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		<title>Yemen - UnHerd</title>
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					<title>Will the Gulf war claim another victim?</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2026/09/will-the-gulf-war-claim-another-victim/?edition=us</link>
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										<unherd:main_theme>Geopolitics</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Malise Ruthven]]>
					</dc:creator>
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																<unherd:article_ranking>2</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[Andy Burnham put the national-interest case directly. (Henry Nicholls/Getty)]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Malise Ruthven</strong> is an author and journalist. He has worked at the BBC World Service, and has taught at universities on both sides of the Atlantic. He is the general editor of <em><a href="https://www.amazon.co.uk/Carving-Up-Globe-Atlas-Diplomacy/dp/067497624X" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Carving up the Globe: An Atlas of Diplomacy</a></em>.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
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						<unherd:twitter_handle></unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is an author and journalist. He has worked at the BBC World Service, and has taught at universities on both sides of the Atlantic. He is the general editor of <em><a href="https://www.amazon.co.uk/Carving-Up-Globe-Atlas-Diplomacy/dp/067497624X" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Carving up the Globe: An Atlas of Diplomacy</a></em>.

&nbsp;

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					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Tue, 22 Sep 2026 23:02:21 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Wed, 23 Sep 2026 11:53:01 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Geopolitics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Houthis]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Middle East]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Saudi Arabia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Yemen]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://stage.unherd.com/?p=1075620</guid>
																												<description>
								<![CDATA[Backing Saudi could strand Burnham]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p dir="ltr">In February 1940, my godmother, Freya Stark, arrived in Sana&#8217;a carrying a forbidden cinematograph projector. Her mission was to loosen Fascist Italy&#8217;s influence over Imam Yahya, the formidable ruler of Yemen&#8217;s Zaidi imamate. Fortunately for Stark and the British, scratchy Ministry of Information footage of Royal Navy ships in Portsmouth made what she called a tremendous impression, with Yahya and his court unable to resist this display of naval might. The Italian legation was furious, and talked of importing a projector of its own. But it was too late. Within a fortnight, Stark believed, Italian influence in Sana&#8217;a had been broken.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Some 86 years later, Britain is back Arabia, wooing a very different set of rulers. The Government has agreed to send an RAF Voyager tanker from its base in Cyprus to provide in-flight refueling for Saudi aircraft defending the kingdom against Houthi missiles and drones. Unlike Britain&#8217;s earlier direct strikes on the Houthis, in which RAF Typhoons took part, the present commitment is described as limited, time-bound and defensive. British support is not, officials insist, intended for Saudi strikes inside Yemen. Yet aerial refueling is never just symbolic. It enables aircraft to remain airborne longer, carrying Britain a little further into a war from which Saudi Arabia has spent years trying to extricate itself.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Britain supposedly withdrew from &#8220;east of Suez&#8221; more than half a century ago. In practice, though, it never entirely left, retaining close military relations with Jordan and Oman; a naval presence in Bahrain and the Gulf; and a defense industry tied intimately to the Saudi armed forces. As Sir William Patey, the former British ambassador to Riyadh, recently told the BBC, Saudi Arabia is Britain&#8217;s largest defense export market, while Britain is its leading supplier of advanced fighter aircraft. The relationship includes British-supplied Typhoons and air-defense systems, as well as continuing support for Saudi air operations under existing contracts. When Iran attacked Saudi Arabia, Patey added, Britain helped with the kingdom’s air defenses. The flags came down with the “winds of change”, then, but the infrastructure of influence survived.</p>
<p dir="ltr"><div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/09/how-shakespeare-explains-the-taliban/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/09/how-shakespeare-explains-the-taliban/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/GettyImages-2290557153.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/09/how-shakespeare-explains-the-taliban/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/09/how-shakespeare-explains-the-taliban/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>How Shakespeare explains the Taliban</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/09/how-shakespeare-explains-the-taliban/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Malise Ruthven</a></p></div></a></div>
<p dir="ltr">The Voyager&#8217;s mission may not be the return of former imperial power so much as the exposure of a continuing relationship normally hidden behind contracts, advisers and joint exercises. The Saudis, having been turned down by the United States, asked Britain to demonstrate that it remained a reliable partner. Andy Burnham then put the national-interest case more directly. “I go back to the point I made about cost-of-living pressures and acting to secure the interests of Britain and the wider region,” he said, “because of course Saudi Arabia has been experiencing attacks, is looking at potential further disruption, and we need to keep those pathways open.” The Houthis have seized the port of Mocha, and strategic Red Sea islands, tightening their grip on the approaches to the Bab al-Mandab, through which roughly a tenth of global trade normally passes. Their missiles have also reached Saudi territory, while attacks on energy infrastructure threaten pipelines designed to bypass the Strait of Hormuz. Altogether, that creates the possibility of a pincer squeeze on the world economy. What happens in the Gulf and Red Sea enters British and European politics through petrol prices, inflation and the cost of borrowing.</p>
<p dir="ltr">The crisis represents not simply the return of Mohammed bin Salman&#8217;s disastrous Yemeni war, but also the re-emergence in revolutionary form of Yemen&#8217;s ancient Zaidi political tradition. To treat the Houthis merely as an Iranian appendage threatening Western commerce is to misunderstand why bombing has repeatedly failed to subdue them. Iranian technology, components, training and revolutionary language have increased their power, and tied them to the so-called “axis of resistance”. Yet Tehran did not invent the movement and probably does not issue its daily orders. Its strength rests on the religious memory and political dispossession of Yemen’s northern highlands.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Zaidism differs significantly from the Twelver Shi&#8217;ism of Iran. Its name derives from Zayd ibn Ali, who died in revolt against the Umayyads in 740. In classical Zaidi doctrine, an imam did not inherit office automatically through an unbroken, divinely designated line. Rather, he had to be a qualified descendant of the Prophet through Hasan or Husayn, as well as learned, just, and also courageous enough to “come forth” against unlawful rule. The choice was elective only within this restricted sacred lineage. Armed resistance was not an accidental feature of legitimacy; it helped constitute it.</p>
<p dir="ltr"><div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;Armed resistance was not an accidental feature of legitimacy; it helped constitute it.&#8221;</div>
<p dir="ltr">Zaidi imams ruled varying portions of the Yemeni highlands from the 9th century. Imam Yahya, who fought the Ottomans and consolidated an independent kingdom after 1918, was the last truly formidable representative of his order. His state was isolated and administratively thin, but he balanced tribes, including the Sunnis of the Tihama lowlands, dynastic claims, and foreign powers with considerable skill, including flirtation with Mussolini in the Horn of Africa. Italian connections alarmed the British in Aden, hence Freya Stark&#8217;s films and her appeal to the aristocratic pride of Yahya&#8217;s court. She contrasted Yemen’s hereditary religious hierarchy with a rampant appeal to dynastic snobbery, explaining that Hitler had been a paperhanger and that Mussolini&#8217;s father had been a blacksmith. Such details, she told her husband, “carry unexpected weight”.</p>
<p dir="ltr">The monarchy survived Yahya&#8217;s assassination in 1948, but not the republican coup of September 1962. Nasser sent an Egyptian army to defend the new republic. In one of the region&#8217;s more instructive confessional paradoxes, Saudi Arabia supported the Zaidi royalists. Wahhabi hostility to Shia belief mattered less than fear of revolutionary Arab nationalism. Britain also played a characteristically deniable role. Colonel David Smiley, an SOE veteran who had commanded the Sultan of Oman&#8217;s armed forces, advised Imam al-Badr&#8217;s royalists, and from 1964 directed a band of foreign soldiers that included former SAS men.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Britain is thus again assisting Saudi Arabia in a Yemeni war: but this time against Zaidi power rather than in its defense. The republic abolished the imamate but not the society that had sustained it. Zaidi scholars and descendents of Muhammad lost authority; Saudi-backed Salafi teaching expanded into the northern province of Saada; central government brought neglect, manipulation and intermittent repression. The “Believing Youth” movement began as a cultural and educational revival. Under the eponymous Hussein Badreddin al-Houthi, however, it acquired a fiercely political theology and the now notorious slogan against America, Israel and the Jews. When President Ali Abdullah Saleh tried to crush it, Hussein was killed, and six wars followed between 2004 and 2010. Saleh, the master tactician who boasted of dancing on the heads of snakes, later allied with the enemies he had persecuted. Forces loyal to him helped the Houthis seize Sana&#8217;a in 2014. When, in 2017, he changed sides again, and sought an accommodation with the Saudis, they killed him. The movement had swallowed the snake-charmer.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Saudi Arabia intervened in 2015 expecting a short campaign. Years of air strikes devastated Yemen — without dislodging the Houthis. Yet it would be their attacks on Red Sea shipping following the Gaza war that brought a local movement and international stage. Sympathy for Palestinians is genuine and consistent with Houthi ideology. It is also politically useful. Palestine lets the movement mobilize a war-weary population, humiliate Arab governments and claim a stature beyond Yemen&#8217;s borders. A missile need not hit its target to work. The credible threat alone diverts ships, raises insurance costs, and turns a sectarian militia into an actor capable of taxing the global economy.</p>
<p dir="ltr"><div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/09/can-anyone-stop-the-houthis/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/09/can-anyone-stop-the-houthis/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/GettyImages-2281295825.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/09/can-anyone-stop-the-houthis/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/09/can-anyone-stop-the-houthis/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Can anyone stop the Houthis?</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/09/can-anyone-stop-the-houthis/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Reuel Marc Gerecht</a></p></div></a></div>
<p dir="ltr">Britain therefore confronts a genuine danger. But it also risks repeating an old error: mistaking superior machinery for political control. Freya Stark&#8217;s projector succeeded because it formed part of diplomacy. It flattered, persuaded and communicated. The Saudi air campaign, by contrast, showed the limits of firepower, especially when there is no plausible Yemeni order waiting to replace the people being bombed. As the Yemen specialist Elisabeth Kendall has warned, air strikes may degrade Houthi capabilities while increasing their popularity. Britain can help intercept drones; it cannot refuel its way to a legitimate government in Sana&#8217;a. Nor is the alternative to the Houthis a single coherent state. The internationally recognized camp contains Saudi clients, former Saleh loyalists, Islamists, southern separatists and competing tribal and regional forces. The UAE has sponsored secessionist allies, especially in the south, while Saudi Arabia has generally insisted on formal unity. The regions of Hadhramaut and al-Mahrah have their own identities and patrons. Oman, with its long experience of discreet mediation and its own British military history, fears disorder on its frontier.</p>
<p dir="ltr">In short, an east-of-Suez strategy built on royal relationships may preserve regimes more readily than it creates states. The Government&#8217;s distinction between refueling defensive Saudi missions and enabling offensive operations is therefore crucial but fragile. Patey assumed that Riyadh had not asked Britain to join direct strikes on the Houthis. Saudi oil and civilian installations were being attacked, he argued, and helping the kingdom defend them was legitimate. That is persuasive as far as it goes. But tankers do not decide the purposes for which an alliance is used; ministers do. The record of the earlier Saudi campaign gives little cause for confidence. Jeremy Hunt, then foreign secretary, spoke of his “frank conversations” with Saudi counterparts about human rights, while the Government defended British arms sales by citing the “extensive British training” given to Saudi pilots and the programmers of its “smart bombs” to limit civilian casualties. RAF liaison officers worked in the Saudi air operations center, ostensibly to help the kingdom comply with international humanitarian law. A former British official who had worked with the Saudis dismissed that claim in a single word: “bollocks.”</p>
<p dir="ltr">Britain now needs transparent rules, parliamentary scrutiny and an answer to the obvious question of what happens if the aircraft sustained by the RAF Voyager move from intercepting missiles to striking targets inside Yemen. Humanitarian law cannot be outsourced to the adjective “defensive”. In 1940, British power appeared in Sana&#8217;a as flickering images; today it arrives as invisible fuel. All the while, the Houthis warn that east of Suez, history never stays offshore for long.</p>
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									<item>
					<title>Can anyone stop the Houthis?</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2026/09/can-anyone-stop-the-houthis/?edition=us</link>
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										<unherd:main_theme>War</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Reuel Marc Gerecht]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/blued-1-300x300-1.jpg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>2</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[‘The Houthis, who not long ago were mostly farmers and shepherds, have thrived in a primitive environment.’ (Mohammed Huwais/Getty)]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Reuel Marc Gerecht </strong>is a Resident Scholar at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and a former Iranian-targets officer in the Central Intelligence Agency.</p>
]]>
						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>ReuelMGerecht</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[is a Resident Scholar at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and a former Iranian-targets officer in the Central Intelligence Agency.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Thu, 17 Sep 2026 23:01:38 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Fri, 18 Sep 2026 12:58:41 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Iran]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Saudi Arabia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Shiism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Yemen]]></category>
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								<![CDATA[Yemen’s civil war is set to go global]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>Yemen has always been defined by its topography. A landscape of narrow coastal plains, mountainous highlands, and a desert interior, has helped preserve tribal identities, blurring and softening sharp religious divisions. If a very modern, post-1979 battle between Sunnis and Shi&#8217;ites now defines the country’s politics, a rugged and inescapable geography continues to impose itself. This is clear enough with the Zaydi Shi&#8217;ites, now better known by the name of a martyred Islamist leader: Hussein al-Houthi. Combining a deep knowledge of their country’s landscape with revolutionary zeal, the Houthis have coalesced into an unrivaled fighting force, as well as Iran’s best allies in its war against America and Israel – costing Tehran surprisingly little money.</p>
<p>Indeed, the more you learn about the Houthis, the less surprising it becomes that the group should have embarrassed the US Navy in 2024 and 2025 (in a foretaste of the second Iran war, Washington simply gave up firing its expensive missiles at Houthi forces), and fought a large Sunni-Arab coalition to a standstill between 2015 and 2019. Despite intense bombardments, and serious battlefield defeats, the Houthis have retained Sana’a, Yemen’s capital which they conquered in 2014. Only the Israelis, who briefly got into a missile exchange with the Houthis in 2025, have managed to deter them: they went after the Houthis’ oil supplies, energy infrastructure, ports, airports, and, perhaps most important, senior personnel. Sure enough, the Houthis stopped firing at Israel. But either way, it’s little wonder that the Houthis are now back, seizing land along the Red Sea littoral and the islands of Perim and Greater and Lesser Hanish, thereby putting into jeopardy Saudi Arabia’s capacity to export oil via its east-west pipeline.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/06/spycraft-will-seal-irans-fate/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/06/spycraft-will-seal-irans-fate/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/GettyImages-2265130479.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/06/spycraft-will-seal-irans-fate/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/06/spycraft-will-seal-irans-fate/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Spycraft will decide Iran&#039;s fate</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/06/spycraft-will-seal-irans-fate/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Reuel Marc Gerecht</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Without outside support, Sunni Yemenis would have had no chance on the battlefield against their Shi&#8217;ite countrymen. The Houthis have received some support from Hezbollah and Iran — but not nearly on the level that Sunnis have received from foreigners since the Sixties. Islamic history has occasionally seen fervent, martial highland peoples descend into conflict with more numerous lowland believers — and usually get the better of them. The Houthis are in this line: mountain Shi&#8217;ites who have managed to gain the upper hand over the cosmopolitan and fractious Sunnis.</p>
<p>During the North Yemen Civil War (1962–1970), the Zaydi royalists of the old Imamate survived a massive assault by the republican forces that had overthrown them. The Republicans included predominantly Sunni Yemenis, but also Zaydi Arab nationalists, and were backed by around 70,000 Egyptian troops equipped with Soviet tanks and aircraft. The Zaydi royalists, meanwhile, adopted highly effective guerrilla tactics. Again and again, they descended from their mountain strongholds, absorbing heavy losses. They were not able to capture Sana’a — but they were repeatedly able to regroup and return to the fight.</p>
<p>The war today is vastly more sectarian. Few Zaydis now fight alongside Sunnis, giving the more cohesive, dogged, and fit Houthi forces the advantage.</p>
<p>Still, since the Nineties, support from Shi&#8217;ites in the wider region has been crucial in shaping Houthi objectives. The Islamic Republic of Iran and Lebanon’s Hezbollah have actively sought to convert Zaydis, who follow a different creed and jurisprudence. These efforts have met some success: perhaps as many as 10% of Zaydis have accepted Iran’s “Twelver” branch of Shi&#8217;ism. These conversions are, however, just icing on the cake. Before the Lebanese and Iranians came calling, Zaydism as a faith had considerable revolutionary potential. Historically, Yemen’s Shi&#8217;ites have had activist imams: religious leaders who could also command troops. Where the Twelver Shi&#8217;ites of Iran, Iraq, and Lebanon could — before the Iranian Revolution in 1979 — sometimes look askance at clerics assuming political power, the Zaydis had no such reservations. Zaydi imams ruled as kings, more or less continuously, from 897 to 1962, when nationalist forces toppled the imamate. The main interruptions came during two periods of Ottoman rule, from 1538 to 1635 and from 1872 to 1918. Even then, the imams did not simply disappear: they retreated into the mountains, where they continued to exercise religious authority and, at times, lead armed resistance to the Ottomans.</p>
<p>Today, a spiritual alignment has unquestionably taken place — and a significant slice of the Zaydi community is now inside the Iranian orbit. The Houthis’ anthem — &#8220;God is the Greatest, Death to America, Death to Israel, Curse be upon the Jews, Victory to Islam” — would have seemed bizarre to most Zaydis before the radical revivalist movement of al-Houthi. Cursing distant America, or Jews as if they were a global menace, or even Israel as a part of a defining, individual creed would have been too modern.</p>
<p>More or less at war with the “official”, internationally-recognized government of Yemen since 2004, the country’s Shi&#8217;ites are on a winning streak. Indeed, since the Saudis, Emiratis, and a coalition of other Arab states tried to humble them from 2015 to 2018, the Houthis’ regional ambitions have grown. They have created their own supply and sanctions-resistant support networks in the Middle East, Africa, and Asia, sometimes piggybacking on the Iranians, sometimes moving independently. With Iranian assistance, they figured out how to defy a Saudi naval blockade and US satellite reconnaissance. Indeed, the Houthis have been able to incorporate Iranian strategic planning into their own ambitions as well as any Iranian proxy. They have proven sharp adopters of Iranian-supplied drones and missiles, learning quickly how to build projectiles from either clandestinely delivered parts or from scratch — indeed, they have proved <a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/09/claude-tyrannys-little-helper/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">enthusiastic adopters of AI. </a></p>
<p>It’s also a foregone conclusion that if Iran can gain control of the Strait of Hormuz and charge tolls, the Houthis will attempt to do the same through dominating the Bab al-Mandab, the chokepoint for all trade moving through the Suez Canal — as well as for Saudi oil via its pipeline. Even if Iran fails to dominate the Persian Gulf, indeed, the odds are that the Houthis will still try to curtail Saudi shipping. If successful, the Houthi’s ambitions – and greed — may direct them towards other commercial shipping.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;The Houthis, who not long ago were mostly farmers and shepherds, have thrived in a primitive environment.&#8221;</div>
<p>Yemen is a very poor country, and the Zaydi mountain heartland now offers little of the trade that once made the Zaydi elite relatively rich within it. Enormous anger towards Saudis is common. When I was traveling among Yemeni Shi&#8217;ites before 9/11 and I needed a conversation starter, aspersing Saudis always worked. So targeting Saudi shipping is a given for the Houthis; and preying on others could become an irresistible financial temptation if they control the Bab al-Mandab. Raiding British and Indian trade in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean in the 18th century was very good business for pirates of the Arabian Peninsula until the Royal Navy and Marines convinced them otherwise.</p>
<p>The US maintains Camp Lemonnier, its only permanent military base in Africa and the operational hub of US Africa Command, just across the Bab al-Mandab in Djibouti. President Trump wasn’t persuaded of the merits of using it to deny the Houthis a partial victory against his Navy in 2025. It’s a good bet that Trump will default the responsibility for stopping Houthi extortion onto European navies, especially the French, who also have a naval base at Djibouti. Trump is perennially capricious — but also firm in his conviction that Europeans are freeloaders.</p>
<p>Nonetheless, the problem that the West has with the Houthis is also a microcosm of the problem that the United States has with Iran: there is no clever, low-cost way to neutralize the enemy’s power. When, in 2015, he was the Saudi defense minister, Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman clearly understood the long-term threat that the Houthis posed to his kingdom. The prince’s execution of the subsequent war may have been abysmal, but his analysis wasn’t. Neither the Saudis, nor the Emiratis, nor the Egyptians, nor the Jordanians, nor the Americans, nor the Europeans have been willing to put a lot of boots on the ground long enough to neutralise the Houthi war machine. Cairo’s unpleasant experience in Yemen in the Sixties — “Egypt’s Vietnam” — remains in the DNA of Middle Eastern military men. The combined Arab assault on the Houthis from 2015 onwards revealed a wariness of replicating the approach the Egyptians had used — trying to take the Houthis on in their heartland.</p>
<p>The Houthis know this. So do the Iranians, who have seen the most independent of their proxies become their most consequential ally. The strategic potential of Yemen’s Shi&#8217;ites now dwarfs the contribution of the Levantine Hezbollah to Iran’s remarkably consistent goal of weakening the West and their allied Arab governments in the Middle East. The Houthis aren’t nearly as sophisticated as the Levantine Shi&#8217;ites, who rival the Iranians in their formative contribution to the development of radical Shi&#8217;ism, and have proved rather better than the Iranians in maintaining the crucial interpersonal relations between Arab militants.</p>
<p>Yet the Houthis, who not long ago were mostly farmers and shepherds, have thrived in a primitive environment. Their relations with Somalia’s Al-Shabaab — a Salafist jihadist outfit, which in 2012 pledged allegiance to Al-Qaeda and has often shown a savagery that rivals Islamic State’s — clearly show the Houthis have, like the Iranians, an ecumenical disposition toward anti-Shi&#8217;ite but anti-Western Sunni Muslim radicals. If left alone, the Houthis might well develop further, becoming emissaries of Iranian mischief far beyond the Gulf of Aden. Some Islamic militants — the Taliban in Afghanistan; Hamas in Gaza — keep their violence local. They don’t become members of the “global jihad” even though they may host or associate with Muslim radicals who do. But the Houthis’ creed certainly suggests an aspiration that could take them into a larger holy cause, especially if under the tutelage of more worldly Iranians and Levantines.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/08/why-america-is-running-out-of-missiles/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/08/why-america-is-running-out-of-missiles/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/GettyImages-637687580-e1787051656430.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/08/why-america-is-running-out-of-missiles/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/08/why-america-is-running-out-of-missiles/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Why America is running out of missiles</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2026/08/why-america-is-running-out-of-missiles/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Edward Luttwak </a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Regardless, the Houthis have offered Tehran the best bang for the buck of all its proxies. We don’t have reliable figures on what the Saudis and Emiratis spent on their multi-year war against Yemen’s Shi&#8217;ites, nor what the Iranian subventions were to their co-religionists, but Tehran’s costs were unquestionably a small fraction of those on the other side. The Islamic Republic is now in a deep financial crisis, but supporting low-maintenance, enterprising Yemenis may still be practicable. Strategically, it remains a steal.</p>
<p>If the United States, the Europeans, and most importantly the Arabs who border and depend on the Red Sea, are serious about thwarting the Houthis, then they should revisit the history of the Ottomans in the Arabian Peninsula. They checked the rebellious Zaydi imams with the patient application of brute force. (Even if, as soon as the Ottoman Empire collapsed in 1918, a Zaydi Imamate came right back). That won’t happen again, however, unless the United States leads the way.</p>
<p>Today, there are so far no volunteers for this mission. The experience of the Egyptians in Yemen in the Sixties, like the more recent sojourns led by the Saudis and the Emiratis, all were bitter failures. The treasure expended didn’t match the gains. The Middle East excels at forcing cost calculations. The Houthis and the Iranians are banking that the years since 9/11 have worn down their enemies. They know that in a contest of wills, they have the unassailable high ground.</p>
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															<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">1075001</post-id>				</item>
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					<title>America’s military humiliation</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2025/05/americas-military-humiliation/?edition=us</link>
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										<unherd:main_theme>Defense</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Malcom Kyeyune]]>
					</dc:creator>
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																<unherd:article_ranking>1</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA['The generals know that the jig is up.' Mario Tama/Getty Images]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Malcom Kyeyune</strong> is a freelance writer living in Uppsala, Sweden.</p>
]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_handle></unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is a freelance writer living in Uppsala, Sweden.]]>
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										<pubDate>Sun, 25 May 2025 23:03:36 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Mon, 26 May 2025 09:20:39 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[America]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Donald Trump]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Joe Biden]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Military]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[War]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Yemen]]></category>
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								<![CDATA[The Houthis exposed its waning power]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>When, in reaction to the war in Gaza, the Houthis of Yemen started imposing their blockade on the Red Sea, it was seen as a sure sign of waning American power: a global hegemon was allowing its control over a vital sea route to be contested. In their rush to fathom why this might be happening, d<span style="font-weight: 400;">etractors of the then president claimed <a href="https://nationalinterest.org/feature/joe-bidens-failed-strategy-against-houthi-threat-red-sea-211607" target="_blank" rel="noopener">he was simply too weak</a>, too much of an appeaser to use the full width of America’s military might to quash the problem. </span></p>
<p>In fact, in response, Biden authorized not one but two military campaigns. The first was Operation Prosperity Guardian, which aimed to combine US naval power with a coalition of willing states to protect shipping and break the blockade. That fast turned into an embarrassing debacle, as most of the coalition partners walked away and ships kept getting hit by Houthi missiles. And so, in January 2024, Operation Poseidon Archer was launched, which involved British as well as American aircraft attempting to bomb the Houthis into submission. Here again, the operation was unsuccessful, doing almost nothing to dent Houthi attacks or open up the Red Sea to shipping. But even then Biden was blamed; the mighty US military was being held back somehow. Thus, the natural conclusion was that once Trump was in office, the gloves would come off.</p>
<p>Biden’s critics were actually half right. Once Trump came in, the gloves did come off. Operation Poseidon Archer was followed by Operation Rough Rider, in March of this year, which attempted to show a new, much more muscular American military response against Houthi targets in Yemen — for all of six weeks. For six weeks, US warplanes pounded Yemen around the clock, with rare and expensive stealth bombers flying missions out of Diego Garcia in support of carrier-based aircraft. Yet once those six weeks were up, Trump proudly announced that Yemen had “<a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cglxl67g28no" target="_blank" rel="noopener">surrendered</a>” and that there was no more need for the US to keep up the bombing. A ceasefire had been brokered by Oman. This was trumpeted as a glorious victory for the US military, with the Houthis finally promising to not attack US ships anymore, and America graciously returning the gesture.</p>
<p>Of course, Trump didn’t mention the terms of the “surrender”. The Houthis only had to stop attacking American ships in exchange for America stopping the bombing; they were free to continue blockading the Red Sea or firing missiles at Israel. America, in other words, had given the Houthis carte blanche to carry on the behavior that was the reason America had gone to war in the first place. Thus, to call this deal a surrender was entirely appropriate; it’s just that it wasn’t the Houthis hoisting the white flag.</p>
<p>It is very commonplace to blame reversals and even defeats in America’s various wars of choice as merely a matter of lack of will. If America really wanted to win, it would win, the story goes; the failure of the US is just one where it never commits the force necessary to finish the fight. But today, that excuse rings hollow. Trump’s Operation Rough Rider, unlike Biden’s operations, utilized many of America’s most limited, expensive, and advanced weapons to try to bring the Houthis to heel. And still it surrendered. The lessons here are thus quite bleak. America’s preferred and increasingly only viable method of warfare — aerial warfare — is no longer cost-effective nor practical. But the US has no alternative modes of warfare to fall back on, which means that its days as a military hegemon are probably coming to a close.</p>
<p>To understand just how big a mess the air war against the Houthis has turned out to be, it’s important to understand a very basic rule to US military inventories. For while, on paper, America has 11 nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, an impressive figure that far outstrips any other country on the planet, that top line figure is barely relevant in practice.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/02/the-fantasy-of-british-defence/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/02/the-fantasy-of-british-defence/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/GettyImages-71556606.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/02/the-fantasy-of-british-defence/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/02/the-fantasy-of-british-defence/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The fantasy of British defence</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/02/the-fantasy-of-british-defence/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Aris Roussinos</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>For comparison, look to the United Kingdom. The UK has two large aircraft carriers, putting it near the top of the international leaderboard when it comes to the ability to project military force. But as anyone with any familiarity with the Royal Navy can tell you, that number does not tell the real story. The number of carriers the UK can actually deploy is far lower, a number which is fairly close to zero. For while the ships exist, the Royal Navy lacks the crew, the planes, the escorts, and the logistical capacity to actually put them to use for any length of time in a real war. The UK Navy has become something of a Potemkin village, where superficial on-paper strengths hide a catastrophic reality of deferred maintenance, insufficient budgets, and lack of personnel.</p>
<p>Though the situation for the US Navy isn’t quite as dire, in practice, the problem is the same: it cannot realistically put more than two to four carriers to sea at any given moment. The ability to surge capacity in times of crisis is limited, because the various reserve components of the US armed forces have catastrophically atrophied. If you discount the American carriers that are slated for the scrapyard, or those currently lacking a functional nuclear reactor, or those which are tied up in deep maintenance, the number of active, usable carriers is roughly a third of the on-paper number. Half of those carriers were being used against the Houthis.</p>
<p>But carriers are not the only example we ought to look at. For Operation Rough Rider, the US Air Force contributed some six B-2 Spirit stealth bombers, arguably the most advanced (and by far the most expensive) airframe in the US arsenal. At first blush, this seems like only a fraction of America’s power, because it has some 20 such bombers in its inventory. But a closer look at these planes suggests that those six used in Rough Rider very likely represent the entire working inventory of US stealth bombers. Because B-2s haven’t been built for decades, the only way to keep them operational is to cannibalize other B-2s for spare parts: as a result, a large number have been functionally scrapped and cannot ever hope to fly again. Only half of US bombers even qualify for so-called “mission capable” status on an average day, a status which doesn’t actually mean that the plane works; it simply means the plane isn’t completely broken and inoperable. Only two thirds or fewer of those mission capable planes can hope to qualify for what the US military instead classifies as “full mission capable” status. “Full mission capable” is your standard Pentagon-speak; it means the plane is in working order, has nothing broken that’s really important, and can realistically be used for what it was built for.</p>
<p>From carriers to stealth bombers, the pattern here is fairly clear, and it is further corroborated by testimonies from inside the Pentagon itself. America essentially pulled out <em>all the stops</em> to attack the Houthis, waging an extremely expensive and intensive air war against a militia controlling most of Yemen, the fourth-poorest nation in the world. The cost to operate a B-2 stealth bomber is extremely high on a per-hour basis; and their fragile stealth coating is not particularly fond of the warm, salty sea air at Diego Garcia. You don’t send in all of them unless you really mean business. America also committed roughly half of its active carriers, spent a fortune in land attack and air defense missiles, and it even cannibalized ammo stores and air defense systems from the Pacific theater of operations for the sake of the operation.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/05/europe-needs-a-new-great-power/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/05/europe-needs-a-new-great-power/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/GettyImages-2199580218.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/05/europe-needs-a-new-great-power/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/05/europe-needs-a-new-great-power/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Europe needs a new Great Power</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/05/europe-needs-a-new-great-power/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Edward Luttwak</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>But as the stories of the campaign start <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2025/04/04/us/politics/us-strikes-yemen-houthis.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">leaking to the press</a>, it’s clear that none of this effort did anything good. The US couldn’t establish air supremacy, meaning it couldn’t risk flying its older, non-stealth planes for fear of losing them. This itself might seem like proof that America was once again just not trying very hard; for what kind of war is it when you’re not ready to accept losses? But the problem is, America can’t afford to replace planes that get lost and pilots that get killed. This is not a problem of cowardice, but of force generation: even if the US military suffers zero losses due to enemy fire in the years ahead, it is still slated to shrink precipitously. This shrinkage and loss of capacity is just due to America’s planes and ships wearing out, with not enough workers, dockyards, engineers, and dollars to replace them. As America burns through its massive military inheritance bequeathed by Ronald Reagan and the Eighties arms race, there is no plan to replace it. For the US military, avoiding casualties is not a matter of caution or cowardice; it is the result of a total inability to replenish the force.</p>
<p>The result of this American Achilles’ heel has been an extremely expensive reliance — when it has come to defending the Red Sea — on so-called &#8220;standoff&#8221; weaponry; cruise missiles, for example, that can be launched from far enough away that anti-air fire won’t be a threat. But even then, there were problems: according to <a href="https://taskandpurpose.com/news/f-35-houthi-missile-close-call/#:~:text=Houthi%20rebels%20in%20Yemen%20fired%20on%20a%20U.S.,a%20U.S.%20official%20confirmed%20to%20Task%20%26%20Purpose." target="_blank" rel="noopener">leaked reports</a>, even the vaunted F-35 stealth fighter had to dodge incoming anti-air missiles on at least one occasion. In Operation Rough Rider, the US deployed many of its most rare and bespoke weapons, such as the AGM-158 JASSM (Joint Air-To-Surface Standoff Missile) as well as heavy, specialized bunker-buster bombs. Again, by all accounts, this had little effect. Partly, this was because the US kept losing so many of its MQ-9 reaper drones, which come with a price tag north of 30 million dollars apiece, and which were supposed to provide the intel to ensure the bombing campaign found its targets.</p>
<p>When Biden first lost interest in defending the Red Sea against the Houthis, people were aghast. Not doing enough was akin to telling the entire world that the US was too weak to keep the Suez channel open. But Trump, <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-politics/donald-trump-houthi-airstrikes-biden-b2477705.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">after berating his predecessor</a>, has also walked away, and de facto recognized the Houthi’s control of the channel. It would seem that the US doesn’t actually have many cards to play.</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;As America burns through its massive military inheritance bequeathed by Ronald Reagan and the Eighties arms race, there is no plan to replace it.&#8221;</div>
<p>Trump could have sent another carrier to the region in support of his operation, bringing the total up to three. But this would hardly have made much difference to the air campaign because the problem with this offensive wasn’t lack of deck space or fighter sorties — US planes were too wary to go anywhere near Yemen’s air defense, and even stealth jets were reportedly not entirely safe. The problem was the lack of standoff munitions which can be deployed from a point of relative safety. But these are so expensive and so limited that there is no budget to replenish them when stores are depleted (a single JASSM with a 450 kilogram explosive warhead comes in at slightly under a million dollars). <a href="https://features.csis.org/preparing-the-US-industrial-base-to-deter-conflict-with-China/#:~:text=According%20to%20the%20results%20of%20a%20series%20of,than%20one%20week%20in%20a%20Taiwan%20Strait%20conflict." target="_blank" rel="noopener">Wargames</a> show the US running out of most or all such critical munitions in a matter of weeks or even days in a real conflict against a peer enemy such as China.</p>
<p>Even worse, much of the US military’s most advanced weapons systems are dependent on components and materials such as rare earths from China, which has already started imposing harsh export restrictions in order to slowly choke the life out of the US military industrial complex. In practice, the US does not have the economy to produce the weapons used for aerial warfare at any sort of scale, and this has only been hidden from full view because the military has coasted along on an aura of invincibility.</p>
<p>As the appetite for ground warfare has waned, the allure of quick, cheap and easy air campaigns has grown. But air warfare is no longer what it once was. Operation Rough Rider was supposed to be a decisive show of force against an under-equipped, internally divided third-world nation. Instead, it ended up looking like the last hurrah of a truly antiquated form of warfare, unable to cope with cheaper and better anti-air weapon systems.</p>
<p>All of these limitations make the current talk about a new bombing campaign against Iran utterly surreal. Iran is far bigger than Yemen, with a much more robust air defense network. Moreover, the distances involved are such that carrier-based aircraft, even when launched from the very shores of the Persian Gulf, can’t actually reach places like Tehran and return on a single tank of fuel. Fighter-bombers will need aerial refueling over the Iranian interior, and tanker planes are slow, easy to spot on radar, and pretty much defenseless. Even attempting to destroy the Iranian air defense network will take huge amounts of precision standoff weaponry, which the US cannot practically replace, even if it weren’t struggling with a massive fiscal crisis and soaring bond yields. The critical parts of Iran’s nuclear program are kept under hundreds of feet of solid mountain; the US, using the heaviest and most advanced weapons in its entire arsenal, did not succeed against the much shallower Houthi bunkers and missile storage facilities in Yemen. All of the problems that forced America’s tacit surrender of the Suez canal would be writ large — and be far more lethal — in any campaign against Iran.</p>
<p>With exploding deficits, a growing internal political crisis, and a slowly collapsing military, America is a leopard that lacks the wherewithal to even attempt to change its spots. The generals know that the jig is up: the old model is broken, there is no new model coming, and nobody has the energy left to do much about it all. And so, this massive crisis of US military power is playing out in the vein of Ernest Hemingway’s comment about the course of his own bankruptcy: gradually, then suddenly.</p>
<p>Once upon a time, there was always a bigger plane, a more advanced high-tech future weapon, yet another trick up the Air Force’s sleeve that you could point to in order to silence the doubters. But those days are over. The gravity of what happened in Yemen will only assert itself once the political class is ready to deal with the new world we are now living in: one in which the US has no new military rabbits to pull out of its hat, and those that it does have simply aren’t enough to get anywhere close to victory.</p>
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					<title>Why Trump can&#039;t beat the Houthis</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2025/03/why-trump-cant-beat-the-houthis/?edition=us</link>
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										<unherd:main_theme>signalgate</unherd:main_theme>
					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Reuel Marc Gerecht]]>
					</dc:creator>
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																<unherd:article_ranking>2</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[Iran doesn't care for the Houthis. Mohammed Hamoud/Getty Images]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Reuel Marc Gerecht </strong>is a Resident Scholar at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and a former Iranian-targets officer in the Central Intelligence Agency.</p>
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						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>ReuelMGerecht</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[is a Resident Scholar at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and a former Iranian-targets officer in the Central Intelligence Agency.]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Fri, 28 Mar 2025 00:01:41 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Fri, 28 Mar 2025 14:33:57 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Donald Trump]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Houthis]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Iran]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[signal]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[The Atlantic]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[US]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[War]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Yemen]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://stage.unherd.com/?p=666070</guid>
																												<description>
								<![CDATA[Attacking proxies won't wound Iran]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>Donald Trump took to Truth Social last week to give <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cwyd2l17ygpo" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Iran a violent warning</a>: “Every shot fired by the Houthis will be looked upon, from this point forward, as being a shot fired from the weapons and leadership of IRAN. IRAN will be held responsible, and suffer the consequences and those consequences will be dire!” It didn’t sound as if he was pondering another round of sanctions.</p>
<p>A few days later came <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2025/03/24/trump-putin-bromance-could-finally-topple-irans-ayatollahs/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">a shift in tone</a>, as Trump’s Middle East envoy, Steve Witkoff, extended an olive branch: “Our signal to Iran is let’s sit down and see if we can, through dialogue, through diplomacy, get to the right place,” he said. “If we can’t, the alternative is not a great alternative.” This followed a letter Trump sent to the Iranian supreme leader Ali Khamenei on 7 March, which supposedly set a two-month deadline for a new nuclear deal to be signed.</p>
<p>As Iran gets closer and closer to building a bomb, Trump will have to decide whether to avert the coming nuclear crisis using military or diplomatic might. His team is divided. The Signal exchange published this week in <em>The Atlantic</em>, in which high-ranking officials discussed plans for air strikes against Houthi rebels in Yemen, revealed a split within the Trump administration over Yemen — and, more importantly though indirectly, over Iran.</p>
<p>In one camp is Vice President JD Vance and the President’s consigliere, Stephen Miller, who together head up the isolationists. Vance has repeatedly expressed strong reservations about Middle Eastern engagements, even those with Israel against Iran, which might lead the United States into conflict. Vance wants the US to do less, and its allies to do more — though not anything that would oblige Washington to intervene militarily. In the other camp is Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth, whose more confrontational views on Yemen echo those of the President. Hegseth’s stance reflects the President’s seeming willingness to extend US power into the Middle East to protect Israel vis-à-vis Iran. Though in other areas of foreign policy, Trump’s reluctance to protect traditional allies and avoid “forever wars” is more in line with his Vice President’s sentiments.</p>
<p>Vance’s and Miller’s animosity towards “free-loading” Europeans, as exposed in the leaked messages, reflects a widespread Right-wing allergy towards any dangerous American commitment in the Middle East. These isolationists oppose America bombing Yemen because they think that Suez Canal trade routes, which are continuously harassed by the Iran-allied Houthis, supposedly benefit Europe more than the United States. So why should America be the one to police them?</p>
<div class="su-pullquote su-pullquote-align-left">&#8220;The Signal exchange revealed a split within the Trump administration over Yemen — and, more importantly though indirectly, over Iran.&#8221;</div>
<p>This aversion to protecting international shipping lanes in the Middle East can be traced back to 2019, when Trump failed to respond militarily to Iranian missile-and-drone and mine attacks on Saudi oil facilities and Gulf shipping. In doing so, he put the so-called Carter Doctrine of 1980— which stipulated that Washington would go to war to protect Persian Gulf oil — on life-support. The decision to sit tight badly damaged US credibility, and might explain Trump’s recent hawkish makeover.</p>
<p>However, one suspects that the Signal debacle was less about shipping lanes, and more about the potential for the Yemen imbroglio to trigger a conflict with Iran. Vance and Miller surely see the Middle Eastern momentum.</p>
<p>The Signal discussion didn’t touch on how the Yemen bombings would affect Washington’s current diplomatic overture to Tehran. Hegseth and the President likely think it can’t hurt: Tehran will see Trump’s Washington as tougher for it, and capable of coercing the Iranians into nuclear negotiations. Meanwhile, Vance may not care: the Vice President doesn’t believe Washington should go to war with Tehran over the nuclear issue, let alone Suez Canal traffic. If he isn’t willing to bomb an Iranian proxy for fear of a slippery slope, then he is surely unlikely to want to bomb its sponsor.</p>
<p>In August 1998, President Bill Clinton fired cruise missiles at al-Qaeda in Khost, Afghanistan, in retaliation to the US embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania. I recall speaking to my old professor, the Anglo-American historian Bernard Lewis, about the barrage. This was his wry assessment: “I was in Khost in 1956. I don’t think it’s changed. Not sure we will be able to see much difference between the before and after shots.”</p>
<p>What was true in Afghanistan then is undoubtedly true in Yemen now: attacking the Houthis, who have always given Tehran a big strategic bang for their buck, isn’t likely to cause significant long-term damage. After all, peasant societies repair infrastructure pretty quickly. Ten years ago, the Saudis and Emirates tried to bomb the Houthis into better behaviour. Despite their overwhelming air power and American targeting assistance, they failed abysmally.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/03/how-rearmament-can-make-us-rich/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/03/how-rearmament-can-make-us-rich/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/GettyImages-1245740406.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/03/how-rearmament-can-make-us-rich/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/03/how-rearmament-can-make-us-rich/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>How rearmament can make us rich</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2025/03/how-rearmament-can-make-us-rich/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Edward Luttwak</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>This is partly because Yemen has been at war with itself for decades, and the years of fighting have shredded Yemeni communitarian restraint — the social, political, and economic capital of older men that checks the aggressive passions of younger men. Violence is now the norm in a deeply fractured society. The only military actions against Yemen that might be more effective would entail constant, scorching assaults by US naval and land forces that would turn the littoral into a wasteland — a more destructive version of what British imperial forces did to quiet the Wahhabi-inspired Gulf pirates of the early 19th century. However, even under Trump, Washington is surely unprepared to support such sustained devastation, and to commit manpower and money to it.</p>
<p>Nor are US military actions in Yemen likely to provoke much fear in Tehran. The whole point of Iranian-backed proxies is to absorb pain. The Islamic Republic has been clandestinely nurturing foreign militants since its inception — and for all this time it’s never cared much about allied-Arab casualties.</p>
<p>All this means that American, European, and Israeli reprisals against the Houthis are likely refortifying an old Iranian doctrine: that the Islamic Republic’s enemies are willing to attack the clerical regime’s proxies, but not Iran directly. The Israelis discombobulated this in October 2024, but now it seems to be back in force.</p>
<p>Yet until Iranian supplies are cut off directly, check-mating the Houthis is impossible. The US and allied navies and air forces have so far failed to stop the Houthis harassing shipping. And they are unlikely to do better until the United States is willing to attack Iranian ports — the primary entrepôts for the Houthis — while also hitting Yemeni targets.</p>
<p>Unlike the Houthis, the clerical regime has much to lose in a duel with the United States. By Middle Eastern standards, Iran has a fairly advanced society, cursed with an incompetent government. The Iranian currency, the rial, now appears to be in free-fall, which, given the history of economic protests in the country morphing into violent political protests, must give the theocracy pause. In this context, US military power is a threat to its capacity to govern. If sustained, US military action against the clerical regime will surely convulse the theocracy at the very least, and disrupt its support to its proxies.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/12/how-syria-will-shape-europes-future/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/12/how-syria-will-shape-europes-future/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/Screenshot-2024-12-16-at-11.56.41.png?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/12/how-syria-will-shape-europes-future/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/12/how-syria-will-shape-europes-future/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>How Syria will shape Europe&#039;s future</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/12/how-syria-will-shape-europes-future/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Aris Roussinos</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>For now, however, Trump still believes that a nuclear deal with Khamenei is possible. And until he abandons this idea, he’ll likely have no more success against the Houthis than his predecessor. The quest for a nuclear deal handicapped Washington’s willingness to counter Tehran in the past. A limited nuclear agreement, which exchanges sanctions relief for some easily reversible diminution of uranium enrichment, would just give Tehran the cash to fortify its proxies again. Trump would become Obama redux.</p>
<p>During the first Trump administration, Tehran essentially stopped the growth of its enriched-uranium stockpile. This time round that doesn’t appear to be happening, and Tehran’s mass of highly enriched, near-bomb-grade uranium is growing larger by the month. Senior officials in the Biden administration more or less operated under the assumption that Iran only had a few technical hurdles left to jump; if provoked, Khamenei could cross the nuclear red line.</p>
<p>But what about Trump? If the President decides to attack the Islamic Republic’s ports and missile factories because of its Yemeni machinations, then hitting the nuclear sites will surely follow. The Trump administration’s intentions on a lot of issues are challenging to assess since the President isn’t captured by consistency and humbled by contradiction. But he does seem to understand that the nuclear issue cannot be separated from the Islamic Republic’s proxy imperialism. They are solved together, or they are lost separately.</p>
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					<title>Should Britain lead the war in Yemen?</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2024/01/should-britain-lead-the-war-in-yemen/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://stage.unherd.com/2024/01/should-britain-lead-the-war-in-yemen/?edition=us#comments</comments>
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					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[Tom McTague]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/Tom-McTague-Website.jpg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking>2</unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[This is an obvious war. (Photo by Mohammad Huwais/AFP/Getty)]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Tom McTague</strong> is UnHerd&#8217;s <strong>Political Editor.</strong> He is the author of <em>Between the Waves: The Hidden History of a Very British Revolution 1945-2016,</em> due to be published in September 2025</p>
]]>
						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>TomMcTague</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is UnHerd's <strong>Political Editor.</strong> He is the author of <em>Between the Waves: The Hidden History of a Very British Revolution 1945-2016,</em> due to be published in September 2025]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Sat, 13 Jan 2024 00:05:06 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Sat, 13 Jan 2024 00:05:06 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[America]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[America First]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Middle East]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Military]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Yemen]]></category>
					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://old.unherd.com/?p=496229</guid>
																												<description>
								<![CDATA[We are always at the tip of the American spear]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>“The tradition of all dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brains of the living,” Karl Marx observed. When it comes to British military adventurism in the Middle East, that certainly rings true.</p>
<p>The recent history of British interventions in the region certainly reads like a nightmarish cycle of folly: in Iraq and Syria and Libya and beyond. And yet the cyclical nature of our national life did not start spinning with Tony Blair. It was 1839 when the East India Company first took Aden in today’s Yemen as a British base to protect shipping from the pirates then operating in the Red Sea, disrupting our trade to India. Sometimes you have to wonder whether anything ever changes.</p>
<p>For almost 130 years, Britain kept this toehold on the Arabian peninsula, before being driven out, shamefacedly, by local guerillas in 1967. Within a few months of the so-called Aden Emergency,  Britain would abandon all of its bases east of Suez, the inevitable result of Harold Wilson’s devaluation of sterling the year before. And so went Britain as a global power, and the start of its journey into Europe and our shiny new future as a normal country. Or that was the plan anyway.</p>
<p>And yet, here we are again, out of Europe and using our military power against the tribes of Yemen to protect our commercial interests and those of the rest of the Western alliance. And not only that, but now with bases once again west of Suez, established in Oman and Bahrain during the reign of David Cameron.</p>
<p>Essentially, though, we never left — Britain is still flying sorties over Syria and Iraq from our sovereign base in Cyprus. And in the case of Yemen, as I reported <a href="https://stage.unherd.com/thepost/yemen-is-a-war-worth-fighting/">yesterday</a>, this is as obvious a war as you can get. If we can’t fight terrorists attacking our ships disrupting our economy, who can we fight? Unlike the first decade of the 2000s, when we were gripped by grand ideas of liberal interventionism, or the second, when we convinced ourselves humanitarian aid was “soft power” that actually worked, here is a straightforward conflict of interest conflict, in which our prosperity is being undermined by a ragtag band of Yemeni rebels using cheap drones to attack international container ships. If this isn’t what militaries are for, then what is?</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/01/how-the-west-can-stop-the-houthis/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/01/how-the-west-can-stop-the-houthis/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/GettyImages-1826914452-1-e1704978468215.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/01/how-the-west-can-stop-the-houthis/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading </span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/01/how-the-west-can-stop-the-houthis/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>How the West can stop the Houthis</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2024/01/how-the-west-can-stop-the-houthis/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> David Rundell</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>This sort of intervention is the kind of thing we do. As one senior official told me, “it is in our DNA”; it is the tradition of our dead generations. Unlike most other European countries, Britain still (just about) has a military capable of taking part in such action and because we have it, we use it. We use it to project power and defend interests. We have the motive and the means to act.</p>
<p>And yet, this does not answer the question about why Britain should commit itself to having such a military force in the first place. What tangible benefit do we get from always being at the tip of the American spear in foreign policy? This was our position in Afghanistan and Iraq and it did us little good. It is the position we have taken up in support of Ukraine and it is now where we are in the fight to control the Houthis. But how do we benefit from being America’s most reliable military partner? Washington was little help during Brexit, bullied us into banning Huawei from any involvement in our critical infrastructure, and won’t even negotiate a trade deal. France and Germany, meanwhile, seem to thrive just as well without taking such risks supporting US hegemony. The Netherlands are now so small they barely have a foreign policy and yet they are far richer than us. What’s more, it’s not as if this intervention is without risk. From 2015 until very recently, a coalition of extraordinarily rich Gulf states led by Saudi Arabia spent $6 billion per month trying to defeat the Houthis — and failed. What makes us think we can do any better?</p>
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<p>The great irony is that when Britain abandoned its military bases east of Suez in 1968, those who had been championing this policy believed it would put an end to the special relationship and usher in a new European era for us. Harold Wilson’s deputy George Brown, for example, had long concluded that Britain needed to devalue the pound and abandon any pretensions to global power if we were to modernise our economy as the Labour Party had promised in its election victories in 1964 and 1966. Talking to that great icon of the Labour Left, Barbara Castle, in 1966, Brown declared that Britain would have to reject any American financial incentives to maintain its global presence, cut the cord and join Europe. “We’ve got to turn down their money,” he declared, according to an account of the conversation in Ben Pimlott’s biography of Wilson. “Pull out the troops, all of them… I want them out east of Suez. This is the decision we have got to make: break the commitment to America.”</p>
<p>At this point, remember, it was the Right, not the Left, leading the charge away from the United States. “Left versus Right had lost its old meaning,” Pimlott writes. “Anti-Americanism was a traditional Left-wing prejudice. Yet the former Leftist Wilson, in his bid to shore up the pound, had become an arch-supporter of the special relationship, against the frequently Right-wing devaluers.” Indeed, it would be Harold Wilson’s replacement as Prime Minister, Edward Heath, who would take this to its logical conclusion, becoming the first — and last — prime minister to conclude that Britain should actively reject the special relationship in order to build a new collective European approach to foreign affairs. At one summit in the US, Heath even declined a privileged briefing from the Americans because he did not want to undermine the collective European front with France and Germany that he was trying to build.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2021/03/anarchy-is-coming/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2021/03/anarchy-is-coming/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/GettyImages-109891750-1-scaled.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2021/03/anarchy-is-coming/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading </span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2021/03/anarchy-is-coming/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Anarchy is coming</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2021/03/anarchy-is-coming/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Aris Roussinos</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>And yet, here we are, half a century on, and we’re back where we have always been, fighting alongside the United States, projecting our power, while the rest of Europe watches on, benefiting. You have to wonder whether this is sustainable, particularly as Britain’s economic challenges continue to mount — just like in 1967. In the end, a nation’s commitments cannot be greater than its capabilities for very long before something snaps.</p>
<p>In some senses, then, the fundamental question facing Britain never changes, much as the fundamental nature of our foreign interventions never seem to change. “Why Britain should want to keep a world role was a difficult question,” Pimlott writes of the British government’s challenge during the Sixties. “There was confusion about whether Britain wanted to continue to be some kind of world power for reasons of national prestige; or to provide a post-imperial sense of national purpose… or simply to guarantee American financial support when the British economy got into difficulties.”</p>
<p>Today, unlike the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the question is not why we are bombing Yemen, because the answer is easy: because a militia is attacking our interests. The question this time is why we are playing such a disproportionate role when we are no longer disproportionately rich. Tradition is not a good enough answer.</p>
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					<title>Israel&#8217;s war is about to escalate</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2023/11/israels-war-is-about-to-escalate/?edition=us</link>
											<comments>https://stage.unherd.com/2023/11/israels-war-is-about-to-escalate/?edition=us#comments</comments>
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					<dc:creator>
						<![CDATA[David Patrikarakos]]>
					</dc:creator>
					<unherd:creator_img>https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/David-Patrikarakos.jpg?w=96</unherd:creator_img>
																<unherd:article_ranking></unherd:article_ranking>
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							<![CDATA[Israel faces war on five fronts. (Christopher Furlong/Getty)]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_bio>
							<![CDATA[<p><strong>David Patrikarakos</strong> is <em>UnHerd</em>&#8216;s foreign correspondent. His latest book is <em>War in 140 characters: how social media is reshaping conflict in the 21st century. </em>(Hachette)</p>
]]>
						</unherd:twitter_bio>
						<unherd:twitter_handle>dpatrikarakos</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is <em>UnHerd</em>'s foreign correspondent. His latest book is <em>War in 140 characters: how social media is reshaping conflict in the 21st century. </em>(Hachette)]]>
					</unherd:author_bio>
										<pubDate>Tue, 28 Nov 2023 00:03:47 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Tue, 28 Nov 2023 12:47:26 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Hezbollah]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Houthis]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[Israel Hamas War]]></category>
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					<guid isPermaLink="false">https://old.unherd.com/?p=492320</guid>
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								<![CDATA[A global conflict cannot be discounted]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p>As I look out over Lebanon from high up on Israel’s northern border, I see undulating hills dappled with hedgerows and green brush that glows golden in the winter sun. But this is far from an idyll. Lebanese Hezbollah have been firing into Israel since October 7. And it is from here that a regional, possibly global, war is most likely to start.</p>
<p>On the ground, with the ceasefire extended for another two days, relations between Israel and Hamas seem to be progressing. The temporary truce, however, is just a plaster on a gangrenous wound. If Hamas releases all of its hostages, then its leverage evaporates and it has nothing to deter Israel from its assault. If Israel ceases military operations now, then its promise that Hamas will never again be able to launch another attack is just empty rhetoric. Neither its traumatised population nor its desperate Prime Minister will allow that.</p>
<p>So, the war continues, with Israel completing its operation in northern Gaza and turning to the south. And along with its horrific cost, the chances of broader escalation will increase.</p>
<p>But the war with Hamas has already expanded. Hezbollah are firing from the north, Syrian groups from the northeast, the Houthis from Yemen in the south — and behind them all, Iran. Israel is now fighting a war on five fronts. But it’s in the north that the greatest threat lies.</p>
<p>“What we’ve been experiencing on the northern border are a few kinds of Hezbollah approaches,” says a source in the IDF’s Northern Command. “Number one: infiltration attempts on the border itself. Two: using anti-tank missiles to target Israeli soldiers, outposts, tanks and armoured vehicles. Three: using aerial vehicles [drones]. This did not really exist in [the Lebanon war of] 2006. The investment in aerial vehicles began in 2009.” Hezbollah, they tell me, is targeting a narrow strip just a few kilometres from the border, rather than cities further south such as Haifa. “From that we assess that the current decision of Hezbollah is not to escalate.”</p>
<p>But Hezbollah also needs to manage its optics. It cannot spend decades railing against the “Zionist Oppressor” and then do nothing when it is at war with the group’s supposed brethren in Hamas. “Hezbollah has activated a few Palestinians from the refugee camps in Lebanon,” I am told. “There is cooperation when interests converge when their interests converge, and Hezbollah is using Palestinians to fire anti-tank missiles at us.” Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah’s leader, seemingly confirmed these assessments when he congratulated Hamas on its attack last month, while stressing he had no idea it was coming. The signal was clear: we had nothing to do with this; beyond saving face, we don’t want to get involved.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/10/israel-wont-wait-for-long/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/10/israel-wont-wait-for-long/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/GettyImages-1725071471-1-e1698253770455.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/10/israel-wont-wait-for-long/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading </span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/10/israel-wont-wait-for-long/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Hamas is playing for time</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/10/israel-wont-wait-for-long/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Edward Luttwak</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>But while 1914 is an overwrought analogy, here, with so many moving parts, escalation cannot be discounted. And beyond the trauma of October 7, many Israelis want action. The northern city of Qiryat Shemona is a mile from the Lebanese border. Today, after local authorities ordered civilians to leave in the face of daily rocket attacks, it is almost deserted. One man who hasn’t left is Moshe Peretz, 63, who owns a garage. He works with the IDF and local farmers and is, he tells me, an essential service provider. “I’ve been here 58 years and I’m used to this sort of stuff — sometimes Hezbollah would fire over 100 Katyusha rockets in one day. Back then we had to cram into small shelters.”</p>
<p>He continues, “if we pass this problem onto our children, then we haven’t achieved anything. We will have suffered 60 years for nothing. We can end it now – and we must.”</p>
<p>We drive up into the mountains, towards the border, through forest where IDF soldiers and tanks line the roads. At the summit, stands a thick metal barrier. It has been erected to protect us from fire from Lebanon. I cannot film it: it’s a new type of armour, I’m told. If I publish photos, the enemy will be able to analyse its thickness and adjust its fire accordingly.</p>
<p>The Hezbollah threat is incredibly potent. In 2019, <a href="https://www.dia.mil/Portals/110/Images/News/Military_Powers_Publications/Iran_Military_Power_LR.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">US intelligence</a> estimated the group had 150,000 projectiles in its arsenal, which includes<a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/erictegler/2023/11/15/hezbollahs-rocket-missile-and-drone-arsenal-is-huge-and-varied/?sh=243459cd2d21" target="_blank" rel="noopener"> Iranian Fateh-110 and Syrian M-600</a> satellite-guided missiles with a range of up to 186 miles, putting Tel Aviv in reach. Added to this are its anti-ship missiles, particularly the Iranian Noor and Russian Yakhont, as well as the 100,000 fighters <a href="https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/what-does-hezbollahs-arsenal-look-like/articleshow/105154647.cms" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Nasrallah claimed</a> to have in 2021 — a figure which, while almost certainly inflated, is not entirely divorced from reality.</p>
<p>That said, Lebanon is also suffering its worst financial crisis in modern history. The last thing it needs is another war with Israel, especially since the one in 2006 brought such destruction to the country. And internally, Hezbollah is powerful right now — why throw it all away?</p>
<p>Meanwhile, the Houthis have launched several drone and missile attacks against Israel: a show of solidarity with the Palestinians and a display of strength to its domestic audience. Though not as powerful as Hezbollah, the group has Iranian Quds-351 cruise missiles, which it has used against Saudi oil fields and which have a reported range of 1,650km. It also has the Iranian Toufan ballistic missile that has a range of up to 1,950km (though unlike the Iranian original it is not precision guided). Finally the Houthis have a drone capability, notably the<a href="https://amwaj.media/media-monitor/interview-inside-the-houthi-arsenal-that-can-reach-israel" target="_blank" rel="noopener"> Samad UAV</a>.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/11/the-defiance-of-israels-border-towns/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/11/the-defiance-of-israels-border-towns/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/GettyImages-1733609128-1-e1698942939407.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/11/the-defiance-of-israels-border-towns/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading </span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/11/the-defiance-of-israels-border-towns/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The defiance of Israel&#039;s border towns</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/11/the-defiance-of-israels-border-towns/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> David Patrikarakos</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>While their missiles are slow and inaccurate, they could theoretically overwhelm Israel&#8217;s Iron Dome if launched in conjunction with Hamas and Hezbollah. Before October 7, the most missiles Israel had faced in a day was 470 in May 2021. On October 7, it faced 5,200 in 20 minutes. Throw drones into the equation, and the picture becomes disconcerting. That said, the Houthis main fight is with Saudi Arabia. If it were to use all its weapons against Israel, the Saudis might sense opportunity, and move in for the kill.</p>
<p>In the end, though, the state that matters most is the one that stands behind Hamas, Hezbollah and the Houthis: Iran. Tehran bases its regional strategy on a doctrine of “Forward Defence” that, loosely speaking, means using regional non-state terror groups to fight its opponents abroad and retain stability at home.</p>
<p>Right now, Iran’s proxies are well-positioned around the borders of its two main regional rivals, Israel and Saudi Arabia — including a joint <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/11/10/iran-proxy-militias-syria-israel-hamas-war-irgc-escalation/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">operation room</a> with Hezbollah in the Golan Heights — which give it a degree of regional security it seems unwise to risk. After Israel and the United States bombed its Revolutionary Guard (IRGC) base in Syria in October, Iran has <a href="https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/will-hezbollah-hold-back-or-escalate" target="_blank" rel="noopener">shifted many of</a> its missile production facilities to Lebanon. Ultimately, these proxies deter direct attacks from Israel. If they are smashed, which will happen with escalation, the threat to Iran gets serious.</p>
<p>But Iran has other options. The IRGC has recently set up two new proxies in Syria: the Afghan Fatemiyoun and Pakistani Zainabiyoun groups whose stated goal is to destroy Israel. Iran can have them continue to attack the “Zionist Entity” at a limited level, while remaining largely unconcerned about retaliation as they are fundamentally expendable.</p>
<p>But in the end, while the Mullahs are happy for Hamas to hurt Israel, there is a limit to their support for it. Reuters <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/irans-axis-resistance-against-israel-faces-trial-by-fire-2023-11-15/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">reported</a> that at a recent meeting in Tehran, Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei complained to Hamas boss Ismail Haniyeh that his country was not warned of the October 7 attacks and that it would not enter the war on their behalf.</p>
<p>For their part, the Israelis are immovable on the eradication of Hamas but also wary of a broader war. The IDF was clear: the end of Hamas serves everyone. Anything short of a decisive defeat, they say, would embolden every terror group in the Middle East.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/10/why-peace-in-israel-failed/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/10/why-peace-in-israel-failed/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/GettyImages-178320128.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/10/why-peace-in-israel-failed/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading </span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/10/why-peace-in-israel-failed/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Why peace in Israel failed</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2023/10/why-peace-in-israel-failed/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Thomas Fazi</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>This is partly why the UK and US have both deployed forces in the area. But, in truth, it is unintended escalation that is the greatest concern — especially when Hamas is still holding so many hostages. Standing in the mountains of northern Israel, I peer down at the roads below and imagine the domino effect a stray Katusha accidentally hitting an Israeli school bus would have.</p>
<p>One act begets another in a region where no one can back down in the face of their own, often oppressed populations. Dictatorships are better at sustaining wars — and casualties — than democracies, and worse at avoiding them. From al-Houthi to Nasrallah to Khamenei, they continue to fight because policy and rhetoric cannot allow otherwise.</p>
<p>On 3 August, 1914, as the United Kingdom entered World War I, the British foreign secretary, Sir Edward Grey, remarked darkly that “the lamps are going out all over Europe, we shall not see them lit again in our lifetime”. Today in the Middle East, a return to 1914 seems, if not yet imminent, then no longer beyond the realms of possibility either.</p>
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					<title>Anarchy is coming</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2021/03/anarchy-is-coming/?edition=us</link>
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						<![CDATA[Aris Roussinos]]>
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							<![CDATA[Wars in the Middle East are now increasingly fought by proxies. Photo: John Moore/Getty Images]]>
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							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Aris Roussinos</strong> is an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist and a former war reporter.</p>
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						<unherd:twitter_handle>arisroussinos</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is an <em>UnHerd</em> columnist and a former war reporter.]]>
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										<pubDate>Tue, 23 Mar 2021 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Tue, 23 Mar 2021 10:47:47 +0000</updated>
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								<![CDATA[The liberal world order has failed to usher in global peace]]>
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								<![CDATA[<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">When the Biden administration undertook </span><a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/feb/25/us-airstrike-syria-iran-militia"><span style="font-weight: 400;">its first known act of war</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> a few weeks ago, it provided an illuminating snapshot of conflict in the 21</span><span style="font-weight: 400;">st</span><span style="font-weight: 400;"> century. The aerial strike on Iranian-backed Iraqi Shia militias in eastern Syria, facing territory held by American-backed Syrian proxy forces, in response to the shelling of American positions in Iraq by Iranian-backed Iraqi militias which led to the death of an American private contractor, encapsulates the central role of surrogate warfare in modern conflict. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Like the </span><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/thepost/armenia-another-country-abandoned-to-its-fate/"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Karabakh conflict</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> last year, when </span><a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/stories-55238803"><span style="font-weight: 400;">Turkish-backed Syrian rebel militias</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> fought Armenian conscripts as disposable cannon fodder, as they had previously done in Libya, while Turkish drones </span><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/thepost/tanks-for-the-memory/"><span style="font-weight: 400;">cleared the way</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> for Azerbaijani forces to advance, we were presented with a sobering image of the new face of war. Like the Spanish Civil War before it, </span><a href="https://tcf.org/content/commentary/politics-memory-ten-years-war-syria/"><span style="font-weight: 400;">the decade-long Syrian Civil War</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">, a conflict perpetually about to conclude which yet may never fully end, has revealed itself as a harbinger of dangerous new trends the full implications of which we are yet to fully understand. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">It is only natural, for example, that </span><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2021/03/britains-plan-for-survival/"><span style="font-weight: 400;">last week’s Integrated Review</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> notes that Britain’s state competitors are likely to use proxy forces to challenge the international order, while the forthcoming defence review will mandate </span><a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2021/03/19/british-army-turn-infantry-soldiers-elite-fighters-tackle-high/"><span style="font-weight: 400;">the creation of a new elite “Rangers” regiment</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> formed precisely to advise and fight alongside proxies of our own.</span></p>
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<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">A recent new book, </span><a href="https://www.amazon.co.uk/Surrogate-Warfare-Transformation-Twenty-First-Century/dp/1626166781"><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">Surrogate Warfare</span></i></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">, by the professors of Security Studies Andreas Krieg and Jean-Marc Rickli, does much to synthesise recent academic work on the deteriorating global situation brought about by both technological advance and globalisation. Echoing research on neo-medievalisation within International Relations — the dawning realisation, </span><a href="https://www.amazon.co.uk/Anarchical-Society-Study-Order-Politics/dp/0333985869"><span style="font-weight: 400;">first voiced by the theorist Hedley Bull in 1977</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> that late modernity was heading inexorably to the weakening power of the Westphalian state system and its replacement by an overlapping web of transnational and sub-national actors — its authors present a stark vision of a world of growing anarchy brought about by the intersection of new technologies and the unintended consequences of globalisation.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">As they warn, “the world arguably looks more anarchical in the early twenty-first century than it has ever been in modern times,” as ”with its 9/11 attacks and the spread of global jihadism, massive transnational migration streams, the financial crisis of 2008, and the wide-spread collapse of state authority across Africa and the Middle East — the idealist, classical conceptualizations of conflict in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries appear as historical anomalies.”</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The liberal world order, and the unhindered global movement of information, goods and people it accelerated, was intended to usher in an age of global peace and harmony. Yet instead, it has undermined the basic foundations of the global order, and “</span><span style="font-weight: 400;">state-centrism, the idea that individuals can escape the state of nature only through a covenant binding them to an authority modeled on the Westphalian nation-state, has become archaic in a world of porous borders and growing migrant populations”.</span><span style="font-weight: 400;"> Instead of promoting good governance across the globe, postmodernity has eroded the authority of the state at home and the stability of the international system itself, returning us to a situation analogous to that of the Middle Ages, where sovereignty was widely dispersed, contested and partial.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">By dismantling physical and informational barriers across the globe, the basic capacity of states to provide security for their citizens has become weakened, perhaps fatally. By eroding the lines between home and abroad, postmodernity has globalised conflicts, and eroded even the very distinction between war and peace. Instead of perpetual peace, it has ushered in an age of perpetual anarchy that states are finding themselves powerless to contain. As Krieg &amp; Rickli note, “the globalised conflict is transnational in nature and disregards the state-centric norms, conventions, and laws put in place in the nineteenth century to limit war.” We have entered an era of “everywhere conflicts” where “the authority of the state in the twenty-first century is the weakest it has been since the Peace of Westphalia in 1648.” </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Which cheerleader of globalisation a generation ago would have foreseen that children in Manchester would be blown apart by a British Libyan suicide bomber as a downstream consequence of wars in Syria and Iraq? That social media would inspire young British citizens to journey to the Middle East to keep captured minorities as slaves and slaughter their compatriots on hi-definition video for the horror and delight of their online audiences at home? Such atrocities, and the state’s desperate attempts to provide security to an increasingly unsettled public, are not anomalies, but the natural outcome of the waning of the Westphalian state and the rise of challengers to its authority from both above and below: “insecurity, not security, has become the norm in postmodern society.” </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">As a result, both liberal Western states and their illiberal competitors are driven to intervene in complex and tangled wars with strong ethnic and sectarian dimensions by an unstable and often contradictory mix of humanitarian concerns, security fears and realpolitik. Yet at the same time, both are conscious that their domestic publics are increasingly averse to casualties, particularly in wars not of obvious strategic necessity, with the result that the burden of fighting is shifted to expendable local proxies, while the brunt of casualties is borne by civilians on the ground at the mercy of stand-off weapons. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Eager to avoid unpopular casualties in these “wars of choice,” states are subcontracting the bloody business of fighting on the ground  to local proxies, whose goals may differ from those of their sponsors, and whose behaviour is not subject to any meaningful legal oversight. As Krieg &amp; Rickli note, “the need to remove military action from society’s checks and balances is the single most important driver and aspect of postmodern surrogate warfare in liberal and illiberal states,” driving the push towards stand-off weapons like drones and local proxies on the ground, almost entirely to the detriment of the civilians who live there. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The catastrophic civil war in Syria, the parallel conflict in Yemen and the widening destabilisation of Iraq, Lebanon and Libya exemplify these trends, where external actors like the United States, Russia, Turkey, Iran and the Gulf kingdoms manipulate their local proxy militias like chess pieces while their drones, ballistic missiles and jets lay waste to the ground on which they fight. Instead of democratising the  Middle East as pundits first hoped, the unintended intersection of the Arab Spring, globalisation and new technologies have seen the entire region spiralling into a giant arena of experimentation in 21st century warfare, almost wholly disastrous to its people, as a result of global trends they had no part in making.</span></p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2021/03/twilight-of-the-american-empire/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2021/03/twilight-of-the-american-empire/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/GettyImages-131440013.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2021/03/twilight-of-the-american-empire/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2021/03/twilight-of-the-american-empire/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Twilight of the American empire</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2021/03/twilight-of-the-american-empire/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Aris Roussinos</a></p></div></a></div>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">It is precisely the internationalisation of the wars in Syria, Libya and Yemen that has made them so deadly. Insulated from taking casualties of their own, intervening states have little or no inclination to moderate their activity. Drones and proxy militias are cheap, compared to the mass mobilisation of armies in the 19</span><span style="font-weight: 400;">th</span><span style="font-weight: 400;"> and 20</span><span style="font-weight: 400;">th</span><span style="font-weight: 400;"> centuries: proxy-centred conflicts  are affordable for even mid-ranking powers, lowering the barrier for entrance into conflict and limiting the need to end them quickly. Claims that Russia, or Iran, or Turkey would soon find themselves bogged down in wars they cannot afford have been repeated for years now, without this moment ever being reached. It is for these reasons, and not solely the inherent instabilities of the nations suffering them, that the conflicts of the Arab Spring have continued for so long. Like the Congo war, a parallel case of intervention by regional powers worsening a local conflict, there is no particular reason why they should not smoulder on for decades.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Yet one innovation marks out the Syrian War from its neighbouring conflicts: the centrality of social media in its prosecution. Beginning in 2011, the Syrian conflict’s early stages tracked the transition from Facebook to Twitter in the global information economy, as the site became the chosen platform of journalists, activists and policymakers. The result was not good for journalism, nor for Syria. As Krieg &amp; Rickli note, “the emergence of social media has not just changed patterns of communication across communities but has become a major means of warfare in itself,” where, “in conjunction with kinetic operations on the physical battlefield, the clash over narratives in the cyber sphere sets the parameters for strategic victory.” </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Social media is not just a novel add-on to the modern way of war: it is a weapon that actively shapes the war itself, turning those sharing it into participants themselves. The inherently toxic dynamics of Twitter’s discourse, which inexorably blurs the distinction between journalists, analysts, activists and trolls, reflected the growing divisions on the ground in what became a shifting multipolar conflict between Assad’s loyalist forces, rebels, al-Qaeda and then Islamic State jihadists and Kurds. It also, arguably, exacerbated them. As the Syrian journalist and revolutionary activist Zaina Erhaim </span><a href="https://english.alaraby.co.uk/english/Comment/2021/3/13/Polarisation-gnaws-at-Syrias-hopes-for-reconciliation"><span style="font-weight: 400;">remarks</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">, “international experts and media have also played a role in over-simplifying our complex conflict into two dimensions &#8212; ‘good vs bad,’” hardening and exacerbating the divisions lived by the Syrian people themselves.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">In that the perceptions of intervening actors, whether governments, foreign fighters or NGOs, were partly moulded by this hyper-combative Twitter environment, it can be argued that Twitter helped shape the choices made by external actors which prolonged the conflict. Certainly, Twitter was the dominant means by which Western recruits were entranced by the war’s drama and bloodshed to actively take part: simply by acting as the recruiting sergeant for the Islamic State, Twitter demonstrably worsened the war’s outcome for both the Syrian people and those of neighbouring Iraq. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The Syrian War blurred the distinction between fighter and content creator, armed group and social media account. Militias proliferated on YouTube videos designed to  be shared on social media to attract funding from external sponsors. ISIS cynically gamed journalism, producing lurid and exciting content expressly designed to be shared on social media, and relying on journalists — including me — to spread their propaganda for them. Indeed, ISIS had a symbiotic relationship with both legacy journalism, itself struggling to navigate the new world of social media and declining budgets for original reporting, and on the new hybrid role of online analyst midwifed by Twitter. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">As Krieg &amp; Rickli note, journalists and analysts are </span><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">themselves</span></i><span style="font-weight: 400;"> surrogate actors in the new conflicts, active participants in a new and only partly-understood form of warfare.  “ISIS’s strategy as a global terrorist organisation relies on social media influencers to target the sociopsychology of Western publics,” they write: “Superinfluencers, such as journalists, analysts, and commentators, become unwilling, somewhat coincidental surrogates for the Islamic State as they spread the images and messages of terror.” </span></p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2020/12/the-british-centrists-deluded-worship-of-germany/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2020/12/the-british-centrists-deluded-worship-of-germany/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/GettyImages-1163071416-1.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2020/12/the-british-centrists-deluded-worship-of-germany/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">More from this author</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2020/12/the-british-centrists-deluded-worship-of-germany/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>British centrists&#039; deluded worship of Germany</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2020/12/the-british-centrists-deluded-worship-of-germany/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Aris Roussinos</a></p></div></a></div>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Perhaps no state actors have understood these new dynamics as well as Erdogan’s Turkey and  Putin’s Russia. While both use their respective television news networks, staffed by ambitious Western journalists, as traditional forms of propaganda, they are also both sophisticated and competent manipulators of the online battlefield. In Libya and the Karabakh war, Turkey exploited the Syria-derived fashion for online “OSINT” analysis in its favour by </span><a href="https://twitter.com/clashreport"><span style="font-weight: 400;">opening social media accounts in their image</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">, utilising the high-quality cameras on their armed drones to provide exciting war imagery that online journalists would eagerly share on its behalf, just as Russia produces thrilling </span><a href="https://www.youtube.com/c/WarGonzo/videos"><span style="font-weight: 400;">gonzo war footage</span></a> <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6gHbFZeT830"><span style="font-weight: 400;">from Syria for its social media fans</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">. Drone, camera and social media sharer thus become a single, integrated weapon system, a hybrid semi-autonomous proxy as useful and as cheap to operate as the expendable proxies fighting on the ground. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">With the barriers between home and abroad, war and peace eroded by postmodernity, it is not difficult to interpret our own interminable culture wars as part of the globalised everywhere war, with the social media platforms celebrated a decade ago for upturning the sclerotic states of the Arab world now vilified for doing the same at home. Now that our own systems are the focus of popular discontent, we are lectured on the evils of social media, and treated to long and convoluted conspiracy theories of foreign bots and disinformation campaigns precisely mirroring those used by Arab regimes to explain away their peoples’ anger. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">America’s generation-long war on terror has come home, as a new Green Zone sprouts up in the heart of the imperial capital and terror experts refocus their gaze on the internal enemy. Journalists are no longer chroniclers of political conflict but active participants, proxies in a sprawling, decentralised war of narratives. Instead of the claimed depoliticisation of liberal technocracy, every aspect of life now functions as a source of conflict. There is no objective truth or reality, just warring narratives dismantling the political contract between people and their governments, “unable to contain the multiplicity of opinions, narratives, and messages being exchanged in an unconstrained cyber sphere.” </span></p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2019/09/have-we-forgotten-syria/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2019/09/have-we-forgotten-syria/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/1557912769575_0620x0435_1557912845830.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2019/09/have-we-forgotten-syria/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2019/09/have-we-forgotten-syria/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Have we forgotten Syria?</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2019/09/have-we-forgotten-syria/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Ian Birrell</a></p></div></a></div>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Like </span><a href="https://www.amazon.co.uk/Imagined-Communities-Reflections-Origin-Nationalism/dp/1844670864"><span style="font-weight: 400;">the new print media which drove the rise of nationalism</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;">, we can interpret the global internet as the mother of new political identities, of micro-nationalisms and never-before-seen ideologies, imagined communities birthed by the online world’s partisan dynamics. Yet perhaps the death of the Westphalian state has been pronounced too early: we are already witnessing </span><a href="https://voxeu.org/article/pandemic-adds-momentum-deglobalisation-trend"><span style="font-weight: 400;">the first stirrings of deglobalisation</span></a><span style="font-weight: 400;"> as the nation-state, desperately fighting for its own survival, seeks to regain control of its own destiny. </span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The increasing regulation of social media, like the re-erection of barriers between the free flow of capital and people, perhaps marks a resurgence of the Westphalian system. States that have come to rely on proxies to do their fighting for them may yet be forced to return to wars of citizen soldiers to preserve their place in a newly fractured global system. To win a conflict between peer competitors, wars of necessity and not choice, states will be forced to reassert their control  of both physical and virtual space in a way we have not seen in decades. Krieg &amp; Rickli’s book is a valuable study of a neo-medieval order that may already be receding: if the high water mark of globalisation has already been reached, then its ebbing tide may yet reveal the Westphalian system born anew. </span></p>
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					<title>How Britain profits from Yemen&#8217;s pain</title>
					<link>https://stage.unherd.com/2018/12/how-britain-profits-from-yemens-pain/?edition=us</link>
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						<![CDATA[Giles Fraser]]>
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							<![CDATA[Credit: Andrew Renneisen/Getty Images]]>
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							<![CDATA[<p><strong>Giles Fraser</strong> is a journalist, broadcaster and Vicar of St Anne&#8217;s, Kew.</p>
]]>
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						<unherd:twitter_handle>giles_fraser</unherd:twitter_handle>
															<unherd:author_bio>
						<![CDATA[ is a journalist, broadcaster and Vicar of St Anne's, Kew.]]>
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										<pubDate>Mon, 17 Dec 2018 06:45:08 +0000</pubDate>
					<updated>Mon, 17 Dec 2018 06:45:08 +0000</updated>
							<category><![CDATA[Arms trade]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[International Aid]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Saudi Arabia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Yemen]]></category>
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								<![CDATA[<p>I flew into at Sana’a airport just after midnight with a fiver in my pocket and no other means of financial support. My debit card was way over the limit and no cash point machine would give me money – which was a bit academic because the airport cashpoint was broken. None of this mattered. My friend was going to meet me. “Come to the Yemen”, he said, “you won’t need money, just come”.</p>
<p>To a penniless student waiting to go off to theological college it was a dream offer. Except he wasn’t there to meet me. A curfew started in an hour and a number of intimidating looking technicals – civilian pick-up trucks mounted with machine guns – patrolled the airport grounds. That was the beginning of the first adventure. The first of many. Welcome to Yemen.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/10/solve-problem-like-saudis/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/10/solve-problem-like-saudis/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/GettyImages-1053350708.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/10/solve-problem-like-saudis/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/10/solve-problem-like-saudis/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>How do you solve a problem like the Saudis?</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/10/solve-problem-like-saudis/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Giles Fraser</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>My final destination was Taiz, a city over 150 miles to the south, up in the mountains. My friend made a living selling large cartons of Rothmans cigarettes to the locals, touring the middle part of the country in a Toyota land cruiser packed with fags. With our gnarled-looking local guide and protector, who lost an eye fighting the Israelis in the Yom Kippur war, we travelled into every out-of-the-way village, every part of a town or port, flogging our cancer sticks to absurdly grateful locals.</p>
<p>Some children had never seen westerners before and would run out to greet us. Rothmans, Toyotas and Kalashnikovs – these were gestures of acknowledgement to the twentieth century, everything else felt like the Middle Ages. It was like nothing I had ever experienced. The smells, the sounds, the flies, the Qat, the gun souks (markets), the in-your-face intensity of the temperature and humidity.</p>
<p>In the day I would wander over to the leper colony and play chess with men and women, who would grasp the pieces between their wrists because they had lost all their fingers. No doubt Edward Said would accuse me of the worst kind of sentimentalised Orientalism as I lay on the roof at night and listened to the call to prayer waft over the town. But aesthetically, I still find Islam the most beautiful of the world’s religious traditions. And I fell in love with Yemen and with Taiz.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/03/saudis-crown-prince-hardly-safe-bet-british/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/03/saudis-crown-prince-hardly-safe-bet-british/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/PA-33584841.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/03/saudis-crown-prince-hardly-safe-bet-british/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/03/saudis-crown-prince-hardly-safe-bet-british/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>Saudi&#039;s Crown Prince is hardly a safe bet for the British</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/03/saudis-crown-prince-hardly-safe-bet-british/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Michael Burleigh</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>Today, however, Taiz has been flattened, obliterated. Photos of it look like the surface of the moon. Or like Dresden after the Second world war. And while I recognise a few of the local natural landmarks in the photographs, I recognise none of the town itself.</p>
<p>Since 2015, Taiz has been one of the major front lines in a complicated civil war that turned into a proxy war between regional rivals of Iran and Saudi Arabia. Tens of thousands of people have been killed. And it’s not just Taiz, the whole of Yemen has been on the edge of collapse, with food supplies so disrupted that an estimated 14 million people are close to starvation. It is a tragedy of unimaginable proportions. Death is everywhere.</p>
<p>Earlier this year, the UK government announced a <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-gives-more-emergency-food-for-yemen" target="_blank" rel="noopener">£170 million aid package to Yemen</a>, to address this growing humanitarian catastrophe. Sounds quite a lot of money, I suppose. But there is something more than a little ridiculous about the UK giving aid to Yemen, when so many of the bombs and weapons that have destroyed it have originated in our country. According to a <a href="https://www.christianaid.org.uk/news/resourcing-war-and-peace-report-launch?utm_source=twitte">new Christian Aid report</a>, over the last five years, the UK has sold over two thirds of its major arms exports to Gulf states, 49% of these to Saudi Arabia.</p>
<p>The Yemeni gun souks I visited as a student, with their cheap knock-off Russian weaponry, reminds me that Yemenis have probably been fighting each other for as long as anyone can remember. But never has such a sophisticated level of technological weaponry been trained on the small towns and villages of this beautiful country. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia spends a whopping <a href="https://www.sipri.org/media/press-release/2018/global-military-spending-remains-high-17-trillion">$69.4 billion a year on its military</a> – that is $12,000 per household. This sucks in the ever-eager arms dealers from all over the world, including from Britain. And we sell more weapons to the Saudis than to anyone else.</p>
<div class="ref-ar"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/10/charity-guru-duped-world/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/10/charity-guru-duped-world/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><img decoding="async" src="https://stage.unherd.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/GettyImages-52434219.jpg?w=300" /></a><div class="content"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/10/charity-guru-duped-world/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span class="meta">Suggested reading</span></a><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/10/charity-guru-duped-world/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><h5>The charity guru who duped the world</h5></a><p class="author"><a href="https://stage.unherd.com/2018/10/charity-guru-duped-world/?edition=us&#038;ref=refinnar" class="text-decoration-none border-0"><span>By</span> Ian Birrell</a></p></div></a></div>
<p>I know the murder of the dissident journalist Jamal Khashoggi in Istanbul shocked many; it gave the victims of Saudi murderousness a face and a name. But the British-made bombs that rain down on residential areas, and on markets and hospitals, in Yemen represents a moral crime that is so much greater in scale and more horrific in nature even than this.</p>
<p>And it’s all justified under the rubric of trade. At this year’s annual general meeting at BAE systems, the chairman, <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/saudi-war-crimes-yemen-british-weapons-bae-systems-know-agm-values-a8347736.html">Sir Roger Carr told shareholders</a> that he does not know if his company’s weapons are being used to commit war crimes in Yemen, adding weakly that the company has an “impeccable record on values”. The technical and philosophical term for this is sort of PR puff is ‘total and utter bollocks’.</p>
<p>Christian Aid’s important report calls out Britain’s “double standards” of supporting the arms industry in selling weapons to Saudi Arabia, and then patting itself on the back for giving aid to the Yemeni government to clear up the catastrophe that we have helped to create. This is genuinely absurd. We build the bombs, we massively profit from the deaths of Yemenis, and then we make out that we are the good guys by giving them back a few million quid in aid. The UK gives half it its aid to conflict areas. Fine – but what’s the point of that if we are the ones supplying the very guns that people are using to kill each other?</p>

<p>The world is now spending more on weapons that it ever has. In 2017, that figure was up to<a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2018/05/02/global-military-spend-rose-to-1-point-7-trillion-in-2017-arms-watchdog-says.html"> $1.7 trillion</a>, which is $231 dollars a year for every man, woman and child on the planet. That is what we should be thinking about this Christmas. Instead of just singing blithely about the Prince of Peace and angels delivering a message of peace and goodwill to all, we ought to be doing something a bit more practical about it.</p>
<p style="margin: 0cm; margin-bottom: .0001pt;">And man, at war with man, hears not</p>
<p style="margin: 0cm; margin-bottom: .0001pt;">The love-song which they bring;</p>
<p style="margin: 0cm; margin-bottom: .0001pt;">O hush the noise, ye men of strife,</p>
<p style="margin: 0cm; margin-bottom: .0001pt;">And hear the angels sing.</p>
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