Rudenko, ‘Spetsoperatsiaa “Derusyfikatsiia.” Interviu z holovnym redaktorom <em>Istorychnoi pravdy</em> Vakhtanhom Kipiani’ (Special operation ‘Derussification’: Interview with the editor-in-chief of <em>Istorychna pravda</em> Vakhtang Kipiani), Ukrainska Pravda, 25 April 2022.] The substance of “decolonisation” was not the building of a stronger sovereign state with a robust public sector — one that would contradict transnational capital, their crucial partner.</p>
<p>Rather, it was the eradication of anything related to Russia or the Soviet Union from the Ukrainian public sphere, including the removal of Russian-language books from libraries, the ban on teaching Russian in schools, even in predominantly Russian-speaking cities like Odessa, and even a ridiculously obscurantist attempt (which passed the first reading in the Ukrainian parliament) to ban the citation of Russian and Russian-language sources in science and education. Add to this the banning of political parties, including some of Ukraine’s oldest, such as the Socialist and Communist parties, which have represented the “Eastern” camp for decades, and further repression of popular opposition media and bloggers stigmatised as “pro-Russian”, even when they expressed no sympathy for the invasion. Ironically, the result is similar to the situation of Ukrainians in the pre-revolutionary Russian Empire: not so much discriminated against as individuals, but prohibited from expressing a distinct collective identity that would be seen as treasonous and repressed.</p>
<p>In Ukraine, we can’t be Soviet anymore. In Russia, it does not look like we can be Ukrainians. Soviet Ukrainians were the product of a social revolution; its degradation destroyed them as a political community. First, the late Soviet and post-Soviet leadership became seen as nothing more than a corrupt, self-serving elite. The atomised masses responded with frequent but poorly organised and amorphous protests that, when successful, only reproduced and intensified the underlying crisis. Unlike social revolutions, the <em>maidans</em> did not bring radical transformations in favour of the popular classes; they typically only increased social inequality. The <em>maidan</em> revolutions did not even build a stronger state but only destabilised the existing one, allowing domestic and transnational elite rivals to seize the opportunity to advance their interests and agendas. The post-Soviet elite responded only with more coercion, which eventually escalated into war (see how it worked out with the successful repression of the 2020 uprising in Belarus). This set the stage for the flourishing not of developmental national ideologies but of regressive neo-tribalist identities. There was no strong force from below to counteract this dynamic. The processes of the escalating crisis of hegemony are universal, but their manifestations in the post-Soviet space are of a rather unique magnitude.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">“In Ukraine, we can’t be Soviet anymore. In Russia, it does not look like we can be Ukrainians.”</div>
<p>The decomposition of a political community is the ultimate endpoint of these crisis trends. Divided by frontlines and borders, some volunteering, some being mobilised by force, some collaborating, some fleeing abroad, some trying to maintain a normal life and work in their hometowns, some simply trying to survive, taking different positions on the war (who even cares what “Ukrainian voices” who speak from Donetsk or Sevastopol think?), lacking our political and public representatives, with limited space for expression, with broken ties and suppressed discussions — is there even a common name, a claimed identity for all of us now? It is easy to pretend that we have never even existed, at most a dead-end branch from the main line of Ukrainian nation-building. But one can be sure that without a new cycle of modernising development in Ukraine, Soviet Ukrainians will not be fully assimilated. The political communication required to define our common identity, interests and collective actions in relation to Ukraine, and the states where we will end up, may start again.</p>
<p>The revolutionary project initiated by the Bolsheviks a century ago is no longer embedded in the national communities where it once took root. For the contemporary Left, this should mean not a break with the project of progress, rationality and universal emancipation, but rather the search for a political (and perhaps no longer national) community in which our efforts could be more effectively applied. Any new social revolution would learn from the Soviet one as much as the Bolsheviks learned from the French Revolution of 1789 — understanding its limits and acknowledging its (sometimes unjustifiable) mistakes, but also registering and building on its achievements.</p>
<p>Could Ukraine again be a core part of a social-revolutionary movement? The extent of the ethnonationalist and anti-communist reformatting of the country’s politics, society and ideology may leave no hope for this in the foreseeable future. But consider how dramatically the memory of the Second World War has changed over time. Who could have imagined in 1945, after the Nazi war of extermination and enslavement on the Eastern Front, which murdered between one-sixth and one-quarter of the entire civilian population of Ukraine, that the descendants of the survivors would fight using German tanks against Russians on the very same battlefields where they had fought in the Red Army against German tanks, and would do so while demolishing the remaining monuments to their heroic ancestors? It is unlikely to be the final ironic twist of Ukrainian history.</p>
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					<title>Why Russia isn&#8217;t winning in Ukraine</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2024/02/how-europe-can-lead-ukraine-to-victory/?edition=us</link>
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										<unherd:main_theme>Strategy</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Rajan Menon]]>
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							<![CDATA[Dusk or dawn for Ukraine? (Vlada Liberova/Libkos/Getty Images)]]>
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							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Rajan Menon </strong>is the Anne and Bernard Spitzer Professor Emeritus at the City College of New York and Senior Research Scholar at the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University.<span style="color: #888888;"><br />
</span></p>
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						<![CDATA[is the Anne and Bernard Spitzer Professor Emeritus at the City College of New York and Senior Research Scholar at the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University.<span style="color: #888888;">
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										<pubDate>Fri, 23 Feb 2024 00:02:51 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Fri, 05 Apr 2024 13:42:54 +0000</updated>
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								<![CDATA[If Europe steps up, this war is not a lost cause ]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>The assessments of Ukraine’s prospects in its war of defence against Russia, which enters its third year tomorrow, are noticeably less upbeat than they were last summer. Back then, the Ukrainians were riding high. Given little to no chance when Vladimir Putin’s army invaded, by November 2022 they had expelled his forces from the north and north-east of their country, as well as from the part of Kherson province on the Dnipro River’s right bank.</p>
<p>The current mood of pessimism stems partly from Kyiv’s failure to punch through Russia’s defences in the south during the summer-autumn counteroffensive of 2023. No less important has been the doubts about continuing American military aid. President Joe Biden’s request to Congress for another $61 billion in assistance for Ukraine — most of it military — seems dead in the water thanks to dogged opposition in the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/13/us/politics/ukraine-aid-bill-house.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">House of Representatives</a> from legislators loyal to Donald Trump.</p>
<p>This is already having repercussions in Ukraine: the fall of Avdiivka last week, representing Russia’s greatest territorial gain in nine months, has been directly linked to <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/russia-avdiivka-full-control-as-kyiv-decries-artificial-deficit-in-ammo/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">dwindling supplies of ammunition</a>. Zelensky referred to this shortage as an “artificial deficit” created by slow delivery of supplies, and continued military support from the United States, supplemented by Britain and Europe, could still help Ukraine regain momentum, even if not this year.</p>
<p>However, if American support falters or ceases, Britain and Europe have the power not only to keep Ukraine in the fight, but, eventually, to help it make the advances needed to reach a favourable negotiated settlement. The second of these two outcomes will require Europe to rethink its military role in ways that it has never had to do since the formation of Nato in 1949. But if it proves up to the task, the repercussions will extend well beyond this conflict. Before the invasion, Russia was widely heralded as one of the world’s two superpowers. In the event that Ukraine can regain at least some additional territory and bring the war to a satisfactory end, Russia will forever be seen in a different light: as a threat Europe can manage largely on its own.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;"><strong>The ground game</strong></p>
<figure id="attachment_491121" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-491121" style="width: 1024px" class="wp-caption aligncenter"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="size-full wp-image-491121" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/GettyImages-2001550314-1.jpg" alt="" width="1024" height="683" srcset="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/GettyImages-2001550314-1.jpg 1024w, https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/GettyImages-2001550314-1.jpg?resize=300,200 300w, https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/GettyImages-2001550314-1.jpg?resize=768,512 768w, https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/GettyImages-2001550314-1.jpg?resize=267,178 267w, https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/GettyImages-2001550314-1.jpg?resize=253,169 253w, https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/GettyImages-2001550314-1.jpg?resize=250,167 250w, https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/GettyImages-2001550314-1.jpg?resize=660,440 660w, https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/GettyImages-2001550314-1.jpg?resize=480,320 480w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" /><figcaption id="caption-attachment-491121" class="wp-caption-text">Ukrainian soldiers train in Donetsk (Jose Colon/Anadolu via Getty Images)</figcaption></figure>
<p>That said, there’s no denying that Ukraine’s 2023 counteroffensive failed. It didn’t break through the Russian-held part of Zaporizhzhia province (on the Dnipro’s left bank) to Tokmak (an important supply hub) let alone to Melitopol further south. Russia had prepared well to foil that gambit, relying on the kind of extensive, layered trenches and fortifications — the so-called “Surovikin lines” — not seen in Europe for <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/ukraines-offensive-operations-shifting-offense-defense-balance" target="_blank" rel="noopener">a generation</a>.</p>
<p>Moreover, Russia’s increased investment in <a href="https://euromaidanpress.com/2023/10/11/russian-drones-e-warfare-stymie-ukrainian-advance-near-robotyne/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">drones</a> helped batter Ukraine’s armoured and mechanised brigades, while the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/graphics/UKRAINE-CRISIS/MAPS/klvygwawavg/#four-factors-that-stalled-ukraines-counteroffensive" target="_blank" rel="noopener">improved accuracy of its artillery and helicopter gunships</a> disabled Ukraine’s American-supplied mine-clearing systems. Belying stereotypes of a rigid and hyper-centralised force, the Russian army also learned from its mistakes, adapting better <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/a477d3f1-8c7e-4520-83b0-572ad674c28e" target="_blank" rel="noopener">electronic countermeasures</a> against the US-supplied HIMARS missiles and Excalibur artillery shells. During my most recent visit to Ukraine, in December, a drone operator described the advantage Russia had acquired in FPV (first-person view) drone variants, and its vastly improved electronic jamming technology — its new <a href="https://defence-industry.eu/izdeliye-55-zala-aero-introduces-new-type-of-loitering-munition/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Izdeliye-55</a> miniature FPV quadcopter, is reputedly all but immune to jamming.</p>
<p>Still, the fact that Ukraine — which lacked sufficient airpower, long-range missiles and general materiel — failed to retake swathes of territory during its counteroffensive remains the war’s “dog bites man” story. The true surprise is that Russia is not only still fighting Ukraine two years after invading it<strong>,</strong> confident of a quick victory, but that it barely shifted the frontlines in the whole of 2023. Its net gain was a bare <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2023/09/28/world/europe/russia-ukraine-war-map-front-line.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">180 square miles</a> (for comparison, Kyiv, Ukraine’s capital, covers <a href="https://worldpopulationreview.com/world-cities/kiev-population" target="_blank" rel="noopener">324 square miles</a>), and that owed mainly to advances in and around Bakhmut, a town for which it fought for <a href="https://www.vox.com/world-politics/2023/5/22/23732453/bakhmut-ukraine-war-russia-wagner-zelenskyy-counteroffensive" target="_blank" rel="noopener">nine months</a>, relying heavily on prisoners, a private army, and various militias. The conquest of Avdiivka similarly required four months of fighting and some 20,000 casualties, notwithstanding Russia’s massive numerical superiority in weaponry (8:1 in artillery shells, for example).</p>
<p>Despite Russia’s vast and continuing advantage in every measure typically used to assay military balance between states, it has failed to transform that superiority into juggernaut-like results. A vivid example can be found in the small <a href="https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-war-dnieper-river-kherson-7d1fe4cfa8b748e6736c9f2b620ff618" target="_blank" rel="noopener">beachheads</a> Ukraine established in mid-November on the Russian-held bank of Kherson province, mainly in Krynky village, after a river crossing under heavy fire. Though Ukraine had only a small number of marines and no armour or artillery on site to speak of, it has preserved or extended the area it holds through <a href="https://twitter.com/defencehq/status/1735224074391998689?s=61&amp;t=JtSYG9R_Q7o2DMbLAoUFSg" target="_blank" rel="noopener">repeated</a> Russian assaults, killed numerous troops, and destroyed many armoured vehicles. All this from what a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/12/16/world/europe/ukraine-kherson-river-russia.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em>New York Times</em> analysis</a> painted as Kyiv’s Krynky “suicide mission”.</p>
<p>In Russian media, there is no such misconception: one military blogger lambasted the “idiots” who kept sending armour to Krynky, only to have “90%” of it destroyed; others <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2024/01/09/russians-lives-are-temporary-in-the-drone-kill-zone-around-krynky-90-percent-of-vehicles-dont-come-back/?sh=4af7fdd14291" target="_blank" rel="noopener">demanded the sacking</a> of Colonel General Mikhail Teplinsky, the army commander in Kherson. And Krynky is not an aberration — Russia’s equipment losses have been remarkably high elsewhere. Returning to <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2023/12/20/to-keep-down-losses-and-prolong-the-war-russia-is-holding-back-its-tanks-and-sending-infantry-to-attack-alone/?sh=24a3d32e7d61" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Avdiivka</a>, one single extended assault <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/11/20/world/europe/ukrainian-soldiers-stalemate-avdiivka.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">in November</a> led to the destruction of 100 Russian tanks and 250 armoured vehicles.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/01/the-world-should-fear-2024/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/01/the-world-should-fear-2024/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/GettyImages-1731674859-1-scaled-e1703766412199.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/01/the-world-should-fear-2024/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/01/the-world-should-fear-2024/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The world should fear 2024</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/01/the-world-should-fear-2024/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Aris Roussinos </a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Russia has also suffered many more casualties than one would have expected against a much weaker opponent: according to British estimates, <a href="https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/uk-estimates-over-300000-russian-military-casualties/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">302,000</a> by late November plus “tens of thousands of deserters”. By contrast, US <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/08/18/us/politics/ukraine-russia-war-casualties.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">intelligence estimates</a> around 70,000 Ukrainian troops had been killed and 120,000 wounded by last autumn. (This would bely Russia’s <a href="https://tass.com/world/1656469" target="_blank" rel="noopener">implausible claim</a>, widely circulated, that 300,000-350,000 Ukrainian troops have <em>died</em>.)</p>
<p>The losses in some Russian units are devastating. Russia’s elite <a href="https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2023/02/14/elite-russian-marine-unit-nearly-destroyed-near-ukraines-vuhledar-a80220" target="_blank" rel="noopener">155th Guards Naval Infantry Brigade</a> was almost eviscerated when Russian commanders insisted upon their habitual “meat wave” assaults on Vuhledar — so high were the losses that the marines turned on their generals. A year into the war, the losses of the 155th at Vuhledar and elsewhere were so bad that the unit had to be reconstituted <a href="https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-24-2023" target="_blank" rel="noopener">multiple times</a>.</p>
<p>Russia’s overall equipment losses have also been staggering. The <a href="https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/02/attack-on-europe-documenting-equipment.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Oryx data base</a>, which tracks destroyed, abandoned, or captured stock, lists as of mid-February: 2,735 tanks; 3,421 infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs); and 1,020 artillery systems. Tank losses have been severe enough to require the requisitioning of models dating back decades. <a href="https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/02/attack-on-europe-documenting-ukrainian.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Ukraine’s corresponding losses</a> have been significantly lower: 742 tanks, 848 IFVs, and 472 artillery pieces. Russia had an overwhelming superiority in tanks when the war began but, because of these losses, <a href="https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2023/07/06/ukraines-tank-numbers-now-equal-russias-analysis-a81759" target="_blank" rel="noopener">by July</a> the two armies were nearly at parity.</p>
<p>Some of Russia’s best weapons — the <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/russia-s400-air-defense-missiles-crimea-ukraine-1828058" target="_blank" rel="noopener">S-400</a> air defence system, the supposedly unstoppable <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/ukraine-and-the-kinzhal-dont-believe-the-hypersonic-hype/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Kinzhal</a> ballistic missile, and <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W6ulOlrrpxE" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Yastreb-AV</a> counterbattery radar, which costs $1.5 billion and was destroyed soon after its first appearance — have not lived up to their vaunted reputation. Ditto the famed, top-of-the-line <a href="https://defence-blog.com/russia-announces-armata-tanks-pullback-from-ukraine/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">T-14 Armata tank</a>, withdrawn from the battlefield soon after its debut. Western weaponry has been essential here. Without American and European tanks, air-defence missiles, anti-tank guided missiles, multiple rockets systems, and cruise missiles (the Anglo-French Storm Shadow/SCALP) Ukraine could never have withstood the Russian army’s assault, much less have inflicted such large losses on it.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;"><strong>Russia at sea</strong></p>
<figure id="attachment_491118" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-491118" style="width: 1024px" class="wp-caption aligncenter"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="wp-image-491118 size-full" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/GettyImages-475257257.jpg" alt="" width="1024" height="645" srcset="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/GettyImages-475257257.jpg 1024w, https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/GettyImages-475257257.jpg?resize=300,189 300w, https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/GettyImages-475257257.jpg?resize=768,484 768w, https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/GettyImages-475257257.jpg?resize=267,168 267w, https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/GettyImages-475257257.jpg?resize=253,159 253w, https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/GettyImages-475257257.jpg?resize=250,157 250w, https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/GettyImages-475257257.jpg?resize=660,416 660w, https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/GettyImages-475257257.jpg?resize=480,302 480w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" /><figcaption id="caption-attachment-491118" class="wp-caption-text">Russian sailors in the bay of Sevastopol (VIKTOR DRACHEV/AFP via Getty Images)</figcaption></figure>
<p>Perhaps even more surprisingly, though it lacks a fully-fledged navy, Ukraine has <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2023/12/23/ukraine-navy-black-sea-uk-royal-support/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">severely hampered</a> Russia’s Black Sea Fleet, based in Crimea. Using missiles, aerial and naval drones, and commando raids, it has hit the Fleet and its infrastructure so many times (beginning with the triumphant early sinking of its flagship, the <em>Moskva</em>, in April 2022, using a homemade R-360 Neptune missile) that Moscow has had to relocate ships and submarines — in some cases all the way to Russia’s mainland Krasnodar region.</p>
<p>But Ukraine targeted the latter as well, damaging one <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-66402046" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Ropucha-class landing ship</a> in August, before attacking the <a href="https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-war-fcab4c6f0bd3738b34f9032cbef0833f" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Black Sea Fleet’s Sevastopol headquarters</a> in September, claiming to have killed <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/09/25/europe/russia-commander-killed-ukraine-attack-intl/index.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">34 officers</a>. The Storm Shadow/SCALP cruise missiles have been indispensable here and, in all, Ukraine claimed to have damaged or disabled about a third of the Fleet’s vessels: 25 ships and one submarine according to most recent figures.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/11/israel-has-no-plan-for-gaza/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/11/israel-has-no-plan-for-gaza/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/GettyImages-1767061621-e1701089343239.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/11/israel-has-no-plan-for-gaza/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author </span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/11/israel-has-no-plan-for-gaza/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Israel has no plan for Gaza</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/11/israel-has-no-plan-for-gaza/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Rajan Menon </a></p></div></a></div>
<p>These victories have had several repercussions, not least in sowing discord at the top of the Russian leadership. One attack early this month on the Crimean airbase at Belbek killed air force <a href="https://www.kyivpost.com/post/27514" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Lt Gen. Alexander Tatarenko</a>, before Ukraine sunk another Ropucha-class landing ship (the <em>Caesar Kunikov</em>) using a swarm of sea drones, precipitating <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russian-bloggers-say-fleet-commander-fired-after-latest-ukrainian-ship-attack-2024-02-15/">the firing</a> of the Fleet’s commander, Admiral Viktor Sokolov, on 15 February. Any proper naval strategy these commanders might have developed has also been sabotaged. It has become much harder for Russia’s Black Sea Fleet ships to fire cruise missiles at Ukrainian cities, forestalling wintertime strikes on Ukraine’s electrical network.</p>
<p>Ukraine has also managed to maintain a sea corridor for food exports from its own Black Sea ports (even after Russia exited the <a href="https://www.ifpri.org/blog/russia-terminates-black-sea-grain-initiative-whats-next-ukraine-and-world" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Black Sea</a> grain deal) despite persistent <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/why-russia-blocking-ukraines-food-exports" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Russian attacks</a> on its port infrastructure. Earnings from food have <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/infographics/how-the-russian-invasion-of-ukraine-has-further-aggravated-the-global-food-crisis/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">dropped significantly</a> since the war started, but a blockade would have dealt the cash-strapped country a body blow. By January though, Ukraine’s seaborne exports (not just in grain, but all shipping) actually <a href="https://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-economy/3823584-ukraine-reaches-prewar-volumes-of-exports-by-sea-shmyhal.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">reached pre-war levels</a>.<strong> </strong></p>
<p style="text-align: center;"><strong>“An army marches on its stomach”</strong></p>
<figure id="attachment_491119" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-491119" style="width: 1024px" class="wp-caption aligncenter"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="wp-image-491119 size-full" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/GettyImages-1986215307.jpg" alt="" width="1024" height="683" srcset="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/GettyImages-1986215307.jpg 1024w, https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/GettyImages-1986215307.jpg?resize=300,200 300w, https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/GettyImages-1986215307.jpg?resize=768,512 768w, https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/GettyImages-1986215307.jpg?resize=267,178 267w, https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/GettyImages-1986215307.jpg?resize=253,169 253w, https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/GettyImages-1986215307.jpg?resize=250,167 250w, https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/GettyImages-1986215307.jpg?resize=660,440 660w, https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/GettyImages-1986215307.jpg?resize=480,320 480w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" /><figcaption id="caption-attachment-491119" class="wp-caption-text">New recruits of the Aidar Battalion (Wojciech Grzedzinski/For The Washington Post via Getty Images)</figcaption></figure>
<p>This aphorism, attributed by some to Frederick the Great and others to Napoleon, highlights how essential supplies from the rear are for success at the front — not just armour and artillery, but food, fuel, and medicine. Ukraine has done a remarkable job of starving Russia of these supplies. To take an example, the 12-mile-long Kerch Strait Bridge was under repair for months following the October 2022 truck bomb explosion engineered by Ukraine. They then attacked the bridge again <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/07/16/europe/russia-crimea-bridge-intl-hnk/index.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">last July</a>, this time with sea drones. Though bridge’s railway tracks remained intact this time, the damage to the roadway necessitated lane closures until November. Fears of attack also led to traffic suspensions on the bridge at least three times in 2023.</p>
<p>Ukraine similarly struck the <a href="https://www.kyivpost.com/post/20401" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Chonhar Bridge</a>, which connects north Crimea to Kherson province, last <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/ukraine-strikes-bridge-supplying-russian-troops-56564b0b" target="_blank" rel="noopener">June</a>, <a href="https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2023/07/29/7413419/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">July</a> and <a href="https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2023/08/6/7414429/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">August</a>. And other military-related Crimean sites targeted include <a href="https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/news-krym-saky-aerodrom-udar-povitryani-syly-zsu-/32763492.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Saky</a>, <a href="https://www.euronews.com/2022/10/29/ukraine-war-massive-sevastopol-drone-attack-russia-on-nuclear-threshold-clocks-controversy" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Yevpatoria</a>, and the <a href="https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-war-crimea-shipyard-d83ad8ea77d6263eca27d93e738bb8e2" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Zaliv shipyard</a> in Kerch. These strikes have disrupted supplies headed to Russian forces in the south via Crimea, the main conduit, forcing Moscow to rely more on the <a href="https://www.wsj.com/story/the-strategic-importance-of-the-russia-controlled-land-bridge-in-ukraine-832d0728" target="_blank" rel="noopener">land corridor</a> it created after the invasion between Crimea and south-western Donbas. Yet that passageway too has come under Ukrainian fire. On top of that, in January and February, Ukrainian drones struck Russia’s energy infrastructure — loading terminals, oil refineries, and storage sites — in the <a href="https://www.wsj.com/world/europe/ukraine-strikes-russian-fuel-terminal-on-baltic-sea-in-long-range-attack-76692dd5" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Baltic Sea</a>, the <a href="https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-war-oil-depot-attack-fire-cc20241267991aad0dac7260e350c48f" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Bryansk region</a>, and in <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraines-sbu-hits-russias-volgograd-oil-refinery-drone-attack-source-2024-02-03/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Volgograd</a> and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/russian-oil-facilities-hit-by-drone-attacks-fires-2024-01-29/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Ryazan</a>.</p>
<p>A <a href="https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2023/02/will-logistics-be-russias-undoing-in-ukraine.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">RAND analysis</a> recently asked whether logistics would prove to be “Russia’s undoing in Ukraine”. This much is clear: an important Russian weakness has been laid bare. This week, <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-68364924" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Western officials claimed</a> that Russia was suffering from severe shortages of ammunition and weapons of its own. And, apart from making it harder to sustain prolonged offensives, supply shortfalls have deprived new recruits of the basics — in some cases family members have had to provide essentials. Morale has therefore become <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2022/11/17/europe/russia-soldiers-desert-battlefield-intl-cmd/index.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">a chronic problem</a> for Russian commanders, and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/wagners-prigozhin-accuses-russian-top-brass-treason-2023-02-21/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">played a role</a> in the Wagner Group’s June rebellion.<strong> </strong></p>
<p style="text-align: center;"><b>A vision of victory</b></p>
<figure id="attachment_491120" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-491120" style="width: 1024px" class="wp-caption aligncenter"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="size-full wp-image-491120" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/GettyImages-1930156420.jpg" alt="" width="1024" height="683" srcset="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/GettyImages-1930156420.jpg 1024w, https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/GettyImages-1930156420.jpg?resize=300,200 300w, https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/GettyImages-1930156420.jpg?resize=768,512 768w, https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/GettyImages-1930156420.jpg?resize=267,178 267w, https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/GettyImages-1930156420.jpg?resize=253,169 253w, https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/GettyImages-1930156420.jpg?resize=250,167 250w, https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/GettyImages-1930156420.jpg?resize=660,440 660w, https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/GettyImages-1930156420.jpg?resize=480,320 480w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" /><figcaption id="caption-attachment-491120" class="wp-caption-text">Zelensky meets President of the EU Commission Ursula von der Leyen (Ukrainian Presidency/Handout/Anadolu via Getty Images)</figcaption></figure>
<p>The Russian army is certainly not, as they say in Texas, all hat and no cattle. But, amid the negative coverage of Ukraine’s counteroffensive, its considerable flaws and failures have been overlooked. Still, the Ukrainian army’s successes would have been impossible absent the massive inflow of Western weaponry — some $100 billion since the invasion — and in particular the US capacity to send close to half, in <a href="https://www.ifw-kiel.de/topics/war-against-ukraine/ukraine-support-tracker/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">dollar terms</a>, of what its Nato allies have provided. But given the Russian army performance in Ukraine, the oft-heard claims that Ukraine’s defeat would expose Nato to attack has become dubious.</p>
<p>To be clear: Russia retains a formidable army that can still do considerable damage to Ukraine. What’s more, Ukraine’s vulnerability has increased because of the mounting shortages its forces now face and the uncertainty surrounding future American military assistance. Despite Russian losses, Putin has not seriously called for negotiations. On the contrary, he <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CYvyFv0h9Ak" target="_blank" rel="noopener">stated recently</a> that the goals of the “special military operation” remained unchanged, would be pursued till victory, and that Western support for Ukraine would eventually dissipate.</p>
<p>Nor have the war’s human and material costs sparked sustained mass discontent among Russians, let alone threatened Putin’s grip on power. He seems confident that time is on his side. To push Ukraine into negotiating now would amount to decreeing its partition — and at a moment when Russia, despite assertions to the contrary, is hardly on a roll. That said, maximalist territorial goals — the ones originally advocated by the Zelensky government and its strongest Western supporters — will likely prove as unrealistic as betting on Putin’s political demise.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">“To push Ukraine into negotiating now would amount to decreeing its partition”</div>
<p>But an outcome in which Ukraine retakes even more of the territory it has lost since February 2022 would still be a major victory and, if it comes to negotiations, Kyiv will be in a stronger position if it has gained more ground. It should demonstrate to Moscow its readiness to fight on: by mobilising its planned <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/6ba4ae1c-005f-4242-80c2-e1e7f3f7bd88" target="_blank" rel="noopener">500,000 new soldiers</a> and breaking up the corrupt, murky, and intricate system that helps men <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-67120904" target="_blank" rel="noopener">dodge military service</a> (you can find plenty of these fellows in Kyiv’s trendy restaurants). The Ukrainian army must reconstitute itself and adopt a strategy of what Mykola Bielieskov calls “<a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/paving-the-way-for-putins-defeat-ukraine-must-prioritize-defense-in-2024/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">active defence</a>”; not mount a major offensive that would risk high losses in troops and materiel, something it can ill afford. Russia may have lost more soldiers than Ukraine, but it also has a far larger pool of military-aged men to draw from.</p>
<p>Further gains by Ukraine will require not only Congress’s approval of the 2024 aid package, but also Europe’s willingness to play a much bigger role. But, having long neglected its defence industries because of the ironclad American military guarantee, Europe cannot step in quickly. To take an example, the Europe Union was supposed to deliver <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/eu-will-only-supply-half-promised-shells-ukraine-by-march-borrell-2024-01-31/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">one million artillery shells</a> by March; so far it has sent half that amount and expects to meet its target only by the end of this year. At best, an increase in European help can keep Ukraine in the fight for the rest of this year so that a larger flow of weapons from Europe down the line will enable it to make bigger advances. That will not happen easily or quickly, which means that Ukraine is vulnerable in the near term.</p>
<p>But Europe does have the means to begin boosting military spending and investing more in its defence industries — and it should, if not only to gain a measure of strategic autonomy and reduce its generation-long reliance on America.</p>
<p>Sheer geography dictates that Ukraine’s fate will always matter more to Europe than it will to the United States, which will focus increasingly on China in the years to come. In addition to arming Ukraine, Europe should eventually take the lead in training and equipping Ukraine’s armed forces so that Kyiv has the capacity to adopt a policy of long-term, armed neutrality. Some describe this as the “Israel model”, though <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/26999271" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Finland’s defence strategy</a> from the end of the Second World War until it joined Nato in April may be the better comparison. Alternatively, a subset of Nato states could guarantee Ukraine’s security, but on the understanding that any resort to force against Russia to defend Ukraine would not trigger <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Article V</a> of the 1949 Nato Treaty, the commitment to collective defence. This would scarcely substitute for Nato membership, but it would give Ukraine more protection than armed neutrality.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/11/putin-has-enabled-ukrainian-nationhood/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/11/putin-has-enabled-ukrainian-nationhood/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/GettyImages-95452475-1.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/11/putin-has-enabled-ukrainian-nationhood/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/11/putin-has-enabled-ukrainian-nationhood/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Putin has enabled Ukrainian nationhood</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/11/putin-has-enabled-ukrainian-nationhood/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Helen Thompson </a></p></div></a></div>
<p>If the uncertainty regarding future American military aid to Ukraine marks a turning point for Kyiv, it does the same for Europe. It is often said that Europe cannot organise defence arrangements of its own because a large, disparate collection of states cannot act in consort. But that is belied by the centralisation the European Union and its associated institutions have undergone. And the EU has already taken some steps toward arming Ukraine autonomously: the <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/european-peace-facility/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">European Peace Facility</a>, established in March 2021, has provided Kyiv more than $5 billion in war-related aid.</p>
<p>The political obstacles to greater European defence autonomy and the challenges of ramping up European defence industries are well-known — Europe’s leaders have never looked less united around its continental institutions. Yet given the combination of the shortages Ukraine faces, the doubts about continued assistance from the United States, and the prospect of Donald Trump’s return to the White House, Europeans ought to consider charting a new course, one that does not require them to dispense with Nato, but adapts it to the present. The impediment to such a change is not a lack of means, but the inertia created by an entrenched way of thinking that makes change seem impossible. The alternative risks not only Ukraine’s long-term future, but Europe’s too.</p>
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					<title>Ukraine&#8217;s new cure for the horrors of war: Ketamine and MDMA</title>
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										<unherd:main_theme>Science</unherd:main_theme>
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						<![CDATA[Alexander Beiner]]>
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							<![CDATA['To Fathom Hell or Soar Angelic, just take a pinch of psychedelic.' Bulent Kilic/AFP/Getty Images]]>
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							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Alexander Beiner</strong> is the author of <a href="https://www.amazon.co.uk/Bigger-Picture-Psychedelics-Sense-World/dp/1788179153" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em>The Bigger Picture: How psychedelics can help us make sense of the world</em></a>. His Substack is <a href="https://beiner.substack.com/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">The Bigger Picture</a>.</p>
]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_handle>AlexanderBeiner</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is the author of <a href="https://www.amazon.co.uk/Bigger-Picture-Psychedelics-Sense-World/dp/1788179153" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em>The Bigger Picture: How psychedelics can help us make sense of the world</em></a>. His Substack is <a href="https://beiner.substack.com/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">The Bigger Picture</a>.]]>
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										<pubDate>Thu, 15 Feb 2024 00:00:50 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Thu, 15 Feb 2024 13:47:22 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[ketamine]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[mdma]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Mental health]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[psychedelics]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[Ukraine war]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[War]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://old.unherd.com/?p=498432</guid>
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								<![CDATA[Drugs could make men better warriors]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>Can ketamine and MDMA help Ukrainian soldiers cope with the horrors of war? Given the urgent nationwide mental-health crisis, the Ukrainian government is warming to the radical idea. And some army units are already experimenting. The nation could soon find itself on the front line of a global drug therapy revolution.</p>
<p>So far, Dr Vladislav Matrenitsky, a pioneer of psychedelic-assisted psychotherapy based in Kyiv, has <a href="https://www.economist.com/europe/2024/01/15/a-new-therapy-for-ukraines-scarred-soldiers-ketamine" target="_blank" rel="noopener">treated around 300 patients</a> suffering from depression, PTSD, or anxiety with ketamine therapy. A growing number of them have been soldiers, including a military psychologist, Ihor Kholodilo, who was left unable to speak after his jeep was hit by a Russian tank shell. After six sessions of ketamine therapy, his stammer was cured. Since then, he <a href="https://www.economist.com/europe/2024/01/15/a-new-therapy-for-ukraines-scarred-soldiers-ketamine" target="_blank" rel="noopener">claims to have referred</a> an elite Ukrainian special-forces unit for the treatment.</p>
<p>Though using ketamine to treat mental illness has been legal in Ukraine since 2017, MDMA and psilocybin — the active molecule in magic mushrooms — are still banned. But Kseniya Vozsnityna, director of Forest Glade, a government military-rehabilitation centre, <a href="https://www.economist.com/europe/2024/01/15/a-new-therapy-for-ukraines-scarred-soldiers-ketamine" target="_blank" rel="noopener">believes</a> that a pilot project using MDMA and psilocybin could be approved within six months. If so, Ukraine would be in good company. Australian clinicians became the first to treat patients with MDMA and psilocybin at the start of this year, while MDMA-assisted therapy could become a treatment for PTSD in the US this year, with the Food and Drug Administration in the final stages of approval.</p>
<p>As a researcher in the field, and having run legal psilocybin retreats, I&#8217;ve seen first-hand how careful use of psychedelics can help people with life-long depression or crippling PTSD. And when I spoke to psychiatrist and psychedelic researcher Simon Ruffell, he said that his ongoing study giving combat veterans Ayahuasca in Shipibo ceremonies in Peru is showing promising results: of the 28 participants with PTSD, none met the study’s criteria for PTSD after treatment.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/05/can-psychedelics-cure-depression/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/05/can-psychedelics-cure-depression/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/GettyImages-144855375-1-1.jpg?w=298" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/05/can-psychedelics-cure-depression/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/05/can-psychedelics-cure-depression/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Can psychedelics cure depression?</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/05/can-psychedelics-cure-depression/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Flo Read</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Yet psychedelic therapy is a complicated process. An experience with psilocybin or MDMA might last eight hours, often with two therapists present for a single participant. During the trip, participants might come face to face with memories, feelings or thoughts from which they had disconnected and work through them; or they might have a powerful “mystical-type experience”. After the trip, they are encouraged to make sense of the profound insights and realisations they’ve had and integrate them into their life in a meaningful way.</p>
<p>In a war zone, however, drug therapy raises complex ethical questions. For instance, should ketamine or MDMA be used to improve performance in battle? Kholodilo argues that not only would psychedelics stop depression spreading through the trenches, but it could also help frontline soldiers overcome their paralysing fear of death. The appeal of this isn&#8217;t hard to glean. As Oleh Orlov, chair of the Ukrainian Psychedelic Research Association, told me: “We are in the middle of a huge war, so we kind of need people recovered. We don&#8217;t have the luxury to just go home and recover.”</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">“Should ketamine or MDMA be used to improve performance in battle?&#8221;</div>
<p>It wouldn’t be the first time that psychedelics have been considered for use in warfare. In the paranoid climate of the Cold War, the CIA grew obsessed with the idea that LSD could help with espionage and psychological warfare. Between 1953 and 1973, it carried out operation MK-Ultra, a secret and illicit human experimentation programme aimed at discovering new methods of mind control and interrogation. The full scope of this shameful operation was laid bare in 1974, when it emerged that the CIA had drugged unwitting citizens with LSD to see if it could be used to force confessions. The truth is, psychedelics are far too complex and unpredictable for these purposes, but that discovery came at the cost of broken minds and shattered lives.</p>
<p>That said, there is no evidence that Ukraine is planning to use psychedelics or ketamine for any other purpose than mental-health treatment. And Orlov hasn’t heard of anyone in the government or the clinical community promoting psychedelics for use in battle. His NGO is focused entirely on the spiralling veteran mental-health crisis — although he does view the introduction of psychedelic therapy for veterans as a matter of national security. Ruffell, meanwhile, is sceptical that drug therapy could be used to fortify Ukrainian warriors, telling me that most of the veterans he&#8217;s treated come out of their Ayahuasca experience looking for more peace in their lives, not a return to the front line.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/01/the-psychedelic-industrial-complex-is-evil/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/01/the-psychedelic-industrial-complex-is-evil/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/fog-man.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/01/the-psychedelic-industrial-complex-is-evil/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/01/the-psychedelic-industrial-complex-is-evil/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Is the psychedelic industrial complex evil?</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/01/the-psychedelic-industrial-complex-is-evil/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Ed Prideaux</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>But such treatments are still a long way off for most Ukrainians. And in desperation, many are starting to self-medicate. Dr Jack Allocca, a neuroscientist and pharmacologist at the University of Melbourne, went to Ukraine last summer to interview soldiers, clinicians, and Ukrainian civilians about medical and recreational drug use. He described a hedonistic and chaotic scene in Kyiv and Odessa, with Ukrainians “using partying as group therapy” and taking a wide variety of drugs. The black market has been flooded with the usual recreational drugs you’d find in most cities, as well as obscure psychedelic research chemicals. These include drugs in the DOx family, which are chemically related to MDMA but highly potent and more psychedelic, with a trip lasting for 48 hours. Allocca was surprised to see such drugs on the streets, and described it as a live experiment by drug cartels on a traumatised population.</p>
<p>The result of all this self-medication, Allocca says, is “very messy”. One person he interviewed was overcome with guilt and grief during his trip because he feared he was going to be drafted. Another who had managed to dodge the draft got stuck in a guilt-ridden thought-loop. This is hardly a healing experience. And it’s worth emphasising that, in order to be effective, psychedelics and ketamine have to be combined with a therapeutic practice. The psychedelic experience is highly contextual, and indigenous cultures that have used them constructively have always done so in combination with meaningful rituals that give the trip a wider purpose. It is important that we do this as well.</p>
<p>There is, however, a good chance that Ukraine will become a hub for psychedelic research in the coming years. According to Orlov, Ukraine’s drug enforcement agency isn’t averse to rescheduling psilocybin and MDMA in a medical context, though the Minister of Health has requested more clinical data. A local pharmaceutical company has offered to make MDMA for $10 per dose, far less than it costs in the US or UK, so that small Ukrainian trials may begin.</p>
<p>But in the fog of war, no one can be sure what the future will hold. After all, in a nation torn by violence, psychedelic therapy can both offer profound healing and, when used unchecked, lead to disorder. Humphry Osmond, who coined the phrase “psychedelic”, may have put it best when he wrote to Aldous Huxley in the Fifties: “To Fathom Hell or Soar Angelic, just take a pinch of psychedelic.”</p>
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					<title>Peace in Ukraine has never seemed further away</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2024/01/peace-in-ukraine-has-never-seemed-further-away/?edition=us</link>
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						<![CDATA[Aris Roussinos]]>
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							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Aris Roussinos</strong> is an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist and a former war reporter.</p>
]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_handle>arisroussinos</unherd:twitter_handle>
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						<![CDATA[ is an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist and a former war reporter.]]>
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										<pubDate>Tue, 16 Jan 2024 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
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								<![CDATA[Zelenksyy's dream of outright victory is over ]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Two years ago, it momentarily looked like the Ukraine war might be concluded as soon as it had begun. As Zelenskyy’s former advisor Oleksiy Arestovych revealed in his <a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/01/oleksiy-arestovych-zelenskyys-challenger/">interview with </a></span><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/01/oleksiy-arestovych-zelenskyys-challenger/"><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">UnHerd</span></i></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">, when he returned from the Istanbul peace negotiations with Russia in April 2022, his team cracked open the champagne to celebrate. The talks had been “completely successful”, he said, with 90% of contentious issues resolved in a manner broadly advantageous to Ukraine. All that was left was for Zelenskyy and Putin to meet in person a few days later to hammer out the final size of the post-war Ukrainian army, and ink the final deal. And then everything changed: “Something changed in Zelenskyy absolutely during this [period]. And historians have to find the answer to what happened.” </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The events of those fateful five days are still obscure and controversial, with two different narratives offered. In the first, Zelenskyy’s visit to the scene of the Kyiv suburb of Bucha, where occupying Russian troops had carried out </span><a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/04/21/ukraine-russian-forces-trail-death-bucha" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">grisly atrocities</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> against captive Ukrainian civilians, hardened the president’s resolve to keep fighting, while making peace talks politically untenable for the enraged Ukrainian public. “The President was shocked about Bucha, all of us were shocked about Bucha,” says Arestovych. “He started to think how could he provide negotiations and meet Putin directly after this? His face completely changed when he went to Bucha and saw what had happened.” </span></p>
<div><div style="left: 0; width: 100%; height: 0; position: relative; padding-bottom: 56.25%;"><iframe src="//cdn.iframe.ly/api/iframe?url=https%3A%2F%2Fyoutu.be%2FsehuAOw0-NI&amp;key=357d953055da7177194e1a84a2d8a5a3&amp;playerjs=1" style="border: 0; top: 0; left: 0; width: 100%; height: 100%; position: absolute;" allowfullscreen scrolling="no" allow="encrypted-media; accelerometer; gyroscope; picture-in-picture; autoplay"></iframe></div></div>
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<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">But in the second narrative — </span><a href="https://disinfo.detector.media/en/post/how-propaganda-used-the-interview-of-the-former-israeli-prime-minister-to-spread-disinformation" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">made much of by Russia propaganda</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">, though first floated by </span><a href="https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2022/05/5/7344206/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">the Ukrainian press</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">, and latterly by former Israeli prime minister </span><a href="https://jacobin.com/2023/02/ukraine-russia-war-naftali-bennett-negotiations-peace" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Naftali Bennett</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> and Ukraine’s </span><a href="https://www.newsweek.com/russia-offered-end-war-if-ukraine-dropped-nato-bid-kyiv-official-1847373" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">former Deputy Foreign Minister David Arakhamia</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> who were both privy to the negotiations — Boris Johnson’s unexpected trip to Kyiv somehow changed the war’s course. “A lot of people say Prime Minister Johnson came to Kyiv and declined these direct negotiations with Russia,” Arestovych volunteers, “But I don&#8217;t know exactly: is it true or false? This is a problem. Yes, yes, he came to Kyiv but nobody knows except I think Mr Zelenskyy and Boris Johnson himself what they spoke about.” Yet whatever the sequence of events, Ukraine broke off peace talks and the war resumed, with vast casualty numbers on both sides as a result.</span></p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/01/oleksiy-arestovych-zelenskyys-challenger/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/01/oleksiy-arestovych-zelenskyys-challenger/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/GettyImages-1239752871.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/01/oleksiy-arestovych-zelenskyys-challenger/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Full interview transcript </span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/01/oleksiy-arestovych-zelenskyys-challenger/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Oleksiy Arestovych: Zelenskyy&#039;s challenger</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/01/oleksiy-arestovych-zelenskyys-challenger/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Oleksiy Arestovych</a></p></div></a></div>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Could things have worked out differently? In hindsight, the path not taken often looks more appealing than the actual course of events. A passage from Thucydides — like Arestovych, a strategic insider later exiled from his country by its turbulent democratic politics — highlights the uncertainties inherent in whether to commit to war or pursue an unsatisfactory peace. In 425 BC, the greatest military power in Greece, Sparta, found its elite troops unexpectedly humbled by their Athenian rivals at the Battle of Pylos. A Spartan delegation rushed to make terms, warning the Athenians not to let the arrogance of victory cloud their judgment. For “you are now in a position where you can turn your present good fortune to good use, keeping what you hold and gaining honour and reputation besides”, the Spartan envoys declared: “Thus you will avoid the mistake so often made by those who meet with some extraordinary piece of good luck and then go on pressing forward in the hope of more still, because of the very unexpectedness of their first success.” </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">War is, after all, an uncertain business, the Spartans warned, </span><span style="font-weight: 400;">in a speech that could easily be placed in Russian mouths: “Our resources are the same as ever; we simply miscalculated them, and this is a mistake that may be made by everyone.”</span><span style="font-weight: 400;"> In concluding a peace agreement, the Spartans urged, the Athenians could “avoid what may happen later, if you fail to agree with us and afterwards, as is quite possible, suffer a defeat.” But the Athenians, swayed by </span><a href="https://www.livius.org/articles/person/cleon/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">the hawkish demagogue Cleon</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">, rejected the offer: after decades of gruelling and devastating war, and the total destruction of entire armies, the result was total Athenian defeat, and the city’s incorporation into the Spartan imperial system. </span></p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/09/what-nato-sceptics-get-wrong-about-ukraine/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/09/what-nato-sceptics-get-wrong-about-ukraine/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/GettyImages-1253740691-scaled-e1695746432927.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/09/what-nato-sceptics-get-wrong-about-ukraine/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author </span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/09/what-nato-sceptics-get-wrong-about-ukraine/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Nato is weakening America</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/09/what-nato-sceptics-get-wrong-about-ukraine/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Aris Roussinos </a></p></div></a></div>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Perhaps too much was staked on Ukraine’s 2023 offensive, by both Ukraine and its Western backers. Though US intelligence officials </span><span style="font-weight: 400;">warned the offensive would <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/apr/11/us-ukraine-counter-offensive-pentagon-leaks-reveal" target="_blank" rel="noopener">likely fall far short</a> of expectations</span><span style="font-weight: 400;">, American strategy nevertheless centred on enabling Ukraine to make battlefield gains so significant that Kyiv could re-enter peace negotiations with Russia from a position of strength. But, delayed from spring into summer by slow weapons deliveries and the failed defence of Bakhmut, a costly distraction for Kyiv, Ukrainian forces barely made any headway against the Russian fortifications. The offensive was a spectacular failure, and the Russian regime shifted from its mode of panic and internal turmoil in early summer to a new mood of overbearing confidence in the war’s final outcome. In retrospect, the growing difficulties on the battlefield seem to bear out America’s then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff  </span><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/thepost/will-there-be-a-ceasefire-in-ukraine-this-winter/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Mark Milley’s warning</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> that the optimum time for negotiations was the winter of 2022, while Russia was on the back foot. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Now, as Ukraine steels itself for its third year of war, peace has never seemed further away. On the war’s current trajectory, there is no incentive for Russia to enter negotiations: Ukrainians must hope that over the coming year, their </span><a href="https://kyivindependent.com/ukraine-finally-moves-to-fortify-front-line-but-could-it-be-too-little-too-late/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">newly constructed fortifications</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> will batter the Russian army so effectively, just as the Surovikin Line mauled their own offensive, that Putin will reassess his prospects of victory, setting the stage for meaningful talks. While far short of the expansive aims of the war’s earlier stages, it is not a terrible strategy, </span><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/08/will-ukraine-recover-from-its-failed-counteroffensive/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">as I suggested back in the summer</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">. Despite Moscow’s vast advantage in men and industrial production, Russian gains remain costly and incrementally slow: eventually the pain Ukraine inflicts may come to outweigh, in Putin’s mind, the modest territorial gains currently being achieved.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">For sympathetic but realistic analysts, like the </span><a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/paving-the-way-for-putins-defeat-ukraine-must-prioritize-defense-in-2024/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Ukrainian strategist Mykola Bielieskov</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> or the </span><a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2023/dec/27/ukraine-russia-europe-support-kyiv" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">RUSI’s Jack Watling</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">, Ukraine’s best outcome at this stage would be to survive 2024, while marshalling resources for another offensive in 2025, once Russia’s own offensive capacity has been dented by another full year of costly assaults. As Bielieskov observes, “</span><span style="font-weight: 400;">While some observers will inevitably see this stance as pessimistic or even defeatist, it reflects the current realities of the war and represents the most plausible pathway to future success.”</span> <span style="font-weight: 400;">The worst-case scenario, </span><a href="https://archive.is/https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2024/01/09/united-states-congress-ukraine-aid/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Watling notes elsewhere</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">, would be “</span><span style="font-weight: 400;">an immediate cut-off of U.S. aid resulting in the slow deterioration of Ukrainian forces over 2024 and a collapse in 2025 as Russia expands the active front”. This outcome, it must be noted, echoes the Russian defence minister </span><a href="https://www.kyivpost.com/post/22038" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Sergei Shoigu’s prediction</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> that on current trends, Moscow will emerge victorious in 2025. </span></p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/11/putin-has-enabled-ukrainian-nationhood/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/11/putin-has-enabled-ukrainian-nationhood/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/GettyImages-95452475-1.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/11/putin-has-enabled-ukrainian-nationhood/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading </span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/11/putin-has-enabled-ukrainian-nationhood/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Putin has enabled Ukrainian nationhood</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/11/putin-has-enabled-ukrainian-nationhood/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Helen Thompson </a></p></div></a></div>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Over 2024 then, both sides will aim to degrade each other’s forces as much as possible: the staggering casualty rates of the past year look certain to escalate even further. With an ability to strike Ukraine’s home front in a way Kyiv cannot match, Russian forces will also escalate their current campaign against Ukraine’s domestic power infrastructure, aiming to sap civilian will to continue the war. Yet for Arestovych himself, a critic of Zelenskyy’s overall strategy, Ukraine’s situation, while bad, is not yet desperate, telling </span><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">UnHerd</span></i><span style="font-weight: 400;"> that even in the worst-case scenario: “I think it will be not immediate collapse, on the frontline or interior Ukrainian situation. I think it will be getting worse and worse, for half of the year probably.” In such circumstances, more expansive definitions of victory ought to be parked, at least for now. “If we really get into realistic policy, we kind of have to say there’s no way to liberate Donbas within five or 10 years for us,” says Arestovych, “The only goal we have right now is to not give Russia the ability to seize more territory of Ukraine.”</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">With the merciless clarity of hindsight, the uncertain prospects of eventual victory and the challenges to be endured over the coming year will revive debate over whether the collapsed peace negotiations of 2022 were a missed opportunity for Ukraine. Should Kyiv have swallowed the bitterness created by Bucha, and accepted Russia’s less onerous terms back at the beginning of the war? Could Putin have been trusted to stand by the peace deal, and not merely amass resources for a second, meticulously planned invasion some years later? Again, Thucydides may afford a useful parallel. For the classicist and neoconservative pundit Donald Kagan, </span><a href="https://www.amazon.com/Peloponnesian-War-Donald-Kagan/dp/0142004375" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">writing</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">, ironically enough, at the height of American hubris in 2003, the Athenian spurning of the Spartan peace offer was, in the circumstances, not unreasonable. “The Athenians must have understood that… Sparta could resume the war any time it pleased,” Kagan observes, and “had good reason to want more than merely the promise of Spartan good will in the future”. Just as Ukrainian opponents of a peace deal with Russia warned in 2022: “Why should belligerence not take the upper hand again once it was safe?”</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Just the same considerations are in play when assessing Ukraine’s path to constructive peace negotiations over the coming year. That the war will end in a peace deal rather than total battlefield victory now looks the best achievable outcome for Ukraine. What remains to be decided is when, and what peace terms are both politically acceptable and militarily achievable. For Arestovych, Putin’s timeline is clear: “I completely understand Mr. Putin&#8217;s goal [is] to get into the negotiations with us from the very strongest position. They need the weakest position for Ukraine, and the strongest position for Russia, for August or September.” Writing for the isolationist Quincy Institute think tank, the strategic analyst Anatol Lieven echoes the Spartan envoys at Pylos </span><a href="https://responsiblestatecraft.org/russia-ukraine-peace/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">in declaring</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> that “Washington and Kyiv both have a strong incentive to open peace talks while we still retain significant leverage; for if we wait, the terms that we will get in the future are likely to be much worse for Ukraine and much more humiliating for the West.” </span></p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/01/the-world-should-fear-2024/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/01/the-world-should-fear-2024/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/GettyImages-1731674859-1-scaled-e1703766412199.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/01/the-world-should-fear-2024/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author </span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/01/the-world-should-fear-2024/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The world should fear 2024</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/01/the-world-should-fear-2024/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Aris Roussinos </a></p></div></a></div>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Yet echoing Kagan’s hawkishness on Athens’ behalf, the neoconservative Institute for the Study of War think tank (founded, in one of the strange rhymes of American public life, by his daughter-in-law Kimberley Kagan) </span><a href="https://twitter.com/TheStudyofWar/status/1740568404438704259" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">rejects the idea</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">, </span><span style="font-weight: 400;">floated by the </span><a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/12/27/opinion/ukraine-military-aid.html?smid=nytcore-ios-share&amp;referringSource=articleShare" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">New York Times</span></i></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> to the </span><a href="https://x.com/Biz_Ukraine_Mag/status/1743086414634373280?s=20" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">horror of Ukraine’s online supporters</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">, that there is any current prospect for meaningful talks, citing bellicose official Russian statements to the contrary and Putin’s general untrustworthiness. Similarly, as the Russia analyst </span><a href="https://x.com/samagreene/status/1740782922691674118?s=20" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Sam Greene observes</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">, there is a likely incentive for Putin to enter into insincere peace negotiations now, on the basis that the Western will for them to succeed will incline Ukraine’s external backers to taper off military support both as a sign of good faith and a means of pressure on Kyiv. As Greene notes: “The problem is this: For the West, negotiations are a means of ending the war. For Russia, they are a means of winning it,” allowing Putin to drag out the fighting on favourable terms while increasing his leverage on the battlefield.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Each argument, for and against, is both rational and credible: sometimes, all the options are bad. Yet either way, </span><span style="font-weight: 400;">though reviled as defeatism by Ukraine’s more excitable foreign cheerleaders over the past year — as dynamic future historians will debate — the median policy of dogged Ukrainian defence leading to peace negotiations has </span><a href="https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2023/12/27/biden-endgame-ukraine-00133211" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span style="font-weight: 400;">now quietly become</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> the Biden administration’s preferred strategy for resolving the conflict. Dependent until now on a supply of Western arms that is drying up, to survive the difficult year ahead Ukraine will be forced to rely on its own industrial resources to a far greater degree than it has achieved so far. This will not be an easy task given Russia’s growing effectiveness at striking deep within Ukraine from the air. Uncertain of the duration and extent of Western support, increasingly divided over strategy and struggling to raise the vast reserves of manpower necessary to hold the line, the coming year will be fraught with challenges for Kyiv and its Western backers. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Negotiations at some point will be necessary — yet whether the best time for them has already passed, or is yet to come, is a question as unanswerable as it is urgent. For centuries, future historians will also debate the twists and turns that led Europe to this point. Unless a basis for a constructive peace is found, one empire or another will be humbled in Ukraine: which one that will be is still the question to be decided. As the Athenian delegates vainly trying to dissuade the Spartans from declaring war observed: “The longer a war lasts, the more things tend to depend on accidents. Neither you nor we can see into them: We have to abide their outcome in the dark.” In 2024, just as in 2022, we stand at a fateful crossroads in the dark. It is only over the coming year that history’s judgment on the path taken will begin to assume its final form.</span></p>
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					<title>The world should fear 2024</title>
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						<![CDATA[Aris Roussinos]]>
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							<![CDATA[The last days of a hegemon? (Hamid Vakili/NurPhoto via Getty Images)]]>
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							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Aris Roussinos</strong> is an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist and a former war reporter.</p>
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						<unherd:twitter_handle>arisroussinos</unherd:twitter_handle>
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						<![CDATA[ is an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist and a former war reporter.]]>
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										<pubDate>Wed, 03 Jan 2024 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Wed, 03 Jan 2024 00:00:00 +0000</updated>
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								<![CDATA[Escalation lurks on every battlefield]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>When asked in 2020 to envisage the world after Covid, Michel Houellebecq proclaimed, accurately enough, that “it will be the same, just a bit worse”. It does not take a soothsayer to foresee that the same will hold true for this coming year. The year 2023 saw <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/africa/world-war" target="_blank" rel="noopener">the greatest global resurgence of armed conflict since 1945</a>: 2024 will be worse. We are living, if not through a World War, then <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2023/11/conflicts-around-the-world-peak/676029/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">a world at war</a>, the great post-globalisation jostling to divide up the spoils of what was once America’s unipolar imperium. This will be as epoch-defining a period as the late Forties were for Britain, or 1991 for Russia.</p>
<p>Unlike the two World Wars, the rival great powers are not challenging the superpower directly — at least, not yet. Instead, American hegemony is being challenged obliquely, as its rivals nibble at the edges of empire, targeting weaker client states in the confidence that the United States now possesses neither the logistical capacity nor the domestic political stability necessary to impose its order on the world. In the Nineties and 2000s, at the height of its unipolar moment, the United States made almost all the world its client state, writing cheques for their security it now struggles to cash: like bankruptcy, decline comes slowly at first, then all at once. The overriding theme of 2024 then, like 2023, will be that of <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2022-01-18/overstretched-superpower" target="_blank" rel="noopener">imperial overstretch</a> precipitating retreat from global dominance. From the Red Sea to the Donbas, the jungles of South America to the Far East, America’s security establishment finds itself struggling to contain local blazes that threaten to become a great conflagration.</p>
<p>Yet bad as things are, they could always be worse. We perhaps too easily forget that only six months ago, in the immediate wake of Prigozhin’s dramatic and unexpected rebellion, Russia’s security establishment was engaged in <a href="https://x.com/HannaNotte/status/1671421325930315776?s=20" target="_blank" rel="noopener">vigorous and public discussion</a> over whether it was necessary to conduct a nuclear strike either in Ukraine, as a warning against the West, or against the West itself. So endemic has the sense of crisis, both globally and domestically, become that the most dangerous nuclear escalation since the Cold War went largely unremarked. We should be grateful that this moment passed, yet the fact it did pass is itself evidence of America’s weakening global position. The brief episode of nuclear anxiety came at a time when Putin’s Kremlin faced both an unprecedented internal threat and the risk of battlefield defeat, on the brink of Ukraine’s much-anticipated summer offensive. But the offensive, as we now know, faltered into a costly defeat for Ukraine, upturning the expected outcome of the war. For our now-lowered risk of nuclear war, Kyiv will pay a heavy price.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/12/will-bidenism-outlive-biden/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/12/will-bidenism-outlive-biden/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/GettyImages-1485172147-1-scaled-e1701714807951.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/12/will-bidenism-outlive-biden/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/12/will-bidenism-outlive-biden/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Will Bidenism outlive Biden?</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/12/will-bidenism-outlive-biden/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Gary Gerstle </a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Like an inscrutable game of chess, the battle lines in Ukraine have barely moved this year, but expectations for the war’s outcome have been totally reversed. This time a year ago, the consensus was that the invasion was already a strategic defeat for Putin: his armies had proved unexpectedly ineffective on the battlefield, and had crumbled before Ukraine’s rapid autumn 2022 northeastern counteroffensive. Rather than breaking apart through its internal divisions, the Nato alliance had found a new sense of purpose, consolidating itself against the Russian threat and devoting vast quantities of already-existing and soon-to-be-produced materiel towards military victory. That mood of triumphalism has already passed. The promised war-winning Western increase in munitions production simply has not materialised, while Russia’s transition to a war economy, and its <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/73fa92eb-58bb-40ef-b2d6-e7571912990d?shareType=nongift" target="_blank" rel="noopener">seizing of Western companies</a> in response to a sanctions regime whose effects have proved the opposite to those intended, have granted Russia both renewed offensive potential and <a href="https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2023/12/10/vladimir-putin-is-running-russias-economy-dangerously-hot" target="_blank" rel="noopener">an economic boom</a> to pay for it. The West imposed on Russia a war stimulus it should have embraced itself. It did not, and as a result this winter is a bleak one for Ukraine; but the year to come looks to be far worse.</p>
<p>Through 2023, Kyiv and its Western backers gambled a successful conclusion to the war on a single armoured thrust in the country’s southeast, punching through Russia’s defensive lines and threatening its hold on the Crimea and Black Sea coast, forcing a humbled Putin into peace negotiations. That gamble failed, and there is now no viable path towards the expansive definition of victory adopted by Zelenskyy at a more buoyant phase of the war. Along the northern border and behind the current lines in the East, Ukrainian forces are <a href="https://kyivindependent.com/ukraine-finally-moves-to-fortify-front-line-but-could-it-be-too-little-too-late/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">hurriedly digging defensive lines</a>, hoping to blunt Russia’s resurgent offensive power in the same way Russia’s fortifications chewed up its own newly-formed and Nato-trained armoured brigades. The “mountain of steel” donated for the offensive by the West <a href="https://www.wsj.com/world/europe/u-s-ukraine-clash-over-counteroffensive-strategy-cb5e4324?reflink=share_mobilewebshare" target="_blank" rel="noopener">will not be repeated</a>; the wave of enthusiastic volunteers who initially manned the lines has been replaced by increasingly unwilling conscripts, with Kyiv planning a further mobilisation of half a million men just to hold the line.</p>
<p>When Zelenskyy’s over-optimistic prognoses of the war’s conclusion were punctured by his military chief General Valerii Zaluzhny characterising the current state of play as a “stalemate”, it revealed <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/11/08/ukraine-zelensky-zaluzhny-russia-war/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">growing internal political strife</a> within the Kyiv leadership. But the hard reality is that now offensive momentum has passed to Russia, Ukraine forcing the war into a stalemate that will lead to peace negotiations looks as close to victory as will realistically be achieved. But as things stand, an <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-12-14/putin-vows-russian-victory-in-war-as-ukraine-s-allies-waver" target="_blank" rel="noopener">increasingly confident Moscow</a> shows no inclination towards peace talks without Ukraine making territorial and political concessions indistinguishable from surrender. That Zelenskyy’s senior advisors are <a href="https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/when-how-will-ukraine-war-russia-end-2024-3bh9bvswr" target="_blank" rel="noopener">floating the possibility</a> of Putin’s sudden overthrow in Moscow as a possible path to victory shows the scale of the threat facing Kyiv. Short of a revolutionary deus ex machina in the Kremlin, the challenge for Ukraine in 2024 will be to hold its defensive lines, degrade Russia’s offensive power faster than its recruitment and industrial production can replace, and maintain the necessary political unity in Kyiv to steer the war towards the least painful conclusion possible. Of all these, perhaps the last will be the greatest challenge.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/12/the-truth-about-the-ethnic-cleansing-in-gaza/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/12/the-truth-about-the-ethnic-cleansing-in-gaza/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/GettyImages-1718506746-scaled-e1702652972842.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/12/the-truth-about-the-ethnic-cleansing-in-gaza/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author </span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/12/the-truth-about-the-ethnic-cleansing-in-gaza/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The truth about the ethnic cleansing in Gaza</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/12/the-truth-about-the-ethnic-cleansing-in-gaza/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Aris Roussinos </a></p></div></a></div>
<p>But as Kyiv struggles, the hegemon is already losing interest in Ukraine, distracted again by its decades-long <a href="https://www.thedefensepost.com/2023/05/12/us-military-readiness-degraded/?expand_article=1" target="_blank" rel="noopener">enfeebling entanglement</a> in the Middle East. Israel is both diplomatically and militarily dependent on the United States, but that relationship is not reflected in Netanyahu’s prosecution of his punitive war on Gaza. When US envoys beg Israel to scale down its war, Netanyahu immediately promises to <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-67819122" target="_blank" rel="noopener">intensify it.</a> Even as American planners fret over the erosion of their precious <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/11/16/ukraine-weapons-military-aid-stockpiles-nato-low-industry/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">munitions stockpiles</a> by the Ukraine war, Israel is burning through <a href="https://www.axios.com/2023/10/19/us-israel-artillery-shells-ukraine-weapons-gaza" target="_blank" rel="noopener">US-donated supplies</a> at an alarming rate. Until the US can <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-push-to-restock-howitzer-shells-rockets-sent-to-ukraine-bogs-down-f604511a" target="_blank" rel="noopener">increase its munitions production</a> and replenish its arsenal, which may take years, every shell fired on Gaza or in eastern Ukraine weakens America’s deterrent power. The result will be the arms equivalent of the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hungry_gap" target="_blank" rel="noopener">“hungry gap”</a>, as its available military resources become <a href="https://news.yahoo.com/us-needs-more-munitions-deter-192031965.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">increasingly unequal</a> to its global commitments. This shortfall presents America’s rivals with a rare and unexpected window to challenge the superpower directly, in the knowledge that it will struggle to fight a high-intensity war of any great duration.</p>
<p>But if the logic of armaments production, as well as the diplomatic isolation and domestic outrage fuelled by the Gaza war, drives the United States to seek a swift resolution to the conflict, the logic of events leads towards escalation. The risk of the conflict widening to Lebanon has not abated — if anything, Israel appears to be straining at the leash to extend its full-scale war across<a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/12/27/israeli-minister-gantz-says-situation-on-lebanon-border-demands-change?taid=658c9e781b6d7400019528ec&amp;utm_campaign=trueAnthem%3A+Trending+Content&amp;utm_medium=trueAnthem&amp;utm_source=twitter" target="_blank" rel="noopener"> its northern frontier</a>, as thousands of Israeli civilians have fled their homes as a result of the tit-for-tat exchange of artillery fire with Hezbollah. Yet the blockade of Red Sea shipping by Yemen’s Houthi movement has shown that Western countries face direct costs for their increasingly qualified support of Israel, and that regional powers are increasingly confident in challenging the United States directly.</p>
<p>Having triumphantly survived a years-long war against Saudi Arabia, <a href="https://caat.org.uk/homepage/stop-arming-saudi-arabia/the-war-on-yemens-civilians/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">devastating to Yemen’s civilian population</a>, in which Saudi forces deployed US jets, bombs and intelligence support to little battlefield effect, the risk of a short-lived American punitive <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/12/23/us/politics/gaza-houthi-yemen.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">bombing campaign</a> must seem a manageable one to the Houthis. Knowing that America has <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2023/12/16/us-strike-options-houthi-red-sea-00132160" target="_blank" rel="noopener">no appetite for a wider conflict</a> that will be seen both internationally and domestically as having been dragged into a war on Israel’s behalf, the Houthis now feel emboldened to attack US naval escorts directly. So politically toxic is Israel’s Gaza campaign that even America’s closest Nato allies <a href="https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/cracks-form-in-new-naval-coalition-drone-strikes-spread-to-indian-ocean">prefer to keep their distance</a> from American security efforts in the Red Sea, while as a result of <a href="https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2023/april/time-scrap-lcs" target="_blank" rel="noopener">poor procurement decisions</a>, the US Navy is struggling to marshal the resources necessary to keep trade routes open, the basic function of a global empire. Balking at fighting Hezbollah or the Houthis directly, the prospect of a US attack on Iran, deemed an over-ambitious goal even at the height of US power, is unlikely in the extreme, which in turn feeds Tehran’s appetite for risk. Overstretched, wearing down its ships through <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/us-navy-sailors-are-cannibalizing-parts-to-keep-warships-operational-2023-2?r=US&amp;IR=T" target="_blank" rel="noopener">over-deployment,</a> and suddenly showing itself dependent on weaker, unenthused European allies to make up the numbers, in the Red Sea we are shown a glimpse of America’s naval performance in a future Pacific conflict: the results will be heartening to China.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/11/ridley-scott-our-anglo-saxon-maximus/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/11/ridley-scott-our-anglo-saxon-maximus/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/Screenshot-2023-11-21-at-15.55.50.remini-enhanced-scaled.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/11/ridley-scott-our-anglo-saxon-maximus/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/11/ridley-scott-our-anglo-saxon-maximus/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Ridley Scott: our Anglo-Saxon Maximus</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/11/ridley-scott-our-anglo-saxon-maximus/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Aris Roussinos</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Like an ailing mammoth, weakened by a succession of individual spear thrusts, the hegemon staggers bleeding across the global scene. Though stronger than any individual competitor, America is not capable of sustaining three simultaneous major conflicts against powerful regional rivals, without mobilising for a war effort unfeasible within its current political dynamics. At the height of its power, when America’s rivals were cowed and isolated, the United States assumed global security burdens that looked easily achievable at the time, while running down the industrial base necessary to sustain them. Bad choices were made, which are now difficult to undo. As a result, the United States has already shifted into a defensive mode, attempting to preserve its gains of better times against resurgent challengers, and delaying the grand-political reordering of global affairs for as long as possible. Yet unlike Russia, Iran or China, America’s democratic system incentivises short-term planning, and offers its leaders the escape route of shifting responsibility for failure to the next, rival administration. Heading towards what looks like an inevitable political defeat in 2024, the Biden administration is already drained of political authority, as tired and absent-minded as the gerontocrat at its helm.</p>
<p>In an earlier phase of America’s history, the looming handover of power would be expected to happen smoothly, and continuity achieved in maintaining the empire’s strategic goals. No such continuity can be expected in 2024. America’s previous two elections were marked by the most serious waves of civil disorder and political instability in decades as each party and their factions within the state bureaucracy contested each others’ legitimacy, each deploying excitable civilians radicalised by their respective court press as proxy weapons. Over the course of the coming year, America will likely be roiled by its internal political dysfunction in a way we have never yet seen, and the rest of the world will live in the shadow cast by the contested imperial throne.</p>
<p>Not just the fate of Ukraine but also of the Nato alliance will be determined by the battle for power in Washington. For Netanyahu, the incentive of America’s election year will be to drag the war out for another year, or widen it into a regional conflict, gambling Israel’s future security on the presumed greater indulgence of the incoming Republican administration. Similarly, for Iran, Hezbollah and the Houthis, the waning days of a cautious Biden administration desirous to avoid a Middle Eastern conflagration presents the greatest opportunity for escalation. For China, waiting in the wings to deliver the final blow, the optimum time to act will be at the moment of Washington’s greatest distraction by internal disorder: perhaps this election season will present an opportunity too rare to pass up, accelerating the <a href="https://news.usni.org/2021/06/23/milley-china-wants-capability-to-take-taiwan-by-2027-sees-no-near-term-intent-to-invade" target="_blank" rel="noopener">timetable to seize Taiwan</a>.</p>
<p>The world is living through its most dangerous moment in many decades, and the logic of events, in every theatre, leads towards further escalation over the year to come. In 2024, America’s fraught domestic interregnum will create a feedback loop with the already bloody global interregnum for the spoils of its empire. <span style="font-weight: 400;">Last year was a hard year, drenched in blood and human misery through global conflict: but in retrospect, we may view it as the last golden summer of our world order, with the troubling storms still distant on the horizon. </span>The coming year will be a historic one: we are right to dread its approach.</p>
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					<title>Putin&#8217;s patron saint of nuclear weapons</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2023/12/putins-patron-saint-of-nuclear-weapons/?edition=us</link>
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					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Peter Flew]]>
					</dc:creator>
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							<![CDATA[The Serafim’s divine light has gone dark. Oleg Varov/AFP/Getty Images]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Peter Flew</strong> is a lawyer and is completing his PhD on Russian History and Literature at the School of Slavonic and East European Studies.</p>
]]>
						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle></unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is a lawyer and is completing his PhD on Russian History and Literature at the School of Slavonic and East European Studies.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Fri, 15 Dec 2023 00:00:30 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Fri, 15 Dec 2023 00:00:30 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[orthodox christianity]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Religion]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Russia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ukraine war]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Vladimir Putin]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://old.unherd.com/?p=491711</guid>
																												<description>
								<![CDATA[Russia's red button is in the hands of God ]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>During a service this autumn, Patriarch Kirill of Moscow wished a happy birthday to one of his congregants in the Church of Christ the Saviour. It was no ordinary salutation. Radii Il’kaev, who had just turned 85, was a nuclear physicist who had worked for much of his life in the secretive town of Sarov, the birthplace of the Soviet atomic bomb. Long before it became a centre of nuclear defence, the town had been home to a monastery where one of Russia’s most popular saints — Serafim — had lived and prayed.</p>
<p>The Patriarch used Il’kaev’s birthday to make an extraordinary pronouncement: that Russia’s nuclear arsenal was developed under Serafim’s spiritual protection. “By God&#8217;s ineffable Providence,” he said, “these weapons were created in the monastery of St Serafim. Thanks to this strength, Russia has remained independent and free.” His message was clear: not only was this saint Russia’s intercessor, but his patronage sanctioned her ability to destroy humanity.</p>
<p>Decades after Soviet attempts to destroy his cult, Serafim has made a comeback. In the context of Russia’s war in Ukraine, even the President has venerated his relics, while a new battalion has been established in his name. In Serafim, Russia has a saint that crystalises the synthesis of religion and military defence. This mix has returned with full force in Russia, although its roots are deeper than the present conflict. Since the Soviet collapse, according to Dmitry Adamsky, the Church has positioned itself as “one of the main guarantors of Russian national security”. Putin confirmed this position as early as 2007, when he told a journalist based in Sarov that Russia would be protected by both its national confession and nuclear armaments. In 2023, this policy has come to fruition.</p>
<p>Appeals to Serafim during times of war, however, are nothing new. Long before Serafim became Russia’s nuclear saint, Tsar Nicholas II turned to him on the eve of his own military misadventure. But first, Serafim’s sacred image underwent a transformation. Serafim was an ascetic monk, who spent much of his life in solitude in the forests nearby Sarov. He went on to become one of Russia’s most renowned spiritual guides. Streams of pilgrims visited him in Sarov, and he was prized for his ability to heal, read minds, and predict the future. After his death in 1833, his fame kept growing, with pilgrims coming from all over Russia to venerate his relics and swim in the holy spring.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/11/how-putin-exploits-russian-antisemitism/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/11/how-putin-exploits-russian-antisemitism/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/GettyImages-162134445-1-e1698775767288.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/11/how-putin-exploits-russian-antisemitism/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading </span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/11/how-putin-exploits-russian-antisemitism/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>How Putin exploits Russian antisemitism</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/11/how-putin-exploits-russian-antisemitism/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Ian Garner</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>By the end of the 19th century, the cult of Serafim had begun to transform. A new chronicle detailed several prophecies that concerned Russia’s future. Serafim predicted that the imperial family would visit the convent of Diveevo — a community of nuns near Sarov, which he considered a divinely-protected spiritual fortress — during a time of great joy. It would be summertime, and hymns of resurrection would be sung. However, after this time passed, he claimed that Russia would experience great suffering. Crosses would be removed from churches and monasteries destroyed. The Antichrist would come. However, although Sarov would fall, Serafim had instructed the nuns to build ramparts in Diveevo which would protect them. Not only would the convent save Russia, but there she would be reborn.</p>
<p>These prophecies reflected a deeper apocalyptic mood spreading in Russia. By 1900, many looked for signs that the world was about to end. Such fears were driven by the social and political context: urbanisation had created a pervasive sense of alienation; factory conditions and housing were resolutely poor; hunger and cholera persisted. Meanwhile, tensions in the Far East raised the possibility of war. But as a revolutionary crisis deepened, systemic reform remained an illusion.</p>
<p>Nicholas II was determined to rule as an autocrat, and he looked to medieval Muscovy for inspiration. To his mind, Russia’s peasants represented the spirit of the nation, and he hoped to form a direct relationship with them to bolster his rule. He did this by an appeal to traditional Orthodoxy. His decision to canonise Serafim was intended to show that he shared their values — but it was more than just political calculation. Nicholas and his consort had long entertained mystics, of whom Rasputin was just one. They were desperate for a male heir, and after trying various folk remedies, they looked to Sarov and Diveevo to assuage their fears. As Russia stood on the precipice of catastrophe, the convent offered a glimmer of hope that the Tsarist regime might survive come what may.</p>
<p>The canonisation of 1903 appeared to fulfil Serafim’s prediction of a time of joy. Yet it soon became clear that things would not go to plan. The summer Nicholas and Alexandra travelled to Sarov was exceptionally hot, and wildfires had reduced entire villages to cinders. Malnutrition stalked the region. Since not enough barracks had been built, many of the 300,000 pilgrims had to sleep under open cover. Most of them were desperately poor, and among them were the severely disabled and those thought to suffer demonic possession. This was far from the romantic image that Nicholas had of his people.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/07/russias-toxic-military-politics/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/07/russias-toxic-military-politics/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/GettyImages-1259023079-1.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/07/russias-toxic-military-politics/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading </span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/07/russias-toxic-military-politics/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Russia&#039;s toxic military politics</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/07/russias-toxic-military-politics/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Alex de Waal</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>But the full extent of the canonisation’s failure was only revealed the following year. During their visit to Sarov, Nicholas and Alexandra had swum in the holy spring. Yet when Alexandra gave birth to a male heir, their happiness quickly turned to despair: the Tsarevich had haemophilia. Worse still was Russia’s war with Japan. Soldiers stopped at Sarov and Diveevo before travelling to the Far East. Icons of Serafim were also dispatched to the front. And yet the campaign ended in Russia’s humiliating defeat. Nor did the debacle end there: revolution broke out in 1905, and the Romanovs were confronted with the chilling possibility of regime change. As a result, Serafim’s claim as a national intercessor was severely dented. Nicholas and the Church largely distanced themselves from him.</p>
<p>However, for the cult’s true believers, the Bolshevik seizure of power in 1917 confirmed the crisis that Serafim had prophesised. Sarov was forcibly shut within a decade, its churches and buildings mostly destroyed. The monks were dispersed, executed, and sent to the camps. Serafim’s relics were desecrated. Then, in the wake of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the Soviet authorities chose Sarov to be the centre of its atomic research. Today, the town remains out of bounds for pilgrims. Diveevo, meanwhile, has charted a different course. While it too was closed after the Revolution, it has become one of Russia’s most popular sites of pilgrimage. At its centrepiece are the relics of Serafim, which were re-discovered in the basement of a Museum of Religion and Atheism in 1991 to great fanfare.</p>
<p>That both the Patriarch and Vladimir Putin have visited Diveevo this year only confirms the saint’s renewed importance to Orthodoxy and the Russian state. After serving a liturgy on the 120th anniversary of Serafim’s canonisation, the Patriarch reminded those gathered of Russia’s strength in the face of adversity. He offered the siege of Leningrad as an example of how, even when Russia has abandoned her faith, God continues to show His favour. This was intended not just to rally the faithful, but to call on Serafim too, just as Russia’s war becomes one of attrition.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/06/how-aleksandr-dugin-influences-the-west/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/06/how-aleksandr-dugin-influences-the-west/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/GettyImages-1242664420-1-e1686483936582-2.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/06/how-aleksandr-dugin-influences-the-west/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading </span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/06/how-aleksandr-dugin-influences-the-west/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>How Aleksandr Dugin influences the West</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/06/how-aleksandr-dugin-influences-the-west/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Aris Roussinos</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Shortly after, Putin made his own pilgrimage to Diveevo. He was filmed walking on the famous ramparts, and in the cathedral he was presented with an icon of Serafim. As the President crossed himself, a bishop entreated him to pray to the saint. For conservative commentators, it was a moment full of rich meaning. Mikhail Tiurenkov, for instance, said “that [Serafim’s] Heavenly intercession was incarnated in our country’s flaming shield is clearly no accident”. Yet although Russia celebrates its nuclear security, it knows that it comes at the cost of certain annihilation if used — not just of Russia’s enemies, but its own people too. The only hope, as Putin suggested in 2018, is that: “We will go to heaven as martyrs, and they will simply drop dead.”</p>
<p>As Putin continues to push Russia to the edge in his war on Ukraine, there is a high chance that the Serafim cult will continue to inform public discourse. Like Nicholas II, Putin has turned to Orthodox tradition as he becomes mired in his own battlefield and seeks to steady the ship. Yet if the experience of Russia’s last Tsar is anything to go by, this celebration of Serafim does not bode well. Indeed, it is perhaps the mark of a desperate man. Not for the first time has Serafim’s divine light gone dark.</p>
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					<title>Putin has enabled Ukrainian nationhood</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2023/11/putin-has-enabled-ukrainian-nationhood/?edition=us</link>
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					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Helen Thompson]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/helen.jpg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
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							<![CDATA[Putin visits the oil port of Kozmino (Konstantin Zavrazhin/Getty Images)]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Helen Thompson</strong> is Professor of Political Economy at the University of Cambridge.</p>
]]>
						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>HelenHet20</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is Professor of Political Economy at the University of Cambridge.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Thu, 09 Nov 2023 00:01:24 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Thu, 09 Nov 2023 09:31:38 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Energy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[energy security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[EU]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Europe]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[inflation reduction act]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Nationalism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ukraine]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ukraine war]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://old.unherd.com/?p=490294</guid>
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								<![CDATA[We are entering a new era of energy nationalism]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>In the early hours of 24 February 2022, Russian troops entered Ukraine. Later that day, the Russian navy captured Snake Island in Ukraine’s Black Sea waters. When the news broke, oil and European gas prices soared. The war that began, and continues to this day, has remade the continent of Europe, forcing European leaders to face the meaning of Ukraine’s national independence and accept Russia as a geopolitical antagonist rather than a critical energy supplier.</p>
<p>This realignment was most profound in the country that sits at modern Europe’s heart. In the event of the invasion, the stakes for Germany involved not only one unopened pipeline — the already-controversial Nord Stream 2 — but its 50-year commitment to <em>rapprochement</em> with Moscow. Within 72 hours, Chancellor Olaf Scholz promised to send German weapons to Ukraine, establish a €100 billion fund to increase military expenditure, and end energy dependency on Russia by opening the country to sea-borne gas. Since Putin had, Scholz told the German parliament, “demolish[ed] the European security order that had prevailed for almost half a century since the Helsinki Final Act” in 1975, everything had changed. “We are,” Scholz said, “living through a watershed era [<em>eine Zeitenwende</em>] … mean[ing] that the world afterwards will no longer be the same as the world before.”</p>
<p>In part the German chancellor was right. But Scholz’s version of why European history fractured in February 2022 also distorts reality. Self-evidently, the European security order before Russia’s war was nothing like the one that prevailed in the mid-Seventies: six new European states stood in the former western Soviet Union. Having no prior history of peacetime independence, Ukraine’s emergence in 1991 as Europe’s largest territorial state had constituted an extraordinary change.</p>
<p>But the new Ukrainian nation-state was always geopolitically precarious. Since at least 2009, Putin had openly denied the legitimacy of its existence. In the treaties Ukraine signed with Moscow during the Nineties, it ceded Russian military rights in Crimea. Then, in 2014, it lost the Crimean peninsula and entered a war against Russian-backed separatist rebels in the south-east of the country. If Russia’s invasion severed the present from the past, the shock was the scale of suffering Putin was willing to inflict to destroy Ukraine’s viability as an independent state, amplified by the chasm between the size of his initial ambition to seize power in Kyiv and a military mobilisation entirely inadequate to the task.</p>
<p>The unintended consequence for Europe is now clear: the emergence of a largely unified nation-state-in-arms with a pressing claim for EU membership that will prove hard to realise without concurrent Nato entry. Regardless of Ukraine’s prospects for entering either association with any alacrity, Ukraine’s resilience against Russia has rendered Ukrainian nationhood a crucial geopolitical fact. In a 1984 essay, the Czech novelist Milan Kundera wrote that the Ukrainian nation, “one of the great European nations… is slowly disappearing. And this enormous, almost unbelievable event is occurring without the world realising it&#8221;. Ukraine’s independence seven years afterwards only partly introduced western Europeans to Ukrainian history. But, by trying to eliminate Ukrainian nationhood, Putin has instead ensured that it has become a permanent feature of Europe with which the EU must grapple.</p>
<p>The post-Cold War EU relied on a measure of German-Russian reconciliation to allow for German reunification even as the eastern European states had only just successfully asserted their nationhood against the Soviet version of the imperial Russian empire. Thereafter, the Holocaust, as an end point for German nationalism and the catastrophic culmination of decades of ethnic division in eastern Europe, became pivotal to the imaginative construction of the idea of European unity. By contrast, in 2022, a state subject to the simultaneous experience of the Holocaust and Soviet mid-20th century terror became an official candidate for EU membership by fighting a defensive war for its territorial national sovereignty.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/11/should-america-be-more-like-ukraine/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/11/should-america-be-more-like-ukraine/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/GettyImages-1242831916-copy-scaled-e1667578556920.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/11/should-america-be-more-like-ukraine/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading </span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/11/should-america-be-more-like-ukraine/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Should America be more like Ukraine?</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/11/should-america-be-more-like-ukraine/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Mark Lilla</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>In doing so, it claimed the right to nation-build, including by suppressing minority languages in the public sphere. No aspect of this experience sits easily with the notion of the post-Maastricht EU as a post-national and peace-oriented construction. An EU that admits Ukraine as a war-formed nation-state would necessarily become a different kind of entity, one that could not be rhetorically legitimated without a new narrative about its historical purpose partially grounded in Russia’s existence as a geopolitical opponent. In Berlin and Paris, an EU with such a relationship to Europe’s resource-rich, continental-size neighbour would indeed belong to a <em>Zeitenwende</em>.</p>
<p>The existential question of Europe’s energy supply triggered by Russia’s war also raises profound questions around nationhood across the rest of Europe. As they opposed Russia in ways that jeopardised their immediate energy security, European governments resuscitated the narrative of energy sacrifice once deployed by Jimmy Carter: reduce your energy usage for the greater good. In spring 2022, the Italian prime minister, Mario Draghi, asked: “Do we want to have peace or do you want to have the air conditioning on?”</p>
<p>But the ghost of Carter’s political failure lingered. Palpably fearing a democratic rebellion on energy, European politicians did not ask citizens to endure too much economic pain in the name of any claim to political community — whether that community be the nation, Europe, or a democratic West. Throwing fiscal caution to the wind, European governments subsidised household fuel bills and some, notably the British and French, still faced a wave of strikes. None appeared to show qualms about European companies buying spot-market LNG already contracted to Pakistan. In Italy, Draghi’s government fell in July 2022 after Five-Star withdrew its support, charging that the former ECB president was prioritising Ukraine over reducing energy prices. Tellingly, when the subsequent general election once again saw the party uncompromised by technocratic and grand coalition politics win the largest number of seats — this time the Brothers of Italy — its leader, Giorgia Meloni, was allowed to become prime minister.</p>
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<p>By contrast, reducing energy consumption in the name of lowering carbon emissions remained off-limits. Instead, in making a new case for the energy transition, the war emergency encouraged further the idea that economic transformation could recreate the cross-class interest in national manufacturing production lost from the Seventies. Yet the prospects for realising this ambition were much more propitious across the Atlantic. With the Inflation Reduction Act, passed in August 2022, American climate policy near explicitly became a political bulwark against another 2016-style shock where Trump or a Trump-style candidate again won by appealing to the losers of American deindustrialisation. In contrast to its New Deal predecessor, this federal intervention is explicitly racially inclusive in its conception of nationhood. Indeed, for the Biden administration, it is an act of reparation for the restrictive American nationhood of the past as well as an attempt at restoring the New Deal-originating idea of economic nationhood.</p>
<p>Whether by reshoring manufacturing production it can succeed on its own terms is open to question. But the fact that the United States under Democratic Party rule in 2022 entered the same political space European governments had already sought to occupy in 2019 with their Net Zero 2050 commitments now constrains European ambitions. The American move establishes a competitive geopolitical contest between Western countries around using energy change to rebuild nationhood in which European states and the EU are disadvantaged by higher fossil-fuel energy costs and American financial power. Already the failure of Boris Johnson’s government, which bet its post-Brexit “levelling-up agenda” on investment in low-carbon sectors, testifies to the problem.</p>
<p>With the Inflation Reduction Act, the stakes for Britain in securing a post-Brexit free-trade agreement with the United States are now quite possibly high enough to force a future choice between British companies’ presence in US-centred low-carbon supply chains and the domestic burden of accepting Washington’s trade terms. Even in the United States, reconfiguring energy production towards national self-sufficiency cannot happen quickly enough to be democratically transformative. As a response to Trump’s 2016 insurgency candidacy, this project leaves the border and citizenship issues untouched. In betting on rapidly building a low-carbon America, the Biden administration has also left itself open to the charge that it is subordinating present energy needs to an unrealisable, future-oriented project to the benefit of those corporations that procure the available subsidies.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/07/has-the-west-lost-control-of-oil/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/07/has-the-west-lost-control-of-oil/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/GettyImages-928555530-1-e1688748811363.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/07/has-the-west-lost-control-of-oil/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author </span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/07/has-the-west-lost-control-of-oil/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Has the West lost control of oil?</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/07/has-the-west-lost-control-of-oil/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Helen Thompson </a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Here, the fundamental problems that the energy transition presents have not shifted. Of the transformative forces unleashed by Russia’s war, game-changing technological breakthroughs of the kind necessary for a low-carbon energy future, especially on the storage of electricity, was not one. Following hard on the 2021 China gas shock, the energy trade disruption caused by Russia’s war, meanwhile, intensified the separate problem of the energy present. The 2022 crisis demonstrated just how politically hard it is for European politicians to reduce the expectations for consumption formed in a prior geopolitical era, or ask their citizens to engage with the energy poverty of people in many non-Western parts of the world.</p>
<p>If Russia’s war has changed the prior democratic predicaments around energy, it is by spreading energy consciousness, including letting loose the spectre of future energy scarcity in polities premised on energy abundance. Where, in the West, energy consciousness was acute for those exercising power but often weak among citizens, the war means these citizens now better understand their material aspirations and fears as energy demands and anxieties. They do so at a time when Western democracies generally have still not recovered from the blows delivered by the 2008 crash — even without a new round of bank interventions in March 2023 — and when in France violent street protest has become a persistent feature of expressed discontent.</p>
<p>In principle, greater energy consciousness could loosen the technocratic logic behind the original European formulation of realising an energy revolution by 2050. But it is more likely to expose the chasm between the interests everyone shares in facing climate change and the inequalities that will come from electrifying personal transport and that are always generated by high fossil-fuel prices. In this future, energy will not be a subterranean source of political disorder, as in the first two decades of the 21st century, but the principal currency of it.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><em>This is an edited extract from the paperback of </em>Disorder, <em>(Oxford University Press)</em> <em>by Helen Thompson.</em></p>
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					<title>Israel&#8217;s mixed blessing for Ukraine</title>
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						<![CDATA[Thomas Fazi]]>
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							<![CDATA[Zelenskyy's dream is unravelling (Viktor Kovalchuk/Global Images Ukraine via Getty Images)]]>
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							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Thomas Fazi</strong> is an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist and translator. His latest book is <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/the-covid-consensus/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">The Covid Consensus</a>, co-authored with Toby Green.</p>
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						<unherd:twitter_handle>battleforeurope</unherd:twitter_handle>
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						<![CDATA[ is an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist and translator. His latest book is <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/the-covid-consensus/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">The Covid Consensus</a>, co-authored with Toby Green.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Thu, 09 Nov 2023 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Thu, 09 Nov 2023 11:40:30 +0000</updated>
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								<![CDATA[The Western alliance can't fight on two fronts]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>In the month since Hamas’s attack, the reduced coverage of the Ukraine war has been a mixed blessing for Zelenskyy and his international backers. Perhaps most obviously, it has caused Ukraine to plummet among the West’s priorities, at a time when political support for continued military aid was already waning. But it has also concealed an uncomfortable truth from the public: Ukraine — and the West — are losing the war.</p>
<p>Even the most ardent supporters of the maximalist victory-at-all-costs narrative are now starting to admit that the Nato-backed counteroffensive has failed. Despite billions of dollars spent and tens of thousands of casualties, Ukraine has <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/08/02/us/politics/ukraine-troops-counteroffensive-training.html?smid=nytcore-ios-share&amp;referringSource=articleShare" target="_blank" rel="noopener">barely made</a> any territorial gains, while Russia continues to make <a href="https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-25-2023" target="_blank" rel="noopener">significant advances</a>, mostly in the north-east.</p>
<p>In a repeat of its year-long campaign to capture the town of Bakhmut, Russia is now <a href="https://euromaidanpress.com/2023/11/04/isw-russia-builds-forces-for-third-massive-assault-on-avdiivka/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">doubling down</a> on its efforts to capture the eastern city of Avdiivka, which has been a symbol of Ukrainian resistance since 2014. <a href="https://ctrana.news/news/448809-situatsija-pod-avdeevkoj-hotovy-li-ukraintsy-k-dolhoj-vojne-ssha-predlozhili-moskve-perehovory-itohi.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">According</a> to Oleksiy Arestovych, Zelenskyy’s presidential advisor until January 2023 and now a staunch opponent, the fall of Avdiivka, which would be the seventh city in a row lost by Ukraine, is almost certain. “Everyone in the military knows that troops from the southern front have been transferred to Avdiivka; this means goodbye to the southern offensive,” he further noted.</p>
<p>Speaking to <em>The</em> <em>Telegraph</em>, Arestovych also <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2023/10/15/ukraines-counter-offensive-russia-disaster-zelensky-adviser/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">called</a> the counteroffensive a “disaster” and directly accused Zelenskyy of making several strategic mistakes: “There will be no return to the borders of 1991, and there will be no Crimea in the near future,” he said. Even the US’s much-vaunted provision of long-range ATACMS missiles — which have allowed Ukraine to strike at several targets in Crimea — appear to be falling short of expectations: Russia’s military recently <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-says-it-shot-down-long-range-us-missiles-given-ukraine-2023-10-25/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">claimed</a> that it had shot down two of them, showing that it is rapidly adapting to new military circumstances.</p>
<div class="ad-insert-events"></div>
<p>This reality — which many <a href="https://mearsheimer.substack.com/p/bound-to-lose" target="_blank" rel="noopener">had predicted</a> — is now starting to dawn even on Western pro-war pundits. As Max Hastings, a long-time believer in military support for Ukraine, <a href="https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/world-cant-afford-to-get-bored-by-ukraine-8wc9llhg0" target="_blank" rel="noopener">put it</a>, “whatever hawkish blowhards may say, the liberation of Crimea and the eastern Donbas is unlikely to happen”.</p>
<p>The real shocker, however, is that this is now being acknowledged, if in slightly more nuanced terms, by Ukraine’s commander-in-chief, General Valery Zaluzhny. Last week, in a surprisingly frank <a href="https://www.economist.com/europe/2023/11/01/ukraines-commander-in-chief-on-the-breakthrough-he-needs-to-beat-russia" target="_blank" rel="noopener">interview</a> with <em>The Economist</em>, Zaluzhny said that “just like in the First World War we have reached the level of technology that puts us into a stalemate. There will most likely be no deep and beautiful breakthrough”. This would require some major military-technological innovation — but “there is no sign that this is around the corner”, he added.</p>
<p>Zaluzhny made several other striking admissions. According to the general, Russia lost at least 150,000 troops — a much <a href="https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2023/10/22/7425176/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">lower estimate</a> than the numbers previously circulated by Ukrainian and Western sources. If that is true, it means that Russia has lost almost as many troops as Ukraine, despite having a much larger population; US and European <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/05/01/world/europe/russia-ukraine-war-casualties-losses.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">estimates</a> put the Ukrainian death toll at well above 100,000. Not only has this undercut Ukraine’s assumption that it could stop Russia by bleeding its troops, as Zaluzhny admits, but it reveals that, in fact, it is Ukraine that has been bled of troops, in large part as a result of the counteroffensive itself. As the general put it: “Sooner or later we are going to find that we simply don’t have enough people to fight.” The Government, in response, has reacted by enacting harsher <a href="https://kyivindependent.com/ukraines-ministry-of-defense-expands-list-of-persons-with-diseases-suitable-for-mobilization/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">conscription policies</a>, but these are already showing their limits. As the Deputy Minister of Defence Natalia Kalmykova recently <a href="https://thepressunited.com/updates/8000-ukrainians-face-criminal-charges-for-evading-draft-media/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">admitted</a> in a television interview, “hundreds of thousands of citizens are currently trying to avoid mobilisation”.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/09/what-nato-sceptics-get-wrong-about-ukraine/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/09/what-nato-sceptics-get-wrong-about-ukraine/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/GettyImages-1253740691-scaled-e1695746432927.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/09/what-nato-sceptics-get-wrong-about-ukraine/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/09/what-nato-sceptics-get-wrong-about-ukraine/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Nato is weakening America</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/09/what-nato-sceptics-get-wrong-about-ukraine/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Aris Roussinos </a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Zaluzhny doesn’t go as far as saying that the offensive should be abandoned, but this is one conclusion that could be drawn from his assessment that the war has reached a stalemate. Given Zaluzhny’s rank — and the fact that he went on record with this extremely bleak analysis — it’s not surprising to learn that this assessment is shared by most people in Zelenskyy’s entourage. In last week’s <em>Time</em> magazine <a href="https://time.com/6329188/ukraine-volodymyr-zelensky-interview/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">cover story</a>, Simon Shuster claimed that “Zelenskyy’s associates themselves are extremely skeptical about the [current] policy”.</p>
<p>The one person who seems unwilling to face reality, however, is Zelenskyy himself. In a <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/politics-news/zelenskyy-ukraine-russia-war-not-stalemate-rcna123670" target="_blank" rel="noopener">recent interview</a> with NBC, the Ukrainian president rebuked the notion that the war is in a stalemate — and indeed his office publicly <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/11/04/world/europe/zelensky-rebuke-general-zaluzhny.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">chastised</a> Zaluzhny for his claims, suggesting that his comments would help the Russian invasion. As <em>The</em> <em>New York Times</em> notes, this “signal[s] an emerging rift between the military and civilian leadership at an already challenging time for Ukraine”, as testified by the recent dismissal of Ukraine’s head of special operations forces. In the aforementioned interview, Zelenskyy reiterated his long-standing position: that Ukraine will not negotiate with Russia until it entirely withdraws from Ukrainian territories, concluding that Ukraine is not ready to concede its freedom to the “fucking terrorist Putin”.</p>
<p>As Shuster noted, however, “Zelenskyy’s belief in Ukraine’s ultimate victory over Russia has hardened into a form that worries some of his advisers”, who described Zelenskyy’s conviction as “immovable, verging on the messianic”. “He deludes himself,” one of his closest aides told Shuster in frustration. “We’re out of options. We’re not winning. But try telling him that.”</p>
<p>Such pessimism, and distrust in the country’s civilian leadership, is palpable even on the frontlines. “We’re not moving forward,” the aide said. Some frontline commanders, he continued, have begun refusing orders to advance, even when they came directly from the office of the president. He further noted that, even if the US and its allies come through with all the weapons they have pledged, Ukraine doesn’t have enough troops to use them.</p>
<p>The image of Zelenskyy that emerges is thus a truly desperate one: an increasingly isolated and delusional leader, pacing up and down his bunker, demanding a total military victory that everyone knows to be impossible. What’s tragic is that many of the claims now being aired by Zelenskyy’s own people have been made by critics of Nato strategy in Ukraine for over a year — only to be dismissed as “Putin talking points”. How many lives were sacrificed in the pursuit of an impossible military aim? And how many could have been saved if the West had been more willing to tolerate an open discussion about the limitations of Ukraine’s, and Nato’s, stated aims?</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/10/nato-wont-win-a-long-war-in-ukraine/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/10/nato-wont-win-a-long-war-in-ukraine/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/GettyImages-1239740939-1.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/10/nato-wont-win-a-long-war-in-ukraine/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author </span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/10/nato-wont-win-a-long-war-in-ukraine/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Nato won&#039;t win a long war in Ukraine</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/10/nato-wont-win-a-long-war-in-ukraine/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Thomas Fazi </a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Just 10 months ago, after all, Shuster himself was among those lionising Zelenskyy, writing the article in which the Ukrainian president was named <em>Time</em> magazine’s <a href="https://time.com/person-of-the-year-2022-volodymyr-zelensky/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">“Person of the Year”</a>, helping to forge the Hollywood-esque character he now can&#8217;t escape. Back then, the Western media had its own talking points, but they now appear to have changed. Shuster’s latest article, and <a href="https://www.wsj.com/world/europe/why-russias-war-in-ukraine-could-run-for-years-383f0bde" target="_blank" rel="noopener">others</a> along the same lines, don’t just signal a rift among Ukrainian ranks — but among Western ranks as well. The message to Zelenskyy from certain quarters seems to be: “It’s time to fall in line.”</p>
<p>So, what comes next? Given the situation, there aren’t many options left for Ukraine. One is to hunker down and prepare for a long war of attrition — one in which Russia has the advantage, as Zaluzhny himself notes. But this would require a constant supply of weapons from the West, in even greater quantities than now, for which there is declining political support, especially in the US. Just before Hamas’s attack, Congress had frozen US aid to Ukraine.</p>
<p>Biden hoped to overcome Republican resistance to sending more money to Ukraine by linking aid to Ukraine <em>and</em> aid to Israel (for which there is overwhelming bipartisan support) into a single bill worth a whopping $100 billion. To further drive the message home, the President drew a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2023/oct/20/joe-biden-tv-address-to-nation-oval-office-speech-vladimir-putin-hamas-aid-for-israel-ukraine#:~:text=%E2%80%9CHamas%20and%20Putin%20represent%20different,a%20darkened%20window%20behind%20him." target="_blank" rel="noopener">direct link</a> between Putin and Hamas: “Hamas and Putin represent different threats, but they share this in common: they both want to completely annihilate a neighbouring democracy.” He also reiterated the claim that “if we don’t stop Putin’s appetite for power and control in Ukraine, he won’t limit himself just to Ukraine”.</p>
<p>Such excitable arguments, however, increasingly carry less weight in Washington. Indeed, the new GOP House speaker, Mike Johnson, spurned Biden’s request and demanded a vote on Israel aid alone, in a testament to just how toxic the issue of funding for Ukraine has become among Republicans. The US <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/us-send-additional-weapons-aid-ukraine-2023-11-03/#:~:text=WASHINGTON%2C%20Nov%203%20(Reuters),Biden%20administration%20announced%20on%20Friday." target="_blank" rel="noopener">announced</a> a new $425 million security package last Friday, but fell way short of the $60 billion requested by the White House. It’s likely that a new round of aid for Ukraine will be approved in the end, but it’s clear that US support for Ukraine is nearing its expiry date.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/11/liberals-have-forgotten-what-free-speech-means/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/11/liberals-have-forgotten-what-free-speech-means/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/GettyImages-1760551397.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/11/liberals-have-forgotten-what-free-speech-means/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/11/liberals-have-forgotten-what-free-speech-means/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Liberals have forgotten what free speech means</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/11/liberals-have-forgotten-what-free-speech-means/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Andrew Doyle</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Once that happens, given the EU is neither able nor willing to plug the gap left by the US, Ukraine will be left with no other choice but to negotiate a truce, if not an actual peace deal, which will necessarily involve some kind of territorial compromise with Russia. According to <u><a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/us-european-officials-broach-topic-peace-negotiations-ukraine-sources-rcna123628" target="_blank" rel="noopener">NBC</a></u>, the West has already begun secret talks with the Ukrainian government about what peace negotiations with Russia might entail. Publicly, however, the topic is still taboo — not only because it would be a de facto admission of defeat for Nato, but also because it would have to explain why it prohibited Kyiv from <a href="https://www.theamericanconservative.com/why-peace-talks-but-no-peace/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">conducting peace negotiations</a> with Moscow in March 2022, when Ukraine had a chance to end the conflict on better terms than it could ever hope for today.</p>
<p>This situation has been further complicated in the past month. For the wars in Israel-Gaza and Ukraine are more closely related than one may think — not in the simplistic good-versus-evil terms used by Biden, but because they effectively represent two fronts of a global proxy war in which the West is pitted against a growing front encompassing Russia, China and Iran. This is why the West can’t accept a public defeat in Ukraine at the moment. What happens in the Middle East has direct implications for the conflict in Ukraine and vice versa, and both sides know it.</p>
<p>Ultimately, however, just as in Ukraine, it is hard to see how the West can win in Gaza. Even if Israel succeeds in completely eradicating Hamas, the high civilian death count will only <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/23/us/ukraine-gaza-global-south-hypocrisy.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">harden anti-Western sentiments</a> in the region, and beyond. If the West believed encouraging war would rekindle its waning influence in Eastern Europe and the Middle East, on both fronts, it seems we are fighting a losing battle.</p>
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					<title>Joe Biden&#8217;s billion-dollar oil mistake</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2023/09/joe-bidens-billion-dollar-oil-mistake/?edition=us</link>
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						<![CDATA[Ashley Rindsberg]]>
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							<![CDATA[Failure may be the only option (Royal Court of Saudi Arabia / Handout/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images)]]>
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							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Ashley Rindsberg</strong> is author of <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Gray-Lady-Winked-Misreporting-Fabrications/dp/1736703315"><em>The Gray Lady Winked: How the New York Times’ Misreporting, Distortions and Fabrications Radically Alter History</em></a></p>
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						<unherd:twitter_handle>AshleyRindsberg</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is author of <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Gray-Lady-Winked-Misreporting-Fabrications/dp/1736703315"><em>The Gray Lady Winked: How the New York Times’ Misreporting, Distortions and Fabrications Radically Alter History</em></a>]]>
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										<pubDate>Wed, 27 Sep 2023 23:02:03 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Wed, 27 Sep 2023 23:02:03 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[China]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[ESG]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Joe Biden]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Oil]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Saudi Arabia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ukraine war]]></category>
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								<![CDATA[The President hamstrung his country from Day One]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>One of the many ironies of the Just Stop Oil movement is that, for the past year, their protests have been positively correlated with the price of oil. If you were tempted to indulge in a little schadenfreude, you might think that the infinitely annoying movement is putting money in the pockets of the world’s biggest fossil fuel producers.</p>
<p>The reality, however, is much grimmer. What has landed us here is a combination of three of the Biden administration’s signature policies — its aggressive support for ESG, its proxy war against Russia, and its sabre-rattling approach to China. The result is that the US is now in an energy chokehold right when the country needs as many options as possible.</p>
<p>After nearly two years of biting inflation, developed nations are starting to believe that the beast of relentlessly rising prices has been tamed. But as <a href="https://www.euronews.com/2023/09/25/oil-prices-keep-rising-experts-foresee-100-a-barrel" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.euronews.com/2023/09/25/oil-prices-keep-rising-experts-foresee-100-a-barrel&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1695821227907000&amp;usg=AOvVaw3H1BkR27X8nA9bebUhWj-T">oil prices again</a> barrel towards $100 — with one industry CEO <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-09-25/oil-is-headed-for-150-without-us-government-support-for-drilling-shale-ceo?leadSource=uverify%20wall" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-09-25/oil-is-headed-for-150-without-us-government-support-for-drilling-shale-ceo?leadSource%3Duverify%2520wall&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1695821227907000&amp;usg=AOvVaw1vSlWNdu__AjOyiHDJEcwu">predicting</a> it could reach a devastating $150 — that could be about to change. Earlier this month, Saudi Arabia announced that it would extend a July production cut of one million barrels a day through the end of 2023. On its own, this news is bad enough. What makes it worse is that the Saudis are now apparently coordinating energy policy with America’s enemy number one, Russia, which has cut <a href="https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/russia-cut-oil-exports-by-300000-bpd-september-2023-08-03/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">300,000 barrels a day</a> for the same period.</p>
<p>For Joe Biden, the timing couldn’t be worse. He is polling neck and neck with Donald Trump, and is facing an onslaught of challenges from House Republicans related to the business dealings of his son, Hunter. But from a policy point of view, the news is far more serious. The causes of surging oil prices trace back to structural changes Biden made to the economy, combined with now intractable foreign policy commitments, which, this late in the game, cannot be easily undone.</p>
<p>Those decisions go back to Biden’s very first day in office. On 20 January 2021, the new president signed an executive order revoking a permit required for the Keystone XL, an extension of an existing pipeline that would have transported an extra 830,000 barrels per day from Canadian oil fields to refineries in Texas. The move had its roots in Biden’s campaign strategy, which positioned Biden as a “climate change pioneer”. According to the text of Biden’s <a href="https://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/535114-biden-nixes-keystone-xl-permit-halts-arctic-refuge-leasing/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">executive order</a>: “The United States and the world face a climate crisis. That crisis must be met with action on a scale and at a speed commensurate with the need to avoid setting the world on a dangerous, potentially catastrophic, climate trajectory.” The Keystone XL pipeline “disserves” American interests, Biden said.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/07/has-the-west-lost-control-of-oil/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/07/has-the-west-lost-control-of-oil/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/GettyImages-928555530-1-e1688748811363.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/07/has-the-west-lost-control-of-oil/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/07/has-the-west-lost-control-of-oil/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Has the West lost control of oil?</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/07/has-the-west-lost-control-of-oil/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Helen Thompson</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>The media bolstered the decision, arguing that, with oil then trading at around $60 per barrel, the pipeline was not economically viable. But it would take just five months for oil to rise 50% to <a href="https://www.macrotrends.net/1369/crude-oil-price-history-chart" target="_blank" rel="noopener">around $80</a>, and a little more than a year for the price of oil to double to about $120 per barrel, pushing inflation up significantly. More importantly, Biden’s executive order and the decision by developers to abandon the pipeline signalled a shift in the policy winds on US energy and oil exploration. With the price of oil rising and the government taking an aggressive ESG-minded position on domestic exploration and development, oil producers went from investing in technologies such as new shale extraction methods to a new mode of profit-taking, where innovation is stopped in favour of extracting the profit from previous years’ investments.</p>
<p>When Biden signed the order, there was little or no inflation on the horizon. By the spring of that year, when inflation jumped to 4% and kept rising — with oil prices tracking it, resulting in a 50% jump in prices at the pump — the administration seemed to grow desperate. In November 2021, Biden began tapping the Strategic Petroleum Reserve, a reservoir of oil meant to weather the country through war. This began with an initial release of 50 million barrels (out of a total capacity of 714 million), in the hope that the move would lower fuel prices and curb inflation. It didn’t. Over the course of the subsequent year, Biden would release another <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2022/10/18/oil-prices-biden-to-announce-release-from-strategic-petroleum-reserve.html#:~:text=President%20Joe%20Biden%20will%20announce,5." target="_blank" rel="noopener">180 million barrels</a> of oil from the SPR, leaving the SPR at its lowest level <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/rrapier/2023/07/07/which-presidents-filled-and-depleted-the-strategic-petroleum-reserve/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">in four decades</a>.</p>
<p>If the White House appeared desperate in the winter of 2021, the following spring would bring about a series of events that would make the most powerful government in the world look like a third-rate power. In March last year, hoping to secure a promise by Gulf producers to increase production, Biden reached out to Mohammed Bin Salman, the de facto ruler of Saudi Arabia, and the UAE’s Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed al Nahyan. Astonishingly, both men declined to take the call.</p>
<p>While Opec+ lives up to its role as the world’s most powerful oil cartel, there generally has been enough wiggle room for American presidents to influence Saudi production. This is partly because, for the past three decades, Saudi Arabia has been more of a reformed American ally than a leverage-pushing adversary. The Saudis lowered prices in response to a lobbying effort by President George W. Bush in 2004 — a success quickly spun by the anti-Bush media as a Saudi attempt to interfere in US elections and “<a href="https://www.salon.com/2004/03/12/unger_2/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">buy</a>” the president — and again in 2008. Most importantly, whether or not they complied, and in some cases they didn’t, they were willing to hear the American president out.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/08/how-mbs-wins-friends-and-influences-people/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/08/how-mbs-wins-friends-and-influences-people/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/08/GettyImages-1499019590-copy-scaled.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/08/how-mbs-wins-friends-and-influences-people/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/08/how-mbs-wins-friends-and-influences-people/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>How MBS wins friends and influences people</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/08/how-mbs-wins-friends-and-influences-people/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> David H. Rundell</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>The reasons for Biden’s fall from the Gulf&#8217;s graces can be traced back to his role in leading aspects of foreign policy in the Obama White House. Specifically, Obama relied on Biden to advance and pass the nuclear deal with Iran which, in exchange for the removal of US sanctions, would see Iran slowing development of its nuclear programme and open it to international inspections. The Saudis, along with other Gulf allies, considered the deal a betrayal that endangered their national security.</p>
<p>After Trump scuppered the deal, Biden campaigned on reinstating it. In the context of Biden’s other Gulf-related campaign pledge — to turn Saudi Arabia into a “<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/24/us/politics/biden-jamal-khashoggi-saudi-arabia.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">pariah</a>” — and the barrages of missiles falling on Saudi Arabia from Iran-backed rebels in Yemen (which Trump also permitted without any significant action), the move seemed to double down on Obama-era fecklessness, leading to Saudi Arabia and UAE’s decision to not only refuse to increase oil production but to not pick up the phone.</p>
<p>By last October, Biden’s administration had no choice but to U-turn as it came out calling for an increase in US oil production. “You should be using these record-breaking profits to increase production and refining,” Biden said at an <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2022/10/19/biden-says-oil-companies-should-prioritize-lowering-prices-over-stock-buybacks.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">October 2022 press conference</a>. That, however, was no longer possible. The stock of cheap, easy-to-access shale had been pulled out of the ground, exhausting the country’s ability to continue ramping up production. And the Keystone pipeline extension that would have brought nearly one million barrels a day from Canada to Texas had been cancelled — by Biden.</p>
<p>While the administration was attempting to retrofit its energy policy, it was formulating the most aggressive economic response to a foreign war in memory. In April 2022, two months after Russia invaded Ukraine, the administration unleashed what it accurately characterised as “<a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2022/04/21/remarks-by-president-biden-providing-an-update-on-russia-and-ukraine-3/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">unprecedented sanctions</a>” against Russia. Biden claimed that, already, the sanctions were achieving the administration’s intended effect of “devastating” Russia’s economy.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/03/blackrocks-tyrannical-esg-agenda/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/03/blackrocks-tyrannical-esg-agenda/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/larry-fink-1.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/03/blackrocks-tyrannical-esg-agenda/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/03/blackrocks-tyrannical-esg-agenda/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>BlackRock’s tyrannical ESG agenda</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/03/blackrocks-tyrannical-esg-agenda/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> John Masko </a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Biden had resisted taking the most drastic economic step of banning Russian banks from Swift, a key component in the international banking system that allows banks in different countries to transact with each other. Biden cited oil prices as one reason, since without the ability to purchase Russian oil in dollars via Swift, Western allies would effectively be removing the country’s oil production from the global pool.</p>
<p>Yet while the US media reported on 25 February 2022 that Biden had rebuffed calls, including from some Democrats, for the Swift ban, the the very next day, the White House and its European allies announced that a number of Russian banks would indeed be blocked from it. A White House <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2022/02/26/politics/biden-ukraine-russia-swift/index.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">official told CNN</a> that the move, which Biden had nixed just 48 hours earlier at a press conference, was an “unprecedented act of global sanctions coordination”.</p>
<p>Predictably, within days, the price of oil had risen by 25%. It would continue to rise, eventually hitting a decade-high at $120 per barrel. But beyond oil prices, the sanctions culminating in the Swift ban presented another risk, this one strategic. On a G7 call prior to the decision, some allies of the economic block voiced the fear that, as the <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/69f72de5-d727-496d-9f9d-316db7bdaf03" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em>Financial Times</em> reported</a>, &#8220;removing Russia from Swift would accelerate efforts by it and China to create rival payment systems that did not use the US dollar&#8221;.</p>
<p>It took only a few weeks for China to capitalise on exactly this vulnerability. In March, China and Saudi Arabia began talks concerning settling oil transactions between the two countries in renminbi. By the end of the year, China turned this into an international strategy as President Xi Jinping “opened the door to trading crude oil and natural gas” in renminbi, as S&amp;P Global reported in a December <a href="https://www.spglobal.com/commodityinsights/en/market-insights/latest-news/oil/121122-china-opens-door-to-trade-crude-oil-and-natural-gas-in-yuan" target="_blank" rel="noopener">market insight report</a>.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/08/the-west-and-china-share-the-same-fate/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/08/the-west-and-china-share-the-same-fate/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/08/GettyImages-82220286-1-e1691517714315-copy.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/08/the-west-and-china-share-the-same-fate/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/08/the-west-and-china-share-the-same-fate/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The West and China share the same fate</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/08/the-west-and-china-share-the-same-fate/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> N.S. Lyons</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>At the time, there was intense scepticism regarding whether China would be able to pull this off in a meaningful fashion — and for good reason. China’s capital controls, its fixed currency and a relatively shallow and illiquid capital market, relative to the dollar, have made investors wary of parking their capital in renminbi-denominated accounts.</p>
<p>But that was before the US leveraged the dollar as an economic weapon against a country it was not even at war with. Today, the picture is changing. In March, China completed its first <a href="https://energy.economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/oil-and-gas/china-completes-first-yuan-settled-lng-trade/99079623?redirect=1" target="_blank" rel="noopener">liquefied natural gas trade</a> in yuan, in this case with the UAE. The yuan is now the dominant currency for China’s own cross-border payments, a first in the country’s modern history. Brazil and Argentina announced this year they would allow renminbi payments in transactions with China. Perhaps most significantly of all, over the past year, China has paid for almost all its Russian oil <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/dedollariztion-china-yuan-russia-oil-imports-sanctions-2023-5?r=US&amp;IR=T#:~:text=China's%20mounting%20such%20a%20strong,oil%20imports%20in%20the%20yuan&amp;text=China%20imported%20$88%20billion%20worth,the%20Chinese%20yuan,%20per%20Reuters." target="_blank" rel="noopener">in its own currency</a>.</p>
<p>In case China did not have enough reason to attempt a restructuring of global trade, Biden, in the midst of Chinese efforts to shift international payments to the yuan, publicly stated that the US would respond with military force if China were to invade Taiwan. This was a break with decades of US policy, and while the administration walked back the claims the next day, it would not take a leap of imagination on the part of Chinese officials to wonder how the US would leverage the country’s role as the backbone of global trade to alter the balance of power.</p>
<p>This is not evidence of the kind of de-dollarisation that China and other nations have sought for decades. But it does signal a new approach to strategic relations between countries such as China and Russia — and one that has come at the severe cost of America’s ability to influence oil prices. China and Russia are now not just allies, but economically bound to each other. Russia is no longer isolated but at the centre of a new axis of power. Worst of all, even the most extreme sanctions and complete weaponisation of the dollar have proved, if not ineffectual, then at least unable to achieve their strategic aims.</p>
<p>And, of course, winter is coming. With oil prices soaring, the US unable to meaningfully increase production, and Ukraine mired in a faltering counter-offensive, it seems that Biden’s most virtue-signalling policies will have the effect of simultaneously limiting the country’s options on trade, energy and foreign policy. The smart move would be to tap out by walking back one (if not all) of these policies. But with the US careening into an election year and Democrats alarmed by a slate of recent polls, for Biden failure may be the only option.</p>
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					<title>Will Russia win Slovakia&#8217;s election?</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2023/09/will-russia-win-slovakias-election/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://stage.unherd.com/2023/09/will-russia-win-slovakias-election/?edition=us#comments</comments>
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										<unherd:main_theme></unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Ian Birrell]]>
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					<unherd:creator_img>https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/Birrell.jpg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
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							<![CDATA[Putin apologist, 'Trojan horse' – and Slovakia's next prime minister? (VLADIMIR SIMICEK/AFP via Getty Images)]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Ian Birrell</strong> is an award-winning foreign reporter and columnist. He is also the founder, with Damon Albarn, of Africa Express.</p>
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						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>ianbirrell</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is an award-winning foreign reporter and columnist. He is also the founder, with Damon Albarn, of Africa Express.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Wed, 27 Sep 2023 23:00:15 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Thu, 12 Oct 2023 11:28:11 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Central Europe]]></category>
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								<![CDATA[This weekend's election could shatter the Nato consensus ]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p><em>Topoľčany, Slovakia</em></p>
<p>Zita took pride in joining the European Union two decades ago, seeing it as a symbol of Slovakia&#8217;s new freedom. But now she is frightened. &#8220;I want a better future for the next generation. But I fear we will go back to the old ways. I fear that democracy, everything is in danger.&#8221; She knew what it was like to grow up under communism, remembers the infamous Soviet invasion in 1968 and describes how entering the European Union was a symbol of overturning that regime. Now, Slovakia faces a similar crossroads, split over the Ukraine war, and forced to choose between supporting the EU-Nato alliance or Putin’s invasion.</p>
<p>It is a decision that has split Zita’s family. She tells me, through tears, how her family is split like the country by issues at core of this vote. She has fallen out with her sister who backed Moscow in the war with neighbouring Ukraine, while she assists a refugee from Bakhmut. Her distress as we talked in Topoľčany, a small town best known for its brewery, personifies the tensions ahead of an election in this small country.</p>
<p>A Nato member, little Slovakia is, at present, among Kyiv’s staunchest supporters, rushing to supply air-defence missiles and fighter jets at the beginning of the invasion. But as the war has progressed, the country has become a test-bed for Kremlin disinformation. The polls remain tight, with the progressives <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/sep/21/revealed-one-in-three-europeans-now-votes-anti-establishment" target="_blank" rel="noopener">taking a narrow lead yesterday</a>, but many still anticipate the election of a pro-Russian populist. And whichever way the result falls, this contest represents a major challenge to the European consensus on the Ukraine war — and a further inroad for the continent’s rampant radical-Right.</p>
<p>Robert Fico, leader of the Slovakian Social Democracy (Smer) party, is the moving force behind all this, and a politician who stretches pragmatism to its limit. He was born in Topoľčany, trained as a lawyer and joined the Communists. But, after leaving their successor party, Fico posed as a “Third Way” progressive centrist in the vein of Bill Clinton and Tony Blair at a time when Slovakia, led by an autocrat with connections to organised crime, was seen as Europe’s democratic laggard. This ushered him into power as prime minister and he ran the country for a decade. Then his second government collapsed in 2018, after mass protests following the murder of Ján Kuciak — a journalist investigating state corruption and government ties to the Italian mafia — and his fiancé Martina Kušnírová shook the capital.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/09/is-this-the-end-of-the-soros-empire/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/09/is-this-the-end-of-the-soros-empire/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/GettyImages-957419742-1.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/09/is-this-the-end-of-the-soros-empire/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading </span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/09/is-this-the-end-of-the-soros-empire/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Is this the end of the Soros empire?</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/09/is-this-the-end-of-the-soros-empire/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Thomas Fazi </a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Five years on, Fico has shrugged off attempts to tie him to the contract killing and stands on the threshold of power, having reinvented himself as an ultra-populist. After blaming George Soros for his downfall, he then exploited the struggles of his successors to cope with the pandemic, inflation and soaring energy prices. Today, he rails against green measures and migrants, rants about the threat of LGBT “ideology” and regurgitates Putin’s propaganda. “The war in Ukraine didn’t start yesterday or last year. It began in 2014 when the Ukrainian Nazis and fascists started to murder Russian citizens in Donbas and Luhansk,” <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/sep/21/revealed-one-in-three-europeans-now-votes-anti-establishment" target="_blank" rel="noopener">he told a cheering crowd</a> in Topoľčany last month.</p>
<p>Fico’s platform opposes EU sanctions on Moscow, seeks to end Slovakia’s military aid for Ukraine and stop Kyiv from joining Nato, and pushes for a peace deal that would let Putin keep occupied land. One former defence minister calls him a “Trojan horse” for the Kremlin. Others suggest he is being aided by Viktor Orbán in neighbouring Hungary, and Fico has been heavily promoted on state media there, which is watched by Slovakia’s sizeable Hungarian minority. Many Slovaks are concerned the Smer leader might follow the same path as the pugnacious Hungarian populist. And he certainly admires Orbán, according to Aneta Vilagi, a political scientist at Comenius University. “They are good political friends who understand they can help each other out,” she told me. “It would be useful for Orbán to have a similar voice with the same policies in the EU and Nato, while for Fico this shows you can be a member of the EU without being a cheerleader for the West.”</p>
<p>She sees Fico — a former academic at her university — as a threat to democracy. Grigorij Meseznikov, president of the Institute for Public Affairs, a think tank in Bratislava, believes that he wants to reduce space for political competition. &#8220;His number two has said freedom and peace come from the east, war comes from the west. But his main motivation is to protect himself after being officially named in three criminal investigations. He wants to gain power to change the law enforcement procedures.&#8221;</p>
<p>The day after I arrived in Bratislava there was a vivid demonstration of the passions aroused in this election. Igor Matovič, another former prime minister, drove up to a Smer campaign event in a pick-up truck emblazoned with the slogan “we will not hand you over to the mafia”. His protest was aimed at Fico’s ally Robert Kalinak, a central figure in the 2018 scandal. Matovič, an anti-graft campaigner who won the subsequent election but proved ill-suited to government, shouted that the ex-interior minister was a <em>mafioso</em> as the pair traded punches and kicks. “They&#8217;ve dragged Slovak politics to a new low,” despaired one prominent liberal politician.</p>
<p>This unruly confrontation was the perfect illustration of the intense feelings Fico stirs up. “I have never voted for Fico and never will vote for him — he robbed the state,” said Lucas, 39, a travel agent I met in Bratislava’s Old Town. “I’m even thinking of moving out of Slovakia because the politics is terrible, the corruption is terrible, the government is terrible.” Another woman told me she did not want to have children under his leadership. “I feel very sad he is coming back,” said Katerina, 35, a former flight attendant. “Everything he says is a lie or just populism, picking on topics of no importance for our people. I worry about democracy and freedom. I think it is going to go worse than Hungary.”</p>
<p>It is common to hear cynicism about politicians and see divisions in democratic societies. In this post-Communist country, these have been compounded by the turnover of four prime ministers in four years, with one poll indicating fewer than half the population now view liberal democracy as good for the nation. “I don’t know who to vote for because I don’t think anyone in the election deserves to represent our country,” said one resident in Topoľčany. Another voter there put it more bluntly: “They’re all dickheads who don’t think about the country at all.”</p>
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<p>But some voters regard Fico as the solution. A few grudgingly told me they would back him because he was more competent than his successors, despite the corruption. “I will not support him directly but will back another party that will be in coalition since there has been so much going wrong over the last few years,” said Peter, a driver, before adding ruefully that there seemed to be “a lot of sudden animosity among our people”. The only person I spoke to who sounded enthusiastic was Lubonir, 60, a member of Fico’s party. “I see problems everywhere. We need to build it back up.” When pressed, the warehouse worker echoed Fico, claiming that the war was not a European conflict since it was really being fought between Russia and the United States. “I support helping Ukraine but not with weapons,” he added.</p>
<p>It might seem strange to find this approach in a country that was invaded by Moscow within living memory (even if Putin did say helpfully earlier this month that “<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/sep/21/revealed-one-in-three-europeans-now-votes-anti-establishment" target="_blank" rel="noopener">it was a mistake</a>” to send tanks into Czechoslovakia). Lurking in the background, however, is the dark shadow of Russian disinformation, which began targeting Slovakia after the 2014 theft of Crimea and assault on Donbas. “We saw the aim: to manipulate public opinion,” said Dominika Hajdu, policy director at the Centre for Democracy and Resilience at Globsec, a Bratislava-based research group. “It started with Ukraine but developed to divide society over democracy, the West, Nato or the migration crisis. Since the full-scale invasion, Ukraine has again become the central and polarising issue.”</p>
<p>Hajdu said they had seen an eruption of online sites recycling Kremlin propaganda. Entrepreneurial locals saw an opportunity, whether paid directly by Moscow or from advertising revenues, which were thought to be worth up to €71,500 a month for the most popular sites. One contributor to a prominent channel was caught on camera being paid by <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/sep/21/revealed-one-in-three-europeans-now-votes-anti-establishment" target="_blank" rel="noopener">a Russian defence attaché, who said</a>: “I told Moscow you are a good guy, that you have many friends, the Slovak mafia.” Another contributor to the site who wrote under a Slovakian name was found to be Russian. In Crimea, a prominent Russian news outlet set up a Slovak-language site.</p>
<p>And beyond the Soviet Union, there is a lingering sentimental attachment to Moscow dating back to a 19<sup>th</sup>-century pan-Slavic movement. <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/sep/21/revealed-one-in-three-europeans-now-votes-anti-establishment" target="_blank" rel="noopener">One Globsec study in 2018</a> found that Slovaks were more likely than Czechs, Hungarians or Poles to look back favourably at the Soviet Union. Another revealed that <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/sep/21/revealed-one-in-three-europeans-now-votes-anti-establishment" target="_blank" rel="noopener">half of them see the US</a> as a security risk, a figure that has risen sharply in recent years. A poll taken across Eastern and Central Europe this year found only <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/sep/21/revealed-one-in-three-europeans-now-votes-anti-establishment" target="_blank" rel="noopener">40% of Slovaks blame Putin</a> for the war, with one in four of them retaining a positive view of Russia’s despot, while half think either Ukraine or the West <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/sep/21/revealed-one-in-three-europeans-now-votes-anti-establishment" target="_blank" rel="noopener">are “primarily responsible”.</a></p>
<p>“Slovakia is a big success for Russian propaganda with the Slovak audience very susceptible to its disinformation,” said Tomáš Strážay, director of the Slovak Foreign Policy Association. “They see Slovakia as a weak spot in Nato and Europe. Even in Hungary there is stronger support for Nato. Russia is using this opportunity.” Yet Strazay also blames domestic politicians for failing to promote liberal European values in a nation still building its statehood, saying that they simply see Brussels as “a cash machine” providing eight in every 10 euros of their public spending.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/09/my-night-out-with-the-proud-boys/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/09/my-night-out-with-the-proud-boys/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/GettyImages-1234017148-1-e1695053442723.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/09/my-night-out-with-the-proud-boys/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author </span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/09/my-night-out-with-the-proud-boys/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>My night out with the Proud Boys</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/09/my-night-out-with-the-proud-boys/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Ian Birrell </a></p></div></a></div>
<p>The toxicity of debate has already led Slovakia’s first female president to opt out of re-election next year. Zuzana Čaputová, an environmental activist, strong supporter of Ukraine and the most trusted politician in the country, won the post in wake of the 2018 post-assassination protests. It is largely ceremonial but appoints top judges, oversees the armed forces and can veto laws passed by parliament. Three months ago, Čaputová said she would not run again after receiving death threats and worrying about her family. Last week she <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/sep/21/revealed-one-in-three-europeans-now-votes-anti-establishment" target="_blank" rel="noopener">declared that she was suing Fico</a> over his false claims that she is an “American agent” and Soros stooge. “Making someone a target with hateful lies has cost people’s lives already in Slovakia,” she said.</p>
<p>The schism over Ukraine is deep, but there are widely shared concerns over issues such as education, globalisation, governance and inequality that Fico exploits with skill. He is part of a continent-wide tide of anti-establishment populism on Left and Right that last year attracted almost <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/sep/21/revealed-one-in-three-europeans-now-votes-anti-establishment" target="_blank" rel="noopener">one-in-three voters participating in elections</a>. Yet he has provoked intense speculation among Western diplomats over his real aims. One predicted he would be “a thorn in the side for Nato”, joining “the awkward squad with Orbán”. This envoy added that there had been a belief in the West that Eastern and Central Europe were “safe and democratic” although the rule of law was still taking root in some nations. “Russia has seen this and knows they are in play.”</p>
<p>Much depends on the the number of parties reaching the 5% threshold needed to win seats, since this will determine the shape of any governing coalition. And if he wins, Fico might re-adopt his previous strategy of strong rhetoric against Brussels and Washington at home while soothing allies abroad. But one thing is for sure: the world has greatly changed from when he was last in office in 2018.</p>
<p>Before leaving Bratislava, I meet Meseznikov, the Russian-born and Jewish analyst who runs the Institute for Public Affairs. “Just look around us here in this square and you see a Western nation,” he said with a sweep of his arm. “We are in the happiest time in our history in our region. We live in free societies, the borders are open, we can travel, there is freedom, we are members of Nato and the EU. There is a stable life in an area that has seen so many battles, ethnic cleansing, really bad social conditions. Sure, there are problems, some groups of people do not enjoy such good lives, voters have seen chaotic government — but these are the best of times. Sadly, now we face Putin with his crazy and destructive ideas — and the ugly politics of Fico.” But the question to be answered on Saturday is: does Slovakia agree?</p>
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					<title>Nato is weakening America</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2023/09/what-nato-sceptics-get-wrong-about-ukraine/?edition=us</link>
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					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Aris Roussinos]]>
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							<![CDATA[Get behind the defensive umbrella. (Artur Widak/NurPhoto via Getty Images)]]>
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							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Aris Roussinos</strong> is an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist and a former war reporter.</p>
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						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>arisroussinos</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist and a former war reporter.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Sat, 30 Sep 2023 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Sat, 30 Sep 2023 00:00:00 +0000</updated>
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								<![CDATA[Europe, not America, is calling the shots]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>Nearly three quarters of a century after Nato’s founding, Britain has slid down its league table of political and military power: from a near-peer ally of the United States to more or less open vassalage. To witness the conquered mindset of the British establishment, one need only read a <a href="https://www.spectator.co.uk/article/britains-shrinking-army-faces-an-uncertain-future/?utm_medium=Social&amp;utm_source=Twitter#Echobox=1694242325-1" target="_blank" rel="noopener">recent article</a> deliberating on what is to be done with the British Army, plummeting in numbers, capability and international esteem. It proposes to reshape our land forces as a collection of Special Forces units at America’s disposal: “we are likely to fight as part of a coalition in future, so why not be the sharpened tip of the American spear?”</p>
<p>On the one hand, the very idea of formalising Britain’s role as Washington’s most loyal and reckless auxiliary, without even the hint that Britain may have vital strategic interests of its own, strikes the reader as a shameful metric of national decline. Yet on the other, it is merely a frank acceptance of Britain’s true role in the world.</p>
<p>Just as the Five Eyes alliance, promoted as a valuable forum to share secret intelligence, can be more accurately viewed as a means to ensure the Anglophone intelligence establishment orientate themselves towards serving US foreign policy goals, the Nato alliance is as much a Cold War means of organising satellite states to serve imperial interests as was the Warsaw Pact. The distinction between Moscow’s loyal network of European generals, securocrats and pet politicians and those of present-day Washington is barely perceptible. Yet, in recent years, the value of the Nato alliance has declined markedly, both to Washington insiders increasingly disgruntled that the United States finds itself subsidising the defence of rich but feckless European states, and to some European leaders such as Macron, who famously termed the Cold War relic “brain dead”. The alliance’s most recent adventures, in Afghanistan and Libya, were disasters both to the countries fated to host its intervention, and to the European states who suddenly found themselves hosting the unwanted human floods that followed.</p>
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<p>Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, then, came as a godsend to the faltering alliance. Once again, Nato could focus on its core purpose: the American-led defence of Europe from an aggressive Moscow. Summarising an emergent  strand of thought on both the Left and Right of European politics, Wolfgang Streeck, writing in <a href="https://www.versobooks.com/en-gb/products/3093-natopolitanism" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em>Natopolitanism</em></a>, Verso’s collection of essays from the <em>New Left Review</em>, remarks that by “restoring the West, the war neutralised the various fault lines where the EU was crumbling… while catapulting the United States into a position of renewed hegemony over Western Europe, including its regional organisation, the European Union”. This precise critique, that a war-revived <a href="https://niccolo.substack.com/p/turbo-america" target="_blank" rel="noopener">“Turbo-America”</a> has consolidated its wavering hold on our home continent, grasping us ever more suffocatingly to the imperial bosom, is now commonplace in discussions of geopolitics following the Ukraine war: but is it true?</p>
<p>The authors in <em>Natopolitanism</em> robustly make the case that, as the writer Thomas Meaney observes, “in practice, Nato is above all a political arrangement that guarantees US primacy in determining answers to European questions“ and “administers US power in Eurasia, as a regional satrapy and launchpad for excursions elsewhere”. In essays spanning decades, which aim to “stand in contrast to the pieties and propaganda that saturate the Natopolitan scene”, the writers outline Washington’s strategy of “convincing potential competitors” such as Europe “that they need not aspire to a greater role”, while accounting “sufficiently for the interests of the advanced industrial nations to discourage them from challenging our leadership”. As Europe’s leadership shows, this plan was entirely successful, so that “what was once presumed to be an artefact of the Cold War order sits so comfortably at the heart of the Western system that it is frequently mistaken for a natural feature in the geopolitical landscape”.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/05/boomer-europe-is-dying/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/05/boomer-europe-is-dying/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/2GettyImages-917363126-1-1-scaled-e1684493128527.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/05/boomer-europe-is-dying/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author </span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/05/boomer-europe-is-dying/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Boomer Europe is dying</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/05/boomer-europe-is-dying/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Aris Roussinos </a></p></div></a></div>
<p>The book reminds us of the fearful warnings of US defence establishment giants such as <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/wikileaks-russia-cable-2014-5" target="_blank" rel="noopener">William J. Burns</a> that the decision to expand Nato eastwards, enfolding the Baltic and Central European states while leaving Ukraine and Georgia in their current, fateful ante-room to membership, was an act of monumental hubris which. It would, he wrote, “cross the brightest of Russia’s red lines” by “indulging the Ukrainians and Georgians in hopes of Nato membership on which we were unlikely to deliver, while reinforcing Putin’s sense that we were determined to pursue a course he saw as an existential threat”.</p>
<p>Indeed, <em>Natopolitanism</em>’s essential thrust — and the limitations of its analysis — can be summarised by the title of Realist theorist John Mearsheimer’s contribution: “Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault: The Liberal Delusions That Provoked Putin.” It captures a strain of thinking common to European strategic autonomists who regret that the alliance has kept the continent subordinate to Washington, Left-wing anti-imperialists keen to highlight the hypocrisy of the alliance’s newfound commitment to the inviolability of national borders, and to the American anti-interventionists whose stance is, at least in liberal interventionist eyes, now indistinguishable from “IR Realism” Outlining viewpoints mocked by American neoconservative broadsheet columnists and boisterous cartoon dogs on Twitter alike, the collection is perhaps the most sustained and articulate critique so far of Washington’s hubristic attitudes towards Russia.</p>
<p>And yet, much of its argument can be refuted by observation of the Ukraine war’s progress until now. The purported “last chance for peace” lamented by contributors, Russia’s eve-of-invasion request to rule out the alliance’s further eastward expansion, also included a demand to withdraw Nato infrastructure from the Central European and Baltic countries welcomed into the alliance a generation ago: a politically absurd demand made in the full knowledge it was impossible to grant. Far from the United States forcing European states into a stance of radical and self-defeating hostility to Russia, it is European states that have consistently pushed a reluctant Biden administration into delivering ever-more deadly and sophisticated weapons systems to Kyiv. The pattern of hawkish European states browbeating their cautious and reluctant overlord into greater escalation echoes the dynamic of the Libya intervention, where the bright-eyed and idealistic Cameron and Sarkozy pairing cajoled Obama’s intervention in what he later termed the Libyan “shitshow” against his better judgment. If anything, Nato displays the European tail wagging the American dog: instead of keeping Europe subordinate, weak but ambitious European states use the Nato alliance to advance their own foreign policy ends — that these ends would, in Libya, prove disastrous is a European failing rather than an American one.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/09/the-russian-invasion-was-a-rational-act/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/09/the-russian-invasion-was-a-rational-act/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/GettyImages-1246326347-e1694625194805.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/09/the-russian-invasion-was-a-rational-act/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading </span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/09/the-russian-invasion-was-a-rational-act/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The Russian invasion was a rational act</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/09/the-russian-invasion-was-a-rational-act/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> John Mearsheimer and Sebastian Rosato</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>No wonder that American defence thinkers, such as the Realist strategist <a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2022/11/how-america-can-save-taiwan/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Elbridge Colby</a>, dispassionately debate the idea of cutting the Baltic countries loose as a strategic burden a declining US can no longer afford. Yet the sceptical attitude to the alliance displayed by <a href="https://www.theamericanconservative.com/the-eu-should-have-an-army/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">the American Right</a>, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/14/us/politics/nato-president-trump.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">and particularly Trump</a>, points to another potential outcome from the war. While Streeck asserts that “the war also seems to have dealt a death blow to the French dream of turning the liberal empire of the European Union into a strategically sovereign global force, credibly rivalling both a rising China and a declining United States”, dwindling American political support for a war in which the EU has fully committed itself leaves Europe forced to assume a position of power, almost against its own will.</p>
<p>Ultimately, Europe’s future defence strategy will be written in the straits and islets of the Western Pacific: either the US will be forced to concentrate on the threat from China, forcing Europe to finally take up the burden of its own defence, or Washington will abandon its role as global hegemon, taking Europe tighter into its embrace as a rich and easily assimilable core empire. Either outcome is possible, and the decision will only come at the time of China’s choosing. But if the first eventuality comes to pass, with a giant and hostile neighbour to its east, and an imperial sponsor distracted from by its own great challenge on the other side of the world, Europe will be forced to extract itself from the position of helpless dependence its role in the Nato alliance has fostered.</p>
<p>For Left-wing writers such as Meaney, such an autonomous Europe is hardly a more appealing outcome than subordinate membership in the American alliance: “considering what the European Union is today, if it ever did succeed in taking a more militarised form, this would hardly be a rosy prospect,” he writes. “A competent EU army patrolling the Mediterranean littoral for migrants, enforcing an elaborate repatriation system, and forcing regimes in Africa and Asia to serve in perpetuity as extraction points for its resources and receptacles of its trash would only clinch the status of ‘Fortress Europe’.” European conservatives, accustomed by habit if not self-interest to look longingly for Washington’s approval, may yet come to welcome this new dispensation.</p>
<p>Certainly, the most recent iteration of Nato as a heavily armed liberal NGO would not survive this shift. As noted in <em>Natopolitanism</em>, Poland’s hawkish attitude to the Ukraine war has led Washington to forget its until-recently-held doubts about the strength of the country’s democratic institutions, just as concerns over Meloni’s purported fascism evaporated once she committed herself to the war. So, Streeck warns, controversies over the “‘rule of law’ will become increasingly obsolete as cultural conflicts between “liberal” and “illiberal” democracy will be eclipsed by the geostrategic objectives of Nato and the United States,” while “a shift in political power inside the EU may be imminent in favour of the Union’s eastern front states”. Poland’s massive programme of rearmament, plus the planned incorporation within the EU of whatever iteration of the Ukrainian state follows the war, already promises a shift in Europe’s gravity from the post-national liberalism of the continent’s northwest to the resurgent, militarised nationalisms of the eastern frontier. As long as the new Europe’s defence posture alleviates the burden on the United States, Washington voices which once promoted Nato as an engine for liberal idealism will no more protest Europe’s Rightward political experimentation than their equivalents of past decades did the pliant authoritarian regimes of member states Portugal, Greece and Turkey.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/07/britain-is-europes-liberal-outcast/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/07/britain-is-europes-liberal-outcast/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/GettyImages-455584006.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/07/britain-is-europes-liberal-outcast/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author </span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/07/britain-is-europes-liberal-outcast/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Britain is Europe&#039;s liberal outcast</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/07/britain-is-europes-liberal-outcast/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Aris Roussinos </a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Far from ensuring Europe’s political and economic subordination, America’s retrenchment towards simultaneously managing both a great struggle with China and its own internal political conflict is very likely to leave Europe functionally autonomous. American voters and politicians may <a href="https://news.yahoo.com/zelenskyy-returns-washington-face-growing-040353960.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">already be tiring</a> of what will be a long and bloody war: Ukraine has, it seems, already reached the high-watermark of Pentagon support. Yet committed as Europe now is, with expanding Russian armies on its doorstep, disengagement is a luxury European leaders cannot afford. Perhaps things might have been otherwise, if different decisions had been made at the zenith of American power: but there is no rewriting history, no going back, and we are forced to make the best we can of the cards our masters dealt us.</p>
<p>In all this, the Sixth Form Third Worldist anti-imperialism of <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2022/apr/20/jeremy-corbyn-would-like-to-see-nato-ultimately-disband" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Nato sceptics such as Corbyn</a> has been superseded by events. The idea that Corbyn could ever have extracted Britain from Nato was fanciful. As Meaney observes of Central Europe, “were any political leadership in Poland, Romania, Hungary, or any other Eastern European state to become intolerable for Washington, it would have an open, exploitable channel to that country’s military, greased by years of mutual exchanges, including stints at Nato headquarters, bevies of Nato conferences, retreats, and ceremonies, as well as wars fought together in the Middle East”. Precisely the same is true, with the inclusion of securocrats and wonks as loyal devotees, for us Western European countries. As the desperate wheedling for an American pat on their head from Britain’s defence establishment makes clear, the idea of Britain pursuing strategic ends distinct from those of its imperial master is literally incomprehensible to our governing class. Updating this strategic calculus is more likely to result from <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/02/27/opinion/a-war-with-china-would-reach-deep-into-american-society.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">a sudden external shock</a> than dispassionate consideration of Britain’s interests.</p>
<p>Yet Macron’s sudden pivot from Nato-scepticism towards <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/france-emmanuel-macron-ukraine-war-russia-uturn-vladimir-putin/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">a full-throated commitment</a> to the alliance’s eastward expansion reminds us that other outcomes are possible. In our current turbulent period of interregnum between American supremacy and retreat from global hegemony, the Nato alliance may provide the framework within which a future, sovereign Europe can establish itself, through the creation of a notionally subordinate European defence pillar ready to take up the burden of the continent’s security from its faltering sponsor. There is no political utility in railing against Nato, given the unshakeable attachment of European elites to their sinecures as loyal auxiliaries. Yet by working within Nato structures, to establish Europe as an equal partner within the alliance rather than a collection of weak and disunited supplicants, our home continent may still quietly prepare itself for <a href="https://thehill.com/policy/international/3900921-former-nato-chief-trump-nomination-would-be-geopolitical-catastrophe/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">the withdrawal of America’s protective shield</a>, and the contested multipolar order already bloodily dawning on its borders. Just as Rome’s successor states, once the legions left, still proudly wore imperial titles, Nato’s ghostly form may yet outlast the empire itself.</p>
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					<title>Elon Musk hasn&#8217;t betrayed Ukraine</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2023/09/elon-musk-hasnt-betrayed-ukraine/?edition=us</link>
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						<![CDATA[Thomas Fazi]]>
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							<![CDATA[An artillery division sends  intel using a Starlink connection (Pierre Crom/Getty Images)]]>
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							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Thomas Fazi</strong> is an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist and translator. His latest book is <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/the-covid-consensus/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">The Covid Consensus</a>, co-authored with Toby Green.</p>
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						<unherd:twitter_handle>battleforeurope</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist and translator. His latest book is <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/the-covid-consensus/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">The Covid Consensus</a>, co-authored with Toby Green.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Mon, 18 Sep 2023 23:01:12 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Tue, 19 Sep 2023 06:07:02 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Elon Musk]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[SpaceX Starlink]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ukraine war]]></category>
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								<![CDATA[Starlink worked for the military from the start]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>It was September 2022, and Kyiv was determined to attack the Russian naval fleet at the Crimean port of Sevastopol. Their plan was straightforward: guided by SpaceX’s Starlink satellite system, six drone submarines would sneak through Russia’s defences and detonate their explosives. Starlink, owned by Elon Musk, had been providing communications services to Ukraine since the start of the war; there was every reason to believe the mission would be a success.</p>
<p>Except it wasn’t. In a new<a href="https://www.simonandschuster.com/books/Elon-Musk/Walter-Isaacson/9781982181284" target="_blank" rel="noopener"> biography</a>, Walter Isaacson writes that Musk, concerned the attack would make Starlink complicit in a major act of war and potentially prompt an escalatory Russian response (perhaps even a nuclear one), decided to secretly switch off Starlink’s coverage of Crimea.</p>
<p>Musk has since dismissed these claims, pointing out that Crimea was not covered by Starlink in the first place <a href="https://kyivindependent.com/musk-says-he-didnt-turn-on-starlink-due-to-us-sanctions-on-russia/#:~:text=U.S.%20sanctions%20on%20Russia%20meant,Los%20Angeles%20on%20Sept.%2012." target="_blank" rel="noopener">because</a> of US sanctions on Russia (which included Crimea); he simply refused to act upon an emergency request by the Ukrainian government for the connection to be turned on for what Musk described as “a Pearl Harbor-type attack on the Russian fleet in Sevastopol”. “Our terms of service clearly prohibit Starlink for offensive military action, as we are a civilian system, so they were asking for something that was expressly prohibited,” Musk <a href="https://twitter.com/elonmusk/status/1700345943105638636?s=20" target="_blank" rel="noopener">said</a>.</p>
<p>Isaacson subsequently <a href="https://twitter.com/WalterIsaacson/status/1700342242290901361?s=20">admitted</a> his mistake. His “revelation”, however, incorrect as it may have been, has nonetheless fuelled a frenzy of attacks directed at Musk. He was called <a href="https://twitter.com/Podolyak_M/status/1699820072418656331?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1699820072418656331%7Ctwgr%5E3d83d54b179c13bee4175f632d83554635981b98%7Ctwcon%5Es1_&amp;ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.theguardian.com%2Ftechnology%2F2023%2Fsep%2F08%2Felon-musk-committed-evil-starlink-order-ukraine">“evil”</a> by a high-level Ukrainian official and a <a href="https://news.yahoo.com/elon-musk-traitor-us-hold-124000812.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">“traitor”</a> by American pro-war hawks. MSNBC’s Rachel Maddow <a href="https://twitter.com/alx/status/1701424181580124577%C3%B9" target="_blank" rel="noopener">said</a> Musk was “intervening to try to stop Ukraine from winning the war”. CNN’s Jake Tapper <a href="https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-news/blinken-musk-starlink-ukraine-1234821712/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">called</a> Musk a “capricious billionaire” who “effectively sabotaged a military operation by Ukraine, a US ally”. Senator Elizabeth Warren even called for an immediate <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2023/09/12/warren-calls-for-investigation-into-elon-musk-and-starlink-in-ukraine.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">congressional investigation</a> into Starlink’s activities in Ukraine.</p>
<p>Such reactions were surprising for a number of reasons. Putting aside Musk’s remarkable support for Ukraine and the strictly legal argument for restraint — namely that Musk needed US presidential authorisation to activate Starlink over Crimea — they forget that his position on Russia’s Crimean “red line” was widely held at the time. Indeed, it was shared until recently by several American and Western <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/europe/20230404-ukraine-unveils-plan-for-recaptured-crimea-%E2%80%93-but-west-reluctant-to-help" target="_blank" rel="noopener">experts</a> and diplomats, <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2023/02/15/blinken-crimea-ukraine-putin-00083149" target="_blank" rel="noopener">including</a> Biden’s own Secretary of State Antony Blinken. That the US administration has now pivoted on Crimea, and on Ukrainian <a href="https://twitter.com/MaxAbrahms/status/1703182192195616774" target="_blank" rel="noopener">attacks in Russian territory</a>, does not change the fact that Musk’s view reflected the consensus last September. Nor, of course, does Russia’s reluctance to go nuclear, despite Ukraine recently carrying out <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/sep/13/ukrainian-missiles-strike-russias-black-sea-fleet-in-crimea" target="_blank" rel="noopener">a successful attack</a> on the Russian Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol, exclude more serious forms of retaliation in the future, especially if Russia’s control of Crimea is threatened.</p>
<p>Even more important, recent criticisms of Musk obfuscate a more pressing issue: how did a private businessman come to play such a crucial role in this war in the first place?</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/07/the-ukraine-war-is-about-to-get-worse/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/07/the-ukraine-war-is-about-to-get-worse/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/2GettyImages-1239498112-1.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/07/the-ukraine-war-is-about-to-get-worse/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author </span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/07/the-ukraine-war-is-about-to-get-worse/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The Ukraine war is about to get worse</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/07/the-ukraine-war-is-about-to-get-worse/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Thomas Fazi </a></p></div></a></div>
<p>In order to answer this question, we must return to February 24, 2022. Just one hour before the invasion, a hacker attack, quite obviously carried out by the Russians, put out of use thousands of modems connected to the American satellite company Viasat, which the Ukrainian government and military relied on for command and control of the country’s armed forces. This meant that, in the earliest hours of the invasion, Ukraine was largely deaf and blind, with very limited communication abilities.</p>
<p>Two days after the invasion, Mykhailo Fedorov, Ukraine’s deputy prime minister, <a href="https://twitter.com/FedorovMykhailo/status/1497543633293266944" target="_blank" rel="noopener">appealed</a> to Musk on Twitter to provide Ukraine access to Starlink’s satellite internet system — the only system capable of providing the necessary coverage: “While your rockets successfully land from space — Russian rockets attack Ukrainian civil people! We ask you to provide Ukraine with Starlink stations.” That same day, <a href="https://twitter.com/elonmusk/status/1497701484003213317" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Musk replied</a>: “Starlink service is now active in Ukraine. More terminals en route.” Two days later, 10,000 relay stations needed to receive the signal from Starlink <a href="https://twitter.com/FedorovMykhailo/status/1498392515262746630?lang=en" target="_blank" rel="noopener">were delivered</a> to Ukraine. Shortly afterwards, Starlink brought the Ukrainian government and military back online, allowing them to communicate and coordinate battlefield operations, and giving them an eye in the sky (through satellite-guided drones) capable of tracking Russian movements and striking military targets with pinpoint accuracy.</p>
<p>It should be noted that the exchange of tweets between Fedorov and Musk was largely a marketing stunt. In March 2022, SpaceX’s president Gwynne Shotwell had already <a href="https://www.space.com/how-spacex-got-starlink-running-ukraine" target="_blank" rel="noopener">revealed</a> that Starlink had been working for weeks to bring Starlink’s satellite internet service to Ukraine. This would explain how the company was able to deliver thousands of terminals to a war zone in a matter of days. In the subsequent months, more than 40,000 terminals, used not just by the military but by banks, businesses and hospitals, were delivered to Ukraine, with the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/04/08/us-quietly-paying-millions-send-starlink-terminals-ukraine-contrary-spacexs-claims/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">financial support of</a> USAID.</p>
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<p>It is hard to overstate just how important Starlink has been for Ukraine; one could even argue that it has been the single most important factor behind Kyiv’s defence, considering that much of weaponry provided by the West would have been largely ineffective without the support of satellite-guided drones, and without real-time communication between soldiers. It also allowed the economy, particularly the banking system, to keep functioning. Crucially, SpaceX initially offered Starlink’s services for free, at a significant financial burden for the company. As Fedorov <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2023/07/28/business/starlink.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">told</a> the <em>New York Times</em>: “Starlink is indeed the blood of our entire communication infrastructure now… This is one of the fundamental components of our success.” “Without Starlink, we cannot fly, we cannot communicate,” a Ukrainian deputy added.</p>
<p>Relations between Musk and Ukraine, however, started to sour last autumn. Musk started growing increasingly concerned about Starlink’s use for offensive purposes, as attested by the Crimea affair. In October, Russia also <a href="https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/international_safety/1835557/">raised the issue</a> at the UN General Assembly: it denounced “the use by the United States and its allies of civilian, including commercial, infrastructure elements in outer space for military purposes”, and, clearly referring to Starlink, warned that this “quasi-civilian infrastructure may become a legitimate target for retaliation” (something that Musk himself had<a href="https://twitter.com/elonmusk/status/1499472139333746691"> expressed concern</a> about).</p>
<p>At around the same time, Musk <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/10/26/technology/elon-musk-geopolitics-china-ukraine.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">proposed a peace plan</a> for Ukraine that included Russia maintaining control of Crimea, sparking outrage among both Ukrainian and Western officials. Zelenskyy openly <a href="https://twitter.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1577006943499350016" target="_blank" rel="noopener">questioned</a> Musk’s loyalty, to which the latter <a href="https://twitter.com/elonmusk/status/1577077410863775744">replied</a>: “SpaceX’s out of pocket cost to enable and support Starlink in Ukraine is ~$80M so far. Our support for Russia is $0. Obviously, we are pro-Ukraine.”</p>
<p>Musk’s response highlighted the company’s growing concerns about the mounting costs borne by SpaceX. The company made it clear that the situation was not only financially unsustainable but also unfair, in view of Starlink’s crucial role in assisting military operations in Ukraine, American defence companies were making billions from the war — why should SpaceX be expected to provide its services for free? In an attempt to remedy this, the company started discussions with the Pentagon to fund Starlink for Ukraine. Eventually, in June, the US Department of Defense <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2023/06/01/starlink-ukraine-pentagon-elon-musk/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">revealed</a> that it had negotiated a deal with SpaceX to take over Starlink’s services in Ukraine — so we can assume that the system is now largely under the Pentagon’s control.</p>
<p>There are several lessons to be drawn from this. The first is that, as Italian journalist Frediano Finucci writes in <a href="https://www.ibs.it/operazione-satellite-conflitti-invisibili-dalla-libro-frediano-finucci/e/9791255410140" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em>Operazione Satellite</em></a>, future historians will look back on this conflict as the “first global satellite war”. The second is that, while Musk can be accused of a lot of things, his support for Ukraine cannot be underestimated. Indeed, if anything, Musk could be criticised for the opposite reason — for giving Ukraine and the West an excuse <a href="https://www.theamericanconservative.com/why-peace-talks-but-no-peace/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">not to negotiate</a> a peace deal in the early days of the war, when Russia had less leverage than today, and ultimately leaving Ukraine in a worse negotiating position than it was a year ago.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/07/will-ukraine-repel-the-new-russian-assault/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/07/will-ukraine-repel-the-new-russian-assault/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/GettyImages-1429989770-2.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/07/will-ukraine-repel-the-new-russian-assault/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading </span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/07/will-ukraine-repel-the-new-russian-assault/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Will Ukraine repel the new Russian assault?</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/07/will-ukraine-repel-the-new-russian-assault/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> David Patrikarakos </a></p></div></a></div>
<p>But the real question is: did Musk have a choice? There is more than a hint of disingenuousness in Musk&#8217;s claim that Starlink is a purely civilian system, or<a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2023/09/07/elon-musk-starlink-ukraine-russia-invasion/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"> that</a> “Starlink was not meant to be involved in wars [but] so people can watch Netflix and chill and get online for school and do good peaceful things”. The reality is that SpaceX received around <a href="https://historycollection.jsc.nasa.gov/JSCHistoryPortal/history/oral_histories/C3PO/GriffinMD/GriffinMD_1-12-13.htm" target="_blank" rel="noopener">85% of its initial funding</a> by the US government, and has been working very closely with the US military from its inception, particularly insofar as its satellite services are concerned.</p>
<p>In fact, Starlink was <a href="https://maxpolyakov.com/hidden-military-potential-of-starlink/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">first tested</a> by the US Air Force as a communications system for its aircraft, and the system’s largest known customer today is the Space Development Agency, a Pentagon subsidiary formed as part of the Trump administration’s effort to resurrect the Strategic Defense Initiative, a proposed space-based missile defence system intended to protect the US from attack by ballistic nuclear weapons. In December, SpaceX even announced the launch of Starshield, an offshoot dedicated to US government and military programmes, which is likely to now oversee operations in Ukraine.</p>
<p>This story, then, is much more complex than that of a good-willing but naïve entrepreneur who decided to provide his satellite service to Ukraine for humanitarian purposes and ended up embroiled in the war against his will. One might argue that Starlink has been used by Ukraine — and Nato — to do precisely what it was created to do (alongside other commercial uses): to provide US or US-allied forces uninterrupted, hard-to-jam communications and targeting capabilities anywhere in the world. In this sense, this is also a story about the growing — and deliberate, I would argue — blurring of the line between corporate and state power, including <a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/04/private-armies-have-infiltrated-the-west/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">in the military sphere</a>, with the precise aim of diffusing and deflecting political responsibility. This is arguably what has allowed the US to effectively colonise low-Earth orbit under the guise of promoting allegedly politically neutral (but in fact state-dependent) private satellite services — first and foremost Starlink.</p>
<p>Here, it is important to appreciate the strategic advantage that, in just a few years, Starlink has achieved over other companies: of the roughly 7,500 active satellites currently orbiting Earth today, more than 4,500 belong to SpaceX. This gives the US, and its national security apparatus, a huge edge. China and other countries (including the EU) are trying to catch up, but they are still very much lagging behind.</p>
<p>This is therefore also a story about the transformation of low-Earth orbit into a territory of geopolitical, and even military, confrontation in its own right. Projections predict between 100,000 and 200,000 satellites in Earth’s orbit in the next 10 years. SpaceX alone plans to put into space a staggering total of 42,000 satellites. Meanwhile, all major countries have already developed anti-satellite systems capable of destroying enemy satellites — an area they are likely to focus on evermore in light of Starlink’s crucial role in the war.</p>
<p>For the past 19 months, we’ve all been focusing on what was happening in the ground in Ukraine; what we didn’t realise was that another war — a satellite war — was also unfolding high above the sky. And in this arms race, Musk is winning.</p>
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					<title>How Kim Jong Un became Prince Charming</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2023/09/how-kim-jong-un-became-putin-prince-charming/?edition=us</link>
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						<![CDATA[Sung-Yoon Lee]]>
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							<![CDATA[Kim has a plan for Russia. (Getty Images)]]>
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							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Sung-Yoon Lee</strong> is a scholar of Korean studies at The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. He is the author of <a href="https://www.panmacmillan.com/authors/sung-yoon-lee/the-sister/9781529073539" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em>The Sister</em></a> (Pan MacMillan/PublicAffairs).</p>
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						<unherd:twitter_handle>SungYoonLee1</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is a scholar of Korean studies at The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. He is the author of <a href="https://www.panmacmillan.com/authors/sung-yoon-lee/the-sister/9781529073539" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em>The Sister</em></a> (Pan MacMillan/PublicAffairs).]]>
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										<pubDate>Thu, 14 Sep 2023 23:01:35 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Fri, 15 Sep 2023 10:45:20 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Kim Jong Un]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[North Korea]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Russia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ukraine war]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Vladimir Putin]]></category>
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								<![CDATA[Russia needs North Korea more than ever]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>When a reclusive North Korean dictator makes his lumbering way to Russia on a luxurious armour-plated train, the world cannot help but watch. And Kim Jong Un’s trip to visit Vladimir Putin in the Russian Far East was no exception. The geopolitical implications were hard to ignore.</p>
<p>Their meeting started with a protracted 40-second handshake — and ended with a grand barter between two widely disdained despots who need each other now more than ever. Putin, in prospective violation of multiple United Nations Security Council resolutions banning Pyongyang’s rocket launches, graciously pledged his <a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/09/13/1199190066/russia-north-korea-putin-kim-jong-un-summit" target="_blank" rel="noopener">support</a> for North Korea’s satellite technology. Kim, ever the courteous guest, vowed <a href="https://d.docs.live.net/79b9183304ae74c2/Documents/violation%20of%20multiple%20United%20Nations%20Security%20Council%20resolutions%20banning%20Pyongyang%E2%80%99s%20rocket%20launches%20that%20he%20had%20endorsed%20before" target="_blank" rel="noopener">“full support”</a> for Russia’s “just fight against hegemonic forces”.</p>
<p>Both parties knew exactly what they wanted. Kim needs Moscow’s support for his growing advanced nuclear and missile programmes, as well Russian money, grain, and oil. Putin, meanwhile, needs ammunition, anti-tank artillery shells, and small arms for his invasion of Ukraine. He also needs manpower — North Korean soldiers operating in the border region and perhaps in Ukraine itself under the camouflage of &#8220;engineers, medics, construction workers, mechanics&#8221;.</p>
<p>This is fine by Kim, as it is clearly in his interests to stick it to the US and its allies in the region, South Korea, and Japan. Why? Because instilling fear into North Korea’s enemies has always brought dividends.</p>
<p>Kim learned this trick from his father, Kim Jong Il (1941-2011), who was a master manipulator. His fool-proof strategy was this: first, threaten South Korea with small-scale lethal attacks. Next, provoke the US with missile and nuclear tests. Wait out the loud condemnations and meek efforts at sanctions enforcement. Then, in a dramatic gesture, summon North Korea’s suitors with calls for denuclearisation and peace talks. They all answer the call, and almost always turn up with cash, food, fuel, and other blandishments. This has been the leitmotif of the past 30 years of nuclear diplomacy vis-à-vis Pyongyang, during which North Korea has gained tens of billions of US dollars’ worth of concessions while continuing to grow its nuclear arsenal. And it has become part of Kim Jong Un’s playbook, too.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/08/has-xi-jinping-bankrupted-china/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/08/has-xi-jinping-bankrupted-china/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/08/GettyImages-1618914777-1-e1692804521946-copy.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/08/has-xi-jinping-bankrupted-china/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/08/has-xi-jinping-bankrupted-china/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Has Xi Jinping bankrupted China?</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/08/has-xi-jinping-bankrupted-china/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Edward Luttwak</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Although Kim presides over a Soviet-style “planned economy” that appears not to have an actual plan, on security matters, he has an elaborate long-term plan. Contrary to popular perceptions, the North Korean dictator is not “crazy” or “unpredictable”. He does not go berserk without restraint but methodically and calculatedly resorts to limited attacks and varying degrees of provocations, followed by de-escalation and diplomatic outreach. His meeting with Putin is a prelude to his eventual engagement with the US, South Korea, and Japan from a position of strength — all of which will be preceded by a trip to China.</p>
<p>Throughout its history, North Korea’s supreme leaders have followed the same strategy: controlled provocations followed by post-provocation peace ploys. Consider Kim Il Sung, the state’s founder and grandfather of Kim Jong Un. Sensing the great shift in geopolitics in the wake of US President Richard Nixon’s visit to China in February 1972, he projected a charming and entirely reasonable persona by meeting with a series of eminent American reporters and a law professor that summer. The North Korean dictator, to everyone’s surprise, came across as not only <em>not crazy</em> but actually very smart, knowledgeable, and entirely affable.</p>
<p>His son, Kim Jong Il, after six years of hermetic lifestyle and missile-borne belligerence, similarly visited Beijing in May 2000. The next month he received South Korean President Kim Dae Jung with a broad smile and palpable bonhomie, thus starring as the main protagonist in the first-ever inter-Korean summit. Peace was nigh, many dreamed. In July, he received Putin and in October sent a special envoy, Vice Marshal Jo Myong Rok, to Bill Clinton, inviting the President to visit North Korea. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright toasted Kim Jong Il less than a fortnight later in Pyongyang.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/08/how-mbs-wins-friends-and-influences-people/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/08/how-mbs-wins-friends-and-influences-people/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/08/GettyImages-1499019590-copy-scaled.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/08/how-mbs-wins-friends-and-influences-people/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/08/how-mbs-wins-friends-and-influences-people/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>How MBS wins friends and influences people</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/08/how-mbs-wins-friends-and-influences-people/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> David H. Rundell</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Kim Jong Un, just like his father, refused to greet a single head of state or make a foreign visit for the first six years upon inheriting power. Then, quite dramatically, he popped up in Beijing in March 2018. His first meeting with President Xi Jinping was followed by summit meetings with South Korean President Moon Jae-In in April and President Xi again in Dalian in May. He met President Donald Trump in Singapore in June and made another visit to China just days later. In September, he received Moon in Pyongyang, shedding his previous image of the cruel, surly despot and coming across, if not entirely as an affable chap, then at least as a reasonable statesman.</p>
<p>Unlike his predecessors, however, Kim did not launch this charm offensive alone. At his side was his trusted sister, Kim Yo Jong, who made her international debut at the Winter Olympics in South Korea in February 2018, winning over much of the host nation just by being there in person and smiling occasionally. Thereafter, a series of summit meetings followed in which her brother was the star and she the supporting actress. Together, North Korea’s supreme leader and the First Sister engaged the leaders of China, South Korea, and the US.</p>
<p>At this week’s meeting in Russia, Yo Jong resumed her well-versed role as her brother’s <a href="https://www.cnn.com/europe/live-news/russia-ukraine-war-news-09-13-23/h_7d85e272bb6cb75ffd281dfbb00681d7" target="_blank" rel="noopener">doting deputy</a>. As he sat down to sign Putin’s guest book, she brought out his pen and watched politely. While she may have been excluded from Kim’s private tête-à-têtes with Putin, the visit was a harbinger of the eventual return of Kim Yo Jong’s former role as the messenger of peace.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/07/has-the-west-lost-control-of-oil/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/07/has-the-west-lost-control-of-oil/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/GettyImages-928555530-1-e1688748811363.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/07/has-the-west-lost-control-of-oil/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/07/has-the-west-lost-control-of-oil/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Has the West lost control of oil?</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/07/has-the-west-lost-control-of-oil/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Helen Thompson</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Since the onset of Covid, however, when the Kim regime castellated itself against the outside world, Kim Yo Jong has played the role of the “Even Worse Cop” to her brother’s “Bad Cop”, ordering the demolition of an inter-Korean liaison office built entirely with South Korean funds and issuing threats of pre-emptive nuclear attack on the South. It was a clever role reversal, for it laid the stage for a sudden return to her delightful old self, which will create even sunnier visions of peace than the one she had created in 2018.</p>
<p>In this game, Ms Kim is expected to enjoy a great advantage simply by virtue of her gender and youth. Her nasty put-downs of Moon, his successor Yoon Suk Yeol and President Joe Biden in recent years are somewhat easier to stomach because they come from a young, slender, pretty woman rather than her portly, less photogenic, male sibling. That is, she can get away with a lot more than her brother.</p>
<p>In due course, no doubt Ms Kim will offer a beguiling smile and engage her nation’s adversaries once again. This time, however, with North Korea’s increased nuclear stockpile, their negotiation position will be all the stronger. And the steady path to that stronger future will have been paved by the despotic duo’s journey to Amur Oblast in their swanky family train.</p>
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