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		<title>Woodrow Wilson - UnHerd</title>
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					<title>MAGA’s samurai justice in Venezuela</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2026/01/trumps-samurai-justice-in-venezuela/?edition=us</link>
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										<unherd:main_theme>Regime change</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Michael Lind]]>
					</dc:creator>
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																<unherd:article_ranking>2</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[Nicolas Maduro landing on a helipad in Manhattan. Credit: Getty]]>
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							<![CDATA[<p>Michael Lind is a columnist at <em>UnHerd</em>.</p>
]]>
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															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[Michael Lind is a columnist at <em>UnHerd</em>.]]>
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										<pubDate>Tue, 06 Jan 2026 00:01:27 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Tue, 06 Jan 2026 13:22:07 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Holy Roman Empire]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[international law]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Venezuela]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[Woodrow Wilson]]></category>
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								<![CDATA[Self-interested policing is nothing new]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">In the 1956 Akira Kurosawa classic, </span><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">The Seven Samurai</span></i><span style="font-weight: 400;">, and its 1960 American remake, </span><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">The Magnificent Seven</span></i><span style="font-weight: 400;">, a group of masterless warriors take it upon themselves to protect townspeople from marauders. But there’s a catch: the samurai and Western gunslingers (respectively) insist on getting paid by the people they protect.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">That about sums up the theory of international law under which President Trump extracted Venezuelan dictator Nicolás Maduro from his home at a military base in Caracas to put him on trial in New York City for drug trafficking. It’s law for a stateless space — which is to say, for our world. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">There are, of course, other theories of international law. One view — call it the Hobbesian, after the 17th-century English philosopher Thomas Hobbes — holds that there is no such thing as international law. In this view, in the absence of a world government with its own police, law exists within states, but not among them, other than the law of the jungle, tempered by whatever restraints morality or prudence might support.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">At the other extreme is what might be called the Wilsonian view, after President Woodrow Wilson. In the late 19th century and early 20th centuries, many idealists dreamed of world federalism, which would replace international affairs with the internal affairs of a world government. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Other reformers a century ago put their hopes in international agencies — leagues of nations, world courts and arbitration tribunals, international police forces, international agencies — that could create de-facto world governance in the absence of a world state by means of cooperation among independent states. Wilsonians put great weight on multilateral treaties and the rulings of transnational agencies and courts as definitive and compulsory international law.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">But the most persuasive account is the one depicted in </span><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">The Seven Samurai </span></i><span style="font-weight: 400;">and </span><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">The Magnificent Seven</span></i><span style="font-weight: 400;">. It could be described as the vigilante theory of international law. Vigilantism is the practice by which members of a community or outsiders carry out rough justice in the absence of a functioning or legitimate state. In this view, international law </span><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">is genuine law</span></i><span style="font-weight: 400;"> — but it is the customary law of a stateless society.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The bureaucratic state — in which legislators and judges and police and military officers are paid out of taxation to enact, judge, and enforce laws — is a recent development in human history. But law is much, much older. It has long existed in societies that have lacked modern states or anything resembling a state at all.</span></p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/12/beware-tech-bro-economics/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/12/beware-tech-bro-economics/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/GettyImages-2178455430.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/12/beware-tech-bro-economics/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/12/beware-tech-bro-economics/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Beware tech-bro economics</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/12/beware-tech-bro-economics/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Michael Lind</a></p></div></a></div>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">In stateless societies, laws are norms that rest upon a widespread social consensus but are enforced informally, voluntarily, and by interested parties. Lacking a salaried constabulary, the stateless society relies on enforcement by individuals and groups. But the enforcers can’t be compelled to enforce the norm against violators, and their decision to do so may be colored by self-interest of some kind.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The Viking-era Icelandic commonwealth that lasted from the 900s until its subordination to Norway in 1262 is an example of a stateless society. Customary law was recited by law-speakers at the Thing, the assembly of free Icelanders. Judges selected from among the attendees had the power to find criminals guilty. But lacking a professional constabulary or a professional army, the judges could only declare an alleged wrongdoer to be</span><a href="https://mds.marshall.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=&amp;httpsredir=1&amp;article=1972&amp;context=etd"> <span style="font-weight: 400;">an outlaw</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">. In the case of full outlawry, such a finding permitted anyone to kill the outlaw without legal repercussions. Usually, those who took on the risk of killing an outlaw had a personal interest in the case, like relatives of a murder victim. </span></p>
<p><a href="https://sites.duke.edu/hiscope/files/2022/04/grzymala-busse_Duke-AGB-church-and-state.pdf"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Medieval Latin Christendom</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> offers another example of law in a stateless society. The effective powerlessness of the Holy Roman Emperor meant there was no real government above the level of kings and other potentates. The pope could excommunicate a king, but the king’s overthrow had to be carried out by the king’s subjects or other monarchs, and in practice, they chose whether or not to do so.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The execution of justice in the absence of a functioning or non-corrupt state is a familiar theme of cinema. Hence, </span><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">The Seven Samurai</span></i><span style="font-weight: 400;">.</span> <span style="font-weight: 400;">In gangster movies like </span><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">The Godfather</span></i><span style="font-weight: 400;">, the mafia functions as an informal, extra-legal, parallel government, with its own customary rules and deliberative councils which can order murders. In Clint Eastwood’s 1992 Western classic, </span><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">Unforgiven</span></i><span style="font-weight: 400;">, prostitutes offer to pay bounty hunters to avenge one of their own in a town run by a tyrannical sheriff and his henchmen.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">In a world without a world government — our world — the equivalent of masterless samurai, private gunslingers, and medieval knights-errant are the few great and middling powers that possess the military capacity to project power and intervene in other countries, in addition to defending themselves.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">In a modern country with a functioning government, it would be an outrage if a salaried police officer personally decided whether or not to respond to a 911 call, and if salaried firefighters, after rescuing a family from their blazing home, insisted that they be paid by the victims in cash or took some of their possessions as a reward. But in a world that has law but lacks a world state, law enforcement can be both voluntary and self-interested. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The few military powers that can enforce customary international law have the right to choose when and where they intervene and can legitimately ask to be repaid by the nations whom they rescue in the form of cash, basing rights, or economic access for their own companies and investors. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">What about the content of contemporary international law? Conventional accounts try to cover all bases, by saying that evidence of international law can be sought in treaties, domestic judicial decisions and laws, and the practice of states. But the practice of states — and of great military powers, in particular — is the main evidence of the existence of an international legal norm, because laws which aren’t enforced are just words on paper.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The practices that are legitimate according to the customary “tribal” law of our stateless international society change over time. Before World War I, it was widely accepted that countries could invade and occupy other countries to force them to repay debts to foreign nationals. This practice has fallen out of favor, as has the practice of hiring privateers to seize and loot enemy shipping in wartime, though a vestige remains in Congress’s power to authorize “letters of marque and reprisal” under the US Constitution.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">In the 20th and 21st centuries, the rights of nations — usually defined as identifiable ethnocultural groups — have increasingly weakened or displaced older notions of state sovereignty and territorial integrity. There is a strong norm against genocide, the deliberate extermination of an ethnic nation or minority, which emerged following World War II and the Holocaust. More recently, following the Balkan Wars, a norm against ethnic cleansing or forcible transfers of an ethnic nation has taken hold. Such norms didn’t exist in the immediate aftermath of World War II, when the victorious Allies allowed population transfers involving millions of ethnic Germans, Poles, and Ukrainians.</span></p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">“Laws which aren’t enforced are just words on paper.”</div>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Even the Trump administration, otherwise allied with the far Right in Israel, has</span><a href="https://www.ap.org/news-highlights/spotlights/2025/trump-doubles-down-on-plan-to-empty-gaza-this-is-what-he-has-said-and-whats-at-stake/"> <span style="font-weight: 400;">backed away</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> from Trump’s earlier horrifying endorsement of the permanent eviction of the people of Gaza from their homeland. In 2019, the first Trump administration declared that the annexation of the occupied West Bank and the slow-motion squeezing out of Arabs to make way for Jewish settlers were not “</span><a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/18/world/middleeast/trump-israel-west-bank-settlements.html#:~:text=Video,to%20annexation%20of%20Palestinian%20territory."><span style="font-weight: 400;">per se incompatible with international law</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">.” Yet Trump last month </span><a href="https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/thank-you-president-trump-vetoing-israeli-annexation-west-bank"><span style="font-weight: 400;">restored the policy of previous presidents</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> of both parties opposing the colonization and annexation of Palestinian land by Israel.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Thus, there is strong evidence of a norm against the dismemberment and annexation of foreign states and disputed territories: from global opposition to Israel’s annexation of the Occupied Territories, to broad international support for the US war to evict Saddam Hussein’s Iraq from Kuwait, to the widespread opposition to Russia’s annexation of Crimea and efforts to seize the Donbass region of Ukraine.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">In today’s customary international law, however, state borders aren’t absolute, to judge from the practice of the great powers and other states. True, foreigners can’t invade a country, expel the inhabitants, and annex the territory. But the national right to self-determination </span><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">has </span></i><span style="font-weight: 400;">been allowed to alter the borders of existing states. German reunification after the Cold War is one example.  And since 1945, many former colonial countries or breakaway nations have won recognition of their sovereignty. Following the Cold War, Czechoslovakia broke up into the Czech Republic and Slovakia in a bloodless “velvet divorce,” while Yugoslavia broke up in bloody conflict into seven countries, and the Soviet Union dissolved into 15 independent successor states in 1991. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Nations that have failed to obtain their own independence, like the Kurds and Igbo and others in Biafra in Nigeria, have lacked great-power support for their ambitions, a fact that illustrates the role of the great powers in choosing when and where to enforce a norm — in this case, the norm favoring national self-determination. The fact that norms are enforced selectively or hypocritically, however, doesn’t undermine their status as norms.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The flip side of national self-determination is popular sovereignty when it comes to choosing constitutions and leaders. Although it is far from universal, the custom of legitimating governments through free and fair popular elections is more widespread than ever. Elections and plebiscites are far from perfect, but the alternative is worse — allowing a supposed norm of “state sovereignty” to protect any tyrant or junta that seizes effective control in a country, no matter how much it abuses its power by executing, torturing, imprisoning, or exiling its opponents.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Which brings us back to Venezuela under Maduro. In that case,</span><a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/article/2024/aug/23/latin-american-states-and-us-reject-maduro-vote-certification-election-venezuela-supreme-court"> <span style="font-weight: 400;">the United States and 10 Latin-American neighbors</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">, along with </span><a href="https://www.as-coa.org/articles/how-have-international-leaders-responded-venezuelas-2024-election#:~:text=of%20the%20election.-,Brazil%2C%20Colombia%2C%20and%20Mexico,both%20Maduro%20and%20the%20opposition"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Japan</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> and most of the democracies of</span><a href="https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20240913IPR23907/venezuela-meps-recognise-edmundo-gonzalez-as-president#:~:text=They%20also%20condemn%20in%20the,the%20country%20in%20recent%20years"> <span style="font-weight: 400;">Europe</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">, either refused to recognize Maduro’s legitimacy or raised questions about it, given his obvious theft of the 2024 election in Venezuela.</span></p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/01/venezuelas-path-to-freedom/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/01/venezuelas-path-to-freedom/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/GettyImages-2253971689.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/01/venezuelas-path-to-freedom/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/01/venezuelas-path-to-freedom/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Venezuela’s path to freedom</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/01/venezuelas-path-to-freedom/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Juan David Rojas </a></p></div></a></div>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The Trump administration plausibly could have won widespread international support — outside of autocracies like China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea — by emphasizing enforcement of the international norm favoring democracy as the main purpose of its intervention in Venezuela, with US support for rebuilding the decayed Venezuelan oil industry subordinated to the decisions of Venezuela’s democratically elected leaders about what to do with their country’s oil.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">But Team Trump chose not to emphasize democratic restoration, relying on other rationales. Trump and his deputies have claimed that the overthrow and imprisonment of Maduro was merely a case of extraterritorial American enforcement of domestic US anti-drug laws — an excuse as transparently dishonest in the case of Maduro as it was in the case of Manuel Noriega’s ouster from Panama in 1989. This pretext was made even more preposterous by Trump’s recent</span><a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2026/01/04/trump-venezuela-maduro-pardon-honduras.html"> <span style="font-weight: 400;">pardon</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> of former Honduran President Juan Orlando Hernandez, who’d been sentenced to prison for 45 years in the United States for drug trafficking and violating US weapons laws.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Trump also claimed,</span><a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2026-01-05/why-venezuelan-oil-is-not-stolen-from-the-united-states/106200804"> <span style="font-weight: 400;">falsely</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">, that beginning in 2007, under former strongman Hugo Chavez, the Venezuelan government &#8220;unilaterally seized and stole American oil.&#8221; But the oil was never &#8220;American.&#8221; Under Venezuela’s democratic 1999 constitution, all oil and gas in the country belongs to the state, which can collaborate with private companies to extract it. Moreover, Saudi Arabia nationalized American oil company interests between 1973 and 1980, and Mexico did the same in the 1920s, without Washington regarding either as justification for a regime-change war.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Worst of all, Trump has implied that instead of handing over power to the winners of the 2024 election, the United States, either directly or through remnants of Maduro’s dictatorship, will govern Venezuela for an indefinite period, a strategy that appears to put the interest of US oil companies above the restoration of Venezuelan democracy. Such a policy is likely to galvanize nationalists and anti-imperialists throughout Latin America and around the world, and bolster the stereotype of US foreign policy as &#8220;capitalist imperialism.&#8221; </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Given the importance of elections in legitimating governments in today’s world, it is hard to make a case from customary international law against a limited intervention by a foreign power that replaces a dictator and restores democracy in a country. But if the intervening power does not move quickly to support a transition to rule by the country’s own democratically elected leaders, it risks violating another strong norm of modern customary international law: the norm against conquest, annexation, and indefinite occupations.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Unfortunately, the efforts of Trump and his aides to explain why the United States overthrew Maduro have been as botched and counterproductive as the operation to capture and remove the Venezuelan dictator was tactically effective.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">In a world without a world government and a world constabulary, vigilantism by major military powers is often the only way to bring about rough justice under customary international law. But when it comes to the norms they invoke, the enforcers aren’t judges in their own case. Others, including those whom the vigilantes claim to liberate, will decide whether justice has been done — as a matter of morality, if not enforcement. Audiences admire the protagonists of </span><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">The Seven Samurai </span></i><span style="font-weight: 400;">and </span><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">The Magnificent Seven </span></i><span style="font-weight: 400;">because, while self-interested, the justice they render is finally real justice. The Trump administration would be wise to follow suit.</span></p>
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					<title>The roots of Trump’s realpolitik</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2025/03/the-roots-of-trumps-realpolitik/?edition=us</link>
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										<unherd:main_theme>American Tradition</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Michael Lind]]>
					</dc:creator>
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																<unherd:article_ranking>2</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[Trump stands in a tradition going back to Teddy Roosevelt. Credit: Getty]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p>Michael Lind is a columnist at <em>UnHerd</em>.</p>
]]>
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															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[Michael Lind is a columnist at <em>UnHerd</em>.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Mon, 03 Mar 2025 01:46:26 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Mon, 03 Mar 2025 07:13:19 +0000</updated>
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								<![CDATA[Uncle Sam always drives a hard bargain]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>President Trump’s attempt to end the war in Ukraine has enraged liberal internationalists on both sides of the Atlantic. Dealing directly with the Kremlin and going over the heads of America’s European allies, publicly belittling Ukraine and its leader, and attempting to clinch a minerals deal as the price of further US support for Kyiv — all this counts as heresy among foreign-policy elites committed to “rule-based liberal international order”.</p>
<p>As often happens, Trump breaks with American presidential traditions more in style than in substance. In reality, the 45th and 47th president is in a tradition of realist presidents, going back to Theodore Roosevelt more than a century ago, who have viewed world politics as a great-power club, rather than an arena for idealism.</p>
<p>In brokering the Treaty of Portsmouth that ended the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-1905, for example, Theodore Roosevelt accepted a Japanese sphere of influence in Korea, South Manchuria, and Sakhalin Island as the price of maintaining a balance of power in East Asia between Russia and Japan. In his 1906 Nobel Peace Prize lecture, TR said that “it would be a masterstroke if those great powers honestly bent on peace would form a League of Peace not only to keep the peace among themselves, but to prevent, by force if necessary, its being broken by others”.</p>
<p>This realist tradition endured the reign of the arch-idealist Woodrow Wilson. Following the entry of the United States into World War I, Wilson asked his adviser Col. Edward M. House to draw up plans for a postwar League of Nations. House suggested to Wilson that such a body “might be confined to the great powers”. In a diary entry at the time, House wrote: “Why permit [smaller powers] to exercise a directing hand upon nations having to furnish not only the financial but the physical force necessary to maintain order and peace?  I am sorry to come to this conclusion, because it does not seem toward the trend of liberalism. However, the idealist who is not practical oftentimes does a cause more harm than those frankly reactionary.”</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/01/can-trump-make-william-mckinley-great-again/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/01/can-trump-make-william-mckinley-great-again/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/GettyImages-2175340194.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/01/can-trump-make-william-mckinley-great-again/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More From This Author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/01/can-trump-make-william-mckinley-great-again/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Can Trump make McKinley great again?</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/01/can-trump-make-william-mckinley-great-again/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Michael Lind</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Wilson’s eventual plan for the League of Nations failed to win ratification in the US Senate, thanks precisely to the realists. Some of these, like Senator Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts, favored a US-British treaty with France to deter future German aggression but thought that the League of Nations was a utopian experiment doomed to failure.</p>
<p>President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, often held up as an avatar by the internationalists, was much more in the realist grain than they would like to admit. FDR, who had served as assistant secretary of the Navy in the Wilson administration, sought to avoid his ex-boss’s mistakes in his own thinking about world order after the defeat of the Axis powers.  Roosevelt put his hopes for the postwar world in “the Big Four” or “the Four Policemen”: the United States, Britain, the Soviet Union, and Nationalist China, which would dominate their respective regions, while smaller countries might have “ostensible” participation.</p>
<p>The only “policeman” with a democratic form of government was the United States: Winston Churchill’s Britain ruled its empire outside of the British Isles undemocratically, Stalin’s Soviet Russia was a communist dictatorship, and Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist China was an anticommunist dictatorship. When the Declaration of the United Nations (the term for the anti-Axis alliance coined by FDR) was signed on Jan. 1, 1941, the Big Four signed it first; the other 12 members of the alliance had to wait until the following day.</p>
<p>In wartime Britain, too, realism dominated thinking about the postwar world to come. Like FDR, Churchill was skeptical about global institutions in which each state, no matter how small and weak, had equal authority. In 1943, Churchill proposed that a “Supreme World Council” run by the great powers that would oversee regional councils for Europe, the Pacific, and the Western hemisphere. In a visit with Stalin in Moscow in October 1944, Churchill came up with what he referred to as his “naughty document” — a secret agreement that assigned shares of influence in Central Europe and the Balkans to Britain and the Soviet Union. Greece was to be 90% under British influence and 10% under Soviet influence, Yugoslavia and Hungary were to be 50% British and 50%, and so on.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">“Trump breaks with American presidential traditions more in style than in substance.”</div>
<p>Focused on winning the war, FDR delegated postwar planning for the permanent United Nations organization to his secretary of state, Cordell Hull, an ardent Wilsonian who recreated the flawed design of the League of Nations under a new name. Cold War rivalries immediately paralyzed the great-power-dominated UN Security Council, because each member had a veto.</p>
<p>The Soviet-backed takeover of China by Mao’s Communists turned the Middle Kingdom from a US ally into an enemy, while Britain’s postwar economic weakness left Washington and Moscow as the only two global military powers in a bipolar world. However, the postwar recovery of Western Europe and Japan and the Sino-Soviet split led President Richard Nixon to conclude in July 1971 that there were now five centers of economic power, if only two of military power — the United States, the Soviet Union, Western Europe, Japan, and China.</p>
<p>According to Nixon, “these are the five that will determine the economic future and, because economic power will be the key to other kinds of power, the future of the world in other ways in the last third of this century”. Determined to extricate America from the war in Vietnam and to avoid similar entanglements, Nixon in 1969 had already espoused “the Nixon Doctrine”, declaring that “we shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower necessary for its defense”.</p>
<p>Following Nixon’s opening to the People’s Republic of China, the Shanghai Communique in 1972 acknowledged China’s interest in Taiwan: “The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States government does not challenge that position.”</p>
<p>Following each of the three global conflicts of the 20th century — the two world wars and the Cold War — idealist hopes for a “new world order” free of great power conflicts excited many Americans. The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the dissolution of the Soviet Union into independent republics in 1991 led liberal internationalists to call for “a league of democracies” to police a globalized world society, while neoconservatives dreamed of a single global market and “rules-based order” policed by the Washington alone as the “world’s only superpower”.</p>
<p>But China under Xi Jinping and Russia under Boris Yeltsin and his successors rejected American hegemony and called for a multipolar world in which they would be the hegemonic powers in their own regions. It is not “blaming the victim” to point out that invitations to join the US-led NATO alliance were followed by the Russian invasions of Georgia in 2008 and of Ukraine in 2014 (and, on a larger scale, in 2022).</p>
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<p>The realists saw this coming. On Aug. 1, 1991, three weeks before Ukraine’s declaration of independence from the USSR, President George H. W. Bush, a consummate realist, told the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic that it would be better for Ukraine and the other Soviet republics to remain together in a loose union, rather than make a hard break with Moscow. In the speech, derided as “Chicken Kiev” by the neoconservative <em>New York Times</em> columnist William Safire, the elder Bush warned: “Americans will not support those who seek independence in order to replace a far-off tyranny with a local despotism. They will not aid those who promote a suicidal nationalism based upon ethnic hatred.”</p>
<p>For its part, the United States has continued to observe the Monroe Doctrine by treating the North American quartersphere as its own exclusive domain, toppling regimes it does not like and installing clients. Reagan invaded Grenada in 1983, Bush I invaded Panama in 1989, and Clinton invaded Haiti in 1994 in “Operation Uphold Democracy”. By abandoning Afghanistan to the Taliban after 20 years of warfare, Joe Biden tacitly acknowledged that Central Asia is less important to Washington than North America. Similarly, by moving quickly to end the costly proxy war in Ukraine and opposing Ukrainian membership in NATO, Trump is signaling that Eastern Europe is not a core American interest, either.</p>
<p>Nor is enmity against Russia baked into the American tradition. For most of the time since the United States achieved independence, Americans have been morally repelled by successive forms of Russian autocracy — even as US diplomats have viewed Russia as a counterweight to powers that pose greater potential threats. During the Civil War, to deter Britain from intervening on the side of the Confederacy, the Lincoln administration welcomed the Russian fleet to American ports, including New York, where Russian naval officers paraded down Broadway past cheering crowds. <em>Harper’s</em> opined that it would “be wise to meet the hostile alliance of the Western Powers of Europe by an alliance with Russia”.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">“The Lincoln administration welcomed the Russian fleet to American ports.”</div>
<p>Under Lincoln’s successor, Andrew Johnson, an American naval squadron arrived at the Russian Baltic port of Kronstadt to a 21-gun salute and a display of American flags. To thwart British influence in North America, Johnson’s secretary of state, William Seward, bought Alaska from the Tsar and tried but failed to obtain Greenland for the United States. In 1946, the Truman administration offered to buy Greenland from Denmark; in 1955, the Joint Chiefs of Staff urged President Eisenhower to try to buy Greenland; and Trump has revived the idea at a time of increased tensions with Russia and China.</p>
<p>Tsarist Russia was America’s ally against Imperial Germany in World War I, and the Soviet Union was America’s ally against Nazi Germany and Japan in World War II. Only the elimination of other great-power threats led to rivalry between Washington and Moscow. Now that China is viewed as America’s greatest strategic rival, an American strategy of seeking to pry Beijing and Moscow apart, if possible, is only to be expected.</p>
<p>There may be sound arguments based on <em>realpolitik</em> to oppose Trump’s strategy toward Ukraine. But to be consistent, moralists who invoke American ideals ought to condemn FDR and Churchill for agreeing to a Soviet sphere of influence in Eastern Europe that lasted half a century after 1945. And they must condemn Eisenhower and Johnson for failing to take significant action to punish the Soviet Union from crushing democratic rebellions in East Germany in 1953, Hungary in 1956, and Czechoslovakia in 1968.</p>
<p>The ephemeral spasms of Wilsonian utopianism form the exception to the rule that American statesmen in every generation usually are guided by considerations of the national interest in their dealings with other major powers, including those whose internal regimes are repugnant to American principles. Uncle Sam may engage in flowery talk — but allies and enemies alike know that he drives a hard bargain.</p>
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